ML20213A709

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Safety Evaluation Confirming That Vendor Interface Program Exists W/Nsss Vendor for Components Required for Performance of Reactor Trip Function
ML20213A709
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1987
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20213A704 List:
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8704280216
Download: ML20213A709 (4)


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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION CONCERNING VENDOR INTERFACE PROGRAMS (RTS COMPONENTS)

GENERIC LtTIER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 2)

CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANI DOCKET NO. 50-213

1.0 BACKGROUND

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. The incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the. initiation of the auto- g matic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to ,

be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant (Salem 1), an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the auto-matic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (ED0), directed the staff to investigate and report on the j generic implications of the Salem Unit 1 occurrences. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem 1 incidents are reported in NUREG-1000. " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission-(NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

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This report is an evaluation of the response submitted by Northeast Utilities, the licensee for the Haddam Neck Plant, for Item 2.1 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28. The documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed at the end of the report.

Item 2.1 (Part 2) requires the licensee / applicant to confirm that an interface has been established with the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor or with the vendors of each of the components of the reactor trip system which includes:

1. periodic communication between the licensee / applicant and the NSSS vendor or the vendors of each of the components of the reactor trip system, and

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2. a system of positive feedback which confirms receipt by the licensee / applicant of transmittals of vendor technical information.

2.0 EVALUATION The licensee for the Haddam Neck Plant responded to the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 2) with submittals dated November 8, 1983 and March 5, 1987. The licensee confirms that Westinghouse is the NSSS vendor for Haddam Neck and that the reactor trip system (RTS) is included as part

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3-of the Westinghouse interface program established for this plant. The response also confirms that this interface program includes both periodic communication between Westinghouse and the licensee and positive feedback from the licensee in the form of signed receipts for technical information transmitted by Westinghouse.

3.0 CONCLUSION

We find that the licensee's statements confirm that a vendor interface program exists with the NSSS vendor for components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function. This program meets the require-ments of Item 2.1 (Part 2) of the Generic Letter 83-28, and is, therefore, acceptable.

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4.0 ACKNOWLEDGMENT This Safety Evaluation was prepared by A. Toalston, PAEI, DPWRL-A.

5.0 REFERENCES

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1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits, " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem l ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8,1983.

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2. Northeast Utilities letter to NRC, W. G. Counsil to Darrell G.

Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, November 8,1983.

3. Northeast Utilities letter to NRC, E. J. Mroczka to Document Control Desk, " Generic Letter 83-28. Item 2.1.2," March 5, 1987.

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