ML20213F235

From kanterella
Revision as of 03:08, 20 January 2021 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Response to 860627 Request for Addl Info Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 2.2.1,2.2.2,4.3,4.5.2 & 4.5.3.W/3 Oversize Drawings
ML20213F235
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 05/07/1987
From: Carey J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20213F237 List:
References
2NRC-7-109, GL-83-28, TAC-62950, TAC-62952, TAC-62958, NUDOCS 8705150266
Download: ML20213F235 (9)


Text

..

} V,, 4

'Af 2NRC-7-109 (412)393 7546 Beaver Valley No. 2 Unit Project Organization Telecopy(412)393 7889 "8 May 7,1987 QG""Bo 8 Shippingport, PA 15077 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 83-28

REFERENCE:

NRC Letter, P. S. Tam to J. J. Carey, Request for Additional Information . . . Generic Letter 83-28, June 27, 1986 Gentlemen:

As per the Reference, additional information is being provided in the attachment in response to Items 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 4.3, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 of Generic Letter 83-28.

If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. R. E. Martin at (412) 393-7713.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By '

U./J./Carey Senior VJde President RWF/ijr NR/RWR/AND/LTR Attachment AR/NAR cc: Mr. P. Tam, Project Manager (w/a)

Mr. J. Beall, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector (w/a)

Mr. L. Prividy, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a)

INP0 Records Center (w/a) 0705150266 070507 PDR ADOCK 00000412 f

. A PDR g L @0 3t

i I

.t I

ATTACHMENT i

1) Item 2.2.1 Question: For Item 2.2.1.2 the applicant should describe how new safety-related items are entered; Reply: New safety-related items are added into the Master Equipment List (MEL) as described in Startup Manual (SUM) Procedure Chap-ter 4.7.12. VI. B.1 and VI. B.2 utilizing the MEL Input Sheet, i 1

Question: " Applicant should describe how changes in classification of listed items are made;"

Reply: Changes in classification are entered in the MEL in accordance with SUM Procedure Chapter 4.7.12 VI.B.1 as required by VI.B.3.b corrections (to MEL). This requires additional MEL Input Sheet preparation and entry into the CRT.

Question: " Applicant should describe how items are verified;"

Reply: SUM Chapter 4.7.12. VI.B.1.d describes the various means of verification.

Question _: " Applicant should describe how unauthorized changes to the information system are prevented;"

Reply: Instructions for "How to Enter" or "How to change" a MEL entry is described in the Master Equipment List User's Manual, ,

reference V.E. of SUM Chapter 4.7.12. Security.on such changes ;

is controlled by the use of only authorized terminals for such actions.

Questi_o_n : " Applicant should describe how the information system will be maintair.ed and distributed to users as a single, unambiguous and consistant version."

Reply: The MEL will be maintained up to commercial operation by the '

SVG Maintenance and Materials Section, Procurement Unit in accordance with SUM Chapter 4.7.12, II. Af ter that date, BV Nuclear Engineering and Construction Unit will be responsible for Maintanance. The usage of fEL information is available to the Startup Group personnel through the DLC Computer System.

Question: For item 2.2.1.4, the applicant should describe the means by which the plant and corporate management assure themselves that these procedures are being correctly and consistently applied.

Page 1 of 8

Reply: Control and update of the Master Equipm:nt List is performed under written procedures. Approval and adherence to written procedures is performed in accordance with the requirements of the DLC Quality Assurance Program and these activities are subject to audit by the DLC Quality Assurance Department.

2) Item 2.2.2 Question: Applicant needs to present his evaluation of NUTAC program and describe how it will be implemented at Beaver Valley Unit 2.

l Accordingly, the applicant will need to supplement his response to address the concerns associated with implementa-l tion at Beaver Valley Unit 2 of measures to improve the NPROS l

and SEE-IN programs outlined in the NUTAC report.

Reply: The operating organization that operates Beaver Valley Unit 1 i is the same organization that will operate Beaver Valley Unit i 2. Thus, References 1 and 2, previously submitted by Beaver l Valley Unit 1 in response to Generic Letter 83-28 Item 2.2.2, are also applicable for Beaver Valley Unit 2.

3) ftem 4.3 l

Question _: Applicant needs to c'ommit to and implement the WOG design or its equivalent for automatically actuating the shunt trp attachment on the reactor trip breakers and address the plant-i specific concerns put forth in the NRC SER on the WOG design.

Reply: This question entails responding to thirteen plant specific concerns. The questions / replies follow

1. Provide the electrical schematic / elementary diagrams for the reactor trip and bypass breakers showing the under-voltage and shunt coil actuation circuited as well as the breaker control (e.g., closing) circuits, and circuits providing breaker status information/ alarms to the control room.

Reply:

The schematic / elementary diagrams for the reactor trip and bypass breakers are shown on drawings 2001-403-001-l 40C, 41C and 42C. These drawings are included in this submittal. i

2. Identify the power sources for the shunt trip coils.  ;

Verify that they are Class 1E and that all cpomponents providing power to the shunt trip circuitry are Class 1E and that any faults within non-class 1E circuitry will not degrade the shunt trip function. Describe the annun-ciation/ indication provided in the control room upon Page 2 of 8

loss of poter to the shunt trip circuits. Also describe the overvoltage prctection and/or alarms provided to prevent or alert the operator (s) to an overvoltage condi-tion that could affect he UV coil and the parallel shunt trip action relay.

See reply to Concern No. 5 for power supplies. Reply to Concern No. 8 addresses physical separation of circuits for obtaining optimum reliability.

There is no direct indication in the Control Room upon loss of power to the shunt trip circuits. The equipment is designed to operate at overvoltage conditions of 115%

of nominal. The power supplies to the shunt trip coil is 125V D.C. from the station battery and the maximum output voltage (equalizing voltage) is less than 115% of nomi-nal . The shunt trip coil is energized momentarily (receipt of scram signal) and the circuit is opened when the breaker opens (via an auxiliary contact). The power the UV coil is taken from the regulated power supply in the reactor protection system.

3. Verify that the relays added for the automatic shunt trip function are within the capacity of their associated power supplies and that the relay contacts are adequately sized to accomplish the shunt trip function. If the added relays are other than the Potter & Brumfield MOR series relays (P/N 2383A38 or P/N 955655) recommended by Westinghouse, provide a descripton of the relays and their design specifications.

Reply The relays used for the automatic shunt trip modification are Potter and Brumfield Westinghouse P/N 955655. The relays are within the capacity of their associated power supplies and the relay contacts are adequatley sized for their design function.

4. State whether the test procedure / sequence used to inde-pendently verify operabilty of the undervoltage and shunt trip devices in response to an automatic reactor trip signal is identical to the test procedure proposed by the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG). Identify any differen-ces between the WOG test procedure and the test procedure to be used and provide the rationale / justification for these differences.

Reply Maintenance Surveillance Procedures will independently verify operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip devices in a manner identical to that proposed by the Westingouse Owner's Group, as submitted by OG-101, dated June 14, 1983. (

Reference:

2MSP-1.04A-1 and 2MSP-1.05A-1) i Page 3 of 8

5. Verify that the circuitry used to implement the automatic shunt trip function is Class 1E (safety-related), and that the procurement, installation, operation, testing, and maintenance of this circuitry will be in accordance with the quality assruance criteria set forth in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

Reply:

The circuitry used for the automatic shunt trip function is Class 1E compromised of two trains, A & B. Train A power is obtained from DC*SWBD 2-1, Train B is DC*SWBD2-

2. The procurement installation and testing was controlled in accordance with Appendix B,10CFR Part 50.

The BV-2 maintenance / surveillance procedures provide adequate instructions for testing the associated circuits. The BV-2 position on information notice 85-18 verifies the Maintenance / Surveillance activities.

6. Verify that the shunt trip attachments and associated circuitry are/will be seismically qualified (i.e., be demonstrated to be operable during and after a seismic event) in accordance with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 1 which endorses IEEE Standard 344, and that all non-safety related circuitry / components in physical proximity to or associated with the automatic shunt trip function will not degrade this function during or af ter a seismic event.
7. Verify that the components used to accomplish the auto-matic shunt trip function are designed for the environ-ment where they are located.

Reply to 6 and 7:

The automatic shunt trip panel and shunt trip attachment were furnished by Westinghouse and are seismically and environmentally qualified in accordance with IEEE-344, 1975 and IEEE-323-1974 respectively.

8. Describe the physical separation provided between. the circuits used to manually initiate the shunt trip attach-ments of the redundant reactor trip breakers. If physi-cal separation is not maintained between these circuits, demonstrate that faults within these cicruits, cannot degrade both redundant trains.

Reply:

Physical separation is maintained between circuits in the folfowing way:

a. Cables are routed as Train A and Train B circuits.

Page 4 of 8

b. The reactor trip switchgear has dual sections with metal barriers between redundant trains.
c. Shunt trip attachments are mounted in separate metal enclosures,
d. Separation at the main control board is maintained by both distance and the use of metal barriers.
9. Specify that the operability of the control room manual reactor trip switch contacts and wiring will be adequate-ly tested prior to startup after each refueling outage.

Verify that the test procedure used will not involve installing jumpers, lifting leads, or pulling fuses and identify any deviations from the WOG procedure. Perma-nently installed test connections (f.e., to allow connec-tion of a voltmeter) are acceptable.

l l Reply Operating Surveillance Testing will adequately test Control Room manual reactor trip switch contacts and

[ wiring. This testing is performed each refueling and prior to startup, if not performed in the previous 7 days. This testing will not involve installing jumpers, lif ting leads, or pulling fuses. (

Reference:

OST 2.1.7 and OST 2.1.17)

10. Verify that each bypass breaker will be tested to demon-strate its operability prior to placing it into service for reactor trip breaker testing.

Reply Maintenance Surveillance Procedures will test the bypass breaker to verify its operability prior to placing it into service. (

Reference:

2MSP-1.04-I, 2MSP-1.04A-I, 2MSP-1.05-I, 2MSI-1.05A and BVPS-2 Tech. Specs. Table 4.3-1)

11. Verify that the test procedure used to determine reactor trip breaker operability will also demonstrate proper operation of the associated control room indication /

annunciation.

Reply Operating Surveillance Testing for reactor trip breaker operability will also demonstrate proper operation of the assocaated Control Room indication /annunciaticn.

(

Reference:

OST2.1.7)

12. Verify that the response time of the automatic shunt trip feature will be tested periodically and shown to be less than or equal to that assumed in the FSAR analyses or that specified in the technical specifications.

Page 5 of 8

Reply Maintenance Surevillance Procedures will measure the response time of the automatic shunt trip feature. The reactor Trip Breaker Monitoring Program will compare response time data to' acceptance criteria. (

Reference:

2MSP-1.14A-I,- 2MSP-1.148-I, and BVT2.1-11.1.2)

13. Propose technical specification changes to require peri-odic testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip functions and the manual reactor trip switch contacts and wiring.

Reply This item was subsequently the sub, ject of Generic Letter 85-09. Refer to the BVPS-2 Position on Generic Letter t- 85-09, dated December 20, 1985. The BVPS-2 Technical Specifications are currently in the proof and review stage and will be issued prior to fuel load. Testing associated with this item is discussed in response to SER Items 4 and 9.

. 4) Item 4.3 Technical Specifications Question: Applicant should submit proposed technical specifications in accordance with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 85-i 09.

_ Reply: The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Technical Specifications are being developed to be as much like the Beaver Valley Unit 1 Techni-cal Specifications as per Reference 3 since both units' designs are similar.

5) Item 4.5.2 Question: Applicant should verify that on-line testing of the RTS will be performed on a regular basis as per technical specifica-tions, which includes independent on-line testing of the diverse trip features.

4 Reply: The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Technical Specifications are being developed to be as much like the Beaver Valley Unit 1 Techni-cal Specificaios as per Reference 3 since both unit's designs are similar.

6) Item 4.5.3 i Question
Need a description of the specific implementation plan for

- Beaver Valley Unit 2 af ter NRC reviewed the technical report WCAP-10271 and Supplement 1.

Page 6 of 8 l

4

, -- - - - - - , , , - ~ e,, ,.y,y -

Reply The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Technical Specifications are being developed to be as much like the Beaver Valley Unit 1 Techni-cal Specifications as per Reference 3. Currently the Beaver Valley Unit 1 Technical Specifications do not contain the charges described in WCAP-10271. The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Specifications will be modified as per WCAP-10271 only when the Beaver Valley Unit 1 Technical Specifications are also to be modified for these changes.

Currently Duquesne Light Company is waiting for WOG efforts on similar changes for the Engineered Safeguards Features Systems to be completed before acting on the Reactor Trip System changes described in WCAP-10271.

Page 7 of 8

References

1) Duquesne Light letter, dated March 18, 1985 from Mr. J. J. Carey to Mr.

D. G. Eisenhut

2) Duquesne Light letter, dated April 22, 1985 from Mr. J. J. Carey
3) NRC letter, dated September 18, 1984 from Mr. G. Knighton to Mr. J. J.

Carey Page 8 of 8

/

/

OVERSIZE  !

DOCUMENT -

i PAGE PULLED  !

SEE APERTURE CARDS NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS i

i APERTURE CARD /HARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM RECORD SERVICES BRANCH,TIDC FTS 492-8989 O

F e

I

-,v--we---~ . _ , - . ., . . _ . , - . ~ . - _ . . - ~ . . . .w-._m__,-.e_m.___________