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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20058F1151993-11-23023 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170,69,169 & 86 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20059G6411993-11-0101 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License DPR-61 ML20059G5261993-10-27027 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 to License DPR-61 ML20057E2011993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 167 to License DPR-61 ML20057E1921993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 166 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9051993-09-29029 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 165 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9291993-09-29029 September 1993 SE Re SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A, Wind & Tornado Loadings & Tornado Missiles. Licensee Estimated Reactor Core Damage Frequency Reduced Signficantly Such That Likelihood of Core Damage Reasonably Low ML20057A3501993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-61 ML20057A3551993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-61 ML20056G2891993-08-25025 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License DPR-61 ML20056D7061993-07-26026 July 1993 Safety Evaluation on SEP VI-4 Re Containment Isolation Sys for Plant.All Penetrations Either Meet Provisions of or Intent of GDCs 54-57 Except for Penetration 39 ML20128E3291993-02-0404 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Util Request for Authorization to Use Portion of Section XI of 1986 Edition of ASME Code for Visual Exams VT-3 & VT-4 to Be Combined Into Single VT-3 ML20128D5231992-11-25025 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to Generic Ltr 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,Usi A-46, ML20210E1891992-06-12012 June 1992 Safety Evaluation Considers SEP Topic III-5.B to Be Complete in That If Pipe Breaks Outside Containment,Plant Can Safely Shut Down W/O Loss of Containment Integrity ML20062B7411990-10-22022 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License DPR-61 ML20059H3101990-09-0606 September 1990 Revised Safety Evaluation Clarifying Individual Rod Position Indication Testing Exception & Bases for Approving Test Exception ML20059A8021990-08-14014 August 1990 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting Electrical Design of New Switchgear Room at Plant ML20056A5641990-08-0303 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Pressurizer Has Sufficient Fracture Toughness to Preclude Fracture of Head W/Flaws Remaining in Component & Pressurizer Acceptable for Continued Svc ML20055G5441990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 128 to License DPR-61 ML20055G5561990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 129 to License DPR-61 ML20055E2361990-07-0202 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-61 ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247E3761989-09-0707 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122,34,143 & 40 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247A4841989-09-0505 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 121 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0121989-08-14014 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Extension of Surveillance Intervals ML20247E6551989-07-20020 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 120 to License DPR-61 ML20247E6841989-07-18018 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License DPR-61 ML20246L2571989-06-26026 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118,33,142 & 36 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20246A8541989-06-23023 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Large Containment at Plant Results in Slow Hydrogen Accumulation Rate & Ensures That Sufficient Time Available to Implement Addl Hydrogen Control Features After Accident.Requirements of 10CFR50.44 Met ML20244C4451989-06-0101 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 117 to License DPR-61 ML20248B3001989-05-31031 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 116 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0751989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 114,30,141 & 33 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20245E8941989-04-21021 April 1989 Safeguards Evaluation Rept Supporting Amend 113 to License DPR-61 ML20235Z0881989-03-0707 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 112 to License DPR-61 ML20196D8641988-12-0606 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License DPR-61 ML20205M5731988-10-26026 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 108,25,134 & 26 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20204G8641988-10-18018 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Analysis of Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident at Facility Followed by Minimization of Water in Affected Steam Generator After Tube Rupture ML20155G4801988-09-28028 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107,23,132 & 24 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-24,respectively ML20151T7641988-08-0909 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-61 ML20150A9551988-07-0101 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-61 ML20155F9811988-06-0101 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-13 ML20155G5031988-05-26026 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-61 ML20153G9671988-04-28028 April 1988 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-61 1999-04-28
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 CY-99-047, Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use1999-03-23023 March 1999 Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use ML20206F1971998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 1998 for Cyap. with CY-99-027, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With ML20198G9101998-12-22022 December 1998 Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Haddam Neck Plant. Marked Up Rev 1 Included ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co CY-98-136, Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line1998-08-12012 August 1998 Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line ML20237B7461998-07-22022 July 1998 1998 Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario Manual, Conducted on 980722 ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 CY-98-068, Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms1998-04-15015 April 1998 Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms CY-98-045, Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing1998-04-13013 April 1998 Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing ML20217F0611998-03-31031 March 1998 Historical Review Team Rept ML20217A0001998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 CY-98-046, Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal1998-03-12012 March 1998 Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal ML20216D6531998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217D7381998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-012, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant1998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-010, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,19971997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,1997 ML20198N6681997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217P4861997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept, for Cyap ML20199L5891997-12-24024 December 1997 Independent Analysis & Evaluation of AM-241 & Transuranics & Subsequent Dose to Two Male Workers at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant ML20203K4271997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20199B1141997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20198J8811997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20210P8721997-08-31031 August 1997 Post Decommissioning Activities Rept, for Aug 1997 ML20217Q3171997-08-31031 August 1997 Addl Changes to Proposed Rev 1 to QA Program ML20210U9301997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant CY-97-082, Special Rept:On 970708,routine Surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Sys Instrumentation Revealed,Data Was Not Being Reproduced by Portion of Playback Sys.Station Presently Pursuing Replacement of Seismic Monitoring Sys1997-08-14014 August 1997 Special Rept:On 970708,routine Surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Sys Instrumentation Revealed,Data Was Not Being Reproduced by Portion of Playback Sys.Station Presently Pursuing Replacement of Seismic Monitoring Sys ML20210L0521997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1997 for HNP ML20149E4451997-06-30030 June 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20141A0041997-05-31031 May 1997 Independent Assessment of Radiological Controls Program at Cyap Haddam Neck Plant Final Rept May 1997 ML20140H5241997-05-31031 May 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20141D4141997-04-30030 April 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1997 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck ML20138G5901997-04-25025 April 1997 Proposed Rev 1 to Cyap QA Program for Haddam Neck Plant ML20137W8051997-03-31031 March 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20137H3031997-03-31031 March 1997 Rev 2 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137C6281997-03-14014 March 1997 Redacted Version of Rev 1 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137A0801997-02-28028 February 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20135C5101997-02-26026 February 1997 1996 Refuel Outage ISI Summary Rept for CT Yankee Atomic Power Co B16268, Special Rept:On 970205,declared Main Stack-Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Methods. Will Revise Calibr Procedure to Technique to Demonstrate Accuracy & Linearity Over Intended Range of Monitor1997-02-19019 February 1997 Special Rept:On 970205,declared Main Stack-Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Methods. Will Revise Calibr Procedure to Technique to Demonstrate Accuracy & Linearity Over Intended Range of Monitor ML20135E3221997-02-13013 February 1997 Independent Review Team Rept 1996 MP -1 Lout NRC Exam Failures ML20134L2751997-02-0303 February 1997 Draft Rev to GPRI-30, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Licensing Basis/Design Basis ML20138K5721997-01-31031 January 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant.W/ ML20134L2791997-01-10010 January 1997 Rev 0 to QA Program Grpi ML20134L2911997-01-0808 January 1997 Rev 0 to UFSAR Rev Grpi ML20134L2721996-12-31031 December 1996 Commitment Mgt Grpi 1999-04-28
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l E MCLOSVRE 1 SAFETY EVALVATION BY THE Off!CE OF NUCLLAR REACTOR RIEVLATION LVALVATION OF THE 120-DAY RESPONSE TO SVPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO GENERIC LETTER 87-02 Mif{ECTICVT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HAC3AM NECK PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-213 MCIE0EQ By letter dater.' September 21, 1992, the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0, the licensee ) submitted its response to Supplement No. I to Generic Letter 87-02 (GL 87-02), Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (VSI) A-46," dated May 22, 1992, for the Haddam Neck Plant. In Supplement No, I to GL 87-02, the staff requested that affected licensees submit the following information within 120 days of the issue date of the supplement:
- 1. A statement whether you commit to use both the seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQ'JG) commitments and the implementation guidance provided in the Generic Implementation Procedure, Revision 2 (GlP-2) as supplemented by the staff's Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER-2) for the resolution of USl A-46. In this case, any deviation from GlP-2, as supplemented by the SSER No. 2, must be identified, justified, and documented. if you do not make such a commitment, you must provide your alternative for responding to GL 87-02.
- 2. A plant-specific schedule for the implementation of the GIP and submission of a report to the staff that summarizes the results of the VSl A-46 review, if you are committing to implement GIP-2. This schedule shall be such that each affected plant will complete its implementation and submit the summary report within 3 years after the issuance of the SSER No. 2, unless otherwise justified.
- 3. The detailed information as to what procedures and criceria were used to generate the in-structure response spectra to be used for VSl A-46 as requested in the SSER No. 2. The licensee's in-structure response spectra are considered acceptable for USI A-46 unless the staff indicates otherwise during a 60-day review period.
9212070297 921125 l PDR ADOCK 05000213' P PDR
I f 2-In addition, the staff requested in SSER No. 2 that the licensees inform the staff in the 120-day response if they intend to change their licensing basis to reflect a commitment to the US! A-46 (GlP-2) methodology for verifying the seismic adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment, prior to receipt of the staff's plant-specific safety evaluation resolving USI A-46.
LVALVATid With regard to item 1, the Itcensee stated that, "CYAPC0 intend [sg to comply with the 500G commitments set forth in Revision 2 of the GIP, inc uding the clarifications, interpretations, and exceptions identified in SSER-2 in order to satisfy GL 87-02." The staff recognizes that the licensee has chosen to implement GIP-2, including both the SQUG commitments and the implementation guidance, for responding to GL 87-02. The staff finds that this it an acceptabic method to resolve USl A-46 at the Haddam Neck Plant.
The licensee indicated that it plans to use existing anchorage evaluations, which were performed as part of the Systematic Evaluation Program at Haddam Neck Plant, as justification of seismic adequacy for USI A-46. The staff finds this approach acceptable provided that the anchorage evaluations previously performed meet the criteria and procedures approved by the staff in SSER Nc.2 (Section 11.4.4). The licensee also indicated that it plans to use existing seismic qualification test reports to demonstrate seismic adequacy for any equipment on its safe shutdown equipment lists (SSEls) which were previously qualified to IEEE 344-1975. The staff finds that this approach is acceptable for verifying equipment operability, but the licensee should also verify the seismic adequacy of the anchorage of this equipment in accordance with the criteria and procedures approved by the staff in SSER No. 2.
The licensee stated that it intends to use the Seismic Margin Methods defined in the Electric Power Research Institute's (EPRI) Report NP-6041-SL, dated August 1991, as one option for the resolution of equipment outliers. The methods defined in this report were intended to be used in conjunction with the seismic margin earthquake (SME), and not with the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) used in USI A-46 reviews. The criteria and methods defined in the EPRI report are less conservative than those defined in GIP-2. Therefore, the methods defined in this report are, in general, not acceptable to the staff for resolving USI A-46 issues. Although the staff acknowledges that outlier resolution is beyond the scope of GIP-R, the staff generally endorses, with the clarifications provided in SSER No. 2, the types of outlier resolution described in Section 5 of GIP-2 (i.e., dynamic testing, engineering analysis, physical repair, anc replacement). As stated in Section 11.5 of SSER No. 2, "It is the responsibility of the utility to resolve outliers, using existing trocedures (e.g., plant-specific procedural controls and QA requirements) as it would resolve any other seismic concerns." The staff will consider the l
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application of some of the criteria provided in EPRI Report fiP-6041-SL, for the resolution of equipment outliers, on a case-by-case basis.
With regard to item 2, the licensee stated that it will submit the Safe Shutdown Equipment list Reports, the Relay Evaluation Reports, and the Seismic Evaluation Reports to the NRC providing the results of the USI A-46 program at the Haddam Neck Plant, within 180 days following the completion of Cycle #17 refueling outage (Spring 1993). The proposed implementation schedule for the Haddam Neck Plant is within the 3-year responsa period requested by the staff and is therefore acceptable.
With regard to item 3, the licensee stated that it "will, at our option, use any of the methods recommended by Section 4.2 of the GlP, for defining in-structure response spectra (demand) for comparison to the SQUG Bounding Spectrum and the Generic Earthquake Ruggedness Spectra," and that the licensee "will provide technical justification of the spectra generation methods where required by SSER-2 Section 11.4.2.4."
Since Haddam Neck is identified as a Category 2 (SEP) plant in Generic Letter 07-02, supplement No. 1, the staff finds that the licensee's response is adequate and acceptable, with one possible exception, which is discussed below, regarding the licensee's response to SSER No. 2,Section II.4.2.4.
Furthermore, if more than one set of in-structure response spectra appear in the licensing basis documents, the more conservative set of spectra must be used to qualify for the definition of " conservative design" in structure response spectra for the resolution of USI A-46 issues at Haddam Neck. If the licensee intends to use the option of developing or using " median centered" in-structure response spectra, the licensee is requested to inform the NRC staff the approximate date by which such information will become available.
With respect to SSER No. 2, Section 11.4.2.4, if the licensee intends to use the option of scaling IPEEE spectra for use in USI A-46, then the licensee's response is not acceptable since it did not provide the spectra generation methods as requested in SSER No. 2. Therefore, if the licensee intends to use this option, it should submit the information requested in SSER No. 2 as soon as possible for staff review.
The licensee indicated that, as part of the resolution of GL 87-02, it intends to change their licensing basis, via 10 CFR 50.59, to include the GIP methodologies as an option for demonstrating the seismic adequacy of new and replacement plant equipment. The staff recognizes that the licensee may revise its licensing basis in accordance with 10 CfR 50.59 to reflect the acceptability of the USl A-46 (GIP) methodology for verifying the seismic adequacy of electrical and mechanical equipment covered by the GIP. However, since the licensee intends to augment its licensing basis to include the GlP methodology as an option for verifying seismic adequacy, rather than revise its licensing basis such that the GIP-2 would be the sole methodology, the
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staff cautions that it is not acceptable to combine any part of GIP-2 with the current licensing basis methodologies such that it results in a less conservative approach than if GIP-2 or the current licensing basis methodologies were applied separately.
CONCLUS101{S The staff finds that the licensee's commitment to implement GIP-2, including the clarifications, interpretations and exceptions identified in SSER No. 2 to be an acceptable method for resolving USI A-46 at the Haddam Neck Plant.
The staff finds that it is acceptable for the licensee to use previously performed anchorage evaluations fc USI A-46, provided that the evaluations meet the criteria and procedures ap) roved in SSER No. 2 (Section 11.4.4). The staff also finds that it is accepta)le to use existing seismic qualification test reports to demonstrate operability for SSEL equipment which was qualified to IEEE 344-1975.
The methods defined in EPRI Report NP-6041-SL are, it, general, not acceptable to the staff for resolving equipment outliers. However, the staff will i.onsider the application of some of the criteria provided in EPRI Report NP-6041-SL, for the resolution of equipment outliers, on a case-by-case basis.
The proposed implementation schedule for the Haddam Neck Plant is within the 3-year response period requested by the staff and is therefore acceptable.
The staff has reviewed the licensee's response concerning in-structure response spectra, and has concluded that it is acceptable, with one possible exception where the licensee refers to SSER No. 2 Section 11.4.2.4. If the licensee intends to use scaled IPEEE spectra for US! A-46, it should submit for staff review as soon as possible, the information requested in SSER No. 2, Section !! 4.2.4. Furthermore, if more than one set of in-structure response spectra appear in the licensing basis documents, the more conservative set of spectra must be used to qualify for the definition of " conservative design" in-structure response spectra for the resolution of USI A-46 issues at Haddam Neck.
The staff recognizes that the licensee may revise its licensing basis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 to reflect the acceptability of the USI A-46 (GIP) methodology for verifying the seismic adequacy of electrical and +
mechanical equipment covered by the GIP. However, since the licensee intends to augment its licensing basis to include the GlP methodology as an option for verifying seismic adequacy, rather than revise its licensing basis sech that the GIP-2 would be the sole methodology, the staff cautions that it is not acceptable to combine any part of GIP-2 with the current licensing basis i methodologies such that it results in a less conservative approach than if l GIP-2 or the current licensing basis methodologies were applied separately.
Principal Contributors: P. Chen l D. Jeng l M. McBrearty Date: November 25, 1992 l
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