ML20059D735
| ML20059D735 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/1993 |
| From: | PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058M010 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9401100055 | |
| Download: ML20059D735 (50) | |
Text
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V 1
l Commonwealth of Pennsylvania l
i Review of the Offsite Response to the j
Site Area Emergency incident at l
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station February 7,1993 l
t i
Prepared by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS D
SECTION PAGE ABSTRACT.............................
i EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
11 TMI INCIDENT REVIEW TEAM...............................
iii ABBREVIATIONS..........................................
IV 1.
INTRODUCTION...........................................
1-1 2.
TMI INCIDENT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS........................
2-1 3.
CUMBERLAND COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE....................
3-1 4.
DAUPHIN COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE.......................
4-1 5.
LANCASTER COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE.....................
5-1 6.
LEBANON COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE.......................
6-1 7.
YORK COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE..........................
7-1 8.
BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION INCIDENT RESPONSE.......
8-1 9.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE INCIDENT RESPONSE............
9-1 10.
AREA EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER INCIDENT RESPONSE..... 10-1 11.
STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER INCIDENT RESPONSE.... 11-1 12.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS...............................
12-1
ABSTRACT
.c This review of the off site response to the unauthorized intruder incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station which occurred on February 7, 1993, examines the alert, notification and response actions taken by the commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the five risk counties of Cumberland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon, and York.
The incident was classified by the utility as a " Site Area Emergency" under the regulatory classification system of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Included also is an examination of the alert procedures of the utility.
The review presents findings and conclusions regarding the response.
It does not fully delve into the tactical search operation or the response actions of the utility.
It does relate to these elements where, when, and how they affected offsite activity.
1 1
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
l 0
At 0654 on February 7, 1993 a vehicle entered the Three Mile Island (TMI) facility, bypassing the administrative check point.
The vehicle drove through owner-controlled areas of TMI and then crashed through a protected area gate, through a roll-up door in the turbine building coming to rest 63 feet inside the turbine building.
The vital systems at the facility were never threatened, though that was not known as a certainty l
until mid-afternoon.
The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the five risk counties were notified individually rather than on the " hot line" system, because the control room was " locked down" to prevent access by the intruders.
This caused a delay and some confusion in the notification process.
The agreed Emergency Notification Report form was not effectively used.
The utility classified the event as a " Site Area Emergency" (SAE) in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulatory format.
Offsite response to the incident at State level was more than adequately executed by state agencies to include lead responsibilities handled by the Bureau of Radiation Protection and the Pennsylvania State l
Police.
Overall coordination was implemented by the State EOC under the direct supervision of the Lt. Governor and the Director of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA).
Governor Casey was kept informed of l
the situation on a continuing basis by Lt.
Governor Singel and PEMA l
Director Joe LaFleur.
Offsite response at three of the five counties was adequate to excellent on a functional basis of plan implementation.
Two counties'
)
responses need improvement.
In these two counties, there was some confusion and misunderstanding in the initial notification process which l
effected the follow-on notification and staffing.
The onsite physical security aspects of the incident which raise serious questions are beyond the scope of this review, but have been addressed by the NRC in its incident report and will be examined by the Singel-Davis Committee, appointed by the Governor, and by the General Public Utilities (GPU) review.
GPU has already instituted changes to its physical security program and announced additional enhancements to be instituted.
l The NRC found that public health and safety were never in danger from l
this incident.
There were, however, a number of response and procedural areas surfaced which need review and possible revision or additional training.
These include receipt and verification procedures to ensure adequate notificaticn and comprehension; public alert and notification system use; public information and media information considerations; deployment of liaison personnel and incident closeout authority and procedures. These areas will be addressed in follow-on staff actions.
In general the offsite plans and procedures were effectively applied in this event.
There were, as in all real situations, deviations from the plans and procedures.
Some were a function of conscious decisions, while others were due to mistakes and/or a lack of training.
As a result, some procedures require revision. Some will need to be reinforced in continuing training and others may need more staff time commitment and/or management oversight. Most procedures, however, proved to be valid and appropriate.
1 11
THREE MILE ISLAND SITE ARIA EMERGENCY INCIDENT REVIEW TEAM The Incident Review Team was assembled by the Chairman following his charge I
o l
by Joseph L. LaFleur, Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency to l
review the actual response in relation to existing state and county planning documents, training programs, and staffing levels.
JOSEF C. JORDAN, CHAIR BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY CHAIRMAN, RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL l
MARGARET E. REILLY BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES l
l CO-CHAIR, RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ADVISCRY COMMITTEE l
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL l
MAJOR GEORGE P. MARCH i
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE l
l i
l ANDREW R. SIMPSON l
BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS l
PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGE ENT AGENCY l
JERRY V.
LA!GERT l
BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY l
RONALD KILLINS, SR.
i BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY t
l JACK RIVES BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 1
1 EDWARD B. WHITE l
BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS l
PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY CARL S. GUSTAFSON BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY iii
ABEREVIATIONS A/N ALERT AND NOTIFICATION ARC AMERICAN RED CROSS BOO BUREAU OF OPERATIONS, PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY BRP BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES CNN CABLE NEWS NETWORK DECON DECONTAMINATION DEMA DAUPHIN COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY DER DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES DMA DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS EBS EMERGENCY BROADCAST STATION ECC EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ECL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL ECOMM ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS EIS EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM EMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY EMC EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR EOC EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER EOD EXPLOSIVE ORENANCE DISPOSAL EOF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY EOP EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN EPLO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS LIAISON OFFICER EPZ EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FBI FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FEMA FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY FIG FORT INDIANTOWN GAP FTIG FORT INDIANTOWN GAP l
l GPU GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY NUCLEAR CORPORATION HAZMAT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS KI POTASSIUM IODIDE LNO LIAISON OFFICER NRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OIC OFFICER IN CHARGE OSF OPERATIONS SUPPORT FACILITY PEIRS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM PEMA PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY PEMARS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY RADIO SYSTEM PENNDOT PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PIO PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER PSP PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE PUC PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION RACES RADIO A!!ATEUR CIVILIAN EMERGENCY SYSTEM l
RERP RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES OR PLANS (PLANNING)
RO RADIOLOGICAL OFFICER ROC REGIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER SCI STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION SAE SITE AREA EMERGENCY SERT SPECIAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM SOP STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE (S)
SRD SELF-READING DOSIMETER TLD THERMOLUMINESCENT DOSIMETER TMI THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION UPI UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL iv
INTRODUCTION
\\
I As a part of the efforts to mitigate the effects of potential nuclear power plant incidents on the public, both the federal and state i
governments require emergency operations
- plans, pre-event training programs, exercise of plans and installation of equipment that will aid the response and operational facilities from which to direct a response. Plans are in place to integrate the response of the utility, the state or states, the volunteer sector, counties and, in the case of Pennsylvania, the municipalities. A map of the approximately lO-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is attached showing the portion of each of the five risk counties which lies within the TMI EPZ (Attachment #1).
i The incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station on February 7, 1993, afforded a valuable opportunity to examine the plans and procedures under incident conditions, rather than just exercises.
The event was classified as a " Site Area Emergency" by the utility in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission classification system.
Two previous exercises with the Beaver Valley Power Station in 1989 and the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in 1992 had terrorist or industrial sabotage implications which provided some practical experience which served as a useful base of the response to this actual incident.
j The incident began at 0654 February 7, 1993 when a vehicle drove past the TMI north gate guard post and entered the TMI facility.
The vehicle proceeded across a bridge, took a left fork at the end of the l
- bridge, passed through several parking areas and approached an administrative building.
The vehicle turned left around the building I
housing the controlled entry to the plant, turned right at the end of the building, then rammed through a chain link gate which defined the protected area of the plant.
It then plunged through a roll-up door coming to rest 63 feet inside the turbine building.
Although not known at the time, the single unarmed intruder exited the vehicle, proceeded down a ladder and hid j
under a pipe in the condenser area.
He was found there shortly before i
1100.
A methodical search of the facility continued until late afternoon to ensure there were no accompanying intruders or explosives and that there had been no damage to the facility.
The activities and background of the i
intruder are described more fully in other investigatory documents.
Attachments 2-4 show the layout of Three Mile Island, the projected route of the intruder, and the layout of the turbine building where he was l
apprehended.
Reviews of the incident were held with each of the five risk counties and the PEMA Area offices.
Summaries of these reviews are contained in Sections 3-7 for the risk counties and in Sections 10 and 11 for the Areas and State Emergency Operations Centers.
The reviews with the counties and PEMA Areas examined the start-up process including notification, activation, achieving operational capability through close out of the incident at the risk counties and their j
risk municipalities.
Consideration was given to the response and its l
relationship to plans and procedures including deviations, if any, and the l
thought processes and rationale for actions taken or omitted.
Also considered were the comments of the counties regarding changes to county or state plans and procedures based on having experienced the February 7 incident.
1-1
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TMI INCIDENT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS February 7, 1993 0725 State EOC notified by TMI of S.A.E.
because intruder crashed gate at 0705.
(TMI logged 0654 as time intruder drove through North Gate; 0705 as time Site Area Emergency was declared; and 0721 as time notification to all five counties and PEMA was completed.)
EOC notified G.
Marsh Johneon, Director, Bureau of Operations, PEMA &
Bureau of Radiation Protection (Maggie Reilly).
0726 York County (Bob Straw) verified 5.A.E.
York EOC "will be at least partially manned."
0727 Lancaster County EMA will partially activate their EOC.
0729 Unable to contact MAJ Harch, PSP.
Contacted CPT Joe Robyak who already knew that Troop H was assisting at TMI.
0731 Director LaFleur (PEMA) briefed by Bureau of Operations Director.
l 0742 John Comey, PEMA Press Secretary notified of S.A.E.
0743 TMI verified that intruder is still loose - believed to be in Turbine Bldg.
0753 Lebanon County verified S.A.E. - EOC activated at 0745.
0755 PEMA Central Area Director (Dougherty) notified of S.A.E.
0814 York County EOC partially manned.
0815 PEMA Dep. Dir. briefed.
John Comey, PEMA, told by PEMA Director to report to EOC.
0820 Lancaster County EOC is partially manned.
0822 PEMA Director is on his way in.
0824 PEMA Director will be in the EOC in 15 minutes (signed into T&S Bldg.
at 0825.)
0836 NRC Region III is manned up in Philadelphia.
0840 Maggie Reilly, BRP arrived at EOC.
CPT Robyak, PSP, arrived at EOC.
l Director LaFleur briefed Governor and Lt. Governor. DER Secretary Art l
Davis, to be notified.
No public announcement at this time.
Request PSP bring Lt. Gov. by air from Johnstown.
I 2-1 l
F
^
0947 Andy Simpson, PEMA, reported for duty at Situation Analysis.
0950 PennDOT EPLOs arrived at State EOC.
0951 Robert Broyles, PEMA, reported to Situation Analysis for duty - was dispatched to Media Center at 1005.
NRC (Smith) to EOC EOD has accessed the car, no one in car; package in car.
EOD looking at how to proceed.
FBI will be arriving on the scene shortly.
0953 Dauphin County verified S.A.E.
)
1000 PUC notified to report to State EOC.
1005 DER EPLO arrived at State EOC.
Joe Jordan, PEMA, departed for Near Site Media Center.
Adams County (support county) notified.
1007 FBI - one person at TMI site; one person to State EOC.
1012 Red Cross EPLO arrived at State EOC.
1014 DMA EPLO arrived at State EOC.
1015 Lebanon County EOC fully stiffed including one Commissioner.
S. Londonderry Twp. etaffed.
All plan items completed.
No unmet needs.
1026 PEMA Director briefed Jim Brown, Governor's Chief of Staff.
1033 Public Info. Center established.
1040 FEMA Region III briefed - teams from there on stand-by.
DMA at FIG manned up and prepared for 1800 shift change.
I 1043 Joe Jordan, PEMA, reported arrival at plant Near Site Media Center.
)
Giangi (TMI) to LaFleur; 75% eure there is not a bomb in the car.
1045 From Ron Killins, PEMA at EOF
" General Emergency would only be declared in case of breach of security in Intermediate Area or Control Room Area. "
Extra security has been called to site.
Site personnel l
access has been limited.
l l
1049 Two support counties briefed by Central Area Director.
NRC (Smith) to EOC - car 1984 Plymouth, State Police in charge.
1 2-3 l
THREE MILE ISLAND l
SITE AREA EMERGENCY INCIDENT REVIEW TEAM The Incident Review Team was assembled by the Chairman following his charge by Joseph L. LaFleur, Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency to i
review the actual response in relation to existing state and county planning documents, training programs, and staffing levels.
JOSEF C. JORDAN, CHAIR BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS
{
PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY CHAIRMAN, RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL MARGARET E. REILLY BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES CO-CHAIR, RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ADVISP,AY COMMITTEE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL MAJOR GEORGE P. MARCH PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE i
ANDREW R.
SIMPSON BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS j
PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY l
l i
l JERRY V.
LAMBERT l
BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS
)
PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
]
RONALD KILLINS, SR.
BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY JACK RIVES BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY EDWARD B. WHITE BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS l
PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY l
CARL S.
GUSTAFSON BUREAU OF PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENC
iii l
B ABBREVIATIONS j
A/N ALERT AND NOTIFICATION c
ARC AMERICAN RED CROSS BOO BUREAU OF OPERATIONS, PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY BRP BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES CNN CABLE NEWS NETWORK DECON DECONTAMINATION DEMA DAUPHIN COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY DER DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES DMA DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS EBS EMERGENCY BROADCAST STATION ECC EMERGENCY cot:MUNICATIONS CENTER ECL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL ECOMM ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS EIS EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM EMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY EMC EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR EOC EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER EOD EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL EOF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY EOP EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN EPLO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS LIPISON OFFICER EPZ EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FBI FEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FEMA FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY FIG FORT INDIANTOWN GAP FTIG FORT INDIANTOWN GAP GPU GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY NUCLEAR CORPORATION HAZMAT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS KI POTASSIUM IODIDE LNO LIAISON OFFICER NRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OIC OFFICER IN CHARGE OSF OPERATIONS SUPPORT FACILITY PEIRS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM PEMA PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY PEMARS PENNSYLVANIA EMERGEliCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY RADIO SYSJEM PENNDOT PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PIO PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER PSP PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE PUC PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION RACES RADIO AMATEUR CIVILIAN EMERGENCY SYSTEM RERP RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES OR PLANS (PLANNING)
RO RADIOLOGICAL OFFICER ROC REGIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER SCI STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION SAE SITE AREA EMERGENCY SERT SPECIAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM SOP STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE (S)
FAD SELF-READING DOSIMETER TLD THERMOLUMINESCENT DOSIMETER TMI THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION UPI UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL iv
INTRODUCTION As a part of the efforts to mitigate the effects of potential nuclear power plant incidents on the public, both the federal and state e
governments require eme;rgency operations
- plans, pre-event training programs, exercise of plans and installation of equipment that will aid the response and operational facilities from which to direct a response.
Plans are in place to integrate the response of the utility, the state or states, the volunteer ;ector, counties and, in the case d Pennsylvania, the municipalities. A map of the approximately lO-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is attached showing the portion of each of the five risk counties which lies within the TMI EPZ (Attachment #1).
The incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station on February 7, 1993, afforded a valuable opportunity to examine the plans and procedures under incident conditions, rather than just exercises.
The event was classified as a " Site Area Emergency" by the utility in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission classification system.
Two previous exercises with the Beaver Valley Power Station in 1989 and the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in 1992 had terrorist or industrial sabotago implications which provided some practical experience which served as a useful base of the response to this actual incident.
The incident began at 0654 February 7, 1993 when a vehicle drove past the TMI north gate guard post and entered the TMI facility.
The j
vehicle proceeded across a bridge, took a left fork at the end of the
- bridge, passed through several pt Ming areas and approached an administrative building.
The vehicle turned left around the building housing the controlled entry to the plant, turned right at the end of the building, then rammed through a chain link gate which defined the protected area of the plant.
It t5sn plunged through a roll-up door coming to rest 63 feet inside the turb s building.
Although not known at the time, the single unarmed intruder exited the vehicle, proceeded down a ladder and hid under a pipe in the condenser area.
He was found there shortly before 1100.
A methodical search of the f acility continued until late afternoon to ensure there were no accompanying intruders or explosives and that there had been no damage to the facility.
The activities and background of the intruder are described more fully in other investigatory documents.
Attachments 2-4 show the layout of Three Mile Island, the projected route of the intruder, and the layout of the turbine bull. ding where he was spprehended.
Reviews of the incident were held with each of the five risk j
counties and the PEMA Area offices.
Summaries of these reviews are contained in Sections 3-7 for the risk counties and in Sections 10 and 11 for the Areas and State Emergency Operations Centers.
The reviews with the counties and PEMA Areas examined the start-up process including notification, activation, achieving operational capability through close out of the incident at the risk counties and their risk municipalities.
Consideration was given to the response and its relationsh4p to plans and procedures including deviations, if any, and the thought prc.,ces ses and rationale for actions taken or omitted.
Also j
considered were the comments of the counties regarding changes to county or state plans and procedures based on having experienced the February 7 incident.
1-1
e The methodology used by the team members for this review consisted of:
1) reviewing documents, staff logs, or other written material relating to the incident at state and county level; 2) reviewing tapes of 911 or EOC operations relating to 'the incident where available; 3) holding interviews with key personnel involved in the response at State and County level; 4) considering plans and procedures to confirm their validity or need for revision; 5) cross checking facts and times against the material gathered from each perspective and location; 6) preparing summaries of the material gathered; 7) considering key issues that arose during the review; 8) preparing findings and conclusions based on the results of the review.
Incident response summaries from the Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) of the Department of Environmental Resources (DER) and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) are contained in Sections 8 and 9.
The findings and conclusions appear in Section 12.
1-2
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TMI INCIDENT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS February 7, 1993 0725 State EOC notified by TMI of S.A.E.
because intruder crashed gate at 0705.
(TMI logged 0654 as time intruder drove through North Gate;
)
0705 as time Site Area Emergency was declared; and 0721 as time notification to all five counties and PEMA was completed.)
EOC notified G. Marsh Johnson, Director, Bureau of Operations, PEMA &
Bureau of Radiation Protection (Maggie Reilly).
0726 York County (Bob Straw) verified S. A.E.
York EOC "will be at least partially manned."
0727 Lancaster County EMA will partially activate their EOC.
0729 Unable to contact MAJ March, PSP.
Contacted CPT Joe Robyak who already knew that Troop H was assisting at TMI.
0731 Director LaFleur (PEMA) briefed by Bureau of Operations Director.
0742 John Comey, PEMA Press Secretary notified of S.A.E.
0743 TMI verified that intruder is still loose - believed to be in Turbine Bldg.
0753 Lebanon County verified S.A.E. - EOC activated at 0745.
0755 PEMA Central Area Director (Dougherty) notified of S.A.E.
0814 York County EOC partially manned.
0615 PEMA Dep. Dir. briefed.
John Comey, PEMA, told by PEMA Director to report to EOC.
0820 Lancaster County EOC is partially manned.
0822 PEMA Director is on his way in.
0824 PEP-Jirector will be in the EOC in 15 minutes (signed into T&S Bldg.
at 06.5.)
0836 NRC Region III is manned up in Philadelphia.
0840 Maggie Reilly, BRP arrived at EOC.
CPT Robyak, PSP, arrived at EOC.
Director LaFleur briefed Governor and Lt. Governor. DER Secretary Art Davis, to be notified.
No public announcement at this time.
Request PSP bring Lt. Gov. by air from Johnstown.
2-1
0842 The five risk counties updated over dedicated line by PEMA Watch Officer 2.
Notified FEMA National of S.A.E. - they will notify FEMA Region III.
0857 PSP Troop H has requested Army EOD from FIG.
0902 York County EMA partially activated - all risk municipalities notified.
0905 Lancaster County reported all municipalities manned; Lancaster County EOC partially manned; Decon teams, Red Cross, RACE 3 Ops in place; TLDs
& KI delivered to Elizabethtown EOC.
GPU interviewed by CNN - live on air.
0908 Central Area Director at area EOC, Selinsgrove 0909 PEMA Director called NRC to discuss security situation.
0913 FEMA Region III updated on current situation.
0917 Joe Jordan, PEMA, in Situation Analysis at 0855.
4 Bill Biegen, PEMA, assisting in Situation Analysis.
PEMA staffers, Jerry Lambert, Bob Broyles, JoAnn Klinger, Ron Killine en route to EOC.
0919 Lebanon County EOC is activated.
0923 Andy Simpson, PEMA, en route to EOC.
PEMA Director discusses reactor status with GPU Director of Emergency Planning.
Reactor stable, 100% power, all plant systems operating properly.
0930 Following EPLOs to report to State EOC: Agriculture, Health, DMA and PennDOT based on information received by PEMA Director in 0927 call.
Risk Counties given update by PEMA Director on conference call.
0936 PEMA Director updated Governor.
0937 Cumberland County EMA is staffed and operational.
0940 Ron Killins, PEMA, dispatched from State EOC to TMI EOF.
0943 Red Cross EPLO arrived at State EOC.
Agriculture EPLO arrived at State EOC.
0945 Health EPLO arrived at State EOC.
2-2
F
.s 0947 Andy Simpson, PEMA, reported for duty at Situation Analysis.
0950 PennDOT EPLos arrived at State EOC.
0951 Robert Broyles, PEMA, reported to Situation Analysis for duty - was dispatched to Media Center at 1005.
NRC (Smith) to EOC EOD has accessed the car, no one in car; package in car.
EOD looking at how to proceed. FBI will be arriving on the scene shortly.
0953 Dauphin County verified S.A.E.
1000 PUC notified to report to State EOC.
1005 DER EPLO arrived at State EOC.
Joe Jordan, PEMA, departed for Near Site Media Center.
Adams County (support county) notified.
1007 FBI - one person at TMI site; one person to State EOC.
1012 Red Cross EPLO arrived at State EOC.
1014 DMA EPLO arrived at State EOC.
1015 Lebanon County EOC fully staffed including one Commissioner.
S. Londonderry Twp. staffed.
All plan items completed.
No unmet needs.
1026 PEMA Director briefed Jim Brown, Governor's Chief of Staff.
1033 Public Info. Center established.
1040 FEMA Region III briefed - teams from there on stand-by.
DMA at FIG manned up and prepared for 1800 shift change.
f 1043 Joe Jordan, PEHA, reported arrival at plant Near Site Media Center.
1 Giangi (IMI) to LaFleur; 75% sure there is not a bomb in the car, j
1045 From Ron Killins, PEMA at EOF
" General Emergency would only be declared in case of breach of security in Intermediate Area or Control Room Area."
Extra security has been called to site.
Site personnel access has been limited.
Two support counties briefed by Central Area Director.
1049 l
NRC (Smith) to EOC - car 1984 Plymouth, State Police in charge.
l 2-3
1050 PennDOT Aviation contacted by PennDOT EPLO - no air restrictiQOs i
requested at this time.
Governor called - updated by PEMA Director.
Governor stayed on line with Director until intruder apprehended.
4 1059 Individual apprehended.
Vehicle removed from building.
Stand down expected within an hour.
Search for other persons ongoing.
1105 NRC to EOC:
individual apprehended; not sure he is the vehicle driver; clothing in package.
1107 PUC EPLO arrived at State EOC.
Risk counties informed that intruder apprehended. Told not to release his name.
1120 NRC I to EOC: confirmed vehicle moved.
1122 Emergency Site Director at TMI EOF advises plant will remain at S.A.E.
until security review is completed.
1123 Lt. Governor updated by Director LaFleur on current situation.
Lt. Governor en route from Capitol City Airport.
1126 FEMA reported their Regional Operations Center (ROC) is up and running.
1132 TMI to remain at S.A.E.
for at least cnother hour.
They are assessing any possible damage by intruder and verifying that he was alone.
1135 Lt. Governor arrived at State EOC.
1136 Lancaster County called for current update and time of de-escalation.
1140 Dauphin County confirmed manning of EOC and its risk municipalities.
A county commissioner is present in the EOC.
1145 Central Area Director updated.
I 1
1152 Risk counties updated by PEMA - Director determined they could stand down municipalities with 2 people - one commo and one emergency ;
management person.
j 1155 Determination made that PEMA Director LaFleur and Press Secretary Comey to go to Near Site Media Center press briefing.
Lt. Governor standing by in operations center.
1157 Acting Eastern Area Director notified and briefed about S.A.E.
1206 Adams County EOC standing down.
2-4
1211 TMl (Dave Wilson) requested verification of time State received the S.A.E.
- 0725 confirmed.
1225 Contact with EOF confirmed no change in information or status during the past hour.
1226 George Giangi's (GPU) response to Director LaFleur's query about stability of the plants checking for possible damage done by the intruder; damage believed to be minimal or none; checking computer to trace intruder's path within turbine building; plant and EOF will remain staffed until at least 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />; critique first thing Monday (2/8). Problem - due to how the situation unfolded, the Control Room chose to keep their door closed and secured which resulted in a delay in notification of support personnel (not offsite) since the auto callup system is located in the supervisor's office and outside control room.
1244 PEMA Director LaFleur advised EOC to have the counties remain operational until there is an "all clear".
Press conference to take place at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br />.
l 1245 Risk counties advised that press conference by Lt. Governor will be at 1330.
100 officers and dogs are sweeping the plant premises until l
about 1500.
1314 Lancaster County had several questions:
how to receive the Lt.
Governor's Press Conference; is Central Area activated (no answer to j
phone calls); and has liaison officer been sent to Lancaster County?
All questions were answered.
1332 PEMA Chief-of-Staf f Churchman called in - told not necessary to come to EOC.
1409 Cumberland County questioned sequence of events call from the plant.
They have no record of calls between 0720 and 0836.
1423 Press conference completed.
PEMA Director LaFleur returning to EOC in 20 minutes.
l 1440 George Giangi, TMI, reported that the following calls from the plant were over dedicated line with the exception of Dauphin and York Counties which were over regular line Dauphin County - dispatcher #19 - 0716.
Cumberland County - dispatcher #55 - 0720 Lebanon County - dispatcher #37 - 0720 York County - dispatcher #9 - 0717 PEMA - Bill Biegen - 0720 Lancaster County - (did not have dispatcher #) - 0720 1442 Mike Wertz, Dauphin County EMI, said he received notification of incident at 0720 from Dave Wilson, who identified himself as the Plant l
l 2-5
Manger at TMI.
Mike said he was unable to get the message through '
autodial.
1449 Bob Straw, York County EMC, notified State EOC that based on PEMA :
bulletin of 1036 hrs this date, York County verified that the !
perpetrator was a former employee of TMI.
This was later found to be untrue, and TMI took exception to York's verifying this report.
UPI j already had the name of the individual, and York County did not verify ;
the name.
1522 Lt. Governor departed State EOC.
1548 Marsh Johnson, PEMA, updated FEMA Region III.
1552 Marsh Johnson, PEMA, updated NRC.
1615 Risk counties given current update over dedicated line.
York County l requested a news release.
I 1635 John Rollin, TMI, notified all parties on the dedicated line that the l event was terminated as of 1635 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.221175e-4 months <br /> and that the plant will be returned to a normal, non-emergency status.
