IR 05000482/2016003
| ML16314B839 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/2016 |
| From: | Taylor N H NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B |
| To: | Heflin A C Wolf Creek |
| Nick Taylor | |
| References | |
| IR 2016003 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML16314B839 (48) | |
Text
November 8, 2016
Adam C. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839
SUBJECT: WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2016003
Dear Mr. Heflin:
On September 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On October 19, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Jaime McCoy, Vice President, Engineering, and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Wolf Creek Generating Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Nicholas H. Taylor, Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-482 License No.: NPF-42
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000482/2016003 w/
Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution
SUMMARY
IR 05000482/2016003; 07/01/2016 - 09/30/2016; Wolf Creek Generating Station; Maintenance Effectiveness The inspection activities described in this report were performed between July 1 and September 30, 2016, by the resident inspectors at Wolf Creek Generating Station and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas." Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process."
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensee's failure to adequately adjust testing and preventive maintenance activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not adjust a preventive maintenance task for a General Electric HEA 86 lockout relay and test the relay in accordance with vendor recommendations and industry operating experience, which resulted in the NB0215 186/M lockout relay associated with the B essential service water pump motor breaker failing as-found testing on August 2, 2016. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensee's failure to adequately adjust testing and preventive maintenance activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not adjust a preventive maintenance task for a General Electric HEA 86 lockout relay and test the relay in accordance with vendor recommendations and operating experience, which resulted in the NB0215 186/M lockout relay associated with the B essential service water pump motor breaker failing as-found testing on August 2, 2016. The licensee's corrective actions included replacing the armature assembly associated with the relay and retesting the relay satisfactorily. Additional corrective actions to address the preventive maintenance activities are expected as a result of Condition Reports 108440 and 108548. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with the NB0215 186/M lockout relay failed on or before August 2, 2016, the safety-related 4160 volt NB02 bus was susceptible to locking out as a result of an overcurrent condition. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," the inspectors determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component that maintained its operability or functionality; the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function; the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its Technical Specification-allowed outage time; and the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant.
The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, operating experience, because the organization did not systematically and effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. This issue is indicative of current performance because the station did not take corrective actions to address the station's failure to adequately consider operating experience, the station did not recognize the need to revise the testing and maintenance strategy following the August 2, 2016, failure, and the same failure would be expected to occur [P.5]. (Section 1R12)
PLANT STATUS
Wolf Creek Generating Station began the inspection period operating at full power. On July 5, 2016, operators reduced power to approximately 68 percent after load swings were observed on the main generator and the La Cygne transmission line was disconnected from Wolf Creek. On July 6, 2016, operators increased power to approximately 85 percent and completed main turbine valve cycle testing. Plant power was restored to approximately full power later on July 6, 2016. On September 2, 2016, reactor coolant system unidentified leakage was calculated to be greater than 1 gallon per minute, Technical Specification 3.4.13 was entered, and a plant shutdown was completed, after which the licensee remained shut down to begin refueling outage 21.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Walk-Down
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems: July 13, 2016, centrifugal charging pump A August 2, 2016, emergency diesel generator A The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems and/or trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted two partial system walk-down samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on six plant areas important to safety:
July 19, 2016, fire areas A-2 and A-4, safety injection pump rooms A and B, elevation 1,974 feet August 1, 2016, fire area ESWC, essential service water vertical loop chase, elevation 1,974 feet through 2087 feet August 15, 2016, fire areas C-13, C-14, and C-35, control building and communications corridor - trains A and B safety related electrical equipment air conditioning units, elevation 2,016 feet September 27, 2016, fire area RB-6, reactor building - general area, elevation 2,068 feet September 27, 2016, fire area RB-10, reactor building - general area, elevation 2,047 feet September 28, 2016, fire area C-16, control building and communications corridor - trains A and B safety related battery and switchboard rooms, elevation 2,016 feet For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions. These activities constituted six quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
On July 20, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensee's flooding analysis, the inspectors chose two plant areas containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that were susceptible to flooding: Auxiliary feedwater pipe chase room 1206 Auxiliary feedwater pipe chase room 1207 The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures related to internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished.
These activities constituted completion of one flood protection measures sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
On September 14, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the readiness and availability of risk-significant heat exchangers. The inspectors observed the licensee's inspection of the ultimate heat sink and the material condition of the ultimate heat sink. Additionally, the inspectors walked down the ultimate heat sink to observe its performance and material condition and verified that the ultimate heat sink was receiving the required maintenance. These activities constituted completion of one heat sink performance annual review sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On July 7, 2016, and September 8, 2016, the inspectors observed a portion of an annual requalification test for licensed operators and simulator training for an operating crew, respectively. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities and simulator training activities. These activities constituted completion of two quarterly licensed operator requalification program samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity and risk due to control rod parking and chemical and volume control system inservice check valve testing. The inspectors observed the operators' performance of the following activities: July 5, 2016, performance of STS AC-001, "Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test," and reactor power ascension from 68 percent power August 18, 2016, control rod parking and chemical and volume control system inservice check valve testing In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including the conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies. These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Biennial Review
a. Inspection Scope
The licensed operator requalification program involves two training cycles that are conducted over a 2-year period. In the first cycle, the annual cycle, the operators are administered an operating test consisting of job performance measures and simulator scenarios. In the second part of the training cycle, the biennial cycle, operators are administered an operating test and a comprehensive written examination.
To assess the performance effectiveness of the licensed operator requalification program, the inspectors reviewed both the written examination and operating test quality and observed licensee administration of an annual requalification test while onsite. The operating tests observed included five job performance measures and two scenarios that were used in the current biennial requalification cycle. These observations allowed the inspectors to assess the licensee's effectiveness in conducting the operating test to ensure operator mastery of the training program content and to determine if feedback of performance analyses into the requalification training program was being accomplished.
On July 26, 2016, the licensee informed the inspectors of the completed cycle results for Wolf Creek Generating Station for both the written examinations and the operating tests: 9 of 9 crews passed the simulator portion of the operating test 53 of 53 licensed operators passed the simulator portion of the operating test 53 of 53 licensed operators passed the job performance measure portion of the operating test 51 of 53 licensed operators passed the written examination Two individuals failed the written examination. One individual was remediated, retested, and passed their retake examinations. One individual was not remediated and the individual's license was terminated by the licensee.
