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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20058F1151993-11-23023 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170,69,169 & 86 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20059G6411993-11-0101 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License DPR-61 ML20059G5261993-10-27027 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 to License DPR-61 ML20057E2011993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 167 to License DPR-61 ML20057E1921993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 166 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9051993-09-29029 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 165 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9291993-09-29029 September 1993 SE Re SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A, Wind & Tornado Loadings & Tornado Missiles. Licensee Estimated Reactor Core Damage Frequency Reduced Signficantly Such That Likelihood of Core Damage Reasonably Low ML20057A3501993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-61 ML20057A3551993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-61 ML20056G2891993-08-25025 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License DPR-61 ML20056D7061993-07-26026 July 1993 Safety Evaluation on SEP VI-4 Re Containment Isolation Sys for Plant.All Penetrations Either Meet Provisions of or Intent of GDCs 54-57 Except for Penetration 39 ML20128E3291993-02-0404 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Util Request for Authorization to Use Portion of Section XI of 1986 Edition of ASME Code for Visual Exams VT-3 & VT-4 to Be Combined Into Single VT-3 ML20128D5231992-11-25025 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to Generic Ltr 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,Usi A-46, ML20210E1891992-06-12012 June 1992 Safety Evaluation Considers SEP Topic III-5.B to Be Complete in That If Pipe Breaks Outside Containment,Plant Can Safely Shut Down W/O Loss of Containment Integrity ML20062B7411990-10-22022 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License DPR-61 ML20059H3101990-09-0606 September 1990 Revised Safety Evaluation Clarifying Individual Rod Position Indication Testing Exception & Bases for Approving Test Exception ML20059A8021990-08-14014 August 1990 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting Electrical Design of New Switchgear Room at Plant ML20056A5641990-08-0303 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Pressurizer Has Sufficient Fracture Toughness to Preclude Fracture of Head W/Flaws Remaining in Component & Pressurizer Acceptable for Continued Svc ML20055G5441990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 128 to License DPR-61 ML20055G5561990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 129 to License DPR-61 ML20055E2361990-07-0202 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-61 ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247E3761989-09-0707 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122,34,143 & 40 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247A4841989-09-0505 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 121 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0121989-08-14014 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Extension of Surveillance Intervals ML20247E6551989-07-20020 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 120 to License DPR-61 ML20247E6841989-07-18018 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License DPR-61 ML20246L2571989-06-26026 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118,33,142 & 36 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20246A8541989-06-23023 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Large Containment at Plant Results in Slow Hydrogen Accumulation Rate & Ensures That Sufficient Time Available to Implement Addl Hydrogen Control Features After Accident.Requirements of 10CFR50.44 Met ML20244C4451989-06-0101 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 117 to License DPR-61 ML20248B3001989-05-31031 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 116 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0751989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 114,30,141 & 33 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20245E8941989-04-21021 April 1989 Safeguards Evaluation Rept Supporting Amend 113 to License DPR-61 ML20235Z0881989-03-0707 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 112 to License DPR-61 ML20196D8641988-12-0606 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License DPR-61 ML20205M5731988-10-26026 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 108,25,134 & 26 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20204G8641988-10-18018 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Analysis of Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident at Facility Followed by Minimization of Water in Affected Steam Generator After Tube Rupture ML20155G4801988-09-28028 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107,23,132 & 24 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-24,respectively ML20151T7641988-08-0909 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-61 ML20150A9551988-07-0101 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-61 ML20155F9811988-06-0101 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-13 ML20155G5031988-05-26026 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-61 ML20153G9671988-04-28028 April 1988 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-61 1999-04-28
