ML20138F831

TMI-1 Control Room Habitability Study:Analysis of Radiological & Chemical Accidents for Abnormal Flow Paths to Control Room, Final Rept

ML20138F831
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/28/1985
From:	Fenstermacher PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138F805	List: ML20138F800 ML20138F831 ML20138F868 ML20138F938
References
PLG-0433, PLG-433, NUDOCS 8510250359
Download: ML20138F831 (70)

Text

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ATTACHMGA1T1 1

PLG-01433 s

TMI-1 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY STUDY:

ANALYSIS OF RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS FOR -

ABNORMAL FLOW PATHS TO THE CONTROL ROOM

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, ' GENERAL PUBLIC UTI.;LITIES . ..

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FINAL REPORT a p e

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AUGUST 28, 1985

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T. EDWARD FENST.E.RMACHER . ,.

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8510250359 851018 PDR ADOCK 05000289 p PDR Pickard,Lowe andGarrick,Inc.

Engineers e AppliedScientists e Management Consultants

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Newport Beach, CA Washington, DC

s PLG-0433 I

l TMI-l CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY STUDY:

ANALYSIS OF RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS FOR ABNORMAL FLOW PATHS TO THE CONTROL ROOM prepared for General Public Utilities FINAL REPORT August 28, 1985 by T. Edward Fenstermacher

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, Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. .

120018th Street, N.W. , Suite 612 Washington, D.C. 20036 W

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TABLE OF CONTENTS I Section Page 1 INTRODUCTION 1-1 2 SCOPE OF THIS STUDY 2-1 3 METHODOLOGY 3-1 3.1 Modeling the large Break LOCA 3-1 3.2 Modeling Ammonium Hydroxide Tank Ruptures 3-1 3.3 Modeling Chlorine Tank Ruptures

' 3-4 3.4 Modeling Atmospheric Dispersion 3-7 3.5 Modeling Flow in the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings and the Portion of the Control Butiding i l

Outside the Control Building Envelope 3-8 '

3.6 Modeling Doses to Control Room Personnel 3-9 3.7 Modeling of Toxic Gas Concentrations in tne Control Building Envelope 3-13 4 DATA 4-1 4.1 Hydros Input Data 4-1 4.2 Ammonium Hydroxide and Related Data 4-1 4.3 Chlorine and Related Data 4-1 4.4 Volume and Flow Data foe the Auxiliary, Fuel Handling and Control Intenncdiate Turbine Buildings 4-2 4.5 Control Building Envelope t' low Data 4-2

[ 4.6 Dose Limits 4-2 l

4.7 Toxicity Limits 4-2 4.8 Meteorological and Dispersion Data 4-3 f 5 ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 5-1 5.1 Analysis of the Large Break LOCA via the Exhaust Damper .

5-1 5.2 Analysis of the Design Basis LOCA via the Auxiliary

[

and Fuel Handling Buildings 5-1 5.3 Analysis of the Unit 1 Amonium Hydroxide Tank Rupture via the Exhaust Vent 5-2

[ 5.4 Analysis of the Chlorine Tank Rupture at the Unit 1 Chlorinator via the Exhaust Vent 5-2

( 6 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 6.1 6-1 Doses to Control Room Personnel from the Design Basis LOCA via the Exhaust Vent 6-1 6.2 Doses to Control Room Personnel from the Design

[' Basis LOCA via the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Bq11 dings 6-1 6.3 Results of the Unit 1 Ammonium Hydroxide Tank

[ Rupture via the Exhaust Vent 6-1 6.4 Results of the Rupture of a Chlorine Tank at the r Unit 1 Chlorinator House via the Exhaust Vent 6-2 7 CONCLUSIONS -

7-1 1

._____-_________..________m_ _ . _ . _ . - _ . _ . _ _n.

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l TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section P,, age 8 REFERENCES 8-1 APPENDIX A I

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LIST OF TABLES Table p,g, 4-1 Data for Design Basis LOCA Accident 4-4 4-2 Properties and Storage of Ammoaf um Hydroxide {

4-3 4-5 Properties and Storage of Liquid Chlorine 4-6 4-4 Values Used in AUXFLOW Hodel 4-5 4-7 Control Building Envelope Flow Rates for Various Conditions, cfm 4-8 4-6 Joint Frequency Table Number of Occurrences of Wind Speed and Direction for Each Stability Class . 4-9 4-7 Data for and Results from Murphy-Campe Method 4-11 for the Design Basis LOCA 4-8 Values of XU/Q for Chemical Releases 6-1 4-12 Dose to Control Room Personnel vs. Total Intake Flow Rate with 200 cfm Leakage through Exhaust Damper 6-3 6-2

{ Dose to Control Room Personnel vs. Total Intake Flow Including 2000 cfm through Exhaust Damper 6-4 6-3 Limiting Flow Rates through Exhaust Damper to Avoid  !

r Exceedences of Limiting Beta Skin Dose 6-5

[ 6-4  ;

Dose to Control Room Personnel vs. Total Intake Flow Rate for Release into Auxiliary Building 6-6 6-5 Limiting Flow Rates into Control Building Envelope

( for Auxiliary Building Release to Avoid Exceedances of Limiting Beta Skin Doses 6-7 111 J

4 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 3-1 Model for Flow through the Auxiliary, Fuel Handling and Control Buildings 3-15 3-2 Model for Control Room Doses 3-16 3-3 Model for Toxic Gas Concentration 3-17 6-1 Maximum Allowable Leakage through Exhaust Damper 6-8 6-2 Maximum Allowable Leakage into Control Building Envelope via Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings 6-9 i

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l. INTRODUCTION J For reasons of safety, both of the general public and of control room personnel, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that, for a variety of potential accident situations, the control rooms of nuclear reactors

.ie maintained in a habitable condition. These accidents include the range of design basis radiological accidents as well as spills of chemicals which may result in injurious levels of toxic gases in the control room. The NRC has promulgated standards for the evaluation of

) these potential hazards in section 6.4 of the Standard Review PlanI and 2

Regulatory Guide 1.4 which deals primarily with the radiological 3

hazard; Regulatory Guide 1.78 which deals with the evaluation of 4

chemical hazards; and Regulatory Guide 1.95 which deals specifically .

with the chlorine hazard. The analysis methods used in this report comply with those in the above documents insofar as they are complete and applicable to the THI-1 control room; where methods are not specified or are, for some reason, inapplicable, appropriately conservative methodologies were developed for this analysis.

The accidents considered in this report all consider flow through pathways other than the normal control room intake system. It is postulated that these pathways could occur due to leaks or damper failures. The same accident sources have been considered, postulating all flow through the normal control room intake system (in either normal or emergency mode), in previous studies.

J 7558G062685 1-1

2. SCOPE OF THIS STUDY In this study, several accident source terms (both chemical and radiological) are studied in conjunction with pathways other than the control building air intake system. Accidents with the same source tenns but with flow paths through the air intake system have been considered in previous studies. It was felt that, for the sake of completeness, leakage of contaminated air by alternate pathways into the control building envelope should be considered.

The source terms considered in this study are:

1. design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA)

2. rupture of the Unit 1 ammonium hydroxide storage tank

3. rupture of a one-ton cylinder of liquid chlorine at the river the Unit I chlorinator

( For all three of these sources, the possibility of leakage through the exhaust damper (AH-D-37) was considered. In the first two cases the concern was the proximity of the damper to the source of contaimination.

For the last case, the concern was the lack of a chlorine detector at either the Unit 1 chlorinator or the exhaust damper. Additionally, the design basis LOCA was analyzed assuming that the entire design leakage '

went into the auxiliary building, and a portion of this activity let a into the control room via the fuel handling building, level 306' of the control building, the control building elevators and stairways, and the patio area, and finally into the control building isolation zone, i

The radiological accidents assume that ES actuation results in the closing of the intake dampers while the detectors in the control room cause automatic shutdown of normal ventilation in the control building envelope, followed by activation of the ventilation system in the emergency mode. The applicable portions of the Murphy-Campe method are ~

[-

applied to the radioactive releases. The ammonium hydroxide and chlorine releases are treated using k factors determined by Dr. James Halitsky in Appendix A, using the 5% worst meteorology. The ammonium hydroxide tank -

2-1 7559G100485

is considered surrounded by a dike which contains the spill. No Wrgency response to the chenical accidents is assumed, t

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3. METHODOLOGY ,

I The assumptions and methodology used in this study are in accordance with I

the Standard Review Plan 6.4 and Regulatory Guides 1.4,2 1.783 and 1.95.4 Where no specification was made of the models to be used in the analysis, appropriate models were developed as described in the following sections.

