ML20116H816

Emergency Feedwater Sys Upgrade to Safety Grade Design

ML20116H816
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	03/31/1985
From:	GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20116H812	List: ML20116H808 ML20116H816
References
NUDOCS 8505020367
Download: ML20116H816 (31)

Text

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EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM UPGRADE TO SAFETY GRADE DESIGN 8505020367 850429 ADOCK 05000289 PDR P PDR T* * *'F e-- v-re-v,-< . - . , - - . , y_, .

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- - _ _ _.J ,,m_ J_ ._i March 31, 1WS Page 1 of 30 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 DESIGN DESCRIPTION 2 1.1 Sunnary 2 1.2 References 4 1.3 Detailed System Description 5 1.4 System Performance Characteristics 11 1.5 System Arrangement 13 1.5 Instrumentation and Contml 14 1.7 System Interfaces 16 2.0 SYSTEh LIMITATION, SET POINTS AND PRECAUTIONS 17 3.0 UPEkATIONS 18 4.0 CASbALTY EVENTS 20 5.0 MAINTENANCE APPkOACH 22 5.1 In-Service Testing and Inspection 22 6.0 TESTING 22 7.0 HUMAN FACT 0kS 22 8.0 ATTACHMENTS TABLE 1 - EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOWS ASSUMING 23 RECIRC LINES OPEN TABLE 2 - PLANT CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR AUTOMATIC 24 ACTION OF EQUIPMENT RELATED TO EFW MODIFICATION TABLE 3 - EFW MODIFICATION LIST OF ANNONCIATORS 25 TA8LE 4 - EFW MODIFICATION LIST OF COMPUTER INPUTS 26 TABLE 5 - EFW Mou!FICATION LIST OF ADDITIONAL IkSTkuMENTS 27 TABLE o - EFW MODIFICATION LIST OF CONTROL ROOM RECORDEkS 28 AND INDICATukS 9.0 EFW Long Term Mcdifications Drawing List 29

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March 31, 1985 Page 2 of 30 1.0 DESIGN DESCRIPTION 1.1 Summary _

Tne purpose of these modifications is to upgrade the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System of Unit No.1 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station (Thl-1) to a safety grade system in order to provide incmased reliability in its capability to mitigate the effects of design basis accioents when the Main Feenwater (MFW) System is not available. Furthemore, tnese modifications to the EFW system must meet the following criteria:

1) Pressure in the reactor coolant and main stems systems should be maintained below 110% of the design pressures.

2) The potential for core damage is evaluatea on the basis that it is acceptable if the core thermal power is less than 112% of rated power.

3) Any activity release must be such that the calculated doses at the site bouncary are within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

4) Tne emergency feedwater system must be safety grade and automatically initiated when required.

5) Prevent core uncovery during small break LOCA's.

6) Prevent overpressurization of the containment as a itsult of main steam line break accidents.

7) Prevent lifting of the PURV in response to design basis loss of NFh transients and prevention of safety valve lif ting during the NFW line break accident.

8) Limit flow to any one OTSG so that tube cross flow v1 oration limits are not exceedea, i.e., Sf t./sec. cross flow velocity.

These modifications were made in accordance witn the require-ments of NUkEG-Ob78 Sections 2.1.7. a and 2.1.7.b, NUREG-0680 Section 2.1.7a and 2.1.7 b of Snort Tern Action Order Item No.8, NUREG-0737 Sections II.E.1.1 and II.E.1.2, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ( ASLB) Partial Initial Decision Section II, Subsection Q, and using the acceptance criteria of Standara keview Plan Sections 9.2.6,10.4.9 (associated Branch Technical position guidance.

ASB 10-1),15.2.6,15.2.7 and 15.2.8 as principal

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March 31, 1985 Page 3 of 30 This system design description addmsses the following modifications within the Emergency Feedwater Long Tem Upgrade Modification Program:

A) Add cavitating venturis and vibration supports in the EFW injection line to each once thmugh steam generator (OTSG).

B) Provide redundant safety grade EFW control anc block valve,s.

C) Lock open the EFW mcirculation valves EF-V8A/8/C to prevent damage to the EFW pumps.

D) Upgrade the EFW pumps mcirt:ulation line from recirculation control valves (EF-VBA/b/C) to the Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

(C0-T18) to Seismic Class I requirements.

E) Intermeaf ate Building flood protection from a Main Feedwater Line Briek (NFLW).

F) Modify the vent stacks for main steam safety valves,hS-V22A/B ano atmospheric dump val ves MS-V4A/b.

G) Provice a class 1E power supply to valves C0-V111 A/B and upgraae tne cable routing for the existing Class 1E power supply to valves Cu-V14 A/b to meet Seismic Class I requirements.

h) Provide an overspeed trip alarm in the main control room for the turbine oriven EFW pump (EF-P-1).

I) Provide an Intemediate Building flood detection alam using Class 1E components.

J) Provide safety grade EFW initiation on nigh containment pressure isolation signal.

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K) Provide safety grade OTSG level instrumentation and signals for l MFW OTSG nigh water level isolation and OTSG low water level initiation of the EFW system.

L) Provide a safety grade automatic contrzl system independent of the Integrated Contrzl System (ICS) that pemits the EFW system to control OTSG 1evel without control interaction with the MFW systee.

h) Upgrade the controls for the Main Steam Line Rupture Detection System (MSLkDS) to safety grade such that a single failure of the contrul system will not prevent NFk isolation when required, nor inadvertently isolate the NFW System.

N) Upgrade to safety grace the water level inoication and low-low water level alam in the control room for eacn CST.

