IR 05000317/1985025

Insp Repts 50-317/85-25 & 50-318/85-22 on 850909-11.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness & Observation of full-scale Annual Exercise on 850910

ML20138D078
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	10/15/1985
From:	Borchardt R, Harpster T, Hawxhurst J, Kenny T, Lynch T, Stoetzel G, Trimble D, Vito D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138D065	List: IR 05000317/1985025 ML20138D061
References
50-317-85-25, 50-318-85-22, NUDOCS 8510230163
Download: ML20138D078 (10)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.___ - _ _ - . .. __ _ .- . . .- . . '

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No /85-25 50-318/85-22 Occket No License Nos. DPR-53 DPR-69 Priority -- Category C

,

Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company i P.O. Box 1475

,

Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant-Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Lusby, Maryland

!

Inspection Conducted: September 9-11, 1985 Inspector:

D. Vito,/Sr , Emergency Preparedness

        /0/3 i         # ddte Sp 1hlit,EPRPg,DRSS

R. b da W rchardt ,C/RI kNITC

        /daie"  i J. A-  J   tokk<

crate t awxhp 'of ,')NRC/R1 T. J enny, NRC

     .

tl l0lCff 3da(e l ' .AW l0 IS b T. Cyn B tje e/PNL /d'ath Jr/ /6/lhT[  ! G. St e el, at lle/PNL baty  ;

!
    '

D. Trim e,NRC/ReAidentInspector, h /O!l[[\ l

        ~ datd ~  t Calve Cliffs (/

,

           !

i i 8510230163 851010

PDR ADOCK 05000317-G PDR I

l

..r-v--- .- . . , - - , ~  . . - - , - . - , - - -.
      ,,,. .,. .-..,----_.-v - , . - . - r, , , , -

.

f__

#

Approved by: h/ O 10 f

    / [1G
    / 89 T. L. Harpst'eril Chief, Emergency
 ~

Preparednes i Section /da[e ~ Inspection Summary: Inspec von on September 9-11, 198 (Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/85-25 and 50-316'/85-22.)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of a full-scale annual exercise conducted on September 10, 198 The inspection involved 190 inspector hours by a team of seven NRC Region I and NRC contractor personne Results: The licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise demons-trated that they could provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Six prior items of concern were closed as a result of this exercise; one item was a repeat concern, and; one item remained open awaiting actio : i l _ _

. _ = _ - - . = = - ._- - - . _ .. . _ - .
.
.

DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following license representatives attended the exit meeting on September 11, 198 T. Forgette, Supervisor, Emergency Planning A. E. Lundvall, Vice President Supply L. B. Russell, Plant Superintendent J. Tiernan, Manager, Nuclear Power In addition, other licensee personnel were present at the exit meeting, interviewed by the inspectors, and observed during the exercis .0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

'

2.1 (Closed) (50-317/84-24-01) Provide enough scenario data to fully test the response of the TSC.

d The scenario provided both data and challenging problems to the TSC and OSC.

l 2.2 (Closed) (50-317/84-24-02) Provide access control and identification of response personnel in the TS No problems were evident for emergency response personnel access to TSC; key response personnel were identified in the TS .3 (Closed)(50-317/84-24-03) Provide training to control room personnel as to the methodology used to get incore thermocouple reading No problem was eviden .4 (0 pen) (50-317/84-24-04) ! ' Perform a reliability study of the MIDAS system and modify the system based on the study to ensure its availability during an inciden The MID S system was only used as a backup to both the manual dose calculations (in the annual EP exercise) and the verbal meteorological data transfer to the E0F. The licensee has indicated that the system will be installed onsite to improve reliability and used as a primary dose assessment syste !

  -. . - - - - . -_  _ - . , , - --,--- -

 -- .  - _- - - -
-

t 2.5 (Closed) (50-317/84-24-05) Provide periodic briefings to the TSC to ensure that work to be i performed is prioritized and responsibility for accomplishment is ' assigne . 1 Periodic briefings were provided in the TSC during the exercise and ! staff were being effectively utilize I 2.6 (Closed) (50-317/84-24-06) Maintain status boards in the OS The OSC director assumed positive control of the OSC and gave fre-quent briefings to the staff; status boards were maintaine .7 (Closed) (50-317/84-24-07) Consideration should be given to evacuation time estimates before making protective action recommendation The Site Emergency Coordinator considered: plant conditions; radio-logical release status and potential duration; offsite dose conse-quences, and; potentially affected postulations. Initial protective action recommendations for this exercise did not warrant detailed consideration of evacuation time estimates due to the nature of the releas .8 (0 pen) (50-317/84-24-08) The RAD failed to demonstrate considerations and recommendations of KI for site personnel to the SEC as advised in the appropriate pro-cedur The Radiological Assessment Director again failed to adequately con-sider recommendation of KI for emergency workers (offsite).

3.0 Emergency Exercise The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant site full-scale exercise was con-

ducted on September 10, 1985, from 5

45 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. In addition, Recovery Actions were discussed for approximately an hour following the exercis .1 Pre-Exercise Activities

! Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had I telephone discussions with licensee representatives and provided ' written comments on the scope and content of the objectives and scenario. As a result, the scenario was revised prior to the exer-cise and these revisions of certain scenario data were available at l l m_

.

. a license briefing of NRC and INPO observers on September 9, 198 In addition, some NRC observers attended a licensee briefing for licensee controllers and observers the following day at 7:00 a.m., September 10, 198 The exercise scenario included the following events:

*

Unit 1 shutdown for reactor coolant pump seal repairs and Unit 2 operating at approximately 100% power;

*

Unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak, 9 gpm;

*

Containment air lock door fails open;

*

Access control area vent radiation monitor reading greater than 9.4E05 cpm, for longer than 15 minutes;

*

RCS leakage increases to approximately 100 gpm;

*

Reactor and main turbine trip (Thermal Margin / Low pressure)

*

Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA);

*

Safety injection actuation signal followed by blocked alarm;

*

Release of radioactive gases to atmosphere via Unit 2 plant vent, and;

*

Recovery and reentry concern The above events resulted in the activation of the licensee's emergency facilitie .2 Exercise Observation During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response persont 91 during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

(1) Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; (2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response; (3) Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information;

.
-

(4) Communications /information flow, and record keeping; (5) Assessment and tracking of radiological (done) data and consideration of protective action; (6) Provision for in plant radiation protection; (7) Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys; (8) Performance of technical support; (9) Performance of repair and corrective actions; (10) Activation and operation of EOF; (11) Performance of PASS; (12) Management of Accident recovery operations, and; (13) Dissemination of public informatio The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the emergency response facilities; and actions and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing pro-cedures. The team also noted the following areas where the licen-see's activities were efficiently implemented;
*

The objectives and scenario package were submitted to the NRC in a timely manner for their review. Appropriate changes were made to reflect NRC concerns;

*

Emergency levels were promptly identified based upon initiating conditions;

*

Control Room staff quickly recognized plant problems and took appropriate corrective actions;

*

TSC was manned expeditiously;

*

The OSC Director assumed positive control of the OSC and gave frequent briefings to the staff;

*

Dosimetry personnel referred to a print-out of worker exposures for the current year prior to issuing dosimetry;

*

Offsite monitoring teams provided clear and concise data to the monitoring team leader; l l

_. _ . . _ . . _ , _ _ . ___. _ _ __ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . ____

.

t

'

5 j

> * Team members- kept track of their exposures and regularly transmitted them to the team leader;

   * Dose assessment status boards and support documentation were well

kept; i

   * EOF habitability surveys were requested in a timely manner; I

"

   * Primary communications links with the control room and the TSC were established and maintained throughout the exercise, and;
!    * Individuals were knowledgeable and professional in their     .

action '

!

l 3.3 The following are the NRC Team findings in areas requiring additional i licensee attention. Most of these findings were also identified by  ; ] the licensee as part of their critiqu NRC open item (84-24-08) on consideration and recommendation of KI

            '

j

'

for site personnel was initially addressed by the RAD but, was not

!

pursued. As a result, an estimated 7 Rem thyroid dose could have l been incurred by offsite monitoring team members. This Open Item l will be re-reviewed during a subsequent NRC/RI inspection.

i l Certain practices conducted within the Technical Support Center that j could have contributed to a degraded response were: L f

   =

j Not providing enough equipment to support a prolonged emergency,

'

specifically communications for NRC (Resident Inspector

Identified).

This area of concern is designated as an Open Item (50-317/85-25-01 and 50-318/85-22-01) and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC:RI inspectio .

            !

Certain practices co'nducted in conjunction with the Operations  ! t Support Center (OSC) that could have contributed to a degraded

response were:

   *

Misleading information provided to the OSC initially caused j confusion, lack of sufficient controller / observer intervention; f * When a plant team exited the auxiliary building (an actual radiological control area), whole-body frisking was not per-

            ,

i '

formed;

' * OSC communicator was not properly trained, essentially he had to be shown how to contact the ERFs and where' the phone listings i ! were kept, and;  : ! l I l F

. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ _ _ -   .__
      ._. _ _ __ _ . . _ _ _ , . _ _ . . _ , . _ _ , _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _

.
*

* OSC receives plant information from the EOF which resulted in an information delay early in the exercise until the EOF was staffe This area of concern is designated as an Open Item (50-317/85-25-02, 50-318/85-22-02).

Certain practices conducted relative to the post-accident sample system (PASS) that could have contributed to a degraded response were:

* Apparent inability to acquire a PASS sample during simulated accident conditions;
* The first PASS attempt (containment atmosphere sample),

had major problems getting the sample due to procedural and/or training problems (keys needed, path alicnment and biopack problems),and;

*

During the second attempt to get a PASS sample, both team mem-bers encountered problems with their biopacks. As a result, it is highly unlikely they would have been able to complete the job because it would have taken longer than 45 minute These concerns are identified as Unresolved Item (50-317/85-25-03 and 50-318/85-22-03) and will be reviewed during a subsequent special NRC:RI inspectio Certain practices related to Dose Assessment that could contribute to a degraded protective action recommendation are:

*

Transition of direction and control for the radiological moni-toring teams (outside the plant) was incomplete in that sample data (iodine air) was not transferred to the EOF;

*

Meteorological data is not provided directly to the EOF dose assessment personnel, consequently incomplete and misinformation hampered the overall assessment;

* Erroneous information passed from the control room to EOF on WRNG monitor release rate at 10:00 a.m. lead to an order of magnitude increase in dose rate at the site boundary which was never verified or corrected;
*

It was not always clear who was "in-charge" of the dose assess-ment area (EOF). The assistant RAD frequently gave direction to , staff and briefed SEC; ! l l

.. -- - - - . -

.
.
*

l 1 * No real dose projections were performed using projected meteo-rological and radiological data, only plume tracking using - actual measured data;

;  .* The MIDAS computer was not effectively utilized to provide dose a

projections, manual centerline hand calculations were used as l the primary means for assessment, and; i ? * Integrated dose calculations were overly conservative, no change j in wind direction was assumed and values were only calculated i at 3 centerline distances (site boundary, 5,10 mi.). I 1 * In addition, due to oversimulation (data collection and MIDAS i calculations) of initial dose assessment and failure to provide adequate dose projections, a scenario objective in this area was i not met.

i , This area of concern is designated as an Open. Item (50-317/85-04 and

! 50-318/85-22-04).

. Certain practices conducted related to offsite field monitoring that coula contribute to a degraded offsite assessment are: l * No Open/ Closed window. readings by monitoring teams traversing

:  the plum.e (Equipment (E-520) will not accurately reflect the

} dose rates due to. shielding of the beta radiation); l l

 *

Contamination control was lacking during the handling and count-

i ing of filters. Gloves were not worn when handling the charcoal cartridges. The scintillation probe was in direct contact with 3 the cartridge during counting, and; ! * An estimated 7 Rem Thyroid dose could have been incurred by {' team members. No mention of the use of KI was received from the RAD at the E0F.

) This area of concern is designated as an Open Item (50-317/85-25-05 i and 50-318/85-22-05) and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC:RI l inspection.

! Certain practices conducted within the Emergency Operations Facility l that could have contributed to a degraded response were: i j * Emergency notification for the Alert and General Emergency were not completed within the required 15 minute time period; i i * The initial notification form (Attachment 1) for the general

emergency was not completed by ECOM and it is not clear if i Maryland Emergency Management was notified by the licensee directly, and; I

!

      *

! i l

. _ _ .- . _ .-____ _ _. . _ .. _  .__ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ - . . _
.
*
,
.
*

$

!   * After declaring the GE, there was a deviatian' from NRC recom-    l mended policy in IE Information Notice d3-28 in not making    I
,

immediate protective actions recommcedation This area of concern is designated as a's Unresolved Item '

(50-317/85-25-06 and 50-318/85-22-06) and will be reviewed during a j subsequent NRC

RI inspectio + i

!  3.4 Exercise Critique    ,

i The-NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique during I which strengths and improvement items were presented by the

'

evaluator j 4.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with licensee

   ~

k i representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader sum-i marized the observations made during the exercise and discussed the areas ] described in Section 3 of this repor '

 .The licensee was informed that no violations were observed. In addition, the licensee was informed that although there were areas identified which required additional licensee attention, the NRC team determined that
.

within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's perfor-l mance demonstrated that they could implement the Emergency Plan and l Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately

provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

! j License management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-

priate action would be taken regarding the areas identified as being in i need of additional licensee attention.

i

          ,

l At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written [

information to the license j i  !

          ,

b

          -
,

! i i . ' I

          >

I

          !,

i

          !
- - - - - . . _ - _ _ . - - . .- - . - ..-...-.-. - .- -. - _- .-.. - _ -

}}