3.1 MODELING THE LARGE BREAK LOCA i The release of radioactive material resulting from a large bNak LOCA was calculated using the assumptions of paragraph c.1 of Reg. Guide 1.4.

Credit was taken for the removal of iodines by the Containment Spray System using Sodium Hydroxide spray solution. The assumptions and'models used in this analysis are presented in a previous report entitled, " Dose Estimates for Three Mile Island Unit 1: Spray Solution".5 This report describes the HYDROS computer code and all data input needed to calculate the leakage rate for.all radionuclides considered. For this study, the HYDR 0S code was modified to output the containment release rates as a function of time up to 30 days after postulated releases begin. These were needed as input to the Em.ergency Building Concentration and Dosimetry models described in Section 3.6.

The dilution of the plume of radioactive material between the containment and the intake vent was computed by using the Murphy-Campe method 0 described in Section 3.5. This should lead to conservative results.

3.2 MODELING AMMONIUM HYDR 0XIDE TANK RUPTURES

[

Aqueous ammonium hydroxide solution is a liquid at normal ambient temperatures and pressures. Upon release from the storage container the solution spills to the ground and ammonia (NH3 ) and water vapor (H 0) 2 evaporate from the spill to form a continuous plume. Only ammonia

~

impacts the habitability of the control building.

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3-1 J 7543G062685

J Since ammonia is more volatile than water, ammonia evaporates from the spill at a faster rati than the water. As a result, the fraction of ammonia in the spill decreases as evaporation proceeds. Since the NH 3

evaporation rate is proportional to the partial pressure of NH above 3

the liquid spill and since the partial pressure decreases as the weight fraction of NH3in the spill decreases, the ammonia evaporation rate -

decreases with time.

The ratio of evaporation of a chemical species i from a liquid mixture is given by:

Myf =hdi Ni A(t) (Psi - Pai)/RTa (3 l) where '

Mjy = rate of evaporation of chemical 1, gm/sec hdi = forced convection mass transfer coefficient for chemical 1, cm/sec Ni = molecular weight of chemical 1, gm/gm mole A(t) = area of spill at time t, cm2 Psi = saturated partial pressure of chemical's vapor above liquid mixture, atm Pai = partial pressure of chemical's vapor in ambient air, atm Ta = ambient temperature, *K R = gas constant = 82.05 cm3-atm/g-mole, *K t = time, see The forced convection mass transfer coefficient is given by:

h di = 0.037 Di Re0 .8 Sc0 .33 (3.2) p i where Di = mass diffusivity of chemical species i in air, cm2 /sec s

3-2 s 7543G062685

- _ ____ _-__-_________-____-___-___-_______n

l L = characteristic length of liquid spill, cm Re = L U pa/Ma = Reynolds Number, dimensionless Sci = Ua/Pa Dj = Schmidt Number of chemical species 1, dimensionless U' = mean wind velocity, cm/sec pa = density of ambient air, gm/cm3 Ua = viscosity of ambient air, gm/cm-sec The characteristic length of the spill is taken as the spill diameter.

Therefore:

(4A(t))1/2 (3.3) l f L(t) =

N ]

The liquid spill area, A(t), is given by A(t) = x ~2+2IgYYI2 r

g t I3 4)

(

( 3) -

where the density of air has been neglected. Here g = acceleration due to gravity, 980 cm/sec V, = initial volume of liquid, cm3 r

o

= initial radius of spill, cm t = elapsed time since rupture, sec It is assumed that the pool reaches its maximum size when A(t) equals the b dike area or the thickness of the pool is I cm, whichever occurs first.

To account for the depletion of ammonia in the spill, the model is applied as follows. At any time t, the mass of ammonia and water in the spill are Mj (t) and M2 (t), respectively. The mass fraction of ammonia in the spill is l

3-3 J 7543G062685

I Mg (t) (3.5) f(t) = .

Mj tt) + "2lt)

The saturation partial pressure of ammonia, Psl(t) and water Ps2(t) are functions of f(t) only and are given over a wide temperature and composition range in Reference 9. At time at later Mj (t + At) = Mj (t) - Myj(t) (3.6)

M2 (t + ot) = M2 (t) - Mv2(t) (3.7)

Mj (t + At) (3.8) f(t + at) = (t + at) + M2 (t + at) when Myj(t) and Mv2(t) are calculated from (3.1) to (3.3). Therefore, beginning at time 0, it is possible to update this amount of each species in the spill and their saturation partial pressures. The model allows f f(t) to fall to zero as time proceeds. The model is run with a background (ambient) partial pressure of zero for NH3 and one corresponding to 50% relative humidity for H 0.

2 This model has been implemented as the PLG code NH3VAP, which produces a time history of the evaporation rate of ammonia in grams per second from a pool of ammonium hydroxide for specified accident conditions.

3.3 MODELING CHLORINE TANK RUPTURES

[

According to NUREG-0570,8 the mass of chemical which is instantaneously flashed to form a puff release is

{

Myo =

MT Cp (T, - Tb)/H y (3.9)

M,y

=

mass of instantaneously vaporized (flashed) chemical, gm M

T

=

total initial mass of spilled chemical, gm l

L 3-4 s 7543G062685

I =

C p liquid heat capacity of chemical, cal /gm *C T, = ambient temperature *C T

b

=

n rmal boiling point of chemical, *C Hy =

heat of vaporization of chemical at normal boiling point, cal /gm The portion of the release which does.not flash to puff will form a liquid pool whose surface area is given by equation (3.4). This liquid (Mt -Myn) will vaporize by absorption of atmospheric and solar radiation, convection of air and ground conduction. NUREG-0570 gives the following formula for calculating the vaporization (boil-off) rate:

A(t)

( .

Mv(t) =

g g +h e - Tb ) + S (T, - Tb )/t 1/2' (3.10) r a v _

id(t)=vaporizationrate,gm/sec y

[ q p = solar and atmospheric radiation fluxes, cal /m -sec

( b c = heat transfer coefficient for wind convection, cal /m 2-sec *C T, = ambient temperature, assumed for both atmospheric and ground, *C

{

T b = chemical's normal boiling point, *C A(t) = liquid spill surface area, m 2

[

Hy = heat of vaporization, cal /gm 2 0 S = 197 cal /m _.C-sec .5 t = time after tank rupture, sec 3-5 7543GC62685

The wind convection heat transfer coefficient is conservatively assumed 2'

I to equal 1.6 cal /m -sec *C as suggested in NUREG-0570. Since radiation flux data were not available, q was r conservatively assumed to equal 2

275 cal /m sec. The values used fore h and7q do not significantly affect the calculations since evaporation due to ground conduction (last term in brackets in equation 3.4) far outweighs that due to radiation and wind convection except at extremely long times after release. At these long times the concentration in the control room has usually passed its maximum.

If (3.4) is substituted into (3.10), the resulting equation may be integrated to yield the mass remaining at time t, M(t):

M(t) = MT-N vo - at0.5 - bt - ct l.5 - dt 2 (3.11 )

where a = 2nSr 2 ( T, - T ) H y b

( b = nr2 [q +h c(T,-T)]H;I 7 b 4S(rgV g

)0.5 (T -TI c= a b 3g y

and d= (vgVg )0.5 [q +b c(T,-T)]H;I 7 b until the pool reaches its maximum extent and thereafter by:

M(t) = et0 .5 + ft (3.12) where e = 2SA,,, (T, - Tb ) H-l y f = A,,x [q r *U c (T, - Tb)] H;I l

L 3-6 7543G062685

and where A,,x is the maximum extent of the pool.

This model has beem implemented as the PLG code CL2VAP, which produces a time history of chlorine evaporation rate in grams per second for specified accident conditions.

3.4 MODELING ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION The dispersion of an effluent is generally modeled with the . equation L

CQ (3.13 )

x"Y

( where

= effluent concentration at receptor, in C1/m3 for radioactive

( X materials and g/m 3 for non-radioactive materials C = proportionality constant, which is a function of source position, receptor position, wind direction, atmospheric stability, and the structure of the terrain surrounding and between the source and receptor, in m-2 ,

Q = effluent release rate, in Ci/sec or g/sec as appropriate U = wind speed in m/sec j For the large break LOCA, Murphy and Campe propose0 C = [no j o, + a (K + 2)-I]-I (3.14) where o,g y = standard deviation of the effluent concentration in the horizontal crosswind and vertical directions respectively at distance s from a point source, m..

3-7 J 7543G062685-

a = projected area of containment building, m2 K = 3(d/s)l*4 s = distance between source and receptor locations, m d = containment diameter, m The values for of and o zare based on the most stable case excluding the worst 5% (i.e., 5% of all hours as or more stable than the stability chosen, 95% are as or less stable). This is known as the 5% stabili+J.

Similarly, the windspeed used for the first 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is the 5% windspeed,

( for the next 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> is the 10% windspeed, for the following three days is the 20% windspeed, while the 40% windspeed is used thereafter. The Murphy-Campe method also allows a correction for wind meander of

(

(.75 + .25F) from 8 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, (.5 + .5F) for 1 to 3 days, and F thereafter. Here F is the fraction of time that the wind direction results in exposure. Credit was also taken for the occupancy factor as allowed in the Murphy-Campe method.

For releases of toxic chemicals, values of C in equation (3.13) were

( derived from wind tunnel studies by Dr. James Halitsky (Appendix A).

These values are similar to Murphy-Campe results for the point-source and point receptor case when credit is taken for the finite size of the spill and receptor. For both chemical releases, the 5% worst meteorology was used.

3.5 MODELING FLOW IN THE A!!XILIARY AND FUEL HANDLING BUILDINGS AND THE PORTION OF THE CONTROL BUILDING OUTSIDE THE CONTROL BUILDING ENVELOPE The flow path including the Auxiliary Building, the Fuel Handling Building and the portion of the Control Building outside the isolation zone is modeled as shown in Figure 3-1. The quantity of each of the 18 radionuclides considered by HYDROS, described in Section 3.1, is determined in each compartment as a function of time by the PLG code g AUXFLOW, and the amount leaked into the control building envelope is L

F 3-8 7543G092685

determined for each radionuclide at each tirre ' step. The input to AUXFLOW consists of the volume of each compartment (V4 ) and the 5 flow values (Uj ) shown in Figure 3-1, along with the release quantities from HYDROS. The governing equations for radionuclide; C

oj(t) = ug-I Q,3(t) (3.15) l dC)) = nu Vf Cg )(t) - (ugj V 'I + Aj ) Cjj(t) (3.16) dt I

dC g=uj Vj Gjj(t) - (u V2 j +

j C 2j(t) (3. m dt 1

dC 3j " "2 Y Cg(t) - [(u2+uIY3 3

+

j] C3 )(t) (3.18 )

dt and Qjj(t) = u4 C3 )(t) (3.19) where C 9 )(t) is the concentration of radionuclide j in compartment i, and Ogj(t) and Q))(t) and the input and output quantities, respectively, of radionuclide j. The identity of the comparttents is given in Figure 3-1.

The equations are solved exactly in each time step. It is assumed that Qgj(t) may be treated as an exponential in each time step.

( 3.6 MODELING DOSES TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL The Control Building Envelope may be modeled as a flow system as shown in Figure 3-2. The time dependent concentrations of eighteen radionuclides in each of the three compartments shown in Figure 3-2 are computed by the PLG code CRDOSE, using the methods described below. The dose rates and integral doses received by personnel in the control room are also '

computed by CRDOSE.

L c

L J 3-9 7543G100285

The CRDOSE code uses time-dependent containment release rates for eighteen radionuclides produced by HYDROS, described in Section 3.1 or AUXFLOW, described in Section 3.5. The remaining data is input by the g

user, and consists of the volume (V 4) of each compartment, the

) volumetric flow rate (uj ) into that compartment, the volumetric flu rate from that compartment into the recirculation loop (uj ), the intake volumetric flow rate (un ), the filter efficiency (n), and the volume of the intake duct (VD ). For a given isotope, other pertinent variables are the intake concentration measured after decay in the intake duct (C,(t)), the concentration of the radionuclide in each compartment as a function of time (Cg (t)), and the decay constant AD. The concentrations are then governed by the equations dC g 3 (3.20)

[ ct j1 Ygj C3 (t) + vjg C (t) where A

9

= uj /V 4 (3.21)

[

3 J U r

= I u'r (3.22) 9,)

3 u =.

( R 1 =1 up (3.23) ag = ug /u (3.24)

{

- u (3.25)

R u+u, R

Yjj = (1-0) SYj aj - ( Aj+A} D ij (3.26) and vg = (1- n) (1- 6) Aj . (3.27)

L 7543G062685

The set of equations (3.20) has a particular solution and three linearly independent homogeneous solutions. It is assumed the Cg(t) may be adequately represented in some time interval k beginning at kt by C,(t)= Ak ' EAk (t-tk )] t<

k t < t +1 k (3.28)

The particular solution then has the form Cyg(t) = F j e Ak [(t-tk )] (3.29)

Substituting this expression into equation (3.20) at tk yields

( 3

( I (Yjj - Ak ij) F3=vAjk (3.30)

[ This set of linear eqrations is solved in CRDOSE by Gauss-Jordan elimination. In order to find the homogeneous solution which matches the

( boundary conditions (tie concentration in each compartment at time t '

k computed in the previous time step), the characteristic equation of the matrix [ygj] is first solved for the eigenvalues of [ygj],W),and the corresponding eigenvectors. Let E gj be the element of eigenvector j corresponding 'co compartment 1. The solution in interval k is then given by

~

N Cg (t) = I E)I 9

Bj e J (t-tk) + F eA k(t-tk) (3.31 )

e Using the known concentrations at time t , the unknown values B k 3 may be found by solving the set of linear equations

[

3 I E j =1 93B ) = C'(t g k ) - F9 (3.32) l

( In CRDOSE, since the operation is carried out many times for each matrix E93, the inverse matrix E ~is found, and the unknowns B 3 are found in each time step by using

[

. 3-11 H :7543G062685 -

L .

f l 3 B) = i E-Ijg [Cy(tk ) - F ]

g (3.33)

This process is repeated for each isotope at each time step, yielding the time dependent concentration of each isotope.

Two types of doses are computed by CRDOSE: beta skin dose and gamma whole body dose. These are treated in the manner outlined in Regulatory a 2

Guide 1.4 for infinite plumes, with two exceptions. For beta skin dose, a user-input protective factor for clothing may be input. Al so, for gamma whole body dose, a correction is made for the finite size of the control room, rather than using the infinite plume value. The Goldstein buildup factor of B(pr) = (1 + Xpr) (3.34) is used, where K

'f-1a (3.35)

A correction factor is derived which is the fraction of the dose from an infinite plume resulting from gamma rays emitted within a distance R of the source point. This is

- pr Fc " #a (1 + Kur) e dr

= (1-e-pR) - (E-p ) Re- UR (3.36)

The radius R is that of an hemisphere of equivalent volume to the control

{

room volume V, 3Y V3 (3.37) c "w The walls, ceilings and floors in the Control Building are of a great enough thickness that the contribution of external shine to the dose may

" be neglected.

3-12 H 7543G082785

It should be noted that both the control. room flow model and the finite plume gamma dose model are more sophisticated versions of approaches

, suggested in the Murphy-Campe model.6 3.7 MODELING OF T0XIC GAS CONCENTRATIONS IN THE CONTROL BUILDING ENVELOPE The model for toxic gas concentrations in the control building envelope is shown in Figure 3-3. While the radioactive decay problem does not occur, the flow path is different in this model.

At the intake damper, a portion of the flow, UB , is diverted to the halls and machine shop, while the remainder, Uj is used in a manner

( entirely analogous to U, in Section 3.6. With this substitution, and with the decay constant XD set to zero, equations (3.20) to (3.33) are used to model the concentration as a function of time.

A further modification is used to correct for the fact that the intake tunnel may be drawing air from a volume over which the concentration varies greatly. If no correction is performed, the amount of toxic gas can be, under some circumstances, be overestimated to the point that more gas would be taken in than was~actually released. To alleviate this problem, the conservative approach shown below was used.

It is assumed that a cross-section of the plume taken in the crosswind plane at the intake has a gaussian distribution with standard deviations 0y in the horizontal direction and z in the vertical direction

[ traveling at windspeed 7. Since the plume is reflected by the ground, it will i: ave a dilution factor as a function of horizontal distance y and

( vertical distance. z of

[' 5= i / ,2 ,23 exp -

l.

D "z 2 (3.38)

(2cy 2+202)

Q -

Isopleths of constant concentration will thus be given by

( [ y} 2 + [ z\ 2 2 (3.39)

=s.

3-13 7543G092685 I

, ___ __ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - =

Bearing in mind that z > 0, this,isopleth is a semiellipse with an area of 2

A= 0. 5 x yz s (3.40)

It is assumed that the intake flow is taken from the area bounded by such an isopleth, thus conservatively maximizing the amount of toxic gas taken in. The required area is A = U/ v (3.41) where U is the intake flow rate. Setting the areas in (3.40) and (3.41) equal, 2U 2X,U 2

s = =

(3.42)

"E Sz Q -

( where X g /Q is the value of (3.38) at y=z=o, the centerline atmospheric dilution factor. Integrating (3.38) over the area bounded by the isopleth (3.39) and multiplying by the windspeed v yields the fraction R of toxic gas which is introduced into the vent:

R = 1 - exp (-s /2) = 1 - exp (-X U/Q). o (3.43)

( It is seen that, in accordance with' physical reality, this fraction varies from zero to one as U increases from zero to infinity. Dividing R by the uncorrected flow rate into the tunnel gives the required

{

correction factor

[ 1-exp(-X,U/Q)

F= (3.44) c (XoV/Q)

{

which reduces to unity for small flow rates.

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4. DATA In this section, the data required for the analysis is discussed. The values used are tabulated herein, and the sources of the data are referenced.

4.1 HYDROS INPUT DATA The HYDROS code used containment flow, spray and leakage models to find the release rates of eighteen radionuclides from containment as a function of time, given a Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident.

f The radionuclides considered and the data required to calculate the release rate for a period of 30 days is presented in Tables 1 to 5 and

[ Figures 1 and 2 of Reference 5. Iodine removal was calculated with one spray header operating. The study of Reference 5 focused on dose estimates at the exclusion boundary at 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the accident. For

~

this study it was therefore necessary to replace entries 1 to 4 and entry 6 of Table 4 of Reference 5 with values relevant to this study. These are discussed in Section 4.8.

( 4.2 AMMONIUM HYDR 0XIDE AND RELATED DATA

{ The relevant chemical data was taken from an earlier habitability study 10 for TMI-1 , as were the tank volume and the distance from the tank to the intake vent. The data are given in Table 4-2.

4.3 CHLORINE AND RELATED DATA The relevant physical properties of chlorine, as well as tank capacity

( and position data, were taken from the study mentioned in the previous section.10 The data are reproduced in Table 4-3.

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4-1

[ 7545G062685

4.4 VOLUME AND FLOW DATA FOR THE AUXILIARY, FUEL HANDLING AND CONTROL INTERMEDIATE TURBINE BUILDINGS f

The volumetric data was computed from a set of drawing furnished by GPU Nuclear. The flow data was taken from 2 ventilation flow diagrams furnished by GPU Nuclear.I The data used is given in Table 4.4.

{ 4.5 CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION ZONE FLOW DATA The control room ventilation system may be run in a variety of modes, each of which has a unique set of flow rates. The flow rates were taken from a variety of sources, primarily a ventilation drawing,13 measurements at the plant,I4 and calculations by Burns & Roe.15 The relevant values are given in Table 4-5.

[

4.6 DOSE LIMITS The dose'l'imits are taken from~ Section 6.4 of the Standard Review Plan.

Gama whole body dose to an operator must be no greater than 5 rem, while beta skin dose must not exceed 30 rem.

• 4.7 T0XICITY LIMITS

{ The potential for ammonia and chlorine to incapacitate control room operators is based upon short term exposure limits recommended by the Comonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Environmental Resources, Title 25, Article IV, Chapter 201 (1971). These are reported in Reference 16.

Exposures in excess of the following are considered to incapacitate the I operators.

[ Ammonia: 1. 100 ppm for 30 minutes

2. 500 ppm for 10 minutes Chlorine: 1. 3 ppm for 5 minutes

2. 15 ppm for 2 minutes The thyroid dose was not considered because the iodine source terms are being re-evaluated by the NRC.

F L 4-2 7545G082785 I - - _ - - - --_

For both amonia and chlorine, the calculations showed that if the second criterion is violated, the first is also violated. Therefore, criterion 1 is limiting and the toxicity model is actually based on 100 ppm for 30 min for ammonia and 3 ppm for 5 min for chlorine.

4.8 METEOROLOGICAL AND DISPERSION DATA Meteorological data from .the period July 1976 to June 1977 taken at the TMI site was used to determine the relevant meteorological conditions at the plant. The joint frequency tables are given in Table 4-6. The data f required for the calculations in the Murphy-Campe method and the resulting atmospheric dispersion factors ar.e given in Table 4-7. The

( atmospheric dispersion factors for the 2 chemical spill sites are given in Table 4-8.

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( TABLE '4-1.

DATA FOR DESIGN BASIS LOCA ACCIDENT Dose Conversion Factors, Rem /hr per Cf/m3 Curies Isotope Released Beta, Skin Gama, Whole Body I-131 4.74E+3 2.11 E+2 I-132 3.36E+2 3.14E+2 5.64E+3 1.85E+3 I-133 8.32E+3 4.46E+2 I-134 3.99E+2 5.58E+2 6.82E+2 1.92E+3 I-135 9.01E+2 3. 31 E+2 f Kr-83m 7.80E+3 1.52E+3 3.86E+1 2.70E-1 Kr-85m 6.90E+3 2.68E+2 Kr-85 7.78E+4 1.31E+2 2.45E+2 1.71E+0 Kr-87 3.79E+3 1.36E+3 Kr-88 1.21E+4 6.48E+2 3.59E+2 1.68E+3 Kr-89 2.81E+2 N/Aa Xe-131m 4.75E+3 N/Aa 1.44E+2 9.92E+0 Xe-133m 7.97E+3 ' . .

1.94E+2 -

2.69E+1 Xe-133 5.94E+5 1.51E+2 3.26E+1 Xe-135m 5.92E+2

[ 9.96E+1 3.54E+2 Xe-135 1.93E+4 L 2.49E+2 2.04E+2 Xe-137 4.36E+2 1.86E+3 1. 51 E+2 Xe-138 2.30E+2 7.19E+2 6. 81 E+2 k

a. Not available

[

[

• Iodine Source terms are used only to Calculate Gamma Whole Body and Reta Skin doses. This was to account for doses associated with iodine and is conservative.

[ .

[ 7545G082785 4-4

i TABLE 4-2. PROPERTIES AND STORAGE OF AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE f Density of 29.4 wt. % aqueous solution .897 gm/cm 3 Molecular Weight of Ammonia 17.03 Molecular Weight of Water

( 18.016 Diffusivity of NH in air 3 80*F: .200 cm2 /sec

• 2 100*F: .214 cm /sec i Diffusivity of H O in air 2 2 80*F: .261 cm /sec 2

100*F: .279 cm /sec Relative Humidity of Ambient Air 50%

Volume of Storage Tank 7000 gallons

[ Distance of Storage Tank from Intake Vent 182 m

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L 4-5 I - - _ - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - . . _ - --

T/.BLE 4-3. PROPERTIES AND STORAGE OF LIQUID CHLORINE *

( Molecular Weight 70.914 Normai Boiling Point -34.05*C Heat of Vaporization 68.79 cal /gm

( 3 Density of Saturated Liquid 1.557 gm/cm Heat Capacity of Saturated Liquid .222 cal /gm*C Relative Vapor Density 2.45 Vapor Pressure 80*F: 116.49 psia f 100*F: 157.09 psia Mass of Chlorine in One Tank 2000 lb

( Distance of River Water Chlorinator from Intake Vent 100 m Distance of Unit 1 Chlorinator from Intake Vent 354 m

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4-6 7545G062685 .

f. .

TABLE 4-4. VALUES USED IN AUXFLOW MODEL 3

Vj = 799316 ft Y2 = 584370 ft 3 3

V3 = 275450 ft3 u = 120761 ft / min u = 59748 ft 3/ min u2 = 16048 ft 3/ min 3

u 3= 2539 ft / min 3

u4= 1000 ft / min

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TABLE 4-5. CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION ZONE FLOW RATES FOR VARIOUS CONDITIOFS, cfa Flow Conditions Ua UB UjI UpI UI3 Uoj UO2 U03 Economizer Mode 69667(b) 25383 13660 15810 8074 0(b) O(b) 0(b)

Normal Mode, 20% Outside Air 32880 25383 13660 15810 8074 10880 12648 6459 Emergency Mode 3000 -

11755 13666 6979 10667 12401 6332 ,

Emergency Mode 4000 - 11755 13666 6979 10304 11979 6117 Emergency Mode 5000 -

11755 13666 6979 9941 11557 5902 Emergency Mode 6000 -

11755 13666 6979 9578 11135 5687 I Emergency Mode 7000 -

11755 13666 6979 9215 10713 5471 Emergency Mode 8000 -

11755 13666 6979 8853' 10292 5256 Emergency Mode 9000 -

11755 13666 6979 8490 9870 5040 Emergency Mode 10000 -

11755 13666 6979 8127 9448 4825

$ Emergency Mode 11000 -

11755 13666 6979 7764 9026 4610 Emergency Mode 12000 -

11755 13666 6979 7401 8605 4394 Emergency Mode 13000 -

11755 13666 6979 7038 8183 4179 Emergency Mode 14000 -

11755 13666 ~6979 6676 7761 3963 Emergency Mode 15000 -

11755 13666 6979 '6313 7339 3748 Emergency Mode 16000 -

11755 13666 6979 5950 6917 3533 Emergency Mode 17000 -

11755 13666 6979 5587 64 % 3317 Emergency Mode 18000 -

11755 13666 6979 5224 6074 3102 Emergency Mode 19000 -

11755 13666 6979 4862 5652 2886 Emergency Mode 20000 -

11755 13666 6979 4499 5230 2671 Emergency Mode 21000 -

11755 13666 6979 4136 4808 2456 7CAECn676RE

s TABLE 4-6. JOINT FREQ5.NCY TABLE - NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION FOR EACH STABILITY CLASS JULY 1976-JUNE 1977 STABILITY A SPEED N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE 5 SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NNW CALM 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.5 MPH 3 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 3 7 1 3 2 5 8 2.5 MPH 10 6 4 0 0 1 3 0 2 2 3 5 7 8 11 10 3.5 MPH 7 7 2 2 5 2 1 4 2 4 6 4 1 6 5 14 4.5 MPH 18 12 1 2 4 4 3 2 3 2 17 11 14 5 7 17 5.5 MPH 24 7 3 1 0 2 4 5 4 2 10 8 9 9 13 13 6.5 MPH 15 14 5 5 3 2 1 6 2 3 6 13 6 12 14 15 7.5 MPH 13 6 3 1 1 0 0 4 2 3 6 9 9 7 19 18 12.5 MPH 57 17 7 6 4 3 7 7 7 29 38 26 49 65 86 79 18.5 MPH 24 4 1 0 0 1 2 5 7 13 1 7 32 40 56 38 24.5 MPH 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 17 7 24.6+ MPH 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 STABILITY B CALM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 MPH 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2.5 MPH 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 2 3.5 MPH 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 4 1 6.5 MPH 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 3 2 0 0 3

[ 5.5 MPH 0 2 0 0 0 1 3 1 2 2 0 2 6.5 MPH 1 2 1 0

( 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 3 2 5 7.5 MPH 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 12.5 MPH 2 0 0 3 1 0 2 7 7 4 18.5 MPH 1 1 10 8 10 12 3 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 5 6 9 9 24.5 MPH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

[L ! 24.6*PH 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0

1 2

0 4

1 5

1 l

STA8!LITY C

(- ll 0 CALM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 MPH 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2.5 MPH 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0

[ 3.5 MPH 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1

0 1 0 1 0 1

4.5 MPH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 2 0 1 0 5.5 MPH 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 6.5 MPH 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 1 3 3 0 1 0 1 7.5 MPH 0 0 0 0 0

[! '

12.5 MPH 4 3 1 1 1

1 1

1 1 1

0 1

2 3

6 2

3 1

0 1

4 1

6 1

8 2

4 18.5 MPH 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 3 4 4 4 24.5 MPH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 2 24.6+ MPH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0

[?

STABILITY D N 0 O 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 MPH 1 1 0 0 1 0 5 6 7 5 5 3 3 4 4 5 3 3 5 5 4 5 3.5 MPH 5 8 11 14 8 7 3 7 2 4 6 4 9 6 8 9' 3.5 MPH 18 11 7 5 14 13 10 11 8 10 10 13 8 6

[ 4.5 MPH 5.5 MPH 13 7

9 12 8

4 10 9

12 14 15 18 13 11 9

16 16 16 16 15 14 14 11 14 10 5

10 9

12 12 8

10 17 11 6.5 MPH 11 0 8 8 13 16 18 14 19 17 13 13 11 12 7 5 7.5 MPH 11 6 5 4 11 14 14 8 14 9 7 10 14 15 14 10 12.5 MPH 16 9 9 8 18 45 21 18 34 40 27 27 63

[ 18.5 MPH 24.5 MPH 12 2

3 1

0 0

0 0

1 0

2 0

5 0

0 2 12 19 9 27 95 87' 125 93 55 46 1 0 1 1 0 6 36 48 12 24.6+ MPH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 13 15 2 4-9

.1

TABLE 4-6 (continued)

STABILITT E SPEED N WNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NNW CALM 0 1 2 1 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 3 1 r 1.5 MPH 16 8 9 9 10 5 11 5 4 5 10 10 17 4 8 9 2.5 MPH 12

( 3.5 MPH 17 11 19 15 8 11 15 9 11 7 5 10 12 10 13 10 14 15 12 19 18 20 16 18 19 22 4.5 MPH 21 24 12 18 21 24 15 22 14 23 12 13 25 23 15 19 22 26 22 19 27 5.5 MPH 19 12 8 8 17 14 21 27 19 19 23 28 46 25 23 30 l 6.5 MPH 17 11 14 4 12 13 15 10 15 22 21 23 45 21 23 27

{ 7.5 MPH 14 16 7 6 11 13 14 6 24 26 15 20 35 36 18 23 12.5 MPH 27 22 10 6 10 12 19 11 28 60 43 32 73 119 103 73 18.5 MPH 15 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 9 5 3 18 54 52 20 24.5 MPH 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 14 9 3 24.6+ MPH 0 0 0 0 0 0

{ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 STABILITY F CALM 0 1 4 0 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 0 1.5 MPH 5 13 8 9 11 10 8 4 11 10 11 6 15 10 11 4 2.5 MPH 11 1 5 10 12 9 10 9 5 11 11 12 12 13 17 10 I 3.5 MPH 7 9 5 7 6 14 11 4 11 9 11 13 17 8 9 16

( 4.5 MPH 16 8 7 5 5 9 8 9 11 10 22 5.5 MPH 14 27 8 17 13 10 4 8 5 3 2 2 7 1 8 10 7 10 12 8 9 6.5 MPH 3 7 1 1 4 0 3 4 3 7 10 8 12 4 3 11 7.5 MPH 4 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 3 2 2 3 9 8 6 5 12.5 MPH 12 3 0 0 f 18.5 MPH 1 0 0 0 2

0 3

0 2

0 0

0 2

0 3 .4 8 8 3 4 7 1 0 0 0 2 0 24.5 MPH 0 0, 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

./4.6+ MPH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(

STABILITY G CALM 0 3 5 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 1.5 MPH 5 2 8 4 6 4 2 5 9 9 11 6 11 2 6 3 2.5 MPH 5 3 4 3 13 12 8 7 3 5 12 4 7 3 10 4 3.5 MPH 3 6 8 10 13 11 3 7 9 5 9 12 14 11 4.5 MPH 4 7 5 1 2 3 7 8 2 5 11 6 8 7 9 4 5.5 MPH 4 0 10 6

[ 6.5 HPH 4 1

0 1

0 2 5

0 2 3 2 0

1 2

1 3

5 4 2 4 1 3 9 5 1 2 1 1 7.5 MPH 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 12.5 MPH 3 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 18.5 MPH l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

0 0

[ 24.5 MPH 24.6+ MPH 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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4-10

[ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _- -

TABLE 4-7. DATA FOR AND RESULTS FROM MURPHY-CAMPE METHOD '

FOR THE DESIGN BASIS LOCA Source Type: Diffuse Receptor Type: Point Containment Diameter, d: 41.76 m Source-Receptor Distance, s: 20.9 m Containment Projected Area: 1985 m2 Wind Direction Sectors that result in exposure: N, NNE, NE, ENE, E WSW, W, WNW, NW, NNW

( K factor: 7.917 oy for 5% stability: negligible a for 5% stability: negligible '

5% windspeed: -0.67 m/s 10% windspeed: 1.12 m/s f 20% windspeed: 1.55 m/s 40% windspeed: 2.46 m/s

( F factor: 0.7090 X/Q, 0-8 hrs: 7.45E-3 sec/m 3 .

X/Q, 8-24 hrs: 4.15E-3 sec/m3

( X/Q,1-4 days: 2'.73E-3 sec/m 3 X/Q, 4-30 days: 1.44E-3 sec/m3

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TABLE 4-8. VALUES OF Xu/Q FOR CHEMICAL RELEASES Unit 1 Chlorinator to Exhaust Vent Wind Directions NNE and NE Stability Class Xu/Q (m-2)

A 5.70E-5 B 1.10E-4 C 1.99E-4 D 3.40E-4 E 5.30E-4 F 6.40E-4 G 7.00E-4

( Unit 1 Ammonium Hydroxide Storage Tank to Exhaust Vent All Stability Classes Wind Direction Xu/Q (m-2)

[

NE 1.38E-4 ENE 1.10E-4

[

E 4.14E-4 f

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t. __:__________-___-____-_-________________-_._.

9

'}, 5. ANALYSIS PROCEDURE In this section, the calculational procedures used in each part of the analysis are detailed. The flow rate assumptions and the codes used are given.

5.1 ANALYSIS OF THE LARGE BREAK LOCA VIA THE EXHAUST DAMPER In this case, it is assumed that the dampers close upon the ES actuation signal, but that the emergency fans do not go on until the radiation detectors in tne control room detect abnormal radiation levels. This is assumed to occur one minute into the accident. The flow rate is the same

( in either flow condition; oniz the filter efficiency changes (0.0 before emergency mode activatio5, 0.90 afterwards). The intake flow rate was varied between 3000 to 21000 cfm in increments of 1000 cfm, with either 200 cfm or 2000 cfm assumed to leak through the exhaust damper, and the f

remainder flowing through the control building. intake system. Since the f

dose is a linear function of the leakage rate through the damper for a .

given total intake flow rate, the limiting leakage rate may be determined

( f as a function of total intake flow rate. *

{ For this part of the analysis, the HYDROS code is coupled directly with the CRDOSE code, with one HYDROS run providing input for all of the CRDOE runs.

5.2 ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN BASIS LOCA VIA THE AUXILIARY AND FUEL (

HANDLING BUILDING 5

, j As in the case above, it is assumed that the dampers close upon the ES actuation signal. However, due to the small dose rates expected, the radiation detectors are not assumed to detect abnormal radiation levels, thus no filtration is assumed. Emergency flow rates were used. The intake flow rate was varied between 3000 cfm and 21000 cfm total with .

1000 cfm assumed to flow via the auxiliary building - fuel handling building flow path, and with the entire relea:;e directed into the auxiliary building. The results were extrapolated to determine the

[

• 5-1 7556G092685

maximum allowable flow rate through the Auxiliary Building - Fuel Handling Building flow path as a function of total intake flow rate.

For this part of the analysis, the HYDROS code is coupled to the CRDOSE code via the AUXFLOW code in order to model the Auxiliary Building - Fuel Handling Building flow path.

5.3 ANALYSIS OF THE UNIT 1 AMMONIUM HYDR 0XIDE TANK RUPTURE VIA THE EXHAUST VENT The rupture of the Unit 1 ammonium hydroxide storage tank was analyzed using the NH3VAP code in conjunction with the CRCONI code to find the anrnonium concentration in the control room as a function of time. Two cases were run: one with the control room ventilation system in the economizer mode, the other with the outside air reduced to 20% of the total flow. In both cases, the 5% worst meteorological case and the actual dike area of 453 square feet were used.

5.4 ANALYSIS OF THE CHLORINE TANK RUPTURE AT THE UNIT 1 CHLORINATOR VIA THE EXHAUST VENT The rupture of a one tone chlorine tank at the Unit 1 chlorinator was analyzed using the CL2VAP code in conjunction with the CRCONI code to find the chlorine concentration in the control room as a function of

( time. Two cases were run: one with the control roem ventilation system in the economizer mode, the other with the outside air reduced to 20% of the total flow. In both cases, the 5% worst meteorological case was used.

L r

L 5-2 r

L 7556G082785

f 6. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS l

The results of the analysis performed for each accident type are given in )

separate sections below.

6.1 DOSES TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL FROM THE DESIGN BASIS LOCA VIA THE EXHAUST VENT The beta skin dose and gamma whole body dose are given as a function of total intake flow rate for leakage rates through the exhaust damper of 200 cfm and 2000 cfm in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. Doses are computed using Murphy-Campe occupancy factors for thirty days starting with accident

[

initiation. In Table 6-3, and Figure 6-1, the limiting leakage rates for beta skin dose not to exceed 30 rem are given. The leakage rates i required for the gamma whole body dose to exceed 5 rem are larger than those for the beta skin dose to exceed 30 rem for all flow rates, and thus are not given.

6.2 DOSES TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL FROM THE DESIGN BASIS LOCA VIA THE AUXILIARY ~AND FUEL HANDLING BUILDINGS The thirty-day beta skin dose and gamma whole body dose are given in

[ Table 6-4 as a function of total intake flow rate for a constant leakage rate of 1000 cfm into the control building envelope for this flow path.

[ Release of all containment leakage into the auxiliary building is assumed. In Table 6-5 and Figure 6-2, the limiting leakage rates for beta skin dose not to exceed 30 rem are given. The leakage rates required for the gamma whole body dose to exceed 5 rem are larger than the total flow rate for all flow rates, and thus are not given.

6.3 RESULTS OF THE UNIT 1 AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE TANK RUPTURE VIA THE EXHAUST VENT The maximum concentrations of ammonia in the control room for these

( scenarios are 3.44 ppm with the system in the economizer mode and 17.75 ppm with 20% outside air. In both cases, a leakage rate of 3500 cfm through the exhaust damper is assumed. These values are well helow the 100 ppm limit.

[

6-1 755'" ' 85

[ __ - - - - - - -- -- ~ - - - - - - -

6.4 RESULTS'0F THE RUPTURE OF A CHLORINE TANK AT THE UNIT 1 CHLORINATOR HOUSE VIA THE EXHAUST VENT The maxirm concentrations of chlorine in the control room for these scenarios are 2.62 ppm with the system in the economizer mode and 7.31 ppm with 20% outside air. In both cases, a leakage rate of 3500 cfm through the exhaust damper is assumed. In order to reduce the peak level in the latter case to the 3 ppm limit, the leakage rate must be reduced to below 1436 cfm.

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i TABLE 6-1. DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEi.',VS. TOTAL INTAKE FLOW RATE WITH 200 cfm LEAKAGE THROUGH EXHAUST DAMPER Beta Gama Uo Skin Dose Dose 3000 4.985 0.196 4000 4.340 0.172 5000 3.936 0.156 6000 3.665 0.145 7000 3.466 0.137 f

8000 3. 31 6 0.1 31 9000 3.196 ,. 0.126 10000 3.099 0.122 11000 3.01 9 0.119 12000 2.954 0.116 f 13000 2.895 0.113 14000 2.842 0.111 15000 2.802 0.109 16000 2.766 0.108 17000 2.731 0.106 18000 2.699 0.105 19000 2.673 0.103 20000 2.653 0.102 21000 2.627 0.1 01

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6-3

( - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . . .

i TABLE 6-2. DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL VS. TOTAL INTAKE FLOW RATE I INCLUDING 2000 cfm THROUGH EXHAUST DAMPER i

Beta Gamma Uo Skin Dose Dose 3000 31.230 1.342 4000 24.664 1.091 5000 20.585 0. 931 6000 17.777 0. 81 8 f 7000 15.750 0.734 8000 14.198 0.669 9000 12.999 0.61 8 10000 '1.983 0.573 11000 11.148 0.536 12000 10.465 0.505 13000 9.898 0.479 14000 9. 3 61 0.454 15000 8.926 0.434 16000 8.533 0.41 5 17000 8.189 0.399

~

18000 7.882 0.384 19000 7.599 0.371 20000 7.347 0.358 21000 7.118 0.347 L.

6-4 7561G100885

TABLE 6-3. LIMITING FLOW RATES THROUGH EXHAUST DAMPER ,

TO AVOID EXCEEDENCES OF LIMITING BETA SKIN DOSE '

Tctal Flow limiting Flow Rate (cfm)

Rate (cfm) Beta Skin Dose 3000 1915 4000 2472 5000 3017 6000 3559

. 7000 4088

}

8000 4613 9000 51 21 10000 5650 11000 6174 12000 6681

( 13000 7166 14000 7684 15000 8194 16000 8700 17000 9193 18000 9681 19000 10185 20000 10686 21000 11171 r

[ l 6-5

[... . . . .

l

TABLE 6-4. )0SE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL VS. TOTAL INTAKE FLOW M TE FOR RELEASE INTO AUXILIARY BUILDING Total Flow Beta Skin Gamma Whole Rate (cfm) Dose (rem) Body Dose (rem) 3000 9.814 0.381 4000 7.421 0.294 5000 6.034 0.239 6000 5.059 0.202 7000 4.366 0.176

{

8000 3.835 0.155 9000 3.413 0.139 10000 3.008 0.126 t 11000 2.819 0.116 12000 2.591 0.107 f 13000 2.391 0.099 14000 2.21 9 0.092 15000 2.075 0.086 16000 1.945 0.081 17000 1.844 0.077 18000 1.743 0.073 19000 1.656 0.069 20000 1.569 0.066 21000 1.496 0.063 6-6 7561G082785

TABLE 6-5. LIMITING FLOW RATES INTO CONTROL BUILDING ENVELOPE FOR

'c AUXILIARY BUILDING RELEASE TO AVOID EXCEEDANCES OF LIMITING BETA SKIN DOSES Total Flow Limiting Flow Rate (cfm)

Rate (cfm) Beta Skin Dose 3000 3000*

4000 4000*

5000 4971 6000 5930 7000 6871 8000 7822

. 9000 8789 10000 9715 11000 10642 12000 11578 13000 12547 14000 13519 15000 14457

(

/ 16000 15424 17000 16268 18000 17211 19000 18115 20000 19120 21000 20053

[

• Dose never exceeds limit I

+ .

6-7 7561G092685

e s

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j0 2

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S

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a AE R KC AX i

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w o

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0

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v i

g5 m,

0 S 0

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m

.6

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l l))i li1i l 1 O

l 0 2

l i

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. LL OI

- RU

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a E s GL u AE o KU i

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e EA t L a BY r AR WA w OI

_ l l

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e MA U

l k

a MA t II n XV l

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l

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Ette$85$EEi:m b

?*

_7. CONCLUSIONS

+

From the above analysis, it nay be concluded that the beta skin dose will

never exceed 30 rem for either of the LOCA cases as long as the flow through the exhaust damper is limited to no more than about 53% of the total intake flow rate for the first case and as long as the leakage via the auxiliary building and fuel handling building is held below 95% of the total flow in the second case.

The rupture of the ammonium hydroxide storage tank results in ammonium

}

) concentrations problem. well below the 100 ppm threshold, and thus pose no The chlorine concentration resulting from a rupture at the Unit 1 chicrinator is below the 3.0 ppm limit if the ventilation system is in the economizer mode, but could rise as high as 7.3 ppm if only 20%

outside air is used.

A reduction of the leakage rate through the damper in this case below about 1430 cfm would remove the possibility of exceedance.

l 7-1 7562G100885

8. REFERENCES

1. NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan 6.4, " Habitability Systems,"

USNRC, 1975.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.4, " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors," USAEC, June 1974.

3. ' Regulatory Guide 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Pcwer Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release," USAEC, June 1974.

I '

4. Regulatory Guide 1.95, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," Revision 1 USNRC, January 1977.

5. " Dose Estimates for Three Mile Island Unit 1: Containment Spray Iodine Removal Using Sodium Hydroxide Spray Solution," prepared by Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. for GPU Nuclear, October 1980.

6. K.G. Murphy and K.M. Campe, " Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Ventilation System Design for Meeting General Design Criterion 19,"

13th AEC Air Cleaning Conference, August 1974.

7. " Final Safety Analysis Report, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station -

Unit 1," Metropolitan Edison Company, March,1970.

8. Wing, James, " Toxic Vapor Concentrations in the Control Room Following a Postulated Accidental Release," NUREG-0570, USNRC, June,1979.

l 9. Perry, R.H. and C.H. Chilton, editors, Chemical Engineers Handbook,

, 5th Ed. , McGraw-Hill Book Co. , New York,1973.

10. "TMI-I Control Room Habitability Study: Probabilistic Assessment of the Potential Impact of Hazardous Chemicals Stored Onsite," prepared for GPUN by Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc., June 8,1982.

11. GPU Nuclear, Drawings IE-154-02-001 through IE-154-02-009 and IE-155-01 -001 through IE-155-02-005.

12. Killough, G.G., et al. "A Methodology for Calculating Radiation Doses from Radioactivity Released to the Environment," ORNL-4992, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, March,1976.

13. Gilbert Associates, Drawings C-302-841, Rev. 29 and C-302-842, Rev. 30.

14. Telephone conversation between T.E. Fenstermacher (PLG) and D. Slear, J. Gulati and J. DeLockery (GPU), April 23, 1984.

I i

8-1 7569G100285

i l

f 15. Private Communication, H.W. Young to T.E. Fenstemacher, t

April 18, 1984.

16. Weiss, G., editor, Hazardous Chemicals Data Book, Noyes Data Corp.,

Park Ridge, N.J., 1980.

I i .

t

/ -

i l

L s

7569G062785

(

Calculation of,Xu/Q at TMI Unit 1 Control Room Exhaust-to-Atmosphere Duct

} for Chlorine and Ammonium Hydroxide Tank Releases I

l i

Prepared by

( James Halitsky, Ph. D.

122 North Highland Place Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y. 10520 i

Prepared for

~

s s

Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.

1200-18th St. NVI diashington, D. C. 20036 1

l

(

s, Y

s June 19, 1985 a .

I J'

ii

.* Table of Contents Paae A -1 Introduction 1 A2 General Arrangement 1 A, 3 Chlorine Release 2 A4 Ammonium Hydroxide Release 2 i

References 4 Table A-1 Values of p/q for Jhlorine Release 5 Figs. A-1 through A-8 6-13 f

( .

~

(

1 o

A1 Introduction ~

This Appendix describes the analysis techniques employed to predict Ku/Q at the Unit 1 control room exhaust-to-atmosphere duct opening, assuming continuous releases at the Unit 1 chlorine tank located between cooling towers A and B, and at the Unit 1 ammonium hydroxide tank located at the base of the east wall of the Unit 1 turbine building.

The duct opening to the atmosphere is in the north wall of the Unit 1 fuel handling building, 89 ft above grade and 10 5 ft below the roof parapet coping. The opening faces the south wall of the con-tainment structure, about 5 ft away. The constricted air space between the containment and fuel handling buildings is closed at its east end.

In the event of flow reversal in the duct (duct supplies outside air to control room), replacement air for the constricted air space will be drawn from above and from the west.

Tne analysis is similar to that in Ref.1, with adjustment for changed receptor location. For convenience in this analysis, the

. release and receptor locations will be reforred to as " tank" and " vent",

respectively.

a 2 General Arrangement tig. A-1 shows a plan view of Units 1 and 2, cooling towers A and 3, and the locations of the chlorine and ammonium hydroxide tanks and the vent. A chlorine release has a potential for contaminating the

! vent most strongly in an 033 wind. An ammonium hydroxide release has a potential for contaminating the vent in 045 , 067 5 and 090 winds.

(

l

2 e

A3 Chlorine Release The method of analysis follows that of Ref. 1, Sec. B 2.22.

Fig. A-2 is the equivalent of Ref. 1, Fig. B-3 The plume originates.

at C and is drawn upwind to the fictitious cooline tower plate A, from which it disperses downwind as a volume source. At P, a portion of the A plume is mixed in the pumphouse wake, and. the A. plume is replaced by a P plume and an A' (depleted A) plume. The R plume of Ref.1 is omit-ted because the vent is in the middle of the building complex.

The equation for Tu/Q is the same as. Ref.1, Eq.14 :

n (g_1) f u/Q = J a=1 F)(TCy2C )~ exph05(y/6y)2]

where F) = fraction of Q assigned to plume j. In this case, n = 2, j = 1 = P, j = 2 - A' ,

and (, and (g are the plume signas calculated by Ref. 1,Eqs. 10 to 12 at the plate.-to-vent distances shown in Fig. A-2.

The values of F) were calculated by

2) 6

, F1-Fp - (2 Ry (3)~1 ,exph05(y/f,)2]iy exp-05(z/C)pz z (A-2)~

-3

(

F2=F,=1-F, g y (A-3) using Cy and C calculated at x = 115 m by Ref. 1, Eqs. 10 to 14.

=

Numerical v' lues of the plume parameters and calculated values of F) and %g/Q are given in Table A-1.

A4 Ammonium Hydroxide Release Figs. A-3, A-4 and A-5 show. plan views and elevation sections of the major plant buildings in the three critical wind directions. In each Figure, elevation section B-B is taken longitudinally through the t

3 tank in the direction of the wind, and elevation section A-A is taken transversely through the vent, normal to the wind. The dot-dash lines in the sections are outlines .of the building contours in the respective viewing directions.

Following the method of analysis in Ref.1, Sec. B 3 11, Ku/Q at the vent is given by yu/q-K/A. c (A-4)

The esti=ation of A and vent K in the three wind directions was done with the aid of Figs. A-6, A-7 and A-8 which show the equivalent prism-atic building (dashed lihes) that controls plume formation in the . region between tank and vent, and the wind flow and dispersion patterns. The prism dimensions are 98 m square in plan and 37 m high. The reference f area in Eq. A-4 is the prism frontal area A - 98 x 37 - 3,626 m2 ,

In an 045 wind (Fig. A-6), the wind sweeping around the north-west side of cooling tower 3 approaches the prism in a diagonal orienta-tion and flows smoothly over the roof of the turbine building. The wini on the southeast side approaches the building in normal orientation and creates a roof cavity. The tank is located between the two flows. The f effluent from the tank will be directed southward along the turbine

,. building wall and up into the roof cavity, but it will be prevented from spreading northward in the cavity by the smooth flow over the roof.

Therefore,-it is unlikely that the air space will be contaminated from above, and contamination from the west should be -small since it will be

{ carried in by side wall cavity return flow from the plume edge. The closest matching configuration is her. 2, Fig. 5 27k. A conservative estimate of K at the vent is K c =05

[

.. . . . . . ... ,, . ______-_L*_______-_--------

4 In an 067 5 wind. (Fig. A-7 ), the tank is in the region of normal flow impaction on the east wall of the turbine building, and substantially all of the roof and lee side of the prism will be con-taminated. The matching configuration is Ref. 2, Fig. 5 271.

Kc"4 seems appropriate for a location on the downwind side of the roof, near the centerline of the building.

In an 090 wind (Fig. A-8) the flow is substantially normal to the wall of the turbine building, but it has.a small component toward the north due to the presence of the cavity of cooling tower B.

Eigher concentrations are to be expected on the north side of the prism. The vent, being on the opposite side, will experience lower concentrations. The effec t of the asymme try may be es timated using he f. 3, Fig. 1.2 0. A value of K = 1 5 seems approp.-iate.

Using A = 3,626 m and K values specified above, we obtain c

iiind direction 045 067 5 090 E

c 05 4.0 15

%u/Q (m;2) - Kc /A 1 38-04 1.10-03 4.14-04 Heferences

1. Halitsky, J. (1982): TMI - 1 Control Room Habitability Analysis, Appendix 3 - Impac t of Onsite Chemicals

2. Halitsky, J. (1968): Gas Diffusion Uear Buildings. Sec. 5-5 of 7

Me teorology and Atomic Energy, D. H. Slade, ed. , US AEC.

3 'uilson, D. J. (1976): Contamination of Building Air Intaken from s

nearby Vents. U. of Alberta, Can. Dept. of Wech. Eng. Rep. No. 1.

e 1

s 0

5 Table A-1 ValuesofKu/QforChlorineRelease t

Plume carameters Designation A' P fyg (m) 24.8 12.0 c z, (m) 6.4 2.4 x (m) 344 299 y (m) 0 1 Plume fractions and distersion factors Stability class F, F Total A P Xu/Q (e-2) at vent A 0 93 0.07 5 70-05 3 0.88 0.12 1.10-04 c 0.83 0.17 1 99 04 D 0 77 0.23 3 40-04 E 0 70 C.30 5 30-04 F 0.67 0 33 6.40-04 G 0.65 0 35 7 00-o4 4

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t

ADDENDUM - A O

t

ADDENDUM A. ANALYSIS OF RADIATION DOSES FROM MEASURED FLOW CONDITIONS i

An analysis of the radiation doses in the TMI-l Control Building Envelope has been performed for a variety of measuced flow conditions, with the results given in Table A-1. There are five sets of flow data with 100%

recirculation and the following damper positions:

1. Damper 39 closed

2. Dampers 37 and 39 open

3. Damper 39 open ar.d damper 37 forced open

4. Damper 39 closed and damper 41 forced open

5. Damper 39 open and damper 28 forced open Within each set there are five cases. The first three correspond to the assumption that inleakage occurs via the auxiitary and fuel handling buildings. Doses are given for each of three radionuclide pati; ways:

damper 37, damper 39, and the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings. The last two cases correspond to the assumption that the inleakage occurs via damper 39. For this assumption, doses are given for the damper 37 and damper 39 pathway. Dose via the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings is zero for this assumption, since there is no flow by that pathway.

Thus, for all of the measured flow cases, the beta skin dose and gamma whole body dose remain within allowable limits, l

A-1 7721G100885

TABLE A-1.

SUMMARY

OF DOSES TO THE' CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR FROM LARGE BREAX LOCA RELEASES FOR MEASURED INFLOW THROUGH VARIOUS LEAX PATHS Intake Flow Rates 30 day Dose, rem lllllE[:

Test I Cases AHD-37(a) AHD-39(b) A&FHBI C) Pathway Beta, Skin Gamma, Whole Body 1 500 3658 2628 AHD-37 4.976 0.21 3 1 500 3658 2628 AHD-39 8.288 0.392 1 500 3658 2628 A&FHB 10.319 0.388 1 500 6286 0 AHD-37 5.608 0.241 1 500 6286 0 AHD-39 13.442 0.647 2a 0 9612 572 AHD-37 1.995 0.068 2a 0 9612 572 AHD-39 13.022 0.676 2a 0 9612 572 A&FHB 1 . 51 9 0.058 2a 0 10184 0 AHD-37 2.112 0.072 2a 0 10184 0 AHD-39 13.790 0.716 3b 0 3780 792 AHD-37 1.725 0.058 3b 0 3780 792 AHD-39 10.552 0.497 3b 0 3780 792 A&FHB 4.539 0.167 3b 0 4572 0 AHD-37 2.087 0.070 3b 0 4572 0 AHD-39 12.751 0.600 4a 775 1296 2848 AHD-37 8.141 0.367 4a 775 1296 2848 AHD-39 5.812 0.242 4a 775 1296 2848 AAFHB 15.245 0.564 4a 775 4144 0 AHD-37 9.347 0.407 4a 775 4144 0 AHD-39 13.248 0.596 Sb 0 10440 572 AHD-37 2.004 0.068 Sb 0 10440 572 AHD-39 13.153 0.688 Sb 0 10440 572 A&FHB 1.406 0.054 Sb 0 11012 0 AHD-37 2.114 0.072 Sb 0 11012 0 AHD-39 13.885 0.727

a. Measured flow through damper AHD-37 included in total intake flow rate

b. Measured flow through damper AHD-39 included in total intake flow rate

c. Calculated inleaka9e from auxiliary and fuel handling buildings through scaled doors and penetrations included in total intake flow rate A-2 7721G100805

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -