ML20128H458

Preliminary Equipment Survivability Rept,River Bend Station Unit 1,Jul 1985

ML20128H458
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	07/31/1985
From:	GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20128H455	List: ML20128H458 RBG-21-423, Forwards River Bend Station Preliminary Equipment Survivability Rept, as Further Evidence to Support Interim Operation at Full Power Until Final Analysis Re Equipment Response to Hydrogen Burn Event Completed
References
NUDOCS 8507100005
Download: ML20128H458 (44)

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RIVER BEND STATION PRELIMINARY EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY REPORT GULF STATES UPILITIES C m PANY RIVER BEND STATICN, UNIT 1 JULY, 1985 g M

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8507100005 850701 PDR ADOCK 05000458 A PDR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0

SUMMARY

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2.0 INTRODUCTION

2 2.1 SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS GOAL 2 2.2 APPROACH 2 2.3 ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION 3 2.4 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT 4 3.0 THERMAL ENVIRONMENT 6 3.1 HYDROGEN BURN CHARACTERISTICS 6 3.2 DEFLAGRATION BURN ENVIRONMENT 6 3.3 DIFFUSION BURN ENVIRONMENT 7 ,

4.0 EQUIPMENT THERMAL MODELING 8 4.1 CODE SELECTION 8 4.2 ASSUMPTIONS 8 4.3 BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 9 4.4 MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND VERIFICATION 9 5.0 RESULTS 15

6.0 REFERENCES

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I 1.0 SIM ERY nis 1%i. identifies and locates the essential equignent which nust survive a degraded core hydrogen burn transient. Represen-tative pieces of this upd==nt have been analyzed to demonstrate that either the casing surface tenperature or the sentive internal cmponent ta perature does not exceed the known qualification taperature limit. m is report provides further evidence to support interim operation at full power until a final analysis is empleted.

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2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS GOAL i

In the unlikely event of a degraded core accident, certain pieces of i equipment would be required to function in order to monitor the course of the accident, return the core to a safe condition, main-tain containment integrity, and mitigate the consequences of the event. The containment and drywell environments during a degraded core event are characterized by high concentrations of hydrogen pro-duced by the zirconium-water reaction in the reactor core region.

The hydrogen igniter system is designed to ignite the hydrogen atmo-sphere at low hydrogen coscentrations to prevent threats to contain-ment structural integrity. Equipment which is required to survive a hydrogen burn and which is located in containment or drywell may be exposed to high temperatures. Therefore, the goal of the River Bend Station (RBS) essential equipment survivability analysis is to dem- l onstrate that the essential equipment will perform its necessary safety functions during or following exposure to the degraded core hydrogen burn thermal conditions.

All essential equipment must be shown to survive the hydrogen burn environment. Equipment which is located in areas of high tempera-ture and which cannot be shown to survive may require thermal shielding, relocation, or replacement with a higher rated piece of equipment.

4 2.2 APPROACH The approach toward demonstrating equipment survivability involves four distinct steps. The first and most basic step is the determi-nation of the list of equipment to be considered. The second step is the determination of the hydrogen burn thermal environment. The third step is the analytic prediction of the thermal response of the equipment. The final step is the determination of survivability.

Selection of the equipment to be considered as essential equipment is discussed in Section 2.4 of this report. The selection criteria, also described in Section 2.4, are consistent with those specified by the Hydrogen Control Owners' Group (HCOG) in the April 27, 1984, Survivability Guide (Reference 2).

The definition of the thermal environment to be considered for each piece of equipment is dependent upon the accident scenario and the in plant location of the equipment. The hydrogen burn thermal envi-ronment for RBS is described in Section 3.0.

Section 4.0 describes the equipment thermal response analyses and the development of the equivalent thermal models for the essential equipment. The thermal models include the heat sensitive components and appropriate geometric features of the equipment.

The survivability of individual pieces of equipment is ensured if the surface temperature of the equipment remains below the

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l qualification temperature. If the outer surface temperature exceeds l the qualification temperature, focus will be placed on the tempera-  !

ture-sensitive nonmetallic internal materials or subcomponents.

These materials have also been exposed to the maximum qualification I temperature during the typical 3-hr to 6-hr soak time in qualifica- l tion testing. In this case, equipment survivability is ensured if I the predicted temperature of the most thermally sensitive internal material is less than either the maximum qualification temperature ,

or the maximum service temperature identified by the material manu- i facturer.

2.3 ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION River Bend analyses of design basis accidents, conducted in accor-  ;

dance with 10CFR50, predict that the maximum metal-water reaction  ;

after a I,0CA will involve less than 1 percent of the outer 23 mils i of active fuel cladding. However, the TNI event demonstrated that nondesign basis scenarios can produce much more extensive l metal-water reactions. To account for the TMI experience, the NRC's final rule, published in 10CFR50, requires consideration of a 75 percent metal-water reaction and the associated hydrogen release .

The rule specifies the quantity of hydrogen to be considered but did not specify the accident scenario postulated to produce the hydrogen.

Task 1 of the HCOG program plan evaluated several degraded core ac-cident scenarios (Reference 3). The accidents selected for consid-eration as hydrogen generation events are based upon both deterministic and probabilistic considerations. One objective for accident selection was to determine the most likely accident scenar-io which would produce a significant hydrogen release without core melt. In addition, accident scenarios which would challenge the structural integrity of both the drywell and the containment were investigated. Based upon these considerations, the following two accident scenarios are considered.

The first accident considered is a transient-initiated stuck open relief valve (SORV) event, with core cooling delayed until signifi-cant hydrogen is produced. Core cooling would be delayed until the operator has depressurized the reactor vessel using the automatic l depressurization system (ADS) valves. This accident represents one of the dominant event sequences which could lead to a degraded core condition. The SORV event would challenge the integrity of the con-tainment because all hydrogen p'roduced would be released by the SORV

and ADS valves through the suppression pool and into the containment atmosphere.

The second accident scenario selected is a small or intermediate

size steam line break. This scenario is similar to the SORV case in that the operator would depressurize the reactor vessel using the l ADS before core cooling water is restored. In this case, hydrogen l is released directly to the drywell from the pipe break and to the  ;

containment through the ADS valves. Consequently, this scenario i challenges the integrity of the drywell.

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2.4 ESSENTIAL FQUIPMENT Essential equipment is defined as systems and components that are exposed to a hydrogen burn event and are required to function during or after the burn event. The RBS essential equipment list was de-veloped in accordance with the HCOG seneric criteria, which are re-stated below. Plant systems and components were compared to the criteria; systems and components meeting one or more of the criteria were placed on the essential equipment list (Table 2.4-1).

The following are the criteria for inclusion on the survivability list:

1. Equipment and systems required to mitigate the consequenc-es of the event.

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2. Equipment and structures required to maintain the integri-ty of the containment pressure boundary.

3. Systems and components required to recover the core.

4. Instrumentation and systems required to monitor the course of the accident.

The effects of hydrogen combustion are limited to the containment and drywell. Only equipment located in these two compartments has

, been evaluated for inclusion on the survivability list.

Figure 2.4-1 shows the approximate locations of the RBS essential equipment with the exception of the hydrogen igniters and hydrogen recombiners.

In addition, some components have been excluded from the essential equipment list based on their failure mode or active safety function prior to exposure to the hydrogen burn environment. Degraded core accidents evolve over a relatively long period of time before zirca-loy oxidation begins. Many components will have performed their safety function before hydrogen combustion can begin. If these com-ponents are not required to function during or after hydrogen com-i bustion, and if failure of the component will not compromise plant safety, then the component is not required to survive these accidents.

Specific exclusions used in developing the RBS equipment list are as follows:

1. Components which have performed their active safety func-tion prior to a hydrogen burn.

2. Isolation valves which remain in the closed position, i.e., fail closed or "as is."

3. Isolation valves which are open during post-LOCA, fail in l

the "as is" position and have a redundant motor-operated 1 isolation valve outside containment for functional backup.

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4. Check valves which are qualified for reactor pressure and temperature with no safety-related instrumentation or electrical function are assumed to survive a hydrogen burn sechanically.

5. Equipment and/or components which fail in a safe condition with no subsequent functional requirement.

6. Manually operated valves or dampers which remain in the "as is" position (i.e., normally open or normally closed).

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O TABLE 2.4-1 EQUIPfENT REQUIRED TO SURVIVE A NYDsIOGEN Bimp Peak Equipment Description Make/ Location Peait Accident Equipment ~ Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Azimuth Accident EDC Qualified Identification Function Cataloa No. Location Elevation Dearees Radius Temperature Temperature DRWELL Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

IB21(RVF0418 Main Steam Safety / Crosby 8 x R a 10, DW-I 132' 5" 278* 23' 10" 330*F 340*F IB21*RVF041C Relief Valves (ADS) Style NS-65-DF DW-1 332' 5" 88* 21' 7" 340*F IB21*RVF04tD DW-1 132' 4" 309* 19' 0" 340*F IB21*RVF041F Depressurize Reactor DW-1 132' 4" 297* 25' 6" 340*F i IB21*RVF047A Vessel DW-1 132' 3" 34* 30' 19' 8" 340*F IB21tRVF047C DW-1 132' 4" 70* 30' 24' 9" 340*F 1 IB211RVF05tc DW-1 132' 4" 57* 30' 25' 2" 340*F HCS Nydromen laniter System

, lHCS*1GN49A Hydrogen Isaiter Power Systems Model 6043 DW-1 116' 8" 354.5* 26' 0" 330*F 340*F 12S*1GN498 Ignite Nydrogen/ Air DW-1 116' 6" 66.8* 20' 11" 330*F 340*F tr S*1GN50A Combustible Mixture DW-1 116' 7" 113.4* 21' 2" 330*F 340*F INCS*IGN50B During Degraded Core DW-1 116' 7" 180* 21' 0" 330*F 340*F 1~ S*IGN51A Event DW-I 115' 2" =

247.3* 20' 10" 330*F 340*F i INCS*IGN51B DW-1 116' 6" 292.9* 21' 2" 330*F 340*F INCS$1GN40B DW-1 133' 1" 359.2* 18' 10" 330*F 340*F INCS*IGN41A DW-1 139' 10" 60.4* 21' 9" 330*F 340*F INCS*1GN41B DW-1 135' 5" 129.9* 21' 10" 330*F 340*F INCS*IGN42A DW-1 138' 11" 179.0* 23' 0" 330*F 340*F l=S*1GN42B DW-1 135' 10" 240* 22' 0" 330*F 340*F INCSilGN40A DW-1 138' 8" 293.3* 25' 0" 330*F 340*F INCS*IGN28A DW-1 156' 0* 24' 8 1/2" 330*F 340*F INCS*IGN28B DW-1 156' 58.5* 23' 0" 330*F 340*F li:S*IGN29A DW-1 156' 125* 21' 6" 330*F 340*F I m *IGN29B DW-I 156' 180* 25' 0" 330*F 340*F IHCS*IGN30A DW-1 156' 233* 22' 0" 330*F 340*F INCS*IGN30B DW-I 156' 306* 21' 0" 330*F 340*F C4/lg764/15A/4YH I of II

Peak Equipment Description Nake/ Imcation Peak Accident Equipment Namufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Asiasth Accident. EBC l>nalified Identification Function Cataloa No. Location Elevaties Bearees Radius Temperature Temperature CMS Drywell Temperature lastruments ICMSXRTD41A Resistance Thermal Pyco, lac. DW 141' 0" 28' 34.47' ~330*F 430*F ICNSMRTD4IB Detectors DW 141' 0" 243* 34.47' $30*F 430*F ICMSXRTD41C DW 138* 34.47' 430*r I41' 0" 330*F ICNSINTD41D DW 141' 0" 300* 34.47' 336*F 430*F CONTA118Elff CNS Coatsinnent Atmosphere Monitorina ICMS*SOV33E Containneet Atmosphere Solenoid Valve. Target Rock CT-G 190' 9" 54' 30' 58' 9" 165'F 385*F ICMS230V33F Sampling TRCP 11KK-003 CT-G 190' 9" 235*35' 59' 6" 165'F 385*F ICNSPSOV34A Drywell Atmosphere Solenoid Valve, Target Rock CT-G 154' 3 1/2" 140* 40' 6" 165'F 385'T Sampling TRCP 77KK-003 ICNS*SOV34B Drywell Atmosphere Solenoid valve Target Rock CT-G 154' I 1/2" 319' 30' 48' 9" 165*F 345'F Sampling TRCP 71KK-003 CPM Containment Nydroaca Minima ICPtf*FNIA Mixing Fan Fan Motor, Buffalo Forge '

CT-G 163' 9" 50* 33' 5" 165'F 212*F West TBFC 145T ICPN*FNIB Mixing Fan Fan Motor, Buffalo Forge CT-G 163' 9" 228* 35' 165'F 212*F West TBFC 145T ICPff*NOVI A Exhaust Valve Notor-operated Valve, CT-G 163' 9" 53* 30' 35' 10" 165'T 340*F Posi-Seal IJtTQ SNB-000-2 ICP'f*tt0VIB Exhaust Valve Motor-operated Valve, CT-G 163' 9" 231* 15' 37' 4" 165*F 340*F Posi-Scal IMrQ SNS-000-2 ICPtt*MOV2A Supply Valve Motor-operated Valve, CT-G 117' 6" 176* 30' 42' II" 165'F 340*F Posi-Scal IJfTQ SM8-000-2 C4/147k/I'aA/4YIf 2 of II

4 Equipment Equipment Description Make/ Peak

' Location Peak Accident identification Function Manufacturer VenJor Model/ EDC Zone Azimuth Cataloa No. Imcation Elevation Accident EDC Qualified Dearees Radius Temperature Temperature 4

CPM Caytainment Hydrogen Mixina (Cont)

ICPN*MOV2r Supply Valve Motor-operated valve, CT-G 129' 5 3/8" 328*

Posi-Sea! IJffQ SMB-000-2 42' 3" 165'F 340*F ICPtt*ft0V3A Eshaust Valve Motor-operated Valve, CT-G 163' 9" 56' Posi-Sea! IJffQ SN3-000-2 37' 11" 165*F 340*F ICPff*MOV3B Exhaust Valve Motor-operated Valve, CT-G 163' 9" 233' 30' 39' 2" 165'T Posi-Scal IJfTQ SMB-000-2 340*F ICPtt*MOV4A Supply Valve Motor-operated Valve, CT-G 117' 6" Post-Scal IffTQ SMB-000-2 173* 43' 2" 165'F 34::*F ICPtt*Mov4B Supply Valve Motor-operated Valve, CT-G 129' 5 3/8" 325* 15' 41' 6" 165'F 340*F Posi-Seal IJfTQ SMB-000-2 NOTE:

Hydrogen mixing system is only required in long term for removal of residual hydrogen from drywell.

E12 Pasidual Neat R e val IEl2*NOVF042A LPCI Injection Etor-operated Valve, Velan CT-G 121' 7" 35*

IJtTQ SB-2-60 48' 0" 165'F 340*F IE12*tt0ViO42B LPCI Injection N tor-operated Valve, Velma CT-G 122' 0" 321' 44' 8" 165'F IJfTQ SB-2-60 340*F NCS dydrogen Recombiner C S*RBNRIA Hydrogen Recombiner Hydrogen Recombiner, Westing- CT-G 186' 3" 80*

house West Model 48 $4' 165*F 330*F IHCSIRBNRIB Hydrogen Recombiner Hydrogen Recombiner, Westing- CT-G 186' 3" 315' 51' house West Model 45 165'F 330*F C4/14764/15A/4YN 3 of 11 1

e Peak Equipment Description Make/ Location Peak Accident Equipment Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Azimuth Accident EDC Qualified Identification Function Catalog No. Location Elevation Degrees Radina Temperature Temperature Hydrrgen Igniter System ,

1%S*IGN52A Hydrogen Igniter Power Systems Model 6043 CT-G 179' 3" 80* 30' 30' 3" 165'F 340*F IHCS*1GN525 Ignite Hydrogen / Air CT-G 179' 3" 138' 50' 33' 2" 165'F 340*F INCS*1GN438 Combustible Mixture CT-G 108' 6" 5' 39' 6" 165'F 340*F INCS21GN44A During Degraded Core CT-G 112' 5" 39' 44' 6" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN448 Event CT-G 109' 0" 65* 39' 6" 165'F 340*F 12 SSIGN45A CT-G 110' 0" 95* 39' 6" 165'F 340*F INCS*IGN458 . CT-G 112' 5" 117' 42' 2" 165*F 340*F INCS*IGN46A CT-G 112' 5" 155' 44' 6" 165'F 340*F INCSSIGN46B CT-G 112' 5" 176* 41' 6" 165'F 340*F INCSSIGN47A CT-G 112' 5" 204* 41' 6" 165*F 340*F t= S21GN478 CT-C 112' 5" 244' 43' 0" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN48A CT-G 109' 6" 268* 39' 6" 165'F 340*F INCS21GN488 CT-C 108' 6" 297* 39' 6" 165*F 340*F 12 S21GN43A CT-G 108' 9" 330* 39' 6" 165'F 340*F INCS21GN32B CT-G 126' 0" 30' 60' 0" 165'F 340*F INCS*IGN34A CT-C 126' 0" 180* 47' 0" 165*F 340*F ICS*IGN32A CT-G 130' 0" 69* 60' 0" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN33B CT-G 126' 0" 90* 60' 0" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN33A CT-G 124' 0" 115' 60' 0" 165*F 340*F INCS*1GN24B CT-G 128' 145' 51' 1" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN35A CT-G 136' 0" 155.l* 46' 7" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN36A CT-G 136' 0" 166.3* 56' 4" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN345 CT-G 139' 4" 209* 54' 2" 165'F 340*F IHCS*1GN358 CT-G 136' 0" 178.7* 45' 0" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN36B CT-G 136' 0" 185.6* 57' 3" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN37A CT-G 135' 0" 202.l* 39' 11" 165'F 340*F IHCS*1GN378 CT-G 134' 0" 201.3* 49' 5" 165*F 340*F IHCS*IGN34B CT-G 139' 4" 209* 54' 2" 165*F 340*F 1HCS*IGN38A CT-G 139' 4" 240.5* 54' 0" 165'F 340*F IZS*IGN38B CT-G 126' 0" 270* 60' 0" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN39A CT-G 126' 6" 298.5* 60' 0" 165'F 340*F IHCS*1GN398 CT-G 130' 328' 55' 5" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN31A CT-9 126' 341.9* Sl' 6" 165'F 340*F 4 of II C4/14}64/15A/4YH

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Equipment. Description Make/ Peak Equipment Location Peak Accident Idextification Function Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Azieuth Catalog No. 1.ocation Elevation Accident EDC Quali fied Dearces Radius Temperature Temperature Hydr: race Janiter System (Cont)

INCS*IGN3I8 Hydrogen Igniter Power Systems Model 6043 IHCS*IGN22A CT-9 126' 17.4* -

Ignite Hydrogen / Air CT-G 53' 6" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN228 150' 21.7* 51' 4" 165*F Combustible Mixture CT-G 154' 340*F INCS*IGN234 During Degraded Core 63* 60' 0" 165*F 340*F INCS*1GN238 Event CT-G 159' 6" 84* 60' 0" 165'F 340*F INCS*IGN244 CT-G 152' 0" 115' 60' 0" 165'F 340*F lHCS*IGN25A CT-G 154' 0" 153' 60' 0" 165*F CT-G 159' 5" 340*F INCS*IGN258 210' 50' 0" 165*F 340*F ICS*IGN26A CT-G 151' 238' 60' 0" 165'T 340*F INCS2IGN268 CT-5 157' 6" 247.5* 49' 6" 165*F CT-5 149' 0" 340*F INCS*IGN278 275.9* 48' 10" 165'F 340*F IHCS)IGN27A CT-G 152' 7" 294.8* 52' 3" 165*F 340*F INCS*IGN218 CT-G 153' 4" 321.1* 46' 2" 165*F CT-7 167' 6" 340*F IES*IGNilA 4.0* 43' 5" 165'F 340*F INCS*IGlilllB CT-7 166' 6" 20.8* 50' 6" 165'F CT-G 173' 340*F INCS*IGNI3A 27' 48' 3" 165*F 340*F 1 3 *IGNI2A CT-G 167' 3" 52.l* 29' 2" 165'F 340*r IHCS*IGNI28 CT-G 173' 6" 64* 57' 0" 165*F CT-G 176' 6" 340*F 1HCS*IGNI4A 88.9* 53' 0" 165'F 340*F CT-G 173' 115' lHCS*IGNI38 60' 0" 165'F 340*F IHCSAIGNI48 CT-G 167' 3" 123.5* 32' 5" 165'F 340*F INCS*IGN158 CT-G 169' 9" 153.9* $2' 3" 165'T CT-G 183' 6" 340*F INCS*IGN18A 212' 56' 7" 165'T 340*F INCS*IGNISA CT-11 173' 0" 235.3* 31' 7" 165'F CT-G 183' 6" 340*F IHCS*IGN178 238' 56' 7" 165'F 340*F IHCS*1GNI6A CT-5 172' 0" 240.5* 38' 6" 165'F CT-5A 173' 0" 340*F IHCS*IGNI88 249.3*. 53' 6" 165'F 340*F INCS*IGNI98 CT-II 173' 0" 260.l* 23' 3" 165'F 1

CT-11 174' 6" 340*F IHCS*IGN168 282.3* 23' 6" 165'T 340*F CT-5A 172' 290.9*

INCS*IGN17A 53' 0" 165'F 340*F IHCS*IGN20A CT-5 170' 6* 298.4* 40' 0" 165'F CT-G 168' 340*F lHCS*IGNI9A 293.9* 54' 1" 165*F 340*F CT-II 175' 6" 303.9* 31' 3" 165'F 340*F C4/14764/ISA/4YH 5 of 11 1

Peak Equipment Description Make/ Location Peak Accident Eq4ipment Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Asieuth Idc5tification Function Accident EDC Qualified Catalog No. Location Elevation Bearees Radius Teeperature Temperature Hydrften Inniter System (Cont)

INCS2iGN20B 319' INCS*IGN21A CT-G 170' 50' 10" 165'F 340*F CT-7 167' 4" 338' 48' 0" 165'F 340*F INCS*1GNIA CT-C 255' 0* 20' 165*F 340*F INCS*IGN78 CT-G 239' 0* 56' 165'F 340*F INCSAIGN3B CT-G 250' 22.5* 38' 165'F 340*F INCS*1CN8A CT-G 239' 45' 56' 165*F 340*F IES*IGN4A CT-G 250' 67.5* 38' 165'F 340*F IES*IGNIB -

CT-G 255' 90* 20' 165*F trOSAIGNBB 340*F CT-G 239' 90* 56' 165'T 340*F INCS*IGN48 CT-G 250' 112.5* 38' INCS*IGN9A 165'F 340*F CT-G 239' 135' 56' 165*F 340*F INCS*IGNSA CT-G 250' 157.5* 34' 165*F 340*F 1ESalGN2A CT-G 255' 180* 20' 165'F 340*F 1HCS*IGN9B CT-G 239' 180* 56' 165*F 340*F IES*IGN5B CT-G 250' 202.5* 38' 165'F IES*IGNIDA 340*F CT-C 239' 225' 56' 165*F 340*F INCS*1GN6A CT-G 250' 247.5* 38' 165*F 340*F IHCS*IGN2B CT-G 255' 270* 20' 165'F 340*F INCS*IGN10B CT-G 239' 270* 56' 1:CS*1CN6B 165'F 340*F CT-G 250' 292.5* 38' 165'F 340*F lES*IGN7A CT-G 239' 315' 56' 165*F INCS*IGN3A 340*F CT-G 250' 337.5* 38' 165'F 340*F HVR Ventilation - Reactor Plant INVR*UCIA Unit Cooler Unit Cooler Motor Buffalo CT-G 162' 3" 107* 47' 6" 165'F 212*F Mitigate Temperature Forge West 445TCZ Increase During Event and Return Temperatures a

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Peak Equipment Description Make/ Location Peak Accident Equipment Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Azimuth Accident EDC Qualified Identification Function Catalog No. Location Elevation Degrees Radius Temperature Temperature NVR Vintilation - Reactor Plant (Cont)

IHVR*UCIB Unit Cooler Unit Cooler Motor, Buffalo CT-G 162' 3" 75* 47' 8" 165'F 212*F Forge West 4457CZ JRB Superstructure - Reactor Building IJRB*DRAI Cont. Personnel Door Access, Graver CT-G 175' 315' 73' 6" 165'T 342*F Airlock Woolley #

IJRB+DRA2 Cont. Personnel Door Access, Graver CT-G 117' 10" 135' 73' 6" 165'T 342*F Airlock Woolley IJRB*DRA3 Drywell Personnel Door Access, Graver CT-6/DW1 130' 7" 163* 30" 39' 6" 165'F/330*F 342*F Airlock Woolley IJRB*DRA4 Drywell Equipment Door Access, Graver CT-6/DWI 95' 9" 225' 39' 6" 165*F/330*F 342*F Hatch Woolley IJRB*DRA7 Cont. Equipment Door Access, Graver CT-G 95' 9" 225' 70' 165'F 342*F Hatch Woolley I;3TE: Airlock and hatches are required to maintain containment integrity during and after event.

Ipstrumentation IB21*LTN073 Monitor Course of Reactor Pressure Vessel CT-G 114' 135' 44' 165'F 232*F (IH22*P005) Transient Level Trans Rosemount Model 1152 IB21*LTN073G CT-G 114' 135' 44' 165*F 232*F (lK22*P005)

IB21*LTN080A CT-G 114' 135' 44' 165*F 232*F (IH22*P005)

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i Equipment Description Make/ Peak Equipment Location Peak Accident Ideatification Function Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Asinuth Cataloa No. Location Elevation Accident EDC Qualified Dearees Radius Temperature Temperature Intrumentation (Cont) 9 1821*LTN0808 CT-C 114' 185* 46' (IN22*P027) 165'F 232*F IB21*LTN080C CT-C 114' 135' 44' (lN22*P005) 165'F 232*F IB21*LTN080D CT-C 114' 300* 48' (IN22*P026) 165"F 232*F IB21*LTN081A CT-C 114' 45' 50' (IH22*P004) 165'F 232*F IB21*LTN0818 CT-C 114' 185* 46' (lN22*P027) 165*F 232*F IB21*LTN091A CT-C 114' 45' 50' (lN22*P004) 165'r 232*F IB21*LTN0918 CT-C 114' 185* 46' (IN22*P027) 165'F 232*F IB2IaLTN091E CT-C 114' 45' 50' (IN22*P004) 165*F 232*F IB21*LTN091F l CT-C 114' 185* 46' (lH22*P027) 165"F 232*F IB21*LTN095A CT-C 114' 45' 50' (lN22*P004) 165'F 232*F IB21*LTN0958 CT-G 114' 185* 46' (IH22*P027) 165*F 232*F C4/14764/85A/4YN 8 of 11 1

t Peak Equipment Description Make/ I4 cation Peak Accident Equipmext Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Azimuth Accident IDC Qualified Ide5tification Function Catalog No. Location Elevation Dearees Radius Temperature Temperature tratrumentation (Cont) ,

IC71*PTN050A Monitor Course Drywell Pressure CT-G 114' 45' 50' 165*F 232*F (H22*PNLP004) of Accident Rosemount 1152 IC718PTN0508 CT-G 114' 185* 46' 165*F 232*F (N22*PNLP027)

IC711PTN050C .

CT-G 114' 135' 44' 165*F 232*F (N22'IPNLP005)

IC71tPTN050D CT-G 114' 300* 48' 165'T 232*F j (N22*PNLP005)

IB21*PTN068A RNR/LPCI Permissive Rosemount 1152 CT-G 114' 45' 50' 165*F 232*F Instrumentation IB21*PTN068B CT-G 114' 185* 46' 165'T 232*F IB21*PTN068E CT-G  !!4' 45' 50' 165'F 232*F IB21tPTN068F CT-G 114' 185* 46' 165*F 232*F Containment Pressure - Instrument located in auxiliary buildin8 ICMStRTD42A Resistance Thermal Pyco, Inc. CT-G 166'9" 72* 52'4" 165'F 430*F Detectors ICMS*RTD428 Resistance Thermal Pyco, Inc. CT-G 166'9" 108' 33'4" 165'F 430*F Detectors ICMS*RTD42C Resistance Thermal Pyco, Inc. CT-G 166'9" 37* 37'4" 165'F 430*F Detectors ICMS*RTD42D Resistance Thermal Pyco, Inc. CT-G 119' 15' 39'6" 165'F 430*F Detectors C4/lj764/15A/4YH 9 of II

Peak Equipment Description Make/ Location Peak Accident Equipment Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Azimuth Accident EDC Qualified Ide-tification Function Cataloa No. Location Elevation Dearees Radius Temperature Temperature ICMS*RTD42E Resistance Thermal Pyco, Inc. CT-G 118'6" 66* 39'6" 165*F 430*F Detector ICMS*RTD42F Resistance Thermal Pyco. Inc. CT-G 118'6" 117' 39'6" 165'F 430*F Detector ICMS1RTD42G Resistance Thermal Pyeo, Inc. CT-G 122'2" 170* 39'6" 165*F 430*F Detector ICMS*RTD42H Resistance Thermal Pyco, Inc. CT-G 118'6" 219' 39'6" 165'T 430*F Detector ICMS*RTD42J Resistance Thermal Pyco, Inc. CT-G 118'6" 270* 39'6" 165'F 430*F Detector ICMS*RTD42K Resistance Thermal Pyco, Inc. CT-G 119' 322* 39'6" 165*F 430*F Detector Cesteinment Electrical Penetrations IRCP*LVC05 Containment Inte8rity Electrical Penetration Assy CT-G Various Various 60' 165* 255*F Conax Corp / Unique IRCP*LVC10A CT-G 165* 255*F IRCP*LVCll A CT-G 165* 255'F IRCP*LVCl3A CT-G 165* 255*F IRCP*LVCIS CT-G 165* 255"F 1RCP*LVC18A CT-G 165* 255*F 1RCP*LVC19A CT-G 165* 255'F IRCP*LVC20A CT-G 165* 255'F IRCP*LVC21 CT-G 165* 255'F IRCP*LVIO5A CT-G 165* 393*F IRCP*LVIll CT-G Various Various 60' 165* 393*F IRCP*LVIl2 CT-G 165* 393*F 1RCP*LVI12A CT-G 165* 393*F C4/14764/15A/4YH 10 of II

_-_ _ m , ___

t l

Equipment Equipment Description Make/ Peak Location Peak Accident Ide-tification Function Manufacturer Vendor Model/ EDC Zone Asianth Catalos No. Location Elevation Dearees Accident EDC Qualified Radius Teaserature Temperature Containment Electrical Penetrations (Cont) .

, IRCP*LVII4 .

IRCP*LVII4A CT-G CT-G 165* 393=y IRCP*LVil5 165*

IRCP*LVil5A CT-G 393*F CT-G 165* 393*F IRCP*LVil73 165* 3,3ey 1RCP*LVII7C CT-G CT-G 165* 3,3er IRCP*LV121A CT-G 165* 393*F IRCP*LVP03 165*

IRCP*LVP03A . CT-G 393*F CT-G 165* 255'T l IRCP*LVP07 165*

l IRCP*LVP07A CT-G 255"F CT-G 165* 255'F IRCP*LVP09 165*

1RCP*LVP09A CT-G 255'T CT-G 165* 255'T IRCP*LVP16 CT-G 165* 255*F IRCP*LVPI6A 165*

IRCP*LVP22 CT-G 255*F CT-G 165* 255'F IRCP*LVP22A CT-G 165* 255'F IRCP*NVP01 CT-G 165* 255'F IRCP*MVP02 165*

IRCP*NMS10 CT-G 405'F 1 CT-G 165* 405*F IRCP*NMS13 165*

CT-G 393.y IRCP*1GIS19 CT-G 165* 393.y IRCP*lelS20 165*

IRCP*LVC06 CT-G .393 F CT-5A 165* 393 y IRCP*LV106A 365*

-IRCP*LVPO4 CT-5A 255'F

' CT-5A 165* 393ey 1RCP*LVPO4A 165*

IRCP*LVPos CT-5A 255'F CT-SA 165* 255'F IRCP*LVPOSA 165*

CT-5A 255*F Ctbles and Terminal Service All Equipment Various Blacks Listed Above Various Various Various Various 365*/330* y , g ,, .

C4/14764/ISA/4YH 11 of II

)

270*

J 1JRS*0RAF MN AREA niii,,

[- GRATIM (EL 98' 9" c'"i! fi (TV P)

' I Il

% Ill i 4, w,g,p!.', .-

10RS*0RA4 e'" '

Q EL 99'.9~ >> >n

(

f *. g 1soa j +

l o-

''""=,, .a ,

l,,,,, II s 'ani. ,,8' CONC FLOOR l l l

90; REFERENCEDWG.

EM 2C. M ACH. LOCATION PLAN l

1 4

FIGURE 2.4-1 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LOCATIO_N PLAN EL 95'-9" (SHT 1 OF 6)

RIVER BEND STATION

4 l- GR ATING (TYP)  !

1C71'PTN0500 H22* PNLP005 1821'LTN0000

,,,= ,, v. -'

a' 'g} _ *

' y . ., , .

,,N~

k[

$g y,d /Cd TvP3 N RETE .

c.

,, .. .. .v.. ,9 , . g,. .-

.6 .@ST ,, /1E12'MOV

.* SPACE ,s ,,,a in F0428 g g 410 4 'b4 .%-

• g.. .

4 e ~~

< . . , ,8 1C71'PTN0600

,* H22*PNLP027

• g

-} . IS21* LTN0808 "I' Y 1821*LTN0018 D ' } i

.O. S .g

.y 1821*LTN0919 g E .<

pi 1821*LTN001F . .

iS21 LTN00s0 Aztes .h iS21 PTN0seS

/

3 1921* PTN064F \ .

ENCLOSED

~

+ 03 180' y Az i7e 80' 4 v0LuME  :

M EL i t r.s- ggi,o.o-gg,3 .

g J M ges * .g- . : 6.

TO -

1 >gg ttT'-4" gg p EL 13T 0"

, j 4A 1C71*PTNOSOC , ,[J, .e.,

t.t 3 j N. ' '-,/ *. e \> ' I ,** ' ,' . . # * *

• 4", GRATING

'4 ,' i A , , , ,. ,,, * .;i If (TY P) 90*

REFERENCE DWG.

LEGEND EM 28. MACH. LOCATION PLAN h SOLENOID VALVE FIGURE 2.4-1 ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LOCATION PLAN EL 141'-0" (SHT 4 OF 6) _

RIVER BEND STATION

DWG.

2 70 EE.35A: ARAGT ELEC PENETRATIONS e

g f

/

[

• v Al

.o.

l l

4 #

.:{..

6 h '

o tu _ _ , _ _

i so ..' -

I ,, ,.l;g

.- f 4, .

p 4 .

i e+

ELECTRICAL  %

'g s PENETRATIONS ELEV NO. .

LVP03 140 0"  !

LVP03A 144 0' 90 NOTES.

LVPO4 148 0 1. ALL ASSY NO $ TO BE PREFlXED WITH 1RCP-

2. SEE SHT 4 FOR FL DESCRIPTION LVPO4A 144 0-LVC05 144 0-LV105A 144 0" LYC06 144'.0" LVIOSA 144 0' LVP07 144 0" LVP07A 144'.0" .

LVPOS 144 0' LVPOSA 144 0 FIGURE 2.4-1

! ESSENTIAL EQUlPMENT LOCATION PLAN EL 141'-0" (SHT 5 OF 6)_

RIVER BEND STATION

CONCETE 270o (TYP)

IJRB*DRA1 f .h EE"' A j!

f}

CPM'Mov3s GRATING

.s  : EL 163'-9" '/ GRATING 1 CPM'MOV1B L 163' 9" 1

'N g "

HolST -

7 g GRATING P -

1 CPM *PN1B EL 163' 9- ENCLOSED AE 338' f,, VOLUME t:

\D-a

• ga 180' _

- - OPEN

{

v M

A3 54' ,

"  ? *r>$ "

GRATING 1 CPM'MOV3A 1 CPM'PN1 A

• EL 163' 8" % \ g EL 163' 9" STAIRS '

[ ,

S 1 CPM'MOV1 A j EL 166 9

• T,7 EL 103' 9"

., AZ 37 4 6 - 8 4 __

1 CMS'SOV33E EL 190' 9*

1HRV'UC1 A -

EL 182' 3" A2107* 1 CMS *RT042A EL 166 -9 '

1 CMS'RTD428 '*"#'"#

EL 186 9 -

90' EL 162' 3" LEGEND AZ 98* A2 75'

@ SOLENOID VALVE REFERENCE DWGS.

h MOTOR OPER ATED VALVE EE 2A; MACH. LOCAT10N PLAN EK 3048.K.M INST. PIPING l

FIGURE 2.4-1 i

ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LOCATION l PLAN EL 162'.3" (SHT 6 OF 6) -

l RIVER BEND STATION i

3.0 THERMAL ENVIRONMENT 3.1 HYDROGEN BURN CHARACTERISTICS Hydrogen combustion is categorized into several burn types based on observed flame behavior as a function of the concentration of hydro-gen and oxygen in the gas mixture and as a function of geometry.

Two types, deflagration and diffusion burning have been identified as possibly occurring in RBS following a degraded core hydrogen gen-eration event. The other types of burning are impossible or very unlikely to occur in the RBS containment, since they require very specific geometry and hydrogen-oxygen mixture characteristics.

i Diffusion burning consists of one or more steady flames anchored at the hydrogen source or other physical restrictions where the hydro-gen-oxygen mixture can be maintained at combustible levels. Diffu-sion burning is expected to occur when the hydrogen release is '

continuous and remains at a rate equal to or greater than the threshold value.

If hydrogen is released at a rate less than the threshold value, the burning is likely to consist of a series of deflagration burns.

Deflagration burning is characterized by a slow buildup of hydrogen, in the presence of excess oxygen, until a deflagration ignition lim-it is reached at an ignition source. Once ignited, a deflagration burn rapidly consumes most of the hydrogen in the volume.

The thermal environment in the containment resulting from a hydrogen burn is highly dependent upon the type of burning considered. Dif-fusion burning generally results in locally high temperatures. The region affected by the high temperatures is dependent upon the burn location, the rate of hydrogen release, and the resulting circula-tion patterns developed in the containment.

The deflagration burning thermal environment is characterized by a series of temperature spikes with a relaxation period between burns.

Each subvolume in the containment may be subject to one or more de-flagration burns. The thermal environment produced by a deflagra-

. tion burn is assumed to directly affect the entire subvolume with high temperatures.

4 In both diffusion burning and deflagration burning, equipment locat-ed within the containment will be subject to convection and radia-

tion heat transfer. The rate of heat transfer is dependent upon the type of burning, the location of burning, and the location of the equipment.

3.2 DEFLAGRATION BURN ENVIRONMENT The thermal environment produced by deflagration burning in a Mark III containment can be estimated through the ~ use of the CLASIX-3 computer program (Reference 4). The nodal arrangement used C4/14764/15/4YH 6 _.

in CLASIX-3 for RBS is shown in Figure 3.2-1. The RBS model is sia-ilar to the model used for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) as reported in Reference 5.

Because deflagration burning is volume-dependent, careful consider-ation of containment geometry must be made when developing the model to be used in CI.ASIX-3. The model used for RBS simulates the drywell, the wetwell, the intermediate containment region between the HCU and refueling floors, and the upper containment above the

- refueling floor. The model includes heat removal from the intermediate volume due to operation of the containment unit coolers.

The inclusion of the intermediate node, from the HCU floor (el 114 ft 0 in.) to the refueling floor (el 186 ft 3 in.), reflects the significant physical changes in flow area at these elevations. , l The HCU floor, consisting of concrete platforms and grating, repre-sents approximately a 60 percent reduction in flow area from the wetwell volume. The flow area through the refueling floor consists primarily of the hoist area and two stairways. This limited flow area represents a significant restriction to flow between the inter-mediate node and the upper containment.

Results obtained from CLASIX-3 for RBS are included as Figures 3.2-2 through 3.2-4.

For a further description of the CI.ASIX-3 analysis and results, see Reference 6.

3.3 DIFFUSION BURN ENVIRONMENT The diffusion burn environment specific to the RBS configuration will be determined by the 1/4 scale tests being conducted by the HCOG. These tests are currently scheduled for completion in 1985.

Therefore, this report does not address essential equipment response to diffusion burn thermal conditions.

~

C4/14764/15/4YH 7

i UPPER CONTAINMENT (VOL. 4) f ye mammmmmmmmmmmmmmmm$ INTERMEDIATE 3

E VOLUME E (VOL. 3)

E ymmiammmmmmmmmmmmmmmmeg ,

E E E E E E E E E I E E

!t

<Om E:::::::::::::::-:::A I b'b b b b b h h h h h h I

DRYWELL m m $5 SUPPRESSION 4 m m WETWELL I

(VOL.1)

' r ;izi?!^_P O O,L_ M ' r (VOL. 2)

F:::::::::::::::::-: : : :-:-!

NUiUiYibi[id2I V5 5^ 55:-:#

W FLOW ALLOWED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS FLOW ALLOWED IN ONE DIRECTION mummmmme HYDROGEN MIXING SYSTEM FLOWPATH mm mum AIR RETURN FAN

- BYPASS LEAKAGE FIGURE 3.2-1 CLASIX-3 NODALIZATION RIVER BEND STATION -

4

)

l r

1 2200 -

1 2100 -

2000 -

1000 -

I 1000 - L 1700 -

1000 -

1500 -

( 1400 -

g 130G -

g im -

< 1100 -

E 1000 -

g OOO -

, .00 -

700 -

400 -

500 -

400 -

l 300 -

2M -

{ (((((((((((,((((((((((g((([((((((((((((

100

. 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 TIME (THOUSAND SECONDS)

I t

FIGURE 3.2-2 WETWELL TEMPERATURES SORV CASE - RELEASE B RIVER BEND STATION

9 l

1100 -

1000 -

900 .

= .

( 700 .

E =

g .

g = .

E g .00 .

m -

I 200 -

, kC b( l l 0

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 TIME (THOUSAND SECONDS) 6 I

i FIGURE 3.2 3 INTERMEDIATE NODE TEMPERATURE SORY CASE - RELEASE B _

RIVER BEND STATION

a -

a _u h

b e

290 -

280 -

270 -

200 -

250 -

240 -

b 230 -

W

~

LL qq g 210 -

kl L g , 200 -

M%d_4ww

! 190 -

180 -

170 -

160 f

150 140 -

'''''''''''ie =

130 i

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 TIME (THOUSAND SECONDS) 1 FIGURE 3.2-4 DRYWELL TEMPERATURES SORY CASE - RELEASE B _

RIVER BEND STATION

k 4.0 EQUIPMENT THERMAL MODELING 4.1 CODE SELECTION The code selected for use in this analysis is HEATING 6. HEATING 6 is a multidimensional heat conduction analysis code using the finite-difference formulation and is the latest version of "The Heating Program," where HEATING is an acronym for Heat Engineering and Transfer in Nine Geometries. The code was prepared for the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission by D. C. Elrod, G. E. Giles, and W..D. Turner under Interagency Agreements DOE 40-549-75 and 40-550-75. The code was selected for use in this project in order to maintain compatibility with other HCOG investigations currently being pursued.

4.2 ASSUMPTIONS

a. Two-dimensional modeling is assumed sufficiently exact for pre-liminary investigations. One-dimensional (radial) modeling is used to represent thin-walled elongated cylindrical objects (e.g., Crosby pilot valve solenoid coil) where the cylinder ends can be assumed to act as massive heat sinks, so that it is conservative to ignore them.

b. Where unit orientation with respect to vertical has not been verified, it is assumed that the unit is so oriented as to max-inize convection to the most critical component.

~

c. Units being analyzed are assumed to be surrounded on exposed sides by hot vapor to a sufficient distance (of at least 10 ft) so as to-maximize emissivity of the radiant cloud.

d. Convection of heat to the units is modeled by assuming forced convection at a velocity of 12 ft/sec.

e. Emissivity and absorptivity of the equipment component surfaces (internal and external) are set equal to conservatively high values, so as to maximize heat transfer to the equipment sur-face and within air spaces located inside the equipment outer surface.

f. Natural convection within free air spaces inside the equipment I surface envelope is modeled by using enhanced heat conduction (Reference 7). '

\

g. Critical unit nonmetallic subcomponents are determined by re-view of vendor data and equipment qualification reports. When c

two subcomponents have similar projected temperature sensitiv-t ity, alternate heat transfer models are developed to maximize heat flow to each potentially critical component. Each model is then subjected to the thermal forcing function for the unit being analyzed. This procedure avoids spurious qualification on the basis of the most thermally sensitive material occurring only in a well protected location (well insulated, attached to C4/14764/15/4YH 8 _

-- - - - - - _ - n , --. , - , , -. . - , -- ,,-, n,

most massive component heat sink, etc), while another material, with less inherent sensitivity to high temperature, may occur in a more exposed environment and thus be heated rapidly above its critical temperature,

h. Internal heat generation has been considered for the hydrogen igniter.

4.3 BOUNDARY CONDITIONS All units are assumed to be maximally exposed to the elevated ther-mal environment as indicated in the diagrams in Section 4.4. Ex-posed surfaces are allowed to radiate to the heat sinks which have surface temperatures calculated by CLASIX-3. No credit is taken for any unit being in a convective " dead zone" and thus shielded from the assumed 12-ft/sec gas stream. ,

Unit internal air spaces (from the shell or case to the heat-sensitive component which is shielded by the shell or case) are assumed to transmit heat by natural convection, by conduction, and by radiation. Natural convection internal to the unit is modeled as an increase in the thermal conductivity of the air in these spaces.

Thermal radiation across the air gap is modeled directly.

Credit is taken for heat flow by conduction into heat sinks, such as will occur from the hydrogen igniters into the wall (drywell, etc) upon which they are mounted. Conservative values of thermal contact resistance are employed so as not to overestimate the temperature reduction due to this effect.

4.4 MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND VERIFICATION Models for component thermal analysis have been developed incorpo-rating the assumptions and boundary conditions listed above. The study uses two-dimensional models, except where a one-dimensional (radial) model more conservatively represents an elongated cylindri-cal object (Crosby pilot valve solenoid coil).

These models will be verified by comparison of modeling techniques and assumptions with other similar analyses, by independent con-sultant review. The models used in the Grand Gulf preliminary survivability report are available (Reference 8). The techniques and assumptions used are generally similar.

In addition to the standard in-house calculation review procedures, SWEC has arranged for a review by Dr. J. R. Howell of the University of Texas at Austin Dr. Howell is an expert in the field of radiant heat transfer and is well known as the coauthor with Dr. R. Siegel of the text Thermal Radiation Heat Transfer.

C4/14764/15/4YH 9

The following sketches show the models used for the hydrogen ignit- -

er, valve operator, solenoid valve, and pilot valve. These are de-rived from the manufacturer's documentation, samples of which are included as Figures 4.4-1 through 4.4-4, respectively.

I

\.

e i

4 1

C4/14764/15/4YH 10 _,

HYDROGEN IGNITER l 4

TEMPERATURE FUNCTION FROM CLASIX 3

/

(RADIATION, CONVECTION)

+ PARTIAL RERADIATION TO WALL /

/

(SiOES OF SOX OWLY) (TYPICAL)

/

/

/ / /

/

^'"

kh /

CON I RADIATION CONDUCTION

~

. COLL CONVECTION j - :=-

=0, fx

,/ CONVECTION 9/

/

/

CONDUCTION, RADIATION

//

[

The above shows a two-dimensional model (rectangular coordinates) of the coil (mixture of copper and insulation), which is taken as the critical component.

C4/14764/15/4YH 11

T e

LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATOR 0.13-HP RELIANCE MOTOR I

TEMPERATURE FUNCTION FRoM CLAstN.3 (RAotAttoN CONVECTION)

' /j '/, STEEL / // / INsuLATEo

[

, AIR '

\

SouNoARY

/ e.,'.**

4** '.

'RoN i \g h C PPER. * ,

^

' g\ '

(NsWLAfloN) ,

/,'

w - ' '

y

\ s

/ 4> RAolAfloM l l(CoNouCTio"'

gyg gg ,4 '

-s iNsuLATEo souNoARv

[.

,/

IRON

\ s'

/, /,'si, EEL /, ', s 'x\

The above shows a two-dimensional model (cylindrical coordinates) of the stator coil (mixture of copper and insulation), which is taken as the critical component. An insulated boundary is used to separate the model from other elements assumed to follow the same temperature transient (typical).

C4/14764/15/4YH 12 -

TARGET ROCK SOLEN 0ID VAI.VE TEMPERATURE FUNCTION FROM CLAS4X 3 (RADIATION, CONVECTION) l

////

h AIR RADIATION. CONDUCTION b $

~

_ INSULATED SOUNDARY W W ,

W "ONDUC C

' lN W SILICON q - - -

The above shows a two-dimensional model (cylindrical coordinates) of the rectifier block, which is considered to be the critical component. The body of the valve is not considered as a heat sink as it is also sub-jected to the thermal transient.

~

C4/14764/15/4Yli 13

, , . - - . ~

CROSBY PILOT VALVE (ADS SYSTEM)

TsaepsA47Uns FuseCTiott Pho40 CLAsoka 1 Convection. AAo6Aflow)

\ \ ,\ M \t

'N NNNN N N

'N %,_._ 'N'38 V,/

$ sY\~~~

o. o- s ,sfest' iComouCTioni //

E KTW f i x i -o.a.=r moost

1. do 000 00 0 0 0 000 00 0 0e TetspsAATues NN i ' CM * * **

E 7""

'C,0,",,j c,7'04- /

bs\ *l*ra

. .h, t1o= f ee: 08 *c l'c*C"**"

8 : so , :c t t C C ?f l ** @O 1 0 3 0 0C O --

sN L

Two models are used:

0-ring Two dimensional (cylindrical)

Coil One dimensional (cylindrical)

These units have two classes of, temperature sensitive subcomponents, 0-rings and a solenoid coil. It is not obvious which will be subjected to the most severe local conditions, so both are modeled. Coil tempera-tures are conservatively estimated by considering maximum thermal radiation f rom the albminum case (i.e. , emissivity = absorptivity = 1.0) while 0-ring temperatures are maximized when the thermal radiation across the air gap is eliminated (i.e., emissivity = absorptivity = 0.0 on the inner surfaces only). A one-dimensional model is chosen for the coil as it conservatively avoids heat flow into the massive sinks at either extremity of the valve. Cylindrical coordinates are used as they fit the shape of the critical components and conservatively ignore significant thermal mass at these extremities.

~

14 C4/14764/15/4YH

/

13-7/8 _

_ 8 - - 5-7/8 -

JL m

l s e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,

% g-$ j 8

g JUNCTION

< 80 e i BOX gM 8e i

. ri - - *is

- ' -I si l l- - 4l 8 il

" ' si e C

i r,.. _1 si s i .. Il 9 GLOW PLUG

..._.1 si

• o

.:.:( Ji i

' ' c = . ::

' 8 ie l

e i ll g;  ! It .:i :::== ,-Ml l L_____j ll c::

i._______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _3

_ U i

i TRANSFORMER COIL ,

SIDE VIEW v

4 r

! FIGURE 4.4-1 i

i HYDROGEN IGNITER ~

RIVER BEND STATION

- - - - - -.-aa%

4 T.*M .

rg

=

S , ,

- 1

m. -

J g

4

'N d

• S,, -

)

y

~

40f 9 8};

9 d

4 i

l FIGURE 4.4-2 LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATOR MOTOR -

RIVER BEND STATION

e j ,

RECTIFIER 50' !

REF- 3#

NUMBERS CORRESPOND TO THE 34 MANUFACTURERS PARTS

, 53 BREAKDOWN

' 35

=

34 52

.; 33 l

3 41 50 40 42 .

54 43 32 55 $4 57 , 31 4,%

5 5. ..

7y 44 f l

5 s

s, .c, N'

.lw: '- s a

& & k h h i

\

5.31 APPROX ,

CG '

t l

.40 APPROX CG-> e 10.50 2.50

) 1 o v t

FIGURE 4.4-3 TARGET ROCK SOLENOID VALyE RIVER BEND STATION

TOP CONN COVER PDTTIN3 GASKET

/ --MI /

O RING N ,% ,

N _ .

, -ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR NUT -

a ~ YOKE ASSEMBLY N

],

l' ORING

/ ,

. COIL / - J , (

ASSEMBLY - / 0 RING

/ - -

/ SOLENOIO GASKET / - COIL

-PLUNGER PLUNGER &

'# 17 SLEEVE SPRING ASSY # .

SODY SEAT b

Ib

=--- 2 1/16" -

C.GYW 4 1/16" SODY j -

ASSEMSLY - C/, j

'0 /

./,f

[

// l FIGURE 4.4-4 CROSBY (ADS) PILOT AIR NAMEPLATE SOLENOID VALVE RIVER BEND STATION'

5.0 RESULTS The predicted maximum temperatures and qualification temperature for the essential equipment considered in this analysis are listed in Table 5.0-1. Both the maximum outside surface temperature of the equipment casing and the maximum temperature of the thermally sensi-tive nonmetallic internal component are given. The table also indi-cates the hydrogen generation event thermal environment applied as the driving condition to the HEATING 6 thermal model of each unit.

I s

e e

6 C4/14764/15/4YH 15

TABLE 5.0-1

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS Material Hydrogen Equipment Predicted Temperature Maximum Generation Equipment Qualification Sensitive Service Unit Event Location Temperature Casina Component Temperature Hydrogen SORV W 340*F (470*F)*** 900*F* 600*F* 500*F igniter (Fig.

3.2-2)

Hydrogen SORV INT 340*F (470'F) 300*F 165'F 500'F

>- igniter (Fig. i 3.2-3)

Hydrogen DWB DW 340*F (470*F) 320*F 305'F 500*F igniter (Fig.

3.2-4) 0.13 HP SORV INT 340*F 310*F 235'F NA R211ance (Fig.

notsr on 3.2-3)

Li-itorque  ;

cpsrator Target SORV INT 385'F 388'F 222*F NA Rsch sole- (Fig.

noid recti- 3.2-3) fisr Crcsby (ADS) pilot valve 0-ring DWB DW 340*F** 336*F 336'F 400*F (Fig.

3.2-4)

Coil DWB DW 340*F** 336*F 312*F 500 F (Fig.

3.2-4)

• Estimated value .

• • LOCA qualification currently in progress

• • • 470*F predicted for sensitive component for 25 watts operating power and 340*F soak temperature

~

C4/14764/15/4YH 16

\

6.0 REFERENCES

1. 10CFR, Part 50, Hydrogen Control Requirements, Final Rule, January 25, 1985

2. A Guide to Preparation of Equipment Survivability Lists, Enercon Services, Inc., Revision 0, April 27, 1984

3. HGN-024, December 14, 1984, from S. H. Hobbs (Chairman, HCOG) to H. R. Denton (Director, NRC-NRR), " Hydrogen Control Program Plan"

4. Fuls, Dr. G. M. , "The CLASIX-3 Computer Program for the Analy-sis of Reactor Plant Containment Response to Hydrogen Release and Deflagration," WCAP-10259 (proprietary) and WCAP-10260 (nonproprietary), March 1983 i ,

5. Enclosure to HCOG Letter No. HGN-001, January 15, 1982, "CLASIX-3 Containment Response Sensitivity Analysis"

6. RBS CLASIX-3 Analysis, February 1985

7. J. P. Holman, Heat Transfer, New York (McGraw-Hill, 1976),

pg 255 to 259

8. RBG-21,218, June 7, 1985, from J. E. Booker to H. R. Denton, <

" Containment Pressure and Temperature Response to Hydrogen Combustion" 4

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