Director LaFleur ordered contact with counties to verify their receipt of termination.
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i 1640 Director LaFleur updated Lt. Governor Singel.
Lt. Governor passed on i
thanks to all personnel involved in the event.
1642 ECOMM message sent from State EOC to risk counties confirming THI event termination.
1 1645 Situation Analysis team logged off.
)
1650 PSP will continue site perimeter search until completed.
1655 Director LaFleur updattd the Lt. Governor.
1700 EOF representative, Ron Killins, PEMA, and Bob Broyles, PEMA, Media Center departed their locations.
1712 York County verified termination via PEMARS.
l 1734 Joe Jordan, PEMA, departed Media Center.
1 l
1736 PSP search at TMI completed and Command Post deactivated.
2133 PIERS Incident form on TMI received from Lebanon County.
NOTE:
THIS TIMELINE IS BASED PRIMARILY UPON'THE STATE EOC LOG, BUT HAS BEEN CORROBORATED BY RISK COUNTY INFORMATION.
TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE WITHIN MINUTES DUE TO DIFFERENT CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATIONS.
l 2-6 i
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C:
CUMBERLAND COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE The following information regarding the governmental of f-site response to the February 7,
1993 incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station was derived from personal interview of Theodore Wise, Coordinator, Cumberland County office of Emergency Preparedness, on February 22, 1993 and subsequent telephonic discussions with selected county personnel.
(See map at Attachment #1.)
Mobilization of Emergency Personnel The county communications center (911) received first notification of the incident from Randy Campbell, TMI Dispatcher #55, on a 7-digit phone line (238-9676), not the TMI hot line, at 0726.
Kevin Cox, a part-time trained operator in the communications center, was informed a Site Area Emergency existed at the plant because someone drove through the gate and was loose in the protected area (Attachment #2).
Mr. Cox stated that the dispatcher gave the impression he was just " letting you know" and said
...it was nothing major, no danger to anyone outside words-to-the-effect the plant and the State Police were on the way to handle the situation."
Mr. Cox said he then put the TMI dispatcher on hold while he informed his snitt lead (Troy Russell) of the conversation; Mr. Russell indicated that since the State Police were involved, Mr. Cox need only make out a Green Card (Cumberland County Administrative Communications 10/90-Form 4).
The Emergency Notification Hessage Form was not used by either the TMI Dispatcher or communications center.
The term "This Is Not A Drill" was not used by the dispatcher; no information on " release", " wind direction" or " wind speed" was given.
Mr. Cox filled out an incident card (Attachment 2, Green Card) and presented this to his shift lead.
Mr.
Russell made note of the event but took no further action.
According to Mr. Wise, Mr. Russell did not think the event important or involved Cumberland County in that it was not on the TMI line (located at the supervisor's console).
Mr. Wise indicated the shift leader did not understand that it was an Emergency Classification Level (ECL).
An Emergency Notification Report was not filled out by Cumberland County during the event.
A shift change (for operator personnel only) took place at 0730, although Mr. Cox indicated he had arrived at 0700 the day of the incident.
t Dan Bretzman, the next shift leader who took over at 0800 (30 minute delay for transition), did not see the incident card previously filled out by Mr. Cox and was briefed only to the extent that there was a routine 4 vent ongoing at TMI.
Mr. Cox stated he and Mr. Bretzman did consider ialling TMI for verification but never actually made a call.
At 0825, he c7erheard a PEMARS transmission concerning a " Site Emergency" at TMI and it, mediately notified Mr. Wise at his home (Attachment #2).
The Coordinator directed that the shift leader notify Coordinator A (Rick Hoerner, operations Supervisor) and obtain confirmation.
Mr. Hoerner was in church and was paged.
Mr. Wise then stated: "I'll be en route."
He departed his home at 0845 following notification of confirmation.
During his trip into the EOC, Mr. Wise used his vehicle radio to advise who should be paged.
1 3-1 i
~
l I
The Communications Center shift leader received the conference call,
from PEMA (Attachment #3), this time on the TMI line, at 0836.
This conference call to risk counties restated the level of emergency which the shift leader understood to the " Site Emergency" at the North Gate (according to the incident card) and that suspect who crashed the gate was j
still at large in the compound; PSP and TMI officials are at PEMA and the i
search for the suspect continues.
Mr.
Bretzman immediately called Mr.
Wise, who determined this was in fact a Site Area Emergency, and the EOC l
staf f began to be mobilized.
Mr. Wise stated that he did not attempt to l
verify the ECL based on the 0825 call; nothing came in on ECOMM.
The l
following personnel, in order, were paged at 0900:
Director 2 (Doug l
Glass), Supervisors B,C,A (full time communications supervisors) and additional EOC staff.
Each was directed to report to the EOC.
Mr. Wise arrived at 0900 and the EOC was partially staffed by 0905.
PEMA was notified that the EOC was staffed and operational at 0937; EOC telephones (separate 16 line system) were operational at 1010.
Barry Horn of the Sheriff's Office was en route as of 1059.
Note: The Communications Center tape of these events has been broken and is not available for review.*
Additional Command and Control Between 0907 and 0910 Commissioner Keller was notified (dressed and j
prepared for church, Mr. Keller arrived before 0919); Commissioner Beach was notified by message left on her answering machine; commissioner Myers was notified at home.
Commissioner Beach called the communications center at 1030 and was informed of the situation.
The municipalities of Lower Allen (Ron Mull, Coordinator and Township Manager) and New Cumberland Borough (Darwin Kell, Coordinator and Steve Sultzaberger, Borough 11anager) were notified at 0919 on 7-digit phone (Attachment #4).
Mr. Wise indicated the delay in notification was due to his focus on briefing of the communications /EOC staff, establishing a skeleton EOC, and determining remaining actions.
While not at full staffing, the municipal EOCs were operational with coordinator and key emergency services staff by 1040.
Mr. Wise acknowledged that his actions were not exactly in accordance with those required by the plan at SAE.
He indicated he activated personnel based on the immediate need as he saw it.
His Mass Care Officer (Nate Atwood) was notified at 0940 and the Ctunberland Chapter of the ARC l
did make telephone inquiries to determine personnel availability; his Office Manager (Donna Martin) needed to staff message center, was en route at 0941; his R.O. and special hazmat commander, Robert Kauffman, was paged at 0943 but did not respond. The Fire Services Coordinator, Bob Jones, was paged at 1013 but not at home.
Jeff Spangler (back-up R.O. ) arrived at 1100, was briefed by staff, and reviewed the RERP (R.O. log Attachment 5).
Brian Freeman, PIO, arrived at 1020 (log and press release at Attachment 6) and handled rumor control.
At the request of the local coordinators, j
school districts were notified between 1110 and 1132.
Fire Companies 12 and 24 in Lower Allen and Company 10 in New Cumberland were alerted at 1122-1124 and directed to remain on standby in quarters for possible route alert notification.
3-2
Checklists from the County RERP, Page E-11, were used and Implementing s
Procedures for staff were issued and available.
The remainder of staff actions were as reflected in EOC log (Attachment 7).
A summary of staff problems encountered is at Attachment 8.
Mr. Wise indicated he did not have a problem with the EBS system not being activated; although Carlisle radio stations 102 FM and 960 AM would be broadcasting information, Cumberland County residents in the EPZ (Lower Allen Township and New Cumberland Borough) are close to and would likely be listening to Dauphin County stations.
Therefore, Mr. Wise believes most people would get their information from TV or a Harrisburg station.
He also mentioned the press releases from the utility /PEMA contained incorrect information (suspect was former TMI employee) which could have misled the public.
Dosimetry is presently kept in the County EOC (will be predistributed 3
J with implementation of new plan).
Both the Decontamination Station Proprietor and Acting Chief were notified at 1110; each was told to remain in alert status but not to move any equipment or personnel.
Dosimetry kits were picked up from the EOC at 1120 by the Sheriff's department and relocated to the West Shore area.
The kits were not to be issued unless the Decon Stations activated or personnel needed them for operations.
Dosimetry was distributed to Lower Allen Township EOC at 1145 and to New Cumberland EOC at 1215.
Mr. Wise initiated county and municipality stand-down ef fective with an 1152 PEMA message (1153, R.O.
log, Attachment 3) indicating EOCs could reduce staffing to a communications officer and an emergency management representative.
Mr. Wise indicated he was not aware that this stand-down pertained only to municipalities and not to counties.
He informed Lower Allen and New Cumberland that they could reduce staffing; believing the nuclear threat had passed, he released his RO effective 1315.
Schools were notified of stand down at 1400.
He deactivated his EOC operations room at
^
1530 but remained operational with his deputy director, operations officer, public affairs officer, message center, clerical support, and extra communications personnel in a debriefing status until 1700. His deputy director stayed until 1730 to wrap up remaining details.
A related issue of communications was noted at 1015 when Mr. Kell called to inform EOC that Sammons Communications Cable TV for New Cumberland Borough and vicinity was out of operation.
Mr. Wise stated this was significant from a public relations standpoint, because a similar
-l outage occurred during the 1979 TMI incident.
Mr. Kell apparently wanted to know if the " blackout" was purposeful.
Sammons Communications was notified of the problem at 1041.
Since service was not restored until after the intruder was apprehended, suspicion ran high. To allay concerns, a release was issued at 1145 citing a " downed line" as the cause of the power outage.
From a corrective action standpoint, Mr. Wise has already implemented shift leader training to include significance of ECLs, correct filling out of message forms, special informational needs of EOC staff, TMI phone notification methods, PEMA confirmation, drill versus not a drill, and reorganized the 911 action books to make the RERP portion more visible.
i 3-3
i e
RELATIONSHIP TO BIENNIAL EXERCISES i
A review of the 1989 report of the federally-evaluated biennial exercise generally showed a good performance by the county in the exercise j
- 1) ability to monitor, understand, and use emergency classification levels; objectives that applied in this incident.
The objectives reviewed wares
- 2) ability to alert, mobilize, and activate personnel; 3) ability to coordinate and control emergency activities; 4) ability to communicate with appropriate organizations; 12) ability to initially alert the public; and i
- 15) ability to establish and operate a rumor control center.
Objectives 1 through 4 were graded adequate by the federal evaluators.
Cumberland County received a deficiency in Objective 12 for delaying both its siren and E=crgency Broadcast System (EBS) activation after state notification.
This was partially due to the dedicated line and radio net used to advise the route alert teams, being located in the communications center, which is separate from the EOC.
Relocation of the rumor control line into the EOC resolved a staffing issue in Objective 15 and has proven effective.
Mr.
Wise was noted to be firmly in charge of operations at the EOC.
No difficulties were experienced by either Lower Allen Township or New Cumberland Borough.
i A review of the 1991 federally-evaluated biennial exercise report vsain generally showed a good performar.ce in Objectives 1, 2, 4, 12 and 15; l
each of these objectives demonstrated by the county were graded as adequate.
The county did experience difficulty in verifying with PEMA, in a timely fashion, the protective action recommendation in Objective 3; as a
- result, the decision was not passed to all of the appropriate j
organizations, particularly the municipalities.
Both municipalities were prepared to implement protective actions and indications were that they could have responded appropriately.
Although Cumberland County was noted to have established an excellent 24-hour dispatch and communications facility adjacent to the EOC following the 1989 exercise and no breakdowns were observed during the 1991 exercise, systemic issues regarding public notification were common to both biennials.
While objective 12 did not directly pertain to the February 7 incident in that EBS was not exercised, a commonality in issues does exist since action taken after communication with PEMA was again a factor and communication problems with the utility were evident.
Rumor control was handled quickly and accurately.
Other performances related to the recent TMI incident were effective.
CODNTY COMMENTS I
Notification from the utility should be made in accordance with the check list; Emergency Classifications Levels should be explicitly stated.
(NOTE: TMI notified using the SAE term.)
i County operators should call the State (PEMA) EOC for incident clarification and verification.
To preclude possible misunderstanding, both the utility dispatchers and the county 911 operators should use correct alert notification procedures.
In particular, non-exercise events should clearly state "This is not a drill" and the term " Site Emergency" should not be 3-4
l.
l l
substituted for Site Area Emergency. (NOTE:
The TMI notification did l
use the SAE term.)
i f
County Emergency Management Agency internal operating procedures need l
to be reviewed, updated and promulgated to key personnel.
The County duty book should be revised with critical information consolidated for ease of use.
County 911 shift personnel need to be trained and sensitive to the ECL notification requirements resulting from a utility incident.
l Since the county did not attempt verification from PEMA during the lapse between initial notification at 0726 and the PEMA conference call at 0836, it would have been helpful if the State EOC had checked i
to see if the county was aware of the ECL.
Minimize utility reporting of routine, on-site occurrences which are l
non-nuclear related (such as worker falling) and not true events of l
potential public interest to the county; proliferation of such routine calls tend to foster a " business as usual" attitude at county level and could lead to unintentional neglect of a true emergency.
PEMA Recommendations
)
After initial notification by the utility, the County did not call 1
PEMA to verify; verificatiors procedures, as documented in County EOP, Annex E, paragraph 5.B.(2), should be followed.
The Emergency Notification Report should be used by county personnel for recording all nuclear power plant incidents involving emergency classifications.
Briefings at the end of shift changes to the incoming county supervisor regarding potential public safety issues or newsworthy events of significant public interest should be mandatory.
Such events should also be recorded on the county supervisor daily report.
Cumberland County press release used both " Site Area Emergency" and
" Site Emergency".
All contact with the public as well as operations staff should use proper terminology.
The county was not authorized to stand down staff during the SAE (either by the plan, federal regulation or request to PEMA); however, they did at 1305 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.965525e-4 months <br />.
SAE was in force until 1635 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.221175e-4 months <br />.
This premature action by county could have had serious public safety consequences had other problems associated with the incident arisen.
l The county was informed by PEMA that municipal EOCs could go to minimum staffing (2 persons, if they wanted) until SAE terminated.
County told municipals they could stand down at 1345.
SAE in force until 1635 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.221175e-4 months <br />.
This premature action communicated by the county could have had safety consequences had additional problems arisen.
The county should have fully staffed the EOC according to SAE regulatory and plan requirements.
3-5
I The decision to allow municipalities to stand down and to stand down<
the county EOC was ill-advised and done without consultation.
After finally learning of the SAE, the (cunty EMA director reacted quickly.
1 According to Douglas Glass, Deputy coordinator, who was contacted by telephone on February 24, 1993, the dictaphone recorder (40 track; 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> recording) was working the day of the incident and a tape was made.
When listening to the recording the following day, a circuit board controlling the braking mechanism locked-up instead of slowing down, and broke the tape.
The dictaphone company was called to make repairs; when the tape i
was returned, it was blank.
.)
f 1
3-6
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MI EGP LOWER NEW COUNTY ALLEN CUMBERLAND NOTIFIED 0726 0919 0919 OPERATIONAL 0926 1040 1040 MINIMUM STAFFING 1315 1305 1305 STAND DOWN DEACTIVATE EOC 1345 1450 DEACTIVATE EOC 1530 OPERATIONS ROOM DEACTIVATE SCHOOL STANDBY 1450 1450 DEACTIVATE EOC 1700 8
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ATTACHMENT #4
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k TMI RECAP LOWER NEW COUNTY ALLEN CUMBERLAND NOTIFIED 0726 0919 0919 OPERATIONAL 0926 1040 1040 MINIMUM STAFFING 1305 1305 1305 STANDDOWN DEACTIVATE 1530 1345 1450 I
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~ITTACHNENT #5 5
T RADIOLOGICAL OFFICER LOG hk'Vk.
1100 JEFF SPANGLER ARRIVED AT EOC d.<IEFED 3Y
- STAFF, g
REVIEWING PLAN.
Ey.%w M WMW 1110 DECON STATION PROPRIETOR (C-Ill) NOTIFIED AS WELL AS ACTING CHIEF (C-115) FOR DECON STATION STAFF - EACH TOLD TO PEMAIN IN ALERT STATUS. BUT NOT TO MOVE ANY EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL PER JTW.
4 / ukc 1120 DOSIMETRY KITS PICKED UP BY SHERIFF'S DEPT./.AND RELOCATED TO WEST SHORE AREA.
WILL BE HELD AND NOT DISTRIBUTED UNLESS DECON STATIONS AND OTHERS ACTIV. ATE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATIONS.
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1132 CONSULTED WITH EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
- EOC, AGREED NO FURTHER ACTION NEEDED AT THIS TIME.
I145
- / DOSIMETRY DELIVERED TO LOWER ALLEN TOWNSHIP EOC.
MLM.
1153 PEMA NOTIFICATION EOC CAN ENTER STAND DOWN MODE (COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER, 1 EOC REP - EMERGENCY MGT.)
1215
- M OSIMETRY DELIVERED TO NEW CUMBERLAND EOC. MLM.
1225 RADIOLOGICAL OFFICER DEBRIEFED, AND RELEASED AT 1315.
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2-7-93 pio actions report 10:15A SAMMONS CABLE REPORTEDLi OUT
?ER DA? WIN < ELL 10:20 PIO ARRIVES AT EOC 10:23 REQUESTED OPERATOR ASSISTANCE TO REACH SAMMONS 10:41 ALEX BRESSLER-SAMMONS-ADVISES T'4 A T CA3LE SERVICE TO NEW CUMBERLAND, PART OF LEM0YNE AND PORTION OF FAIRVIEW TOWNSHIP IS OUT. D0WNED CABLE DN BRIDGE ST IN NEW CUMBERLAND.
10:49 PEMA ADVISED OF CC EOC PIO OPERATIONAL PEMA ADVISED OF SAMMONS PROBLES 11:07 TMI ADVISES-SUSPECT IN CUSTODY 11:20 PEMA UPDATE ARRIVES BY FAX l
11:20 LOWER ALLEN EOC IN OPERATION W/ FIRE DEPARTMENT 11:21 DARWIN KELL ADVISED OF PEMA CPDATE 11:30 SAMMONS ADVISES THAT SERVICE IS RESTORED 11:31 PRESS RELEASE WRITING IMPLEMENTED 11:35 PEMA ADVISED THAT CABLE SERVICE IS RESTORED 11:45 CCEMA PRESS RELEASE COMPLETED AND APPROVED l
12:13 COMMISSIONER KELLER UPDATED BY TMI'S RAY D0DERi l
i 12:14 PRESS RELEASED SENT TO MEDIA SY rAX GROYP SEND 12:20 REVIEW BY TED WISE WITH CO2 5TA?F i
12:52 PEMA ADVISES OF 1330 PRESS C O::F E R E N C E FROM TMI 100 0FFICERS AND DOGS SWEEP!NG ?LANT SITE EMERGENCY IN AFFECT C '; T I L !500 12:59 r A :- TO MEDIA IS COMPLETED SUBMITTED BY:
BRIAN W I L L I A
CREEMA:. PUBLIC I N F O R M A T I 0 !,
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@l. h'SOFFKE OF EMERGENCY PREPflREDNESS
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(UMBERtRND COUNIV COURTHOUSE
- 1 COURTHOUSE SQUARE
- CRAUSLE. PA 17013 338 I
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NEWS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CUMBERLANE C O U ::T': OFF;Ci 0F ? ".E.C E : C Y P R E ? ARED::ES S CARLISLE, PA 1
CONTACT:
BRIAN F R E EM A:,
235-9676 CARLlSLE ( February 7,
1993)- The Emergency Operations Center was activated by the Cumberland County Office of Emergency Preaparedness following the declaration of a " site emergency" at the Three Mile Island ::u c l e a r Generating Station in Dauphin County Pennsylvania.
Theodore Wise, director of the Cumberland County Office of Emergency Management activited the county's operations center shortly before 9:00am.
I Wise said, "We have maintained constant contact with the utility, the Pennsyvania Emergency Management Agency, and local emergency officials."
Cneberland County Commissioner Chairman, Earl Keller said, "our operations center was in full operation very quickly and was able to deal with a few public inquires about the incident after they were heard over local news outlets."
Keller added, " Cable service to the boro of New Cumberland, a portion of Lemoyne and the northern portion of Fairview Township in York county was lost due to a downed line." "This had nothing to do with the site emergency but was an un:inely coin'cidence."
Service was restored by 11:30am. '
A Site Area E m e r g e n c ;. is the second most serious level of a four step emergency classification. From least to mos: 4erious, the feceral emergency classification is L' n u s u 2.
- c. v e n t, iler:, Site 1, r e a Ener;eney and General Emersenc I
1 The counties involved are Concerland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon and York count 1es.
,11: 45am 2-7-93) 1
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s During the early afternoon hours, most agencies were removed from standby, and EOC's went to downgraded staffing.
Throughout the day, reports were received from the National Wea t h ei-Service for the latest weather information.
Agencies /organi:ations involved included:
Conoy Two. EMA East Donegal EMA West Donegal EMA Mt. Joy Twp. EMA Eli:abethtown EMA Elizabethtown Fire Co./ EMS Bainbridge Fire Co./ EMS Rheems Fire Co./ EMS Mt. Joy Twp. FFC Mavtown Fire Co./ EMS Mt. Joy Fire Co./ EMS Marietta Fire Co.
Hempfield EMS Manheim EMS West End EMS Ha:-Mat 2 Florin Fire Co.
E.
Donegal Twp.
P.D.
W.
Donegal Twp.
P.D.
Elizabethtown P.D.
Mt. Joy Twp. P.D.
Conoy Twp.
P.D.
Pa. State Police-Lancaster Lancaster Red Cross WLPA/WROZ Radio WGAL Television Lancaster County RACES Red Rose Transit Eshbach Bus Service Incident terminated at 16: 45.
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l DAUPHIN COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE I
The following information regarding the governmental of f-site response to the February 7,
1993 incident at Three Mile Island was derived from personal interviews with Mike Wertz, Emergency Management Coordinator, Dauphin County, and log entries made at the State EOC during the incident.
(See map at Attachment #1.)
Mobilization of Emergency Personnel The Dauphin County Emergency Communications Center (ECC) was initially contacted at 0716 hours0.00829 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.72438e-4 months <br /> by David Wilson, shift foreman, TMI Unit One.
He called on a seven digit telephone line (236-7976) that is listed in the telephone directory as the non-emergency number rather than on the dedicated TMI line.
Wilson appropriately stated that "This is not a drill", but that appears to be the only indication of following a format relative to the Emergency Notification Report (Attachment 2).
He did not provide his phone number until asked for it by Dispatcher 19; he did not say this was an emergency classification; he misidentified the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) as " Site Emergency" rather than the correct
" Site Area Emergency".
He did not indicate whether the classification was an " Escalation", ' Jeduction" or "No Change" in classf.fication status; he did not state whether there had been "No Release", " Airborne Release", or
" Liquid Release"; he did not indicate a wind direction or speed, nor did he end the report with "This is not a Drill".
Wilson advised that an intruder had crashed the gate at TMI, that he was loose inside the turbine building, that the " Site Emergency" was called at 0705, and that he did not have access to the autodialer (dedicated TMI hotline).
When questioned whether he needed anything from Dauphin County, Wilson said no, that State Police (PSP) were there, and was told to call if he needed anything.
The Dauphin County operator identified himself as Dispatcher 19.
Dispatcher 19 logged the information he received on a
" Emergency Notification Report" form as a " Site Area Emergency" (Attachment
- 2) and briefer his supervisor (OIC) although there is no indication on the form of approval, time, or date.
A shift change in the Dauphin County ECC at 0725 hrmrs brought on a new OIC.
The oncoming OIC was briefed that an intruder was loose on TMI, 1
that GPU was using PSP to locate him, and that TMI had no requirement for i
county help.
No mention was made by the off-going supervisor nor was a question asked by the incoming supervicor about the classification of the incident.
At a time listed in the State EOC log as 0842, risk counties including Dauphin County were updated on the TMI incident over the dedicated TMI line by the State EOC Watch Officer, Steve Vergot.
He gave the following message:
"The plant is still at Site Area Emergency as of 0705 due to an intruder who crashed the North Gate.
The PEMA Director is on board PEMA as well as the Operations Officer. State Police and BRP will be here soon.
Word from the plant is that the search for the 4-1
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intruder is still ongoing and that is a status update j
as of 0835.
Are there any questions?"
Lebanon and i
Lancaster Counties responded "okay".
Vergot then l
signed off before hearing responses from Dauphin, j
Cumberland and York Counties.
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j This call, and others from counties on ' the Pennsylvania Emergency i
1 Management Agency Radio System (PEMARS) indicating the activation of their EOCs, caused the Dauphin County OIC to decide to call the Dauphin County
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Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) Coordinator at 0845.
When calling his l
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residence, the OIC was advised by the Coordinator's daughter that he was at f
church. She was asked to have him call as soon as he returned.
At approximately 0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br />, the ECC OIC decided, after ' hearing i
3dditional radio transmissions, to page the DEMA Coordinator instead of.
waiting for him to return home. The Coordinator called, and was informed I
of an intruder at TMI.
In response to the Coordinator's question about whether there was any classification, the OIC answered that there was none.
The Coordinator, seeing no need for action based on information he was 4
provided, advised that he would call after returning home.
At a time listed in the State EOC log as 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />, the ECC OIC 3
received a second call on the. TMI dedicated line.
The caller was PEMA Director LaFleur updating all risk counties simultaneously.
(NOTE:
This was the third contact about Site Area Emergency in the first two hours of the event.
These l
contacts were in addition to Dauphin County's 1
I observation and monitoring of escalated emergency services radio traffic in this area.)
During the call the Director explained what was taking place onsite at TMI, that there had been no breach of radiation areas, no release of radioactive material and no reason for anyone to be evacuating or taking emergency actions offsite at this time.
All emergency agencies necessary I
were onsite and updates would be given to counties periodically.
Counties were encouraged to use the GPU News Release and respond to the media relative to what they are doing at municipal levels.
The conference call ended in a conversation with the Dauphin County OIC who asked if the Director wanted Dauphin County to go into operation. The Director's advice was to follow the procedures outlined in the plan for Site Area Emergency.
Now realizing the magnitude of the incident, the OIC again paged the DEMA Coordinator.
The Coordinator called about 0935 hours0.0108 days <br />0.26 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.557675e-4 months <br /> and was advised that the plant status was " Site Area Emergency".
He told the OIC to page the paid staff to report to the EOC and to begin r.otification of municipal EMCs.
Wertz then left church in a hurry and arrived at his EOC about 1015 hours0.0117 days <br />0.282 hours <br />0.00168 weeks <br />3.862075e-4 months <br />.
En route he called his Commissioner Chairman, Russ Sheaffer, on a
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cellular phone and advised the Commissioner of his status and the plant situation.
In the meantime, staff pagers were activated at 0940.
Dave Stough was the first staff member to arrive at the EOC.
Stough took a message from the OIC to have the DEMA Coordinator call Jerry Lambert at the State EOC - a message that had been taken at 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> by George Mahalick.
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I Mike Wertz called the State EOC at 1020 from his EOC to verify.that he j
was on site and to request, on behalf of his ersuissioner, what might be l
the worst-case scenario in terms of a plant release if the intruder accomplished whatever sabotage he might be intending.. Mr.
Wertz was i
advised that a General Emergency would be declared in this case only if i
there were a bretath of security in the Intermediate or Control Room areas -
and that there appeared to be no possibility of that.
