ML20206L458

Insp Rept 50-293/88-30 on 881027-1118.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Followup Activities Re Loose Anchor Bolts in Pipe Support Base Plate,Safety Significance of Subj Discrepancy & Response to Bulletins 79-002 & 79-014

ML20206L458
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	11/21/1988
From:	Carrasco J, Chaudhary S, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206L449	List: ML20206L444 ML20206L458
References
50-293-88-30, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8811290576
Download: ML20206L458 (27)

See also: IR 05000293/1988030

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . _ _

, *. s '. ' .: ,

.,

,- .

.

.

l

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

.

Report No. 50-293/88-30

Docket No,' 50-293

,

License No. OPR-35

Licensee: Boston Edison Company

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 3

RFD #1 Rocky Hill Road  ;

Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Facility Name: P!!:r!e: Mue!e:r Generatin; Statien ,  !

Inspection At: Plymouth, Massachusetts and Braintree, Massachusetts

Inspection Conducted: October 27, 1988 - November 18, 1988

Inspectors: a.4 M4 .-

li/r// gg

.

S '. audha or Reactor Engineer :date

f g

J:-fhrfrasco, R actor Engineer

//j4///8'

l

/ dite l

i Approved by: ~

. //[#/88

l~ J R. Strosnfder, Chief date

MPS, EB, DRS  ;

I l

Inspection Summary: Special announced inspection on October 27 -

November 18, 1988 (Report No. 50-293/38-30) ,

Area Inspected: The inspection .:uvered licensee follow-up activities with

regard to loose anchor bolts found in a pipe support base plate, the safety .

significance of this discrepan:y, and the adequacy of the licensee's previous l

programs in response to NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14,  !

L

Results: The inspection did not identify any condition that would adversely ,

impact system operability and safety. The licensae's bulletin follow-up L

program was found to be adequate.  !

I

l

l

-

8311290576 881121

PDR ADOCK0500tyj3

0

_

-

..

., 4.

.

.

.

1. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF INSPECTION

On October 14, 1988, an NRC inspector identified a penetration support

(No. X-52) with two loose concrete expansion anchor bolts in one of the

base plates. The base plate was ceiling mounted and had a total of six

anchor bolts to transfer load to the structural concrete in the ceiling.

The penetration support was on the "B" loop of the residual heat removal

system at elevation 33'-6", inside the "B" valve room in tne reactor

building. The deficiency was brought to the attention of the licensee

and subsequently the licensee implemented an extensive program of plant

walk-down inspectioas, anchor bolt torque testing, stress analyses and

records reviews to determine the extent and safety significance of the

problem.

An NRC inspection of licensee activities regcrding this issue was conducted

at the Pilgrim plant and at the licensee engineering offices in Braintree,

Massachusetts during the period from October 27 to November 4, 1988.

Further review of the findings from licensee plant walk-down and stress

analyses of piping supports'was performed in the NRC Region I office during

the week of November 14, 1988, and a management meeting was held with the

licensee on November 17, 1988 in the NRC Region I office to discuss NRC

findings and licensee actions to resolve *this issue. The objective of the

NRC inspection was to assess the extent and safety significance of the

loose anchor bolt problem and to assess the adequacy of the licensee's

actions to resolve the issue. During the course of the inspection the

scope of the licensee's activities and the NRC inspection was expanded to

include un assessment of the effectiveness of t*evious activites by the

licensee in response to NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 regarding piping

support base plates, and "as-built" configurations, respectively.

Section 2.0 of this report presents the NRC inspection findings regarding

the licensee's activities. Section 3.0 presents a summary of the

management meeting held on November 17, and Section 4.0 presents the 4

conclusions. Attachment 1 is a list of persons contacted during the

inspection, Attachment 2 1s a list of documents reviewed and Attachment 3

is an attendance list and copy of the licensee's presentation from the

November 17 management meeting.

l

l

i

I

I

l

. . , - . .

..

,

s

'.f *

.,

.

-

3

2.0 CONDUCT OF INSPECTION '

Following discovery of the loose anchor bolts in containment penetration

pipe support X-52, the licensee implemented a program to 16ntify and

examine simiitar penetration supports. The purpose of the program was to

determine the extent of the loose anchor bolt problem and to erify the

integrity of similiar suppe -ts..on other primary containment penetrations.

The licenseis program incsuded a review of plant drawings to determine

the location and type of supports on systems penetrating the primary

containment drywell. The licensee identified 393 drywell penetrations.

