ML20141M857

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Investigation,Analysis & Corrective Action for River Bend Station,860101 Loss of Offsite Power
ML20141M857
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/28/1986
From: Henry G
GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20141M856 List:
References
NUDOCS 8602280466
Download: ML20141M857 (35)


Text

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ATTACHMENT 6

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1-28-86 IhVESTIGATICN, ANALYSIS AND CORRIETIVE ACTICN

- FOR RIVER BDO STATICN JANUARY 1,1986 IOSS T GTSITE POWER PURPOSE

%e purpose of this report is to describe the investigations, analysis and corrective actions that have been taken by Gulf States Utilities prior and subsequent to return to power for the January 1,1986 loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power is documented in Condition Report 86-0003 of January 1,1986 (Attachnent 1, pages 1 through 10) .

In addition, this report documents the " Subsequent Actions After Return O

" to Power" to assure that within reascnable certainty the conditions will not recur. his report serves as that action and as input to Itan 9 of the Condition Report with the empletion of the outstanding work described herein.

SUWARY A loss of offsite power (IOP) was experienced at the River Bend Station (RBS) on January 1, 1986. This is documented via Condition Report Ib.

86-0003 and via the tbtification of Unusual Event (?KUE) , GSU to NPO letter RBG-22,911 of January 2,1986 (Attachnent 2) . It will also be addressed in Licensing Event Report 86-002.

Gulf States Utilities has investigated and carefully reviewed the event and has concluded with "high probability" that it was caused by radio frequency interference with the tone equipnent backup relaying between j the plant and Fancy Point substation.

l Corrective actions for the root cause have been taken and additional i actions are in progress as described below. %ere is no unreviewed safety question.

f DISCUSSICN AND ACTICNS We following is intended to describe in a chronological order, as l nearly as practical, the actions taken subsequent to the loss and restoration of offsite power to the plant on January 1, 1986 and additional actions underway to assure, with a high degree of confidence, that a loss of offsite power (ISP) will not recur in the future. In the discussion, the justifications and rationale are presented.

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' GSU Vice President, Jim Deddens, conducted a briefing meeting the first Don thing en January 2, 1986, subsequent to the IOP on January 1.

Peynerson, Director NuPE, was directed to form a task force to investigate the IOP as directed by Mr. Deddens' January 2, 1986 1

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1-28-86 menorandum (Attachnent 3) . % e directions were to diagnose, reccamend corrective actions for return to power and reccmmend changes and inprovements to prevent future occurrences.

% e task force met several times and conducted tests on both January 2 and 3, 1986. B ere were no protective relaying initiating targets which would indicate that an actual fault had occurred. % rough further investigation of the pilot wire relaying and circuits, no misoperations were found. Both the tone and pilot wire systeuns functioned as designed during followup testing.

Since the initial testing of the pilot wire and tone transfer trip circuits verified that the equipnent was operating properly, tests were conducted, using the fodr and five watt radio transrritters as used by .

Operations and Security personnel and a 100 watt mobile radio, to deter:rine the equignent susceptibility to radio frequency interference (RFI) . Although keying of the 100 wett mobile unit outside the Fancy Point substation control building had no effect on the equipment, keying of the four and five watt transmitters inside the control building repeatedly produced trip signals.

The task force has been unable to show conclusively that anyone was inside the Fancy Point control building at the tine of the first trip (09:41). Operations personnel were in the area during the second trip (10:44). However, due to the now proven susceptibility of the tone transfer trip equipnent to RFI, the task force has concluded with "high probability" that the trip was initiated by RFI causing the backup tone relaying equipnent to be erroneously keyed and causing the IOP. mis report is contained in pages 11 through 15 of Attachnent 1.

The balance of this report addresses the corrective actions of the task force stated on pages 13 and 14 of Attachment 1, by Action Item number.

It also identifies additional actions determined in pursuing those.

I.A. Tony Fredieu, Assistant Operating Supervisor, confirmed on January

6, 1986 that all operating shifts had been notified via shift briefings not to take or use portable radios inside the Fancy point substation building. The same effect was acccmplished by Security on Jaauary 3 and 4, 1986 (see pages 16 and 17 of l

Attachnent 1) .