The inspectors observed examination security measures in place during administration of the exams (including controls and content overlap) and reviewed any remedial training and re-examinations, if necessary. The inspectors also reviewed medical records of six licensed operators for conformance to license conditions and the licensee's system for tracking qualifications and records of license reactivation for four operators. The inspectors reviewed simulator performance for fidelity with the actual plant and the overall simulator program of maintenance, testing, and discrepancy correction.
The inspectors completed one inspection sample of the biennial licensed operator requalification program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related SSCs: August 2, 2016, NB0215 186/M lockout relay failed to trip during as-found testing August 8, 2016, train B 480 VAC electrical power distribution subsystem, excessive voltage September 19, 2016, trains A and B safety injection system, unplanned outages The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule. These activities constituted completion of three maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for the licensee's failure to adequately adjust testing and preventive maintenance activities in accordance with Procedure AP 16B-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revision 5. Specifically, the licensee did not adjust a preventive maintenance task for a General Electric HEA 86 lockout relay and test the relay in accordance with vendor recommendations and operating experience, which resulted in the NB0215 186/M lockout relay associated with the B essential service water pump motor breaker failing as-found testing on August 2, 2016.
Description.
During performance of Procedure STN NB-215, "DPEF01B Feeder Breaker Trip Circuit Verification," Revision 1A on August 2, 2016, while the B essential service water pump and breaker were out of service for maintenance, the 186/M lockout relay failed to trip during as-found testing. The lockout relay provides protection to the B essential service water pump motor and 4160 volt safety-related bus NB02 in the event of an overcurrent condition. If the lockout relay fails to actuate and trip the B essential service water pump motor breaker, it could result in damage to the 'B' essential service water pump motor or cause the NB02 bus to lockout due to an overcurrent condition on the bus, which would be recognized by the NB02 bus protection circuitry.
During the test in accordance with Section 8.2, "NB0215 186/M Lockout Relay Tests," of STN NB-215, a direct current test voltage of 82.5 volts is momentarily applied. The relay is expected to actuate at 80 volts or less, but it is considered within tolerance if it actuates at less than or equal to 87.5 volts, and the licensee determined that it is acceptable for the relay to actuate up to 95 volts. During the performance of STN NB-215 on August 2, 2016, the test voltage was increased up to 125 volts, but the relay did not trip. The licensee did not test the relay past this point and replaced the armature assembly associated with the relay, calibrated it, and retested it prior to returning the relay and system to service.
This test was last performed successfully using Procedure RNM C-1301, "Miscellaneous Relay and Meter Equipment," Revision 6, on August 10, 2009, and the NB0215 186/M lockout relay passed. The current testing and preventive maintenance task is performed every six years, and the August 2, 2016, test was conducted within the grace period for the current preventive maintenance task frequency.
The inspectors reviewed applicable vendor documentation, GEH-2058, "Auxiliary Relays," Revision E, for type HEA61 relays. This vendor documentation states, "During any scheduled outage of the equipment and preferably at yearly intervals, the relay should be tripped electrically to insure that it is in good operating condition, and that all the circuits are complete so that the breakers can be tripped." The inspectors also reviewed Wolf Creek corrective action document Performance Improvement Request (PIR) 2003-2708, which evaluated OE16724 - General Electric Type HEA Lockout Relay Test Interval. The PIR discussed contact made with General Electric, "HEA relays tend to be sluggish during the first operation when tested on a 3 to 5 year interval. The problem applies to the whole family of HEA relays, and General Electric recommends testing yearly." Wolf Creek's lockout relays were tested on a 6-year frequency.
The inspectors also reviewed industry operating experience from June 19, 2012, which was evaluated by Wolf Creek Condition Report 54212. The industry operating experience made two recommendations that included determining "the total population of General Electric HEA 86 relays and the subset of General Electric HEA 86 relays that are not normally actuated each cycle or within the [preventive maintenance] frequency."
Additionally, the event report recommended, "Any that can be tested on line should be tested as soon as practicable. The functional test should be an electrical trip that actuates the relay coil. Replace any test failure with modified [General Electric] HEA 86 relays or suitable alternative." Corrective actions did not identify any necessary changes to the testing or maintenance activities for the NB0215 186/M lockout relay. The inspectors noted that Section 6.2, "Establishing [Preventive Maintenance] Activities,"
of Procedure AP 16B-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," Revisions 2 through 7, provided direction for implementing the preventive maintenance program including consideration of vendor recommendations and operating experience. The inspectors determined that the August 2003 and June 2012 operating experience documents were not adequately evaluated, in that the licensee's relay testing and preventive maintenance activities were not adjusted after considering vendor recommendations and industry experience. The failure to appropriately adjust testing and maintenance activities for HEA relays resulted in the failure of the 186/M lockout relay on August 2, 2016. Additionally, neither the licensee's evaluation of Condition Report 106164, which was written to address the equipment failure on August 2, 2016, nor any other condition report identified the need to revise the testing and preventive maintenance frequency.
The licensee's corrective actions for the August 2, 2016, relay failure included replacing the armature assembly associated with the relay, retesting the relay satisfactorily, and returning the relay and system to service. The station entered the equipment condition into the corrective action program as Condition Report 106164, and the licensee entered Condition Reports 108440 and 108548 into the corrective action program to address the inspectors' concerns associated with the need to revise the testing and preventive maintenance activity frequency for the subject relay.
Analysis.
The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately adjust a testing and preventive maintenance task for the NB0215 186/M General Electric HEA 86 lockout relay in accordance with Procedure AP 16B-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, with the NB0215 186/M lockout relay failed on or before August 2, 2016, and the safety-related 4160 volt NB02 bus was susceptible to locking out as a result of an overcurrent condition. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, and determined this finding is not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component that maintained its operability or functionality; the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function; the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its Technical Specification-allowed outage time; and the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Technical Specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, operating experience, because the organization did not systematically and effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. Specifically, PIR 2003-2708 and Condition Report 54212 documented vendor recommendations and industry operating experience regarding HEA relay failures, and neither the vendor recommendations nor the industry operating experience were effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs, and testing and preventive maintenance activities were not adequately adjusted. This issue is indicative of current performance because the station did not take corrective actions to address the station's failure to adequately consider operating experience, the station did not recognize the need to revise the testing and maintenance strategy following the August 2, 2016, failure, and the same failure would be expected to occur [P.5].
Enforcement.
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Section 9.b of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires that preventive maintenance schedules be developed to specify inspections of equipment and inspection or replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime. The licensee established Procedure AP 16B-003, "Planning and Scheduling Preventive Maintenance," which provides direction for implementing the preventive maintenance program to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirement. Section 6.2 of Procedure AP 16B-003 requires, in part, that preventive maintenance activities be developed by considering vendor recommendations and operating experience. Contrary to the above, until October 16, the licensee did not ensure that preventive maintenance activities were developed by considering vendor recommendations and operating experience. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that adequate preventive maintenance activities were developed for the NB0215 186/M lockout relay by considering vendor recommendations to trip the relay electrically during any scheduled outage of the equipment and operating experience documented in PIR 2003-2708 and Condition Report 54212. As a result, the NB0215 186/M lockout relay failed on or before August 2, 2016, and the safety-related 4160 volt NB02 bus was susceptible to locking out as a result of an overcurrent condition. The licensee entered this condition into its corrective action program as Condition Reports 106164, 108440, and 108548. The licensee replaced the relay armature assembly and retested the relay satisfactorily. Additional corrective actions to address the preventive maintenance activities are expected as a result of Condition Reports 108440 and 108548. This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000482/2016003-01, "Failure to Adequately Adjust Testing and Preventive Maintenance for Safety-Related Lockout Relays."
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
July 15, 2016, condensate storage tank valve housing lift near the condensate storage tank and auxiliary building July 19, 2016, planned A safety injection pump maintenance August 10, 2016, planned maintenance on train B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump The inspectors verified that these risk assessment were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments. The inspectors also observed portions of three emergent work activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems: July 1, 2016, unplanned maintenance on the non-safety auxiliary feedwater pump July 6, 2016, weekly risk assessment and emergent reactor power changes in response the La Cygne transmission line out of service August 15, 2016, unplanned maintenance on the train B class 1E electrical air conditioning unit The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
These activities constituted completion of six maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed four operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs: July 1, 2016, operability determination of auxiliary feedwater system equipment while the condensate storage tank valve house was removed August 2, 2016, operability determination of B essential service water traveling screen foot sprocket and collar set screw degradation August 10, 2016, operability determination of shutdown and control bank rod insertion limits in the cycle 21 safety analysis August 15, 2016, operability determination of Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning unit SGK05B out of service as a result of a clogged condensation drain line The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC. The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators' ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures. These activities constituted completion of five operability and functionality review samples, which included one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two permanent plant modifications that affected risk-significant SSCs: August 30, 2016, station black out diesel generator permanent electrical feed to non-safety auxiliary feedwater pump August 30 and 31, 2016, revision of SYS GK-122, "Manual CRVIS Line-Up," impacting the control room air conditioning unit 4A control room discharge isolation damper The inspectors reviewed the design and implementation of the modifications. The inspectors verified that work activities involved in implementing the modifications did not adversely impact operator actions that may be required in response to an emergency or other unplanned event. The inspectors verified that post-modification testing was adequate to establish the operability or functionality of the SSCs as modified. These activities constituted completion of two samples of permanent modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed seven post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs: July 13, 2016, B centrifugal charging pump July 25, 2016, A pressure relief isolation valve breaker August 3, 2016, B emergency diesel generator and fuel oil transfer pump August 10, 2016, B auxiliary feedwater pump August 31, 2016, train B auxiliary building and control room pressure testing September 21, 2016, post-accident monitoring nuclear instrumentation testing September 22, 2016, intermediate range nuclear instrument cable testing The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs. These activities constituted completion of seven post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
On September 2, 2016, reactor coolant system unidentified leakage was calculated to be greater than 1 gallon per minute, Technical Specification 3.4.13 was entered, and a plant shutdown was completed, after which the licensee remained shut down to begin refueling outage 21. During the station's refueling outage that was in progress at the end of the inspection period, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following: Review of the licensee's outage plan prior to the outage Monitoring of shut-down and cool-down activities Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities Observation and review of reduced-inventory and mid-loop activities Observation and review of fuel handling activities These activities constituted partial completion of one refueling outage sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed four risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service tests: September 6, 2016, STS MT-008, "Spring Loaded Safety Valve Settings," Revision 25 Reactor coolant system leak detection tests: September 1 and 2, 2016, STS BB-006, "Water Inventory Balance Using the NPIS Computer," Revision 14 Other surveillance tests: July 28, 2016, STS IC-211A, "Actuation Logic Test Train A Solid State Protection System," Revision 36A August 31, 2016, STN AP-102, "NSAFP Full Flow Test," Revision 7 The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
These activities constituted completion of four surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone:
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector verified the adequacy of the licensee's methods for testing the primary and backup alert and notification system. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's program for identifying emergency planning zone locations requiring tone alert radios and for distributing the radios, and reviewed audits of distribution records. The inspector interviewed licensee personnel responsible for the maintenance of the primary and backup alert and notification system and reviewed a sample of corrective action system reports written for alert and notification system problems. The inspector compared the licensee's alert and notification system testing program with criteria in NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1; FEMA Report REP-10, "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," and the licensee's current FEMA-approved alert and notification system design report, dated May 7, 2008. These activities constituted completion of one alert and notification system evaluation sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.02.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector verified the licensee's emergency response organization on-shift and augmentation staffing levels were in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan commitments. The inspector reviewed documentation and discussed with licensee staff the operability of primary and backup systems for augmenting the on-shift emergency response staff to verify the adequacy of the licensee's methods for staffing emergency response facilities, including the licensee's ability to staff pre-planned alternate facilities. The inspector also reviewed records of emergency response organization augmentation tests and events to determine whether the licensee had maintained a capability to staff emergency response facilities within emergency plan timeliness commitments. These activities constituted completion of one emergency response organization staffing and augmentation testing sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.03.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the following for the period November 2014 to July 2016: After-action evaluation reports for licensee drills and exercises; Independent audits and surveillances of the licensee's emergency preparedness program; Self-assessments of the emergency preparedness program conducted by the licensee; Licensee evaluations of changes made to the emergency plan and emergency plan implementing procedures; Drill and exercise performance issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program; Emergency preparedness program issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program; Maintenance records for equipment supporting the emergency preparedness program; and Emergency response organization and emergency planner training records. The inspector reviewed summaries of corrective action program reports written by the licensee between November 2014 and July 2016 associated with emergency preparedness and selected 23 to review against program requirements, to determine the licensee's ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems in accordance with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F. The inspector verified that the licensee accurately and appropriately identified and corrected emergency preparedness weaknesses during critiques and assessments. The inspector reviewed one licensee evaluation of the impact of changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures to determine the licensee's ability to identify reductions in the effectiveness of the emergency plan in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspector verified that the evaluation of proposed changes to the licensee emergency plan appropriately identified the impact of the changes prior to being implemented. The inspector reviewed records pertaining to the maintenance of equipment and facilities used to implement the emergency plan against program requirements to determine the licensee's ability to maintain equipment in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.E. The inspector verified that equipment and facilities were maintained in accordance with the commitments of the licensee's emergency plan.
These activities constituted completion of one sample of the maintenance of the licensee's emergency preparedness program as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
Training Evolution Observation
a. Inspection Scope
On July 7 and August 11, 2016, the inspectors observed simulator-based licensed operator requalification training that included implementation of the licensee's emergency plan. The inspectors verified that the licensee's emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the evaluators and entered into the corrective action program for resolution. These activities constituted completion of two training observation samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: High Pressure Injection Systems (MS07)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of July 1, 2015, through September 12, 2016, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for high pressure injection systems, as defined in Inspection procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Cooling Water Support Systems (MS10)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of July 1, 2015, through September 12, 2016, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for cooling water support systems, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Drill/Exercise Performance (EP01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluated exercises and selected drill and training evolutions that occurred between October 2015 and June 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for classification, notification, and protective action recommendation opportunities. The inspector reviewed a sample of the licensee's completed classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations to verify their timeliness and accuracy. The inspector used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constituted verification of the drill/exercise performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensee's records for participation in drill and training evolutions between October 2015 and June 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for drill participation opportunities. The inspector verified that all members of the licensee's emergency response organization in the identified key positions had been counted in the reported performance indicator data. The inspector reviewed the licensee's basis for reporting the percentage of emergency response organization members who participated in a drill. The inspector reviewed drill attendance records and verified a sample of those reported as participating. The inspector used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constituted verification of the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.5 Alert and Notification System Reliability (EP03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensee's records of alert and notification system tests conducted between October 2015 and June 2016 to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for siren system testing opportunities. The inspector reviewed procedural guidance on assessing alert and notification system opportunities and the results of periodic alert and notification system operability tests. The inspector used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constituted verification of the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Plant Events
a. Inspection Scope
For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The inspectors communicated the plant event to appropriate regional personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors," issued October 28, 2011, for consideration of potential reactive inspection activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Wolf Creek staff made appropriate emergency classification assessments and properly reported the events in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Wolf Creek's follow-up actions related to the events to assure that Wolf Creek implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance. Excessive unidentified reactor coolant system leakage resulting in commencement of technical specification required shutdown on September 2, 2016 (event notice 52218) Seismic monitor triggered on September 3, 2016, due to seismic event during plant shutdown These activities constituted completion of two event follow-up samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)/Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the final report for the WANO/INPO assessment conducted in September 2015. The inspectors evaluated this report to ensure that NRC perspectives of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation performance were consistent with any issues identified during the assessments. The inspectors also reviewed this report to determine whether any significant safety issues were identified that required further NRC follow-up.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Reasoner, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee's staff of the results of the licensed operator requalification program inspection on June 30, 2016.
The final results of the inspection were telephonically presented to Mr. R. Meyer, Licensed Supervising Instructor, Simulator and Exam Group, and other members of your staff on August 8, 2016. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. On August 4, 2016, the inspector presented the results of the onsite inspection of the emergency preparedness program to Mr. A. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspector had been returned or destroyed.
On October 19, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. McCoy, Vice President, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- R. Acree, Licensed Instructor
- T. Baban, Manager, System Engineering
- W. Brown, Superintendent, Security Operations
- T. Broyles, Manager, Information Services
- D. Campbell, Superintendent, Maintenance
- J. Dagenette, Emergency Planning
- M. Dale, Emergency Planning
- T. Damashek, Simulator Fidelity Coordinator
- T. East, Superintendent, Emergency Planning
- J. Edwards, Manager, Operations
- D. Erbe, Manager, Security
- R. Fincher, Manager, Quality
- R. Flannigan, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- J. Fritton, Oversight
- B. Gagnon, Supervisor, Security
- N. Good, Licensing Engineer
- C. Gross, Manager, Chemistry
- C. Hafenstine, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- A. Heflin, President and Chief Executive Officer
- S. Henry, Manager, Integrated Plant Scheduling
- R. Hobby, Licensing Engineer
- J. Isch, Superintendent, Operations Work Controls
- J. Knapp, Superintendent, Operations Training
- B. Lee, Licensed Supervising Instructor, Operator Requalification
- D. Mand, Manager, Design Engineering
- J. McCoy, Vice President, Engineering
- R. Meyer, Licensed Supervising Instructor, Simulator and Exam Group
- W. Muilenburg, Supervisor, Licensing
- L. Ratzlaff, Manager, Maintenance
- C. Reasoner, Site Vice President
- A. Servaes, Licensed Instructor
- M. Skiles, Manager, Radiation Protection
- T. Slenker, Supervisor, Operations Support
- S. Smith, Plant Manager
- M. Storts, Engineer
- A. Stueve, Engineer
- A. Stull, Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer
- M. Tate, Superintendent, Security Operations
- J. Yunk, Manager, Training
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000482-2016003-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Adjust Testing and Preventive Maintenance for Safety-Related Lockout Relays (Section 1R12)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment Procedures Number Title Revision
- CKL
- BG-120 Chemical and Volume Control System Normal Valve Lineup 41 CKL
- BG-130 Chemical and Volume Control System Switch and Breaker Lineup 31A CKL
- JE-120 Emergency Fuel Oil System Lineup 19 CKL
- KJ-121 Diesel Generator NE01 and NE02 Valve Checklist 39 STS
- BG-100B Centrifugal Charging System "B" Train Inservice Pump Test 51 SYS
- BG-201 Shifting Charging Pumps 66 SYS
- EG-120 Component Cooling Water System 39
Drawings
- Number Title Revision M-12BG03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical & Volume Control System 48 M-12JE01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Emergency Fuel Oil System 19 M-12KJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "A" Cooling Water System 13 M-12KJ02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "A" Intake Exhaust. F.O. and Start . Air Sys. 22 M-12KJ03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "A" Lube Oil System 17 M-13BG02 Piping Isometric
- CVCS-Max. Charging Flow "A" & "B" Train-Auxiliary Bldg. 11 M-13BG09 Small Piping Isometric CVCS Seal Water Injection Auxiliary Building 15
Drawings
- Number Title Revision M-12BG03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical & Volume Control System 48 M-13BG10 Small Piping Isometric RC PP Seal Water Return & Excess Letdown Flow-Auxiliary Bldg. 2
Condition Reports
- 106338
Section 1R05: Fire Protection Procedures Number Title Revision
- AP 10-102 Control of Combustible Materials 19
- AP 10-106 Fire Preplans 17
Condition Reports
- 106124
- 106133
- 106335
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision E-1F9905 Fire Hazard Analysis
- 7
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures Procedures Number Title Revision
- AP 10-104 Breach Authorization 35
Drawings
- Number Title Revision M-120103 Symbols and Legend for System Flow and Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 1 M-12FC02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Turbines Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine 23 M-12LE01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Turb. Bldg. and Aux. Feedwater Pump Rooms Oily Waste System 8
Drawings
- Number Title Revision M-13FC06 Small Piping Isometric Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Drains - Aux. Bldg. 8 M-13LE01 Piping Isometric Oily Waste Sump Discharge Tendon Access & Aux. Building 3 M-17LF01 Plumbing and Drainage System Notes, Symbols and Schedules 2 M-17LF02 Plumbing and Drainage System Details 2 M-OP1151 Drainage Systems (LE) Auxiliary Building El. 1974'-0", El. 1989'-0" & El. 2000'-0" Area 5
- 6
Condition Reports
- 90879
- 100653
- 100654
- 100655
- 106165
Work Orders
- 08-303899-000 15-397860-000 16-416247-000 16-416247-001 16-416247-002
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision
- FL-01 Flooding of the Auxiliary Building 2
- FL-04 Summary of Flood Levels in All Aux. Bldg Rooms Due to Pipe Break or Crack 2
- LE-M-002 Flood Level in Auxiliary Building Rooms 1206 & 1207 Due to Pipe Break 1
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance Procedures Number Title Revision
- STN
- MT-004 Ultimate Heat Sink Dam Surveillance Vertical Movement And Sedimentation 5
Drawings
- Number Title Revision S-0080 Ultimate Heat Sink Plan & Sections 16
Work Orders
- 15-409222-000 15-409921-000
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision C-404 Periodic Surveillance of Safety Related Water Control Structures and Reservoir 8
- WR-WC-UH-1 Area Capacity - Ultimate Heat Sink 1
- WR-WC-UH-1A Elevation-Area-Capacity of UHS 0 Z065-C-001 Evaluation of Annual UHS Sediment Measurements 10
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Procedures Number Title Revision
- AI 28A-100 Condition Report Resolution 10A
- AI 30B-015 Licensed Operator Requalification Examination Guidelines 10A
- AI 30C-001 Continued Assurance of Simulator Fidelity 16A
- AI 30C-004 Simulator Real Time Capacity Testing 5B
- AI 30C-005 Simulator Steady State Testing 9A
- AI 30C-007 Simulator Core Testing 3
- AI 30C-008 Scenario Based Testing 2A
- AI 30C-010 Post Event Testing 1
- AI 30E-002 Evaluation 42
- AI 30E-013 Written and Oral Examinations 24
- AI 30E-015 Just-In-Time Training 11
- AI 30E-023 Remediation 3
- AI 30E-23-01 Remediation Plan 2
- AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations 77
- AP 22-001 Conduct of Pre-Job and Post-Job Briefs 19
Procedures
- Number Title Revision
- EPP 06-006 Protective Action Recommendations 9
- GEN 00-004 Power Operation 86
- MA-038 Rapid Plant Shutdown 28 STN
- SF-001 Control Rod Parking 18A STS
- AC-001 Main Turbine Valve Cycle Test 52 STS
- BG-210 CVCS Inservice Check Valve Test 33
Condition Reports
- 70423 76993 76995 88178 94596 96734 99058 99576
- 100662
- 101655
- 102267
- 106525
- 106526
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- Reactivity Maneuver Plan July 6, 2016
- Simulator Differences List April 13, 2016
- Simulator Steady State Testing
- Transient Test 3 - Simultaneous Closure of All Main Steam Isolation Valves
- Transient Test 7 - Maximum Rate of Power Ramp
- Week 0 - 5 JPMs, 2 Scenarios
- Week 1 - 5 JPMs, 2 Scenarios
- Week 4 - 5 JPMs, 2 Scenarios
- Week 7 - 5 JPMs, 2 Scenarios
- APF 06-002-01 Emergency Action Levels 17A