Out of these 393 penetrations, 303 are small bore (2 1/2 inches or less in

diameter) and hoe no pipe supports. For the remaining 90 large bore

penetrations, draw!ngs were reviewed and inspections were performed in the

4

plant to determine if there were any supports installed to strengthen the

penetrations. The resiew identified 16 large bore piping penetrations in

, primary containment with supplementary structural steel and base plates, t

These penetrations are l hted below.

Penetrations with drilled in expansion anchors:  ;

X-12, RHR Shutdown Cooling, A-RHR Valve Room

X-51A, RHR-LPCI Loop "A", A-RHR Valve Room

X-518, RHR-LPCI Loop "B", B-RHR Valve Room

X-52, HPCI Steam Supply, B-RHR Valve Room

X-53, RCIC Steam Supply, TIP Room, and ,

• X-7A thru 0, X-8, X-9A and B, (Steam Tunnel Gang Support).  ;

Penetrations with cast-in place anchors:  ;

X-14, RWCU Ht Ex Su; tion, RWCU Ht Ex Room

X-16A, Core Spray Loop "A", RWCU Ht Ex Room

'

. X-16B, Core Spray Loop "B", MG Set Rm Area, and i

X-17, RHR Head Spray, Full Pool Ht Ex Room. '

! ,

These penet. rations involved ten supports, because one of the supports i

(identified with *) was a "gang" support for seven piping penetrations. '

For penetration X-14, the licensee's inspection indicated that the support

i was installed using "Wej-it" anchors, although the design drawing

indicated cast-it place anchors. l

l

! The licensee :onducted in plant inspections that included torque testing i

l of all the anchor bolts in the ten containment penetration pipe supports

!

as well as comparison of the "as-built" configuration of the supports to

the design drawings. This inspection identified two loose base plate  ;

i anchor bolts in support X-51A in addition to the two loose bolts that had ,

been observed in support X-52. Also, several discrepancies between the  !

"as-built" configuration of the supports and the design drawings were *

'

, identified. These discrepancies included items such as missing cross <

bracing, missing gusset, plates and, in some cases, over sized structural  :

l members. i

!

i

,

..

• (

.

'

.

.

.

.

-

4

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's follow-up on this problem to

verify that the safety significance of the identified deficiencies was

being properly evaluated and that licensee actions were adequate to

resolve the issue. On October 27, 1988, two NRC inspectors performed an

inspection in the plant to visually examine support X-52 in which the

loose anchor bolts were initially observed and other similiar containment

penetration supports that the licensee had identified arJ examined.

Also, the findings from the licensee's plant inspectione and their

ongoing evaluations were reviewed by the NRC inspecurs at the licensee's

engineering offices in Braintree, Massachusetts. Based on this review

and discussion with licensee personnel engaged in the follow-up on this

problem, the NRC inspectors identified the two following coacerns:

1. Adequacy of the containment penetration pipe supports to assure

systm operability considering the deficiencies identified in the

licensee's walk-Jown inspections, and ,

2. Adequacy of the licensee's previous programs and actions in

response co NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 regarding piping support

base plates and "as-built" discrepancies, respectively.

The licensee's actions and NRC inspection activities in these two creas

are discussed in the following sections.

2.1 Adequacy-of "As-Built" Containment Penetration Pipe Supports.

Because original design calculations could not be located for all of

the containment penetration pipe supports and because of the

discrepant conditions identified, the licensee performed stress

analyses for all ten of the penetration pipe supports. Two sets of

analyses were performed. The first analyzed the "as-found"

condition of the discrepant supports to determine if the identified

discrepancies would impact system operability. For these analyses a

minimum factor of safety of two was considered necessary to demonstrate

system operability. This approach is consistent with NRC Bulletins

79-02 and 79-14. The second set of analyses was performed to determine

if the applicable code factors of safety committed to in the FSAR

were satisfied or if modifications or repairs to the discrepant

supports were necessary.

The NRC inspectors reviewed in detail the reanalyses of all ten

containment penetration pipe supports to determine the technical

validity of the analytical apnroach and the acceptability of the

results of the calculations, ihe reviews were performed at the BECo

engineering offices during the period from October 28, 1988 to

November 4, 1988, and in the NRC Region I offices during the week of

November 14. The following aspects c the calculations were

reviewed:

, */ *

' !.

,

.

-

S

- Origin and validity of the loads on the supports;

- Coordinate axis and orientation of the loads used in the

analyses;

- Methods and basis of load combinations;

- Transformation of loads from global to local axes, as

required;

- Validity of the mathematical models in representing the

correct "as-built" geometry and dimensions of the supports;

- Validity of interaction equations for structural members,

eided connections, cast-in place anchors, and concrete

expansion anchors;

- Random checks of numerical values; and

- Overall validity of assumptions, analytical procedures, and

conclusions.

The inspectors also verified that the containment penetration pipe

supports were properly modeled as anchor points in the piping stress

analysis models.

Based on their review, the NRC inspectors identified no deficiencies

in the licensee analyses and concluded that the analyses were properly

performed and supported the licensee's conclusions.

The results of the licensee's calculations indicated that all ten

containment penetration pipe supports had a minium factor of safety

of two in their "as-found" condition. Thus indicating that the

identified discrepancies between the "as-found" configuations and

design drawings did not affect system operability. The licensee's

calculations also demonstrated that eight of the ten supports

satisfied the applicable code factors of safety committed to in the J

FSAR and that the remaining two supports would satisfy those factors

of safety af ter repair or modification. The licensee informed the

NRC that the specific repairs and modifications required are in

progress, and are expected to be complete by November 22, 1988.

The licensee also performed a records review and physical

examinations to determine the cause of the loose anchor bolts

identified in supports X-52 and X-51A. It was determined that the

entainment penetration pipe supports were included on the

containment civil / structural design drawings and not on the piping

..

.

v.;  :;

,

. . . . -

,

~ .

.

,

.

'. 6

drawings that had been used to establish the Bulletin 79-02 and l

79-14 and pipe support ISI programs. As a result, the containment

per etration pipe supports apparently had not received the same

tk sughness of inspection as other piping supports. The licensee

, u formed a review of other civil structural drawings and a plant

i walk-down to verify that no other supports had been missed in a

j similiar fashion. In addition, the licensee performed physical

inspections of the loose anchor bolts found in supports X-52 and

X-51A. These particular bolts were "Wej-it" type anchor bolts located

in ceiling and wall base plates. Examinations revealed that the bolt

holes in support X-52 had been drilled oversize and the bolts grouted

in place. The anchor spades on the bolts showed no indication that

they had been properly set and the washer tabs that operate the anchor

,

spade push rods were bent on two bolts. The loose bolts in X-51A also

appeared to have not been properly anchored when Initially installed.

As a result of these observations, it was concluded that the failures

i

were most likely due to improper installation in the difficult over

head and wall positions. Torque testing of other bolts as described

later in this report included a large number of additonal "Wej-it"

, type anchors and no other loose "Wej-it" anchors were identified.

+

The NRC inspectors reviewed licensee data and visually examined removed

"Wej-it" bolts and concluded that no generic installation problem

existed.

2.2 Adequacy of Prior Activities Related To Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14

The loose anchor bolts and "as-built" discrepancies identified in the

containment penetration pipe supports raised concerns regarding the

adequacy of prior licensee activities in response to NRC Bulletins

79-02 and 79-14 regarding piping support base plates and "as-built"

,

configuations, respectively. To address this concern the licensee

performed ir ,, ant inspections of piping supports included in the

79-02 and 79-14 programs and other supports, including dual service

pipe whip restraint / pipe supports and civil structures (cat walks,

etc.) utilizing anchor bolt supports. A review of previous pipe

support inservice inspection program results also was performed.

Licensee Inspections c' Supports in the 79-02 and 79-14 Programs

l

! The licensee initiated a program of "as-built" verification inspec-

. . tions and anchor bolt torque testing for pipe supports that were

included in the NRC Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 programs. Statistical

, sampling methods described in, "Sampling procedures and Tables for

i

Inspection by Attribute", MIL-Standard 1050, indicated that a sample

size of 80 was necessary to provide a 95% confidence level of a .95

probability that the percentage of defective supports was five percent

i or less. The actual number of supports inspected to verify the

"as-built" configuration was 115. These supports were included on

nine isometric drawings selected from the five plant systems identified

l

as most important to risk in the pilgrim Individual plant Evaluation

(IPE). The selected systems were: high pressure core injection

l

l

. - _ _ - . - - .

- ___- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

• E.

~

. */.

..

.

,

.

.. 7

-

... .

(HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), residual heat removal

(RHR/LPCI), core / pray (CS) and salt service water (SSW). In addition,

184 base plates were inspected and 160 anchor bolts torque tested in

accordance with mant.facturer reconmendations. These inspections and

tests identified four 1cose anchor bolts out of the 160 tested and

five discrepancies in a pports; none of which impacted system oper-

-

ability.

,

The most significant discrepancy identified was a failed member on an

RHR pipe support. The failure occurred at a fillet weld between a

vertical tubular support member and a ceiling base plate. The licensee

performed visual examin.. tons of twelve other supports in the RHR

system (not part of the original 115 sample) and found no other

damaged supports.. Licensee evaluation concluded that the failure was -

the result of lack of penetration of the fillet weld and possible

thermal hydraulic loads in the system; although, no other evidence of

significant pipe motion or damage was observed. Also, the licensee

reviewed the erection / installation documents of the support to identify

the welder who had performed the installation welding. By this review

. of records the licensee established that the. two welders who had

. performed welding on the failed support r. iso had worked on six (6)

l other supports in addition to the one i,ith the' failed weld. The

4 licensee performed visual examinations of these supports and found

that two welds had minor discrepanctes (one with weld spatter and

i one undersized). All inspected welds, however, were determined to be

acceptable for intended service.

Dual Service Supports and Civil Structure Inspections

In addition to the above, the licensee performed "as-built"

!

inspections of 15 supports in balance-of plant systems,14 supports

i in non-safety related high energy systems, performed torque testing

I on 125 anchor bolts in pipe whip restraints and 94 anchor bolts in

j civil / structural supports such as catwalks. These inspections

revealed no significant "as-built" discrepancies. Of the 207 anchor

i bolts tested,16 failed to reach the manufacturer specified torque

I values. As of November 18, none of the conditions found were determined

l to affect system operability; although, analyses of some conditions

i were still in progress. In addition to operability analyses, the

i licensee was performing analyses to confirm that the discrepant supports

'

satisfy applicable code factors of safety or will satisfy these

-l factors of safety af ter repairs are completed. The inspectors reviewed

l in detail analyses for the following dual service supports:

i

,

-_.

, ____ ______ _____ ___ ____ -_______ -__________ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _

. .

'. ,

-[- .

. 8

,

H 12-115, H 12-1-116, H 12-1-117 (i %.681),  ;

H 12-1-111, H 12-1-112, H 12-1-113 (150.680)  :

H 23-1-102 (I50.602) . l

-

H6-1-200 & H6-1-201 (ISO, 644), and -

7

H 1-1-200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205 (1S0.694)

>

The above review indicated that there was no appannt tret.d or

programatic inadequacy in the design of these supports. Also, the  !

review of discrepancies identified in the licensee's inspection did -

not disclose any safety significant problem in the installa',fon of

these supports.

The results of the operabil.ity analyses and the analyses to

5

demonii.ral.e code safety factors will be examined during a future NRC

, inspection (IFl 293/88-30-01).

l

Piping Support ISI Procram Review

• ;

The inspectors determined that the licensee's inservice inspection-  !

program includes a visual inspection of 100% of the safety related

piping supports every ten years. Since 1985, approximately 600

supports have been inspected by the licensee under this program.

The inspectors questioned whether these inspections had revealed any

discrepant conditions relevant to the current issues. The licensee

performed a review of the non-conformanco reports associated with ISI

activities. The results of this review indicated that there was no

discernable trend or other evidence indicating previous similar pipe

support problems.

3.0 NOVEMBER 17, 1988 MEETING

A management meeting was held with the licensee on November 17, 1988

in the NRC Region I office to discuss the NRC inspection findings,

the safety significance of the loose anchor bolts and the licensees

program for resolving the issue. A list of the meeting attendees and

a copy of the licensee presentation are included in Attachment 3.

During the meeting the licensee presented the scope and findings of

their program to resolve the loose anchor bolt concern and their

schedule for final dispositon of identified discrepancies. The

licensee indicated that all necessary repairs would be completed by

approximately November 22. They also stated that their review to

determine if any aspect of the issue requires reportability under

10CFR S0.72 would be completed by approximately the end of November.

. _ _ _

'"

..

' *

... ,

1.

.;

.