I I.B. Signs were posted on January 3, 1986 en all doors to the substation building and at the substation entrance gate restricting radio use beyond this point. 01 January 6,1986 the sign at the gate was revised to indicate no radio use within the substation building to allow usage in the yard.

I.C. An operator aid (page 15 of Attacnment 1) was posted at both ICES Panel 1F in the Turbine Building and 2CES Panel 1G in the l

Auxiliary Control Focn on January 3,1986 to provide instructions on ho,e to reset the relay equipnent.

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1-28-86 I.D. %e tone system was returned to service the evening of January 3, 1986.

%e above were empleted, or ongoing in the case of item I.A., prior to return to power.

Follow-up and inplanentation action was delegated to Greg Henry, Supervisor NuPE-EE. The follow-up task force consisted of:

A. Bysfield (GSU/ Tech Staff)

G. Canfield (GSU/T&D Relaying)

O. Cassidy (GSU/ NAPE)

R. Cole (GSU/ Projects)

L. Dopson (GSU/Beatatont Engr.)

J. Ducote (GSU/T&D Comunications)

J. Hargrove (GSU/ Beaumont Engr.)

D. Powell (GSU/ Beaumont Engr.)

J. Reeves (GSU/ Baton Rouge T&D)

T. Shea (SWEX'/SII;)

Still referencing pages 13 and 14 of Attachment I for item numbers, the following subsequent actions have or are being inplemented with the schedule noted for outstanding iters.

II.A. We training department added Fancy Point protective relaying as a two hour addition to License Requalification, the Hot License Operator Training and the Nuclear Equipnent Operator Training (see Attachment 4) . Wis training cm menced the week of January 13, 1986 and will be cmpleted on or before March 28, 1986.

II.B. The manufacturer of the tone equipnent, G.E., claimed that they had heard of loss of guard, but not keying due to RF interference. Studies were performed and reemrendations made to eliminate RFI interference (see pages 1 and 2 of Attachnent 5).

A purchase order was issued (Attachment 6) for the material to construct RF shielding around the tone egaipnent in the .

substation. No additional shielding is being added in the plant since the tone equipnent is in a concrete walled roan with metal doors.

INSTALL SHIEID STRUCIURE: R. Cole by January 31, 1986 INSTALL PF SHIEID: J. Ducote by February 12, 1986 II.C. A study was performed in April,1984 in response to FSAR question 430.14 (8.2.1) . The tone / fibre optic system was installed as a

" diverse" method to provide plant to substation protective relaying control functions. Wis cm mitment was added to the FSAR via Amendment 13. This study was revisited considering the tone equipnent as well as other backup relaying options (pages 3 through 6 of Attachment 5) with the reccrimndation that two tone 3

a 1-28-86 trip signals, instead of only one as was being used, be present for a transfer trip to be initiated. 'Ihis provides the type 40 tone equipnent added security against RF interference nuisance trips (IDP without actual fault) . This work was accmplished by a Tertporary Alteration. Itdification Request MR-86-0081 (Attachnent 7) was issued to document and make the fix permanent.

MR INTERDEPr. QUEKLISTS: R. Cole by January 28, 1986 REMOVE TEMP ALT: A. Bysfield by January 29, 1986 II.D. Initial review of the d-c feeds to the tone equipnent revealed that in sme cases the power and keying had different battery sources for the same tone channel (see Attachnent 8) . 'Ihe -

voltages could vary causing transients in the control circuits especially if a battery charger was lost - possibly causing inadvertent signals. A Tertporary Alteration was made to rectify this. In addition, a Modification Request MR-86-0026 (Attachnent 4

9) was issued to document and make the fix permanent.

INIERDEPT. CHDCKLISTS: R. Cole by January 28, 1986 RENOVE TEMP ALT: A. Bysfield by January 29, 1986 II.E. 'Ihe lock-up features of the tone relaying equipnent was carefully reviewed by engineering and reported on Attachment 5, Itern E, page 6 and Figure 2. By resetting 86-RxBB and/or 86RxPB2,first, as the other 86 relays may be reset (Note: x is either 1 or appropriate). 'Ihus , the Operator Aids described in Item I.C.

' above were revised and replaced with those shown en Attachment 10.

II.F. Seguence of events recorders have been purchased for installation at both the plant and substation to monitor both pilot wire and tone equignent. 'Ihe recorders are being installed to rnonitor status and trip signals not indicated by target relays (see Attachment 11). A purchase order has been issued for the equiptent. bbdification Request MR-86-0027 (Attachment 12) was issued to emplete the plant raceway and cable work. An additional Modification Request MR 86-0098 (Attachment 16) was generated to perform the termination work. Installation cable termination will be empleted in accordance with the following

schedule

i MR Itnuwtri'. GIDCKLISTS: R. Cole by January 28, 1986 INSTALL CABLES & RACEWAYS: A. Bysfield by January 29, 1986 INSTALL PI1NT EQUIP: A. Bysfield by January 30, 1986 MAKE TERMINATIONS AT SUBSTATICN AfD PIANT DURING d]TAGE APTER 35% POWER: G. Canfield by February 5, 1986 l

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II.G. We GSU operating T&D personnel have been instructed not to take radios into the Fancy Point Substation building and to keep the II.H. doors locked (see Attachment 13) . In addition, the gate locks have been changed using non-duplicatable keys and controlled distribution of the keys.

In addition to the above there are several other actions that were identified as an ongoing review by the task force, by GSU management, and NRC reviews. These are identified below, including their scheduled action:

1. Operations was instructed and signs were posted at the two doors to the rocm containing the CES panels, where the tone equipnent is located in the plant, to not use RF equipnent in the rocun and to keep the doors locked.
2. It was noted during the course of equignent checkouts that the shield wires for the three pilot wire circuit schemes are grounded

' through a ccanon grounding reactor. During fault conditions, circulating currents could possibly be induced frczn one circuit set of shields to another. %erefore it was decided to install three additional reactors on the plant side to provide individual

grotniing for each circuit's shields. Itxlification Request MR-86-0093 (Attachment 14) has been issued for this work.

l MR INTERDEPr. CHECKLISTS: R. Cole by January 28, 1986 j

INSTALL REACIOPS: A. Bysfield by January 29, 1986

3. It was discussed with the NRC and concluded by the task force that 4

alanns (one each for Fancy Ibint and plant) should be added to the control room for tcne equipnent trouble. Thus, the plant would not have to rely solely on the SCADA system alann via microwave to the l

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Baton Rouge dispatcher's office and call back to the plant.

Modification Request MR-86-0094 (Attachment 15) was issued for this

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j work. Mditionally, printed circuit cards have been ordered as replacements in the tone equipnent racks for each channel. These canis will allow not only loss of channel alanns, but also loss of guard and trip signals. Ch receipt, they will be installed to give additional alarm and events recorder indication without The any additional cable installation or terminations required.

, schedule for the work is as follows:

CCMPIETE MR DESIGN: SWEC/GE by January 28, 1986 NUPE MR REVIEH: J. Cassidy by January 29, 1986 MR INTERDEPr. CHECKLISTS: R. Cole by January 30, 1986

, SUBSTATICH INSTALIATICN: G. Canfield by February 3, 1986

! PIAVr INSTALIATICN: A. Bysfield by February 5, 1986

' CARD REPI1CDB7f: Ducote/ Canfield by April 18, 1986 5

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4. Develop or incorporate into existing prochs the instructions  ;

neccesary .for maintaining the events recorders (i.e., paper supply r and routine mintenance).

CtEPIEI'E FROCQUhES: A. Bysfield by J&nuary 29, 1996 ,

i S. Freventatin Maintenance Procedure EMP-1210 has teen issued for '

testing tPe tcna t'ystens on a conthly basic instead of the l

smi-anmsal cycle that was beine used. ,

1 CCNC11S10fl  ;

i Although not kro.n with 100% certainty that the tone equi m t, via radio frequency interference, caused the LOP on January 1,1985, the ,

i i 3mestigatiw and fo11cv .:p task fcrce belieses it to be the case witu a i "high probability" ittm all indications, tAnserous reasures 11we bec taken to elleeinate this possibility in tre i future and to rake t2n tone wyctem in c h cote secure. Thr.se '.rclo<ie l

providing FF Meldi;g, double trip signals, postirq slans, locking

doors, prohibited PF equiper2.t in the area, trainito, additier.al i tuonitoring egaipnent, control recm 41arr's , nore trequent tecting, acd other design irgrovements.

'Ihe task force believes that with these design inprovsts and f 4 -modifications the tone relaying equitrent vill cc.tinue to provido 4

highly reliable relay 1;rotectican with significe.tly icproved security against erroneous trippir.g wftich could ot.sedbly upse a 16P. 'This ccurse of action was also wice with .Mi atprwei by t.5e Faci uty Pcview Comittee on January 14,19M.  ;

A Mnnar/ schedule for cernpletion of the outstanding work to close out i the Condition acport is shown on Attacirmat 17. ,

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.a 1-28-86 Attachtents: 1 - 17 pages Condition Feport No. 86-0003 2- 4 pages RB3-22,911 dated January 2, 1986 3- 1 page JCD-001-S6 dated January 2, 1996 4- 3 pages Nr-0245 dated January 10, 1986 5 - 10 pages Memo to D. Reynerson dated January 9, 1986 6- 1 page Purchase Bequisition AXX-24960 7- 1 page e dification Request 86-0081 8- 1 page DC Feeds 9- 1 page N dification Request 86-0026 i 10 - 2 pages h . e-Aed operator Aid for Resetting 86 lockouts l

11 - 3 pages Sequence of Events Recorders 12 - 1 page N dification Request 86-0027 13 - 1 page Mano to All T&D Operating B@loyees dated January 6, 1986 14 - 1 page :tx11ficatien aequest 86-0093 15 - 1 page m dification Request 86-0094 l

16 - 1 page Modification aequest 86-0098 l 17 - 1 page Sunnuy Schedule of Outstanding wbrk to Close Out Condition Report l

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ATTACHMENT 7 m au.mw-,g ,,

Hardware Helated Events Power Systems Including 94itchyards In a review of all License Event Reports (IER's) we have found nine I2R's that dealt with problems with electrical power / control ancerns.

LER 85-002 CR 85-0287 85-006 85-0334 85-009 85-0372 85-017 85-0460 85-028 85-0475 85-055 85-0624 85-057 85-0648 Turbine Trip of 12/31/85 85-0703 IOP of 1/1/86 86-0003 of these nine IIR's three were detemined to be personnel errors:

85-002,85-017, and 85-028, four were determined to be equipnent failures / malfunctions:

85-006,85-009, nirbine Trip, and ICP, one was determined to be a design / procedural error 85-055, and one is still considered in$eteminate:

85-057.

Attachttent 1 provides a brief synopsis of each of theso LER's.*

An " Electrical Distribution Problens Task Force" has just recently been organized to research problens such as spurious trips or continual ,

equipment malfunctions in nore detail. This group is in the process of reviewing condition Reports ard LER's to determine trends and to establish solutions to ecstplex distribution problems. Attac! rent 2

' provides an overall scope of the problers that the task force is presently addressirq.

  • The IOP LER is not addressed here because of the earlier r

presentation.

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Page 1 of 4-Attachment 1 CR 85-0287 09-04-85 ID 85-002 1

Reactor Protection System Isolation Three Actuations:

1) Manually tripped RPS Channel "A" to perform maintenance calibration.

Construction sinultaneously generated a noise spike frm handling '

main steam line radiation nunitors, which caused Channel "B" trip. ,

scram discharge volume filled with water due to first

2) High actuation.
3) Repeat of what happened in the first actuation.

Correction Actions Taken:

1) Ceased inspection of radiation nonitors.  ;
2) Radiation nonitors jtzrpered out of the RPS logic until they are fully operational and are repired.

CR 85-0334 99-16-85 In 85-006 Reactor Protection System tatuation Spurious trip occurred on Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) C71*S003E in PPS Channel " A" alternate pcu r feed due to malfu.mion of unde 1 voltage timr uction in EPA logic card.

Corrective Action:

R*placed the printed circuit board, functionally tested and returned to service, i

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I Page 2 of 4 Attachnent 1 IIR 85-009 CR 85-0372 09-26-85 Beactor Water Cleanup Contairunent Bolation Spurious actuations caused by obtaining tarperature readings on a leak i

detection differential testperature. Cause is a generic design prcblan in U.S. Riley type tetperature switches.  !

Corrective Action:

MR 85-0589 adds a 5.9 Kohn resistor on affected U.S. Riley terrperature switches.

, LER 85-017 CR 85-0460 10-25-85 ESF Isolation of E12*HWF008 (Shutdown Cooling Suction to RHR Ptstp A)

Technician inadvertently grounded a recorder lead in an attorpt to attach the lead to a relay teminal. Fuse B21H-F76A blew.

Corrective Action i STP-204-0602 was revised to attach all signal point test leads to a tenninal block.

CR 85-0475 10-30-85 i _IIR 89-028_

PRR "A" Isolation and RPS "B" Ioss of Power Electrical technician inadvertently tripped it@S-SWG1B, ACB-25. This is the main supply breaker for the 1NPS-SWG1B bus.

Correction Action:

Since the incidont was caused by personnel error and the onployee has been instructed concerning his errer no further corrective action is deemed necessary, i

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Page 3 of 4 Attachtent 1 i

LER 85-055 CR 85-0624

. loss of RPS Bus "D" Power with Ioss of Annulus Pressure Control, PhCU Isolation and RHR Isolation Drawing error caused an error in the procedure. Troubleshooting to determine the error resulted in personnel error when a technician shorted across two terminals.

Corrective Actfon:

i MR 85-1138 was initiated to correct drawing error. 'ICT 85-4892 to FrP-508-4802 es initiated to correct the ptx:edure.

LER 85-057 CR 85-0648 12-16-85 Voltage Transient on Div. I Power Buses Causes ESF Actuations Breaker 1NNS-ACB-06, which is the supply breaker for ite:S-5WGIA from ISTX-XNS1C, was closed in on a hot INNS-SWG1A bus causing a backfeed

< through the ISTX-XNSIC transformer to tfA 22Kv isophase bus. ACB-06 imediately tripped but the resulting transients caused autmatic initiations of Div. I Standby Cos Treatment, Div. I and II Annulus Mixing, and Div. II Control Roczn HVAC.

i Conclusions; Investigation into .pecific ESP actuations is inconclusive. nrnentary loss of power (severe voltage drop) to Div. I power buses would allow Annulus Pressuro Control System (AICS) pressure control danper to close.

Standby Gas and Annulus Mixing would start on icw flow. Ioss of Div. I power would also cause loss of Div. I control building HVAC to trip and Div. II control building INAC to start. Further investigation required.

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Page 4 of 4 Attachnent i CR 85 0703 12-31-85 IER

  • Turbire Trip and anactor scram Ite Turbine Trip was caused by a crebinaticca pressure transducer failed high and a rate of current change transient caused by a fault on a 50G:v line south of Willcu Clen, Corrective Action:

Pressure trarsducer reworked. Itdification Request sutnitted for sequence turbine intercept valves back open after a fast clomare to prevent pressure transients in the DiC syst<e.

  • LER to be suimitted by-Jarwxy 31, 1986, l-

Page 1 of 2 Attachrent 2 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION FROBLIMS TFM 1. E. Cole FI M Ett M. O' Brian Description of Problem Electrical distribution -problems, generally related to transisnts, are _

causing unit trips or operating problems. Page 2 contains a brief synopsis provided by the Plant Manager. These problems cause abnormal effects in one or more plant systems and lessen confidence that the plant will respond in a predictable manner. Review of the 10 Condition Reports showed that although abnormal conditions were reported in each case, 5 of the problems were caused by specific minor equipment problems. Correction of these problems should permanently resolve the condition. One of the CR's addresses " ghost lights" which is being handles separately. However, three of the CR's deal with problems which have not had adequate solutions. The lack of solutions is generally due to "one-shot" non-repetitive problems. The last CR deals with the degree of lightning protection for the switchyard.

Consequences If unexplained electrical problems persist, unit reliability will be adversely affected.

Present status Lightning protection switchyard; NuPE (Henry), Maintenance (Roark) to discuss with Beaumont. After answering the CR, there does not appear to have been further action on the unexplained problems.

Plan

1. Charter a standing task force to track electrical distribution problems and handle resolution of those that cannot be adequately explained.
2. This task force to develop plan to be implemented when this type of problem arises. This plan will address data to be taken, personnel to call, etc. Thir will maximize the amount of knowledge gained from each occurrence.

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3. The task force will analyze each problem occurrence, data taken, and recommend a course of action. Then expedite the actions as a task force.

Page 2 of 2 Attachnent 2 ELECTRICAL PROBLEPS

1) Voltage transient caused flow control runback in the Reactor Recirc System (CR-85-0547).
2) A nomal closure of NNS-ACB-06 onto a 4169V BUS resulted in a voltage spike causing the loss of "C" preferred transformer (CR-85-0671).
3) Voltage transients on the system have caused the plant to experience a load unbalance causing a turbine trip and reactor scram (CR-85-067t).

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4) During electrical stems or voltage transients on system transmission lines, the plant has experienced electrical spikes causing fuses throughout the plant to blow. These fuses included safety related control fuses in ECCS and ESF systems including a 200 amp RPS alternate fuse. Additionally, many annunciator cards have failed. HVAC chillers trip and SGTS to auto starts (CR-85-465,85-460, 85-431,85-519).
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5) During electrical storms we have experienced lightimrstHkes in the switchyard which have lead to breakers tripping and fires in the 500 KV yard (CR-85-0414).
6) Ghost light indications on various breakers (CR-85-605, 85-0425).

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ATTACHMENT 8

., . .+...-r-VIBRATING CONDENSATE PIPING 1

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CONDENSATE BYPASS VIERATIONS PROBLEM - SHORT CYCLE RECIRCULATION BYPASS TO CONDENSER H4D '

PROBLEMS WITH VIBRATION INDUCED FAILURES OF SMALL BORE PIPING (DRAIN LINE) AND SUPPORTS CAUSE - FLOW CHARACTERISTICS INDUCED HIGH FREQUENCY VIBRATIONS WHICH LOOSENED HANGER BOLTING, AND CAUSED FAILURE OF SUPPORTS CORRECTIVE ACTION -

Re. ROUTE PIPING TO PROVIDE FLOW PATH WITH LESS IURBULENCE AND PRESSURE DROP. ALSO MINIMIZE USE OF THIS BYPASS. MODIFICATION TO BE STAGED TO BE DONE IN SHORT OUTAGES LONG TERM ACTION - FINAL MODIFICATION WILL INCLUDE PIPE REROUTING, POSSIBLE CHANGE IN CONTROL VALVE TYPE AND LOCATION AND SUPPORT Rt-DESIGN

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FEEDWATER PUMP PROBLEliS l

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FEEDWATER PUMP LUBE OIL COOLING PROBIFM - LOW TURBINE PLANT COMPONENT COOLING WATER TEMPERATURE IS CAUSING FEEDWATER PUMP LUBE OIL TEMPERATURES TO BE TOO LOW TO START THE PUMPS CAUSE - TURBINE PLANT COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM IS OVERSIZED AND CURRENT LOW POWER LEVELS OF OPERATION HAVE NOT PuT ENOUGH HEAT LOADS ON THE SYSTEM TO ACHIEVE OPTIMUM OPERATING IEMPERATURE CORRECTIVE ACTION - PROVIDE AN AUTOMATIC IEMPERATURE fl0NITORING AND BYPASS OF THE LUBE OIL AROUND THE LUBE OIL COOLERS

e 9 s

ATTACHMENT 10

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FEEDWATER MINI-FLOW RECIRC, LINES

4 FEEDWATER MINI-FLOW PROBLEMS PROBLEM - EROSION OF PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF THE FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION VALVE (MINI-FL0w TO CONDENSER)

CAUSE -

OPERATION OF SYSTEM IN IEMP AND PRESSURE RANGE OUTSIDE OF IDEAL DESIGN RANGE CORRECTIVE ACTION - A) INTERIM MODIFICATION TO CHANGE Our PIPING MATERIAL TO EROSION RESISTANT STAINLESS STEEL IN AREA 0F EROSION B) FINAL MODIFICATION UNDER ENGINEERING ANALYSIS TO BE IMPLEMENTED AT FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE -

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  • ATTACHMENT 11 m.=,_., ~m x ;, rz . . ., ; , m. u. -r-FEEDWATER LONS CYCLE RECIRCULATION

FEEDWATER LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

PROBLEM - EXTENDED USE OF LONG CYCLE RECIRC VALVE FOR PUMP PROTECTION IS CAUSING ADDED OPERATION CONCERNS FOR REACTOR LEVEL CONTROL CAUSE -

THE VIBRATION PROBLEM WITH THE SHORT CYCLE RECIRC HAS CAUSED EXTENDED USE OF THE LONG CYCLE RECIRC CORRECTIVE ACTION -

CHANGED LOGIC FOR LONG CYCLE RECIRC VALVE TO AUTOMATICALLY CLOSE UPON LEVEL 4 (MR 86-0127) i s . - - . . .,. . - - - _ , . - - - - - . . , - .

z t ATTACHMENT 12 w e.n m-- .u,w.u ,s::arma=vsamox FEEDWATER VALVE PROBLB4S l

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MOV FAILURE i

PROBLEM - OPERATOR BROKEN OFF VALVE CAUSE -

SHORT AND LOOSE BOLTS APPEARED TO HAVE LED TO THE FAILURE CORRECTIVE ACTION -

REPLACE OPERATOR, REPLACE BOLTS AND CHECK ALL OTHER OPERATORS OF THE SAME TYPE AND SIZE i FOLLOW UP ACTION -

ESTABLISH PLAN FOR CHECKING ALL LIMITORQUE OPERATORS FOR BOLTING IORQUE AND IHREAD ENGAGEMENT, AND PERFORMING ANY NECESSARY

! REWORK STATUS -

INSPECTION PLAN IS BEING FOLLOWED WITH ALL REWORK TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO STARTUP AFTER 35% OUTAGE i

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ATTACHffENT 13 w~n -me ,momm,.,w,;-

RERC'KR WGER CU!NUP SYSTIBt 05KII)

. RWCU Operability Task Force established by RBS managanent to review problen areas and to initiate corrective actions required to inprove system operability / reliability.

Corrective Actions (Short Term)

. Differential Flow Instrumentations - MR 85-1039

- Becalibrated differential flow instrumentation for cold -

conditions.

- Field work cmpleted 12/23/85

- Modification improved the operability of RWCU Cavitation / flashing across flow elenent in the blowdchm line -

MR 85-1037

- Resized the restrictino orifice in blowdown line to the condenser.

- Field work cmpleted 1/5/86

- Modification inproved the operability of RWCU

. Riley Tenperature Switches -- MR 85-0589

- Design change made to eliminate " noise" - induced spurious isolation signals when going to " test" node.

- Modification empleted on 28 of 32 switches. '

- Have had no additional trips.

RWCU isolation bypass switches -- MR 85-0585 f

- Eliminate requiremera to jumper out contacts during monthly

' surveillance testing.

j - Field work scheduled for next outage or Riley

. No isolations due to differential flow instrumentation temperature switches have occurred since December, 1985.

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REACKR MmR CumHOP SY!mM 05G)

Correctiva Actions (Iong Tem)

. Continue MEU Operability Task Force activities

- Review for new or additional problem areas and develop action plan to address.

- Cm plete evaluation of corrective actions empleted to date (gather operational data) .

- Continue evaluation of additional modifications proposed for possible incorporation into plant design:

a) MR 85-1038 "Pevise differential flow instrurent trip setpoint".

b) MR 85-1055 " Change design to use tenperature -

cmpensated differential flow instrurentation" .

c) MR 86-0011,0012 " Wiring revision in Division A Panel, Division B Panel, d) " Provide separate test p a el for surveillance testing."

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SUNEY GAS TREMMNT SYSTEM (SGTS)

IWview of Operational Everats

. Condition Report (CR85-0648)

Operating Annulus Pressure Control Subsystem (APCS) fan tripped,

~s tandby fan failed to start, causing SGPS and Annulus Mixing subsystem to initiate.

. Condition Report (CR85-0671) / Licensee Event Report (LER85-057)

Voltage transient on Division 1 power buses led to SGTS initiation.

Corrective Actions

. Will troubleshoot the systen (mR-12,366) to determine possible causes of condition (CR 85-0648).

Have reviewed breaker closing operation and control circuit design.

Have reviewed ongoing surveillance testing activities. No evidence found to link these events with the initiation and no hardware problems identified (CR 85-0671/LER 85-057).

. Will continue to monitor system performance through surveillance testing program.

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, w REUCITR MttER CumIRIP SYSUBE WERABILITY SSK PGCE 4

4 Established Decerter 13, 1986 to address operation problens with RWCU System I

6

. Task Force nertership Plant Operations Plant Chemistry

> Plant Tech Staff Plant Maintenance Projects

Planning Nuclear Plant Engineering General Electric Cmpany i

Stone & Webster Egineering Corporation i

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