ML20138F868
| ML20138F868 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1985 |
| From: | Sanford M GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138F805 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM TDR-728, TDR-728-R, TDR-728-R00, NUDOCS 8510250364 | |
| Download: ML20138F868 (43) | |
Text
r AfD90lN&kW 2 TDM NO. _728 REVISION NO.
0 SuOoET TECHNICAL DATA REPORT ACTIVITY NO. 412168 pagg 1
op 34 PROJECT:
DEPARTMENT /SECTION Engineering & Design / Mech. Sy L ten Three Mile Island Muclear Generating Station Unit 1 RELEASE DATE REVIS80N DATE DOCUMENT TITLE: Evaluation of Capability of Control Building HVAC Systens to r:atntain a Post Accident Habitable Environment in the Control Room ORIGINATOep SIGNATURG DATE APPROVALISI SIGNATURS OATE
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M ti IT APPff0pL Ph EXTERNAL DISTRieUTION DATE
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4.d-8C Does tswe TOR include recommendationt:17 0ve. O Ne if yee. TFWR/TR TP BT 4350. DPF 035957 o
DISTRieUTION AssTmacy.
PROBLEM NUREG 0737 Item III.D.3.4 " Control Room Habitability" defines
- 0. K. Croneberger the specific criteria necessary to assure that the Control Room R. W. Keaten is maintained in a safe, habitable condition under accident G. R. Capodanno conditions by providing adequate protection against radiation M. O. Sanford and textc gases.
In order to determine if the existing Control M. Calbureanu Room HVAC system provides such protection, a teft was performed T. Hawkins to:
R. J. Col nz 1.
Evaluate the ability of the Control Building HVAC system to F. P. Barbieri maintain a positive pressure in the Control Room up to H. Shipnan
+0.10 in w.g. during its emergency operation mode with or H !!itchell without single failure of certain dampers. Prior to R.."cCoey performance of this test, certain air registers in the M. Iqbal Control Building HVAC system were blanked off and all C. Smythe Control Butiding Envelope doors were weather stripped.
R. Dunowski 2.
Identify all potential sources of outside air infiltration R. 9arley into the Control Building Envelope.
R. Surrers 3.
Determine if air is exhausted or drawn in through the R. J. Toole Control Bu11 ding HVAC System Exhaust during its normal operation mode.
SUMMARY
OF KEY RESULTS 1.
The Control BulTding HVAC system maintained a positive pressure of 0.10 in w.g. In the Control Room during emergency operation under selected modes with and wtthout single failure of Outside Air Intake Damper (OAI) AH-0-39, exhaust damper AH-0-37 and damper AH-0-28.
A positive pressure of 0.10 in w.g. was not maintained in the control room with a single failure of damper AH-0-41A.
2.
All potential sources of outside air infiltration into the Control Building Envelope were identifled. Data from the test were used to quantify infiltrated air.
These quantities were compared with analyzed allowable infiltration in order to verify that the Control Building HVAC System is capable of maintainicg operator exposure below the limih estabilshed in NUREG 0731 (30 Rem Beta, 5 Rem Gamma). Cd5deringallsourcesofinleakageintothe Co" trol Buildin velope, the operator doses do nM anceed the above limits 0910250364 051010 LCOVER PAGE ONLY
{,DH Apocg Ono g
F 1
r-TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page la of 34 3.
It was vertfled that during the normal operation mode of the Control Building HVAC system, air is exhausted at all times through the Control Building HVAC System Exhaust.
CONCl.USIONS
- 1.. The Control Building HVAC System is capable of maintaining a positive pressure of 0.10 in w.g. In the control room during emergency operation with and without a single failure of OAI damper AH-0-39 and exhaust damper AH-D-37, 2.
To assure a positive pressure of 0.10 in w.g. In the control room during single failure of damper AH-0-28, OAI damper AH-0-39 must be opened to a predetermined position (gradual switch position 10,5).
3.
To assure a positive cressure of 0.10 in w.g. In the control room during a single failure of dameer AH-D-41A (8) the stand-by emergency train must be started.
4 The above conclusions are contingent upon permanent isolation of the air registers which were planked off prior to the test as well as maintenance of installed weather stripping on Control Building Envelope Doors.
S.
The Control Building HVAC system is capable of maintaining operator exposure below 30 Rem Beta and S Rem Gamma with and without single failure of dampers AH-D-39, AH-D-37 and AH-0-28.
6.
The Control Building HVAC System Exhaust is not an entry point for toxic gases during normal operation of the system.
RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
Permanently isolate Control Building HVAC System air registers which were blanked off during the test. Maintain weather stripping on Control Building Envelope Doors.
2.
Revise Operating Procedure CP-1104-19 " Control Building Ventilation System" and Abnormal procedure EP-1203-34 " Control Building ventilation System" to; a.
Start the emergency train associated with the standby normal duty fan when entering the emergency mode of operation, b.
Modulate OA! damcer AH-0-39 to gradual switch position 10.5 when entering the emergency mode of operation.
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F TDR No. 728 Rev. O Page 2 of 34 g
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No.'s.
I EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS
===1.
Background===
4 2.
Test Purpose 4
3.
Test Prerequisites 5
4.
Test Criteria 6
5.
Test Equipment 6
6.
Test Modes 7
7.
Evaluation of Test Results 9
8.
Conclusions 19 Table I-I - Delta P & Air Flow Measurements 21 Test Criteria Table I Summary of Delta P & Air Flow 22 Measurements Tests Results CALCULATION OF INLEAKAGE TO CONTROL BUILDING ENVELOPE 1.
Introduction 25 2.
Criteria for Calculation 25 3.
Methodology 25 4.
Results 26 Table !!-l - Calculated Inleakage Rates 27 Table II Total Infiltration Rates 28 30544 l
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1 TOR No. 728 Rev. O Page 3 of 34 Page No.'s.
III EVALUATION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF TOTAL INFILTRATION 1.
Introduction 29 2.
Evaluation 29 3.
Conclusions 30 IV.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 31 V.
RECOMMENDATIONS 31 VI.
REFERENCES 33 VII.
APPENDICES 34 i
r 3054d
7 TOR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 4 of 34 I
EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS 1.
BACKGROUNO As per GPUNC commitments to the USNRC (Ref. 1), a Control Building Differential Pressure (delta P) and Air Flow Measurements Test was conducted in July-August 1985.
The purpose of the test was to evaluate the capability of the Control Building HVAC System to maintain a positive pressure in the Control Room up to 0.10 in, w.g. with or without single failure of various dampers.
By uttilzing the pressure and flow measurements in combination with the results of Pickard, Lowe and Garrick Report PLG-0433, the habitability of the Control Room will be verified for radiological and toxic gas releases.
The test is an expansion of the test performed during February 1985.
During the February 1985 test, it was demonstrated that a positive pressure higher than 0.10 in, w.g. was attained in the Control Room due to increased outside intake.
It was expected, therefore, that under single failure conditions, operator action to admit increased air intake through damper AH-0-39, will provide a higher positive pressure margin in the Control Room during emergency operation. Modulating damper AH-0-39 is accomplished by adjusting the damper's gradual switen in the Control Room. Appendix H provides the basis for the establishment of the gradual switch positions.
The test was performed in accordance with Test Procedure STP-141/13 titled
" Control Building Delta P Test with Single Mode Failure (Postulated) of Dampers (AH-0-37, 41A & 28) and Air Flow Measurements."
The air flow path of the HVAC system during emergency recirculation mode is shown in Appendices A & B.
As shown in Appendix A, the HVAC System, during the emergency rectrculation mode supplies recirculated, filtered, cooled air to elevations 355'-0" 338'-6" and 322'-0" of the Control Butiding.
Note that the patto (hallway) area, which is adjacent t6 the west wall of these elevations, and the control building stairwell which is adjacent to a portion of the north wall of these elevations, do not interface with the Contrc,1 Building HVAC System (See Appendia C).