'

. 9

i

4.0 CONCLUSIONS ,

i

Based on the above inspections, evaluations, and observations by  ;

inspectors, the NRC Region I staff identified no conditions regarding ,

the containment drywell penetrations th..>tould adversely impact *

operability of the associated systems. The licensee's plan to repair  ;

and restore the pipe supports to meet their design safety rargin i

required by ASME code prior to plant start-up is acceptable. The '

licensee's exter ive ti. plant walk down inspections, reanalyses and ,

-

in-depth evaluations of identified deficiencies, and corrective

, actions, when necessery, have provided confidence in the reliability

of plant safety' systems to fulfill their intended fcction.

'

Additionally, the licensee's efforts to assure the tdequacy of prior I

activities relative to Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 have demonstrated  !

that those activities were generally adequate to identify and 1

resolve significant deficiencies as was intended by the bulletins.

The licensee's current efforts in this area have been extensive and  !

are based on recognized statistical methods to provide an acceptable ,

level of confidence that systems important to safety are operable, i

The above conclusion is also supported by the licensee's in-service '

inspection program for pipe supports, the results of which do not

indicate any adverse trend in this area.

,

t

i

l

\ ,

J I

d

i

e

'

i

!

,

i

5

^

4 L

L

!

i

j

,

. , - , - , - - - - , , ~ . , - , _ , , . , . _ - , - - , - . , , , , , _ , , , _ _ , , , , _ , , , , , , , - -

, , - - - .

-

, _ , , - - . , _ , - . _ , , - . , - , , , - - , , , ,

., ~J '.

'

.

! , Attachment 1 :

g PERSONS CONTACTED

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY

R. N'. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager .

H. V. 0heim, Deputy Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department

R. V. Fairbank, Design Section Manager

R. E. Grazio, Regulatory Section Manager  ;

P. Hamilton, Compliance Division Manager '

W. Riggs, Fluid Systems & Mechanical Components Division Manager

F. N. Famulari, Quality Assurance Manager

N. L. Desmond, Operations Quality Control Division Manager  ;

T. J. Tracy, Civil Structural Division Minager

J. Jerz, Project Manager

S. Roberts, Principal Mechanical Engineer i

-

V. J. Zukauskas, Principal Structural Engineer

L. Chan, Mechanical Enginaar

G. Mileris, Hechinical Engineer i

R. C. Chugh, Structural Engineer

J. G. Dyckman, Structural Engineer

C. T. Pitts, Structural Engineer ,

C. D. Rydman, Structural Engineer a

S. L. Manning, Structural Engineer  !

CYGNA ENERGY SERVICES

N. Williams, Project Engineer

BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION

!

'

N. Goel, Pipe Stress Analist

i R. Canti, Pipe Stress Analist

>

!

i

+

,

1

d

4

!

v:>

l

!

I

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

..

,: [.

.

-

Attachment 2

'

DOCUMENT REVIEWED

CALCULATIONS

BECo Calc No. Title

C15.0.2740, Rev. O Support for Penetration X-12

C15.0.2741, Rev. O Support for Penetration X-51A

C15.0.2742, Rev. O Support for Penetration X-518

C15.0.2729, Rev. O Support for Penetration X-52

C15.0.2743, Rev. O Support for Penetration X-53

C15.0.2744, Rev. O Support for Fenetration X-7,8,9

C15.0.2733, Ray. O Support for Penetration X-14

C15.0.2735, Rev. O Support for Penetration X-16A

C1:i.0.2745, Rev. O Support for Penetration X-16B

C15.0.2734, Rev.,0 Support for Penetration X-17

C15.0.2747. Rav. O

C15.0.2736, Rev. O

C15.0.2737, Rev. O Pipe Support H12-1-111 (PR-12-1-1)

H12-1-112 (PR-12-1-2), H12-1-113 (PR-12-1-3),

ISO 680

C15.0.2738, Rev. O

C15.0.2746, Rev. O Pipe Supports H12-1-115 (PR-12-1-5),

H12-1-116 (PR-12-1-6), H12-1-117 (PR-12-1-7),

150 681

DRAWINGS

BEco Orawing No. Drawing Title

I

H33, Rev. E5 Piping & Mechanical - Reactor Building Areas 1

and 3, plan above EL. 23'-0" to EL 40'-9".

l M35, Rev. E5 Piping & Mechanical - Reactor Building Area

! 3, plan above EL 40'-9".

1

'

H36, Rev. E3 Piping & Mechanical - Reactor Building Areas

1 and 3, plan above EL.51'-0".

H36, Rev. E3 Piping & Mechanical - Reactor Building Areas

1 and 3, plan above EL.74'-3".

.

C127, Rev. 3 Reactor Building - Main Steam Pipe supports

I (sheet 1)

-1-

l

l

l

__

-

.