0) In addition to the turbine driven EFW pump, both of tne motor driven EFW pumps automatically start upon loss of Doth hfW pumps or loss of tour (4) Reactor Coolant (RC) Pumps.

March 31, 1985 Page 4of 30 P) The motor driven EFW pumps am automatically loaded on the diesel generator during loss of offsite power with or without simultaneous existence of Engineered Safeguar11s (ES) actuation.

Q) Redundant indication is available in the control room of EFW flow to eacn steam generator.

R) Control rton annunciation for all auto start conditions of the EFW system is available.

S) Delete the existing cross-connect between electrical busses that allows a control room operator to load botn EFW pump motors onto a single diesel generator in order to ensure electrical separation of tne busses.

T) Provide main steam overpressure protection to the turtline section of the turoine driven EFW pump. Change setpoints for main steam valves hS-V6 and MS-V22 A/S.

U) Evaluate the EFid and ES electrical power, control and instrumentation cables that art presently routed through the Alligator Pit and Tendon Access Gallery.

1.2 References The codes and standards used for these modifications are in accordance with SDD 424A, 4248, 4240 and 424E Division I Requirements. Drawings which show the modifications are given below:

1.2.1 GPU Nuclear (GPUN) Drawings GPbN Drawing No. Rev. Title

, IC-640-42-001 0 Instrument Loop Diagram OTSG A Pressurt/ Level Sheet I

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IC-640-42-002 0 Instrument Loop Diagram OTSG A Pressure / Level Sheet 2 IC-640-42 -003 0 Instrument Loop Diagram OTSG A EF/FW l IC-640-42-004 0 Instrument Loop Diagram OTSG A Pressure / Level Sheet 1 IC-640-42-005 0 Instrument Loop Diagram OTSG A Pressure Level Sheet 2 IC-640-42-006 0 Instrument Loop Diagram OTSG A EF/FW l

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March 31, i98 5 Page 5 of 30 IC-640-42-007 0 Instnsaent Loop Diagram Condensate Storage Tank A48 Level l

IC-640-41 -001 0 Logic Diagram OTSG A FW Isolation IC-640-41 -002 0 Logic Diagram OTSG A FW Isolation on Hi Level IC-640-41 -003 0 Logic Diagram OTSG A EF Initiation on Low Level (Pumps)

IC-640-41 -004 0 Logic Diagram OTSG Containment Pressure - RPS/ES and Feed-water Rupture Detection (FWRD)

IC-640-41 -005 0 Logic Diagram OTSG A Main Steam Rupture Detection (hSRD)

IC-640-41 -006 0 Logic Diagram OTSG A/EF Pumps EF Initiation IC -640-41 -007 0 Logic Diagram UTSG B FW Isolation 10-640-41 -006 0 Logic Diagram OTSG B FW Isolation on h1 Level IC-640-41 -009 0 Logic Diagram UTSG B EF Initiation on Low Level (Pumps)

IC-640-41 -010 0. Logic Diagram 0TSG B Feedwater Rupture Delection (FhkD)

IC-640-41 -011 0 Logic Diagram OTSG B Main Steam Rupture Detection (MSRD)

IC-640-41 -012 0 Logic Diagram OTSG EF Initiation IC-640-41 -013 0 Logic biagram OTSG A EF Initiation on Low Level Valves IC-640-41 -014 0 Logic Diagram OTSG B EF Initiation on Low Level Valves c

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March 31, 1985 Page 60f 30 IC-640-41 -015 0 Logic Diagram OSTG A/B FW Isolation on Hi Level (2)

IC-640-41 -016 0 Logic Diagram OTSG A/8 Main

i. Steam Rupture Detection (MSRD)

(2) 1.2.2 Impe11 Corporation Drawings Impell Drawing No.

Rev. Description U370-039-001 2 " Emergency Feedwater Bypass Line Modification - Plan" 0370-039-002 1 " Emergency Feedwater Bypass Line Mocification - Sections"

, 0370-039-003 2 " Emergency Feedwater Recircu-lation Line Modification 0370-039-007 0 " Bypass and Racin:ulation Line Modification - Flow Diagram" (Mark-up Gilbert Dwg.

C-302-081, Rev. 24) 0370-039-011 1 " Condensate - Flow Diagram" (Martt-up Gilbert Dwg.

C-302-101, Rev. 24) 0370-064-001 1 HSPS Modification Electrical block Diagram 0370-064-002 0 Main Steam and Feedwater Instrumentation Diagram 0370-U64-003 0 HSPS Modification OTSG Level Instrument Cabinet Assignments 0370-064-004 0 HSPS Modification UTSG Level

Instrument Caoinet Assignments

! 0370-064-005 0 Location of HSPS Modification Electronic Panels

! 037U-054-U10 0 HSPS Modification - Main Control Panel "CC" kevisions 0370-Ub4-011 0 HSPS Modification - Main Control Panel "CL" kevisions 0370-064-111 1 HSP5 Modification-Electronic Cabinet Layout.

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l March 31, 1985 Page 7 of 30 1.2.3 G11Dert Associates Inc. (GAI) Drawings GAI UkAWIhG h0. REY. DESCRIPTION zou-sus TK U Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center 209 435 1F-0 Electrical Elementary Diagram 1 Alams l 302-081 25 Feedwater Flow Diagram i

1.3 Detailed System Description The basic result of the moof fications to the EFW System is that the system is capable of withstanding a design basis event and a sir.gle active failure and still perfom its function of supplying a heat removal path to allow safe shutdown of the reactor. The a modifications also ensure that a single active failure will not inadvertently initiate the EFW System nor isolate the MFW system.

1.3.1 The cavitating venturis and their supports are being installed to limit the flow of EFW to a ruptured DTSG in order to ensure sufficient EFW flow to the intact OTSG, to limit the mass and energy release within the keactor Building for overpressure e

protection and to limit the flow to the OTSG in order to reauce excessive keactor Coolant System (kCS) overcooling.

1.3.2 Tne installation of redundant safety grade EFW block valves and control valves is being implementea to preclude a single active failurt from preventing the addition of EFW to the steam generators. The EFW Dlock valves will also ensure the capability to isolate EFW flow to a rupturno UTSG.

1.3.3 Tne EFW recirculation line modification upgrades the EFW pumps recirculation line from the EFW recirculation control valves (EF-V-8A/8/C), to the condensate storage tank (CO-T18), to Seismic Class I requirements. This modification ensures that this piping can withstand a design basis event and thus prevents

depletion of the required CST inventory for the EFW function.

The EFW rect rculation valves EF-V8A/8/C are being blocked open to prevent possible EFW pump damage caused by an EFW pwnp running at shutof f head with the recirculation line closed.

I 1.3.4 The Intemediate Building flood protection modification mitigates the effects of flooding due to a postulated NFLB in the Intemediate Building by allowing water to flow into the Tendon Access Gallery (TAG) and portions of the Alligator Pit.

By removing the upper half of the "stop walls", in tne alligator pit and opening entrances "A" and "B" to the TAG, the time i

rtquired for water from a MFLB to jeopardize the EFW pumps (EL 296'-7/8") in tne Intermediate building is increased from 5.5 minutes to approximately 25 minutes.

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T March 31,. 1985 Page 8 of 30 1.3.5 The vent stack modification upgrades the stacks for main steam safety m11ef valves MS-V22A/B and atmospheric dump valves MS-V-4A/B to Seismic Cla:s I requimments. This modification ensures that the vent stacks are able to withstand a seismic event and therefore prevents the release of main steam to the Intermediate Building. Tnus, this modification reduces the possibility of overpressurization in the Intermediate Building and protects the EFW System components from exposure to a harsh steam environment and gravity missiles, i.e., the Vent Stacks.

1.3.6 Safety grade power is b'ein'g supplied to valves CO-Vill A/B to allow isolation at the main control room of a damaged CST from the EFh system. Tnis modification ensures that the EFW System will perform its safety function by having sufficient inventory in the intact CST. The cable routing for the power supply to valves CD-V14A/B has been upgraded to meet Seismic I mquirements. Tne ability to close CO-V14A/B frza the main control room will allow isolation of non-EFW functions from the C5T.

4 1.3.7 .sn overspeed trip alarm is beingadded in the main control room i

Nr the turbine driven EFh pump (EF-P-1). This alarm provides the operator with an otherwise non-detectable trip indication in tr:e contrul room. .

1.3.8 An intermediate Building flood detection alarm system utilizing Class 1E components is being added to alert the operator in the control room to flooding conditions in the Intermediate Building as a result of a NFL6. The transmitter will be located in the lower Tendon Access Gallery (Elev. 263 ' - 2 1/4" + 3") and will provide the operator with sufficient time to take corrective i

action to prevent damage to the EFW pimips.

1.3.9 The EFW system is being designed to initiate on a high containment pressure isolation signal. This signal is an indication of a possible MFLB, MSLB or LOCA inside containment.

This indication (along with low OTSG 1evel) anticipates a possible failure of the secondary heat sink.

1.3.10 Safety grace level instruments for the OTSG's and safety grade controls are designed for MFW isolation and EFW initiation. MFW valves Fh-V5A/8, FW-V16A/B, FW-V17A/B and FW-V92A/B receive a signal to isolate the affected OTSG f f high water level exists in either of the OTSG's. Tne EFW System will be initiatec if low water level exists in either of tne UTSG's. The MFW

' isolation or EFW initiation signal will be capable of proper operation while sustaining a single active failure in any part l of the safe.ty grace instruments or controls.

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, Page 9 of 30 1.3.11 A safety grade automatic control system, independent of the Integrated Control System (ICS), is designed to measure the OTSG water level, compare the meding to a preselected setpoint and modulate the EFW control valves EF-V30 A/8/C/D to contml OTSG

' water level. The preselected setpoint will depend on plant conditions and RC ptmp availanility.

1.3.12 The MSLkD System is upgraded to safety grade and designed to withstand a single failure in the control system. The main steam line pmssure of each OTSG is monitored by four redunaant channel s. Two enannels for eacn OTSG are located in the keactor Buildi ng. Two cnannels for each OTSG are located in the Intemediate Building. The reounaancy of monitoring and diversity of location ensure that no single failum will prevent isolation of MFW if such isolation is required.

1.3.13 The upgrade of the water level indication of u CST to safety grade is being implemented to display proper CST level for each tank in the Control Room. An alam will annunciate when low-low water level is sensed in either CST.

1.3.14 All of the EFW pumps receive a safety grade i ,v-start signal on loss of both MFW pimps or loss of all four RC pumps. Detection of loss of both MFW pumps is accomplished by sensing tha

differential pressure across the MFh pumps. Loss of all four RC

' pumps is sensed by utilizing contacts from the RC pump power

, monitors.

The motor driven EFW pimps are powerva by the diesel generators during all loss of off-site power conditions, with or withcut E5AS actuation. In order to limit voltage alp on the diesel 9enerator during concurrent loss of off-site power and coincident ESAS actuation concition, the motor driven EFh pumps will be loaded on the diesel generator five seconds after clock four loading. For a loss of off-site power only, tne motor ariven EFW pumps will be loaded on tne diesel generator five seconds atter the diesel generator has startec.

1.3.15 Each of the EFW injection lines are provided with two redundant Class IE flow indication loops. For each EFW injection line, one annubar shall serve as the source for two redundant differential pressurt transmitters. The differential pressure transitters provide flow signals, through Class IE instrument loops to the main control room indicators.

1.3.16 Control rvom annunciation for all auto start conditions is being provided and alerts the operator to the fact that certain EFW initiating parameters have been reached.

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March 31, 1965 Page 10 of 30 1.3.17 The deletion of the MSLRDS signals from the EFW control valves EF-V30A/B prevents the MSLRDS frem isolating EFW to the OTSG's in certain scenarios when it should not be blocked. The deletion of the MSLRDS signal will improve the availability 'of the OTSG's as a heat sink and will improve the reliability of EFW flow to the OTSG's during loss of MFW. Low OTSG pressure, which actuates the MSLADS, can msult from either a severe overcooling or a loss of heat sink event. The original design required operator action to bypass MSLRDS to prevent a loss of heat sink if a low OTSG pressure condition developed. Since the venturf s limit EFW flow, the MSLADS is no longer required for OTSG protection against severs overcooling. The addition of the cavitating venturf s to the EFW System and removal of the MSLRDS from isolating the EFk contml valves eliminates operator action to provide EFW to the intact OTSG.

1.3.18 The deletion of the cross connect feature between electrical busses prevents botn motor driven EFW pumps from being loaded onto a single diesel generator. Tnis design featuru will ensure-electrical separation and will prwvent a common mode single failure from rendering both motor driven EFW pumps inoperable.

1.3.19 Main steam over pressure protection is being provided for the turnine section of the turbine driven EFW pump. Pressure control valve MS-V6 in the main steam supply to the EFW pump turnine section is being restricted to 65% of the full valve steam travel distance and the pressure setpoint for the pressure controller to valve MS-V6 has been changed from 200 psig to 175 psig. Furthemore, the pressure relief setpoints for main steam safety valves MS-V22A/B, for the EFW pump tuttine section, are bein psig $and hanged fromrespectively.

220 psig, 495 psig and 505 psig, respectively, to 200 Tnese modifications to the turbine driven EFW pump will protect the turbine section from overpressurization in the event of a failure of pressure control valve MS-V6 with upstream valves MS-V10A/8 open.

NOTE: The three (3) EFW pump turbine section nozzle hand valves are being locked open to ensure sufficient main steam flow to the turbine section.

1.3.20 The EFW and ES electrical power, control, and instrumentation cables were evaluated to deterwine their capanility of performing their safety function after a WL8, incident and subsequent Intermediate Building flooding. Tne results of this evaluation is discussed in Technical Data Report (TDR) No. 542.

March 31 1985 Page 11 of 30 1.4 System Perfomance Characteristics Tne cavitating venturis located in the EFW injection lines to the OTSG's limit the total EFW flow to 1250 gpa to both OTSG's.

System perfomance characteristics of the Heat Sink Protection System (HSPS) modifications remain essentially unchanged. Pipe sizing / routing and valve selection were chosen in order to attain minimal pmssure drops consistent with the original configuration.

Instrumentation and control modifications will ensure that the system will perfom its intended function while sustaining a single active failure in the instrumentation and control system.

The modification to the EFW controls allows tne "B" train of the EFW to be manually controlled from Remote Shutdown Panel "B". The operator has control of both the "B" train EFW Block Valves (EF-V-53, & V-54), and EFW Control Valves (EF-V-308 & V-300) which are used to control EFW flow and 0TSG level. Similarly, the

operator has control of the "A" train EFW Control Valves (EF-V-30A &

l 30C)on Remote Shutdown Panel "A". The necessity of operator action l

' to manually control the EFW will be required if a) the Control Room becomes uninhabitable and reactor shutdown is required from an alternate location or b) the unlikely event of a fire damaging three or more channels of the HSPS electronics.

The Appendix R modifications to the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) will be completed at the Cycle 6 kefueling Outage. Until such time as the moaification to the RSP is made the EFW system will have an interim design to interface with the existing LM-38 Remote Shutdown Panel . The interim EFW design will allow for contrzl of level control valves EF-V30A/B from their respective LM-38 RSP. The four EFW block valves (EF-V 52, 53, 54 ana 55) anc the two EFW control valves (EF-V-30C/D) will not De controlled from tne LM-38 RSP. The interim design maintains the fire protectiu and remote shutdown capaDility that existed previous to the EFW nodification.

The Thl-1 EFW is a stand by plant system whict: is not used during nomal plant start ups, t hutdowns or operation. The system is maintained in stand-ey diring plant operations cnd is automatically actuated upon loss of both MFW, or loss of all four kC pumps; high

! containment isolation sigul, ano low OTSG water level. Tne following table gives actuation times for the EFW pumps:

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March 31, 196b Page 12 of 30 MOTOR-EVENT DRIVEN-PUMP TukBINE DRIVEN PUMP a) Loss of MFh, Immediate 5 sec.

or Loss of four RC Pumps, low OTSG Tevel, High Containment Pressure -

b)Abcve with loss of Immediate 15 sec.

off-site power (LOOP) c)Above with ESAS but Immediate 20 sec.

rio LOOP d) Above with ESAS and Immediate 30 sec.

LOOP Start up and test data indicates that the turnine driven EFW pump mquins 18 seconds to micn full flow. The motor driven EFW pumps are capable of accelerating to full speed in less than 10 second s. Therefore unoer worst case conditions EFW flow will be established within 40 seconds of initiation. Maximum deliverable EFh flow rates are sumarized in Table 1 for various pump combinations.

Control of EFW flow following initiation is designed to be accomplisned by the heat Sink Protection System (HSPS). The HSPS controls the injection of EFh to maintain water level in each OTSG to one of two setpoints depending on whether tne RC pumps are available. Under forced cooling conoitions, the HSPS contmis level to 30 inches on the start up range since this is sufficient to provide core cooling. However upon loss of forced RCS circulation the HSPS contmis UTSG 1evel to 240 inches on the operating range to promote natural circulation with the RC System.

NOTE: The control mon manual EFW contmis are available for the operator to take contml of EFW flow to either OTSG, when needed, or in the event of HSPS malfunction.

The Intemediate Building flood detection alam system will alert the operator in the control mon of a possible MFLB. The alaris will annunciate in a timely manner such that the operator will have a minimum of 20 minutes to take action to mitigate tne consequences of flood damage,to the EFW pumps. Tne alam will be initiated by the Sens-Pak relay located in the Containment Water Level Cabinet "C".

Tnis alam will correspond to a oetectea level of 2ft. + 3 incnes tolerance in the Tendon Access Gallery.

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1.5 System Arrangement The redundant safety gradat EFW control and block valves i

added to the system by means of a by-pass line areund each of the

' existing 5FW control valve.s as shown on Impell Drawings 0370-039-001, 002, 004 and 007.

EFW pumps recirculation contml valves EF-V8A/B/C are shown as

locked open on flow diagram C-302-081.

The motor driven EFW pumps auto start circuits ano the diesel block Icacing sequence ensums that a single active failum shall not result in less than the minimum required pump capacity being availab'le under all conditions including loss of off-site power.

Tne THI-1 EFW design provides an emergency feed line with control pmvisions to each UTSG. The design is such that the required quantity of water can be provided to at least one UTSG during all single failure conditions involving a design basis event or loss of NFW. Under MSLB or MFL8 conditions, when both MFW and EFW are isolated to the affected steam generator, a single failure must be assumed for the unaffected EFW feed line control valve. To provide further assurance that EFW can be delivered: 1) a back up instrument air system is provided, 2) manual contml stations are previded in the control room, and 3) flow monitoring devices installed in the EFW lines pmvf des infomation to the operator for regulating flow.

The EFW System is designed to have redundant fail close level control valves controlling EFW flow to each OTSG. The valves are designed to be installed in parallel with one valve controlled from each of the safety grade control systems. In conjunction with the LFW Block Valves, tnis Gesign will ensure that no single active failure will prevent loss of decay heat removal capabilities or an inadvertent over-filling or over-cooling condition.

Tne level instruments which monitor the normal operating range and start up range of each of the two OTSG'S is incmased to four separate channels per range and also upgraced to safety grade requirements. Similarly, the pressure instruments which monitor the steam pressure in each of the OTSG's is incmased to four separate channels and upgractd to safety grade requirements. These pressure transmitters are located so a failure of a main steam line will not prevent the steam line failure from being detected. The level instruments monitoring both the CST levels are upgradea to two seismically qualified Class IE channels for each tank.

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bbrch 31, IMS l Page 14 of 30 The EFW control is designed to be from tne Control Room. The EFW System will be capable of operation from outside the Contml Room at the Remote Snutdown Panel. Control of the EFW Control Valves EF-V308 and EF-V30D and EFW Block Valves EF-V53 and EF-V54 is available at the Remote Shutdown Panel "8." Control of EF-V30A and EF-V30C is available at the Remote Shutdown Panel "A." Both kemote Shutdown Panels are located in the Control Building at elevation 322'.

1.5 The above Remote Shutdown- Panel arrangement represents the final design after the Appendix R Modification to the Remote Shutdown Panel . The Appendix R Modification is scheduled to be completed auring Cycle 6 Refueling Outage., In the interin, control of EFW Control Valve EF-V30A will be available from Remote Shutdown Panel "A" and control of EFW Control Valve EF-V308 will be available from Remote Shutdown Panel "B". Operator actions relative to the interim design is described in Section 4.

l.6 Instrumentation and Contml EFW flow indication is provided for operator infomation in the Contml Room anc on the Nemote Shutdown Panel.

Tne EFW System is initiated through a safety grade 2 out-of-4 (2/4) combination control logic. Once initiated, the EFW is controlled by redundant level controllers wnich moaulate the EFW flow fmm a aemano signal caseo on OTSh level. The EFW is teminated by the operator.

The EFW System is designed to initiate on any of the following signals:

a) . Low level in either OTSG.

D) High containment pressure (4psig) c) Both feedwater pumps tripped (not part of 2/4 logic).

d) All Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP's) tripped (not part of 2/4 logic).

I The MFW to the OTSG is designed to isolate on the following signals:

a) High-high OTSG level.

b) MSLRU which is detected by low Main Steam line pressure (600 '

l psig).

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l March 31, 1985 Page 15 of 30 The OTSG level is measured by ten level transmitters on each OTSG (see table 5). Four level transmitters measum level over the operating range. One transmitter is assigned to each of the four measurement channels. Four level transmitters measure level over the startup range. One transmitter is assigned to each of the four measurement channels. Two full range level transmitters, one for Channel A and one for Channel B, use the EFW electronics to develop a temperature and pressure compensation full range level signal to be displyed in the Main Control Room and on the Remote Shutdown Panel. The locations of the OTSG level transmitters are shown on Impell Drawings 0370-064-003 and 004.

l lhe level sensing lines to each of the OTSG vent connections will nave four temperature elements, one temperature element for each of tne measurement channels. This temperature measurement will be used for compensation of the level measurement to give a more accurate reading of the UTSG level.

The MS line pressure is measured by two pressure transmitters on i.

eacn of the MS Lines from the UTSG's. Two measurement channels are connected to one steam line from each OTSG and the remaining two l measurement channels are connected to tne other steam line from each OTSG. Four MS line pressure transmitters (one for each steam line) will be located in the Containment outside of the D-Ring wall at the 308"-0 floor elevation. Four MS line pressure transmitters (one for each steam line) will be located in the Intermediate Building. The diversity in location will ensure that in the event of a MS Dreak, the HSLRD system will function.

Four new containment pressure transmitters (see Table 5), one for eacn measurement channel, will monitor containment pressure and be used by the H5PS electronics to develop a feedwater isolation signal and an EFk pump initiation signal.

The level in both Condensate Storage tanks is measured by two channels of instrumentation. Level indication and off-normal annunciation is given in the Control Room.

l The HSPS electronic instrumentation will accept input signals (see Table 5), compensate for temperature variation ano density variations as required and use these signals as input to the logic for EFW actuation and contrwl, MFW isolation, ICS inputs and Control Hoom inoication and alarms. The instrument loops are shown on GPU l

drawings IC-640-42-001 through 007.

The logic for NFw isolation is shown on GPU Drawings IC-640-41-001, l

002, 004, 005, 007, 009, 010, and 011. Tne conditions which will isolate the MFW system are:

- I l

1 I

March 31, 1985 Page 16 of 30 a) level in eitner OTSG exceeds 370 inches b) stema'line pressure less than 600 psig, except if bypassed by tne operator as is required during normal shutdown. ,

The Logic for EFW initiation is shown on GPUN Urawings 1C-640-41 -003, 004, 006, 009, 010, 012, 013, and 014. The EFW System is initiated on low OTSG water level in a two step process.

The low level initiation signal will initiate EFW pumps if the OTSG ,

water level goes below 20 inches above the lower level tap. The EFW control valves will not open until the low low OTSG water level setpoint (i.e.18 inches above the lower level tap) is reached.

This two step process is intended to prevent an inadvertant injection of EFW into a OTSG as a result of a single failure in the low level initiation circuitry. The high containment pressure signal described previously will also initiate EFW. A signal that both FW pumps have tripped or all RC pumps have tripped from existing logic cabinets will also initiate EFW. If the EFW System is initiated, a setpoint is automatically selected as input to the EFh level controller. The setpoint will be approximately 30 inches if at least one RC pump is running and approximately 240 inches if no RCP is running. Level is expressed as distance above the lower level tap which is 6 inches above the lower tube sheet. Table 2 lists the equipment actuation when the above plant conditions are sensed.

Tne electronics cabinets will be located in the Control Building at elevation 338'-6. See Impe11 drawing 0370-064-111 for location of the hSPS electronics cabinets.

Table 3 lists the annunciator points and annunciator / alarm assignments from the HSPS electronics cabinets. Table 4 lists the computer inputs from tne HSPS electronics cabinets.

1.7 System Interfaces The mechanical and structural modifications addressed by this revision are contained solely within the EFW system. The system interface for the instrumentation and controls of the HSPS Modifi-cation is shown on the Electrical Block Diagram, Impell Drawing l

0370-064-001. The HSPS electronics cabinets interface with the MFW System, the Annunciator System, plant computer, Main Control Room, Integrated Control System, Remote Shutdown Panel, and the 120 Volt l Vital AC System. Interfaces with non-IE equipment or signals is

, through the Train A electronics cabinet and is electrically isolated with a Class IE isolation device to prevent faults in the non-IE system from affecting the IE System. Electrical separation between redundant channels and between redundant trains, as well as non-1E circuits is in accordance with "TMI-l Nuclear Generating Station Electric Cable and Raceway Routing" SDu 772-A.

l

Il March ~1 1965 Page li of 30 Existing Motcr Control Center (MCC) Units 13A,138 in ID Turbine Plant MCC' (size 1 reversing starters) will be spamd. Motor operated valve C0-V111A will be fed from MCC 1A Engineered Safeguards Unit 120. Motor operated valve CO-V-lllB will be fed from MCC 18 Engineemd Safeguard Unit 140. Nuclear Safety Related (NSR) reversing starters will be installed in the above MCC cubicles.

New motor starters for EFW block valves are located in the ES MCC 1 A and ES MCC 18. The starter for EF-Y-52 is located in ES MCC 1 A Compartment 10A. The starter for EF-V-53 is located in ES MCC 18 Compartment 1bA. The starter for EF-V-54 is 1ocated in ES MCC 1B Compartment 15u. The starter for EF-V-55 is located in ES MCC 1A Compartment 13D.

The motor starters for the MFW block valves are located in ESV MCC 1A and ESV MCC lb. MFW block valve Fh-V-92A is fed from ESV MCC 1 A Compartment 2C. hFW block valve FW-V-928 is fed from ESV MCC IB Compartment 2C, MFW block valve FW-V-5A motor starter will be moved frVm ESV MCC 1C Compartment 10 to ESV MCC 1 A Compartment 10D. MFW block valve FW-V-5B motor starters will be moved from ESV MCC IC Compartment 1C to ESV MCC 1B Compartment 12A & 128.

2.0 SYSTEM LIMITATIONS SET POINTS AND PRECAUTIONS Tne following are setpoints in process units for the HSPS electronics:

Parameter Setpoint Logic OTSG High Level 337"* IC-640-41-002, 008

, UTSG Hign-Hign Level 370"* IC-440.-41 -002, 008 OTSG Overfill Level 380"* IC-640-41 -002, 008 l OTSG Low Level 23"* IC-640-41 -003, 009, 013, 014 l OTSG Low-Low Level 18"* IC-640-41 -003, 009, 013, 014 Containment 4 psig Hign Pressure IC-640-41-004, 010 MS Low Pmssure 750 psi IC-640-41 -005, 011 or less NS Low-Low Pressure 600 psi IC-640-41 -005, 011 l

or less 1

_,_m.,-...m _, ,.,,

March 31, 1985 Page 18 of 30 Tne following are setpoints for the EFW Level controllers. This infomation is from GPbN Instrument Loop Diagram IC-640-42-003, 006.

Condition Setpoint Tolerence ho kCP's running 240"* 16 inches

~

One or more RCP's running 30"* 18 inches ho EFW in operation 0"* 14 inches

• = Level is expressed as distance above the lower level tap which is 6 inches above the lower tube sheet A list of annunciator points is given in Table 3.

3.0 OPERATIONS During all phases of Operation where the EFW System is not required to operate, tne HSPS electmnics is used to generate compensated 0TSG Level inputs to the Integrated Control system and monitor the level in Condensate Storage Tanks l A and 18.

3.1 Feedwater Isolation The HSP5 electronics will isolate the MFW supply to the affected 0TSG in the event of a failure of the MFW controls resulting in hign level in either of the OTSG's. The HSPS electronics will also isolate the NFW to both OTSG's in the event of low pressure in the depressurized OTSG line unless the operator has bypassea this interlock during nomal shutdown proceoure. In both cases, the EFW pumps will not start imediately. However, due to tne isolation of the MFW and the resultant loss of flow to the OTSG's, the EFW pimps can be expected to start once the secondary side inventory in either OTSG has boiled off enough coolant to lower the UTSG water level to the EFW low level initiation point (i.e. less than 20 inches) or if the MFW pumps trip as a result of a malfunction in the nonnal MFW control. If the level continues to drop tc-the EFW Low-Low level (i.e. less than 18 inches) the EFW 1evel control valves will automatically receive a preset setpoint and the level control valves will automatically open to control EFW flow around this preset setpoint.

l l

l l

\

l

March 31, 1985 Page 19 of 30 3.2 faergency Feedwater System Actuation 4

The EFW System will actuate on any of the following conditions:

a. Low level in either OTSG

b. High Containment pressure (4PSIG)

c. Loss of both feedwater pumps.

d. Loss of all reactor coolant pumps.

Once initiated, the EFid System will supply water to both

' OTSGS. The sensing portion of the HSPS electronics is four (4) independent channels with the actuation logic of two out of four (2/4). Such an arrangement will withstand a single failure in any 2/4 channel even if one channel has been

bypassed for maintenance, test or repair. The actuation portion of the HSPS electronics is two independent trains. A single failure of either train will not prevent at least one train of EFW from operating. i Tnere is a Train A and Train B level controller which contrels the EFW to each UTSG. Each controller will receive a setpoint from the H5P5 electronics depending on the plant conditions.

They are as follows:

t

a) homal Conditions - setpoint is 0 inches b) EFW initiation and at least one kCP running - setpoint is

30 inches -

c) EFW initiation and no RCP are running - setpoint is 240 i nche s.

The operator may override the automatically selected setpoint by means of controls at each of the controller display stations located on the control consoles CC and CL in the Main Control

, Room. The operator may also switch to manual control by means of controls at these same contrels display stations.

3.3 Normal Startup and Shutdown During normal shutdown, the EFW System is not needed. When the reactor is operating at power levels below 15% of rated power it is possible to experience oscillations in the OTSG level measurements to the extent that the EFW system may be i inadvertantly initiated. To prevent possinle EFW initiation, tne circuitry which initiates EFW on low UTSG water level shoula be bypassea. This is done by means of bypass switches, one for eacn train of initiation, located on the control console. When low OTSG water level initiation is oypass, this fact will De annunciated in tne Control koom. This bypass raust be removed, by operator action, when the reactor power is above 151 rated power.

4 4

-,,w,-- r -w-

_. _-- . _ - - - = - - _ _ - - - _ - . - _ _

d 4

hhrch 31, 1985 i Page 20 of 30 In order .to pmvent isolation of the MFW System and subsequent

' initiation of the EFW System, the operator must perfom the following action during shutdown:

When the main steam line pressum decmases below 750 psig, the operator should bypass the MSLRD logic by operating contml switches located on console CL and CC. When this is done, an indicating light entitled "SL8 Enabled" will turn off indicating the MSLRD has been bypassen. Both trains of MSLku logic must be bypassed.

unce bypassed, the steam line pressure can amp below 600 psig witnout initiating MFW isolation. The bypass is automatically

' removed wnen the steamline pressure increases above 750 psig.

The bypass can not be initiated whenever the steam line pressure is greater than 750 psig.

4.0 CASUALTY EVENTS AND RECOVERY PROCEDURES 4.1 Casualty Events Casualties which can be experienced by the EFW are:

a) Loss of pressure integrity for OTSG A or B a b) Loss or malfunction of contml signal c) Ruptum of a MFW line to OTSG A or B d) Fire e) Component Malfunction f) Loss of Voltage g) Rupture of an EFW line to one OTSG n) Rupture of a steamline to the turbine driven EFW pump l 4.2 Design Features to Mitigate Effects of Casualty Events i

l a) Loss of pressure integrity of one OTSG may mnder the '

! failed UTSG ineffective in properly removing heat from the l RC System in a contmiled manner. This can be the result l of a MSLB, MFLu or an UTSG blowdown line bmak. Tne i operator should verify tnat water level is being maintained l in each OT5G and the pressum of each OTSG is appmximately  ;

l equal (i.e. less than 200 psi difference). If this is not I tne case, the OTSG which can't maintain level or pmssure i may be bmached. If the operator detemines there is a l breached 0TSG, he can stop all EFW flow to that OTSG. Flow can be stopped by transfer of the EFW level controllers for i that OTSG to manual and driving ti.e controller outputs to zero. The system would still have the other OTSG which could be used as the path of heat removal fmm the RC System.

l

. - , . - . . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ - - , - , . _ - . - - m-- - - - - - ,_ . - -_ _ _ _ . - . . . . . . . . _ . . _ - , . . . . - _ - . . _

March 31, 1985 Page 21ef 30 b) Loss or malfunction of a control signal will mnder one train' inoperative. Tne msult will be supplying too much water or not enough water to the OTSG's. If not enough water is being supplied to the OTSG, the backup level contmls will open the other contml valve to ensure a i

supply of water to the OTSG. If too much water is supplied, the operator can place the malfunctioning contmls in manual and close the block valve if requimd to the affected contml valve. The backup control loop will automatically take over and supply the cornet amount of water to the steam generators.

c) Rupture of the MFW Iine to the OTSG B anywhere inside the Intemediate Building could msult in flooding the EFW pump compartments. This scenario is a worst case design basis i

i ncident. The modifications to the EFW system give approximately 20 minutes from the time of receipt of an

! Intemediate Building flooding alam until the time the i

water level maches the 296'-7/8" elevation in the

Intemediate Building to jeopardize the EFW pumps.

t Upon mceipt of this alam, the operator should aispatch personnel to the Intemediate butiding to verify the alam. Tne operator shoula also monitor the level in OTSG u for sign of insufficient feedwater i.e. Iow UTSG b level or decaying level. If a feedwater rupture is confimed, all MFW to UTSG u snoula be stopped and a shutdown

' ini tiated. Tne affected UTSG should be supplied with EFW flow unless the MFW Iine rupture results in loss of OTSG pressure integrity. ,

I d) Protection against fire is being included in the design by ensuring proper separation distances are maintained between redundant channels and between redundant trains of the EFW System components.

As a backup to the entire HSPS electmnics system, the EFW System can be contmiled from the Remote Shutdown Panels.

See Section 4.3d for required operator actions.

e) Protection against component malfunction is being included in the design by including sufficient redundancy in the system so that no single failure can prevent the EFW System from perfoming its design function. Four independent enannels of sensing is combined in a two-out-of-four (2/4) logic so snat no single channel failure will, pmvent the system fmm operating wnen required or cause the system to operate when it is not required. Tne initiating logic is separated into two inoependent trains so that no single failure will prevent the system from perfoming its function.

March 31, 1965 Paga 22 of 30 f) Each channel and train is supplied with power from the uninterruptable power supply mlated to that channel or 1

di vision. A single failure of a power supply can disable -

only one of the four channels and only one of the two 4 initiation trains.

g) Ruptum of an EFW line to an OTSG would result in a loss of  ;

}

' pressure to the affected OTSG. The cavitating venturi in '

the EFh line would limit EFW flow through the ruptured line and prevent complete loss of EFW system capaht11 ties.

Detection of this event is similar to Section 4.2a above.

The operator could isolate the EFW line by use of the block i

valves or manually closing the EFh control valves by use of the EFh Control Valve h/A Station.

h) kupture of a steam line to the turnine driven EFh pump would rencer this pump inoperable. Steam flow to this pump '

can be stopped by closing Main Steam valves MS-V13 A/8.

1 5.0 MAINTENANCE 5.1 In-Service Testing and Inspection In-service testing and inspection shall comply with the mquimments of ASME Section XI - 1980 Edition with Addenda through winter 1980 and THI-1 Technical Specification Section j 4.2.2 and 4.9.

Testing of the electronics shall be done periodically to ensure that undetected failures will be minimized. Testing shall be performed per manufactumr's specifications, instructions and roccamendations.

I 6.0 TESTING 1 Testing mquired to ensum proper installation of the various i modifications is covered under installation specifications

{ T115 -412024-001, 003, 004, 005 and 006.

f d

7.0 HUMAN FACTORS The location ano arrangement of the piping layouts including

! pipe supports nave been designeo to provide access for 1 operation and maintenance functions. The control ana block valves on the EFW By-Pass Lines were located to provide the ,

, capability to manually operate these valves at the Intemediate i Building 295'El without the use of additional platforms.The

controls and indication related to the EFW System are located on the Main Control Console sections CC and CL in the Control Room and on the Remote Shutdown Panels 'A' and '8'. The i

controls and indications are laid out and labled in accordance with GPUN Standard ES-004 " Human Engineering Guide - TMI-1,"

l Rev. O. The operator will be able to override automatic 4

control of the level controller from the Main Contr91 Room.

l The operator will also be able to transfer control of the EFW t control valves to their respective Remote Shutdown Panel and manually control flow to both OTSG's from Remote Shutdown Panel "B" with Remote Shutdown Panel "A" acting as a backup means of control.

a .

Much 31, 1985 .,

Page 23 of 30 '

'/

.s s ,

1 u, .

' i y ,

TABEEI a

1'

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOWS-WITH RECIRCULATION CONTRbt VALVES EF-V8 A/8/C OPEN

.I i Total searing Recirc

No. Pumps Steam Pressure Flow Flc w Flow l

l Turb. Mator Flow to OTSG

_ "A" , "B" "

~V' "B" a

) