IR 05000318/1985031

Insp Rept 50-318/85-31 on 851101-06.No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Refueling Preparation & Activities,Cycle Fuel Performance Followup & Qa/Qc Interfaces W/Refueling Activities

ML20138K027
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	12/12/1985
From:	Eselgroth P, Wen P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138K026	List: IR 05000318/1985031 ML20138K022
References
50-318-85-31, NUDOCS 8512180188
Download: ML20138K027 (6)

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L .. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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t Report N /85-31

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Docket N License N DPR-69 Priority -

Category C'

Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P. 0.-Box 1475-Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs' Unit No. 2

~ Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland-Inspection Conducted: November 1 - 6, 1985 '

Inspector: .. l2 h p P~eter C. Wen, React' o r Engineer Idate r Approved by: (l)

Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief 'date Test Program Section, OB, DRS Inspection Summary:

Inspection on-November l'- 6, 1985 (Inspection No.50-318/85-31)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of preparation for refuelin~g ,

refueling activities, cycle fuel performance follow-up, and QA/QC interfaces with refueling activities. The inspection involved 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> on site by one ,

region-based inspecto Results: No violations were identifie s f 512180188 851216 I PDR ADOCK 05000318

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C DETAILS I

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1.0 Persons Contacted R. H. Beall, Engineer, Incore Fuel Management

• E. Denton, General Supervisor, Training & Technical Services

! l, *J. A. Mihalcik, Principal Engineer, Fuel Cycle Management 9 * G. Phifer, Jr. , QA Specialist e * E. Roberson, General Supervisor, Quality Assurance Operations s *

L. B. Russell, Plant Superintendent

. *J. O. Wood, Engineer, Fuel Cycle Management *

r Nuclear Regulatory Commission

T. Foley, Senior Resident Inspector

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D. C. Trimble, Jr., Resident Inspector I

• Denotes those present at the exit meeting on November 6, 1985.

The inspector also contacted other licensee employees in the course of the inspectio . Pre-fuekHandlingActivities 2.1 New Fuel Receipt ,

i The inspector reviewed Fuel Handling Procedure FH-1, "New Fuel Assembly and Control Element Assembly Handling, Inspection, and Storage", Rev. 21, for technical adequacy. All 60 new fuel assemblies (FA) and 9 new control element assemblies (CEA) were inspected by the licensee in accordance with this procedur '

FA 2J119 was found with a missing tab on spacer grid #2 on the left face near rod #14. According to fuel vendor's (Combustion Engineering) QC

[ manual (QC 15-11), such a discrepancy was allowed in the fully fabricated fuel assembly. This subject was discussed with a cognizant' licensee en- l gineer. The inspector concurred with the licensee's assessment that the missing tab has no impact on the grid structure functio The inspector had no further question l 2.2L Reload Safety Evaluation

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The cycle 7 reactor core is comprised of 217 FAs. During this refueling outage, 69 FAs from previous cycle operation were replaced by 60 fresh FAs (batch J) and 9 twice burned FAs (8 batch E and I batch D). The remaining 148 FAs (72 batch H and 76 batch G) were

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reshuf fled to new core locations. The reload safety evaluation (RSE)

along with the required Technical Specifications (TS) change were sub-mitted to the NRC for review (Letter from C. H. Poindexter (BG&E) to E.' Butcher, Jr. (NRC), dated August 30,1985). This reload submittal is currently ur, der review by NRR. The basic assumption used in the RSE was previous cycle (cycle 6) burnup between 12,200 MWD /T and 13,800 MWD / The inspector verified the actual cycle 6 Surnup to be 13,249 MWD /T. The assumption is thus vali .3 Fuel Inspection Due to core symmetry considerations, FAs 1E110 and IE115 were loaded in the Cycle 6 operation. Both FAs contained knowr grid damage prior to Cycle 6 operation. During the refueling period, both FAs were discharged and inspected at the spent fuel pool by the licensee. Although FA 1E110 showed additional material missing around one grid spring tab, no sign of fretting damage appeared on the nearby fuel rods. FA 1E115 did not show any further deterioration. This fuel inspection indicated that the de-graded grid structure did not affect the fuel performance in the Cycle 6 operation. Both fuel assemblies have completed 3 cycles of irradiation and will not be reuse In addition, eight (8) batch E and one (1) batch D FAs were inspected by the licensee in the spent fuel pool using the underwater periscope per procedure FH-39 prior to loading into the core. No major problems were found which would adversely affect the Cycle 7 operation. Most of the reported deficiencies involved minor fretting in the spacer grids. How-ever, the inspector noted that there were no inspections performed for the batch G and batch H fuel assemblie To assess the impact of this lack of inspection on batch G and H fuel assemblies, the inspector reviewed Cycle 6 fuel performance data. From the data reviewed, the inspector noticed that at least one fuel rod has been leaking since May, 1985. However, the effect of this leaking fuel rod did not increase the primary coolant activity significantly. The specific activity at the end of Cycle 6 (October, 1985) was about 0.005 to 0.007 uCi/ gram dose equivalent I-131 which was still well within TS limit of 1.0 uCi/ gram. In view of these facts, even with the degraded fuel rod still remaining in the core, the projected Cycle 7 primary coolant activ-ity is not likely to challenge the operation limit. The inspector had no further question .4 Refueling Preparations Fuel handling procedure FH-6, " Core Refueling Procedure", Rev. 12, was reviewed by the inspector to confirm that the surveillance prerequisites of TS 3/4. 9 " Refueling Operations", were addressed through Appendix H checkoff lists and required shift supervisor's signatur J

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ia o.a.1 requires a boron concentration sufficient to ensure either a K,ff of 0.95 or less, or a concentration greater than 2300 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive during the refueling period. Based on the Com-bustion Engineering Cycle 7 design calculation, a boron concentration of 1891 ppm corresponds to K,ff of 0.937, therefore, the 2300 ppm requirement is more restrictive. The inspector verified this requirement daily through control room operator log revie No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Fuel Handling Operations The inspector witnessed refueling operations on November 2, 3, and 4, 1985. These direct observations were made on the refueling floor and in the control room to verify that:

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Crew makeup was as required;

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Dedicated communications existed between the control room and personnel at the refueling station;

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Source range neutron flux monitors were operable and audible indica-tion was provided in the containment and control roo Containment integrity was maintaine Personnel and tool accountabilities were controlle Housekeeping around the refueling floor was acceptabl Adequate water level was maintained above the top of fuel assemblie Boron concentrations were as required by TS; and,

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Fuel accountability was in accordance with procedure The inspector noted that the refueling operation was conducted delib-erately and in accordance with the detailed procedure (FH-6). The refuel-ing operations were acceptable with no incidents occurring during the inspection period (Nov. I through 6, 1985). However, on October 29, 1985, the first day of refueling, during CEA swaps, CEA-X was inadvertently moved towards its final location before being completely withdrawn from the assembly. The CEA handling tool was moved laterally about 2 feet relative to about 41 feet of vertical grapple distance. The licensee did the following prior to installing CEA-X back to its intended positio Periscope inspection was performed. Only minor indications were found on the corner fingers of contact faces.

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Drag tests-were performed twice. 'Both tests confirmed that there was no excessive friction between the CEA and the guide tub Combustion Engineering was consulted and concluded that no safety implication was involved. The CEAs will be further tested for drop

' time measurement as required by TS 4.1.3.4 prior to Cycle 7 startu The inspector had no further questions regarding this CEA-X inciden The inspector independently performed 1/M calculations during fuel loading to verify the licensee's calculations. The calculations were in agreemen .1 Core Verification The licensee performed core verification in accordance with procedure FH-6, Appendix E, " Fuel Loading Verification Check" on November 4,198 The inspector witnessed portion of the core verification process in the

. containment. The inspector also reviewed one-half of the core verifica-tion videotapes and verified that the as-loaded pattern agreed with the .

intended core loading plan (Letter from J. E. Baum (CE) to J. A. Mihalcik (BG&E), "Calvert Cliffs 1 Cycle 7 Fuel Core Loading Pattern", dated October 22,1985).

No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Independent Calculations / Verifications The inspector performed independent calculations / verifications of Cycle 6/7 refueling related activitie These included:

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Independent 1/M calculations as described in Section Core loading verification as described in Section .0 QA/QC Interface The inspector reviewed QA/QC interfaces with the refueling operations in progress. The inspector noted that QC ' personnel were actively involved in the following refueling related activities:

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Inspection of refueling floor cleanliness; and

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Personnel and material accountability.

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l-QA has a more direct involvement in refueling operations by performing periodic monitoring of refueling operations. Based on discussions with a QA lead auditor, QA had a thorough plan to cover the refueling operation.

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Verifying Fuel Handling procedures meet appropriate requirements;

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. Verifying compliance of refueling operations to TS requirements fuel handling procedures, and Quality Assurance plan; and

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Participation in core loading verificatio During the inspection period, the inspector noted that a QA auditor was actively involved in the activities as mentioned abov i No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Exit Interview Licensee management was informed of the purpose and scope of the inspec-tion at the entrance intervie The findings of the inspection were periodically discussed and were summarized at the conclusion of the inspection on November 6, 1985. Attendees at the exit interview are denoted in paragraph 1. Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives at the exit intervie it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction .

No written material-was provided to the licensee by the inspector at any time during this inspection.

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