.-

• f

, .'

.*  ;

Attachment 2-

". DOCUMENT REVIEWED Cont.

C127A, Rev. 5 Reactor Building - Miscellaneous Pipe

. supports (sheet 2)

Cl34, Rev. E2 Reactor Building - Steel Framing at Elev.

51'-0; Plan, Sections and Details l

C135, Rev. 5 Reactor Building - Steel Framing et Elev.

51'-0", Details (SH.2)

C152, Rev. E2 Reactor Building - Containment Vessel

Requirements, Drywell; Plans, Sections and ,

Penetr&tions

C153, Rev. E4 Reactor Building - Containment Vessel

,

Requirements, Suppression Chamber; Plan, i

' Sections and Penetrations

t

'

C373, Rev. 3 Reactor Building, Miscellaneous Structural

,

Steel (Sheet 3)

J

C357, Rev. El Reactor Building, Miscellaneous Structural  !

Steel; Pipe Restraints for Main Steam and

Feedwater

4

'

C803, Rev. E3 Reactor Building, R. H. R. Valve Compartment  !

FL. El. 23'-0", Pipe Restraints, Anchor,  !

! Valve and Cable Protection

i .

C805, Rev. E2 Reactor Building, R. W. C. V. Compartments EL  !

S1'-0" Pipe Restraints, M.0. Valve and Cable i

,

Protection

-

i

.

l

In addition to the above, substantial number of other documents were reviewed. i

i

Those documents included correspondences, specifications, procedures, f

' instructions, safety data sheets, and engineering and safety evaluations. ,

!  !

t

[

l  !

!,

1 i

!

!,

l 1

l

1 -2- f

,

.

I

l  :

i

l I

( I

'

i

. _ _ _ _ _ _ .

"

? -

, .,ATTACHMEllT 3

.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0mlSSION

.

DATE: /Vo v . / 7, /9 68

.

SUDJECT: [/ t. G erin (so 24T) ; /3 n3g /[,s 7c[ditt'ere//3ce /.

ATTENDEES: (Please Print) -

TITLE:

S. L' 0/A UD H A P V SW WEA cro R Suc,rtivW/. It)f C, S 1

llA(A' Lf/7f0fMcNW O//M /kRk%If/f'/fKfXff7 //YT7&V J/rfUM

aup.>x t .- . a<r, na-ran n w. we.

_'G a re ra k : 3a %;5 A

^

s. /% ri, J

,

%97f"

, Ji Gsersus ABush dur. Ai>+. /

v v

hG/'N l. G(W . Ass isa Mb/.$6.c - /AA73G" M6W.

Su A Amroson TvNrw Eason - Paar Nag

Sold E, C-<cox;,, 80 sin, G~/;sn faafnh<v

u y Afle' n Nr.

,

8 G , 8Wd tehn GJsc>, .s. w Pos.cos Jaa.,-

2. td, &asa n /$oden EJn <>, -^{ rubs <F e.. ,,,,,y nige

.

O. k va Mc M r Bh<eL

l A,3,V(avi. t)fLC-, CA, d b RfJ 3I5 D R.P

-

- ,

L,T . 30 FR T L c i d NTR t 'P R o rs c.T cm / ME ft.

}

! 3.'T, ULh44is W c. ..C Hier PaFJu rr t$r>me a_

E. &Ab nac . Ih.,s b.4 6 . u s

l T. MA tec: tonR ,/ ts6 B

~T* K e 6 eIowki ._n a c ,

v g

Sen wv Res efor & fc e#

e

!

1

8/1988/djh

i

[ AGENDA

.

-

. .

[ .'

'

.'.

I Summary and Conclusion

11 initial Finding and BECo. Response

ill Investigation Process and Completeness

.

IV Positive Results

V Subsequent Findings and Disposition

VI Sumniary and Conclusions

2

i

6

l

.

.

.

.

l ACHIEVED HIGH CONFIDENCE IN PIPE SUPPORTS AND

!

j BASE PLATE ANCHORAGE THROUGH EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION

Pipe Suppo.rts installed per Stress Analysis of Record

' Anchor Bolts, including Wej-its, Properly Installed

Findings Few, Significance Low, None Reportable ~

Soundness of IEB 79-02,79-14 Programs Consistently

Evident

System Operability Consistently Demonstrated

i

3

.

_ - . - - _ . _ _.

. .

,.