Upon arrival att the EOC, the DEMA Coordinator began the checklist calldown as specified in his. Emergency Operations Plan - (EOP) (Attachment' l
- 3).
At 1109, Commissioner Sheaffer arrived at the EOC (he had called the l
l EOC after the Coordinator arrived and was asked to respond to the EOC).
1 Between 1128-1143 hours, University Hospital, Hershey. Medical Center' and nursing homes within the EPE were notified of: the situation.
They were '
told that no action war. required.
I At 1148, Dauphin and other risk counties were notified via conference i
telephone line that a suspect was apprehended and a full-scale search of the island with K9s was in progress. The onsite emergency.was expected to last another hour.
(Note: The State EOC log shows that risk counties were l
notified of the suspect's apprehension at 1107 hours0.0128 days <br />0.308 hours <br />0.00183 weeks <br />4.212135e-4 months <br /> and that risk counties i
were again updated at 1152 hours0.0133 days <br />0.32 hours <br />0.0019 weeks <br />4.38336e-4 months <br /> and advised that their municipalities
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could stand down with two people remaining on duty - one commo and one emergency management person.)
At 1252, the ECC OIC received a message from PEMA that the Lt. Governor would hold a press conference at 1330.
There were currently about 100 l
police and K9s searching the island.
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I At 1300, municipalities began questioning when subsequent events could be expected.
Several stated that they were going'to begin breaking down, l
but they were advised by Wertz to keep someone available by phone or pager.
As others called, they were provided this same'information, but they were j
also informed that the decision to deactivate was theirs.
The following times indicate deactivation of municipal EOCs:
1306 - Derry Township 1315 - Harrisburg City 1508 - Paxtang Borough 1535 - Swatara Township and Londonderry Township 1537 - Middletown/Royalton 1538 - Lower Swatara Township and Highspire Borough' 1541 - Conewago Township 1545 - Lower Paxton Township At 1620 hours0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.1641e-4 months <br />, DEMA was notified by PEMA that Units 1 and 2 were secured and a sweep of the island was in progress.
Termination of the incident was received from John Rollin at TMI at 1635 and from PEMA via Electronic Communications module (ECOMM) at 1642.
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t Additional Command and Control Dosimetry is normally predistributed to municipal level.
However, on l
February 7 all dosimetry, except thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs) and potassium iodide (KI), had been called into the county for swap out of 3
self-reading dosimeters (SRDs) and chargers and to redistribute all other dosimetry under the new area dosimetry policy which resulted ~ in newly computed quantities.
Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency did not
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attempt to redistribute dosimetry to municipal levels during this incident, because there did not appear to be a serious expectation that a l
radiological release would occur.
Checklists from the County RERP were used and Implementing Procedures for staff were issued and available.
However, only paid staff and i
Commissioner Sheaffer were required to be present at the EOC.,
1' As evidenced by the log at Attachment 2, municipalities, paged at 0940 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.5767e-4 months <br />, responded at various times, from 0940 to as late as_1048 hours.
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Relationship to Biennial Exercises i
A review of the 1989 report of the federally-evaluated biennial j
exercise showed a good performance in the exercise in the objectives that
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applied to the county in this incident.
The objectives were: 1) the ability to monitor, understand, and use emergency classification levels (ECLs); 2) the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for-both facility and field-based emergency functions; 3) the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities; 4) the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel and; 15) the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. Objectives one and two hold a relationship to difficulties encountered in the 1993 event.
Some room for improvement was observed in 1989 with regard to the use of the dedicated. line linking the County with the State EOC and the utility.
It was recommended that the protocol for the dedicated line be reviewed and modified to improve message accuracy and to either limit the number of personnel in the EOC authorized to answer the dedicated line or.to place an additional message log at the i
dedicated line for control of key messages.
Action was taken to correct-l the difficulties noted in the 1989 exercise.
l The 1991 federally-evaluated biennial exercise confirmed good performance in all the areas reported above.
Objectives one and two were successfully demonstrated in the 1991 exercise which was the last biennial exercise before the 1993 incident.
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County Comments Notification from the utility should be made in accordance with the Emergency Notification Report form; Emergency Classifications Levels should be stated precisely.
Consider using different classification for non-radiological incidents even though they may "so at a nuclear plant.
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ECLs should be changed from those existing to terms that would more s
surely cause the recipient of the message to research documentation for a proper reaction.
Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency internal operating procedures need to be reviewed, updated and promulgated to key personnel.
PEMA Recommendations County 911 shift personnel need to be retrained and made sensitive to the ECL notification procedure in accordance with Annex E.
After initial notification by the utility, Dauphin County did not call PEMA (or the utility) to verify.
Verification procedures, as documented in County EOP, Annex E, page E-4, paragraph 5.B.(2), should be followed.
The ECLs are specified in federal regulation and cannot, nor should they be, changed. The confusion of Dauphin County operators over their use is a training issue and should be so addressed.
Dauphin County should devote dedicated staffing to county level I
training and readiness.
The Emergency Notification Report was not signed or dated.
It correctly showed the SAE as transmitted by the plant.
This is a breach of operations procedures and constitutes a training / personnel issue.
The unilateral action by Dauphin County not to bring all risk municipalities to an operational status and not to follow the state
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advisory on staffing stand down was ill advised and was done without consultation.
l Dauphin County should staff its EOC as required for an SAE (federal regulatory classification) by the approved plan.
After finally learning of the SAE, the County EMA director reacted
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LANCASTER COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE s
The following information regarding the governmental off-site response to the February 7, 1993, incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station, was derived from a personal interview of Randy Gockley, Coordinator, l
Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency, on February 22, 1993.
Supporting papers including check lists, notification form, rosters, and reports from the county are attached.
(See map at Attachment #1.)
Mobilization of Emergency Personnel l
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At 0718 hours0.00831 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.73199e-4 months <br />, February 7, 1993, Lancaster County Wide communications was notified on the Emergency Management Agency phone line, number 299-8373, of a Site Arsa Emergency at the Three Mile Island Nuclear i
Station.
The call, made by Randy Campbell, TMI One Shift Foreman, was l
taken by Jim Herr, Lancaster County Telecommunicator.
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As soon as the words " Site Area Emergency" were spoken, Herr asked l
Campbell to hang on for a second and alerted Lancaster County Wide I
Communications Acting Shift Supervisor, Jim McElhenny, to take over the call.
The notification did not follow the format prescribed on the Emergency Notification Report form.
A copy of the completed form is i
Attachment 2.
The form was completed by McElhenny after receiving the call.
The information for selected items on the form such as:
"This is not a drill" and "There is no release" was not stated by Campbell.
This information was assumed by McElhenny and so marked on the form.
Information for other items on this form including " Changes in the i
classification status" and " Wind direction / speed" was not stated by Campbell. This information was not assumed by McElhenny and was left blank on the form.
A transcript of the notification call taken from the Communications Center 24-hour recording machine is Attachment 3.
After receipt of this notification, McElhenny immediately paged Randy Gockley, Lancaster County Emergency County Coordinator.
Gockley, who lives in Ephrata, was on'a false alarm fire call at the Ephrata Community Hospital at the time.
Since he was on an emergency vehicle, five minutes passed before Gockley was able to get to a cellular phone. After calling in at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br /> and learning of the ECL declaration, he directed that the duty officer, Paul McCracken, be notified to report in i
and instructed McElhenny to notify the risk municipalities. McCracken was i
notified at 0732 hours0.00847 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.78526e-4 months <br />.
The times of notification, activation and deactivation for the risk municipalities are at Attachmen+. 4.
Upon arrival at the County EOC, McCracken, who lives five blocks away, notified all County EMA personnel on the roster, both paid and volunteers, to report to the EOC immediately.
A copy of the attendance roster ir.
As att exception to the plan, the School Services Officer was not required to report to the EOC since the incident was on a Sunday and the schools were not open.
Once the staff was notified, all fire departments, ambulance companies, and police departments within the 10-mile EPZ were notified and placed on stand-by.
The County HAZMAT Team and the 5-1
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Marietta Fire Company (Monitoring and Decontamination for Emergency Workers Team) were notified and put on stand-by.
A copy of the completed Site Area Emergency check list is Attachment 6.
Randy Gockley arrived at the EOC at 0804 hours0.00931 days <br />0.223 hours <br />0.00133 weeks <br />3.05922e-4 months <br /> and immediately obtained verification from PEMA over PEMARS at 0810 hours0.00938 days <br />0.225 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.08205e-4 months <br />.
He then notified the County Commissioners and the County Administrator (who serves as the EMA Public Information Officer.)
One Commissioner (Kauffman) was out of town, but notice of the incident was left on his recorder.
Commissioner Huber reported to the EOC at 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br /> and Commissioner Fischer arrived at 1045 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.976225e-4 months <br />.
Additional Command and Control The County EMA Incident Report is Attachment 7 and includes,a list of the EOC staff and volunteers that were activated.
This report also contains a comp 1 rete listing of the agencies and organizations that supported the incident. Times of EOC man-up are as follows:
Initial Notification:
0718 EMC Notification:
0730 EOC Partially Activated:
0822 EOC Fully Activated:
0852 The Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency and Lancaster County Municipal Emergency Management Agencies performed responsively and in accordance with established plans and procedures.
The Red Cross Chapter was notified.
In turn, the Disaster Action Team was activated and reported to the Chapter House in a stand-by status.
The Manheim Township EMA was also notified and placed on stand-by.
These two units would operate the Reception and Mass Care Centers if needed.
The County EMC decided that until a radiation concern was received, the East Hemphill School District would not be alerted to open Centerville Junior High School for use as the Mass care Center. There would be adequate time to have the facility ready for mass care use if evacuation was ordered.
The county EBS entry radio station was notified of the incident and placed on stand-by.
Hospitals, nursing homes and Elizabethtown College were notified of the incident and informed that there was no need for evacuation.
Should this be a requirement, they would be so instructed.
Red Rose Transit and Eschbach Bus Service were notified of the incident.
They were queried as to the number of buses that would be availtble if they were needed.
Both firms indicated that only one half of the number indicated in their agreements would be available. However, this total would still meet the entire county requirement.
The Public Affairs Officer, Sherry Heller, answered inquiries from two radio stations as well as TV Station WGAL.
The TV station visited the County EOC and coverage of the EOC's response was aired on the evening and 5-2 t
i
)
e late night news casta.
Approximately 18 calls were received and answered on the rumor control line.
Centrally stored dosimetry (TLDs and KI) were delivered to Elizabethtown EMA in accordance with the plan and further distri.buted to the municipalities.
Lancaster County was in the process of implementing the Area Concept for dosimetry stock and issue.
Although the concept was not yet reflected in municipal plans, some municipality training on this reduced stockage had been completed by TMI trainers.
County EMA personnel dropped off the correct amounts of dosimetry in accordance with current plans, but some confusion as to the exact quantities to be issued arose in those municipalities who had received the Area Concept training; county personnel did not wait to clarify the issue basis.
j l
The conoy Township EMC, Chuck Hower, requested permission to announce at each on-going local church service information concerning the incident.
Since this township is adjacent to TMI, people were observing unusual activities around the p3 ant that included movement of numerous police cars, 1
helicopter flights and blocked roads.
Permission was given and the l
congregations were informed by township volunteers.
l The PEMA EOC log entry at 1409 hours0.0163 days <br />0.391 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.361245e-4 months <br /> indicates that Lancaster County I
was originally notified over the dedicated phone line.
When this information was provided by the EMC, he had erroneously assumed that the l
call was received on the dedicated line.
Mr. Gockley's assumption was l
incorrect.
As stated earlier, the original notification came over Lancaster County EMA's principal phone line (299-8373.)
l Lancaster County paid for the use of two deputy sheriffs that provided security for the EOC for the duration of the exercise.
PSP Troop J Duty Officer, Lt.
Zenk, provided support to the EOC throughout the incident.
He was also able to accomplish his Troop Duty Officer functions from the EOC as well.
l The Mayor of L4acaster City asked why she was not notified of the incident by the County EOC.
The decision was made by the Commissioners that there were no reasons requiring notification of municipalities outside l
of the 10-mile EPZ.
l Relationship to Biennial Exercises A review of the 1989 report of the federally-evaluated biennial exercise for TMI showed a strong performance in the exercise objectives l
that applied to the county in this incident. The objectives reviewed were:
)
j
- 1) ability to monitor, understand, and use emergency classification levels;
- 2) ability to alert, mobilize, and activate personnel; 3) ability to coordinate and control emergency activities; 4) ability to communicate with appropriate organizations; 12) ability to alert the public and disseminate an instructional message within 15 minutes; and, 15) ability to establish and operate a rumor control center.
Federal evaluators rated county and municipal performance adequate in these six objectives.
The 1989 exercise results show a strong correlation with the county and municipal response to j
the February 7 TMI incident.
j i
5-3 l
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A review of the 1991 report of the federally-evaluated. biennial,
exercise for TMI showed another strong performance in the same objectives (1-4, 12 and 15. )
Each of the objectives demonstrated by the county were graded as adequately demonstrated by the federal evaluators.
There were two issues noted concerning objectives 1 and 3 only at the municipal level.
The performance of Lancaster County as reflected in both the 1989 and 1991 exercises was a good predictor of the strong performance in the aspects that applied to the February 7, 1993 TMI incident.
i Lancaster County's EOC and its municipal EOCs have continued to perform efficiently in response to exercises and incidents at nuclear power plants.
County Commente i
PEMA liaison officer should have been sent to the County EOC.
The i
liaison officer's presence would have been helpful.
The siren system should have been used to alert the public to the incident.
The alert EBS message announcing the incident and advising the public to stay tuned to the ISS station should have been broadcast.
Anytinie that the public can obviously see unusual activity at a plant, j
this planned procedure should be used.
In retrospect, the County EMC stated that he should have used his sirens and EBS message with the I
commissioners' approval.
PEMA Recommendations The standard Emergency Notification Report form should always be used when notifying a county about a nuclear power plant incident.
The dedicated line between the plant and the county should also be used, if possible.
Operations and communications personnel do not expect to receive information from the utility in a non-prescribed format over a routine business line.
Deviations from these established procedures open the door for errors and can result in the loss of valuable time.
i The county attendance roster (Attachment 5) should be changed to include columns for times signed in and out.
The county Site Area Emergency check list (Attachment 6) heading should be changed from Site Emergency to Site Area Emergency to conform to proper regulatory terminology.
The use of the siren and EBS is a judgement call in a situation such as this.
The timely and abundant coverage by local and network broadcast media appeared to provide the public with all the information needed.
Sounding of the sirens to institute the EBS would probably have caused undue alarm and possibly panic at church services resulting in spontaneous, but unnecessary, evacuations.
Independent activation of 5-4
D.
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l EBS was not advisable in this case due to the above and the lack of l
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readiness of all involved counties and municipalities.
Sirens in one i
l county could have caused panic in adjacent counties.
The State was aware of this situation ~and these were some of the reasons the EBS was i
not used by the State. EBS activation must be coordinated.
The Emergency Incident Notification Report was not properly completed.
4 The TMI staff should follow the report form when making a report.
t The county and municipalities appropriately and commendably followed j
the regulatory requirement, planned approach, and PEMA advisory on EOC staffing until the SAE was closed out.
)
Lancaster county and municipal staffs carefully and appropriately
)
followed plans and procedures to implement public safety actions.
Planning, training, exercising, and equipment acquisition over the years again paid off.
l
. The County EMA director and his staff made good, quick, knowledgeable decisions.
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i LANCASTER COUNTY MUNICIPAL NOTIFICATION TIMES j
. Minimum i
Staff Municipality Notified Activated Operational Stand down Deactivate
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i conoy Twp 0736 0805 0905-1200 1645 I
East Donegal Twp 0738 0800 0905
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Elizabethtown Boro 0743 0803 0905 1200 1645' l
Mount Joy Twp 0746 0759.
0905 1200 1645 i
i West Donegal Twp 0748 0800 0905 1200' 1645 ~
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i LEBANON COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE The following information regarding the governmental of f-site response to the February 7, 1993 incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station was derived from two interviews with Mr. Clyde H. Miller and Ms. Annette Smith, EMA-1 and EMA-2 of the Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency.
Supporting documentation, consisting of a response to PZMA questions (Attachment #2) GPU News Releases and a tape transcript of selected TMI/
Lebanon EMA/PEMA converaations are attached.
(See map at Attachment #1.)
i Mcbilization of Emergency Personnel At 0723 hours0.00837 days <br />0.201 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.751015e-4 months <br />, February 7, 1993, Lebanon County Communications Center was notified on a regular seven digit telephone line of a Sito Area Emergency at tne TMI Nuclear Station. The call was made by Randy Campbell, a TMI Shift Foreman, to the shift leader in the Lebanon County Communications Center. The details of the conversation are attached in the tape transcript (Attachment #3).
The essential elements of the situation j
were covered by the call, including the correct terminology of Site Area Emergency.
- However, not all of the information on the
" Emergency Notification Report" (Attachment #3) was covered.
In particular, the opening statement should have been "This is not a drill." Also not covered were the phone number, release status, wind information and the conclusion, "This is not a drill".
Although Attachment #3 shows both the beginning and ending, "This is not a drill," this was added by the dispatcher and was not part of the notification call from the utility.
The same is true of the telephone number.
At 0724, the shift leader tone paged the Deputy Director (EMA-2) who was the duty officer that week.
This resulted in a phone call back to the
)
shift leader at 0726.
The situation was accurately described to EMA-2 by the duty officer (Attachment #4) except for the use of the expression " Site Emergency" instead of the TMI stipulated " Site Area Emergency". The EMA-2, j
thinking out loud about a potential sabotage situation, ordered that the Coordinator (EMA-1) and the South Londonderry EMC (EMA-27) be notified of the situation.
1 At 0728, EMA-1 and EMA-27 were paged.
The EMA-1 called the shift i
leader at 0730.
After briefing EMA-1 on the situation, using the expression " Site Emergency", the shift leader was specifically asked " Site Emergency - did he say Site?".
The shift leader response was
...and the j
Site Area, and Site Area Emergency".
The Coordinator asked, "a Site Area Emergency?" and the duty officer responded, " Yeah".
The Coordinator (EMA-1) then was then advised that they had it on tape.
The 0721 tape was then played over the phone for the Coordinator.
In the ensuing dialogue between the shift leader and the Coordinator (Attachment #3), it was obvious that the Director had recognized the " Site Area Emergency" as well as the requirement to start
... gearing up the EOC staff and everything else".
The South Londonderry EMC acknowledged the page at 0730 and he was also briefed on the incident.
At 0734, the duty officer (EMA-2) through the communications Center contacted PEMA to verify the incident. The SAE was verified by PEMA (Steve 6-1
e
(
Vergot).
At 0739, the verification was provided to the Coordinator j
(EMA-1).
At the same time, the Lebanon County HAZMAT team was ordered to '
respond to the EOC (tone alert pager). At 0745, the Lebanon County EOC was activated and became operational.
At
- 0835, the EOC was declared operational.
The South Londonderry EOC was activated at 0830 and became operational at 0940 (Attachment #5).
Additional Command and Control The GPU called the County Commissioners.
The Lebanon County Coordinator believes that is a County EMA responsibility.
- Further, numerous fax messages were sent to the Commissioner's Office by GPU (Attachment #6).
No one was there; the Commissioners were tihere they were supposed to be - in the ECC.
The GPU called the County EMA to terminate the incident saying -
"...the drill is terminated".
After being questioned, the response was corrected to "the incident is terminated".
The Lebanon County Coordinator thinks that termination should have come from PEMA, not GPU.
The Lebanon County Coordinator reported that information from PEMA on conference calls over the hotline was clear, concise and excellent.
The Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency and South Londonderry Emergency Management Agency performed responsively and in accordance with established plans and procedures.
In hindsight, there were examples of imprecise communications that could have resulted in delayed response, had the level of training and knowledge been less than the expertise demonstrated.
The use of the correct terminology when referring to nuclear power plant ECLs is quite important to the decision making process relative to levels of response.
The appropriateness of the TMI calls and f axes to commissioners were questioned by the County EMA Coordinator.
The calls and faxes may be appropriate, depending on the wishes of the elected officials.
If they are appropriate, updating telephone numbers and fax numbers should be done quarterly.
If not appropriate, the practice should cease.
The TMI alerting procedures, while conveying some correct -information and the correct classification terminology (Site Area Emergency), did not completely follow the " Emergency Notification Report" form agreed to by the utilities and the Commonwealth. While the form is almost completely filled out, (Attachment #4) the transcribed text from the tape does not contain all the information noted.
The omission of the first statement "This is l
not a drill" denies an oral cue to the receiver of the information l
regarding the importance of the communication.
Additionally, the alerting l
call did not come over the dedicated plant line, which is prominently l
displayed in the EOC, and recognized as the primary system for receiving nuclear power plant ECL declarations.
These two factors, although not critical, could have caused delay or resulted in an incorrect decision relative to the appropriate level of response.
1 l
6-2
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In summary, the Lebanon County off-site response organization performed
's in accordance with their plans and procedures and they did so in a timely j
manner.
As to be expected in real world occurrences, hindsight-and j
i reconstruction usually highlight some things that should have been done a j
little better and some things that could be done differently.
j i
Relationship to Biennial Exercises' 1
4 A review of the 1989 report of the federally evaluated biennial i
j exercise showed a strong performance in the exercise objectives that l
applied to the county in this incident.
The objectives reviewed were: 1) i ability to monitor, understand, and use emergency classification levels; 2) l l
ability to alert, mobilize and activate personnel; 3) ability to coordinate and control emergency activities 4) ability to communicate -with j
appropriate organizations and; 15)* ability to establish and operate a rumor i
j control center.
Four of these objectives were graded as adequate and the fifth (ability to coordinate and control emergency activities) was graded l
4 as outstanding.
In this latter category, the emergency management
{
coordinator was praised for his performance.
The entire staff was also praised by the phrase,
...of special note is the team work and enthusiasm i
which was apparent at this EOC."
Objective 12 (EBS) was also examined because of communications j
implications, even though the EBS was not used during the incident.
The i
demonstration was adequate. Another complimentary aspect was the EMC/ staff i
J recognition of inadequate information ~ being provided to them.
This recognition prompted a call to the State which resulted in the correction j
of the situation.
The 1989 exercise showed a close correlation of the aspects which applied to the strong performance during the February 7 TMI j
incident.
I County Comments There should be consideration for a security-event classification j
2 (non-radiological) which would require notification of the county and require only limited activation of the EOC.
i j
The utility called the county commissioners. Operational briefings are i
the responsibility of the county EMA.
Numerous fax messages were sent
)!
to the vacant commissioners' office.
(
The utility called the county EMA to terminate the incident.
The 2
county believes termination information should have come'from PEMA, not the utility.
PEMA Recommendations The utility needs to ensure that emergency notifications are relayed in the exact " Emergency Notification Report" format in order to provide j
the best opportunity for complete comprehension on the receiving end.
1 I
The County Communications Center training should be structured to sensitize dispatchers and duty officers to the importance of using 6-3 q
t
e 2
correct terminology regarding nuclear power plant incident,
classifications.
County communications personnel should demand complete information from the utility relative to the Emergency Notification Report form.
j When providing materials to elected of ficials, care must be taken by the utility to differentiate between information and operational j
elements.
Operational offsite decisions are the responsibility of the state, county, and municipality.
PEMA agrees with the county - the incident is not over nor is the status changed until verified and announced by the State.
The NRC has the latitude to disagree with the utility's classification recommendation. The State has the latitude to disagree with Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) by the utility.
Counties tend to forget this option, because of exercise uniformiti that the utility protective action is "always right".
The NRC tends to be a passive or even a non-player in exercises relative to reviewing utility decisions.
Exercise technical scenarios never seem to cause a utility-NRC disagreement.
PEMA disagrees that a separate security event classification system should be used.
This could easily cause confusion.
Every security y
8 event is also a potential radiological event or of fsite command and control activity due to the possibility of (spontaneous) evacuation.
Unfortunately, the NRC and the nuclear power plants only now have come to realize this issue.
The county and municipality appropriately and commendably followed the deactivation guidance of the state and the regulatory requirements.
The county and affected municipality appropriately and effectively reacted based on the plan, training, exercise participation, equipment acquisition and facility development relative to this event.
The County EMA Director mado quick, knowledgeable, and effective decisions.
t l
6-4
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f LEBANON COUNTY r
TMI SECURITY BREACH I
FEBRUARY 7, 1993 s
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EVENT EOC/EMA BOC/EMA i
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NOTIFIED 0723 0730 i
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NOTIFICATION 07 A j~".",'
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.-M.)4 NUCLEAR PO'ER PLANT-INCIDENT
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EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION REPORT
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This is a Drill This is not a Drill 1.
This is:
D.s :J w : hen at Pl.. + m e -
7 m.t My. phone number is: 149-9069 2.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
ll Unusual Event
- 8 Site Area Emergency 11 Alert I
General Emergency l[l The Event has been Terminated I
AT:
TIME:
o7oF DATE:
d 2-o7-77 E'
l@I Escalation THIS REPRESENTS A/AN:
' eduction IN CLASSIFICATI0!! STATUS:
l[l Change 3.
BRIEF NON-TECHNICAL-DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:
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THERE IS:
% !!o Release 1[I Airborne Release l[iLiquidRelease S.
'/HE!! GE!!ERAL EP.ERGENCY IS THE I!!ITIAL EVENT, PROVIDE PROTECTIVE ACTIO!!
RECC:mENDATION 5Et.cW:
none 6.
WIND DIRECTION IS FROM:
'.41ND SPEED IS:
ll This is a Drill This is not a Drill APPROVED:
TIME:
DATE:
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SECURITY BREACF 8 M8 o **
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operationit Hinimum Steffing Standdown 1600 Deictivite 1645
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ATTACHMENT #2 i
NOTFICATION OFs A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l INCIDENT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIOff REPORT
.- 4 THIS IS A DRILL:
THIS IS NOT A DRILL: -l 1.
THIS IS:
ANb7 P 36LL AT TM I MY PHONE NUMBER IS:
2.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
EVENT OF POTENTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST SITE AREA EMERGENCY UNUSUAL EVENT GENERAL EMERGENCY ALERT EVENT HAS BEEN TERMINATED AT - TIME:
07I8NFL DATE:
/~8/3 700, [Ti3 ESCALATION THIS REPRESENTS A/AN REDUCTION IN THE CLASSIFICATION STATUS NO CHANGE 3.
BRIEF NON-TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:
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NO RELEASE AIRBORNE RELEASE LIQUID RELEASE 5.
PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION:
(WHEN GENERAL DTRGENCY IS THE INITIAL EVENT) f
- 6.
WIND DIRECTION IS FRCM THE:
WIND SPEED IS:
THIS IS A DRILL THIS IS NOT A DRILL APPROVED:
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ATTAC&iENT #3 e
1 TMI SAE NOTIFICATION OF LANCASTER COUNTY, TAPE TRANSCRIPT The call from Randy Campbell, TMI One Shift Foreman, to Lancaster County Telecommunicator, Jim Herr, who alerted Jim McElhenny, Acting Shift Supervisor, who took the call.
1 Herr: Lancaster County Emergency Management.
Campbell Hi, this is Randy Campt M' at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station.
At, let's see, 0705, we declared a Site Area Emergency.
Herr:
Can you hang on a second please?
1 Campbell Yeah, yeah.
McElhenny: Hello, can I help you?
Campbell:
OK, this is Randy Campbell, I'm a Shift Foreman at Three Mile Island.
McElhenny: Yes sir.
Campbell:
OK, at 0705 we declared, declared a Site Area Emergency because j
somebody drove through the North Gate, drove through our protected area fence, ran through a big roll-up door, and now he's loose on the plant somewhere.
We are still at 100% power.
Ah, this is just an initial notification to all the counties.
Ah, State Police is on the way; Middletown Police, our security force is out in force, and we can't find the guy.
McE1henny:
OK.
Your name again please.
Campbell: Randy Campbell, Shift Foreman, TMI One.
McElhenny: OK Campbell: TMI One.
s McE1henny: Oo you need anything from us? Or?
Campbell:
Ah, not at this time.
Ah, I note State Police have been dispatched from Troop H and Lancaster Troop which I'm not sure which it is.
McElhenny:
Yeah, Troop J, Lancaster.
Campbell:
Yeah, they are heading this way.
McElhenny:
OK, you just give us a call if you need us any more.
Campbell: Thank you' sir.
McElhenny:
OK, thanks, goodbye.
)
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ATTACHMENT #4 s
LANCASTER COUNTY MUNICIPAL NOTIFICATION TIMES Minimum Staff Municipality Notified Activated Oy lational Standdown Deactivate
[
Conoy Twp 0736 0805 0905 1200 1645 East Donegal Twp 0738 0800 0905 1200 1645 Elizabethtown Boro 0743 0803 0905 1200 1645 Mount Joy Twp 0746 0759 0905 1200 1645 West Donegal Twp 0748 0800 0905 1200 1645 e
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ATTACHMENT #5 f
'i LANCASTER COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY ATTENDANCE ROSTER - TRAINING, MEETINGS, SEMINARS j
%,/7/93 NAME (PLEASE PRINT)
ORGANIZATION REPRESENTED 4
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' HECK TIME TIME OFF RECEIVED DECLARED
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PROVIDE ONSITE EMERGENCY SERVICES IF REQUESTED
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NOTIFY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
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D MOBILIZE MUNICIPAL AND COUTY EOC STAFFS:
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ACTIVATE SIREN SYSTEM AND EBS STATIONS AS REQUIRED L
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MOBILIII AMBULANCE SERVICES V
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PROVIDE COORDINATED PUBLIC INFORMATION STATEMENTS (PEMA & COUNTY LEVELS)
COUNTIES COORDINATE WITH PEMA PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTION. PEMA TO COORDINATE WITH RISK COUNTIES IN SOUNDING OF SIRENS ACTIVATE TRANSPORTATION STAGING AREAS (OPTIONAL FOR EACH RISK COUNTY)
/
//),' V NOTIFY SCHOOL DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENTS & COLLEGES TO PLACE BUSES AND DRIVERS NEEDED FOR EVACUATION ON STANDBY STATUS:
ELIZABETHTOWN COLLEGE ELIZABETHTOWN SCHOOL DIST.
M DONEGAL SCHOOL DISTRICT p7 /3 MUNICIPA* ! TIES DISTRIBUTE DOSEMITRY, KI & REPORT FORMS TO EMERGENCY WORKERS DISTRIBUTE SURVEY METERS TO MASS CARE, DECONTA'4INATION C. '.'~..r..t. :
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_ ATTACHMENT #7 4
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INCIDENT PEFORT
'l February 7, 1993 Site Area Emergency-TMI At 07:19 Lancaster' County Wide Communications uas
-[
notified via the EMA phone line (299-9373). of a " Site Area l
Emergency" at the plant.
At.07:30 and.07:32, EMC Gockley_
and D.O. Paul McCracken were notified.
Coordinator Gockley had the municipal EMC's notified
'l and instructed to activate their EOC's.
The County Commissioners were immediately. notified of-the situation,,
with the enception.of Commissioner Kauffman; whoywas not;
.j available.
The following EOC Staff and volunteers.were activated and called in:
R. Gockley, Coordinator P. McCracken.
D.O.
T. Baldwin. Communications E. Bachman..EMA E. Swain, EMA D.J.
Troupe. Security l
D.R. Kendig, Security Lt..R.
Zenk.
P.S.P.
i J. Cander. PA.
D.O.T.
M.J.
Stas, EMA l
S. Nelson, R.O.
P.
Colvin, EMA J. Huber, Commissioner B. Fischer. Commissioner i'
R. Small, RACES S.. Heller,-PIO.. Administrator J. Helms, EMS.
L.
Ibaugh, EMA i
C.
Elmer, EMA C. Rivera. RACES G. Shirk, Agriculture M.. Weaver. Communications l
R. Harrison. Communications D. Wiker. Commun i c a t i o ns -
In line with the plan, KI and Dosimetry was taken to the Eli:abethtown ECC for distribution.. Security was established at ihe County.EOC.
Fire Companies, EMS j
orcanizations, and Municipal Police Departments were placed 1
on standby in the Emergency Planning Cone.
The Marietta Fire Station was placed'onLstandby for
)
{
emergency worter decon. and the Ccunty Ha:-Mat. Team-activated.
The County assured that nursing hcmen.-health facilities.-and Ell:abethtown College was notified.
Calls were made to. place bus companies on standbv and to find out available number of buses.
A call was placed to the County EPS entr. station to assure they were aware of the. situation and placed on standby.
Two County Commisioners were in'the ECC through 13:30 to monitor =the situation and assist i n dec t s ton mak ing.
The Cou.a t. PIO did an in death inteiview with the local T'/
station and. handled app. 13 phone calls on the rumor.:ontrol-11: e.
4 i -'
ATTACHMENT #7 l
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$0C AN TMI SITE EMERGENCY - 02/07/93 072h COMMUNICATIONS CENTER RECEIVED IST NOTIFICATION FROM TMI (ON 7-DIGIT PHONE LINE NOT TMI LINE) THAT SOMEONE DROVE VEHICLE AND INTO TURBINE ROOM THROUGH GATE.
0825 DAN BRETZMAN OVERHEARD PEMARS TRANSMISSIONS CONCERNING INCIDENT' - NOTIFIED J.
THEODORE WISE - TRIED TO CONTACT COORDINATOR "A" - DID_NOT ANSWER PHONE.
0830 SITE EMERGENCY DECLARED.
- f QLFW 0836 COMMUNICATIONS CENTER RECEIVED 2ND CALL FROM TMI ON T:!I PHONE CONFERENCE CALL TO ALL COUNTIES - ON SITE EMERGENCY - PE:1A HEADQUARTERS ACTIVATED - PSP NOTIFIED.
' 95 0900 PAGED DIRECTOR '
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0900 PAGED SUPERVISOP. B p
0900 PAGED SUPERVISOR C spff/t 0900 PAGED SUPERVISOR A/
0907 COMMISSIONER KELLER NOTIFIED.
0907 COMMISSIONER BESCH NOTIFIED - MESSAGE LEFT ON ANSWERING MACHINE.
0910 COMMISSIONER MYERS - NOTIFIED AT HOME.
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t' c/O 0919 LOCAL COORDINATORS NOTIFIED - DARWIN KELL - RON MULL AND STEVE SULTZABERGER (NEW CUMB. BORG MGR.)
0932 PIO NOTIFIED AND RESPONDING.
0937 PEMA WAS NOTIFIED THAT OUR EOC IS STAFFED & OPERATIONAL.
0940 NATE ATWOOD - RED CROSS - NOTIFIED AND ENROUTE.
0941 DONNA MARTIN - MESSAGE CENTER - NOTIFIED & ENROUTE.
?lllL V ?M "Cf'.
0943 ROBERT KAUFFMAN - PAGED.
1000 PEMA - JERRY LAMBERT CALLED TO FIND OUT IF EOC WAS
- TANNED WHO WAS HERE - I TOLD DIM JTW, COMMISSIONER, AND DRM.
1005 CALL FROM DARWIN KELL TO JTW FOR AN UPDATE.
1007 JERRY LAMBERT PEMA CALLED TD FIND OUT 4HICH COMMISSIONER WAS HERE.
e 5
l 1010 EOC PHONES ARE OPCRATIONAL.
1015 CALL FROM DARWIN RELL - S A!!M ON S COMMUNICATIONS CABLE TV IS OUT OF OPERATION.
BOB JONES WAS PAGED - NOT AT HOME. fN SW kW[
1013 1030 COMMISSIONER BESCH CALLED COMMUNICATIONS CENTER WAS i
INFORMED OF SITUATION.
C OM111 S SIONE R KELLER CALLED COMMISSIONER MYERS TO UPDATE 1940 HER AND TO CHECK IF HER CABLE WAS OPERATIONAL - SHE i
DOESN'T HAVE CABLE.
SAMMONS COMMUNICATIONS 1041 PIO CALLED ALEX BREXLER REFERENCE THEIR CABLE SERVICE BEING OUT IN N.E W CUMBERLAND BORD.
I 1045 DARWIN KELL CALLED JTW - HIS PHONE #774-0193.
1053 PEMA FAX - SITREP.
1059 BARRY HORN - SHERIFF'S OFFICE - NOTIFIED - ENROUTE jdhGkEud7 1100 SHERIFF TOM KLINE NOTIFIED - ENROUTE j.G- (.l(f., AXD4' M/
1110 (EWH) NOTIFY BIG SPRING 1110 - GARMAN -
1112 M R.-
[&lld / ;w/dCOWDEN N/A 1113 - DR. HOUSER - N/A 1114 - DR.
PT/f$y#g STEGER -
DISCONNECT - 1120 -
DR.
HOWARD RETIRED 1125 BRUCE NEIGHBORS
- N/A
- 1127 - STEVE ANGLE -
OY &lf#
N/A.
1132 (EWH) NOTIFY WEST SHORE SCHOOL - 1132 - DAVE FRANTZ OK 1144.- STEVE _rAIR TO ? REMAIN IN LEMOYNE A R E A. (4#7 p/* 444 5mp i j
F McONyW 1107
-PEMA CALLED COMMUNICATIONS CENTER - TMI CALLED THEM SUBJECT IS IN CUSTODY.
1108 FAX SITREP FROM PE 1A.
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1122 CO. 12 WAS DISPATCHED - STANDBY IN QUARTERS.
fjf Q U A R T E R S. / N A '/ X U N / @
1124 CO. 24 WAS DISPATCHED - STANDBY IN 1138 SAMMONS COMMUNICATIONS CABLE TV IS BACK ON AIR ALEX BREXLER CALLED PIO TO INFORM HIM.
1139 CALL F RO:1 PEMA PIO - INCIDENT IS WINDING DOWN.
4 379
[ Jg /fm. O HANM i 1150 CALL FROM RON !!ULL ASKING FOR TIMES. L
,,77.34.<g N) 3 1200 COMMISSIONER KELLER CALLED COMMISSIONER MYERS TO UPDATE HER - SHE IS ENROUTE TO NEW CUMBERLAND ECC.
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1248 TMI CALLED COMMUNICATIONS CENTER LT.
GOVERNOR WILL HAVE A
PRESS CONFERENCE FROM THE TMI MEDIA CENTER AT
- 1330, 100 0FFICERS AND DOCS SWEEPING THE PLANT.
SITE EMERGENCY UNTIL 1500 HOURS.
i 1254 PEMA FAX - SITREP.
[
1 1305 RECEIVED CALL FROM RON MULL - HOW LONG ARE WE TO STAY OPERATIONAL?
WILL GO TO MINIMAL STAFFING UNTIL WE INFORM HIM TO SHUT DOWN EOC.
1335 PAXED COPY OF PRESS RELEASE TO PEMA FOR THEIR RECORDS.
-1345 (EWH) L'WER ALLEN AND NEW CUMBERLAND EOC'S WERE ADVISED l
TO STAT-DOWN.
i 1450 (EWH) 3IG SPRING AND WEST SHORE. SCHOOLS ADVISED EVENT
[
TERMINATED.
1459 SITREP FROM PEMA - DRM CALLED PEMA !? NOTIFY THEM THAT I
WE DID NOT RECEIVE PAGE 5 0F SITREP.
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1530 CLOSED DOWN EOC.
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1 ATTACHMENT #8 e
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f TM1 NOTES - PROBLEMS ENCOUNTEP.ED i
Did not receive notification in a timely manner -
shift leaders need to be briefed on what to do.-
call back to TMI to find out j
what happened and verification.
Need to go back to original " ALERT" notification procedure 4 when you start out at " SITE EMERGENCY".-
i Pagers'for shift leaders for immediate notification to save l
time for immediate staffing.
P Bretzman - problems with resources - notification duty book.
Not sure where to look uent through numerous books to ge t-information.
?
Jeff Spangler - was not briefed on situation immediately upon arrival - EWH wasn't here yet.
t Doug Glass - phone jacks need to be put on ceiling - corrosion ~is 4
occurring in Jacks on floor rendering phones inoperable.
EWH - in transition period between new and old TMI plan reference dosimetry and distribution.
Communications Center needs checklist similar to Weather and Haz Mat checklist?????
Is copy of " SOP" in Communications C e'n t e r ?
I FIO Brian Freeman - notification should be clarified with "NOT A
D Rl' t".
Alsoi numerous radio station fax numbers are not programmed into fax machine.
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Attachment #1 l
Lebanon County Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
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ATTACHMENT #2 I
' QUESTIONS l
1
- What time were you notified?
Personally?
E0C Notification?
l
- Who notified you? What words were used, if you remember or have it on tape?
- How were you notified?
6 l
- What action did you take upon notification?
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- Was this action in accordance with your plan and procedures?
i
- If you deviated from your plan and procedures, please describe your actions and rationale.
- Did you use your checklist (s)?
If not, why not?
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- For risk county and area EOCs: When was your EOC notified?
activated?
operational?
l mobilized?
I
- For risk county only: When was each of your municipalities notified?
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activated?
operational?
mobilized?
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- What should be done to improve your plan and procedures / state plan and procedures?
f
- Other comments.
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LEBANON COUNTY 4w.
Room 14. Municipal Building CLYDE H. MILLER 400 South 8th St.
Director Lebanon, PennsyIvania 17042 (717) 272 7621 4
February 19, 1993 - 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> Meeting: Ed White, Bureau of Plans and Preparedness, PD!A and Clyde H. Miller, Director Lebanon County EMA In Re: Questions v/ answers in regards to Site Area Emergency at TMI on February 7, 1993.
QUESTION #1 (PART #1 - #2 - #3) [
Reference:
ATTACHMENT A]
0723 hrs. - Notification (via regular seven digit telephone line) from GPU to Lebanon County Communications Center of a S.A.E. at TMI.
- Notified by tone alert pager and informed by duty officer, EMA-2, of S.A.E. at TMI.
1
- Notification made by tone alert pager and by telephone.
QUESTION #2 (PART #1 - #2) [
Reference:
ATTACHMENT A & B]
0723 hrs. - GPU.
l
- [See attached Emergency Notification Report.]
QUESTION #3 [
Reference:
ATTACHMENT A],,
-On-aregularsevendigIt'telephonelineintheEMACommunications Center.
l QUESTION #4
[
Reference:
ATTACHMENT A)
- Notification immediately made to Director by Duty Officer and, also, l
immediate notification to South Londonderry Township Local EMA Coordinator.
- Notification with PD!A, via telephone, requesting verfication of reported information from GPU of a S.A.E. and incident details, by D!A Duty Officer.
- Re notification with Director by Duty Officer of verification by PEMA.
- Notification by tone alert pager to County D!A staff personnel and County D!A Haz-Mat Team members to responc to tne EOC, ASAP.
QUESTION #5
- yes.
l 2
1 Meeting: PEMA and Director Miller February 19, 1993 In Re: Q. & A. - TMI - S. A. E. - 02/07/93 Page 2 QUESTION #6
- N/A QUESTION #7
- Yes.
QUESTION #8
[
Reference:
ATTACHMENT A)
- EOC - 0739 - notified
- EOC - 0745 - activated
- EOC - 0745 - operational
- EOC - 0835 - mobilized t
QUESTION #9
[
Reference:
ATTACHMENT A]
l
- municipality - 0728 - notified
- municipality - 0830 - activated
- municipality - 0830 - operational
- municipality - 0940 - mobilized QUESTION #10
- Possible consideration for an event classification in regards to the type of inc_ident which occurred on the 7th (terrorist incident) or plant security incident, non radiological, which would require i
notification and limited activation of EOC.
]
UTHER CWMENTS GPU called County Ctemissioners - This is County EMA's ' responsibility, e
not GPU. :.'umerous fax messages sent to C:=missioner's office bv CPU.
No one was in the Commissioner's office. The Commissioners were where thev were suppose to be. in the ECC.
Not b,u j C
- Al so. GPU called County EMA to terminate the incident saving. "the i
g G 3 di drill is teretnated". then after resconse from individuals on line, corrected it and said "the incident is terminated".
Feel termination information should have come from PEMA, not GPU.
l Information from PEMA on conference calls over hot line was clear. concise and excellent. Thank you.
3
p 1
AITAC2iENT A
.y February 7, 1993 - Site Area Emergency "IMI Initial Times:
0723 hrs.
Notification (via regular telephone line) by GPU to Lebanon County EHA i
Communications Center, of S.A.E. at T.M.I.
0724 hrs.
Notification (via tone alert pager) by Lebanon County Communications Center to labanon County EMA Duty Officer (EMA-2] of S. A.E. at T.M.I.
0728 hrs.
Notification (via tone alert pager) by Lebanon County Communications Center to Director [EMA-1] and South Londonderry Township Local EMA Coordinator '[EMA-27]
of S.A.E. at T.M.I.
Authority EMA-2.
0734 hrs.
Phone connection between Lebanon County Com=unications Center with PEMA.
Verification requested by EMA-2 with Steve Vergot, PEMA, of S.A.E. at T.M.I.
Incident verified by PEMA.
0739 hrs.
Confirmation of S. A.E. incident at T.M.I. given to EMA-1 by EMA-2.
Notification to Lebanon County EMA Haz-Mat Team (via tone alert pager) to respond to EOC.
Authority EMA-2.
0745 hrs.
Lebanon County EMA - EOC activated and operational.
j 0800 hrs.
South Londonderry Township EOC to respond.
0830 hrs. South Londonderry Township EOC operational.
=$
l EMA-1 Director Clyde H. Miller EHA-2 Deputy Director Annette M. Smith EMA-27 SouthLondonderryTownshipLocalEM[ Coordinator 4
ATTACHMENT #3 r
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LEBANON COUNTY a
d 4
This is not a word for word representation from the tape.
It captures the high points of notification, termi~nology and times of alerting.
Tape (second source) is available at PEMA for review.
Original tape is being preserved at Lebanon County EMA until released by PEMA.
0721 Hi, this is Randy Campbell at Three Mile Island.
I'm a shift foreman here, at 7:05 this-morning, we declared a Site Area Emergency.
Somebody decided to drive through the North Gate,
... decided to drive through the gate surrounding the fence into our protected area, and after he drove through that, he continued to drive through a big roll-up door.
He is now loose in the plant, everybody and their brother is on the way, the State Police have been notified, Middletown Police, our police force is out, we're still at 100% power, but this guy is out in the plant and we have no idea where he's at at this time...
0724 Lebanon dispatcher pages EMA-2 (Annette Smith).
Got a call from Randy Campbell from TMI, they have an onsite emergency up there at TMI,
...and its not a drill, a guy drove through the fence, the North Gate fence, and into a restricted area and through a f
big garage door there and he's loose on the premises.
They notified the State Police, Middletown Police and they are just advising us and it happened at 0705 this morning and at this time the person's not in custody.
So I don't know what we're supposed to do but...
EMA-2 Well, that a potential sabotage type of situation, now I'll tell you whati I would page Clyde and let him know and I would also page South Londonderry Township local coordinator and let him be aware of it, too...OK...I think that's probably all...it's 1
probably all...OK...
-- ?,
0726 Lebanon dispatcher pages EMA-1 (Clyde Miller) and South
.Londonderry Township Coordinator is instructed to call the base:
0728
...Clyde, we paged Annette and let her know... I got a call from Randy Campbell from up at TMI, he's the shift foreman,. he said that at 0707 this morning they had a, they have a Site Emergency j
and subject drove a vehicle through their main North Gate and fence and inside their restricted area...and drove through a big garage door and he's loose on the premises.
And...I think they're letting us know that...
EMA-1 Site Emergency - did he say site?
Dispatch And the Site Area, and Site Area Emergency.
EMA-1 A Site Area Emergency...
Dispatch Yeah
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ab EMA-1 OK...I wonder if he's on.../
they don't...they can't find him, they don't know.
He said they have the State Police, Middletown Police and their own security personnel at this time searching for the person.
Dispatch OK, you know, the terminology he used to you would be a...I have i
it on the tape.
(Dispatcher plays EMA-1 the tape recorded from TMI, transcribed above at 0721.
After the tape ends, the dispatcher says...That was it.
EMA-1 OK, I'm just going through my mind because the terminology t' hat he gave you, by my rules and regulations, we should start gearing 1
up with EOC staff and everything else.
Because you've got your i
Unusual Event, Alert and Site Area Emergency and General...What did Annette say to you?
Dispatch she said page you and let you know and also page the EMA coordinator from South I.ondonderry Township.
EMA-1 OK, Steve, do me a favor.
Page her and have her call me at 274-2197. Alright, I've got to talk to her because it's not that
' j I want to follow through on this, but I'm afraid if I don't and something goes wrong then I'm gonna...you know what I mean, my head will be on the block.
Dispatch OK.
EMA-1 OK, because if that's the terminology, I gotta follow through unless we can make connection, with some higher authority, that says, hey, we don't have to.
Alright, I'll wait for her, for the call.
t EMA-27 This is South Londonderry Coordinator.
Dispatch Hold on here a second... It 's gonna be a reference to an onsite emergency at TMI.
EMA-27 OK.
Dispatch Apparently, somebody drove through the gate, drove the restricted
=cne gate, and inside some type of garage down there on the site, and running around free inside the building, they haven't-located l
the guy yet.
EMA-27 OK.
Dispatch And they just wanted us to make you aware,... hold ca here...What l
else do you want?
John Wilson ' identified.
Right not they are l,
just basically letting the people in the area know.
i
)
EMA-27 OK.
I 2
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Dispatch At this time that's basically all I have to tell you...
f EMA-27 OK.
Dispatch And Clyde going to check to see what we have to do ourselves.
EMA-27 OK.
I l
Dispatch And if something else comes up, we'll page you and let you know.
0733 Dispatcher patched EMA-2 to EMA-1.
EMA-1 Did you get the terminology that they used?
?
EMA-2 (To dispatcher)
Can you put me through to PEMA live or give me PEMA's number as I have to verify it.
Dispatch OK.
Dispatch OK, York County is going on right and their people are, from what I'm monitoring on the PEHAR's radio, they're going into their EOC, and notifying the people...
j Dispatch Central Area, I have a number for them.
Dispatch You need Harrisburg, state one, OK, I'll put you through for a minute.
EMA-2 OK.
0735 PEMA Operations, Steve Vergot.
EMA-2 Steve, this is Annette... receives authentication.
0740 EMA-2 asks dispatcher to*h&ve hazmat team respond into the EOC.
l 0741 Hazmat team paged.
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' ATTACHMENT #4 f
9
(
EA STAFF NAME/NO.
EMA TELECOMMUNICNIOR NO. 3. Klose 43<
EMERGENCY NOTIFTCATION-REPORT (NOTIFICATICN OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. INCIDENT)
' Rec'd.-07k' h 3
THIS IS A-DRILL XXX THIS IS NOT.A DRILL.
]
')
ATTACTIMENT B f
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1.
Tni:: is:
Randy Cacobell (Shif t Foreman'at "lMI ~
~!
My phone number is:
948-8070' t
5 2.
EMERGINCY CIASSITICATION:
I i
Unusual Event XXX Site Area Emergency Alert s,
General Emergency j
The Event Has Been
^
Terminated AT:
' Time 07:05-Date 02/07/93 t
Escalation THIS REPRESENTS A/AN:
Reduction IN CLASSIFICATION STATUS No Change j
3.
BRIEF NON-TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:
Unauthorized.
Person on pre =ises Subject drove vehicle through a North gate into.
)
o-ected eres 'and throuch a' Roll-uo door.
Subject loose on oremises Still at 100I Power I
1
-i No Airborne Liquid 4.
THERE IS:
Release _
Release.
Release 5.
WHEN GENERAL EMERGINCY IS THE' INITIAL EVENT,-PROVIbE--
PROTECTIVE ACTION (recommendation belowji i
6.
WIND DIRECTION IS FROM:
WIND SPEED IS:
i 1
THIS IS A. DRILL XXX THIS IS NOT A DRILL J
Approved:
/M4 M WMo
/
Time:
Mao Date:
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- l TMI SECURITY BREACH FEBRUARY 7, 1993 i
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l EVENT EOC/EMA EOC/EMA NOTIFIED 0723 0730 i
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ATTACHMENT #6 News Release MNuclean Public Information Services C:ntact: Mary.We1..s j
Release: Immediataly Date: 02/07/93 Time: 8 :20 a.m.
No.1 SIS INFOR.4ATICN CURREN" AS OF: 7:45 a.m.
TMI-1 ::ECT ARES SITE ART.A EMERGENCY
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Middletcwn, PA -- A site area emergency was declared at TMI-1 at 7:05 a.m. this morn ng after an intrtder drove a vehicle through the plant gate and into the. plant's turbine building.
As of 7:45 a.m.
the intruder had not been ' apprehended.
Pennsylvania State Pclice and TMI site protection officers are l
' searching the plant.
3 "he plant is cpezating at 100 percent power.
Federal, state and local efficials h:.ve been notified.
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1 AOWS M,elease k.5:d Nuclear 1
PublicInformation Services
Contact:
Mary Wells Release: Immedietely Date: 02/07/93 Time: 8 :20 a.m.
No.2 THIS INFCRMATION CURRENT AS OF: 9:10 a.m.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY 5TILL IN EFFECT AT TMI-l Middletown, PA
- A site area emergency is still in effect at TMI-l as Pennsylvania State Police Of ficers and TMI site protection officers search the plant for an intruder who breached the plant's protected area at ar >und 7 :05. this morning.
l TMI-l continues to operate at full power.
The plant's vital i
area has been securec.. There h'as been no release of radiation from I
the plant.
The intrtder gained access to the plant's turbine building after driving a stat:on wagon through a fence and a rool-up door.
All non-essenti.t1 plant personnel are being accounted for and will be relocated te a plant office building.
Federal, state ind local officials are being kept notified of the event.
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f GNuclea Public Information Services
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Contact:
Ma:y Wel.s Release: !=mediataly Date: 02/07/93 Time: 11:18 a.m.
No.3 l3 l
THIS INFORFATION CURRENT AS OF: 11:00 a.m.
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INTRUDER APPREHENDED I.iSIDE TMI-l TURBINE BUII. DING Middletown, PA --
Pennsylvania State Police Officers and TMI l
site protection office rs apprehended en intruder inside the TMI-l l
turbine building today at around 11:00 a.m.
Officials are in the O
P=ccese et tate = vie 1=1 the tat =uee=-
TM1-1 15 OperatinJ dL Iull power.
The plant's vital crec wco not penetrated.
There has been no abnormal release of radicactivity from the plant.
The intruder gaiped access to the plant's turbine building after driving a staticn wagon through a fence and a roll-up door earlier this morning.
All plant personnel have been accounted for.
Federal, state anf local officials have been kept notified of the event.
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NEWS MeieaSe Three Mile sland Nuclear Station Post Office Box 480 Public Information Services Middletown, Pa.,
17057 i
Contact:
Mary Wells Release: Immediately Date: February 7,1993 Time: 12:15 p.m.
No. 4 i
THIS INFORMATION IS CURRENT AS OF: 12:15 p.m.
j INTRUDER FOUND UNARMED, OFFICIALS INSPECT PLANT SYSTEMS Middletown, PA -- The Pennsylvania State Police'have confirmed that an intruder into the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating 7
Station turbine building was unarmed.
The St ate Police apprehended the intruder and escorted him off-site at aoout 11 a.m.
Plant officials are conducting a thoro :gh inspection of all plant systems to ensure the intru' der had no impact on the plant.
The intruder was found under the plant's condenser, a non-nuclear i
system in the plant.
1 The State Police are conducting an interrogation of the intruder.
Vital areas of the plant were locked and protected while the intruder was in the plant.
The intruder gained access to the plant's turbine building af ter driving a station wagon through a fence and a roll up door at about 7 a.m. this morning.
The turbine building c3ntains equipment that O
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The plant continued to operate at 100 percent power during the emergency.
The plant continued to operate as a precaution to i
protect the safety of workers who might havi to go.into' the turbine building during a shutdown.
The plant has been in a Site Area Emergency since 7:05 a.m. and will remain in a state of emergency until a complete inspection of the plant is made.
GFU Nui: lear continues to keep federal, s : ate and local of ficials l
infcrmed of the event.
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ea-d a-Pcst Office Box 480 pUh{ CID Ormation $0TVices Middletown, Pa.,
17057
Contact:
Mary Wells Release: Immediately Date: February 7,1993 Time: 2:50 p.m.
No. 5 1
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THIS INFCRMATION IS CURRENT AS OF: 2:40 p.m.
PLANT SYSTEMS INSPECTIONS CONTINUE Middletown, PA Officials at Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station are continuing to test pla.t equipment to ensure it was unaf fected by an intru. der who penetrat4d the plant's turbine building early this morning.
A gate that was damaged when the intruder struck it with his vehicle is being repaired and activated wit? security equipment.
Maintenance staff also are installing a tarr over a large roll-up door that was da= aged.
The door is part ef the plant's turbine building that contains non-nuclear equipment and systems.
An inspection is being performed on equ pment in the turbine building to ensure there was no damage, and : hat systems will work as designed.
State Police have ended a search for any explosives that the intruder may have left inside the plant.
A special K-9 dog force searched the intruder's vehicle and did not c.etect any scent of any 6
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The intruder was taken. into custody ' at about 11 a.m.
by the State Police.
l The plant has continued'to operate at 100 percent power during
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the emergency, without any unusual operating _ conditions.
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The plant will continue in a Site Area Emergency until equipment l
l-inspections are completed.
I GPU Nuclear continues to -keep federal, star.e and local of ficials-l informed of the event.
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NEWS Release Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Pubb. Information Services Post Office Box 480 c
Middletown, Pa.,
17057
Contact:
Marf Wells Release: I==ediately Date: February 7,1992 Time:
4:35 p.m.
No. 6 i
THIS INFCRMATION IS CURRENT AS OF: 4:35 a.m.
J EMERGENCY AT THREE MILE ISLAND ENDS Officials at Three Mile Island Nuclear Middletown, PA
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Generating Station ended a site area emergency at 4:35 p.m. today af ter plant of ficials confirmed that an intn: der in the plant had
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no i= pact en any plant systems.
Pennsyl*$and
- State Police conducted. a Site officials and thorough search of all TMI Unit 1 plant ar2as after the intruder i
I was apprehended.
TMI Unit 2, which is situated nearby and is not in operation, also was checked as a precaution.
The Operations Department, concurrently, conducted extens ve checks on TMI Unit l's plant eculpment.
State and federal of ficials concurred wi-h plant officials that all necessary steps were taken to conclude the emergency.
_lant buildings were opened fu. occess Lo employees at about w
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3:30 p.m.
Other worn was in progress to re, air damage done by the intruder when he crashed his car through a security fence and a 8
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door on the turbine building, where non-nuclear systems _Are_hnused.
The Pennsylvania State Police apprehended the intruder and escorted him off plant property at about 11 a.m.
i Vital a rea.9 of the plant were locked and protected while the l
r intruder was in the plant.
The intruder di:1 not penetrate any of i
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the plant's vital areas but those were thcroughly searched as a precaution.
The intruder gained access te the plantr o turbino building after driving a station wagon through a guard 3d plant entrance, a
1 security fence and a roll up door at about a.m. this morning.
l The plant continued to operate, without incident, at 100 percent power during the emergency.
As a precaution the plant remained at s
power, without shutting down, Lv ps.cLect the saf ety ef worleses who I
would h:vc>-co go into the turbine building 1urt ug a _ sbur.down.
i Federal, state and local officials have 3een notified that the-event has ended.
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1 YORK COUNTY INCIDENT RESPONSE The following information regarding the governmental off-site response to the February 7, 1993 incident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station was derived from a personal interview of Robert Straw, Coordinator, York County Emergency Management Agency, on February 26, 1993.
(see map at Attachment
- 1.)
Mobilization of Emergency Personnel The mobilization sequence was initiated at 0722 hours0.00836 days <br />0.201 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.74721e-4 months <br /> by a phone call
[
from TMI (Dave Wilson, Shift Supervisor) notifying York County EMA that at 0705 hours0.00816 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.682525e-4 months <br /> a Site Emergency (sic) had been declared resulting from an individual driving through the plant's North Gate and entering the protected area (Attachment #2).
Mr. Wilson went on to say that. the intruder was in the turbine building and had not yet been apprehended.
i Since Mr. Wilson had called the county's published' rumor control number and was not using the power plant's dedicated incident notification phone line, the individual answering the call had to transfer it to one of the dispatchers in the York County 911 Center.
York County Dispatcher #9 took-the transferred call.
Mr.
Wilson _ then passed the same notification-f information contained in his previous message (Attachment #3).
Mr. Wilson asked for message recipient identification and Dispatcher #9 complied.
Dispatcher #9 then completed the verification by asking for Mr.. Wilson's name and callback number.
Mr. Wilson passed the requested information and asked if he had in fact been speaking to York County (911).
Dispatcher #9 answered in the affirmative and asked Mr. Wilson if PEMA had been notified.
Mr. Wilson replied that, "We're working down towards PEMA."
Both parties then terminated the call.
It should be noted that the TMI shift supervisor did not follow the format or sequence of the Emergency Notification Report, attached, which is part of Annex E to the Commonwealth Emergency Operations Plan.
Although stated later in the text of the message, the TMI shift supervisor did not begin the notification with, "This is not a drill."
He did not (until prompted to do so by Dispatcher #9) provide his phone number nor did he say that this was an emergency classification.
When the THI supervisor did state the Emergency Classification Level (ECL), he incorrectly identified it as " Site Emergency" rather than the correct " Site Area Emergency."
- Further, he did not indicate whether the classification was an
" Escalation", " Reduction", or "No Change" in classification status.
He did not state whether there had been "No Release", " Airborne Release" or
" Liquid Release".
He did not indicate a wind speed or direction, nor did he end the report with "This is not a drill."
The County 911 Center notified Bob Straw, York County EMC, of the incident at approximately 0725 hours0.00839 days <br />0.201 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.758625e-4 months <br /> (Attachment #4).
Mr. Straw called the State EOC at 0726 hours0.0084 days <br />0.202 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.76243e-4 months <br /> for verification of the incident.
The EOC duty j
officer confirmed the notification and provided amplifying details.
Based upon his assessment of the incident (security breach as opposed to plant safety system failure), Mr. Straw decided to respond with a partial manning of the County EOC.
At approximately 0733 hours0.00848 days <br />0.204 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.789065e-4 months <br />, Mr. Straw called the County 911 Center and instructed the shift supervisor to execute a partial 7-1
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1 calldown cascade of selected county EOC staf f of ficers (Deputy EMC, Rumor Communications Staff Officer, Operations Officer and Radiological "
- Control, Staff Officer).
By 0750, Mr.
Straw had notified all York County-Commissioners.
Mr. Straw arrived at his EOC at approximately 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> and took charge of the emergency response operation.
The York County EOC achieved operational status at 0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br /> with a manning level of ten staff, officers. Remaining staff officers were notified of the incident and given instructions to remain on " phone alert".
Complete EMC staff notification was achieved at approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />.
Realizing that the county primary EBS station used "second team" members on Sunday, Mr. Straw called the station engineer at his home to inform him of the situation.
The engineer graciously agreed to go to the station's broadcast center to standby in the event an EBS broadcast became necessary.
Although he did not mobilize the county Mass Care Staff Officer, Mr. Straw did contact the Emergency Director of the York County Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC).
The Chapter activated its EOC and notified its Shelter Systems Officers in case evacuation became necessary. The Fairview Village Nursing Center was notified at 0911 houro and given instructions to standby for further guidance.
There are no other nursing homes no hospitals in York County located within the 10-mile EPZ of TMI.
Transportation providers and school districts were not notified based upon the EMC's estimate of the situation (Attachment #5).
At 0809 hours0.00936 days <br />0.225 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.078245e-4 months <br />, all municipal EMCs were paged.
By 0840 hours0.00972 days <br />0.233 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.1962e-4 months <br />, all eleven had telephonically responded to the page.
The EMCs were briefed on the current situation and given the option to mobilize their municipal EOC staffs or remain on " County EMA radio standby".
(The latter required the EMCs to monitor their portable EMA radios at home.)
Four of the eleven opted to partially activate their EOCs while the remainder chose the radio standby option. Those individuals received hourly EMA radio updates.
Mr.
Straw directed all risk municipalities to immediately notify their elected officials and police departments.
(A summary of the York County EIS Log is Attachment #6).
Additional Command and Control once activated, the County EOC functioned in a smooth, efficient manner.
Staff members performed their duties according to procedures contained in the County RERP.
Several were not pleased with the format of the recently published county plan.
They stated that the information contained in the section dealing with Site Area Emergencies was sketchy and did not adequately address all required actions.
They suggested that augmentation by position-specific SOPS would enhance operational efficiency. Additionally, the county RO was unable to contact the State RO to get advice regarding the issuing of dosimetry.
While the county eventually received an answer to the question of dosimetry from Maggie
- Reilly, BRP, Mr.
Straw believes that the State RO should have been mobilized early in the incident.
The county exercised the following communications during the conduct of the emergency responses commercial telephone, dedicated telephone line, PEMARS radio, RACES radio, EIS/ECOMM, telephone pager and facsimile machine. All systems operated reliably and allowed the York County EMA to communicate with state, support county, and municipal staffs as well as 7-2
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with county staff members.
The A/N system was not activated, based upon guidance from PEMA.
When asked if he had considered a unilateral activation of the York County A/N system, Mr. Straw stated that the thought had crossed his mind initially but he had not done so, because of the PEMA policy for coordinating the use of sirens and EBS during nuclear power plant incidents. Mr. Straw added that he did not bring the subject up during i
conversations with the county commissioners.
4 The county rumor control cell was activated and became operational at 0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br />.
From the onset of the incident, rumor control traffic was quite heavy.
The volume of traffic continued to increase until it peaked at approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />. The EMC found that the current staffing level did not support the load placed on the rumor control function.
As a result, Mr. Straw augmented the staff with personnel from the 911 center.
j On the negative side, the rumor control staff received numerous calls from residents complaining of the lack of information ~(specifically EBS) from the county.
Many expressed their outrage at having to receive information from the broadcast media.
Mr. Straw believes that public confidence in the County EMA has been eroded somewhat.
Mr. Straw also stated that the rumor control staff was forced to rely upon utility news releases since there was a dearth of preso information provided by the State.
The EMC considers the emergency information (media) aspect of the response effort to have been the weakest.
Mr. Straw stated that the lack of press releases from the State had a most deleterious impact upon county media operations. While the utility generated a total of six news releases during the incident, PEMA only produced two (one of which was a wrap-up news release that came at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />). Besides the obvious negative impact upon the rumor control function, county media operations were hamstrung and initially could not follow the practice of conducting media briefings every thirty minutes, because there were no state-approved news releases upon which to base the briefings.
Upon realizing that news releases from the State were not forthcoming, Mr. Straw made the decision to use utility news releases and operational messages in their stead.
The obvious pitfalls of such action became painfully clear during the incident in which Mr. Straw was quoted by UPI regarding verification of the identity confirmation of the intruder.
Mr. Straw defends his actions by stating that he was under incredible pressure by the public and news media to provide information.
He stated that the media was well-informed on the incident and related I
response by means of radio scanners.
When an event or its outcome was broadcast over the airwaves, members of the media would call the County EOC and ask for verification. Realizing there was little in the way of press information forthcoming from the
- State, Mr.
Straw used operational information to fill the void.
Relationship to Biennial Exercises A review of the 1989 report of the federally-evaluated bleunial exercise showed a good performance in the exercise objectives that applied to the county in this incident. The objectives reviewed were: 1) aoility to monitor, understand, and use emergency classification levels; 2) ability to alert, mobilize, and activate personnel; 3) ability to coordinate and 7-3
I control emergency activities; 4) ability to communicate with appropriate,
organizations; and, 15) ability to establish and operate a rumor control center.
All five of the above objectives were graded as adequate by the federal evaluators.
Objective 12 (EBS) was also examined because of Communications implication, even though the EBS was not used during the j
incident.
The federal evaluators judged the demonstration to be adequate.
The 1989 exercise showed a good performance in these aspects which correlated with the performance in the February 7 TMI incident.
A review of the 1991 report of the federally evaluated exercise showed a good performance in the same objectives (1 through 4 and 15).
Each of the objectives demonstrated by the county were graded as adequately demonstrated.
Objective 12 (EBS) was also examined because of communications implications.
The federal evaluators judged the i
demonstration to be adequate.
There were eight issues identified at the municipal level concerning objectives 1,
2 and 4.
The two issues with Objective 1 concerned Fairview Township and their failure to both verify and post emergency classification levels.
The three issues with objective 2 concerned manning shortages in three different municipalities.
The three issues with objective four were communication problems, one transmission difficulty due to an antennae problem, 2 shortages of RACES operators and two malfunctioning pagers in one township.
None of these issues are considered to be a trend in light of occurrences during the TMI incident.
I County Comments The county plan needs to be revised to include comprehensive, bullet-type checklists.
When a SAE is declared (regardless of the initiating event), the A/N system should be activated to inform the public of the situation.
During radiological events, the State RO should be mobilized in the first calldown.
In any incident of this type, early and responsive public information support at the State level is essential to the effective management of the emergency. This will help to ensure that the Commonwealth and its counties are speaking as one voice.
PEMA Recommendations All notifications (both initial and subsequent) should be made using the proper procedures and format.
The decision of the York County EMC not to bring all risk municipalities to an operational status was ill advised.
Plans and regulations call for EOC mobilization for a SAE.
When the State and risk county EOCs are activated, PEMA should dispatch a LNO to the risk county EOC, if possibls,-to assist the information flow to and from the emergency management coordinator.
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1 The State RO responsible for advising county Ros, should be called in when an event initiates at ALERT or higher.
The potential for the event to become " radiological" should not be discounted.
Further, the counties (according to plan) will issue dosimetry at SAE.
PEMA has now included this action in the State EOC Standing Operating Procedure (SOP).
The State concurs that more public information is better for all concerned. However, knowledgeable public information officers are key to the activity.
The 1991 layoff of PEMA staff, to include Pios, should be addressed by the State and utilities.
These positions should be restored.
State law (Title 35, Chapter 7320) requires adequate public information staff for radiological incidents.
Other sections o t' Title 35 require adequate technical. and professional-staffing to carry out missions assigned to the agency.
The advent of additional missions in public information from new federal and State laws and federal regulations nakes this a key state shortfall.
The j
available State staff performed well.
York county did not mobilize fully the county staff as required for a SAE per the plan and regulatory requirement.
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Other than where specifically noted,'the York County EMC and mobilized staff carried out specific functions offactively.
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ATTACHMENT ' #3-ATTAC903T y APPDIDIX 2
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NOTITICATION OF A '
NUCilAR PC'wTR PLWT INCIDENT '
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION REPORT i
lI This is a Drill, 121 This' is not a Orill i
1.
This is: o mc D Wrtso />
at T P~[
My phone number i.s: C N T - T Ot'a9 2.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
r 11 Unusual Event 12 Site Area Emergency 11 Alert l'1 General Emergency 1-l The Event has been Terminated AT:
TIME:
0 7 CL K DATE: 4/7/09 i
t 11 Escalation THIS REPRESENTS A/AN:
l-l Reduction IN CLASSIFICATION STATUS:
1-l No Change 3.
BRIEF NON-TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:
Sun 3Ecv c AsnE ia pu n,p1wGA7r a,un n A L. V N: A4 r+f3pMO 9(Pint /VfM.
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THERE IS:
12 1 No Release 1-l Airborne Release 1-l Liquid Release 5.
WHEN GENERAL EMERGENCY IS THE INITIAL EVENT, PROVIDE PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION BELOW:
4 6.
WIND DIRECTICH IS FROM:
WIND SPEED IS:
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l1 This is a Drill l~1 This is not a Ort 11 APPROVED:
TIME:
DATE:
j
ATTACHMENT #4
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YORK COUNTY l
MOBILIZATION CF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER 0725 EMC notified of incident at TMI.
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0726 EMC calls State EOC for incident verification.
0733 EMC directs York County 911 Center to begin partial calldown cascade.
0750 EMC notifies county commissioners.
0800 EMC arrives at County EOC.
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0809 Municipal EMCo paged.
0815 York County EOC operational (ten staff officers present) 0831 York County Red Cross Chapter notified.
0900 York County EMA achieves 100% staff notification.
0911 Fairview Village Nursing Center notified.
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1700 York County deactivates.
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ATTACHMENT #5 t.
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YORK COUNE MUNICIPAL NOTIFICATICN.". ATRIX FEBRUARY 7, 1993 I
NOTIFIED /
MUNICIPALITY RESPONDED OPERATIONAL MOBILIZIED Conewago Township 0809/0814 N/A N/A Dover Township 0809/0811 N/A N/A 1
East Manchester Township 0809/0819 N/A N/A Fairview Township 0809/0810 N/A N/A coldsboro Borough 0809/0812 0836 N/A Hellam Township 0809/0828 N/A N/A l
Lewisberry Borough 0809/0816 0904 N/A Manchester Township 0809/0832 0909 N/A Mount Wolf Borough 0809/0811 N/A N/A Newberry Township 0809/0826 0856 N/A springettsbury Township 0809/0839 N/A N/A Warrington Township 0809/08I0' N/A N/A York Haven Borough 0809/0822 N/A N/A i
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16:26 2/07/93 York County Emsrg:ncy Mnnagement i'#
EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM E v e n t-N u m b e r : 3338
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EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 1 3338a 11:05 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 0725-TMI CONTROL NOTIFIED YORK EOC THAT AT APPROXIMATELY 0705 THIS MORNING AN INTRUDER HAD ENTERED l THE PLANT BY THE NORTH GATE, CRASHING THROUGH TWO GATES IN A PRIVATE AUTOMOBILE. THE PLANT HAS DECLAIRED AN ON SITE EMERGENCY ALTHOUGH THE PLANT ITSELF IS STABLE. PSP t
IS ON THE SCENE AND IS SEARCHING FOR THE INTRUDER ALONG WITH PLANT SECURITY.
0726-YORK COUNTY EMA REQUESTED VERIFICATION OF STATUS 0730- CALLED KAY, OF SITE AREA EMERGENCY AT TMI. YORK COUNTY WILL BE AT PHIL, SCOTT, IDA, LEAST PARTIALLY MANNING THEIR EOC.
BARRE, PAT.
l 0727-LANCASTER COUNTY EMA ADVISED THAT THEY WERE PARTIALLY ACTIVATING THEIR EOC.
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2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 16: 46 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS f
1 3338a 11:05 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 0729-PSP NOTIFIED BY STATE EOC. PSP ADVISED THAT TROOP H HAD BEEN NOTIFIED AND WAS PARTICIPATING IN SEARCH FOR INTRUDER.
0742-PEMA PRESS SECRETARY NOTIFIED.
0743-STATE EOC CONTACTED TMI WHO VERIFIED THAT INTRUDER HAD NOT BEEN APPREHENDED AS OF 0739. INTRUDER IS BELEIVED TO BE-SOMEWHERE IN VICINITY OF TURBINE BUILDING.
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2/07/93 York County Emargency Management 16:26,e EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event,Numberi 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 2 3338b 11:21 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA DIRECTOR 800 REPORTED THAT HE AND CLERICAL STAFF ARE EN ROUTE TO STATE EOC. PEMA DIRECTOR NOTIFIED. PEMA DIREF JR NOTIFIED LT. GOVERNOR.
0750- ALL 07.
PSP REPORTED TROOP H ON SITE AT TMI. PSP EPLO EN COMMISSIONERS WERE NOTIFIED.
ROUTE TO STATE EOC.
0834-RISK COUNTIES NOTIFIED OVER DEDICATED LINE.
0755-EBS WAS PUT ON ALERT.
0840- PEMA DIRECTOR BRIEFED LT. GOVERNOR AND GOVERNOR ON CURRENT SITUATION AT TMI. THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC 08 0 9-LOCAL EMC ' S
ANNOUNCEMENT AT THIS TIME. THEY WILL CONFERENCE IN 1/2 PAGED.
HOUR (0930). REQUEST PSP HELICOPTER FOR LT. GOVERNOR FOR 0840- ALL LOCAL FLIGHT FROM JOHNSTOWN.
EMC'S CALLED.
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16:26 2/07/93 York County Emergency Management EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 2 3338b 11:21 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 0842-RISK COUNTIES UPDATED OVER DEDICATED LINE.
0900- ALL COUNTY 0851-DER EPLO NOTIFIED OF INCIDENT, WAS PREVIOUSLY EOC STAFF I
NOTIFIED BY BRP EPLO. DER EPLO NOTIFIED DER SECRETARY PERSONNEL WERE AT 0745. PSP NOTIFIED FEMA NATIONAL OF THE TMI SITE AREA ALERTED.
EMERGENCY; HE WILL NOTIFY FEMA REGION III. PSP UNIFORMED PERSONNEL AND PERSONNEL IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES ARE ON THE SCENE. SENSING DEVICES ON FENCE LINE DO NOT SHOW ANYONE LEAVING TMI COMPOUND.
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16:27 York County Emcrgency Mnnngem:nt 2/07/93 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM' Event Number: 3338 STATUS
'i EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION 3 3338c 11:38 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 0857-ARMY EOD, INDIANTOWN GAP, HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO REPORT TO SITE.
0858-PEMA REQUESTED HELICOPTER FROM PSP TO TRANSPORT LT. GOVERNOR FROM JOHNSTOWN TO HARRISBURG.
0905-ALL MUNICIPALITIES IN THE EPZ ARE MANNED, DECON RED CROSS, RACES OPERATORS ARE IN PLACE. TLD'S
- TEAMS, AND KI DELIVERED TO ELIZABETHTOWN EOC.
0936-PEMA DIRECTOR UPDATED GOVERNOR. GOVERNOR REQUESTED A CONFERENCE CALL IN 1/2 HOUR.
1000- PSP UPDATED THAT INFORMATION ON THE INTRUDER, pat WAS PIERCE NYE, A WHITE MALE AGE 31 FROM BETHEL, of 17 [PgUp/Dn), [S]ummary, #[F]ull screen, [T] ext, [E]comm, [M]ap:
16:27 York County Emergency Management 2/07/93 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 3 3338c 11:38 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA RELEASED FROM EPHRATA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL ON 1-17-93.
1003-PEMA PERSONNEL DISPATCHED TO TMI PRESS CENTER.
1007-DER EPLO AT STATE EOC. FBI ADVISES ONE PERSON ENROUTE TO THE INCIDENT SITE AND ONE' PERSON TO STATE EOC.
1012-RED CROSS EPLO AT STATE EOC.
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2/07/93 York County Emergency Mansgam2nt 16:273-EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 4 3338d 11:50 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 1014-DMA EPLO AT STATE EOC. LT. GOV'S PRESS SECRETARY NOTIFIED TO REPORT TO THE STATE EOC.
l 1026-JIM BROWN, GOV'S CHIEF OF STAFF, WAS BRIEFED BY THE PEMA DIRECTOR.
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1036-PEMA EOF LIAISON REPORTS THAT INTRUDER HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF TMI. CURRENTLY A RESIDENT OF BERKS COUNTY.
1045-TMI, GEORGE GIANGI, REPORTS THAT THE VEHICLE IS BEING REMOVED FROM THE SCENE. PACKAGE IS IN THE VEHICLE ON THE PLANT SITE.
1048-PEMA DIRECTOR UPDATED BY THE GOVERNOR.
7 of 17 [PgUp/Dn), [Sjummary, #[F)ull screen, [T] ext, [E)comm, [M]ap:
2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 16:27 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 4 3338d 11:50 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 1049-NRC REPORTS THAT VEHICLE IS A 1984 PLYMOUTH REGISTERED TO A WOMAN FROM BERKS COUNTY. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE WOMAN HAS A SON WHO WAS RELEASED FROM A MENTAL INSTITUTION ON OR AROUND JANUARY 17 AND IS CONSIDERED TO BE A VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL. FBI REPORTED THAT THERE ARE SOME WIRES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PACKAGE. THE STATE POLTCE ARE IN CHARGE. VIOLATIONS ARE STATE NOT FEDERAL.
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$ 2/07/93 York County Emergency Managemant 16: 27 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 Lj EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 5 3338e 12:03 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 1050- PENNDDT REPORTS NO AIR RESTRICTIONS REQUESTED AT THIS TIME.
1100- PEMA LIASON REPORTS THAT INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN TAKEN 1155-NOTIFIED BY INTO CUSTODY. PSP CONFIRMED THIS REPORT.
PEMA TO BEGIN PHASE DOWN OF EOC 1106-PEMA LIAISON AT TMI EOF CONFIRMED APPREHENSION OF STAFF.
SUSPECT AND FURTHER ADVISED THAT CONTENTS OF THE PACKAGE IN THE CAR CONTAINED CLOTHING.
1205-LOCAL EOC'S AND HOSPITALS 1107-ALL RISK COUNTIES NOTIFIED THAT INTRUDER HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF APPREHENDED. COUNTIES ADVISED NOT TO RELEASE INTRUDER'S DE-ESCALLATION.
NAME. PUC EPLO AT STATE EOC.
1110- PEMA OPERATIONS DIRECTOR CALLED NRC FOR 9 of 17 [PgUp/Dn), [S]ummary, #[F]ull screen, [T] ext, [Ejcomm, [Mjap*
2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 16:27 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 5 3338e 12:03 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA INFORMATION. UNABLE AT THIS TIME TO CONFIRM THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS APPREHENDED WAS THE DRIVER OF THE CAR. NRC CONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE PACKAGE CONTAINED CLOTHING.
