ML20148A906

Notice of Violation from Insp on 880119-29.Violations Noted: Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Deviated from on 871030 W/O Temporary Changes Being Made to Procedure.Licensee Strengths & Weaknesses Encl

ML20148A906
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	03/11/1988
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148A904	List: IR 05000317/1988001 ML20148A900 ML20148A906
References
50-317-88-01, 50-317-88-1, 50-318-88-01, 50-318-88-1, NUDOCS 8803210236
Download: ML20148A906 (4)

Text

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k I l APPENDIX'A l t

NOTICE OF VIOLATION j Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-317  !

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant- 50-318 i License Nos. OPR-53 ,

DPR-69 q As a result of the inspection conducted.on January 13-29,~1988, a violation of l NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General S'atement of f Policy and Procedure for_ NRC Enforcement Action," (10 CFR 2, Appendix. C), 'the {

violation is listed below: j Technical Specification 6.8.3.6 and Cal' vert Cliffs Instruction (CCI) 101J,- l Review and Approval Procedures for Proposed Calvert Cliffs Procedures, l require that, when it is necessary to depart from ' approved procedure a - 1 temporary change be written into the procedure and reviewed and approved i by two members of station management, one of whom must hold a senior -

reactor operator license on the affected unit, j i

Contrary to the abovt, (1) STP 0-5-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System, was j deviated from on Octobe ^ 30, 1987 without temporary changes _being made to r the procedure. As a cusequence, a _ valve was closed in the No. 13 l Auxiliary Feedwater Pump recirculation line which had the potential for }

degrading the operability of the pump and, (2) several temporary changes  ;

including addition and deletion of steps.were made and implemented prior  !

to the required second review for the June 30, 1987 and September 23, 1987 performances of STP 0-65-2, Quarterly Valve Operability Verification.

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This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I) applicable to OPR-53  !

and 69.

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Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company i is hereby required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of i this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including: (1) the  !

corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective  ;

steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when  ;

full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration f will be given to extending the response time.  ;

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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY CIR CC 88 0003.0.0 l 8803210236 880311 03/08/88 PDR ADOCK 05000317

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s APPENDIX B LICENSEE STRENGTHS Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-317 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 50-318 License Nos. DPR-53 DPR-69 As a result of the inspection conducted on January 19-29, 1988, the following strengths were identified.

1. Daily performance, experience and demonstrated knowledge of the operations staf f was goad. Shift inspectors had positive findings with regard to:

Control room operations and visitor control.

Shift turnovers and crew briefings.

Knowledge level of Auxiliary Operators.

Control Room response to the January 22, 1988 loss of #22 instrument bus and subsequent plant trip demonstrated a well controlled, systematic and professional approach including:

• Operator system knowledge and ability to focus on problems quickly.

• Good communications.

Excellent immediate follow-up of the trip in review of the plant status.

2. The licensee's initiative in performing a Safety System Functional Inspec-  !

tion (SSFI) was considered to be positive. The SSFI appears to have been  ;

well planned and systematic. BG&E personnel worked jointly with an exper" l ienced contractor to develop in-house expertise for future activities of this type. Findings with potential safety significance were promptly considered by POSRC; licensee engineers and management personnel were ,

thoroughly briefed. l

3. Completed maintenance packages contained detailed descriptions of the work accomplished. Such packages:

• Facilitated turnover,

• Enhanced communications, l Provided evidence of active QC involvement; and, Provided good references for future activities.

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY CIR CC 88 0004.0.0 03/11/88

L, Appendix B 2 v

4. Several good management practices were observed to have been completed or in progress. They included:

• - U:e of an opinion survey to ideatify potential- problems.

Training in and implementation of team. building / conflict resolution-techniques.

• Several steps.taken to enhance communications.

• Actions being taken to involve more of the staff at lower levels in collaborative decision making, Accountability measures through interrelated performance objectives and performance appraisals.

• Effective reward / recognition system.

Increased emphasis on plant and equipment material conditions.

Maintaining positive employee work ethic.

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l 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY CIR CC 88-01.- 0005.0.0 03/05/88

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l APPENDIX C LICENSEE WEAKNESSES Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-317 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 50-318 License Nos. DPR-53 DPR-69 As a result of the inspection conducted on January 19-29, 1988, the following weaknesses were identified.

1. Housekeeping and material condition of the plant in selected areas needed improvement:

There was excessive material adrift including test and equipment carts in the vicinity of safety-related buses and panels.

Scaffolding was erected near safety-related equipment for long periods of time. There were no designated scaffolding storage areas.

General housekeeping was poor in the 5 f t. elevation of the Unit 2 east penetration room and the intake structure.

Contaminated areas in the ECCS pump rooms inhibitec access and con-tributed to the generation of radiological waste based on required operator access to this area several times a shift.

2. Inadequate control of troubleshooting efforts was the primary cause of the Unit 2 trip that occurred on January 22, 1988. Improvements appeared to be warranted in the following areas:

Troubleshooting is usually accomplished under a general Maintenance Order without a mechanism for specific control of parameters and bounds.

A more detailed investigation of the job per Calvert Clif fs Instruc- l tion 117 was needed prior to commencing work. 1 Conservative steps such as checking for grounds and sneak circuits  ;

were not used. I There were communications / interface problems with the vendor in interpreting vendor-supplied information.

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l OFFICIAL RECORD COPY CIR CC 88 0006.0.0 i 03/11/88 l

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