_

'

_

'

.-

INVESTIGATION PROCESS WAS DISCIPLINED l

AND THOROUGH

Find Deviation

Define Problem

Identify Causes, Contributing Factors

Postulate Extent, Potential Significance

Establish Reportability

Initiate Corrective / Preventive Actions

Capture Lessons Learned

(

4

.

__ ___ . - _ . _ . -

..

.

.- . ,.

,

.

.' -

SIGNIFICANCE OF LOOSE BOLT QUICKLY RECOGNIZED

Close to Restart

Potential Programmatic Implications identified

- IEB 79-02

- IEB 79-14

- Tack Welded Fasteners

- Wej-Its

Potentially Large Scope

, -

5

.

-, . -

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.- . .

.

,

.

.

.

BECO'S RESPONSE WAS CONSISTENT WITH

.!

l POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE

i

l

-

I

1

i

j Effort Directed by Senior Level Managers

1

Use of Utility Resources Maximized

1 Series of Checks / Balances Set in P! ace

I

l Management _ Oversight Established Early

l 8000 Engineering and QA Manhours ~

l Expended Over 34 Days

4

!

l

i

'

6

,

e

%

. _ _ . . - -

_ _ _ _ .-

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ __

_ _ _ _ _

.-

._ . - _ -

l .- . .

j .

,s

-

-

i

l

'

PIPE SUPPORT LOCATION. ORIENTATION. FUNCTION

AGREED WITH ANALYSIS AND lEB 79-14 INSPECTION RESULTS

l

!

!

Walkdowns Performed on Five Most Safety Significant

Systems Based on IPE Results

. - Represented a Sample Population of Hangers Meeting

j MIL STD 105D Criteria ,

I

'

Only One Minor Deviation Was Found

_

No Additional Supports identified

As-Found Conditions Confirmed Operable

Pipe Penetration Anchors Were Considered as Pipe Stress

Analysis Termination Points

c

Dual Purpose Whip Restraints Were Considered in the Pipe ,

Stress Analysis

7

.

--

- - , - _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - . - , - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

-_ _ _ - . _ _ . - _ .

. _ _ _ -. . _-

. - - - - - _ . . . - .-

'

'

. . .'s

,

'

-

..

ANCHOR BOLT CONFIRMATORY WALKDOWN RESULTS

AGREED WITH IEB 79-02 INSPECTION RESULTS

Sample Population for Walkdowns Exceeded

MIL STD 105D Criteria

Only 2 Repairs Required as a Result of

Walkdowns

Torque Tests Performed on Identified Wej-Its

for Large Bore; Safety Related Pipe

Torque Tests Were Approximately 95%

Successful

No Reportable Findings

1

8

.

. _ - . __ _

.

'

','.

-

.

j IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION ISOLATED THE ISSUE

TO LIMITED NUMBER OF BOLT INSTALLATIONS

l

.

Initial Problem (Tack Welded Nuts to Plate) Found in Only

i

One Other Place

) Anchor Sensitive Walkdown by Expert Consultants

Revealed Just Three items of Significance

.

Installation Problems Limited to Wej-Its

- Use of Wej-Its Limited

4

l - Findings Modest

,

- Installation Craftsmanship Good

J

l

i

i

I

9

i

l .

._ .

--. . . _ _ _ - . . . _ - _ _ _ __ . .. ._ .__

f e

-

.

,.

-

.

.

'

EXPOSURE REDUCTION MEASURES WERE USED

THROUGHOUT THE FIELD WORK

Lifts and Ladders in Place of Scaffolding

Remote inspection Device Used Where Possible

Inspection Teams Staffing

- Minimum Size Sufficient to Perform the Function

- Personnel Qualifications Reviewed

Pre-inspection Review Meetings

- Reviewed Detailed Task Scope

- Attended by ALARA and Radiation Protection

Supervision -

Engineering Products Were Established to Respect ALARA

- Detailed Review to Ensure Sufficient Detail

- On-Site Engineering Coverage Provided

- Cautions in PDC About ALARA Group Involvement

!

! Dedicated RWPs Generated for Exposure Tracking

!

o

l

-

,

.- _ _ _ _ _ - _ .

- _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -

. . .

.

-

-

.

.

'

ALARA PERFORMANCE WAS CLOSELY MONITORED-

THROUGHOUT THE INVESTIGATION

i

l

- Penetration Support inspection Repair

1

ALARA Budget 4.2 Person Rem

l Expended 3.82 Person Rem (100% Complete)

- Anchor Bolt inspection / Test

1

ALARA Budget .

3.0 Person Rem

l

Expended 2.013 Person Rem (95% Complete)

l

I

' 11

,

,

l

• ,.

_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - , , . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _

_ . . , . , _ _ . _ - - _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

_ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ -____ _ _ _ _ __ - _ .

' ~ '

.

WALKDOWN, TEST & INSPECTION SUMMARY .' -

'

DATES ISOs PlPE ANCHOR B/P FINDINGS

SCOPE -

SUPPTS BOLTS

79-14 10/30 9 115 -

Consistent with79-14

79-02 11/5 & 6 30 =298  ; g 184 Consistent with 79-02

'# ns

g EQE 11/8-10 3 Items of Significance

Inspections Cnmt Pipe 10/21 10 Minor Physical Deviations

Anchors -11/10

Cnmt Pen 10/31 8 -

Verified No Steel

w/o Steel

BOP W!R 10/30 15 -

FW Pipe Support w/o Vert Rest.

NSR HEL 11/11 14 =

No Wej-Its Found

"Baseline" 4 Loose Bolt in X-51B

79-02 11/7-11 21 33 160 156 Passed,4 Failed

Whip Rest. 11/11-13 125 117 Passed,8 Failed

Torque EQE 11/12 94 90 Passed,4 Failed

RETEST 11/12-14 5 5 Passed

UT Whip Rest. 11/14 44 9 One Short Bolt

Walkdowns 9I

Tack Weld 11/3 68 2 Supports w/ Tack Welds

79-14 Supp 19 Operable As-Found

Analyses

Other,Supp 7 Operable As-Found (prelim.)

Pipe 11/2-18 5 Operable As-Found 12

. -

- - _

- - - - _ - . - - - - . _. ._-

i_ '

-:

'

.

SUMMARY OF INSPECTION FINDINGS .

.

Scope

_

issues Disposition Status

Tack Welded

Containment Anchor Bolts X-52 Repair Complete

Penetration & X-52

Pipe Whip X-51B Accept-As-Is F/C 11/18

Restraint X-51 B

inspections

Minor Phys.ical Accept-As-Is F/C 11/20

Dev,iations

Tack Welds Others Observed Accept-As-Is Complete

FW Pipe Support w/o Accept-As-Is Complete

Vertical Restraint

RHR Pipe Support Repair Complete

IEB 79-02/14 Weld Failure

Samples SSW Pipe Support Repair F/C 11/18

HPCI Pipe Support Ac~ceptable As-Is Complete

Loos " ds

DP S /.59 Repair F/C 11/18

'

D/G Fuel Oil Line Acceptable As-Is F/C 11/18 '

13

.

, . - - - . , . - - . . . - - - , - - - - - - - , - - . - - - - - - - - - , - -

._

4 .

.

• .2

.

.

SUMMARY OF INSPECTION FINDINGS (cont'd)

)

Scope issues Disposition Status

j immovable Nuts (154) Accept-As-Is Complete

Spinners (3) Reset Complete

I Spinner.cp) Repair F/C 11/22

Toque Test

Oversized Nut Repair F/C 11/18

Pull Out (1) Repair F/C 11/22

Cut Ends (4) Accept-As-lo F/C 11/18

Cut Ends (2) Repair F/C 11/22

_

Severed Bolt (1) Accept-As-Is F/C 11/18

Ultr sonic Short Bolt (1) Accept-As-Is F/C 11/18

Analysis /

Coniiquration Five Conflicts Evaluation and Contplete

Vecilication Revised Analysis

14

.

- , . , - . .-- ..

_ _ _ __ _ ____ - _ _ _ . ___- - - - _ .. - - _-__ - _ - = _ .

'

j , . .

,

,

.

- ~

,

j ^

i

1

l ACHIEVED HIGH CONFIDENCE IN PIPE SUPPORTS AND

1

l BASE PLATE ANCHORAGE THROUGH EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATIOt!

1

!

'

j

l i

!

l

-

Pipe Setports Installed per Stress Analysis of Record

1

Anchor Bolts, including Wej-Its, Proparly Installed

1 Findings Few, Significance Low, i;or:0 Reportable

l

I -

Soundness of IEB 79-02,79-14 Programs Consistently

Evident f

-

System Operability Consistently Demonstrated

,

'

p

.

,

i

f

-

j i

!

!

!

'

I