These elevations of the control building (excluding the patto area and control tullding stairwell) constitute the Control Building Emergency Envelope hereinafter referred to as the Control Building Envelope.
Elevation 355'-0" of the Control Building which is part of the Control Building Envelope is considered the Main Control Room Emergency Zone hereinafter referred to as the Control Room..
2.
TEST PURPOSE
- 1. Radiological Emergenclet The purpose of these tests was*
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1 TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 5 of 34 l
(a)
To evaluate the capability of the HVAC System to maintain a positive pressure in the Control Room up to 0.10 in w.g. with or without single failure of certain dampers.
This is accomplished by opening outside air intake (OAI) damper AH-0-39.
The tests measured the amount of air exchanged from the Control Building Envelope through Dampers AH-0-39, AH-0-37, and AH-0-28.
(b)
To evaluate the modulation of OAI Damper AH-D-39 as an operator j
action to enhance Control Building HVAC system performance.
A failure of the damper to either open or modulate is evaluated by performing this test.
(c)
To measure and/or calculate the total amount of infiltration to the Control Building Envelope and compare the aforementioned inflitration with analyzed allowable infiltration.
If the positive pressure of the Control Room or any other areas of the Control Building Envelope served by the Control Building HVAC System in the emergency mode is less than 0.1 in. w.g., then sufficient infiltration is assumed to achieve 0.1 in, w.g.
- 2. Hazardous Chemical Release The test is a confirming test.
The purpose of the test was to determine that during the normal operation mode of the HVAC System, air flow is always exhausted via damper AH-0-37.
3.
TEST PREREQUISITES
- 1. Temporary modifications of the HVAC System performed during the February 1985 test (blanking off corridor return register) remain in effect.
(See Appendin F).
Additional modifications were performed during this test in order to evaluate their impact and suitability.
These modifications were:
- a. Blank off supply and return registers 5-1A and R-1A (HVAC Equipment Room El. 380'-0").
These registers are located outside of the Control Building Enveloce and provide additional cooling in the HVAC Equipment Room.
(See Appendix G).
- b. Blank off return register R-9 located in the Control Room adjacent to door 48.
(See Appendte F).
- c. Weatherstrip all doors which are part of the Control Building Envelope - Doors 47, 48, 65, C-307. C-312, 63, C-207 and C-215.
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3 TOR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 6 of 34
- 2. Testing in Aprli. 1984 proved that both emergency train supply fans perform within t 10% of design capacity. Since emergency train supply fan AH-E-18B produces higner fan capactty than for AH-E-18A, AH-E-18A was used for this test as its lower capacity provides more conservative results.
4.
TEST CRITERIA During the test, the fatture position of the following dampers was simulated:
Exhaust Damper AH-0-37
- Open Controlled Access Area Damper AH-0 Open Normal Outy Intake Fan Damper AH-0-41A - Open OAI Damper AH-0-39
- Clo:ed Separate tests.were conducted for each of the above failure positions.
During test modes, the following information was recorded:
- 1. Control Butiding supply flow rate (FI-834-flow indication)
- 2. Control Butiding return air flow rate (FR-271-flow recorder)
- 3. a. Amount and direction of air flow through:
OAI Deeper AH-0-39 Exhaust Damper AH-0-37 Control Access Area Damper AH-0-28
- b. Backflow rate through:
Intake Damper AH-0-41A
- 4. a. Otfferential pressure across Control Room doors 47, 48.
- b. Otfferential pressure across remaining Control Building Envelope doors 65 C-307. C-312, 63. C-207 and C-215.
- 5. Control Room pressure versus inflow by modulating OA! Damper AH-0-39.
The position of the damper gradual switch was also recorded.
- 6. During a test in the normal ventilation mode the direction of air flow through Exhaust Damper AH-0-37 (20% open damper position) with Hallway Ventilation System AH-E-93A/94A "0N" or "0FF" was determined.
5.
TEST EQUIPMENT
- 1. Test eautoment is described In STP 141/13.
- 2. Installed equipment which was utilized for measurements is as follows:
Flow Indicator FI-834 3054d
1 TOR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 7 of 34 Flow Recorder FR-271 6.
TEST H0 DES Six separate tests have been performed within Test Procedure STP-141/13 (Rev. 0).
The descriptions below are the basis for each test.
Numbers in parenthesis refer to the corresponding section of STP-141/13.
- 1. Test 1 (Section 9.1) - 100% Emergency Recirculation Mode-Dampers AH-0-39, AH-0-37 and AH-0-28 closed.
In this configuration the HVAC System is in the emergency recirculation mode, (dampers AH-0-39, AH-0-37 and AH-0-28 Closed and damper AH-0-36 cpen).
This test mode simulates failure to control outside air for pressurization.
0.A.I. damper AH-0-39 is in the fall closed position.
- 2. Test 2 (Section 9.2) - 100% Emergency Recirculation Mode-0.A.I. Damper AH-D-39 Ocen With the HVAC System in the emergency rectrCulation mode as in test 1, gradual ocening of 0.A.I. damper AH-0-39 admits more outside air into the Control Building Envelope to increase the Control Building positive cressure.
(Test 2a).
By gradually opening Damper AH-0-39, the infiltration rate through Oamper AH-0-37 will be reduced.
The present Control Room H'. AC control scheme design coordinates Jimpers AH-0-39, AH-0-37 and AH-0-36.
The position of outside air damper AH-0-39 determined by a gradual switch modulates campers AH-0-37 and AH-0-36, accordingly.
If during test 2a the Control Butiding Envelope is not maintained at a positive pressure of at least 0.1 in, w.g. by gradually opening damper AH-0-39, a temcorary variation of the control scheme will be initiated.
(Test 2b).
This tetcorary variation requires modulation of damper AH-0-39 with damper AH-0-37 fully closed, the purpose of this action was to determine if by fully closing the AH-0-37 damper the pressure inside of Control Building envelope could be increased.
Test 2c 15 a variation of test 2b (different position of OAl damper AH-0-39 gradual snttch).
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3 TOR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 8 of 34 3.
Test 3 (Section 9.3) - 100% Recirculation Mode-Damper-AH-0-28 closed, Damper AH-0-37 Failed Open (F.O.)
Test 3a is performed with the HVAC System in the emergency recirculation mode and damper AH-0-37 failed open, gradually open 0.A.I. damper AH-0-39 in order to admit more outside air into the Control Building Envelope.
This will reduce the infiltration rate through damper AH-0-37.
Test 3b is run in the same manner as Test 3a with the AH-0-39 damper gradual switch at a different position.
4.
Test 4 (Section 9.4) - 100% Recirculation Mode-Dampers AH-0-37 and AH-0-28 closed, Damper AH-0 41A F.O.
Test da is performed with the HVAC System in the emergency recirculation mode and damper AH-0-41A failed open, with 0.A.I.
damper AH-0-39 closed. During the Emergency Recirculation Jode '
with single failure of damper AH-0-41A backflow exists between AH-E-18A emergency supply fan and AH-E-17A normal supply fan via damper AH-D-41A (See Appendir A).
Opening damper AH-0-39 is espected to reduce eackflow through the failed open camper AH-0 41A and therefore increase the supply air flow into tne Control Building Envelope.
Test ab is run in the same manner as test 4a with the OAI Damper AH-0-39 partially open.
5.
Test 5 (Section 9.5) - 100% Recirculation Mode-Damper AH-0-37 C osed Damper AH-0-28 F.0.
This test measures the effect of admitting more outside air on i
Control Building Envelope pressures with AH-0-28 damper failed ocen.
Test Sa is run with the HVAC System in the emergency recirculation mode and damper AH-0-28 failed open, with 0 A.I.
damper AH-0-39 closed.
Test 50 is run with OAI Damper AH-0-39 l
ocen.
6.
Test 6 (Section_9.6) _ Normal Operation-AH-E-17A Fan-On,_0.A.I.
Damper AH-0-39 20% Ocen l
Test 6 is performed to determine the direction of air flow through i
damper AH-0-37.
During normal operation, air flow Into the l
Control Building varies from 100% outside air to a minimum of l
20%.
Test 6 is run with minimum 20% outside air which represents 1
the molt Conservative position.
l l
.M 54d
TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 9 of 34 Test 6a was run with the patto (hallway) ventilation system (AH-E-93A/94A) "off".
Test 6b was run with the patio (hallway) ventilation system (AH-E-93A/94A) "on".
7.
EVALUATION OF TEST RESULTS Sections 9.1 - 9.5 General The data recorded during different test modes as summarized in Table 1-2 enables evaluation of the capability of the HVAC System to maintain a positive pressure of 0.10 in, w.g. In the Control Room during its emergency mode of operation.
This data also identiftes and quantifies i
all potential sources of infiltration to the HVAC system which contributes to or detracts from maintaining this positive pressure.
For those rooms in the Control Building Envelope where the measured pressure is less than 0.10 in. W.g., the data provides the basis for calculating the additional air infiltration to the Control Building Envelope l
required to achieve +0.10 in, w.g..
As shown in Table I-2 the following data were recorded during different test modes.
-Supply air flow into System (AH-E-18A) - CFM
-Return air flow (AH-E-19A) - CFM
-Measured infiltration air rates through damper AH-0-39, AH-0-28, AH-D-37
-Measured backflow through AH-0-41A damper
-Temcerature of the infiltrated air
- F
-Offferential pressure across:
Control Room doors 47, 48 l
Remaining Control Building Envelope doors -65, -C307. C-312,63, C-207. C-215.
l For the purpose of this evaluation the following data were used:
-Supply air flow into system
-Measured infiltration rates through dampers AH-0-39. AH-D-28, and AH-D-37
-Measured backflow through AH-0 41A damper
-Offferential pressure across doors.
The following is a general evaluation of the above IIsted parameters.
This envelopes all the test modei except test 6.
Additional evaluation is discussed for different test modes. An Individual evaluation was performed for test 6.
l 1
l 3054d l
TOR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 10 of 34 As shown in Table I-2 the supply air flow (Fan AH-E-18A) varies between 41,250 CFM as recorded in Test 1 and 44,750 CFM as recorded during the Test 4a.
The design flow capacity of supply fan AH-E-18A is 42,000 CFM. Since a fluctuation of 2 107. of the fan design capacity is customarily acceptable, fan AH-E-18A is within design capacity and therefore operates properly.
The measured infiltration rates through dampers AH-0-39 and AH-D-37, during different test modes, varies from 4158 CFM (3.658 + 500) as recorded in Test I up to 10.440 CFM as per Test Sb.
The 4.158 CFM measured infiltration rates through dampers AH-0-39 and AH-D-37 during Test I maintained positive pressure in the Control Room of + 0.14 in. w.g. The 10,440 CFM measured inflow rates through partially open damper AH-0-39, as per test Sb increased Control Room pressure up to + 0.26/+0.22 in w.g.
Therefore, the amount of inleakage required to pressurize the Control Building Envelope for all test modes is the total inflow through AH-0-39 and AH-0-37 dampers as recorded based on traverse readings.
These readings are more meaningful than comparing flow measurements of return air fan AH-E-19 with emergency supply fan AH-E-18A to calculate infiltration through dampers AH-0-37 and AH-D-39.
Therefore, flow measurements of AH-E-19 are not utilized in identifying infiltration.
Damper AH-D-28 as per Table I-2 always exflitrates air and is not considered a source of infiltration.
AH-0-41A damper is not considered as an inflitration source due to its position in the HVAC system configuration.
It causes emergency fan short circuiting or backflow when failed open and results in a net reduction in air supply to the entire HVAC System.
Evaluation of the differential pressure readings across Control Room doors 47 and 48 and remaining Control Building Envelope doors 65, C-307 C-312, 63, C-207 and C-215 is done separately for each individual test using the following as a guide:
a.
The acceptable criteria for the positive pressure in the Control Room is 0.10 in w.g.
b.
A positive pressure of 0.10 in. w.g. is not a criteria for the entire Control Building Envelope.
The measured differential pressure across any Control Building Envelope doors. (if less than
+0.10 in. w.g.) is used as a basis for calculating additional infiltration air required to bring these rooms to a positive pressure of +0.10 in w.g.
See Section II of this TOR.
The total Infiltration rates required to maintain a positive pressure up to 0.10 in, w.g. In the Control Building Envelope are calculated based on the formula:
3054d
1 TOR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 11 of 34 Total infiltr. rates. Measured + calculated infiltr. rates.
Total inflitration rates are used in comparison with analyzed allowable infiltration rates to the HVAC system.
This evaluation is covered in Section III of this TDR.
Note that a requirement was identified in reference 11 to relocate a return air register on elevation 355'-0" of the Control Building which had been blanked off for both testing in February, 1985 and for the latest test. While it is still necessary to blank this register off to insure pressurization of the Control Room, relocation of this register is not necessary.
No increase in temperature was observed in this area during testing. Since there was no impact on temperature as a result of blanking off this register, there is no need to relocate the register.
7.1 Test i Eculpment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply On AH-E-19A Return Fan On Closed AH-D-39 OA1 Damper AH-D-37 Exhaust Damper Closed AH-0-28 Controlled Access Area Closed Damper AH-D-36 Rectreulation Damper Open for test results see Table I-2.
In this test measured inleakage occurred through dampers AH-0-39 and AH-D-37.
The total measured inleakage was 4158CFM. A measured exfiltration of 194 CFM occurred through AH-0-28 damper. -
The Control Room was maintained at a positive pressure of 0.14 in, w.g.*
(see Table I-2).
The pressure in the remaining rooms in the Control Building Envelope varied between -0.10 in. w. g. and +0.10 in. w. g.
Since these values are less than 0.10 in
- w. g., a calculation was performed to determine the additional infiltration required to bring these rooms to a positive pressure of +0.10 in. w. g.
The source of infiltration is assumed to te the patto (hallway).
For the calculation of this additional inflitration, see section II of this TDR.
7.2 Test 2 Three sections were performed as described by Test 2a, 2b & 2c in the following description. All the sections used 0AI Damper AH-0-39 as a means to increase the cositive pressure inside the Control Building Envelope by admitting more outside air.
Reference delta P across Control Room Doors 47 and 48. As discussed in 4.4a all subsequent control room delta P readings are across doors 47 and 48.
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(
l TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 12 of 34 Test 2a Equipment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- On AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OA1 Damper
- Partially open Gradual Switch Position
- 10.5 AH-D-37 Exhaust Damper
- Partially open AH-D-28 Controlled Access Area
- Closed Dampe.
AH-D-36 Recirculation Damper
- Partially open For test resul.ts see Table I-2.
In this test measured inleakage occurred through 0.A.I. damper AH-D-39 which was partially open.
The total measured inleakage was 9.612 CFM. A measured exfiltration of 9.185 CFM occurred through the partially open AH-D-37 damper and AH-D-28 damper.
The Control Roma was maintained at a positive pressure of +0.33/0.24 in w.
g.
The pressure in the remaining rooms of the Control Building Envelope varied between 0.0 and +0.35 in, w. g.
As in Test 1, a calculation was performed to determine the additional inflitration required to bring the rooms to a positive pressure of 0.10 in, w. g.
The source of infiltration is assumed to be the patto (hallway).
For the calculation of this infiltration see section II of this TDR.
Since two Control Building Envelope rooms were at a positive pressure less than +0.10 in. w.
g., test 2b was performed.
Test 2b Equioment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- On AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OAl Damper
- Partially open Gradual Switch Position
- 10.5 AH-D-37 Exhaust Damper
- Closed AH-0-36 Recirc. Damper
- Open AH-D-28 Control Access Area
- Closed Damper For test results see Table I-2.
3054d
7 TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 13 of 34 The test 2b is a repetition of Test 2a with the AH-D-37 damper closed.
The purpose of closing the AH-D-37 damper was to improve the positive pressure inside the Control Building Envelope.
In this test, measured inleakage occurred through dampers AH-D-39 and AH-D-37.
The total measured inflow was 6119 CFM. An exflitration of 229 CFM occurred through the AH-D-28 damper.
The Control Room was maintained at a positive pressure of +0.30 (+0.34) in, w. g. which is above the results of Test 1
(+0.14 in. w. g.).
The pressure in the remaining rooms of the Control Building Envelope varied between +0.02 and +0.35 in, w. g. which exceeds the results of Test 1.
Test 2c was performed to evaluate the effect of placing damper AH-D-39 to an intermediate position.
Test 2c Equipment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- On AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OA1 Damper
- Partially open Gradual Switch Position
-7 AH-D-37 Exhaust Damper
- Closed AH-D-36 Recirc. Damper
- Open AH-D-28 Control Access Area
- Closed Damper For test results see Table I-2.
Test 2c Delta P readings across Control Room doors 47 & 48 dropped from Test 2b readings from +0.34/0.30 to +0.14/0.14 in, w.g.
A reduction of positive pressures was expected in other rooms in the Control Building Envelope.
Therefore, no more readings were taken and no further evaluation of Test 2c is required.
7.3 Test 3
-Two sections were performed as described by Test 3a and Test 3b.
Both sections used 0AI damper AH-D-39 as a means to increase the positive pressure inside the Control Building Envelope by admitting more outside air, and to reduce the inflitration rate through the AH-D-37 damper.
The only difference between the two sections is the position of the AH-D-39 damper gradual switch which determines the air flow through AH-D-39 and the air flow through the failed open AH-D-37 damper.
3054d
1 TDR No. 728 Rev. O Page 14 of 34 Test 3a i
Equipment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- On AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OA1 Damper
- Partially open Gradual Switch Position
- 7 (1.5 psig)*
AH-D-37 Exhaust Damper
- F.O.
AH-D-36 Recirc. Damper
- Open AH-D-28 Control Access Area
- Closed Damper For test results see Table I-2 In this test measured inleakage occurred through dampers AH-D-39 and AH-D-37.
The total measured inleakage was 3.480 CFM.
A measured exflitration of 188 CFM occurred through the AH-D-28 damper.
The Control Room was maintained at a positive pressure of +0.23 in. w.g.
The pressure in the remaining rooms of the Control Building Envelope varied between - 0.02 and +0.30 in. w.g.
Since infiltration thru AH-D-37 damper existed and since the " delta P" across some Control Building Envelope doors was negative, test 3b was performed.
Test 3b Equipment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- O'n AH-E-19 Return Fan
- On AH-0-39 OAI Damper
- Partially open Gradual switch position
- 8 (2.5 psig)
AH-0-37 Exhaust Damper
- F.O.
i AH-D-36 Recirc. Damper
- Open AH-D-28 Controlled Access
- Closed Area Damper For test results see Table I-2.
In this test measured inleakage occurred through OAI damper AH-D-39 which was partially open.
The total measured inleakage was 3780 CFM. A measured exfiltration of 180 CFM occurred through the AH-D-28 damper and 5225 CFM through the F.O. AH-D-37 damper.
Erroneously reported as 8 in STP 141/13.
i 3054d
1 TDR No. 728 Rev. O Page 15 of 34 The Contrcl Room was maintained at a positive pressure of +0.18/+0.20 in.w.g.
The two Control Building Envelope rooms which experienced negative pressure in test 3a, showed no significant changes. A calculation was performed to determine the additional infiltration required to bring the rooms to a positive pressure of 0.10 in w.g.
The source of infiltration is assumed to be the patto (hallway). For the calculation of this infiltration see Section II of this TDR.
Comparison of test 3b to 3a shows that modulating 0.A.I. damper AH-D-39 is beneficial even though it decreased positive in the Control Building Envelope while still maintaining positive pressure in the Control Room above 0.10 in. w.g. as test 3b eliminates inflitration through damper AH-0-37.
7.4 Test 4 Two (2) sections were performed as described by Test 4a and Test 4b.
The two sections were basically the same.
The only difference is that the Test ab uses the OAI Damper AH-D-39 as a means to increase the positive pressure inside the Control Bul! ding Envelope by admitting more outside air into tne Control Building Envelope.
Test da Equicment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- On i
AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OAI Damper
- Closed AH-D-37 Exhaust Damper
- Closed AH-D-28 Control Access Area
- Closed Damper AH-D-36 Recirc. Damper
- Open DH-D-41A Intake Damper
- F.O.
For test results see Table I-2.
Comparing the capacity of fan AH-E-18A during this failure mode with the capacity of this fan during previous test modes, an increase in fan capacity from 41,000 CFM to 44,750 CFM was measured.
This increase in the capacity of the fan was caused by a backflow condition which resulted from the failed open position of damper AH-D-41A.
The measured backflow was 11,148 CFM.
This means that the amount of the air supplied into the Control Building Envelope was:
44,750 CFM - 11,148 CFM - 33,602 CFM.
3054d T
l
TDR No. 728 Rev. O Page 16 of 34 In this test measured inleakage occurred through dampers AH-0-39 and AH-D-37.
The total measured inleakage was 2,071 CFM. A measured exflitration of 125 CFM occurred through the AH-D-28 damper.
This low infiltration rate in conjunction with reduction of the quantity of air supplied into the Control Building Envelope as described previously was the cause of the low positive pressure achieved in the Control Room -
+0.08/+0.02 in w.g.
The pressure in the remaining rooms of the Control Building Envelope varied between -0.15 and +0.11 in, w.g.
A calculation was performed to determine the additional infiltration required to bring the rooms to a positive pressure of 0.10 in. w.g.
The source of infiltration is assumed to be the patio (hallway).
For the calculation of this infiltration, see section II of this TDR.
In order to increase the positive pressure inside the Control Room and Control Building Envelope, test mode 4b was initiated by gradually opening the OAI Dameer AH-D-39.
Test 4b Equipment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- On AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OAI Damper
- Open Gradual Switch Position
- 10.5 AH-D-28 Control Access
-Closed Area Damper AH-D-36 Recirc. Damper
-Open AH-0-41A Intake Damper
-F.O.
For test results see Table I-2.
Since the supplied fan capacity was close to that as per test 4a (44,000/44,750) and the return air capacity was less 35,000 CFM compared to 37,000 in test 4a, it was concluded that this test mode will not increase the positive pressure inside the Control Building Envelope over Test da.
Therefore, no more readings were taken.
7.5 Test 5 Two (2) sections were performed as described in Test 5a and 5b.
The two sections are basically the same.
The only difference is that test 5b used the 0.A.I. Damper AH-0-39 as a means to increase the positive pressure inside the Control Building Envelope by admitting more outside air.
i l
3054d l
L.
TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 l
Page 17 of 34 Test Sa Equipment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- On AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OAI Damper
- Closed AH-0-37 Exhaust Damper
- Closed AH-0-36 Recirc. Damper
- Open AH-D-28 Control Access Area
- F.O.
Damper For test results see Table I-2.
In this test measured inleakage occurred through dampers AH-D-39 and A'i-D-37. The total measured inleakage was 2954 CFM. An exfiltration of 1450 CFM occurred through failed open damper AH-D-28.
The Control Room was maintained at a positive pressure of +0.12/+0.08 in, w.g.
The pressure in the remaining rooms of the Control Building Envelope varied between -0.15 in w.g. and +0.16 in. w.g.
Since the Control Room was maintained at a positive pressure less than
+0.10 in. w.g. Test 5b was performed by gradually opening the AH-D-39 damper.
Test 5b Equipment Status AH-E-18A Emergency Supply
- On AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-E-39 DAI Damper
- Open Gradual Switch Position
- 10.5 AH-D-37 Exhaust Damper
- Open AH-D-36 Recirc. Damper
- Open AH-D-28 Control Access Area Damper
- F.O.
For Test Results see Table I-2 In this test measured inleakage occurred through damper AH-D-39.
The total measured inleakage was 10,440 CFM.
A measured exfiltration of 6025 CFM occurred through the AH-D-37 damper and 1712 CFM through failed open damper AH-D-28.
The Control Room positive pressure was increased from +0.12/+0.08 in. w.g.
as per test 5a to +0.26/+0.22 in w.g.
The pressure in remaining rooms in the Control Building Envelope also increased.
Two rooms in the Control Building Envelope still showed pressure less than 0.10 in, w.g..
For these rooms a calculation was performed to determine the additional infiltration required to bring the rooms to a positive pressure of +0.10 l
3054d
TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 18 of 34 in, w.g.
The source of infiltration is assumed to be the patic (hallway).
For the calculation of this infiltration, see Section II of this TDR.
7.6 Test 6 Two (2) sections were performed as described by Test 6a and Test 6b.
The two sections are basically the same.
The only difference between the two tests is that Test 6b has the Hallway Ventilation System AH-E-93A/AH-E-94A fans on.
Since the discharge of the fans are common, a verification of the flow was required with the AH-E-93A/94A fans "on" or "off".
Test 6a Equipment Status AH-E-17 Normal Supply
- On AH-E-19 Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OAI Damper
- 20% Open Gradual Switch Position
- 10 AH-0-37 Exhaust Damper
- 20% Open AH-D-36 Recirc Damper
- Open AH-D-28 Control Access Area
- Open Damper AH-E-93A Hallway Supply Fan
- Off AH-E-94A Hallway Exh. Fan
- Off Direction of air flow - Exfiltration to Control Building Exhaust Test 6b Equipment Status AH-E-17 Normal Supply
- On AH-E-19A Return Fan
- On AH-D-39 OAI Damper
- 20% Open Gradual Switch Position
- 10 AH-0-37 Exhaust Damper
- 20% Open AH-D-36 Recirc. Damper
- Open AH-0-28 Ccntrol Access Area
- Open Damper AH-E-93 Hallway Supply Fan
- On AH-E-94 Hallway Exhaust Fan
- On Direction of air flow - Exfiltration to Control Building Exhaust 3054d
7 TOR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 19 of 34 8.
CONCLUSIONS
- 1. The HVAC System is capable of maintaining a positive pressure in the Control Room greater than 0.10 in w.g. during its emergency operation mode with or without single failure of 0AI damper AH-D-39 and exhaust AH-0-37.
- 2. The HVAC System is capable of maintaining a positive pressure of 0.10 in, w.g. in the control room during single failure of damper AH-D-28 provided OAI damper AH-0-39 is opened to a pre-determined position (Gradual Switch position 10.5).
- 3. During the failure mode of the AH-D-41A damper, the pressure in the Control Room was +0.08/+0.02 in. w.g.
To eliminate the single failure concern of damper AH-D-41A, corrective action is required.
(See recommendations).
- 4. Conclusions 1-3 are contingent upon permanent isolation of the air registers which were blanked off prior to the test as well as maintenance of installed weatherstripping on Control Building Envelope doors.
The requirement identified in reference 11 to relocate a return air register on elevation 355'-0" is not necessary as no increase in temperature was observed in this area during the test with this register isolated.
This register need only be blanked off permanently.
- 5. The pressure in the remaining rooms in the Control Building Envelope varied from a minimum of -0.15 in. w.g. up to a maximum of +0.35 in.
w.g.
- 6. During the normal ventilation mode, air is always exhausted via the AH-D-37 damper.
Therefore there is no concern of toxic gases entering into the Control Room through a flow path not previously evaluated.
- 7. Opening 0.A.I. damper AH-0-39 proves the most beneficial in assuring maintenance of the Control Room at + 0.10 in. w.g.
HVAC System procedures should be revised accordingly (see recommendations).
This reduces the set of applicable test modes for use in radiological dose and toxic gas analyses to the following:
- a. Test 1 - 1001 Recirculation Mode - OAI Damper AH-D-39 Closed
(!'
- b. Test 2a -
100% Recirculation Mode OAI Damper AH-D-39 Open AH-D-37 Damper Open 3054d I
l
'1
'TDR No. 728 Rev. O Page 20 of 34
- c. Test 3b -
100% Recirculation Mode AH-0-37 Damper F.O.
0AI Damper AH-0-39 Open
- d. Test 5b -
1001 Recirculation Mode AH-0-28 Damper F.O.
0AI Damper AH-D-39 Open
- e. Test 6a -
Normal Operation Mode 6b -
CAI Damper AH-0-39-20% Open AH-E-93A/94 ON or 0FF
- 8. The following test modes have been eliminated since they do not assume cperation of the AH-0-39 damper in the method identified above in item 5:
Test 2b, 2c, 3a, 4b and Sa
- 9. Test 4a is evaluated in section II and III of this TDR.-
D 3054d
9 TDR No. 728 Rev. O P gs 21 of 34 Table I-1 Delta P & Air Flow Measurement Test Criteria Applicable Closed Damper D_gminer AH-D-39 Test Sections of System Mode AH-D-Open Position of No.
Test Proc.
of Operation 39 37
_28 41A Yes/No Crad. Switch Remarks 1
9.1.
100% Recirc.
X X
X X
No 0
2a 9.2.
1001 Recire.
X X
Yes 10.5 Cradually Open D-39 Open D-39/D-37 Open h
9.2.
1001 Recire.
X X
X Yes 10.5 D-39 open as D-39 Open Above D-37 Closed c
9.2.
1001 Recirc.
X X
Yes 7
D-39 Open D-39 Open D-37 Closed.
3a 9.3.
100% Recirc.
X X
Yes 7-(1.5 psig)
(D-37 F.0) b 9.3.
1001 Recirc.
X X
Yes 8 (2.5 psig)
(D-37 F.O.)
4a 9.4.
100% Recire.
X X
X No O
(D-41A F.0) b 9.4.
1001 Recire.
X Yes 10.5 (D-41A F.O.)
5a 9.5.
1001 Recire.
X X
X No 0
(D-28 F.O.)
b 9.5.
100% Recire.
X Yes 10.5 (D-28 F.O.)
6a 9.6.
Normal Oper.
Yes 10 AH-E-93 A/94A "0FF" 20% 0.A.
b 9.6.
Normal Oper.
Yes 10 AH-E-93A 94A "0N" 201 0.A.
3054d J
71* No. /Z3 Rev. O Fese 22 cf 34 Tabl2 1-2 Susmary of Test Results Delta F & Air Flow Measurements Test Applicable Supply Return Infiltretton CFM Delta P (th W.C.) Across Door Sectice of est System Mode CFM CFM Air Temp.
'F Test E of Operation (FI-834) (FR-271) D-39 D-37 D-28 D-41 47 48 65 C-307 C-312 6]
C-207 C-215 Procedure Bemerke Ex.
(-)
I 1001 Rectrc. 41,250 42.000
_3658
_500 194 0.14 0.14 0.10 0
0.04 0.10 0
0 10.1.2.3.4 Mode.
(s4,4) (83.5)
(72.3) 5.6.7 (D-39 Closed)
Ex.
Es.
2a 1001 Rectre. 41.000 38.000 9612 8922 263 0.33 0.24 0.01 0
0.18 0.35 0.20 0.34 10.2.2.3.4 D-39 damper Mode (83)
(75.6)
(10.0) 5.6.7.8 gradual switch D-39 Open position = 10.5.
D-37 Open Ex.
b 1001 Rectre. 41.750 39.000 5400 719 229 0.34 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.35 0.34 0.34 10.2.10.11.12. D-39 damper Mode.
(79.6) (80.6)
(71.7) 13.14.15 aredual evitch D-39 Open position = 10.5 G-37 Closed but D-37 damper closed.
Es.
c 1001 Rectre.
_3420 600 194 0.14 0.14 10.2.15.16.17. D-39 damper Mode (85.9) (86.2)
(69.3) 18 gradual switch D-39 Open position = 7 and D-37 Closed D-37 damper closed.
- Unoffletal recording.
4544 l
1 n
7 TDR No. 728 Bev. O Fase 23 e.f 34 Tabla I-2 Summary of Test Beaults Delta F & Air Flow Measurements Test Supply Beturn infiltration Cm Delta P (IN. W.C.) Across Door Applicable feet System Mode Cm CFM Air Temp.
- F Section of
% of Operation (FI-834) (FR-271) D-39 D-37 D-28 D-41 47 48 g C-307 C-312,6_]
C_-20 7 C-215 Test Procedure Remarks Ex.
(-)
(-)
la 1001 Recirc. 41,250 40,250 2000 600 let 0.23 0.23 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.30 0.28 0.30 10.3.2.3,4,5 D-39 damper gradual Mode.
(80.6) (82.8)
(69.9) 6,7,8 switch position 7 D-39 open (1.5 Fals).
As-D-37 Inflow through Failed Open D-37 damper.
En Ex.
(-)
(-)
L 1001 Rectre. 41,000 40.000 3700. 5.225 _ L80_
0.18 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.20 0.29 10.3.9.10,11 D-39 damper gradual Mode (79.3) (16.50) (68) 12,13 switch position =8 D-39 Ope _n (2.5pels.) Measured AE-D-37
& observed the flow F'iled Open through D-37 damper. (Esfiltra-tion = 5225 CFM)
Es.
(-)
(-)
(-)
4a 1001 Rectre. 44.750 37,000 1296 775 125 W l48 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.11 10.4.3.4.5,6 D-39 damper closed.
Mode (83.6) (82.2)
(70.2) (79.2) 7,8,9 The positive pres-AN-D-41 A sure is less than F'iled Open 0.10*' W.C.
Ab 2001 Rectre. 44,000 35,000 10.4.10.11 D-39 damper gradual Mode switch = 10.5.
D-39 Open No benef1t in AE-D-41A reducing the back-F lled Open flow rate since the supply &
return CFM is close to those of test 4a.
0544 h
A h
)
TL:*. No. T(,/
Bys. 0 x
Pass 24 af 34 Table 1-2 Susumery of Test Results Delta P & Air Flow Measurements Test Supply Return Infiltration C_m Dette P (IN. W C.) Across Door.
Applicable 2
Test System Mode Cm Cm Air Temp.
- F Section of No et Operation (F1-834 ) (FR-271) D-39 D-37 D-28 D-41 47 48 65 C-307 C-312 63 C-207 C-215 Test Procedure seemets 2
Es.
(-)
(-)
Sa 1001 Rectre. 41.000 42.000 2,304 650 1,444 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.16 10.5.2.3.4.5.6 Mode (86.4) (86.3)
(62) 7 AN-D-se r-Iled open (2)
En Ex. (1)
(-)
Sb 1001 Rectrc. 41.000 38.000 10.440 6025 1713 0.26 0.22 0.03 0
0.15 0.28 0.27 0.29 10.5.8.9 B-39 damper gradual Mode (76.7) (76.0) 62.4 13.14.15 avitch position -
D-39 Open 16.16A.17 10.5 (unof ficial AM-D-28 recording) D-37 F3tled Ope _n damper open.
Esfiltration through D-37 damper a 6025 Cm.
6a Normel Enfiltr.
10.6.2 D-39 damper gradual Operation switch position =
Mode 10.
(201 0.A) 201 Open AN-Enfiltration thru D-33 & D-37 D-37 was observed.
6b Normal No flow 10.6.3.4 Same as 6a.
Operation into No inflow thru as 6a CBVS.
D-37 d w r.
A5-E-93/A ON AN-E-94/A ON lotw:
1)
Fana AE-E 90. 91. 92 are running. (when AE-E-90. 91. 92 were stopped the enflow rate was 3913 cm).
2)
This value was subsequently corrected in test procedure STP 141/13. Since the dif ference is minor (+1.51) impact on integrated radiological dase is negligible.
tC54d
_a
l TOR No. 728 Rev. O Page 25 of 34
_I I CALCULATION OF INLEAKAGE TO CONTROL BUILDING ENVELOPE i
1.
INTRODUCTION Ref. 1 includes revised criteria and clarifles the Control Room habitability reautrements such that the dose assessment will include inleakage of unfiltered air from other sources (both outside and inside the plant), if the positive pressure of the Control Room is less than 0.10 in, w.g.
For the purposes of this calculation, inleakage throughout the i
Control Building Envelope will also be considered.
Inleakage will be assumed to achieve a pressure of +0.10 in. w.g. during HVAC emergency operation mode with or without single failure of the dampers.
Test data evaluated in Section 1 of this TOR provide:
l t
a).
Pressures measured in the Control Building Envelope -
b).
Measured filtered inleakage through OAI Damper AH-0-39 and Exhaust Dancer AH-0-37 during different test modes.
This section of the TCR clarifles the differential pressure criteria for calculation of additicnal inleakage and explains the methodology used in preparation of the calculation.
The results of the calculations are summarized as " Total Inleakage" into the Control Building Envelope.
2.
CRITERIA FOR CALCULATION As per Table I-2, the worst measured delta P across doors 47, 48, 65, C-307. C-312, 63, C-207 and C-215 during 1007, emergency rectrculation mode with or without single failure of the isolation dampers is -0.15 in. w.g.
as measured across door C-307.
Since, the additional inleakage into the Control Building HVAC System has to be based on achieving +0.10 in, w,g.
positive pressure, the differential pressure criteria for calculating additional inleakage will be:
0.10 in. w.g. - (.15 in, w.9) = 0.25 in, w.g.
delta P
=
f To assure a conservative approach, a differential pressure of 0.30 in.
w.g. will be applied for all rooms where the measured differential pressure across a door is less than +0.10 in, w.g. regardless of the measured differential pressure across a door.
3.
METH000 LOGY 1
Section III of Ref. 7 was used as a basis for determining infiltration l
rates through penetrations of the Control Building Envelope, such as l
cable, cable trays, ducts and others.
O 3054d
I' TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 26 of 34 According to Ref. 7, the leakage rate per each unit leak path is based on the formula:
t l
0 BP
AP +
I where:
1 Leak rate (CFM)
Q
=
A,8 - Empirical Constants i
j P
Olfferential pressure Since Ref. 7 covers only special types of doors, calculation of leak rates j
through doors will be based on Reference 8. (ASHRAE) which is more
{
conservat've.
j t
'{
The leak caths have been determined by using Ref. 9 and 10.
These two l
references identify all Control Building Envelope penetrations,,
t cenetration dimensions. and types of penetrations. All penetrations in 1
the Centrol Buitaing Envelope are fire sealed.
In addition all doors are 1
weather-stripped Fire doors.
For the purpose of calculating infiltration J
rates through the doors, a crack of 0.10 in, around the perimeter of the doors has been considered even though the door s have been l
weather-stripped. Also, as per recommendation of Ref. 7, a multiplication 1
factor of 4 was applied toward calculated inleakage rates for all j
penetrations except doors.
i 4.
RESULTS i
The results of the calculation (Ref. 5) are shown on Table 11-1 and Table j
II-2.
In these tables, the inflitration rates through Damper AH-0-39 and i
Damper AH-0-37 were measured during tests.
(See Table I-2.)
The i
j calculated inleakage rates are listed under column " Calculated" (Table l
II-2).
Table II-2 also shows the total infiltration rates required to
{
maintain the Control Building Envelope at +0.10 in, w.g.
(i.e. The sum of measured and calculated infiltration rates.)
I 1
?
r i
i i
i l
[
3054d i
I TDR No. 728 Rev. O Page 27 of 34 I
TABLE II-1 I
(Calculated)
Inleakage Rates (Penetrations and Doors)
Inflitration Rates Test Test Mode of (CFM)
Total i
t No.
Operation C.R.
El. 338' E1. 322' (CFM)
[
1 100% Recire. Mode 780 924 2628 0-39 Closed 924 572 2a 100% Recirc. Mode 572 Open 0-39 Open j
3b 100% Recirc. Mode 572 220 792 j
0-37 F.O. D-39 Open
)
da 100% Recirc. Mcce 572 780 572 2848 0-41 F.O.
924 i
5b 100% Recirc. Mode 572 572 0-28 F.C. D-39 Ocen i
1
!,O j
i i
1 i
i I
I, 4
l l
l l
3054d l
l l
l l
TOR No. 728 Rev. O Page 28 of 34 i
Table II-2 Total Inflitration Rates i
(Measured and Calculated)
Test Test Mcde of Infiltration Rates /CFM Total No.
Operation Measured Infiltration Rates 0-39 D-37 Calculated (CFM) l 1
1001 Rectrc. Mode 3658 500 2628 6786 (0-39 Closed) 2a 1001 Retire. Mode 9612 0
572 10184 0-39 Open
(
3b 100% Rectrc. Mode 3780 0
792 4572 0-37 F.O./0-39 Open 4a 100% Recirc. Mcde 1296 775 2848 4919 0 41 F.O.
Sb 100% Rectrc. Mcde 10440 0
572 11012 0-28 F.O./0-39 Cpen l
O i
3054d f
r TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 29 of 34 I_II EVALUATION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF TOTAL INFILTRATION RATES 1.
INTRODUCTION Pickard, Lowe & Garrick, Inc. has prepared a Control Room Habitability Study entitled " Analysis of Radiological and Chemical Accidents for Abnormal Flow Paths to the Control Room" PLG-0433 dated August 28, 1985 (Ref. 6).
The study provides the details of the analytical model used to determine the radiation dose to the Control Room operators during radioactive releases as discussed with NRC.
In general, the model is based on:
- 1. criteria provided in Murphy-Campe report
- 2. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> first shift after an incident
- 3. Beta and Gamma dose only as per NRC concurrence.
The Iodine source term is being re-evaluated by NRC.
- 4. The dose analysis includes the contribution from in-leakages through the exhaust damper (AH-0-37) as well as that from other in-plant sources such as the patto (hallway) area.
A parametric study of total inflitration by source versus Beta skin dose and Gamma Whole Body dose was conducted and the results are tabulated in the report.
The results are included in Tables 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4 and 6-5 of Ref. 6.
The study includes an analysis of total integrated doses versus measured inflitration through dampers AH-0-39 and AH-0-37.
Calculated infiltration via the patio (hallway) is also included in the evaluation.
The source present in the patio is assumed to be either equivalent to~the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building atmosphere or the supply air from the Air Intake Tunnel (AH-0-39), whichever yields the higher dose.
The results are included in Table A-1 of Reference 6, (Appendix E).
For accidental releases of hazardous chemicals, an analysis of toxic gas concentrations in the Control Building Envelope has been performed with the results given in pages 6-1 & 6-2 of Ref. 6.
2.
EVALUATION Table A-1 of Ref. 6 provides a summary of radiation doses to Control Room operators in the Control Room; Beta skin and gamma whole body /versus total measured (measured + calculated) inflow rates into Control Building Envelope. The five sets.of flow data as shown in this table envelope the following test modes:
- 1. 1007. Emergency Recirculation Mode - AH-D-39 damper closed (Test 1).
O 3054d i
TOR No. 728 Rev. O Page 30 of 34 i
4
)
- 2. 1001 Emergency Recirculation Mode - AH-0-39 damper partially open (Test 2a).
- 3. 100% Emergency Recirculation Mode - AH-D-39 damper partially open.
l Damper AH-0-37 F.O. (Test 3b).
AH-D-41A F.O. (Test 4a).
\\
5.
1001 Emergency Recirculation Mode AH-D-39 damper partially open; damper AH-0-28 F.O. (Test 5b).
i i
For each of the above test modes, there are three cases corresponding to the assumption that infiltration occurs via AH-0-37, AH-0-39 and the Auxillary and. Fuel Handling Building.
In addition, there are two Cases I
corresponding to the assumption that infiltration occurs via AH-D-37 and AH-D-39 only.
The latter excludes consideration of the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building as a contributor to Control Room operator dose assessment.
This permits assessment of the worst case with respect to the cose contribution frcm the patlo (hallway).
For each case discussed above, the principal pathway which contributes to control room operator dose identifies the integrated dose for that i
pathway.
Where the principal pathway is AH-D-37, AH-0-39 is considered as a secondary pathway and vice versa.
This is consistent with the criterla O
provided in the Murphy-Campe report.
Where the principal pathway is the j
Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building, there is no secondary pathway.
j As per Table A-1 (Appendix E) the total integrated beta skin dose will not exceed 16 rem and the gamma whole body dose will not exceed I rem for all test modes.
This includes the single failure mode of damper AH-D-41A.
1 i
Since Test 6 verifies that air is always exhausted through the AH-0-37 4
i Exhaust Damper during HVAC System Normal Mode of Operation, the system operates within the bounds established in the hazardous chemical release i
evaluation (PP. 6-1 & 6-2 of Ref. 6).
j
3.0 CONCLUSION
S i
- 1. The Control Building HVAC System is capable of maintaining operator exposure below 30 Rem Seta (Skin) and 5 Rem Gamma (whole body) with or 4
without single failure of dampers AH-0-39, AH-D-37, AH-0-28 and i
AH-D-41A(B) by admitting more outside air to the Control Building Envelope via OAI damper AH-D-39.
i t
lO 3054d l
l
1 TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 l,
Page 31 of 34
- 2) The Control Building HVAC system exhaust is not an entry point for toxic gases during normal operation of the system.
Therefore the system functions within the bounds established by the hazardous chemical release analysis Ref. 6.
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS j
- 1. The HVAC System is capable of maintaining a positive pressure in the Control Room greater than 0.10 in.w.g. during its Emergency Recirculation Mode with or without single failure of CAI damper AH-D-39 l
and exhaust damper AH-D-37.
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- 2. To assure a positive pressure of 0.10 in. w.g. In the Control Room, during single failure of damper AH-D-28, OAI damper AH-D-39 must be opened to a predetermined position (gradual switch position 10.5).
- 3. The above conclusions are contingent upon permanent isolation of the i
air registers which were blanked off prior to the test as well as maintenance of installed weatherstripping on Control Building Envelope j
doors.
It is not necessary to relocate a return air register on elevation 355'-0" of the control building as per Ref. 11.
The register need only be blanked off as no increase in temperature was observed in i
this area during the test.
- 4. Tne failure condition of the Normal Duty Intake Fan AH-D-41A(B) damper can be excluded from the scenario since operator action following a j O.
High Radiation signal will prevent failure of this damper from i
impacting Control Building Envelope pressures.
(See Appendix D) l 4
- 5. Control Room operator exposure over a 30 day period is below maximum i
permissible doses. (30 rem beta skin and 5 rem gamma whole body),
i during HVAC system emergency mode of operation with or without single i
j failure of dampers AH-D-39, AH-D-37. AH-D-28 and AH-0-41A.
- 6. For toxic gas assessment the results of the tests confirmed that the
[
Control Room operator is protected against toxic chemical releases i
since during normal operation of the HVAC system the air is always I
exhausted thru AH-D-37 damper.
V.
RECOMMENDATIONS i
- l. The achieved positive pressure in the Control Room was the result of I
temporary modifications performed during this test.
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TOR No. 728 Rev. O Page 32 of 34 The following must be done:
Blank off the Return Register R-9 located in the Control Room.
Blank off the Corridor Return Register located in the Control Room Corridor.
Blank off the Supply and Return Register 8-1A(B) & R-1A (2A) located in HVAC Equipment Room.
- 2. Relocation of the corridor return register committed in Ref. 11 is not necessary.
The environmental Conditions of the Control Building Envelope are not impacted so as to warrant the relocation.
- 3. The following operating procedures must be revised.
OP-1104 Control Building Ventilation System OP-1203 Abnormal Procedure - Control Building Ventilation System These procedures should be revised to reflect:
- a. Operator manual action following a High Radiation signal to start the emergency train associated with the standby normal duty fan to mitigate the consequences of potential failure of either AH-D-41 I
- b. Operator manual action following a High Radiation Signal to modulate f
the OAI damper AH-D-39 at a position determined by the results of i
the tests.
(Position 10,5).
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TDR No. 728 Rev. 0 Page 33 of 34
[
VI. REFERENCES
- 1. GPUNC letter to USNRC-$211-85-2085 dated May 20, 1985 - Centrol Room Habitability.
- 2. TMI-1 STP-141/13 Rev. O CBVS " delta P" and Air flow measurement with postulated single mode failure of dampers and OAI Damper AH-0-39 open.
- 3. TMI-I STP141/10 Rev. 1 CBVS " delta P" and Air flow measurement with postulated single mode failure of dampers,
- 4. Memo MSS-85-100 MR. Calbureanu to F.P. Barblert dated Feb. 25, 1985 -
CBVS " delta P" and Air flow measurement test report.
- 5. Calculation C-1101-826-5360-006/8/21/85 Additional Inleakage to the Control Building Envelope from sources other than OAI Damper AH-0-39 and Exhaust Damper AH-D-37.
- 6. Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. - TMI Control Room Habttability Study:
Analysis of radiological and chemical accidents for abnormal flow paths to the Control Room. PLG-0433 dated August 28, 1985.
- 7. Reactor Technology - NAA-SR-10100, Conventional Building for Reactor Containment / Atomic International, May 1965.
- 8. ASHRAE Handbook of Fundamentals, 1981.
- 9. TMI-1 Fire Hazard Analysis Report, Vol. 2.
- 10. SP-1303-129, Surveillance Procedure - Fire Barrier Seal Inspection,
- 11. GPUNC letter to USNRC 5211-85-2043 dated February 28, 1985 - Control Room Habitability.
4
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- O 3054d
TOR No. 728 Rev. O Page 34 of 34 VII.
APPENDICES A. TMI Control Building HVAC System 1007. Recirculation Mode B. Control Building Ventilation System C. Control Building Emergency Envelope D. Operator action following a high radiation signal to mitigate the consequences of single failure of damper AH-D-41A (B).
E. Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. - THI Control Room Habitability Study PLG-0433 Table A-1 F. Control Room Partial Plan Duct Layout - Location of Return Registers (E1. 355')
G. Control Buildino HVAC Equipment Room (E1. 380') Ouct Layout - Location of Supply and Return Registers H. Basis for Gradual Switch Positions O
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TDR No. 728 l
Rev. 0 Page 01.of 2 Appendix D Operator Action Following A High Radiation Signal RMA-Al i
To moderate the effect of a single failure of damper AH-0-41A(B) following i
detection of high radiation by Radiation Monitor RMA-1, the operator will place the Control Switch for Control Building Normal Outy Supply Fan AH-E-17A(B) in the "Stop/ Normal After Stop" position (providing it was the i
running unit).
The operator will then go to the opposite train and start the Control Building Emergency Supply Fan AH-E-13B(A).
I
- 1. The reason for operator action is as follows:
(a)
Mechanical failure of damper AH-0-41A(B) partially open (contacts open on damper switch) could cause back flow through the idle
[
Normal Outy Supply Fan when the Emergency Supply Fan is started i
in the same train. This would cause diminished output to the Control Building Ventilation System in the Emergency Recirculation mode, resulting in positive pressure lower than 0.10 in w.g. in the control room.
By starting the opposite train Emergency Control Building Supply Fan this recirculation problem would ce eliminated because the damper AH-0-41 in this train L
would already be closed since the Normal Outy Supply Fan in this train was not in operation prior to High Radiation Signal.
(b)
Failure of damper AH-D 41A(B) between partially and full open (contacts made up on damper switch) would restart the Normal i
Control Building Supply Fan AH-E-17A(B) upon starting the Emergency Control Building Supply Fan AH-E-18A(B), in the same train because fan starter is controlled by damper limit switch.
]
This condition would result in the simultaneous running of both y
tne Emergency and Normal Control Building Fans.
The Normal I
Control Building Fan, once started could not be stopped using its i
Control Switch since the Fan starter is controlled by damper limit switches.
This simultaneous operation of Normal and Emergency Fans in the same train, would require operator action i
outside the Control Room to stop the Normal Fan.
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3054d
TOR No. 728 Rev. O Page 02 of 2 O
NOTE:
The simultaneous running of Normal and Emergency Control Building fans in the same train is quite noticeable in the Control Room by the increased noise level and verification of H & V Panel indicating lights would show both units on.
Should this condition occur, the Normal Control Building Supply Fan (AH-E-17A(B) can be stopped by opening its supply circuit breaker in the M.C.C.
(c)
After a trip (Hi rad signal) the Control Switch indicator (Normal Outy Fan) is not in agreement with the Fan indicating lights.
Placing the Control Switch in the "Stop/ Normal After Stop" position returns the switch indicator to be in agreement with Fan indicating lights.
This clears annunciator alarm in Control Room.
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3054d
$4G E E4 APPE%M' F TABLE A-1.
SLSOLARY 0F DOSES TO THE CONTROL R0OM OPERATOR FRON LARGE BREAK LOCA RELEASES FOR MEASURED INFLOW THROUGH VARIOUS LEAK PATHS O
i Intake Flow Rates 30 day Dose.ren Test Cases AHD-37(a)
AHD-39(b)
AAFH8(c)
PathwRy Seta, Skin Gasma, Whole Bott:
1 500 3658 2628 AHD-37 4.976 0.21 3 1
500 3658 2628 AND-39 8.288 0.392 i
1 500 3658 2628 AAFHS 10.319 0.388 1
500 6286 0
AND-37 5.608 0.241 l
1 500 6286 0
AND-39 13.442 0.647 2a 0
9612 572 AHD-37 1.995 0.068 i
2a 0
9612 572 AHD-39 13.022 0.676 2a 0
9612 572 MFH8 1.519 0.058 2a 0
10184 0
AMD-37 2.112 0.072 2a 0
10184 0
AHD-39 13.790 0.716 3b 0
3780 792 AMD-37 1.725 0.058
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3b 0
3780 792 AMD-39 10.552 0.497 3h 0
3780 792 MFHB 4.539 0.167 3b 0
4572 0
AHD-37 2.087 0.070 3b o
4572 0
AHD-39 12.751 0.600 4a 775 1296 2848 AH0-37 8.1 41 0.367 4a 775 1296 2848 AND-39 f,812 0.242 4a 775 1296 2848 MFHB 15.245 0.564 4e 775 4144 0
AHD-37 9.347 0.407 4a 775 4144 0
AHD-39 13.248 0.596 5b 0
10440 572 AHD-37 2.004 0.068 i
sb 0
10440 572 AND-39 13.153 0.688
$b 0
10440 572 MFHS 1.406 0.054 Sb 0
11012 0
AHD-37 2.114 0.072 Sb 0
11012 0
AMD-39 13.885 0.727 a.
Measured flow through damper AHD-37 included in total intake flow rate i
b.
Measured flow through damper AHD-39 included in total intake flow rate Calculated inleakage from auxiliary and fuel handling buildings through sealed, c.
doors and penetrations included in total intake flow rate
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l Appendix H Bases for Gradual Switch Position
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(Damper AH-D-39) l l.
During normal operation of the HVAC System the ventilation rate required
. outside air) is 20% of the supply air.
This corresponds to
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i approximately 9,600 CFM outside air (20% x 49,000 CFM) i 2.
20% outside air (9,600 CFM was used in the basis for calculating the design basis Cooling Load of the Control Building Air Conditioning Unit.
3.,
In order to preclude admitting outside air which would exceed the design capacity of the Air Conditioning unit, 10,000 CFM (110%) of outside air was established as a basis for determining the maximum open position of the damper AH-0-39.
The flow rate of 10,000 CFM (310%) corresponds to an average duct velocity of 250 FPM (t 10%) and to a damper gradual switch position of 10.5.
The other gradual switch positions are
]
selected as intermediate positions as required by different test modes.
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