1114-PEMA LIAISON AT EOF COULD NOT ASCERTAIN WHETHER SHOTS HAD BEEN FIRED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE APPREHENSION.
1120- NRC CONFIRMED THAT VEHICLE HAS BEEN MOVED TO
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2/07/93 York County Emargency Management 16:28 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 6 3338f 13:58 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA OUTSIDE OF THE PROTECTED AREA.
1122-PEMA EOF LIAISON REPORTED THAT OFFICIALS WILL REMAIN AT CURRENT EAL UNTIL A SECURITY REVIEW HAS BEEN COMPLETED.
1123-LT. GOVERNOR UP-DATED BY PEMA DIRECTOR. LT.
GOVERNOR IS CURRENTLY IN NEW CUMBERLAND AND IS DUE TO ARRIVE AT THE STATE EOC IN 15 MINUTES.
1124-NRC REPORTS THAT FBI HAS CONFIRMED THE DRIVER OF THE CAR HAS BEEN UNDER A MENTAL HEALTH REVIEW PREVIOUSLY. HE IS CURRENTLY IN A CONFUSED STATE OF MIND.
1126-JOE.ZAGONE, FEMA REGION III, REPORTS FEMA'S 11 of 17 [PgUp/Dn), [S]ummary, #[F]ull screen, [T] ext, [E]comm, [M]ap:
2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 16:28 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 6 3338f 13:58 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA i
REGIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER IS MOBILIZED. THE STATE EOC l
UP-DATED MR. ZAGONE.
}
1135-LT. GOVERNOR ARRIVED AT STATE EOC.
1140- GOVERNOR'S PRESS SECRETARY, VINCE CAROCCI, ARRIVED AT THE STATE EOC.
1143-PSP CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NO STRUGGLE INVOLVED IN THE APPREHENSION OF THE INDIVIDUAL. PSP CONFIRMS THEY 7 3338g 14:22 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA i
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SITE AREA ARE IN CHARGE OF THE INTERROGATION.
1145-PEMA CENTRAL AREA DIRECTOR NOTIFIED THE STATE EOC THAT A BOMB SEARCH WAS BEING CONDUCTED AT THE SITE.
CONFERENCE BETWEEN LT. GOVERNOR, GOVERNOR'S PRESS OFFICE, AND PEMA DIRECTOR TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC INFORMATION. PEMA TO REPRESENT STATE AT ON-SITE PRESS CONFERENCE. LT. GOVERNOR STANDING BY IN OPERATIONS CENTER.
i 1228-PEMA DIRECTOR REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM GEORGE GIANGI, TMI. MR. GIANGI ADVISED THE PLANT IS BEING CHECKED FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE INTRUDER. DAMAGE IS BELIEVED TO BE MINIMAL OR NONE. A COMPUTER CHECK IS BEING CONDUCTED TO VERIFY THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE 13 of 17 [PgUp/Dn], [S]ummary, f[F]ull screen, [T] ext, [E]comm, [M]ap:
l 2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 16:28 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 8 3338h 14:24 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA INTRUDER BEFORE APPREHENSION. GIANGI ADVISED THAT THE TMI EOF AND PLANT WILL REMAIN STAFFED TO ENSURE PLANT SECURITY.
1238-LT. GOVERNOR SINGEL AND PEMA'S DIRECTOR AND PRESS l
SECRETARY EN ROUTE TO PRESS CONFERENCE AT TMI BEING I
CONDUCTED AT 1330 HRS.
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2/07/93 York County Emargency Managsmant 16:28 '
EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 9 33381 16:06 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA i
1243-PSP REPORTS A SEARCH IS BEING CONDUCTED OF THE E
SITE BY PSP STRATEGIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM AND TMI SITE SECURITY. SUSPECT HAS BEEN TRANSPORTED TO TROOP H HEADQUARTERS.
1250- PEMA DIRECTOR (EN ROUTE TO PRESS BRIEFING) WAS BRIEFED BY PEMA LIAISON AT THE PLANT AND DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS. NO DAMAGE HAS BEEN FOUND AND IT APPEARS THAT THE INTRUDER DID NOT ENTER ANY VITAL SAFETY AREAS. THE IN".dU. DER'S CAR WAS DRIVEN INTO THE FIRST FLOOR OF THE TURBINE BUILDING; HOWEVER, THE TURBINE IS ON THE FOURTH FLOOR. DISTANCE BETWEEN THE GATE AND THE TURBINE BUILDING IS 1/4 TO 1/2 MILE..THE TURBINE BUILDING IS SEPERATED FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE PLANT BY THICK WALLS AND SECURITY DOORS.
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l 2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 16:28 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 9 33381 16:06 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 1334-BRP REPORTS THAT GPU MONITORED THE INTRUDER'S VEHICLE AND THE DETENTION ROOM WHERE THE SUSPECT WAS HELD BEFORE BEING TRANSPORTED TO TROOP H.
l 1418-SUSPECT WAS MONITORED BY PSP AND GPU PERSONNEL WITH NO CONTAMINATION DETECTED.
1420- PEMA TMI LIAISON REPORTED ON-SITE SEARCH FOR POSSIBLE BOMB HAS BEEN TERMINATED; DOGS FOUND NO l
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11'd W101 "2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 16:29 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 10 3338j 16:21 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA EVIDENCE OF A BOMB.
1423-PEMA DIRECTOR BRIEFED DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AFTER PRESS CONFERENCE. LT. GOVERNOR SINGEL IS PRESENTLY ANSWERING PRESS QUESTIONS. SUSPECT HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AT LEAST FOUR COUNTS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY AND WILL BE ARRAIGNED LATER TODAY. PEMA DIRECTOR AND PRESS SECRETARY WILL RETURN TO THE STATE EOC IN APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES.
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A 2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 17:13 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS 11 3338k 17:00 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA.
1451-LT. GOVERNOR AND PEMA DIRECTOR BRIEFED THE GOVERNOR ON THE SITUATION. PSP HAVE THE SITUATION WELL i
IN HAND. THE STATE AND RISK COUNTY EOC'S WILL REMAIN PARTIALLY MANNED. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE THERE WILL BE A SWEEP OF THE ENTIRE ISLAND. THE SITUATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE MONITORED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY. THE SUSPECT REPORTEDLY WAS ABLE TO GAIN ACCESS THROUGH THE GATES DUE TO A SHIFT CHANGE THAT WAS UNDER WAY AT THE TIME. NRC OFFICIALS WILL BE WORKING THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND TOMORROW REGARDING SECURITY ISSUES / REGULATIONS. THERE IS A' GREAT DEAL OF MEDIA i
INTEREST IN THIS INCIDENT.
1522-LT. GOVERNOR DEPARTED THE STATE EOC.
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4 2/07/93 York County Emergency Management 17:13 EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEM
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Event Number: 3338 EVENT TIME SUBJECT LOCATION STATUS
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11 3338k 17:00 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.~
SITE AREA 1545-STATE EOC UPDATED FEMA REGION III. A SEARCH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 HAS BEEN COMPLETED. TMI WILL CONTINUE WITH A MORE THOROUGH SEARCH OF THE ENTIRE PLANT.
1555-STATE EOC UP-DATED NRC. NRC INFORMED PEMA TRAT UNITS 1 AND 2 AND THE MORE PROTECTED AREA HAVE BEEN CLEARED. CONTINUING WITH A MORE THOROUGH SEARCH OF THE
~i PLANT.
1635-TMI CALLED TO TERMINATE INCIDENT.
12 33381 17:12 SECURITY BREECH MIDDLETOWN, PA.
SITE AREA 1642-PEMA CONFIRMED TERMINATION.
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s SECTION 8 BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION INCIDENT RESPONSE r
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1 February 9, 1993 l
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Subject:
Notes on the TMI Site Area Emergency j
of February 7, 1993 To:
William P.
Dornsife, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection From:
Margaret A. Reilly, Chief Division of Environmental Radiation On February 7, 1993 at 07:35 I was' contacted by Bill Biegen, the PEMA watch officer, regarding the declaration of a Site Area Emergency at Three Mile Island Unit 1.
The basis for the declaration was the intrusion of the facility by an unidentified individual.
I contacted Rich Janati of Nuclear Safety, who called the control room directly.
At 07:50, Janati called back, after having contacted Randy Campbell of TMI.
At about 07:00, the intruder drove past the North Gate, through a chain link truck gate in the security l
fence, and through a metal rollup door on the turbine building.
He remained at large.
The turbine building is in l
the protected area.
Concern was expressed, however, that the intruder might penetrate a vital area.
1 The description of the situation was passed back to PEMA.
I contacted Charles High, Barbara Conrad and Deputy Secretary Cowan.
Conrad contacted Kopenhaver and Beaver.
Janati went
]
to the site.
NOTE:
With respect to safeguards and security, the site falls j
l into three classes of areas; industrial, protected and vital.
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Each class has distinct levels of security.
l 1.
The industrial class is controlled much like any l
Industrial site, e.g identification at a guard shack.
This area continues from the outside world up to the security fence.
2.
The protected area includes everything inside the security fence.
Normally, to gain access to the protected area, one in required to go through personal search procedures including metal and explosives detectors and a pat-down.
3.
The vital area includes special places in the protected area that require extra security.
Included, for example, are the reactor building, the control room, and the emergency diesel generators.
Access to these areas requires controlled electronic access cards.
GPUN's first press release was timed at 08:20.
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.r I arrived at the PEMA EOC around 08:35.
Brookhaven was notified at 08:50.
Charles Flood returned my call at 08:58.
At 09:02 I called NRC Region 1 and got the answering machine.
At 09:04 I called NRC Incident Response. Center and was patched to Bill Kane in the Region.
At that point the Region was lining up potential support personnel, and had no plans to send additional staff to the site.
Their resident inspector, Skip Young, was at the site.
Janati arrived at the site around 08:45, and went under armed guard to the control room, following processing.
About 09:00 I called the control room to inquire about Janati's arrival; talked with Henry Shipman, Director of Site Operations; he had seen Rich.
At 09:20 Janati called to describe the intruder as a white male, 25-30 years of age, with long hair, seems to know the site, driving a Dodge K-car station wagon.
At 09:35 Tod Fish, NRC Region 1, called to indicate that the FBI was dispatched to the site.
At 09:45 Janati called to indicate the major concern that a' package in the car was of unknown contents, maybe a bomb.
At 10:05 Janati called to indicate that a bomb squad was ?
being called to extract the car and its unknown contents from the turbine building.
The car gained about a 50 foot penetration into the building.
He further indicated that the licensee was sure that the intruder did not access a vital area.
Janati sent Bob Barkanic to the EOF with arrival around 10:00.
Barbara Conrad volunteered to help out at the EOC and arrived around 10:10.
Somewhere in this time frame, ?.he Governor / Governor's Chief of Staff (Brown) expressed concern as to why the reactor was not shut down in light of the security breach, with the risk of a bomb in the turbine building.
I indicated to him by phone, that the outcome if a bomb were detonated would not depend heavily on the power level of the reactor.
Also, a planned shutdown requires stationing personnel out and around the plant to monitor the process; that this was not attractive due to the possibility of the intruder being armed.
I indicated that the decision to continue at 100% power was supported by NRC.
Mr. Brown did not seem convinced.
At 10:30, Janati indicated that the fire brigade was beginning the extraction of the car from the turbine building.
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At 10:40 LaFleur contacted George Giangi about the bomb f
problem.
Giangi indicated that they were 75% sure that the package was not a bomb.
1 Soon after 11:00 Janati indicated that they caught the guy at l
10:58.
He was in his underwear under a grate in a compartment ~
near the condensers.
A sweep of the site for possible additional intruders and/or bombs was conducted including PSP and others.
Unit l' sweep was completed by 15:20.
Unit 2 sweep ended prior to event i
termination at 16:25-t
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4 ADDITIONAL RELEVANT BRP COMMENTS 8
i DECLARATION OFTHE SITE AR'EA EMERGENCY
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The licensee's decision to declare the Site Area Emergenc TMI procedure EPIP-TMI.01, " Emergency Classifications,y was in accordanc and TMI Emergency Action Level (EAL) S-3.1, " Security Threat.' This decision was appropriate at the time since the whereabouts of the intruder and his capability to threaten the Vital Areas were unknown.
CONTINUED PLANT OPERATION The licensee's decision to maintain the plant at full power throughout the event was in accordance with the TMI emergency procedure (EP-1202-13). This procedure allows the plant operations to continue unless instability is detected. No instability was detected and no plant transients occurred during this event. No plant systems were disturbed, and the systems required for safe shutdown remained secure within the Vital Areas. Additionally, to shutdown the plant or to initiate a power reduction would normally require several plant operators to be dispatched to the various locations within the plant including the Turbine Building, where the intruder was located. Considering the security nature of this event, pcsitioning the operators in these locations would have been very risky. Therefore, we concur with NRC that the licensee's decision not to initiate a reactor trip or a power reduction was appropriate for this event.
SECURITY AREAS ATTMl With respect to the security and safeguards, the NRC requirements and the TMl site fall into three areas:
Owner Controlled Area (OCA)- That is the largest part of the Island and includes everything inside the perimeter fence up to the Protected Area fence. In this area are buildings typical of any industrial site, such as warehouses and office buildings. The security checkpoint at the North Gate is not required by the federal regulatory requirements. In this event, the extra security officer at the North Gate provided early and immediate notification of the intruder to the security guards on the Island.
Protected Area (PA)- Within the OCA is the second security area called the Protected Area. The Protected Area is fenced and gated and incorporates sophisticated intrusion detection devices, but it is not an intrusion prevention system. Normal entry into this through a metal detector, an explosive detector and a radiatio The Protected Areas contain much of the non-nuclear side of the plant such as the Turbine Building, which contains equipment similar to that at a non-nuclear facility. it is into this building that the intruder drove his car.
Vital Area (VA)-Inside the Protected Areas are the Vital Areas of the plant. The Vital Areas contain equipment, systems, devices, nuclear materials, the failure, destruction or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. The Vital Areas have an added sophisticated level of intrusion prevention. These areas are within heavily reinforced concrete walls and bulletproof doors which are accessed by specially designed key carc;s or by spec During the February 7,1993, security event, the TMI Security s highest priority was to ensure the security of these Vital Areas.
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February 9, 1993
Subject:
Notes on the TMI Site Area Emergency of February-7, 1993 To:
William P. Dornsife, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection I
From:
Margaret A. Reilly, Chief Division of Environmental Radiation On February 7, 1993 at 07:35 I was contacted by Bill Biegen, the PEMA watch officer, regarding the declaration of a Site Area Emergency at Three Mile Island Unit 1.
The basis for the declaration was the intrusion of the facility by an unidentified individual.
I contacted Rich Janati of Nuclear Safety, who called the control room directly.
At 07:50, Janati called back, after having contacted Randy Campbell of TMI.
At about 07:00, the intruder drove past the North Gate, through a chain link truck-gate in the security fence, and through a metal rollup door on the turbine building.
He remained at large.
The turbine building is in l
the protected area.
Concern was expressed, however, that the intruder might penetrate a vital area.
l The description of the situation was passed back to PEMA.
I contacted Charles High, Barbara Conrad and Deputy Secretary Cowan.
Conrad contacted Kopenhaver and Beaver.
Janati went to the site.
NOTE:
With respect to safeguards and security, the site falls into three classes of areas; industrial, protected and vital.
Each class has distinct levels of security.
j l.
The industrial class is controlled much like any i
industrial site, e.g identification at a guard shack.
This area continues from the outside world up to the security fence.
2.
The protected area includes everything inside the l
security fence.
Normally, to gain access to the protected area, one is required to go through personal search procedures including metal and explosives detectors and a pat-down.
3.
The vital area includes special places in the e
protected area that require extra security.
Included, for example, are the reactor building, the control room, and the emergency diesel generators.
Access to these areas requires controlled electronic access cards.
GPUN's first press release was timed at 08:20.
8-2 1
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I-i I arrived at the PEMA EOC around 08:35.
Brookhaven.was notified at 08:50.
Charles Flood returned my call at 08:58.
At 09:02 I called NRC Region 1 and got the answering machine.
At 09:04 I called NRC Incident Response Center and was' patched to Bill Kane in the Region.
At that point the Region was t
l lining up potential support personnel, and had no plans to i
send additional staff to the site.
Their resident inspector, Skip Young, was at the site.
Janati arrived at the site around 08:45, and went under armed i
guard to the control room, following processing.
About 09:00 I called the control room to inquire about Janati's arrival; talked with Henry Shipman, Director of Site Operations; he had seen Rich.
At 09:20 Janati called to describe the intruder as a white male, 25-30 years of age, with long hair, seems to know the site, driving a Dodge K-car station wagon.
At 09:35 Tod Fish, NRC Region 1, called to indicate that the FBI was dispatched to the site.
j At 09:45 Janati called to indicate the major concern that a' l
package in the car was of unknown contents, maybe a bomb.
i t
At 10:05 Janati called to indicate that a bomb squad was ?
l being called to extract the car and its unknown contents from i
l the turbine building.
The car gained about a 50 foot penetration into the building.
He further indicated that the I
licensee was sure that the intruder did not access a vital area.
i Janati sent Bob Barkanic to the EOF with arrival around 10:00.
i Barbara Conrad volunteered to help out at the EOC and arrived i
around 10:10.
l
.i Somewhere in this time frame, the Governor / Governor's Chief of Staff (Brown) expressed concern as to why the reactor was not shut down in light of the security breach, with the risk of a l
bomb in the turbine building.
I indicated to him by phone, that the outcome if a bomb were detonated would not depend heavily on the power level of the reactor.
Also, a planned shutdown requires stationing personnel out and around the plant to monitor the process; that this was not attractiveLdue to the possibility of the intruder being armed.
I indicated that the decision to continue at 100% power was supported by NRC.
Mr. Brown did not seem convinced.
At 10:30, Janati indicated that the fire brigade'was beginning the extraction of the car from the turbine building.
8-3
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At 10:40 LaFleur contacted George Giangi about the bomb problem.
Giangi indicated that they were 75% sure that the package was not a bomb.
Soon after 11:00 Janati indicated that they caught the guy at 10:58.
He was in his underwear under a grate in a compartment near the conc'ensers.
A sweep of the site for possible additional intruders and/or bombs was co1 ducted including PSP and others.
Unit 1 sweep was completr,d by 15: 20.
Unit 2 sweep ended prior to event terminatior. at 16:25
}
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ADDITIONAL RELEVANT BRP COMMEMTS i
DECLARATION OFTHE SITE AR'EA EMERGENCY The licensee's decision to declare the Site Area Emergenc TMI procedure EPIP-TMI.01, " Emergency Classifications,y was in accorda and TMI Emergency Action Level (EAL) 5-3.1, " Security Threat.' This decision was appropriate at the time since the whereabouts of the intruder and his capability to threaten the Vital Areas were unknown.
CONTINUED PLANT OPERATION The licensee's decision to maintain the plant at full power throughout the event was in accordance with the TM) emergency procedure (EP-1202-13). This procedure allows 1
the plant operations to continue unless instability is detected. No instability was detected and no plant transients occurred during this event. No plant systems were disturbed, and the systems required for safe shutdown remained secure within the Vital Areas. Additionally, to shutdown the plant or to initiate a power reduction would normally require several plant operators to be dispatched to the various locations within the plant including the Turbine Building, where the intruder was located. Considering the security nature of this event, positioning the operators in these locations would have been very risky. Therefore, we concur with NRC that the licensee's decision not to initiate a reactor trip or a power reduction was appropriate for this event.
SECURITY AREAS ATTMI With respect to the security and safeguards, the NRC requirements and the TMI site fall mto three areas:
Owner Controlled Area (OCA)- That is the largest part of the Island and includes everything inside the perimeter fence up to the Protected Area fence. In this area are buildings typical of any industrial site, such as warehouses and office buildings. The security checkpoint at the North Gate is not required by the federal regulatory requirements. In this event, the extra security officer at the North Gate provided early and imrr ediate notification of the intruder to the security guards on the island.
Protected Area (PA)- Within the OCA is the-second security area called the Protected Area. The Protected Area is fenced and gated and incorporates sophisticated intrusion detection devices, but it is not an intrusion prevention system. Normal entry into this area is through guarded access points with security measures that include passage through a metal detector, an explosive detector and a radiation monitor.
The Protected Areas contain much of the non-nuclear side of the plant such as the Turbine Building, which contains equipment similar to that at a non-nuclear facility. it is into this building that the intruder drove his car.
Vital Area (VA)-Inside the Protected Areas are the Vital Areas of the plant. The Vital Areas contain equipment, systems, devices, nuclear materials, the failure, destruction by exposure to radiation.or release of which could directly or indirectly endange The Vital Areas have an added sophisticated level cf intrusion prevention. These areas are within heavily reinforced concrete walls and bulletproof doors which are accessed by specially designed key cards or by spe During the February 7,1993, security event, the TMI Security s highest priority was to ensure the security of these Vital Areas.
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SECTION 9 PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE INCIDENT RESPONSE 9-1
~
l m.sn...a COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSEVANIA 8
1 DATE:
March 24, 1993 l
l
SUBJECT:
Pennsylvania State Police Emergency Response Team Observations; Three Mile Island Intruder Incident, Sunday, February 7, 1993 l
T0:
Josef Jordan l
Director, Plans and Preparedness Division l
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Age cy FRON:
Major George P. March b -
O-e l
Acting Deputy Commissioner of Staff Pennsylvania State Police l
ENCLOSURE:
(1) Troop H, Harrisburg, After Action Report, Three Mile Island Intrusion, dated February 7, 1993 1.
This correspondence is submitted at the request of Andy Simpson to record observations and comments from my perspective concerning the Subject incident. Other than obtaining Enclosure (1), I have made no separate inquiry of Department command or response personnel to obtain their views on the matter; therefore, other than Enclosure (1), the information provided cannot be considered an official Department position on the issue, rather, consider the following as my personal observations l
obtained from my narrowly defined involvement in the situation.
2.
My observation is that the PEMA E0C operated in an efficient 1
manner during the incident.
All PEMA staff, all other Commonwealth and federal agency representatives, and members of the administration performed their various roles and duties in an enthusiastic and exemplary manner.
I l
experienced no difficulty whatsoever in maintaining liaison, establishing contact as necessary, or obtaining competent cooperation with anyone within the E0C.
l 3.
As concerns the ability of PSP E0C Response Team members to i
establish and maintain contact with State Police command staff at our i
Department and on-site command posts, I encountered no difficulty whatever.
Whatever resources or information I had need to access was made readily available.
4.
Several points of constructive criticism are appropriate to mention. First, although the incident occurred at 0705 hours0.00816 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.682525e-4 months <br />, I received no notification of the incident from within the Department or from within PEMA until 09 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. My first notice of the situation occurred when I j
was contacted by the Director of our Tactical Operations Division to advise methatourSpecialEmergencyResponseTeam(SERT)hadbeenactivatedto respond. A few minutes later I received PEMA's automated recorded call-in message. After I arrived in the E0C I was advised that a telephone call had been placed to my home soon after 0705 from the PEMA E0C but there was 9-2
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2 PSP Emergency Response Team Observations...
- March 24,1993 Page 2 no answer.
I was not at home between 0530 and 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> but my telephone answering machine was on, operating properly,' set to answer after four l
rings, and had received no call between 0530 and 0917 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.489185e-4 months <br />. By 0917 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.489185e-4 months <br /> l
I should have been notified by PEMA, and through various channels within the Department.
i 5.
After receiving the automated recorded call-in message, I i
telephoned the E0C u d was told that Captain Robyak was already in the E0C.
The E0C phone systes does not permit transfer of calls from the Operations Center number to the telephone in the PSP cell so I tried to call the PSP cell directly. Due to the amount of telephone activity there I was unable to complete the call for thirty-eight minutes during which time I could not begin to travel to the EOC. A cor.tinual problem during the incident was the existence of only the single phene line into the PSP cell; the telephone was almost continuously busy; it was impossible to make incoming calls or more than a single outgoing call.
Since the PSP cell is designed to accommodate the Attorney General and FBI response teams also, and since they were there in addition to the PSP, the access to. outgoing or incoming phone service was unacceptable and could have caused serious problems.
Fortunately, the circumstances of the situation this time did not cause major problems associated with our lack of telephone access but it was necessary to prioritize outgoing calls; the difficulty encountered by those attempting incoming calls is unknown except for the inconvenience of the delay I experienced personally.
6.
Another annoying, inconvenient, and inefficient situation-was the PEMA computerized action /information log.
It requires total attention by an operator throughout a situation.
The system requires too much operator manipulation to access different information and functions, and as the incident progresses and the computer data becomes more voluminous, the system slows down making the system continuously less efficient and continuously more of an impediment than an aid.
7.
Two situations developed during the event which require particular consideration for possible avoidance in future incidents. Fir.st was the Lt. Governor's decision that he did not want the PSP Public 4
Information Officer to participate in the press briefing held on-site at
)
TMI, but rather wanted the State Police on-scene commander to participate instead. This is contrary to our plans and caused confusion on her part as to where and when she should participate in the briefing, and disrupted her command responsibilities when she was required to leave the on-site command post to attend the press briefing.
8.
The second issue was an apparent lack of early and continuing press briefings in favor of delaying until the Lt. Governor had arranged his appearance.
This caused a gathering crowd of reporters all clamoring for information as they were required to wait. More frequent briefings would have assisted in rumor control and controlling the increasingly active attempts of reporters to gain access to information.
4 9-3
1 PSP Emergency Response Team Observations...
March 24, 1993 Page 3 9.
In summary, two aspects of planned response did not occur as planned. First, initial timely notice of the incident; second, press briefings and their associated rumor control function. Two logistical problems within the E0C deserve attention; access to sufficient incoming and outgoing telephone service in the PSP Cell, and the inefficiency of operation of the E0C computerized action /information log system.
10.
Enclosure (1) is provided for your information and comment as appropriate. My review of it reveals several areas of concern which I will address internally within the Department. Following further internal review of those areas I expect to coordinate improvement in PSP /PEMA interaction in the future.
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1 4
3 AFTER ACTION REPORT THREE m R ISLAND INTRUSION FEBRUARY 7, 1993 1
On February 7,1993 at appro:rimtely 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />, simultaneous calls were received by Troop H
Desk / Communications and Telecommunications personnel from security at Three Mile Island.
A vehicle had allegedly driven through (around) a security gate (North Bridge) into the facility.
Subsequent information revealed j
the vehicle also crashed through an interior security gate and ran l
l into one of the buildings.
The actor was no longer in the vehicle 1
and his whereabouts were unknown.
It was also unknown whether the actor was alone; although only one person had been viewed in the vehicle as it entered the grounds of the facility.
Units from Troop H, Harrisburg were immediately dispatched to the scene.
At 0705 hours0.00816 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.682525e-4 months <br />, Troop H Desk-Communications Unit requested vehicle information from TMI.
The Troop H Officer Of The Day, Lieutenant John Thierwechter was notified at his residence of the incident at 0707 hours0.00818 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.690135e-4 months <br />; however, it was his understanding that a vehicle had run into a fence at Three Mile Island.
At 0714 1
hours, John Wilson, Security Shift Supervisor, called Troop H to i
i advise the car had also driven into a metal, roll-up door on one of l
the buildings.
The first unit arrived at the scene at 0719 hours0.00832 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.735795e-4 months <br />.
At 0725 hours0.00839 days <br />0.201 hours <br />0.0012 weeks <br />2.758625e-4 months <br />, requests were made of Harrisburg City to get a dog to assist 4.n looking for this subject.
Harrisburg City dogs l
were not available.
At 0733 hours0.00848 days <br />0.204 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.789065e-4 months <br />, Susquehanna Police Department advised they were enroute with a dog (s);
- however, this was cancelled at 0828 hours0.00958 days <br />0.23 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15054e-4 months <br /> by Susquehanna.
Additional units arrived on the scene at 0731 hours0.00846 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.781455e-4 months <br />.
Permission was received from Troop S Officer Of The Day to utilize a Trooper from Troop S, Harrisburg.
9-5
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< -i Subsequently, one was dispatched. At 0736 a Criminal Investigation Unit member was dispatched from his residence to the scene.
Captain Joseph Robyak,. called Station at 0743 hours0.0086 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.827115e-4 months <br /> after i
being called by PEMA.
A member of the Vice/ Intelligence / Narcotics Unit arrived on the scene at 0751 hours0.00869 days <br />0.209 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.857555e-4 months <br />.
Identification Unit member and the helicopter were notified at 0757 hours0.00876 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.880385e-4 months <br />.
E.O. D.,.
Indiantown Gap was dispatched at 0759 hours0.00878 days <br />0.211 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.887995e-4 months <br />, after notification by TMI at 0744 hours0.00861 days <br />0.207 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.83092e-4 months <br />.
According to TMI
- reports, the FBI i
(Philadelphia) was notified at 0741 hours0.00858 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.819505e-4 months <br />, with an agent dispatched l
at 0757 hours0.00876 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.880385e-4 months <br />.
News media representatives began calling che Communication Desk at 0822 hours0.00951 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.12771e-4 months <br /> requesting information.
Additional units continued to arrive.
Helicopter, H3, went into service at 0825 hours0.00955 days <br />0.229 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.139125e-4 months <br />.
By 0844 hours0.00977 days <br />0.234 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.21142e-4 months <br />, State Police Units were posted at both the North and South Bridge Entrances to the Plant.
The Troop H Officer Of The Day arrived at Harrisburg at approximately 0845 hours0.00978 days <br />0.235 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.215225e-4 months <br />.
The Commanding Officer, Troop H,
Harrisburg and the Area I Commander were then being advised of the incident.
Two supervisors, one crime and one patrol were called and dispatched to the scene to help coordinate on-site personnel.
At 0912 hours0.0106 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.47016e-4 months <br /> the registration was obtained from the cai. -The delay in obtaining this information was a result of the roll-up, steel door, which was struck, folding down over the car and the subsequent concerns that the car may be carrying explosive devices.
The vehicle was registered to Miriam J.
Nye', Box 203, 24 Green Alley, Bethel, Pennsylvania 19507.
Prior to arrival on station, the Area I Commander initiated contact for SERT activation at 0927 hours0.0107 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.527235e-4 months <br />.
The Commanding Officer, Troop H, Harrisburg and the Area I 9-6
3 A
Commander arrived at Headquarters at approximately 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br /> and 0945 hours0.0109 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.595725e-4 months <br />, respectively. Arrangements were made through Aviation, Harrisburg Police Department and Indiantown Gap to pick up a bomb-sniffing dog and handler in Hegins and fly them to Three Mile Island.
Arrangements also were made to assign an additional Troop H Lieutenant to address county operations, including 'a possible disturbance at the Eastern Sportsman's Show and normal Officer of-the Day duties.
Also two Police Communications Operators were called to assist and take over duties of "off-duty" Corporal, permitting the latter to get back in uniform.
The Troop Administrative Manager was notified and she also reported for duty.
All Troop H Stations were notified to prepare to have patrols respond and replace assigned Trocpors. A car from Troop L, Hamburg I
was requested to attempt to locate the registered owner of the vehicle.
Further information on a possible suspect was requested cnd received rom the Troop L Officer of the Day.
Two Troop J units also responded to the TMI area and patrolled l
the southern outside perimeter along State Route 441.
Corporal Eddy, after arrival on-site, went to a post at the Main Gate.
Other patrol members were assigned to other gates to reinforce security.
According to TMI logs, SERT began arriving on-site at i
1023 hours0.0118 days <br />0.284 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.892515e-4 months <br />.
The Troop H Officer Of The Day arrived on the scene at approximately 1045 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.976225e-4 months <br />.
A formal Command Post had not been established.
The lobby area of the Processing Center was being utilized.
This area did not have adequate seating and telephones.
The suspect in this case was taken into custody by the TMI Emergency Response Team at approximately 1059 hours0.0123 days <br />0.294 hours <br />0.00175 weeks <br />4.029495e-4 months <br />.
He had been found hiding under grates.within the Turbine Building.
Troop H personnel took custody shortly after 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />.
By approximately 9-7
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t 1110 hours0.0128 days <br />0.308 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.22355e-4 months <br />, the car was removed from the building; however, it was not declared to be free of explosives by EOD personnel until af ter
~
the bomb dog from Harrisburg Police Department, handled by Officer l
Reed, was utilized.
Identification personnel were assigned to l
collect evidence.
i Although attempts were made to keep "TMI" from radio transmissions, it was impossible.
On-site, members used the TAC 1 channel to help ensure some level of confidentiality.
I u
l At approximately 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br />, a Command Post was established in the Operations Support Facility (OSF).
This, area was determined not to be adequate since it had only one telephone; however, no other area was made available to PSP.
Captain Doutt arrived at the l
l Command Post at 1158 hours0.0134 days <br />0.322 hours <br />0.00191 weeks <br />4.40619e-4 months <br /> and assumed Command.
It was soon t
learned cellular phones would not work from inside the building (s),
so additional phones were available only by going to other offices in the building.
Also, portable radio transmissions from inside i
}
the building were limited to on-site personnel.
There was no direct radio communication between the Command Post and Harrisburg Station.
It was observed, and confirmed, the Shift Supervisor was not participating in the Command Post.
He would stop by occasionally as he tried to coordinate TMI operations.
3 Members of the Eastern SERT Team had been dispatched to the scene and continued to arrive as the day progressed.
It was learned the western SERT Team was placed on alert. The suspect was not coherent; therefore, a determination could still not f
be made that he had acted alone.
For this reason, the I
SERT Team was utilized to clear buildings in the secured, critical area of the plant.
The TMI Emergency Response Team was also utilized to clear buildings in the secured, critical area of the 9-8
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plant.-
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Five units 'were placed along the fenced ~ perimeter of this area to maintain its security during the building. clearing _ and to ensure
]
its continued security afterwards.
j By 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />, the decision had been made:to conduct a sweep-of the entire enclosed portion of the ' island.
This was to be' accomplished through the use of two platoons-(one from~ Troop H and one from Troop J) and forty-five (45) Cadets'from the Academy.
A: ~
]i staging area was established in. the large parking lot-off of Building 48.
Building-48 was used to assemble personnel.
Captain-l i
Doutt started to make demands of the Shift n Supervisor to help-l i
ensure more efficient and effective operations.
A. site map was.
obtained.
In the absence of. the Shift ' Supervisor, ai security.
i i
officer with a radio was ' to. be assigned the Command' Post..
Arrangements were also made for' the : assignment of' additional-l security officers to accompany the search, teams : to assist ' in identifying whether packages, objects 'and/or ; persons s encountered.
b, 1
during the search were normal / approved.
At approximately 1325 hours0.0153 days <br />0.368 hours <br />0.00219 weeks <br />5.041625e-4 months <br /> Captain Doutt and' Sergeant Morris left the Command Post to attend a news conference at the Three Mile Island Training Center.
The news conference included Mary: Wells,.
l TMI media spokesperson, Lieutenant Governor 'Singel, Mr.
Joe LaFleur, Director of PEMA and Captain. Doutt.
During : the news conference, media representatives were tc,ld by TMI-officials that.
l they would be taking a bus load down to view =the'areaLbreached_by:
I the accused.
Immediately following-the news conference,. Captain--
Doutt requested a contact, higher than-the. Shift ^ Supervisor,~if l-coordination problems continued. She was provided with the name of' Mike.Ross and his extension.
9-9 u
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At 1355 hours0.0157 days <br />0.376 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.155775e-4 months <br />, the Command Post was advised that a bus with I
mcdia representatives would be allowed to enter the area.
Since the area was not yet secure, Lieutenant Thierwechter advised Pennsylvania State Police Personnel at the gate not to allow the bus through the gate and contacted Captain noutt at the Training i
Center. After giving clearance, Captain Doutt was contacted by the Area I Commander, who stated the SERT Commander had contacted him requesting the bus not be allowed in.
TMI officials explained they were trying to demystify the incident for the public.
The Commanding Of ficer, Troop H, Harrisburg subsequently viewed the scene and placed numerous constraints on the entrance and actions of the media, in an effort to mollify TMI officials and the media while still respecting concerns of PSP. These included:
searching the bus; assigning a Sergeant to accompany the bus; limiting access to the area; stationing a car and Trooper to prevent the bus access to the restricted area.
Senator John Shumaker also arrived at the Training Center. He was extremely upset at not receiving a personal contact from TMI.
He then demanded to go on-site to view the scene.
A Trooper was assigned to accompany him.
All personnel for the security sweep had arrived by 1520 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.7836e-4 months <br /> and were standing by.
There was a breakdown in getting rosters of arriving personnel to the Command Post from the Assembly / Staging l
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Area.
Ti e sweep could not begin until 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, since shift change was allowed to commence at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />.
Arrangements were i
made by order of the Deputy Commissioner of Operations and through the Troop Administrative Manager to feed all on-site personnel.
The meal was to include hot soup in addition to other items, in consideration of the cold temperatures.
9-10
i Lieutenant Thierwechter briefed the Troops at approximately 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br />.
The Platoons were divided so that the Cadets were intermingled with the Troopers. Additionally, approximately twelve (12) members of GPU/TMI Security assisted.
The sweep began at the
' north end of the grounds at approximately 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />.
All areas were determined to be clear by 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />.
This sweep included a search of all abandoned buildings, buildings not declared secure by either SERT or the TMI Emergency Response Team, as well as the grounds.
Pennsylvania State Police Personnel were directed to the North Office Building for a meal.
At 1737 hours0.0201 days <br />0.483 hours <br />0.00287 weeks <br />6.609285e-4 months <br />, Pennsylvania State Police stood down at Three Mile Island.
PEMA was notified.
At 1835 hours0.0212 days <br />0.51 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.982175e-4 months <br /> the Con: mand Post officially went out of service, as the Detail had finished eating and had started to return to their respective Stations.
TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND MANHOURS I
BUREAU / TROOP / STATION
- PERSONNEL
- HOURS
- ALERT CARLISLE 5
39.00 0
CEVIBERSBURG 4
32.25 0
GETTYSBURG 4
25.00 0
FJ.RRISBURG 19 169.25 0
LYKENS 5
28.00 0
NEWPORT 4
17.00 0
l YORK 7
51.50 0
ACADEMY 52 289.50 0
TROOP J 35 275.00 0
TROOP L 4
40.00 0
SERT (EAST) 25 200.00 0
SERT (WEST) 20 0.00 70 9-11
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AVIATION 3
28.00 0
TROOP S 1
7.00 0
TOTALS 188 1201.50 70 TOTAL INJURIES / FATALITIES - NONE l
TOTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE - $15,000.00 - $19,000.00 l
l EXPENDITURES MEALS $347.03 l
l ARRESTS:
Pierce NYE, l
Box 203, 24 Green Alley Bethel, Pennsylvania 19507 i
Date Of Birth - December 13, 1961 Social Security Number - 193-52-7544 Incident #H1-709760 l
CHARGES:
CC3302 - Causing Or Risking Catastrophe l
CC3304 - Criminal Mischief CC2705 - Recklessly Endangering Another Person CC3503 - Criminal Trespass l
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
i Several problems were identified from the onset of this I
incident.
The severity of this incident was not relayed to the Communications Unit at Troop H, at the time of the original call.
1 l
Also, the Uniscope was down during this time period, preventing normal notifications to PSP and subsequently to Stations, PEEA and other Troops.
i A Command Post was not officially established until over four (4) hours of this incident had elapsed.
This was because of the mass confusion in the beginning, with many agencies responding.
Troopers did establish an unofficial Command Post in the Operations
- 3 Building.
A Trooper maintained a post here for phone calls and coordination until the arrival of a Supervisor.
The responding Supervisor (s) chose to continue to use this location, adjacent to the crime scene, as a coordination point.
The Command Post that was established was inadequate in size 9-12
s
.I and facilities.
A more appropriate room was located when security opened the North Office Building to permit access to a large cafeteria / eating area.
It is recommended that the large conference room beside the cafeteria in the North Office Building be used as the Commd Post. It has multiple phone line capabilities, viewing screen, blackboard, etcetera.
There is parking in this area which could be used by Command Post personnel.
Staging areas and assembly points for an on-site incident were
}
l not predetermined.
Existing plans call for the Command Post to be l
l located at the TMI Training Center, across State Route 441 frcm the j
island facility.
There is not adequate parking for a mass PSP i
response, considering most places were already being used by the l
l media, TMI personnel, etcetera. For an on-site incident, depending on its location, the parking area immediately off to the left of I
the access road after crossing the bridge (coming through the Main Gate), would fit our needs.
Assembly could be accomplished in the area of Building 48, as was used over the weekend.
)
Assembly / Staging could also be accomplished in the area of the cafeteria of the North Office Building, near the Command Post, if necessary.
Confusion also existed as to the roles of certain agencies.
For instance, the FBI had three Agents present, but did not accept jurisdiction for any part of the operation.
It was later learned 1
they would only accept jurisdiction if extortion were involved.
However, it is our understanding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission still feels the FBI should be using a federal statute concerning nuclear facilities to arrest NYE on federal charges.
These areas should be predetermined, so there will be no need for someone to ask, "Who's in charge?"
9-13
l t
l L
We have _been advised GPU has an automatic dialing system during an emergency, which we have learned was not utilized on j
February 7, 1992.
However, if this automatic system were'used, agencies would be notified to respond without knowledge of. the Pennsylvania State Police.
This call list should be provided to t
Pennsylvania State Police for future emergencies.
i There appears to be a coordination and training deficiency when Telecommunications is involved, at least during a Troop H I
emergency.
Telecommunications personnel have never been taught, l
nor have they been expected to keep logs.
Their efforts may be duplicating or interfering with Desk-Communications responsibilities.
This area will have to be studied.to determine appropriate solutions.
Troop H Communications Personnel were overwhelmed by the demands placed upon them.
A Corporal leaving the building at the conclusion of his midnight shift was forced into service in his l
off-duty clothes to help answer calls and radio transmissions.
l i
They began to receive numerous calls from the media, ' various l
t depa.:tment entities, site people and Commanders before they could t
adequately provide information to, or even contact, their own Commanders.
They could not adequately handle all the demands.
3 i
This area will also be addressed.
i k
9-14
t
-t TMI INTRUSION FEBRUARY 7, 1993 0700 Thelma DETWEILER, Troop H, Harrisburg, received a call from Security at Three Mile Island.
They reported that a vehicle drove through a security gate and ran into a Turbo building.
Actor was not in the car.
0701 TMI - ECKEL #948-8040 Security Emergency (10-457) - Car 9 0714 John WILSON, Super.
~
Thru metal door.
Dogs 0717 Wrecker (Roll Back) 0719 10 8 0719 WERTZ 6 0720 KEGERREIS - I.D. #545-2123 0721 Portable 0725 Harrisburg City - Sergeant Henry - Dog?
0720 Susquehanna - Robinson - Decline Dog.0724 0726 CARBERRY calls.
Wait for KEGERREIS to call roll.
0728 Sergeant ALLEN, Harrisburg - No dog available.
0730 Called Swatara-for dog.
0731 9 23 0732 Contacted Middletown Police Department.
Sergeant Reese MTTT ml/ Pat. STILL 0733 Swatara and Susquehanna enroute with dogs.
(Page l
ROBINSON).
Swatara - nobody available.
I l
l 0738 Sergeant GALINAC i
i l
0736 STANSFIELD #896-8438 - Sent straight to TMI l
l 0743 Mr. Richard HOOVER - Roll Back 0743 Captain ROBYAK i
9-15
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O h
s.
PEMA called.
EOC i
0751 76 23 0754 Lieutenant JOYCE - One man from Interstate.
0757 59044 - KEGERREIS 8 9 - went land line.
SP-D Helicopter - FOUTZ/LAUVER 0759 EOD - Bomb Team Corporal KEAN (Jonestown) 0808 WERTZ - Still inside.
Put one at each gate.
TAC 1 0822 News 8 called.
0825 6 8 0825 H3 8 0826 Helo Pad.
0828 ROBINSON - Susquehanna - Not available.
0830 Earl CASEY - CNN Atlanta.
NUC Reg. Comm.
(PSP Harrisburg - authority) 0833 Middletown 0839 Earl CASEY - CNN Atlanta NRC Washington 0844 6 and 135 23 0847 TMI/WHP/Spokesperson Major HAZEN 0853 238-4821 - Captain Lancaster City Derry Township 0859 Phila. News SNOT 9-16
~
e 0845 (814) 472-8500 PSP Ebensburg Johnstown Greensburg 0900 Lieutenant (412) 832-3288 Residence - Johnstown To PEMA 0900 Corporal LESTER advised DETWEILER to call Headquarters Officer of the Day (OD), Captain CAPRIOTTI.
DETWEILER called his home and his son advised he was in Maryland having breakfast.
0900 CAPRIOTTI 0904 EOC - 783-7150 Corporal EDDY 0912 ACT 3721 84 Plymouth Station Wagon 4 N'IES 1 Male within Miriam J. NYE Box 203 24 Green Alley Bethel, PA 19507 0915 DETWEILER called him and informed him of the situation.
CAPRIOTTI asks to please call Colonel HICKES.
He, in turn, got in touch with Colonel WALP.
Colonel WALP called DETWEILER.
0927 Lt. TORKAR - SERT (From HAZEN) 0931 FREEHLING to TMI Captain coming 0932 EDDY in and out 10-17 H1 enroute Station 0933 Area I 17 0937 Jim MASON - News 8 0937 29 - EDDY enroute (5545) 0941 Derry Township dog enroute
(
0945 Two bomb dogs l
9-17
o 0
PennDOT 6',
blue eyes Pierce Nye 12-13-61 193-52-7544 1058 2-man car into us (C.P. within) 1059 Found man under condensors.
Handcuffed at this time.
Take to Maintenance Building - Conference.
e 1101 Headed (601) - John WILSON, TMI Sec. has him.
1104 KEGERREIS can do car.
No longer threat (secured).
Black hair / black beard /5'5"-5'7" 1110 Car out of building for last search.
1111 With KEGERREIS at building.
TMI Response Team found.
1112 KEGERREIS gathering evidence in area of car.
Captain leaving with Sergeant MORRIS.
l Across bridge in parking off to left.
1120 Lieutennat T. to WERTZ in Mr. HARPER's office.
1124 Middletown Police Department going 10-7 from location.
579-2731 1
1130 SERT - TMI - Conference Meeting 1130 STANSFIELD/WERTZ - Suspect Out 1132 Assume he wasn't alone.
SERT is going to clear.
Found in Unit 1.
I 1142 Londonderry Fire Amb.
Land Line #948-8458 KEGERREIS - VAN BUSKIRK - PONICSAN - with car in area of broken door.
9-18 l
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e i
4 i
l Dan and Jeff and suspect off island.
Lieutenant T. - Cindy - Les - Carberry - Me - Conf. Room.
I 1154 FBI gone.
1156 Dog here with'H1'.
Take it over the car.
1300 2 Platoons
'I 45 Cadets l
Radio from WILSON i
Assembly Point
{
- Reck. Endangering 1
- Cause Risk. - Cat.
- Crim. Tress.
- Crim. Mischief l
value - gate
- door i
- H1-709760 (Crim. Tress)
{
Single /loutt L
Security - Tony FINKLE t
L.D.
9-1 VAN B. - logging ind. as arriving.
.[
i 1326 H3 - H1 - Out fuel.
H3 on' site.
i l
1330 135 - WHALEY - released.
Les call Jeff at HDQ i
OIC i
1337 H3 N. end l
4 Raid Con wants name of PSP
- 944-2063 - Bob MCDONALDS GRCS - 8083 t
i Jim STACY - auth bus of media to come on island i
1341 All PSP personnel assembled at 48 (per Lieutenant TITLER)
DJ YANICH (Swatara Township Duty Magistrate)
($250,000.00) arraigned 1440 hours0.0167 days <br />0.4 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.4792e-4 months <br />.
9-19
. ~..
e>'
5 i
l Sweats / green / brown jacket / black sneakers SIMMONS observed subject come on at Main'N Gate.
1355 Media denial i
Bldg. 48 i
1415 Lieutenant TORKAR to Major Hazen
- 948-1356 8829 5804 i
H4 - 8070 - Control TMI
~
t
- Tony FINKLE - TMI has M & M. Why not more?
Why wasn't M & M used.
l 1445 Sergeant HESS on bus with media.
No one is allowed off the bus.
j 1446 L3 with people - 30 enroute 7 stragglers Senator SHUMAKER i
Lieutenant TITLER - 8087 31 Troopers with Lieutenant TITLER and Corporal LESTER l
1 Corporal /l Trooper /49 Cadets - Academy
.1 1500 Rosters - Supper a little after 5:00..
j Spoke with Sara (Captain).
1509 Call to Mr. BEDELL - not at gate.
i 1510 Tony FINKEL - Phone Call t
1515 L3 23 j
49 Cadets 33 Enlisted 1520 Lieutenant Titler Lancaster here:
37 people / Lieutenant SAUERS 1523 4 Mr. FINKEL 1530 Long distance on (717) 9+#
Bill SEAWORD 1535 Perimeters NE - PONICSAN H1-6 9-20
~.
~.,,. _ - -... - -.. _..,
)
=
.s l
From.HAWKINS NW - STEINEACHER Hamburg 9 WE ENTER - MENDEZ/ SHRIVER E7 SW - MOWREY - H7-7 SE - LEEDOM - H2-6 l
)
Darlene RANK - TMI i
14 officers from TMI for look-l, Car out 48 -
j Inside 48- - Corporal LESTER l
NE - PONICSAN H1-6 l
NW - STEINEACHER - Hamburg 9 l
W ENTER - MENDEZ/ SHRIVER H7-19 SW - MOWREY H7-7 SE - LEEDOM H2-6 i
1605 H3 told no need to return after dropping Sergeant MORRIS.
i Senator SHUMAKER i
1624 SERT is deactivated and leaving the island.
1635 Lieutenants THIERWECTHER and SAUERS - 3 l
Lieutenant TITLER - 2 l
)
l 1640 TMI down - grading to normal operation' i
l 1650 PEMA shutting down.
l l
l 1652 1-2-3 1652 All to 4 and 5 as they are complete in'3-and'2.
t j
1701 R. BROWN - F.S.
secured.
All'is 10-4.-
i 1702 Lieutenant STEIN sent bear detail-home.
Lieutenant released but still handles Troop Emer.
Harrisburg City Chief SHAEFFER - Offered assistance of i
any kind needed.
j i
1715 4 and 5 complete and clear.
s 10-17 to 48 i
- Directive 34 l
List of automatic phone calls.
1 GPU l
1734 Perimeter relieved and to go North Office Building.
I l
9-21 l
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m w
1737 PSP stand down at 2MI - PEEA called by Captain DOUTT.
l 1835 Command Post Down l
l l
l l
l l
I l
B 4
i t
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I I
9-22
j l
l PENA COMMENT TO MAJOR MARCH'S MEND, DATED 3/24:
)
1.
Notification to - the PSP did take place in a timely manner.
PSP l
responded in a timely manner.
One of the initial calls made at 0729 was to MAJ March; no answer was obtained.
CPT Robyak was contacted by the EOC.
PSP was onsite at 0755; CPT Robyak arrived-l at the EOC at 0840.
2.
' Action will be taken to provide more phone lines in the PSP EPLO area.
3.
The EOC computerized EIS System is being reviewed for possible.
~
conversion to a random access data base.
PSP must train and assemble staff as required to use the system.
I I
i i
9-23
- - -.,,,. _. -. - - _..... _. - _,-.._.-,.~._.._-..._..--_.---.-__ _-~.-.. - _ _-
-4 SECTION 10 i
AREA EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER INCIDENT RESPONSE CENTRAL AND EASTERN AREA EOC OPERATIONS i
r central Area The Central Area Director's home was contacted by the State EOC at approximately 0800.
The Director was out.
He returned the call to the State EOC at approximately 0830.
He was briefed that there was a Site Area Emergency (SAE) at THI, that an intruder had breached security by driving a' station wagon onto the
{'
property and through a partially closed roll-up door in the turbine building.
The intruder was et 1.cge, presumably in the turbine building, that a search was underway, and that all vital areas were secure.
The Central Area Director proceeded to his EOC which was opened at approximately 0900. The area Director monitored the situation and at 1030 initiated calls to advise Union, Adams and Franklin Counties of the SAE.
After being advised that the intruder had been apprehended about 1100, the Central Area Director advised the three. counties.
They closed their EOCs, as did Central Area, about 1200.
Eastern Area The Eastern Area Acting Director was contacted and briefed by duty officer 2 at 1157. The Area EOC was not activated. Duty Officer 2 offered to contact Schuylkill County.
A call was initiated, but no contact was made.
Schuylkill County letter attached.
t 1
1 J
10-1
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1 J
1 SECTION 11 STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER INCIDENT RESPONSE The following information was compiled by a review of records and I
tapes and discussions with EOC staff members.
Initial Notification i
The initial notification was received from the TMI shift supervisors on a seven digit phone line, not the hot line, (this. hot line' connects TMI, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and the 5 TMI risk counties
[
i
- Cumberland, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon and York - on a simultaneous conference call basis), by the EOC duty officer at 0725.
l The 0725 time is approximate in that the time channel on the EOC recording tape was not operating on February 7.
.When notifying the State EOC, the THI shift supervisor did not follow the format or sequence of the Emergency Notification Report,. attached, which is a part of Annex E to the Commonwealth Emergency Operation Plan.
Annex E, Radiological Emergency Response to Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, l
1s the basis for Commonwealth response and derivative county and municipal responses.
The TMI shift supervisor did not begin the notification with "This is not a drill".
He did, however, say "This is not a drill" during l
his notification; he did not provide his phone number; he did not say this l
was an emergency classification; he misidentified the Emergency.
Classification Level (ECL) as " Site Emergency" rather than the correct i
i
" Site Area Emergency"; he did not indicate whether the classification was an " Escalation", " Reduction" or "No Change" in classification status; he l
did not state whether there had been "No Release", " Airborne. Release" or i
" Liquid Release"; he did'not indicate a wind direction or speed, nor did he
)
end the report with "This is not a Drill."
The EOC duty officer, after responding to verification calls from York and Lancaster counties, notified the PEMA Director of Operations at his home within seven minutes of the original call from TMI.
Only one person was on duty in the State EOC.
The duty officer briefed the Director of l
Operations about the incident including properly identifying the ECL as Site Area Emergency.
When the Director of Operations asked ' if "all the j
risk counties know it", the duty officer's response was " Yeah, I've gotten calls. The duty officer in fact knew only that York and Lancaster counties were aware of the incident. A second EOC duty officer who was scheduled to replace the overnight duty officer arrived and some twelve minutes into the incident AT 0737 took a call from Lebanon County verifying receipt of the SAE.
Whether duty officer 1 was aware of the call received by duty officer 2 (as they will be designated in this report) is not clear; but, in any event, duty officer 1 could have known of a maximum of three counties being aware of the SAE.
11-1 1
1
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o 0
L The duty officer on duty at the beginning of the event was a substitute and not a regular EOC staff duty officer.
This duty of ficer
(#1) was a PEMA staff member.
The State EOC is of ten staf fed by only one person, periodically a substitute.
Activating State Response The Director of Operations advised that he would contact the Director of PEMA and directed duty of ficer 1 to start making notification calls to key EOC staff - Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), and the PEMA Legislative Liaison and Press Officer.
The expansion of calls to staff the EOC continued adding support staff and representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Health, Military
- Affairs, Transportation, the American Red Cross and Public Utility i
commission.
The PEMA Central Area Director was notified and activated his EOC.
Support counties in Central Area were notified.
1 Within an hour and fifteen minutes from the notification of the incident, the Director of PEMA briefed the Governor and Lieutenant Arrangements were made to fly the Lieutenant Governor from his Governor.
residence in Johnstown to the State EOC.
The Pennsylvania State Police, the FBI and the US Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team from Fort Indiantown Gap (FITG) responded to the TMI site.
Commonwealth LNOs were sent to the TMI facility in Londonderry Township, to the TMI Near Site Media Center located adjacent to the plant in Londonderry Township and to the TMI Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) in Susquehanna Township.
Continuing communications were maintained with the facility throughout the incident.
f Specific discussions took place between the GPU Director of Emergency Planning and the PEMA Director regarding the plant conditions. The reactor was known to be stable at full power and at no time throughout the incident was there any problem with the reactor.
In
- addition, frequent consultations were held with the NRC confirming the information regarding the continuing stability of the reactor which was being provided by GPU.
Based on the information available including the fact that no vital area had been breached and that this was a security incident, not a i
radiological incident, the decision was made to partially staff the EOC and not dispatch LNOs to the five risk counties.
PEMA either upon request or in certain circumstance may/can send liaison officers.
PEMA, through regular training, planning and annual work plan activities, as well as basic public safety requirements in federal and State law, expect counties to have prepared and capable emergency management programs.
The decision was also made not to use the check list system with the counties.
The check list system is normally managed by.the LNos.
I 11-2
)
o 8
Cumberland and Dauphin County Response At approximately 0842, Duty Officer 2 called the five risk counties on the " hot line" to give them an update (Duty officer 2 was apparently unaware that cumberland and Dauphin Counties, although on the line, were still not reacting to the ECL of Site Area Emergency as declared.
Duty of ficer 2 provided an update regarding the Site Area Emergency at TMI.
He was very clear on this terminology.
He advised that the intruder was being sought and that the Director of PEMA and the PEMA Director of Operations were in the State EOC.
l i
Contact was established with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by the EOC as additional staff continued to arrive.
l By approximately 0905, based on the 0842 call and an overheard radio transmission, Cumberland County had realized the significance, of the incident, and made the EOC operational as Lancaster, Lebanon and York Counties had done earlier.
At approximately 0930, the Director of PEMA briefed the five risk l
counties using the " hot line".
The briefing included the fact that the intruder had still not been apprehended, the intruder's vehicle was under a door of the turbine building, the ownership of the vehicle was being checked through vehicle registration; EOD was reconnoitering the vehicle; all vital areas including the control room and reactor building were secure; the Governor and Lieutenant Governor had been briefed and he appreciated the efforts of the counties.
When he was questioned about a press release, the Director said a PEMA press release was being prepared and would be faxed out.
The press release would indicate that the risk counties had been notified and were staffing their EOCs, that there had been no breach of radiation areas and no radiation release, and that there was no reason for any protective action by the public. York County was also advised, in answer to a question, that they could use the TMI press release.
The Dauphin County representatives on the call then said words to the effect that he was understanding that Dauphin County should have their EOC in operation.
The PEMA Director advised him that Dauphin County should be following the procedures in the plans for a Site Area Emergency.
The Dauphin County Communications shift leader then contacted the Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) Director again, but this time the DEMA Director recognized for the first time that there was a Site Area Emergency.
He took decisive action to activate his EOC, notify the risk municipalities and advise his Commissioners.
That was at approximately 0935.
Continuing State Response While the difficulties within the Cumberland and Dauphin County responses were worked out, the State and other county responses continued.
11-3
(
t-Notification, activation and operational timings for each of the counties and municipalities are contained in each particular county incident response section.
State agencies continued to augment their personnel at the State EOC, to establish communications with their organizations and county counterparts and to complete the other notifications and contacts needed under a Site Area Emergency.
Coordination continued with the plant (TMI) with primary emphasis on apprehending the intruder while ensuring vital areas remained secure.
Primary State agency involvement was through the PSP.
Coordination and information flow with the plant EOF and media center also continued through the PEMA LNOs as well as with the risk counties and area EOC.
The Governor's Office, the Governor, and the Lieutenant Governor were kept directly informed.
At approximately 1100, the intruder was apprehended and all concerned were advised.
There would be no change from the Site Area Emergency Classification level until a complete security search and review was completed at the plant, ensuring that there was only one intruder, that he had caused no damage and that all systems were operating properly.
The Director of Emergency Preparedness for General Public Utility Nuclear Corporation, the operator of TMI, briefed the Director of PEMA at approximately 1230 advising that damage was little or none, that the intruder's estimated route on the island was being checked.
It was estimated that the EOF would remain staffed until at least 1500.
The Directer of PEMA instructed that the risk county EOCs be advised to remain operational until there was an "all clear."
Efforts at the State EOC included preparations for a press conference to be held at the TMI near site media center.
The counties and EOC staff and LNOs were advised that there would be a press conference - originally scheduled for 1330.
The Lieutenant Governor, Director of PEMA, and the PEMA Legislative Liaison and Press Officer were the State participants at the press conference. The Lt. Governor's opening statement, as speaker for the Commonwealth, is attached.
The press conference was completed by approximately 1430.
The press conference was the last major action that took place although coordination calle continued between all concerned parties until the plant terminated the incident and returned to a non-emergency status based on having completed a search or a series of searches, confirming that the intruder operated alone and did no damage to any plant system.
11-4 a
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I 4
SECTION 12 I
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS i
GENERAL l
The obvious comparison to be made is that with the 1979 TMI incident.
f Clearly the comparison is favorable, First, there was no loss of control of the facility and no release of radiation.
Second, and almost as important, there were plans and procedures in place at the State, counties, municipalities, and plant in 1993 that were not available in 1979.
The State EOC was activated and coordination between the various State agencies including PSP, BRP, PEMA, with the utility, federal agencies, and three of the five risk counties was excellent.
Initial notification and activation of the other two counties was not adequate.
However, even the approximate two-hour delay by two counties was recovered due to the advanced awareness, plans,. training and systems in place since 1979.
The plans and procedures were not always implemented in an even way.
The plans were designed with a radiological incident in mind. The security incident without an active radiological component caused decision makers at all levels to modify the implementation of the plans and procedures.
This is not an illogical 'aituation in that all plans and procedures are prepared in the vacuum of normal activities and are implemented under the strese of an incident.
A plan or procedure is a best effort starting point.
After an incident begins, the judgement of the decision makers,
)
based on the information available, causes modifications of the plans and procedures.
The difficulty is that decision makers at various levels are not aware of the modifications / changes being made at other levels.
For example, the State anticipates that the county is staffing in a certain way at a prescribed speed while the county may have modified that procedure.
INDIVIDUAL FINDINGS The following pages contain specific findings and conclusions.
I 12-1
i 5,
m 4.
Finding #1 a
USE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION REPORT It appears from the review of the records, logs and tapes at the risk counties and State EOCs that the Emergency Notification Report was not used or at least not effectively and completely used by the TMI personnel making the initial notification.
Discussion:
The Emergency Notification Report form (Attachment 1) is a portion of the State Annex E and is the agreed form to be used by each utility for reporting an ECL.
The two TMI shift foremen who made the initial notification calls on February 7 did not explicitly follow the Emergency Notification Report form.
Most of the information that would be placed on the form was provided, but not in the sequence of the form and in some cases inaccurately; i.e.,
Site Emergency vs the correct Site Area Emergency.
==
Conclusion:==
The Emergency Notification Report should be specifically used in its exact sequence to avoid confusion and possible misinterpretation.
Message receivers should ensure that all information categories listed in the Emergency Notification Report form are addressed if the sender (TMI) fails to follow the form.
Communication is a two-way process.
The Emergency Notification Report was not properly completed.
The county
)
staff should demand that the TMI staff follow the report form during the notification call.
9 6
12-2
f i
l ATTACHMENT #1-i
- .^
I
'I e5 l'
i
?
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION REPORT l_7 This is a Drill ll This is not a Drill l
l 1.
This is:
at l
l My phone number is:
j i
l 2.
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
I a
i l
11 Unusual Event l-l Site Area Emergency-17 Alert l-l General Emergency.
I l
l[l The Event has been Teminated AT:
TIME:
DATE:
17 Escalation THIS REPRESENTS A/AN:
l-l Reduction IN CLASSIFICATION STATUS:
l_7 No Change i
j 3.
BRIEF NON-TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:
)
^
4 THERE IS:
1l No Release ll Airborne Release l-l Liquid Rilease 5.
WHEN GENERAL EMERGENCY IS THE INITIAL EVENT, PROVIDE PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION BELOW:
6.
WIND DIRECTION IS FROM:
WIND SPEED IS:
l-l This is a Drill l_-l This is not a Drill APPROVED:
TIME:
DATE:
4 Finding #2 INITIAL NOTIFICATION CALLS TO PEMA AND COUNTIES The initial notification calls were made by two THI shift foreman.
Since the control room had been " locked down", the normal use of the " hot line" which would have simultaneously notified PEMA (the State EOC) and the five risk counties was precluded.
This finding is consistent witis that of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission cited on pages 6-8 of NUREG-1485, Unauthorized Forced Entry into the Protected Area at Three Mile Island Unit 1 on February 7, 1993.
I Discussion:
The following listing of initial notification times come from county and PEMA records:
i Dauphin County 0716 Lancaster County 0718 York County 0722 Lebanon County 0723 State EOC (PEMA) 0725 Cumberland County 0726 In a comment to the York County dispatcher from the TMI shift supervisor, it was stated that they were " working down towards PEMA" which would indicate that PEMA was not the first on the list to be called.
Since the " hot line was not available to the THI control room shift supervisors, the most efficient method of notification would have been to
)
call PEMA who continued to have access to the hot line and could have made one simultaneous notification to all counties.
Instead, PEMA was not the first call, but apparently the fifth call of six.
gnelusion:
If the " hot line" is unavailable, PEMA should be the first agency called.
PEMA should be so advised and asked to notify the counties.
The Emergency Notification Report form 'should then be used to advise PEMA who would in turn notify the counties.
The utility should establish an alternate location to allow access to the
" hot line" in security breach incidents.
The alternate " hot line" location should also be capable of being secured with access available to security and emergency personnel.
The personnel 4
who might have to operate the alternate " hot line" telephone must be trained to use the Emergency Notification Report form.
Copies of the form should be positioned at the alternate location.
12-3
m a.
4 Finding 43 1
USE OF CORRECT LANGUAGE IN ECLS a
)
It appears that the current ECL language may have. contributed to the-confusion at two counties.
The ECL Site Area Emergency, misstated in one case as Site Emergency, may have been interpreted to mean that there was an l
emergency at or on the site, but not that there was an official; NRC Emergency Classification Level.
e Discussions l
Tha incorrect use of the term is related to lack of priodic, planned.
tr:inir.g and awareness programs and the need to uma the Emergency Notification Report form discussed in Finding fl.
I conclusion:
Persons who might perform the emergency notification functions need to be ~
f trained and drilled in correct terminology and proper use of the report.
form.
If findings il and #2 are carefully adhered to by the utility, the t
l potential for error in use of the critical ECL transmissions will be
.l significantly reduced. Nevertheless, the importance of frequent, repetitive-training of both the utility shift supervisors and the state and risk county EOC duty personnel in the use of the Emergency Notification Report form and the proper use of ECLs must be stressed.
All new, part time, I
l intermittent, and full time persons who might have the responsibility to i
l initiate or receive the ENR/ECL information should be briefed regarding
.I that information and the forms at least quarterly. Record of the briefings l
should be maintained by the utility, state and risk counties.
j l
t 12-4.
1 s
e 4-Finding #4
_(
MUNICIPAL VERIFICATION OF INITIAL NOTIFICATION TMI Risk County procedures for response to nuclear power plant incidents, Annex E to each county Emergency Operations Plan, call for notification of Alert or higher ECL to municipal level.
Discussion:
Risk municipal emergency operations plans (in SOP B) call for municipalities to verify the receipt of an Alert or h:.gher ECL with their county.
==
Conclusion:==
Since notification was not provided in a timely manner by some counties during the February 7 incident, some municipal emergency management coordinators (EMCs) or other officials became aware of the incident through other means.
In these instances, the EMCs or other officials should have contacted their county EOC.
This procedure will be added to the municipal plans.
While it is accurate that two counties (Cumberland and Dauphin) did not notify municipalities as per the plan, municipal EMCs should query the EOC/EMC at any time there is a question or confusion, no matter what the incident or situation.
Frustration and concern by municipal officials was duly received at all levels and was appropriate for the situation.
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12-5 i
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Finding #5 ACTIVATION OF THE PUBLIC ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEN j
Emergency Broadcast System [EBS])~
A decision was made not to activate the Sirens and EBS system.
_In retrcspect, two counties (Lancaster and York) thought the use of the sirens
[
i and EBS would have been helpful.
Discussion:
The State decision was based on the facts'that: 1). the media ' was _ already
[
covering the incident both on national and. local news; 2).two counties and many municipalities were not ready to handle' the activation; 3) the incident was not a radiological event; 4) it was ' unlikely to become ' one l
according to federal agencies; 5) the plant _ and all safety systems were-operating properly in the first 2-4 hour period in question; 6) the Bureau of Radiation ~ Protection did not disagree with the plant status in any of
{
its advice to the state EMA. director; and, 7)- the _ Nuclear Regulatory' conunission did not disagree with the plant status in any.of its _ advice to '
l the State.
The NRC in their Incident Investigation Report reviewed,this situation. The Report ccncluded that there never was any danger to the public during the incident ano that the decision to -leave the reactor at -
-l full power was correct under_ the circumstances.
- However, it is acknowledged that' situational changes could have modified the_ decision..
conclusion:
The determination to activate the Alert - and Notification System by the decision makers is based on the information available at the. time of an incident. Criticism can range from " unnecessarily alarming" the population by activating the sirens, to "not fully informing" the.public if the system' is not activated.
Radiological technical advisors unanimously agreed there was not an offsite threat to the public.
The State EOC followed this situation - carefully.
The etate and counties provided available information to the media.
f The decision to not use the sirens-and ~ EBS in this incident was not unreasonable, hrhss the local and network broadcast media were keeping the public fuly Airarmed.
Sounding of the eirons. to institute the EBS would have ma% # sudue alarm and panic at church services-resulting in l
spontaneous f.tv. unt *Jessary, smacuations.
Independent activation of. EBS I
was not advaa14.% 4 this case due to the above and the lack of readiness of all involvet. wunties and m'anicipalities.
Two counties and nearly all municipalities were not r4rady to st;Mf access andl traf fic control points. -
Sirens in one county could have caused panic in an adjacent county..The State was aware of this situation.
The use of EBS must be coordinated before activation.
l 12-6
r.
4 Finding #6
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PRESS INFORMATION FROM THE STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER The State EOC issued two press releases during the incident; one at approximately 1000 and one at 1645.
Discussion:
The Commonwealth Emergency News and Information Center was partially staffed. Two press releases were issued.
In addition, considerable effort was expended in preparation for the press conference held at the TMI 8
Near-Site Media Center.
The press conference, conducted at approximately 133G, provided abundant information to the public.
It was carried live on some radio and TV stations.
Nevertheless, some counties were desirous of I
more press information being available from the Commonwealth at an earlier time in the event.
==
Conclusion:==
Sufficient public information was available at the national, State, and local levels through news releases from the utility, and the State.
Had thir event occurred at a location more remote than TMI, the ability of the Agency to provide adequate public information to the counties would have been difficult.
The time necessary to mobilize, stage and move personnel and equipment to support the Commonwealth Media Center and the Utility's Media Center increases as the distance from Harrisburg increases.
Because of PEMA's role as the focus of coordination for emergency / disaster response l
by the Commonwealth, the demands for public information challenges the Agency's one person capacity.
Title 35, Chapter 7320, requires PEMA to provide adequate staffing for these situations as do Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations.
Inadequate public information can jeopardize the safety of the public.
The State must provide timely and frequent support to the counties.
PZMA will make a good faith effort to meet the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requirements for annual media briefings.
f 12-7
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<ir Finding &7 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF I.EVELS OF PRESS INFOPy.ATION The basic principles for information releases contained in the Annex E ot the Commonwealth EOP state that the utility provides information on plsnt conditions, the Commonwealth provides information on state activities, the counties cover their actions and the municipalities supply informa cion on local efforts.
Discussion:
There is always a desire to fulfill media requests for informatAon and interviews.
Care must be taken to present accurate information within the bounds of competence of the agency providing the information or interviews.
This did not always happen during the February 7 incident, perhaps in part due to the limited number of news releases provided by the Commonwealth Emergency News and Information Center.
York County, for example, after consultation with the PEMA Director, provided information to the media taken from GPU press releases.
Conclusion Annual media briefings for the local press,
- county, and municipal l
information personnel should continue to stress the basic principles of levels of press information.
Counties have always been advised to refer
" State level queries" to the PEMA Press Secretary and " plant situation queries" to the appropriate information center.
The State acknowledges that limited public information statements were available.
PEMA concurs that additional " official" statements would have been helpful to the counties.
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12-8
m p
Finding #3 J
l DISPATCH OF LNOS TO RISK COUNTIES State Liaison Officers (LNOs) are normally dispatched to the risk counties at the Alert ECL.
Discussions s
This incident was initiated at Site Area Emergency. It was determined, based on the BRP technical assessment of the incident and on the fact that this started out as a security breach event, that LNOs would not initially I
8 be sent to the risk counties by the PEMA director.
The director believed the counties could staff the event' based on their exercises. The State EOC operations staff also determined that it would not use the nuclear power l
plant incident check list, in part, because the LNOs would normally have been the agents to provide that information to the EOC.
The State believed l
the counties and municipalities were staffing as planned and required by regulations.
i Conclusions l
While the decision to dispatch LNOs to risk counties can be somewhat judgmental at Alert, the initiation of an incident at the Site Area Emergency ECL appears to place sufficient stress on the risk county EMCs to warrant the assignment of LNos as a SOP rather than as discretionary l
dependent on the situation.
The LNOs do play a very useful role in i
facilitating coordination between the State and county EOCs.
Since the use of LNOs was initiated by the State five years ago to " assist" the counties,
)
some counties prefer to have them, request them, or believe it is an appropriateirequirement.
PEMA agrees.
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12-9 l
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Finding #9 1
INCIDENT CLOSE OUT i
The incident was terminated by the utility (TMI) as of 1635 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.221175e-4 months <br /> I
February 7, 1993.
Discussion:
The de-escalation status call was made over tho'" hot.line" to the State EOC.
and the risk counties.
The plant then returned to a non-emergency status.
The counties reacted to the TMI call.
The State EOC confirmed via the ECOMM system to the risk counties that' the Commonwealth, county, and
{ j municipal rc=penses could be terminated at 1642.
Some municipalities terminated much earlier.
j 1
==
Conclusion:==
The termination of onsite exercise or incident activities at the plant is the utility's decision.
Termination of.an event, - relative to offsite 3
activity requirements in the Commonwealth, county, and municipal facilities l
is coordinated by the State EOC.. The counties should be aware ' that the utility has terminated an incident - or exercise, but coordination of the offsite response requires that the termination at municipal, county,. and f
state levels be with the knowledge and consent of the Statre EOC.
Failure to follow this procedure ruptures coordinated offsite response activities.
I and aborts any effort to collect or disseminate necessary ' information.
Finally, premature termination by county..or municipal jurisdictions.can
)
potentially jeopardize the safety of emergency workers. -This'is a critical consideration.
t h
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12-10 i
3
- ^.
- r Finding 410 3j i
GEOGRAPHICAL EFFECT ON STATE RESPONSE Both THI incidents occurred near (within fif teen miles) 'the. State EOC.
Both events required a large-scale activation of the State EOC and response to, or near, the incident site.
.l I
i Discussions I
The response to the February 7, 1993, TMI incident.was quick and effective.
state liaison personnel responded rapidly to the incident locations to 1 i
~
provide communication links to the State EOC.
The State EOC can activate quickly under all' circumstances, but should an emergency occur at a nuclear power plant. other than TMI, it would take longer to have liaison personnel and equipment in place.
For. example, travel time to the Beaver Valley Power Station in Shippingport is
?
approximately 4 1/2 hours _by passenger car. Communications vans would take even longer.
Added to the travel time west, of course, would be the time it takes to contact personnel and have them report to pick up equipment and vehicles.
This mobilization time is affected by the time of day,- day of the week, the weather and other factors.
This could potentially degrade the ef fectiveness of the information - flow' and response for an additional three to seven hours or longer.
j i
conclusion:
t The rapid responses to the TMI inciden+. should not provide a bench mark
)
regarding responsa time.
The geographical location, weathar conditions, j
time, and day of the week will affect the state response _ time. Acquisition and possession of adequate state level communications equipment / vehicles is I
both an operational necessity and a regulatory requirement for non-local events.
It should be noted that PEMA is responsible for' conducting i
preparedness and response activities to nine nuclear power plants.
Operations for all eight locations. beyond TMI require mobile support communications.
Operators for this equipment (communications technicians) 7 l
are critical due to its sophisticated nature.
PEMA's communications' staff L
is a critical asset that must be capable of meeting these response support requirements.
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12-11
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t' d
Finding #11 AREA EOC ACTIVATION The PEMA Central Area Emergency Operations Center Area Director, (EOC) was opened by the but the EOC was not made operational.
was not opened.
Area EOCs assist support counties in preparing toThe Eastern Area EO accept evacuees.
aid and Discussion:
Annex E, Radiological Emergency Response to Nuclear Power Pl requires the Area EOCs to notify support ant Incidents, and changes thereto.
In addition, Area counties of ECL classifications coordinate and support reception, mass care operations EOCs are to be prepared to and unmet needs.
The Central Area support counties were not notified of the Site Ar Emergency until 1 1/2 hours after the Area EOCwas opened.
Contact with the Eastern Area support county (Schuylkill) established during the incident.
The state EOC did not was never action in a timely way.
The follow up on this procedures or training of staff.
county did not have adequate internal Copelusion:
Area EOCs may be activated at the Alert. ECL.
EC' classifications require staffing.
State plans for higher the Alert ECL or higher as called for iSupport counties must be notified at n the plans.
The two counties notified by Central Ar per their plans.
ea did not fully mobilize staff as 12-12
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7 Finding #12 PSP NEWS CONFERENCE, PARTICIPATION Conference On scene Commander Participation in the Press for the Discussion:
the Pennsylvania State Police spokesperson knowledgeable, uniformed, senior was determined that of should be a incident press conference h
public, with an image It af ficer who could convey to the media and t ehand and no threat to public well in While she was authority, that the situation was commander was selected.
interrupted I
PSP this hiatus The on scene safety existed. in her presentation to the media, If there had been tic 1.
very ef fectiveher command and control of an active search c.pera I
this withdrawal of the f
intruder (s),
have disrupted the continalty of ether unknown and yet to be found I
risk.
The PSP f
commander for nontactical purposes couitneedlessly placed troopers at to the officers trained in making presentations the mission and would have If none of the available public information offic has public inforration public and the media.
PSP Headquarters to speak fulfilled the desired criteria, of command by designating a senior of ficer fremThe proximity of PSP 3eadg at the press conference.
ite Media Cer.*.er and become time for another officer to travel to the Near S sufficiently informed before briefing the media.
==
Conclusion:==
blic safety involves In instances where the perceived potential threat to pu sensitive issues such as an incident at a nuclear power plant that is I
ide public information receiving national attention, PSP should plan to provi ld.
support from PSP Headquarters to commanders in the f e
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4 12-13
1 i "y
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Finding #13' SAFEGUARD INFORMATION The NRC is reluctant to share Safeguard or classified information with key i
offsite safety officials who are otherwise qualifled (possess necerity l
j clearances from other federal agencies) to be cleared for such information.
l l
l Discussion:
l l-I
- Withholding Safeguard information from key PEMA Staff has precluded the Agency's participation in security planning as it relates to response from l
offsite agencies.
i Conclusions The NRC should grant Safeguard access to selected State emergency management agency plans and operations personnel who possess other agency I
clearances. over compartmentalization of such classified data has not only impeded the conduct of this review, but it also degrades the Agency's ability to properly plan the Commonwealth's response.for potential accidents involving the shipments of nuclear fuel.
A security event at a nuclear power plant always has radiological safety implications.
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12-14 i
4 r
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Findir J #14 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND SECURITY INTERFACE The State is concerned that the utility emergency planning and security personnel do not interface appropriately.
Discussion:
The NRC Incident Investigation Team (IIT) report (NUREG 1485) cited the,
... poor communications and the ineffective transfer of information between i
operations and security," (p4-3).
Finding 6.7 of the same report (p6-5)
- states, "several past drills provided indications of a
lack of understanding of the plant staff's role in a security event.
Difficulties in the command and control of security and operations were found during security events and drills."
These, along with two other TMI actual (1976 and 1981) precursor events, caused the IIT to conclude that " Previous TMI events, drill critiques, and other reports identified weaknesses that also were evident during the February 7, 1993, event."
In April 1991 there was an FBI drill held at Three Mile Island.
This was an equipped, trained assault force exercise. The exercise was held outside the TMI owner controlled area.
TMI security was asked by the FBI for permission to stage the exercise at TMI.
TMI security gave permission.
There was no involvement of any TMI personnel in the FBI exercise.
The exercise was called to PEMA's attention by residents in the TMI area who were concerned about the activities they were viewing.
TMI security had not advised TMI emergency planning personnel nor PEMA of the proposed exercise.
}
l conclusion:
Utility emergency planning personnel could better perform their functions through awareness of and possible participation in onsite security exercises.
If TMI security, for example, had advised TMI emergency offsite planning or PEMA of the proposed exercise, there might-have been recognition that there were offsite implications.
The separation of security activities from the emergency planning function is artificial and is another example of the detrimental impact of over compartmentalization addressed in Finding #13 of this review.
The " Site Area Emergency" level should be treated by all involved in its full context, not as separate compartments; i.e.,
security event only.
The February 7th event should not be addressed relative to future improvements e
as only improving security or police operations, but rather in a total i
preparedness support planning improvement context.
12-15 h
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