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 CY-99-047, Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use1999-03-23023 March 1999 Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use ML20206F1971998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 1998 for Cyap. with CY-99-027, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With ML20198G9101998-12-22022 December 1998 Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Haddam Neck Plant. Marked Up Rev 1 Included ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co CY-98-136, Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line1998-08-12012 August 1998 Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line ML20237B7461998-07-22022 July 1998 1998 Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario Manual, Conducted on 980722 ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 CY-98-068, Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms1998-04-15015 April 1998 Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms CY-98-045, Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing1998-04-13013 April 1998 Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing ML20217F0611998-03-31031 March 1998 Historical Review Team Rept ML20217A0001998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 CY-98-046, Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal1998-03-12012 March 1998 Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal ML20216D6531998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217D7381998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-012, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant1998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-010, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,19971997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,1997 ML20198N6681997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217P4861997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept, for Cyap ML20199L5891997-12-24024 December 1997 Independent Analysis & Evaluation of AM-241 & Transuranics & Subsequent Dose to Two Male Workers at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant ML20203K4271997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20199B1141997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20198J8811997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20210P8721997-08-31031 August 1997 Post Decommissioning Activities Rept, for Aug 1997 ML20217Q3171997-08-31031 August 1997 Addl Changes to Proposed Rev 1 to QA Program ML20210U9301997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant CY-97-082, Special Rept:On 970708,routine Surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Sys Instrumentation Revealed,Data Was Not Being Reproduced by Portion of Playback Sys.Station Presently Pursuing Replacement of Seismic Monitoring Sys1997-08-14014 August 1997 Special Rept:On 970708,routine Surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Sys Instrumentation Revealed,Data Was Not Being Reproduced by Portion of Playback Sys.Station Presently Pursuing Replacement of Seismic Monitoring Sys ML20210L0521997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1997 for HNP ML20149E4451997-06-30030 June 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20141A0041997-05-31031 May 1997 Independent Assessment of Radiological Controls Program at Cyap Haddam Neck Plant Final Rept May 1997 ML20140H5241997-05-31031 May 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20141D4141997-04-30030 April 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1997 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck ML20138G5901997-04-25025 April 1997 Proposed Rev 1 to Cyap QA Program for Haddam Neck Plant ML20137W8051997-03-31031 March 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20137H3031997-03-31031 March 1997 Rev 2 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137C6281997-03-14014 March 1997 Redacted Version of Rev 1 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137A0801997-02-28028 February 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20135C5101997-02-26026 February 1997 1996 Refuel Outage ISI Summary Rept for CT Yankee Atomic Power Co B16268, Special Rept:On 970205,declared Main Stack-Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Methods. Will Revise Calibr Procedure to Technique to Demonstrate Accuracy & Linearity Over Intended Range of Monitor1997-02-19019 February 1997 Special Rept:On 970205,declared Main Stack-Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Methods. Will Revise Calibr Procedure to Technique to Demonstrate Accuracy & Linearity Over Intended Range of Monitor ML20135E3221997-02-13013 February 1997 Independent Review Team Rept 1996 MP -1 Lout NRC Exam Failures ML20134L2751997-02-0303 February 1997 Draft Rev to GPRI-30, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Licensing Basis/Design Basis ML20138K5721997-01-31031 January 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant.W/ ML20134L2791997-01-10010 January 1997 Rev 0 to QA Program Grpi ML20134L2911997-01-0808 January 1997 Rev 0 to UFSAR Rev Grpi ML20134L2721996-12-31031 December 1996 Commitment Mgt Grpi 1999-04-28
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UNITED STATES
[") }% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHING TON, D. C. 20555
%&.&);E SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE,OF NL' CLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT, NO.119 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-61 CONNECTICUTYANKEEA10MIC_POWERCOMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-213 <
INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) has proposed to amend the Operating License No. DPR-61 for the Haddam Neck Plant. ;
By letter dated January 10, 1989, CYAPCO proposed to amend the Technical Specification (TS) sections that refer to the baron concentrations in idled and isolated loops. The amendment will: a) split and revise existing TS, Section 3.3.1.5 " Isolated Loop," into Sections 3.3.1.5 " Isolated Loop" (MODES I and 2) and 3.3.1.6 " Isolated Loop" (MODES 3, 4, 5 and 6), b) renumber and revise existing TS, Section 3.3.1.6 " Isolated Loop Startup," to TS Section 3.3.1.7 " Isolated Loop Startup," c) split and revise existing TS, Section 3.3.1.7 " Idled Loop," into Sections 3.3.1.8 " Idled Loop" (MODES I and 2) and 3.3.1.9 " Idled Loop" (MODES 3, 4, 5 and 6), and d) split and revise existing TS, Section 3.3.1.8 " Idled Loop Startup," into Sections 3.3.1.10 " Idled Loop Startup" (MODES 1 and 2) and 3.3.1.11 Idled Loop startup" (MODES 3, 4, 5 and 6). In MODES I and 2 the existing TS will remain unaltered. In MODES 3, 4, 5 and 6, the revised TS will require a boron concentration in the idled and isolated loops that is consistent with existing TS, Sections 3.1.10.2 ar,d 3.
DISCUSSION, The current TS's regTrding idled / isolated loops are designed to prevent reactivity transients due to intentional or unintentional startups of the idled / isolated loops. The current TS's require either the power to be removed from the isolation valve operators or the boron concentration in the idled / isolated loops to be maintained greater than or equal to the boron concentration in the operating loops. The proposed TS will not alter the existing TS while in MODES I and 2. However, in MODES 3, 4 and 5. the proposed TS will require that the bcron concentration in the idled / isolated loops be maintained such that the current shutdown margin requirements of existing TSs 3.10.1.2 and 3.10.1.3 are main-tained. In MODE 6. the idled / isolated loop will be required to be at no less than the refueling boron concentration as specified in existing TS Section 3.13.
8907260257 890718 DR ADOC.K0500g3
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The amendment request is based on operational experience observed during the Cycle 15 startup. During the startup, the plant was maintained at a high baron concentration well above the minimum horon concentration required for shutdown margin con.;iderations. Eut due to bomn sampling accuraqy, a sample from the idled / isolated loop could deviate slightly from the operating loops and would require additional boration and sampling of the idled / isolated loop.
The licensee contended that the additional boration and rad waste generation was unneessary since the plant already exceeded the shutdown margin requirements. Therefore, the licensee proposed a revision to the TS requirements for MODES 3, 4 and 5.
EVALUKfl0H Existing TS 3.3.1.5, " Reactor Coolant System (RCS) - Isolated Loop" The existing section of the TS requires that the boron concentration in the isolated loop be maintained greater than or equal to the boron concentration in the operating loops while in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The proposed arandment divides this TS section into Sections 3.3.1.5 and 3.3.1.6. The new T5 Section 3.3.1.5, addresses the minimum boron concentration in the isolated loop while in MGDES I and 2. This remains unchanged from the current TS. Proposed TS Section 3.3.1.6 addresses the boron concentration while in MODES 3, 4, 5 and 6. The revised TS requires that the boron concentration be maintained greater than or equal to the amount required to meet the shutdown margin requirements as specified in the current TS Sections 3.10.1.2 and 3. In general, the shutdown margin requirement is based on the ability to mal.e the 4 reactor suberitical or prevent inadvertent criticality from a shutdown q condition. This requirement has been predetermined and specifically stated in existing TSs 3.10.1.2 and 3. By maintaining a boron concentration in the isolated loop such that the stated shutdown margin requirement is met, an intentional or unintentional loop startup will not result in a reactivity addition to the core and the reactor will remain subcritical. Therefore, the proposed TS changes will have no adverse istpact on reactor operation and the change will be consistent with the current safety analysis. TS Section 3.3.1.6 also requires that while in MODE 6, the isolated loop shall be at no less than the refueling boron concentration as stated in existing TS Section 3.13. This i is an additional requirement that will reduce the potential for reactivity transients dring MODE 6 operation and will ensure that the core will remain subtritical.
I Existing TS,Section 3.3.1.6, "RCS-Isolated Loop Startu__p" In the current TS, j lhis section requires that while in MODES 3, 4, 5 and 6, the loop shall remain isolated until: 1) the temperature at the cold leg of the isolated lonp is within 20 degrees F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops, ,
- 2) the isolated loop boron concentration is greater than or equal to the boron l concentration of the operating loopt, and 3) the reacter is subtritical by at
! least 1000 percent millirho (pcm). The an.endment renumbers this section to x 3.3.1.7. In the revised TS Section the temperature requirements of the N i existing TS remain unchanged and thereby dL not alter the current safety }
I analysis. The amendment does revise the boron concentration requirements. The :
revised requirements are that the isolated loop concentration be such that the 4
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I shutdown margin requirements of Sections 3.10.1.2 and 3 are maintained. In general, the shutdown margin requirement is bcsed on the ability to make the reactor subcritical or prevent inadvertent criticality from a snutdown condition. This requirement has been predetermined and stated in existing TSs 3.10.1.2 and 3. By maintaining a boron concentration in the isolated loop such that the stated shutdown margin requirement is met, a loop startup will not result in an unintentional reactivity addition to the core and the reacter will remain suberitical. Thus, the change will be consistent with the current safety analysis. Deleted from this section the stated requirement that the reactor must be subcritical by at leapt 1000 pcm. Since the definition of MODES 3, 4 and 5 require that K(eff)4.99 and MODE 6 requires K(eff)<.94, the '
reactor is already suberitical by at least 1000 pcm. As a result, the deletion has no effect on the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). There is an ;
additional note in this TS which removes from the applicability section the '
instances when the hot leg loop isolation valve is opened to create an idled loop. This note was added to clarify the isciation to idled te operating loop startup sequence. Since the cold leg isolation valve is still closed in the idled loop configuration, there will be no flew induced reactivity insertion due to the temperature or boron concentration differences. Should the RCS be depressurized while in the idled loop configuration, the volume of water displaced from the idled loop into the remainder of the RCS would be minimal and its effect would be insignificant. Therefore, the added clarification has no adverse impact on reactor operation and plant safety.
ExM.N SecW.: 3.3.1.7, "RCS-Idled Loop" The existing TS requires that while in MOliT1' through 5, the borc. concentration in the idled loop be greater thtn or equal to the boron concentration in the operating loops. This l TS sr.ction has been divided into Sections 3.3.1.8 and 3.3.1.9 in the proposed amendment. The new Section 3.3.1.8 addresses the boron concentrations in the idled loop while in MODES 1 and 2 and remains unchanged fr
Proposed TS Section 3.3.1.9 requires that the boron concer. ration in the idled bop, while in MODES 3, 4, and 5, be maintained greater than or equal to the concentration required to meet the shutdown margin requirements as specified in <
Sections 3.10.1.2 and 3. Following the analysis previously discussed in "RCS-Isolated Loop," by maintaining a boron concentration in the idled loop such that the stated shutdown requirement is met, an unintentional or ;
intentional loop startup will not result in a reactivity addition to the core. l Therefore, there will be no adverse impact on reactor operation and the change l will be consistent with the current safety analysis. This TS section also I requires that while in MODE 6, the idled loop will be of no less than the !
refueling boron concentration as stated in existing TS 3.13. This is an ,
I additional requirement which will reduce the potential for reactivity '
l transients daring MODE 6 operstion and will ensure that the core remains suberitical. ;
Existing Section 3.3.1.8, "RCS-Idled Loop Startup" In the current TS, this section requires that in all MODE 5, the loop shall remain idled until: 1) the temperature at the cold leg of the isolated loop is within 20 degrees F of the highest cold leg temperature of the operating loops, 2) the isciated loop boron '
concentration is greater than or equal to the boron concentration of the operating loops, and 3) the reactor is no greater than 60% rated thermal power if one loop is idled or is subcritical by at least 1000 pcm if more than one loop is idled. This TS section has been divided into Sections 3.3.1.10 and 3.3.1.11. The new TS Section 3.3.1.10 addresses idled loop startup while in
u, l
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I MODES 1 and 2. Section 3.3.1.10 deletes the references to operation with more j than one loop idled. Since the plant does not operate in this configuration at i power, the deletion hes no effect on plant operation and safety. Otherwise, '
this section remains unchanged from the current TS. Section 3.3.1.11 addresses ,
idled loop startup in MODES 3, 4, 5 and 6. The temperature requirements cf 1 this section remain the same as the existing TS and thereby do not alter the !
current safety analysis. The boron concentration has been changed such that, 1 the boron concentration in the idled loop will be maintained greater than or j equal to the boron concentration required to meet the shutdown margin requirements of existing TSs 3.10.1.2 and 3 (MODES 3, 4, 5) and 3.13 (MODE 6).
Following the analysis previously discussed for the isolated startup, by maintaining a boron concentration such that the stated shutdown margin requirement is met, a loop startup will not result in an unintentional reactivity addition to the core. TS section 3.3.1.11 also deletes the stated requirement that the reactor be subcritical by at least 1000 pcm and the requirement that the reactor be at no greater than 60% rated thermal power. As stated in the evaluation of existing TS section 3.3.1.6, by definition of MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, the reactor is subcritical and the removal of these requirements does not remove any restrictions from the original TS.
In conclusion, the staff has determined that the TS changes will have no adverse impact on plant safety and will maintain the intent of the current TS while eliminating unnecessary operational difficulties. Therefore, the TS changes are acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. We have has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The staff has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorica? exclusion set forth in 10 CFR %51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 951.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the ecmmon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
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Dated: July 18, 1989 Principal Contributor: G. E. Garten l
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