- DTI 212 Maintaining Simulator Setup Current with the Plant 1 DTIF 212-01 Maintaining Simulator Setup Checklist and Index Sheets April 11, 2016 LR5004009 Mid Loop Operations 6
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date Scenario 16-11 2016 Biennial Requalification Exam 0 Scenario 16-12 2016 Biennial Requalification Exam 0
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Procedures Number Title Revision
- EOOP-05 Insulation Resistance Testing 23 MPE E009-01 Siemens Breaker Cubicle Maintenance, Testing and Swapping 5 MPE E009Q-01 13.8 KV and 4.16 KV Switchgear Inspection and Testing 34A STN
- NB-215 DPEF01B Feeder Breaker Trip Circuit Verification 1A STS
- NB-005 Breaker Alignment Verification 29 SYS
- NG-132 Energizing NG02, NG04 and NG06E 22 SYS
- NG-332 Deenergizing NG02, NG04 and NG06E 20
Drawings
- Number Title Revision E-K3EF01A Schematic Diagram Essential Service Water Pump B 12
- KD-7496 One Line Diagram 59
Condition Reports
- 29718 54212 54926 64870 64999 65676 66396 66398 77718 83510 85417 85309 88661 95773 97335 98587 98588
- 100088
- 100380
- 100384
- 100629
- 100716
- 102162
- 104411
- 104413
- 104869
- 106164
- 106180
- 106211
- 106273
- 106286
- 108440
- 108548
Work Orders
- 08-303899-000
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date 54926 Functional Failure Determination Checklist August 16, 2012 64870 Functional Failure Determination Checklist May 16, 2013 64999 Functional Failure Determination Checklist April 4, 2013 65676 Functional Failure Determination Checklist April 17, 2013 66396 Functional Failure Determination Checklist April 28, 2013 74290 Functional Failure Determination Checklist November 27, 2013 77718 Functional Failure Determination Checklist January 25, 2014 83510 Functional Failure Determination Checklist August 7, 2014 85309 Functional Failure Determination Checklist July 23, 2014 85417 Functional Failure Determination Checklist July 23, 2014 88661 Functional Failure Determination Checklist November 12, 2014 90187 Functional Failure Determination Checklist January 5, 2015 93127 Functional Failure Determination Checklist April 1, 2015 93146 Functional Failure Determination Checklist April 1, 2015 93357 Functional Failure Determination Checklist April 1, 2015 97335 Functional Failure Determination Checklist July 26, 2015 98434 Functional Failure Determination Checklist August 25, 2015
- 106164 Functional Failure Determination Checklist August 30, 2016
- EM-01 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed
- September 19, 2016
- EM-02 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed
- September 19, 2016
- EM-03 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 19, 2016
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- EM-04 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 19, 2016
- EM-05 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed
- September 19, 2016
- EM-06 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 19, 2016
- EM-07 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 19, 2016
- EM-08 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed
- September 19, 2016
- EM-09 Maintainence Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed
- September 19, 2016
- GEH-2058 Auxiliary Relays
- E
- NB-01 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 27, 2016
- NB-02 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 27, 2016
- NB-03 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 27, 2016
- NB-04 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 27, 2016
- NB-05 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation Printed September 27, 2016 NG System Health Report
- April 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016
- NG-01 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation August 9, 2016
- NG-02 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation August 9, 2016
- NG-03 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation August 9, 2016
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- NG-04 Maintenance Rule Final Scope Evaluation August 9, 2016 PIR 2003-2708
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls Procedures Number Title Revision
- AI 14-011 Lifting and Rigging 7
- AI 22C-013 Protected Equipment Program 17
- AP 14-001 Control of Heavy Loads, Lifting, and Rigging 4
- GEN 00-004 Power Operation 86 STN
- AP-101 NSAFP Recirc Test 11 STN
- EM-001A Train A Leakage Inspection Program of Safety Injection System 2A STN
- EM-201 Safety Injection System Valve Test 11A STS
- EM-100A Safety Injection Pump "A" Inservice Pump Test 39 STS
- EM-201A Safety Injection System Train A Inservice Valve Test 7 SYS
- GK-200 Non-Functional Class 1E A/C Unit 35
Drawings
- Number Title Revision M-12BG03 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Chemical & Volume Control System 48 M-12EJ01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat Removal System 52 M-12EM01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System 42 M-12EM02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System 21
Drawings
- Number Title Revision M-12EM03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Test Line 2 M-13GK01 Small Piping Isometric Room Coolers And Compressors Vents and Drains - Aux. Bldg. 14
Condition Reports
- 66605 66841
- 105564
- 105614
- 105615
- 105625
- 106303
- 106322
- 106416
- 107185
Work Orders
- 13-366479-000 13-378954-000 14-390199-000 15-405362-000 15-405970-000 15-408584-000 15-409609-000 15-409615-000 15-409616-000 15-409617-000 15-409618-000 16-411165-000 16-416523-000 16-416523-001 13-366479-000
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- Control Room Turnover Checklist August 12, 2016 15-400938-053 Rigging and Hoisting Checklist July 14, 2016 16-302 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule; Risk Assessment Dates - July 7, 2016, through July 10, 2016 June 9, 2016 16-305 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule; Risk Assessment Dates - July 25, 2016, through July 31, 2016 July 24, 2016 16-307 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule; Risk Assessment Dates - August 8, 2016, through August 14, 2016 August 9, 2016 16-308 Control Room Risk Assessment Log/Work Schedule; Risk Assessment Dates - August 15, 2016, through August 21, 2016 August 1, 2016 16-308 Daily Operational Focus Senior Leadership Review Team People Solving Problems August 16, 2016 M-622.1-00061 Instruction Manual For Package Air Conditioner Units W42
- WCNOC-4 Report on Control of Heavy Loads 18
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations Procedures Number Title Revision
- AI 22A-001 Operator Work Arounds/Operator Burdens/Control Room Deficiencies 12
- GEN 00-005 Minimum Load to Hot Standby 87
Drawings
- Number Title Revision M-020-0K037 General Arrangement Model 45A Traveling Water Screen, 8'-0" Wide x 43'-0" Centers W08 M-020-0K057 FMC/Foot Section Assembly for 8'-0 Wide Water Screen W01
Condition Reports
- 79425 89251
- 105567
- 106183
- 106289
- 106296
- 106416
- 106417
- 106425
- 106438
- 107042
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- Control Room WR/WO Log September 10, 2016
- 014512 Safety-Related Power For Temp Fans Between SGK05A & B Areas 3
- 015147 ESW Traveling Water Screen Sprocket Set 1
- APF 21-001-02 Control Room Turnover Checklist, Days September 9, 2016
- APF 21-001-04 Auxiliary Building Ops Relief Checklist, Nights September 10, 2016
- APF 21-001-05 Turbine Building Ops Relief Checklist, Nights September 10, 2016
- APF 21-001-06 Site Operator Relief Checklist, Nights September 10, 2016
- APF 21-001-09 Fire Brigade Leader Relief Checklist, Nights September 10, 2016
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- CR 105567 Basic Engineering Disposition - Auxiliary Building Water Intrusion Via Penetration P125W2312 or CST Sump Drain June 30, 2016 E-1F9910 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Area Analysis 14
- EQSD-1 Equipment Qualification Design Basis Document 9 M-020-0K015 Instruction Manual for Traveling Water Screens W21
- OE-EF-16-002
- FEF01B - ESW Traveling Water Screens 0
- NB-16-004 Operability Evaluation associated with
- CR 106417 0 OE
- SF-16-003 Operability Evaluation - SF/Rod Control System 0
- SCA-16-0008 ESW Traveling Screen Footshaft Collar Setscrew 0 Various Operational Issues Database September 10, 2016
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications Procedures Number Title Revision
- STN
- AP-102 NSAFP Full Flow Test 7 SYS
- AP-122 Non-Safety Aux Feed Pump Operation 8 SYS
- AP-124 Non-Safety Aux Feed Pump Operation On Recirc 1 SYS
- GK-122 Manual CRVIS Line-Up 22
Drawings
- Number Title Revision
- KD-7496 One Line Diagram 60 M-12AP01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Condensate Storage And Transfer System 14 M-12GK01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Control Building HVAC 13
Condition Reports
- 106373
- 106725
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date 14776 Field Change Notice-SBO Feed For Non-Safety Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3 16-1517 Document Revision Request August 30, 2016 50.59 Evaluation 2016-0002 Dedicated Operator to Support Maintenance Activity on GKD0081 August 30, 2016 Basic Engineering Disposition Required Function of GKD0081 August 30, 2016 STN
- AP-102 NSAFP Full Flow Test Performed August 31, 2016
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing Procedures Number Title Revision
- AI 16-007 Electrical Safety Manual 10
- AP 12-003 Foreign Material Exclusion 15
- AL-201B MDAFW Pump B Inservice Check Valve Test 16A STS
- BG-100B Centrifugal Charging System "B" Train Inservice Pump Test 51 STS
- IC-433 Channel Calibration Nuclear Instrumentation System Post Accident Monitoring N61 17 STS
- JE-001B Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil System Train B Test 12 STS
- MT-024A Functional Test of 480 and 120 Volt Molded Case Circuit Breakers 14 STS
- PE-004 AUX Building And Control Room Pressure Test 16 STS
- PE-061 Control Room/Control Building Habitability Test 1 SYS
- GK-122 Manual CRVIS Line-Up 21 SYS
- GK-200 Non-Functional Class IE A/C Unit 35
Drawings
- Number Title Revision E-13GK13A Schematic Diagram Class IE Electrical Equipment A/C Unit 7 M-622.1A-00002 SGK05A & SGK05B Air Conditioner Electrical Schematic W13 M-622.1-00003 IE Electrical Equipment Air Handling Unit Layout SGK05A(3-4-1) & SGK05B(3-4-1) W16 M-12AL01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater System 28 M-12GK01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Control Building H.V.A.C. 13 M-12GK02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Control Building H.V.A.C. 22 M-12GK03 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Control Building H.V.A.C. 20 M-13GK01 Small Piping Isometric Room Coolers And Compressors Vents And Drains - Aux. Bldg. 14 M-1H1521 Heating, Ventilating, & Air Cond. Auxiliary Building El. 204.7'-6" Area 2 9
Condition Reports
- 106157
- 106725
- 106740
Work Orders
- 15-400229-001 15-406641-019 15-407224-000 16-417261-000
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date 16-0044 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation - Essential Required Reading July 21, 2016
- APF 21-001-02 Control Room Turnover Checklist 32 STS
- AL-210B MDAFW Pump B Inservice Check Valve Test Performed August 10, 2016
Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities Procedures Number Title Revision
- GEN 00-009 Refueling 38
Condition Reports
- 107125
- 107138
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision
- APF 22B-001-04 Mode 4 8
- APF 22B-001-05 Mode 5 Loops Filled 12
- APF 22B-001-06 Mode 5, Loops Not Filled OR Mode 6 RCS Inventory Between Reactor Vessel Flange (indicated Level of 100.1 In.)
- AND 23FT. Above Vessel Flange (Indicated Level of 376 In.) 10
- APF 22B-001-07 Mode 5 or 6, RCS Lowered Inventory (Indicated Level At Or Below 100.1 in. And Higher than 3 Ft. Below the Reactor Vessel Flange) OR RCS Reduced Inventory - Below 3 Ft. Below Vessel Flange (indicated Level of <64.1 In.) 9
- APF 22B-001-08 Mode Mode 6
- 9
- APF 22B-001-09 No Mode - Defueled 9
- APF 22B-001-10 Shutdown Safety Function Status & Assessment Summary 9
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures Number Title Revision
- AP 29G-001 RCS Unidentified Leak Rate Monitoring Program 5
Procedures
- Number Title Revision
- OFN
- BB-007 RCS Leakage High 18 STN
- AP-102 NSAFP Full Flow Test 7 STS
- CR-001 Shift Log for Modes 1, 2, & 3 97 STS
- IC-211A Actuation Logic Test Train A Solid State Protection System 36A STS
- MT-008 [Steam Generator] Spring Loaded Safety Valve Settings 25 SYS
- KU-121 Energizing NB01 From Station Blackout Diesel Generators 4 SYS
- KU-124 SBO Generator Local or Manual Operation 2
Drawings
- Number Title Revision
- M-12AB02 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Main Stream System 16 M-12BB01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System 12
Condition Reports
- 95553
- 105668
- 106763
- 106804
- 106822
- 106859
- 106862
- 106867
Work Orders
- 15-406204-000 15-406207-000 15-406208-000 15-406209-000 15-406210-000 15-406211-000 15-406212-000 15-406213-000 16-411417-000
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- 52218 Event Notification Report:
- Technical Specification Required Shutdown September 2, 2016 M-022-00001 Station Blackout Diesel Generator Kohler Instruction Manual W02
Section 1EP2: Alert Notification System Testing Miscellaneous Number Title Revision/Date
- 2014 Tone Alert Radio Audit Report December 4, 2014
- 2015 Tone Alert Radio Audit Report December 2, 2015 ANS Report WCNOC
- REP-10 Design Review Report May 7, 2008
- EPP 06-022 Tone Alert Radio Maintenance/Compensating Measures 5A
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Augmentation Testing Procedures Number Title Date 14-Q4 Quarterly Callout Test December 14, 2014 15-Q1 Quarterly Callout Test February 10, 2015 15-Q2 Quarterly Callout Test June 17, 2015 15-Q3 Quarterly Callout Test September 30, 2015 15-Q4 Quarterly Callout Test December 13, 2015 16-Q1 Quarterly Callout Test March 28, 2016 Drill Unannounced Callout Drill Report May 4, 2016
Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies Procedures Number Title Revision/Date
- AI 26A-003 Regulatory Evaluations (Other Than 10CFR50.59) 16
- AP 06-002 Radiological Emergency Response Plan 18
- AP 06-004 Equipment Important to Emergency Response 4
- EPP 06-009 Drill and Exercise Requirements 10
Procedures
- Number Title Revision/Date
- RA 14-0122 Annual Emergency Planning Review; includes: Annual Evacuation Time Estimate Update Review Annual On-Shift Staffing Analysis Review December 8, 2014
- RA 15-0098 Annual Emergency Planning Review; includes: Annual Evacuation Time Estimate Update Review Annual On-Shift Staffing Analysis Review December 7, 2015
Condition Reports
- 85703 86306 88447 89360 89606 89831 90728 91773 94541 94739 95958 96306 97232 97396 97410
- 100702
- 101392
- 101484
- 101650
- 101858
- 101859
- 102885
- 105010
- 106171
- 106177
- 106178
- 106230
- 106223
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Date 15-03-EP Quality Assurance Audit Report (Emergency Preparedness) June 29, 2015 15-SA-01 Semi-Annual Health Physics Drill February 15, 2015 15-SA-02 Semi-Annual Health Physics Drill July 28, 2015 16-05-EP Quality Assurance Audit Report (Emergency Preparedness) June 21, 2015 16-SA-01 Semi-Annual Health Physics Drill February 17, 2016 16-SA-02 Semi-Annual Health Physics Drill June 22, 2016 Drill 2015 Site Medical Drill September 17, 2015 Drill 2016 Site Medical Drill July 13, 2016
- QA-2015-0151 Assessment: E-Plan Drill Performance Observations December 11, 2015
- QA-2016-0213 Assessment: E-Plan Drill Report Review June 29,, 2016
- QH-2014-0916 Quick Hit Review: NRC Performance Indicator November 20, 2014
- QH-2014-0919 Quick Hit Review: Emergency Planning New Rule Implementation November 4, 2014
- QH-2015-1004 Quick Hit Review: Fukushima Response Implementation Lessons Learned Workshop March 16, 2015
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Date
- QH-2016-1252 Quick Hit Review: 2015 Industry HAB Evaluated Exercises March 16, 2016
- QS-2014-0727 Assessment: Fourth Quarter Emergency Planning Department Assessment December 30, 2014
- QS-2015-0102 Surveillance: TSC Readiness April 13, 2015
- QS-2015-0134 Surveillance: August 11 ERO Drill August 31, 2015
- QS-2015-0145 Surveillance: Security Event Response November 4, 2015
- QS-2015-1411 Surveillance: 08/11/2015 EPlan Drill
- August 20, 2015
- QS-2016-1565 Surveillance: Emergency Siren January 12, 2016 Review Letters of Agreement December 15, 2015 Test Monthly Communications Test November 2014 through July 2016 Condition Reports 85703 86306 88447 89360 89606 89831 90728 91773 94541 94739 95958 96306 97232 97396 97410
- 100702
- 101392
- 101484
- 101650
- 101858
- 101859
- 102885
- 105010
- 106171
- 106177
- 106178
- 106230 106223
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation Procedures Number Title Revision
- EPP 06-006 Protective Action Recommendations 9
Condition Reports
- 106425
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- 2016 E-Plan Schedule June 6, 2016 77899 Scheduled Offering Roster - Simulator LR4414101 0
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- AIF 30B-015-05 Shift Engineer Simulator Performance Evaluation Summary Sheet - SM Time for New Shift Manager Quals - LR4414101 0A
- AIF 30B-015-11 E-Plan Simulator Performance Evaluation Summary Sheet - SM Time for New Shift manager Quals - LR4414101 2
- APF 06-002-01 Emergency Action Levels 17A
- EPF 06-007-01 Wolf Creek Generating Station Emergency Notification - August 11, 2016 12E LR4407001 Cycle 17-1 Practice CPE 1 LR4414101 SM Time For New Shift Manager Quals 0
- NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline 7 Scenario 16-11 2016 Biennial Requalification Exam 0 Scenario 16-12 Biennial Requalification Exam 0
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification Procedures Number Title Revision
- AI 26A-004 Emergency Planning Performance Indicators 8
Condition Reports
- 107112
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- MSPI Derivation Report July 2016
- BG-07 MSPI Unavailability For Chemical & Volume Control System
- BG-07, Train A Data
- BG-07 MSPI Unavailability For Chemical & Volume Control System
- BG-07, Train B Data
- EM System Health Report April 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016
- EM-01 MSPI Unavailability For High Pressure Coolant Injection System
- EM-01, Train A Data
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- EM-01 MSPI Unavailability For High Pressure Coolant Injection System
- EM-01, Train B Data
- EG-01 MSPI Unavailability For Component Cooling Water
- System
- EG-01, Train A Data
- EG-01 MSPI Unavailability For Component Cooling Water System
- EG-01, Train B Data
- NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline 7
Section 4OA3: Event Follow-Up Procedures Number Title Revision
- ALR 00-098D
- OBE 15A
- ALR 00-098B
- SSE 14
- ALR 00-098E Seismic Recorder On 15
- APF 06-002-01 Emergency Action Levels 17A OFN
- SG-003 Natural Events 30
Condition Reports
- 106904
Miscellaneous
- Number Title Revision/Date
- APF 20-002-01 Post-Trip/Event Review Data Package September 2, 2016