ML20071P861
| ML20071P861 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1982 |
| From: | Mckinney T, Ramsey B, Razlaff W EDS NUCLEAR, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20071P846 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.D.1, TASK-TM 09-0870-001, 09-0870-001-R00, 9-870-1, 9-870-1-R, NUDOCS 8212290104 | |
| Download: ML20071P861 (64) | |
Text
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l EVALUATION OF PRESSURIZER SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE SYSTEM for POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT Prepared for-Wisconsin Electric Power Company by EDS Nuclear Inc.
2333 Waukegan Road Bannockburn, IL 60015 December 1982 EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 Revision 0 P212290104 821223 PDR ADOCK 05000266
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EDS NUCLEAR INC.
REPORT APPROVAL COVER SliEET j Client: Wisconsin Electric Power Company Pr: Ject: SRV Evaluation Job Number: 0870-005,006 Evaluation of Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valve System for Report
Title:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Report Number: 09-0870-001 Rev. O N work described in this Report was performed in accordance with the EDS Nuclear Quality Assurance Pmgram. The signatures below verify the accuracy of this Report and its compliance with applicable quality assurance requirements.
Prepared By:
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REVISION RECORD Rev. .
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page List of Tables i List of Figures li
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 1.1 General 1
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1.2 Work Performed 1 1.3 Modification of Loop Seal 2 1.4 Conclusions 2 2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 4 2.1 General 4 2.2 Piping System 5 2.3 Operating Conditions 5 3.0 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EVALUATION 6 3.1 Introduction 6 3.2 Safety valve Evaluation 6 3.3 Thermal-Hydraulics Analysis 12
. 3.4 Piping Evaluation 17 4.0 RESULTS 23 4.1 Piping Stresses 23 4.2 Nozzle and Valve Flange Load 23 4.3 Valve Accelerations 24 4.4 Support Loads 24 4.5 Discussion of Piping Results 24 i
REFERENCES 27 APPENDIX A: Description of Computer Programs APPENDIX B: SUPERPIPE Models APPENDIX C: Detailed Pipe Stress and Support Load Summaries i
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n WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page i LIST OF TABLES Table Title 2-1 Safety Valve Parameters 2-2 Power-Operated Relief and Block Valve Parameters 3-1 Applicable EPRI Tests for PBNP Safety Valves 3-2 Comparison of Results for Applicable EPRI Tests 3-3 Maximum Calculated Backpressures 3-4 Maximum Calculated Temperatures 3-5 Load Combinations for Piping Analysis 3-6 Pipe Support Load Combinations 3-7 Allowable Stresses for Seismic Class Piping 3-8 Allowable Stresses for Non-Seismic Class Piping 4-1 Unit 1 Pipe Stresses 4-2 Unit 2 Pipe Stresses 4-3 Nozzle / Flange Loads 4-4 Safety Valve Accelerations 4-5 Piping Support Loads
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page ii LIST OF FIGURES Figure Title 2-1 PBNP Unit 1 Pipine; Configuration 3-1 Loop Seal Box Insulation 3-2 Loop Seal Temperature Profile 3-3 Typical Plot of Safety Valve Backpressure 3-4 PBNP Unit 1 REF$RC Model 3-5 Unit 1 Force Time History for Data Point F-1 3-6 Unit 1 Force Time History for Data Point F-17 3-7 Unit 1 Force Time Listory for Data Point F-5 3-8 Seismic Response Spectrum
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General EDS Nuclear has completed an evaluation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) pressurizer safety and relief valve system. This evaluation was performed for Wisconsin Electric Power Company in accordance with the recommendations of NUREG-0578, Section 2.1.2, clarified by NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, and by the NRC's letter of September 29, 1981.
This report summarizes the evaluation.
1.2 Work Performed The EDS scope of work included an evaluation of the operability of the safety valves and the functionality and integrity of the system piping. The operability of the power-operated relief valves (PORV's) and the block valves was not evaluated within this scope.of work. PORV and block valve operability has been addressed in Wisconsin Electric Power Company letters to the NRC dated June 30, 1982 and August 9, 1982.
The operability of the safety valves was evaluated principally by correlation with the industry-sponso{ed The Research Institute (EPRI) Test Program.
Electric Power applicability of this program to PBNP is addressed in Section 3.2.1. The results of the evaluation are given in Section 3.2.2. ,
For the pressurizer safety and relief valve discharge piping system, thermal-hydraulic analyses were performed to calculate the bounding dynamic loading induced on the piping by rapid valve actuation. The computer program RELAP5/MQD1 2 was used, together with the post-processor REFpRC. These analyses are described in Section 3.3.
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. m WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 2 Piping analyses were performed for these thermal-hydraulic loads, using the computer program SUPERPIPE.4 Analyses were also performed for gravity, thermal, pressure, and seismic loads. These analyses are described in Section 3.4.
1.3 Modification of Loop Seal As an ongoing part of the evaluation, potential modifications to the loop seal and the safety valves were considered as a means of either improving system performance or reducing discharge piping loads.
Based on the adequacy of the existing system, no modifications to the va.ves are planned. Furthermore, the loop seals will be retained. However, Wisconsin Electric has elected to raise the temperature of the loop seal water by adding insulation upstream of the safety valves.
The evaluation of safety valve operability (Section 3.2) is based on the cold, uninsulated loop seal. Raising the loop seal water temperature will further assure the valves' operability.
As the decision to insulate the loop seal was made before the thermal-hydraulic analyses were started, these analyses (Section 3.3) have been based on the modified loop seal temperature profile. Thus, they can be used as the basis for any future modification to the discharge piping system.
The discharge piping stresses reported in Section 4.0 are therefore also based on the modified temperature profile.
Stresses for the existing, cold loop seal would be expected to be somewhat higher. However, this is not considered to impact the conclusions that have been drawn as to the adequacy of the existing system.
a WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 ,
Page 3 1.4 Conclusions Based on the EPRI Test Program results and the plant-specific evaluation described in Section 3.2, it is concluded that the operability of the PBNP safety valves is confirmed. For the postulated, severe system operating transients under which they may be activated, the safety valves should relieve pressure and prevent overpressurization. Furthermore, their operating characteristics are such that the conclusions drawn with regard to the safety aspects of PBNP in Section 14 of the FFDSARS should not be impacted.
Due to the high out-of-balance loads induced by the sudden discharge of the water loop seal, the stresses calculated on certain portions of the discharge piping system exceed the specified allowable stresses. Due to the conservatism of the transient definition and the thermal-hydraulic and piping analyses, the stresses may be significantly overpredicted.
However, some yieldinc of the PBNP discharge piping system would probably occur following safety valve actuation. Also, the loads computed on certain supports exceed those to which these supports were evalaated in the recent IE Bulletin 79-14 effort (although it is probable that the ultimate capacity of these supports is significantly greater than the 79-14 loads) .
Further evaluations are in progress to provide modifications to the discharge piping supports and increase the system's ability to withstand the calculated transient loads. As is discussed in Section 4.5, based on the transient nature of the loading, the function of the piping, and the low probability of safety valve actuation, there is no significant safety impact to the present piping and support configuration pending installation of these modifications.
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v.rxann mum:a:unxumce=xexxaumawwnumas.awmememu muzz ,a WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 4 2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 General PBNP is a two-uni? power plant. Each unit is a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with two primary coolant loops.
Each unit is rated at 1518 MWt. In general, Unit 2 is a mirror image of Unit 1.
The safety and relief valve system for each unit consists of:
Two spring-loaded, Crosby Valve and Gage Co. HB-BP-86 series safety valves Two Copes-Vulcan Inc. power-operated relief valves Two Velan gate-tj pe block valves with Limitorque operators Three pressurizer outlet piping lines: one line, including a loop seal, for each of the two safety valves, and one (branching) line for the block and power-operated relief valves A common discharge piping line, routed into the pressurizer relief tank (PRT)
Details of the safety and power-operated relief valves are given in Tables 2-1 and 2-2, respectively.
The inlet and outlet piping is described in Section 2-2.
The layout of the Unit 1 system is shown in Figure 2-1. The Unit 2 layout is essentially a mirror image of Unit 1, with some difference in the piping near the PRT.
If an abnormal transient causes a substained pressure increase in the pressurizer at a rate exceeding the control capacity of its spray system, a high-pressure trip signal is activated.
This signal opens the PORV's. If the pressure continues to rise and reaches the set pressure of the safety valves, one or more of these valves will open to relieve the overpressure.
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NY sureuruwcarmaarra.-~~mutwaammuruwmumewmmuuascxwum;wa=34emmaam merm WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 5 2.2 Piping System Each safety valve is connected to a pressurizer outlet nozzle by 4-inch diameter piping in a loop seal configuration. The loop seal is currently uninsulated and contains cold water.
Each safety valve also has a 6-inch discharge (or tail) pipe which runs into a common 8-inch header pipe.
The two PORV's share one pressurizer outlet nozzle. A 4-inch pipe from this nozzle branches into two 3-inch pipes, one for each PORV. For Unit 1, one PORV is a 3-inch, the other-a 2-inch valve. For Unit 2, both are 2-inch valves. The 2-inch PORV's are attached to the 3-inch pipes through 3 by 2-inch reducers. Each PORV has a 3-inch discharge (or tail) pipe.
These run into a common 4-inch header which runs into the 8-inch header common to the safety valve discharge piping.
The block valves are in series with (and upstream of) the PORV's.
The 8-inch header pipe discharges into the PRT. The PRT has a volume of 5984 gal and is equipped with an L-quencher and a 100 psig rupture disc.
2.3 Operating Conditions The most severe reactor coolant system overpressure condition requiring operation of the PORV's or of the PORV's and the safety valves would occur following the postulated instantaneous seizure of a reactor coolant pump rotor - a
" locked rotor" accident.5,6 The transient analysis for a locked rotor accident conservatively assumes that the PORV's do not operate and that pressure relief is through the safety valves only. The peak pressurizer pressure computed for this case is 2763 psig with j a maximum pressure ramp rate of 297 psi /sec.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 6 Upon clearing of the loop seal water, the fluid condition is saturated steam only. No postulated PBNP transient results in the passage of solid water through the safety valves after discharge of the loop seal water. Cold overpressurization may result in passage of solid water through the PORV's only; however, given the slow opening time of the PORV's relative to the safety valves, the locked rotor transient would induce a much more severe loading of the system piping.
3.0 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT EVALUATION 3.1 Introduction The evaluation was performed in three parts.
First, the operability of the PBNP safety valves was evaluated by correlating the EPRI Test Program data to the PBNP-specific design.
Secondly, thermal-hydraulics analyses were performed to determine the bounding forces imposed on the piping by valve actuation. Actuation of a valve allows the discharge of loop seal water and high-pressure steam from the pressurizer into the discharge piping, inducing pressure and momentum transients. Until steady-state is achieved, these transients create significant unbalanced forces on each straight run of the piping.
Thirdly, dynamic piping analyses were performed to determine the response of the piping to these (and other relevant) loads. From these analyses, upper-bound stresses on the piping and upper-bound loads on the supports were calculated.
These analyses are described below.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 7 3.2 Safety Valve Evaluation At the request of the PWR utility industry, EPRI directed a full-scale test program to evaluate the performance of pressurizer safety and relief valve piping system. A number of valves, representative of those currently installed, were tested under conditions that encompassed typical, postulated pressure relief transients. Actual testing was completed in December 1981. Reports on the results of these tests have been issued to the participating utilities and the NRC./,8,9 3.2.1 Applicability of EPRI Test Results The EPRI Test Program included tests on a number of Crosby and Dresser spring-loaded safety valves. These valves were tested with various inlet piping configurations and for various fluid and flow conditions. Those tests which are relevant to PBNP and their applicability are discussed in this section. Valve type and installation, inlet and outlet piping configuration, and operating conditions are addressed.
Valve Type Crosby 3K6 and 6M6 safety valves were tested. These valves are structurally and functionally similar to the PBNP Crosby 4K26 valves. A comparison was performed by Crosby Valve and Gage Company and is included in the EPRI Valve Selection / Justification Report.10 This report considered the ef fect on valve operability of differences in valve operational characteristics, materials, design details, and size. The conclusion states that the selected test valves (3K6 and 6M6) do represent (and thus the EPRI test results are fully applicable to) the Crosby valves presently installed in PWR plants (including the 4K26).
Inlet Piping Configuration The Crosby valves were tested with both short and long (loop seal) inlet p; ping configurations. Both PBNP units have long inlet, loop seal configurations.
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- n w nnn m.m mm m uwga wn.uxu mamm w w mam.va,a WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 8 The geometry of the long inlet configurations used for both the 6M6 and the 3K6 tests was essentially the same as that installed at PBNP - however, specific pipe dimensions and lengths dif fered. For example:
The 6M6 and 3K6 inlet piping was of 6 and 3-inch diameter, respectively: The PBNP piping is 4-inch diameter.
The distance f rom the pressure source nozzle to the valve inlet was approximately 142 and 114 inches for the 6M6 and 3K6 valves, respectively: For the PBNP units, it is less than 100 inches.
The volume of the loop seal water was approximately 1760 and 470 cubic inches for the 6M6 and 3K6 valves, respectively: For the PBNP units, it is less than 370 cubic inches.
Similarly, the lengths of the loop seal water slug were 94 and 61 inches for the test valves, but less than 48 inches for the PBNP units.
In summary, while the 6M6 and 3K6 tests are clearly applicable, it is noted that the PBNP water loop seal slugs are much smaller that those used in the Test Program. Also, the inlet piping length is shorter - this will lead to the plant-specific inlet pressure drop being generally less than the tested inlet pressure drop.
Outlet Piping Configuration The test configuration is essentially similar to that for PBNP. However, the distance f rom the valve outlet to the first elbow was considerably more than that for PBNP (approximately 59 inches versus 22 inches) . Similarly the second straight run was longer (approximately 280 inches versus 60 to 110 inches) . The effect on valve operability is covered under the diccussion of backpressure. However, the shorter runs at PBNP will result in generally lower transient out-of-balance forces on the outlet piping than were recorded in the tests.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 9 Fluid Conditions The valve inlet fluid conditions used in the loop seal tests included cold loop seal water followed by saturated steam, saturated water, or subcooled water. Transitions from steam to water, and heated loop seal water cases were also run.
For the current PBNP configuration, the tests with a cold loop seal followed by saturated steam only are applicable - for the planned, modified configuration (see Section 1.3), the tests with a heated loop seal water followed by saturated steam are also applicable. These tests are listed on Table 3-1.
Inlet Pressure For the PBNP safety valves, the analysis of the critical, locked rotor transient is based upon the safety valve opening at 2465 psig. The calculated pressure ramp rate at this pressure is 297 psi /sec., and the peak pressurizer pressure is 2763 psig. These are the maximun ramp rate and peak pressures for any transient analyzed.
All the tests listed on Crosby safety valves were on valves set at 2485 psig. The pressure ramp rates range up to -
375 psi /sec. Clearly, these inlet pressure test conditions envelope those under which the PBNP safety valves may be required to operate.
Backpressure The steady-state backpressures for the EPRI tests listed in Table 3-1 ranged from 227 to 700 psia. The thermal-hydraulic analyses described later in this report determined backpressures for the PBNP valves of approximately 550 psig.
Applicable Tests Table 3 -2 includes a comparison of pressure ramp rates and backpressures for the relevant tests listed in Table 3-1.
Based on these, tests which are directly relevant to the PBNP configuration (specifically, those with high pressure ramp rates and backpressures) are indicated. While the remaining tests in this table do provide applicable data on the operability of the PBNP valves, they are of less direct relevance.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 10 3.2.2 PBNP Safety Valve Operability The Crosby 6M6 and 3K6 safety valves operated successfully in all tests applicable to the PBNP loop seal configuration - a water loop seal followed by saturated steam. In all cases they relieved pressure and prevented excessive overpressurization.
The applicability of these tects to PBNP has been addressed in the previous section. Thus, on the basis of the EPRI Test Program, it is concluded that the operability of the PBNP safety valves is confirmed.
As has been noted in the EPRI Test Program reports, valve flutter occurred during some tests with loop seals; however, subsequent valve performance was not affected substantially.
Also, delayed lift (until the loop seal had cleared) and instances of valves opening and closing slightly outside the system specifications were observed on some tests. The impact of these test valve response characteristics on PBNP is discussed below.
Valve Flutter On certain of the EPRI tests, the valve stem did not immediately open to its rated, full-lift position. Rather, oscillation (flutter) occurred, particularly during clearance of the solid water in the loop seal. In more severe instances, the valve reclosed during these oscillations (chatter) . In other tests, this flutter (or chatter) occurred during the closing cycle.
The flutter and chatter was confined to long inlet configurations. It was most pronounced on tests in which solid water conditions occurred. With the exception of the loop seal water clearance, these solid water conditions are not applicable to PBNP. Note also that chatter only occurred on three of the tests listed in Table 3-2. These were all low backpressure tests - PBNP has high backpressure.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 11 The phenomenon is apparently related to upstream water hammer. Upon initial valve lift, a pressure wave (pressure drop) is propagated upstream through the long inlet piping.
This wave is reflected at the pressurizer interface and travels btck to the valve. The resultant pressure drop at the valve may cause the valve to momentarily start closing until the pressure rebuilds. Under certain resonance conditions between the valve stem and this pressure wave, flutter may occur.
The tendency for flutter to occur will thus be dependent on the valve characteristics, the fluid conditions, and the length of the inlet piping - that is, the distance to the pressurizer.
In intarpreting the significance of the EPRI Test Program results with respect to flutter and chatter, it is assumed that the valve characteristics of the PBNP-specific 4K26 valves and the 6M6 and 3K6 valves are essentially the same.
For the test on the 3K6 valve listed in Table 3-2 as directly applicable to PBNP, the valve response was stable. For the three corresponding tests on the 6M6 valve, some flutter occurred in each case. This was confined to the period during loop seal clearance.
As noted in the previous section however, the extent and volume of the loop seal and the length of the inlet piping at PBNP is considerably less than for either the 6M6 or 3K6 tests. Based on this, it is concluded that any flutter that may occur at PBNP will be of lesser extent and severity than that observed in these EPRI tests. This is because less loop seal water must be discharged and subsequent water hammer will be of higher frequency and thus unlikely to resonate with the valve. -
Furthermore, should flutter (or even chatter) occur, it will not affect the operability of the valves. They will continue to open to relieve pressure and to close as-required. Damage to the valve seat may occur, but any post-activation leakage (the maximum observed in the tests listed in Table 3-1 was 1.5 gpm) will not be significant.
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%Y esserway-8 +gananameumeuwcammmm. nam:.:x wwumamesamsz a m WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 12 Delayed Lift In most tests oa the loop seal configuration, the valve opened partially to discharge the loop seal water before opening fully on the subsequent saturated steam. The time between initial opening and full lift was of the order of one second or less.
Similar behavior would be expected of the PBNP valves.
However, given the lesser volume of the PBNP loop seals (370 cubic inches versus 470 and 1760 cubic inches for the 3K6 and 6M6, respectively), the time between initial opening and full lif t will be correspondingly less.
This slight delay in full lift is not considered to be of consequence in evaluating the pressure relief system's ability to relieve the postulated operating transients for PBNP.
Valve Opening Pressure Valve specifications require that the safety valves open within 13 percent of their set pressure. The opening pressures of the 3K6 and 6M6 safety valves in the tests relevant to PBNP (Table 3.1) ranged to +8.9% of the set pressure.
Given the conservatism of the limiting,-locked rotor transient definition foi PBNP - which, among other conservatisms, does not consider the relieving capacity of the PORV's - the variation is not considered significant.
Valve Lift and Flow The 3K6 generally achieved rated lift and at least 90 percent of the required rated flow. The 6M6 generally exceeded the required rated flow. Based on this, it is deduced that the PBNP 4K26 valves will provide sufficient relieving capacity.
Valve Bloudown The blowdown specified for the PBNP valves is 5 percent. The actual blowdown in the EPRI tests ranged from 5 to 10 percent for the 6M6 valve, and from 17 to 20 percent for the 3K6.
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Ring Settings For the Crosby 6M6 tests listed in Table 3-1, a limited variation of the ring settings was carried out. The effect of these ring setting variations on Crosby valve performance during the tests was not significant.
3.3 Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis This section describes the development of force time histories induced on the piping system by safety valve actuation. This.
includes:
Development of a thermal-hydraulic computer model of the system Performance of analysis to determine transient state histories at discrete locations Integration of these transient state histories to develop force time histories on the piping 3.3.1 Thermal-Hydraulic Models The thermal-hydraulic analysis was performed using the computer program RELAP5/MQD1, which is described in Appendix A.
RELAP5/MpD1 thermal-hydraulic models were developed for each unit. Each consists of a number of fluid control volumes connected by flow paths or junctions. These volumes extend through the piping system from the pressurizer to the PRT, and through the rupture disc to the containment.
The Unit 1 model contains 196 control volumes and 196 interconnecting junctions. The Unit 2 model used 210 control volumes and 210 interconnecting junctions.
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JL 17 m-~amawaanwwwmauacamuwn=wwmuuan swx.nmnanamzawa . . m -a WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 14 The size of the volumes used was decreased in regions where the hydrodynamic nehavior is expected to change more rapidly.
In particular, the control volume size in the areas'where loads could be underestimated due to numerical smearing was maintained less than or equal to the loop seal water volume.
Since the probability of numerical smearing decreases as the water slug travels downstream, the control volume size was increased gradually toward the PRT.
Control junctions were included at all changes in flow area -
such as the safety valves, reducers, tees, and the pressurizer and PRT nozzles. Other junction locations were chosen to maintain dynamic stability and to provide sufficient force detail.
Individual control volumes and junctions were defined in terms of fluid state and phase parameters, geometry, and flow characteristics. The boundaries were placed to ensure adequate representation of the fluid transient.
To model each valve, a valve area, opening time, and loss coefficient were input. The critical flow correlations built into the code determine the valve flow rate based on these input parameters and the inlet pressure.
The alternate choking model in RELAP5/MQD1 was-not-used in the discharge piping for the transient calculations. It was, however, used upstream of and at the valves since choked flow would occur in these areas.
3.3.2 Parameters and Assumptions for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis This section defines (and describes the basis for) key assumptions and parameters for the thermal-hydraulic analysis.
Safety Valve Parameters Each unit has two safety valves mounted on the pressurizer.
Pertinent safety valve data is given in Table 2-1.
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Revision 0 Page 15 Flow Rate - The rated capacity of each Point Beach safety valve is 288,000 lbs/hr of saturated steam. This value was used in the analyses. In the EPRI tests, the larger 6M6 valve achieved flows in excess of its rated capacity, while the smaller 3K6 achieved flows slightly lower than its rated capacity. Thus, the use of rate'd capacity is considered appropriate.
Set Pressure - Both safety valves were assumed to open simultaneously with the PORV's at the safety valve setpoint of 24C5 psig.
Valve Opening Time - Valve opening (pop) time was based on the valve achieving full lift in 20 milliseconds. This is conservative. The poptimes recorded for the 6M6 and 3K6 valves in the EPRI test ranged from 20 to 80 milliseconds.
PORV Parameters Each unit has two PORV's. These are attached to the pressurizer through a common nozzle. Pertinent PORV data is given in Table 2-2.
Flow Rate - The maximum rated capacity of each PORV is 210,000 lb/hr. This value was used in the analyses.
Set Pressure - The set pressure for the PORV's is 2335 psig; however, the analysis assumes that both valves open at 2485 psig. The degree of conservatism introduced by this assumption has been investigated using a sequential valve actuation model - the effects were found to be negligible.
Valve Opening Time - The thermal-hydraulic analysis assumes a 0.80 second opening time for the PORV's.
Initial Conditions The initial conditions for components upstream of the safety and power-operated relief valves were assumed to be those of the pressurizer. The pressurizer was assumed to contain saturated steam. The initial conditions for downstream components were assumed to be those of the PRT, the normal operating pressure of which is less than 5 psig. Initially, it was assumed to contain water and nitrogen at 14.7 psia.
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1F samass.aawsaxaxermouracane namusmce:wm=ninswammmmmxnwwww WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 16 Loop Seal Temperature Profile - The safety valve loop seals were assumed to be heated by means of enclosed insulating boxes as shown in Figure 3-1 (see discussion in Section 1.3) .
The temperature profile used in the RELAPS/M@D1 analysis is shown on Figure 3-2.
Heat Structure Model Condensation ef fects were conservatively ignored because considerable uncertainties are involved in the definition of a heat transfer coefficient, and a leaky valve would cause high pipe wall temperatures, thereby reducing the beneficial effect of wall heat transfer.
PRT Level Under normal operating conditions, the PRT is 72 percent full. This level was used in the analysis. As the level only determines quench capacity, the short-duration transient considered in this analysis would not be sensitive to differences in the tank level.
3.3.3 Development of Force Time Histories Af ter the transient state histories were determined using RELAP5/MQDl, force time histories on the piping system at changes in flow direction and flow area were generated using REFORC. REF@RC is described in Appendix A.
These forcing functions include wave forces (control volume forces) and blowdown forces (control surface forces) . Gravity forces were determined separately within the piping analyses.
3.3.4 Thermal-Hydraulic Results and Discussion From the RELAP5/M@D1 analyses, transient pressures in the piping system, backpressures on the safety valves, and j steady-state celiperature profiles were determined. From the REFQRC analysts, forces on the piping system were calculated. l l
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Revision 0 Page 17 The analyses were reviewed for reasonableness. In particular, the adequacy of the simalatico of the valves was verified.
Key results for both units are summarized below. As expected, results for the two units are very similar - only in the region of the PRT, where the geometries differ significantly, do the results show marked differences.
Backpressures - A typical plot of safety valve backpressure is shown on Figure 3-3. Maximum backpressures for each valve are summarized on Table 3-3.
Temperature Profiles - Similarly, maximum discharge line temperatures were those in the steady-state phase at the end of the transient. Maximum temperatures at each valve and at the PRT nozzle are given on Table 3-4.
Discharge Piping Forces - The force time-histories on the elbow immediately downstream of safety valve PCV-435, on the second elbow downstream of PORV PCV-431, and on the fourth elbow from the PRT nozzle are shown in Figures 3-4 through 3-7.
3.4 Piping Evaluation 3.4.1 Jurisdictional Limits The piping evaluated includes the upstream piping from the pressurizer outlet nozzles to the safety and power-operated relief valves, and the downstream (or discharge) piping from each of these valves to the PRT* nozzle.
The 4-inch branch lines from relief valves 1-314 and 2-314 (Units 1 and 2, respectively), which join the 8-inch discharge header in the region of the PRT, were modeled beyond these valves so as to account correctly for their influence on the discharge piping response.
Loads on valves, nozzles, and flanges were determined, but no evaluation of the adequacy of these components was performed.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 18 3.4.2 Mathematical Models The piping system for each unit was idealized as SUPERPIPE mathematical models. These consist of concentrated masses connected by massless elastic members. The concentrated masses were located so as to adequately represent the dynamic properties of the system. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 mathematical models are provided in Appendix B.
EDS Nuclear's computer program SUPERPIPE was used for all analyses. SUPERPIPE performs static, dynamic response spectra, and transient dynamic analyses. It also performs the required load combinations, code verification, and support load summaries. A description of SUPERPIPE is included in Appendix A.
The piping system supports were modeled by specifying the support type and applicable direction. Actual support stiffnesses were calculated and included.
3.4.3 Description of Analyses Deadweight Analysis The weight of the piping, components, and contained water (as appropriate) was applied. The design preloads of the spring hangers were modeled as vertical forces on the pipe. Snubber supports were assumed inactive for this analysis.
Thermal Expansion Analysis For the calculation of secondary stresses due to thermal expansion, the following design temperatures were used:
Piping upstream of safety valves and PORV's - 6800F Balance of piping - 4770 F The pressurizer was also assumed to be at 680 0F. The stress-free temperature for the analysis was taken as 70 0 F.
Neither spring hangers nor snubber supports were included in the thermal analysis.
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'Page 19 Seismic Analysis The seismic analysis input was based on Reference 11.
Two co-directional earthquakes were modeled (X + Y, and Z +
Y). Each was treated as an independent event, and the envelope of the resulting response was used. Consistent with
- .he design basis for PBNP, differential seismic building -
movements were not considered.
The pressurizer was included in the mathematical model for the seismic analysis in order to accurately represent its seismic input to the piping system.
The spectral curve used in the analysis is shown on Figure 3-8. The spectral accelerations given by this curve are conservative in that they envelope the spectral curves for the different support levels in the piping system. The corresponding accelerations for the Maximum Potential Earthquake were obtained by doubling these D'esign Basis Earthquake values.
Damping was taken to be one-half of one percent of critical for all seismic analyses.
Valve Discharge Time History Analysis Thermal-hydraulic force time histories at changes in flow direction hnd flow area, calculated for each unit by REF@RC, were applied.
The direct integration solution method was used. SUPERPIPE allows the system dynamic characteristics to be written as a set of differential equations of the form:
Mu + Cu t Ku = P where M, C, and K represent the mass, damping, and stiffness of the system, u is the time-dependent displacement, and P is the applied load.
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sk MY sammewmemaacummsusaasewememswm wwsua:amuswcmm ewunvamwema WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 20 This-set of equations is solved in coupled format by generating the response of the system as a function of the response at the previous time step. By assuming that the damping matrix is a linear combination of the mass and stiffness matrices, two unique frequency damping ratio pairs can be selected. These values were taken as one percent of critical damping at both the fundamental structural frequency and at the highest significant mode considered in the analysis, (125 cycles /sec.). The frequencies of interest -
that is, those between these limits - are conservatively underdamped.
The integration time step for the time history analysis was selected to provide accurate response in the higher frequencies of the system. A value of one millisecond was used.
The event durations were taken as 0.70 and 0.75 seconds for Units 1 and 2, respectively. Stresses were determined using the maximum of each moment component.
During certain of the EPRI tests, very high frequency pressure spikes were recorded in the upstream, loop seal piping. These water hammer stresses occurred principally during valve opening and were associated with valve flutter. For a discussion of the phenomenon, see Section 3.2.3.
These high frequency pressure spikes were not included in the time history analysis. The B31.1 code allowable stresses are based on quasi-statically applied pressure throughout the pipe, not on localized pulses. Furthermore, should these pressure spikes actually occur at PBNP, they would be of even higher frequency than those observed in the EPRI tests (due to the small volume of the loop seal and the short length of the inlet piping - see Section 3.2.3) . It is not considered feasible that any significant permanent strain would occur in the PBNP piping. Thus, the potential for these pressure spikes is.not of significance with regard to the piping integrity, io e
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No.' 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY -
Revision 0 Page 21 3.4.5 Load combinations Load combinations are given in Tables 3-5 and 3-6. ,
The grouping method (modes with frequenc'ies within 10. percent being regarded as closely-spaced) was used to combine, modal -
components in the seismic analyses. Seismic responses from multi-directional input were combined using the SRSS nethod.
Seismic and valve actuation responses were also combined by the SRSS method.
For all pipe support combinations, the loads were maximized (maximum positive and maximum negative) by considering the line both hot (thermal loads included) and cold (th'ermal loads >
not included).
3.4.6 Code Evaluation The Code of Record for PBNP is USAS B31.1 (1967).12 As part of the piping evaluation, the pipe stresses resulting from the above load combinations were compared to the appropriate allowables.
In this evaluation, the (more convervative) stress intensification factors (SIF's) defined in ANSI B31.1 (1973)l3 were used for piping design with the following excpeption: the Codo of Record SIF wasadopted.1{orbutt-weldedreducers, Allowable Stresses The piping between the pressurizer outlet nozzles and the safety and power-operated relief valves-is' seismic class piping. The discharge piping between these valves and the PRT is non-seismic class piping.
The allowable stresses for the seismic and non-seismic class piping are uiven on Tables 3-7 and 3-8, respectively.
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.t WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 22 For the seismic class, pressure-retaining piping, the 4 6, and 6a allowable 7re as per stresses the FFDSARforSload combinations and the Code of Record. 1, 2,12, The allowables for the valve actuation load combinations (numbers 3 and 5) , which are not addressed in the FFDSAR, are consin Code.2gentwiththe1980ASMEBoilerandPressureVessel In particular, the stress criterion for load combination 3 is the Level C (Emergency) service limit and that for load combination 5 is the Level D (Faulted) service limit.
The non-seismic class, non-pressure retaining discharge piping's function for the dynamic load cases (seismic and valve actuation) is to ' support' the valves and seismic class piping. Thus, less restrictive allowables are appropriate.
To ensure that discharge piping integrity is maintained under these conditions, the faulted allowable per the 1980 ASME Code 15 (2.4 Sh) was used.
Note that higher stress or nonlinear strain allowables may be appropriate for this non-seismic piping, with justification being provided that integrity is maintained such that the response of the seismic class piping and valves is not affected adversely.
4.0 RESULTS 4.1 Piping Stresses For full computer summaries, see Appendix C.
Maximum stresses for each valve actuation load combination are given in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
The stresses are given for two regions of piping - the PORV section and the safety valve (SV) section.
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Revision 0 Page 23 The PORV section includes the inlet piping to the PORV's and their discharge piping to the tee-junction in the vertical run of the 8-inch header. The SV section consists of the remaining piping - including the inlet piping to the safety valves and their discharge piping to the PRT nozzle.
Both are further divided to distinguish the seismic class piping upstream of the valves and the non-seismic class discharge piping.
Load combinations 1, 2, and 4 were considered as part of the IE Bulletin 79-14 reanalysis. These combinations do not include valve actuation and are thus not reported here.
However, the stresses computed for thermal and gravity load cases at the upstream reducers on both Unit 2 PORV's were higher than those computed in the 79-14 reanalysis. The l
maximum factored thermal and gravity stresses at this location were calculated to be 34,325 and 9,530, psi, respectively.
4.2 Nozzle and Valve Flange Lcads Detailed nozzle and valve flange loads are included in the computer summaries (see Appendix C) . Table 4-3 gives the maximum components of load on each.
4.3 Valve Accelerations Approximate maximum safety valve accelerations in the horizontal and vertical directions are given on Table 4-4.
These accelerations are due to valve actuation only.
l 4.4 Support Loads For detailed support load summaries, see Appendix C.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 24 Maximum support loads from the load combinations given in Table 3-6 are shown on Table 4-5. Original design loads for the supports are not available. However, the supports' adequacy for seismic loading has been verified in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-14. The loads given in Table 4-5 generally exceed these 79-14 loads. However, it is probable
- t. hat the supports' ultimate capacity is significantly greater than the 79-14 loads.
4.5 Discussion of Piping Results I
Piping Stresses SV Section - Seismic Class Piping - The stresses at the elbow I immediately adjacent to the nozzles exceed the specified code allowables for load combinations 3 and 5. This exceedance occurs at the butt weld at the elbow, the SIF for which is 1.8. It is directly due to the relatively high valve actuation loading. Some local yielding may occur, but piping integrity should be maintained. However, given the conservatism of the load definition and the extremely low probability of safety valve actuation, this is not considered a significant safety concern.
SV Section - Non-Seismic Class Piping - The stresses in portions of this section of piping exceed the allowables given in Table 3-8. This exceedance is due to the large valve actuation forces imposed by the discharge of the loop seal water slug. The maximum exceedances occur remote from the seismic portion of the line and the safety valves. Yielding in this area would have a lesse effect on the response of the pressure-retaining, seismic class piping.
PORV Section - The stresses for load combinations 3 and 5 in this portion of the piping exceed the allowables. The most severe exceedance is at the reducers at each end of the 2-inch PORV's. However, the allowable stresses are also exceeded at several other locations.
The PORV section of the line is not directly subjected to significant valve actuation loads - the out-of-balance piping forces detericined for this section are an order lower than those for the SV section. This is because of the slow action of the PORV's and the absence of PORV loop seals.
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Revision 0 Page 25 Thus, the response of the PORV section is primarily due to the large vertical displacements and accelerations imposed by the movement of the SV section at their common tee-junction. As the PORV section is lightly supported, this motion at its extremity induced large resonance in the SUPERPIPE model.
This resonance led, in turn, to the large stresses recorded.
In actuality, this resonance is considered to be significantly overpredicted. Minor yielding would alter the dynamic characteristics of the PORV section - this would greatly l reduce its tendency to resonate. Also, the analysis was performed for very low damping - effectively, significantly less than one percent of critical. The actual damping in the PORV section at these levels of stress would be much higher, and the calculated response would reduce accordingly.
Also, as discussed in Section 4.1, increased thermal and gravity stresses (compared to the 79-14 reanalysis stresses) were calculated at the reducers on both Unit 2 PORV's. The factored thermal stress was 34,325 psi. The allowable stress is 27,440 psi (Table 3-7). Thus, the calculated overstress is approximately 25 percent. This is conservative because:
Design rather than operating temperatures were assumed.
The analysis assumes that there is no gap between active thermal supports and the piping - in fact, finite gaps exist and this will decrease these thermal stresses.
The maximum calculated gravity stress of 9,530 psi exceeded that reported for the 79-14 reanalysis effort. This would reduce the margins for load combinations including gravity.
However, this gravity stress is, again, conservative. It is primarlily induced by the presence of a stiff support nearby.
The gap at this support was not considered - this gap will reduce the stresses. Also, this particular gravity stress is secondary in the sense that, were the support in question to deflect or not be present (or the pipe to slightly yield) , the stress at this point would be relaxed.
Thus, these slight overstresses are not considered to be a safety concern. The adequacy of the line for thermal and gravity stresses will be addressed in the ongoing program to modify the pipe support system for valve actuation loading.
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- 1. "EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Safety and Relief Valve Test Report" (Interim Report) , Electric Power Research Institute, dated April 1982,
- 2. RELAPS/MQD1 Code Manual, NUREG/CR-1826.
- 3. REF$RC V.2A: A Computer Program for Calculating Fluid Forces Based on RELAPS Results, User's Manual, Revision 1, dated June 1982.
- 4. SUPERPIPE Users Manual, EDS Nuclear Inc, Version 15C, dated June 25, 1982.
- 5. " Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report -
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit No. 1 and 2," Chapter 14, Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Wisconsin Michigan Power Company.
- 6. " Valve Inlet Fluid Conditions for Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves in Westinghouse-Designed Plants" (Interim Report) , Westinghouse Electric Corporation, dated February 1982.
- 7. "EPRI/CE Safety Valve Test Data for the Crosby 3K6 Safety Valve (Long Inlet Pipe Configuration) ," Electric Power Research Institute, November 10, 1981.
- 8. "EPRI/CE Safety Valve Test Data for the Crosby 6M6 Safety Valve (Long Inlet Pipe Configuration) ," Electric Power Research Institute, January 12, 1982.
- 9. "EPRI/CE Safety Valve Test Data for the Crosby 6M6 ._afety Valve (Long Inlet Pipe Configuration) ," Electric Power Research Institute, February 18, 1982.
- 10. "EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Valve Selection / Justification Report" (Interim Report) , Electric Power Research Institute, dated December 1981.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page 28
(
- 11. " Seismic Analysis - Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units One and Two Reactor Building Job No. 6118", Bechtel Corporation, dated March 1970.
- 12. USA Standard B31.1.0-1974, " Power Piping," American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
- 13. American National Standard ANSI B31.1-1973, " Power Piping,"
American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
- 14. Letter from Wisconsin Electric Power Company to EDS Nuclear, " Point Beach Nuclear Plant Stress Intensification Factors," dated November 22, 1982.
- 15. "1980 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code," an American National Standard, American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
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Table 2-1: Safety Valve Parameters Number of Valves (per unit) 2 Manufacturer Crosby Valve and Gage Co.
Type Spring-loaded nozzle type relief valve Designation: Size 4 F2 6 Style HB-BP-86 Type E Weight 520 lbs. .
Steam Flow Capacity 288,000 lbs/hr (sat. steam)
(rated and maximum) i Inlet Outlet Design Pressure and 2485 psig 500 psig Temperature 650 0 F 4700F Set Pressure 2485 psig Table 2-2: Power-Operated Relief and Block Valve Parameters Number of Valves (per unit) PORV's: 2 Block: 2 Manufacturer PORV's: Copes-Vulcan Inc.
Block: Velan Type PORV's: Globe Valves Block: Gate Valves Steam Flow (PORV 's) 210,000 lbs/hr (max) 179,000 lbs/hr (normal)
Design Pressure and 2485 psig/6500F Temperature (PCRV's and Block Valves)
Set Pressure (PORV 's) 2335 psig
Table 3-1: Applicable EPRI_ Tests for PBNP Safety Valves 3K6 Valve 6M6 Valve-l Tests Tests 525 906 526 908 529 910 536 913 917*
920*
923 929 1406 1415*
1419*
- heated loop seal Notes:
- 1. Above tests are for a filled loop seal
- 2. Test fluid is saturated steam o
Table 3-2: Comparison of Results for Applicable EPRI Tests Directly1 EPRI Test Pressure Ramp Steady State Applicable Number Rate (psi /sec)_ Backpressure (psia)_ to PBNP (3K6 Valve) 525 3 445 526 200 520 529 18 385 536 8 432 (6M6 Valve) 906 3 253 908 297 613
- 910 375 227 913 375 233 917 291 238 920 297 240 923 283 650
- 929 319 700
- 1406 325 245 1415 360 245 1419 360 240 Note:
- 1. That is, both high backpressure and high pressure ramp rate.
Table 3-3: Maximum Calculated Backpressures Backpressure (psia)
( Unit 1 Safety Valve PCV-4 34 635 Safety Valve PCV-435 546 Unit 2 Safety Valve PCV-434 586 Safety Valve PCV-435 555 Table 3-4: Maximum Calculated Temperatures Temperature (OF)
Unit 1 Safety Valve PCV-434 682 Safety Valve PCV-435 682 PRT Nozzle 364 Unit 2 Safety Valve PCV-434 682 Safety Valve PCV-435 682 PRT Nozzle 364
i .
Table 3-5: Load Combinations for Piping Analysis Load' Combination Number Load Combination 1 (Sustained) Pr + Gr 2 (Occasional) Pr + Gr + OBE
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3 (Occasional) Pr + Gr + SOT 4 (Faulted) Pr + Gr + SSE 5 (Faulted) Pr + Gr + SSE + SOT 6 (Thermal Expansion) Th 6a (Thermal Expansion Th + Pr + Gr and Sustained)
Table 3-6: Pipe Support Load Combinations Combination Loading Support Design Number Condition Load 1 Sustained Gr + Th 2 Occasional Gr + Th + OBE 3 Occasional Gr + Th + OBE + SOT 4 Faulted Gr + Th + SSE 5 Faulted . Gr + Th + SSE + SOT where Pr = Pressure Gr = Gravity OBE = Design Basis Earthquake SDT = System Operating Transient (Valve Actuation)
Th = Thermal
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Table 3-7: Allowable Stresses for Seismic Class Piping Load Combination Allowable Number Stress 1 (Sustained) 1.0 Sh 2 (Occasional) 1.2 Sh
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3 (Occasional) 1.8 Sh 4 (Faulted) 1.8 Sh 5 (Faulted) 2.4 Sh 6 (Thermal Expansion) SA 6a (Thermal Expansion SA+Sh and Sustained)
Table 3-8: Allowable Stresses for Non-Seismic Class Piping Load Combination Allowable Number Stress 1 (Sustained) 1.0 Sh 5 (Faulted) 2.4 Sh 6 (Thermal Expansion) SA 6a (Thermal Expansion) SA+Sh where l
Sg = (1.25 Sc + 0.25 Sh)
Note:
The allowable stress for load combinations number 2, 3, and 4 is 2.4 Sh - these cases are thus enveloped by load combination 5.
Table 4-1: Unit 1 Pipe Stresses Load Maximum Allowable 2 Combination Joint Stress, Stress, Nurrber Name/fype l psi _ psi POW Section/ Seismic 3 56/ Reducer 177,100 28,800 5 56/ Reducer 177,214 38,400 POW Section/Non-Seismic 5 34/ree 114,677 35,140 SV Section/ Seismic 3 C21A/ Elbow 59,143 28,800 5 C21A/E] bow 59,151 38,400 SV Section/Non-Seismic 5 C20B/ Elbow 138,454 35,140 Notes:
- 1. For joint name/ location, see Appendix B
- 2. "er Tables 3-7 and 3-8 l
Table 4-2: Unit 2 Pipe Stresses mad Maximum Allowable 2 Combination Joint Stress, Stress,
- Ntsnber Name/ Type l Psi Psi POW Sectiorv' Seismic 3 26/Beducer 198,340 28,800 5 26/Beducer 201,075 38,100 POW Sectiorv'Non-Seismic 5 40/ Tee 124,705 35,140 SV Sectiory' Seismic 3 C26B/ Elbow 54,880 28,800 5 C26B/ Elbow 54,920 38,400 SV section/Non-Seismic 5 102/ree 476,805 35,140 Notes:
- 1. For joint name/ location, see Appendix B
- 2. Per Tables 3-7 and 3-8
Table 4-3: Nozzle / Flange Loads Axial Resultant Torsional Bending Moment Nozzle / Inad Shear Ioad Moment Flange Load Case (Ibs) (lbs) (ft-lbs) My(ft-lbs) Mz(ft-lbs)_
( Unit 1 POHV Gravity 17 35 229 301 633
( Nozzle %ermal 170 1437 932 3554 180 t at inter- Seismic OBE (X+Y) 147 120 109 202 580 face of Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 252 222 176 395 1084 press. Seismic SSE (X+Y) 294 240 218 404 1160 nozzle & Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 504 444 352 790 2168 PORV Sor 5581 5374 10550 6843 6778 inlet piping E
Piping Gravity 461 495 273 221 89 Nozzle %ermal 112 1292 735 1348 2937 at inter- Seismic OBE (X+Y) 79 88 47 55 208 '
face of Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 79 89 39 51 155 press. Seismic SSE (X+Y) 158 176 94 110 416 nozzle & Seismic SSE ( Z+Y) 158 178 78 102 310 PCV-435 Sor 5217 5475 8750 6466 9205 inlet piping E Gravity 34 72 395 457 454 Piping %ermal 793 723 362 54 140 Nozzle Seismic OBE (X+Y) 76 102 63 46 98 at inter- Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 72 94 71 57 104 face of Seismic SSE (X+Y) 152 204 126 92 196 press. Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 144 188 142 114 208 nozzle & Sor 4496 7768 9545 6541 11499 PCV-434 inlet piping PRT Gravity 963 209 329 1358 51",
at %ernal 904 269 1073 1580 4043 nozzle Seismic OBE (X+Y) 721 805 1069 1134 341 Seismic OBE (Z&Y) 354 573 697 2595 705 Seismic SSE (X+Y) 1442 1610 2138 2268 682 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 708 1146 1394 5190 1410 Sor 29115 73570 86357 24234 84610 Flange Gravity 16 382 20 38 196 down- %ermal 385 881 332 370 118 stream Seismic OBE (X+Y) 120 173 212 47 206 of POHV Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 209 283 369 82 375 1-PCV- Seismic SSE (X4Y) 240 246 424 94 412 431C Scismic SSE (Z+Y) 418 566 738 164 750 Sor 9726 17372 4599 4040 6130
I Table 4-3 (con't)
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Axial Resultant 'Ibraional Bending Moment
( Nozzle / Ioad Shear Load Moment Flange Inad Cases (lbs) (lbs) (ft-lbs) My(ft-lbs) Mz(ft-lbs) l Flange Gravity 0 134 169 10 100 down- %ermal 380 323 142 806 386 stream Seismic OBE (X+Y) 97 112 116 98 257 of PORY Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 69 173 206 191 445 1-PCV-430 Seismic SSE (X+Y) 194 224 232 196 314 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 138 346 412 382 890 SOT 17216 16760 3456 2570 5597 PCV-435 Gravity 414 50 61 347 787 at valve %ermal 738 1066 648 491 520 inlet Seismic OBE (X+Y) 78 38 53 52 56 Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 76 47 58 51 54 Seismic SSE (X+Y) 156 76 106 104 112 i Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 152 94 116 102 108 SOT 5842 8530 3998 5265 4181
'l PCV-4 35 Gravity 39 195 304 97 596 at valve %ermal 231 1276 318 1505 950 outlet Seismic OBE (X+Y) 93 74 60 57 66 Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 88 132 64 120 58 Seismic SSE (X+Y) 186 148 120 114' 132 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 176 264 128 240 116 SOT 28612 13068 8264 10850 5073 PCV-434 Gravity 261 80 1612 173 360 at valve Thermal 986 422 117 1005 111 inlet Seismic OBE (X+Y) 78 37 28 45 64
! Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 69 41 29 39 54 i
Seismic SSE (X+Y) 156 74 56 90 128 I
i Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 138 82 58 78 108 S0r 4221 7429 4677 3819 6372 i
L PCV-434 Gravity 79 868 1392 141 420 .
l at valve %ermal 401 995 851 6 181 I outlet Seismic OBE (X+Y) 98 97 70 62 34 t Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 52 97 73 71 32 Seismic SSE (X+Y) 196 194 140 124 68 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 104 194 146 142 64 SDr 35059 10804 8344 7858 6820 ,
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Table-4-3 (con't)
Axial Resultant Torsional Bending Moment Nozzle / Ioad Shear Load Moment Flange Inad Cases (Ibs) (lbs) (ft-lbs) My(ft-lbs) Mz(ft-lbs)
Flange Gravity 114 305 3095 283 265 on branch %emal 24 62 86 73 176 line up- Seismic OBE (X+Y) 429 788 2843 2439 2149 stream Seismic OBE (ZtY) 680 489 1461 963 2114 of PRT Seismic SSE (X+Y) 858 1576 5686 4878 4298 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 1360 978 2922 1926 4228 S0r 3940 5606 4273 11038 7813 Unit 2 PORV Gravity 209 352 922 273 611 Nozzle %ermal 191 995 4192 192 227 at inter- Seismic OBE (X+Y) 772 1154 1337 917 1488 face of Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 238 469 499 686 468 press. Seismic SSE (X+Y) 1544 2308 2674 1834 2976 nozzle & Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 476 938 998 1372 936 POFV SCrr 4451 6720 9313 9652 9412 inlet piping E Gravity 295 428 '176 92 188 Piping hermal 573 983 1P52 2229 736 Nozzle Seismic OBE (X+Y) 188 216 278 276 238 at inter- Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 105 111 91 90 163 face of Seismic SSE (X+Y) 376 432 556 552 476 press. Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 210 221 182 180 326 nozzle & SOT 6786 10563 9794 11454 8113 PCV-435 inlet piping E Gravity 341 267 672
- 733 671 Piping nemal 3827 3432 1996 2232 2342 Nozzle Seismic OBE (X+Y) 86 202 288 303 114 at inter- Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 77 112 108 124 89 fece of Seismic SSE (X+Y) 172 404 576 606 228 press. Seismic SSE ( Z+Y) 154 224 216 248 178 nozzle & SOT 5655 10193 5583 6057 15876 PCV-434 inlet piping
l Table 4-3 (con?t)
{
Axial Resultant Wrsional Bending Moment
, Nozzle / Inad Shear Load Moment Flange Ioad Cases (lbs) (lbs) (ft-lbs) My(ft-lbs) Mz(ft-lbs)
PRT mavity 803 100 57 369 1132 at termal 2927 5726 2684 396 11775 nozzle Seismic OBE (X+Y) 187 235 434 754 465 f 186 293 574 989 556 Skismic OBE (Z+Y)
Seismic SSE (X+Y) 374 470 868 1508 930 Ekismic SSE (Z+Y) 372 586 1148 1978 1112 SDI 59328 48140 37798 21499 116105 Flange Ravity 42 380 157 46 57 down- Sermal 313 377 1590 601 651 stream Seismic OBE (X+Y) 219 423 1837 123 866 of PORV Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 243 238 529 181 464 2-PCV- Seismic SSE (X+Y) 438 846 3674 246 1732 431C Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 486 476 1058 362 828 SOT 12410 17528 2511 7883 7272 Flange Davity 29 1240 34 19 13 down- Remal 180 6893 1193 523 2487 stream Seismic OBE (X+Y) 233 2695 307 230 1322 of PORY Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 84 873 288 134 590 2-PCV- Seismic SSE (X+Y) 466 5390 614 460 2644 430 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 168 1746 576 268 1180 l SOT 7980 24984 5659 3962 3613 PCV-435 eavity 251 97 165 241 668 at valve termal 971 593 6 1419 2052 inlet Seismic OBE (X+Y) 167 217 104 80 45 Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 103 74 58 58 45 i Seismic SSE (X+Y) 334 634 208 160 90 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 206 148 116 116 90 SOT 6794 9011 3855 3940 6182 PCV-4 35 navity 74 362 194 216 510 l,
at valve temal 413 1059 1096 349 2546 outlet Seismic OBE (X+Y) 242 166 86 100 109 Skismic OBE (Z+Y) 118 118 71 77 91 Seismic SSE (X+Y) 484 332 172 - 200 218 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 236 236 142 154 182 SOT 24218 14332 13340 8909 6563
Table 4-3 (con't)
Axial Resultant Torsional Bending Moment
(
i Nozzle / Ioad Shear Load Moment Flange Ioad Cases (lbs) (lbs) (ft-lba) My(ft-lbs) Mz(ft-lbs)
PCV-434 Gravity 6 343 330 57 398 at valve %ernal 5103 615 245 3842 827 inlet Seismic OBE (X+Y) 80 189 47 57 70 Seismic OBE (Z+Y) 75 75 26 43 66 Seismic SSE (X+Y) 160 378 94 114 140 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 150 150 52 86 132 SOT 5366 11117 5516 4497 7206 PCV-434 Gravity 326 611 135 417 269 at valve Thermal 616 5103 3916 334 4616 outlet Seismic OBE (X+Y) 212 100 86 56 144 Seismic OBE (Y+Z) 89 106 49 63 60 Seismic SSE (X+Y) 224 200 172 112 288 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 178 212 98 126 120 SOT 27509 19587 10311 12512 6783 Flange Gravity 50 278 49 317 634 on branch %ermal 117 472 89 477 1964 line up- Seismic OBE (X+Y) 85 181 367 608 270 stream Seismic OBE (Z4Y) 100 246 522 903 338 of PRT Seismic SSE (X+Y) 170 362 734 1216 540 Seismic SSE (Z+Y) 200 492 1044 1806 676 SOP 43371 44113 10603 14860 74871 9
Table 4-4: Safety Valve Accelerations 1,2 Horizontal Vertical Safety Valve Acceleration Acceleration Unit 1 PCV-434 37.6 14.4 PCV-435 30.8 10.9 Unit 2 PCV-434 35.1 21.9 PCV-435 29.5 15.3 Notes:
- 1. The accelerations shown above are a result of valve actuation
- 2. All accelerations are in units of gravity (g's),
and are given at the valve's center of gravity
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r Support Mark No. Support Load Load Combination No.
[ (Data Point No.) Type (1bs) 1 3 5 Unit 1 HS-14 Snubber Fx -
11555 12002 (15)
S-247 Rigid Fx 1597 12506 12705 (37)
Fz 840 8745 9231 HS-14 Snubber Fx -
8588 8741 (43)
RS-200 Rigid Fz 35 28446 28699 (71)
HS-17 Snubber Fx -
18348 18520 (73)
HS-18 Snubber Fx -
23041 23173 (80)
HS-200 Snubber Fy -
44089 44376 (84)
S-248 Rigid Fx 59 14569 14671 (86)
S-248 Rigid Fz 1222 8887 9122 (86)
H-200 Hanger Fy 2498 15922 16472 (93)
H-200 Hanger Fz 584 17507 17967 (93)
Table 4-5 (cont'd)
Stipport Mark No. Support Load Load Combination No.
(Data Point No. )- Type (lbs) 1 3 5 Unit 2 2S-266 Hanger Fy 8480 36770 39560 (58)
Fz 1267 14888 15452 HS-28 Snubber Fx -
7386 8771 (15) 2S-265 Figid Fx 5205 19616 21402 (37)
Fz 971 7520 7988 HS-28 Snubber Fx -
11210 11653 (43)
H-201 Rigid Fz 1118 30375 30772 (Cl4A)
HS-30 Snubber Fx -
18628 18933 (72)
HS-29 Snubber Fx -
22949 23236 (80)
HS-1 Snubber Fy -
53901 56536 (82) 2S-265 Rigid Fx 6132 22691 23912 (85)
Fz 744 14850 15288 H-200 Rigid Fx 5699 108358 108778 (99)
Fz 436 39993 40445
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_.-nax;w.--,-+--c ~mansmuycsunwn;uwesvuuzumra.aa:c=:xmm:mme wwmarm a WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page A-1
{
APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS SUPERPIPE SUPERPIPE is a comprehensive computer program developed by EDS for l the structural analysis and design checking of piping systems.
Analysis may be carried out in accordance with the requirements of any one of several standard piping codes.
SUPERPIPE executes in distinct phases; namely, specification of system geometry, static analysis, determination of dynamic
( characteristics, response spectrum or time history analysis, and design checking against code requirements. Appropriate combinations of these phases may be executed during any specific computer run.
SUPERPIPE can generate its own finite element mesh, lumped masses being automatically positioned aloag the pipe.
( Supports may be specified as active or inactive depending on the type of loading. Support participation can be changed from one analysis to the next within the same computer run.
[ Output from SUPERPIPE includes a detailed summary of stresses and displacements. Results of analyses can be saved permanently on problem data files and recalled for use in subsequent computer
{ runs. A code compliance summary based on any of several standard piping codes built into the program is output. Nozzle and penetration summaries are also available. SUPERPIPE features a
[ number of post processors and plotting routines.
The SUPERPIPE program has been extensively benchmarked against
( several other piping anal', sis programs and has been found to be both accurate and cost <cffective.
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0 Page A-2 j RELAPS/MQD1 RELAPS/MQD1 was originally developed to calculate PWR thermal-hydraulic loads induced by a loss-of-coolant accident .
Recently, it has been benchmarked against the EPRI Safety and Relief Valve Test Program.
The basic parameters used in modeling the hydraulic network are control volumes and connecting junctions. RELAPS/MQD1 solves the conservation of momentum, energy, and mass equations for the resulting network of control volumes and junctions.
The program calculates thermal-hydraulic transients with a complete two-fluid, two-velocity, two-temperature description. A set of five equations (two mass, two momentum, one energy) describes the two fluids. The need for a second energy equation has been eliminated by assuming that the least-massive phase is at saturated conditions. Two-velocity phenomena such as entrainment and slip are
( calculated by simultaneous solution of separate phasic mass and momentum equations. Interphase friction correlations are flow regime dependent, and there is no reliance on direct empirical correlations for slip velocity, flooding rate, or entrainment fraction.
f Thermal nonequilibrium of either phase is accounted for in RELAP5/MQDl. Calculations of evaporation / condensation determine the rate at which the two fluids reach equilibrium. One phase in each control volume is assumed to be at its saturated condition, thus, both subcooled water and superheated steam can be treated simultaneously in an overall model, but not within an individual control volume.
For liquid discharge, the critical flow rate is calculated in RELAPS/MQD1 by application of a modified Bernoulli equation f hetween the upstream fluid volume and the choking plane. -
Nonequilibrium is accounted for L; allowing the pressure at the choking plane to undershoot the local saturation pressure based on the Alamgir-Leinhard-Jones correlation. For two-phase discharges, the critical flow rate is calculated f rom a characteristic analysis of the conservation equations. For vapor discharge, the critical flow rate is calculated based on the local fluid-sonic velocity.
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REFSRC was developed as part of the EPRI Safety / Relief Valve Test Program. It calculates the fluid forces acting on a piping network by application of Newton's Second Law of Motion.
The method of force-history generation is to develop the total transient force (Ft ) in the axial direction at opposing components (such as bends or tees) according to the following equation:
F=Fw+Pcs t
F w is the wave force due to the fluid acceleration and F cs is the blowdown force due to the pressure and momentum at the control surf ace normal to the direction of F. Total transient forces are calculated in this f ashion at variations in flow areas and/or changes in flow direction.
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L WISCONSIN ELECTRIC EDS Report No. 09-0870-001 POWER COMPANY Revision 0
[- Page B-1 APPENDIX B: SUPERPIPE MODELS s
Models for Units 1 and 2 are attached.
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L APPENDIX C: DETAILED PIPE STRESS AND SUPPORT LOAD SUMMARIES l
I Detailed computer summaries are held under separate cover.
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _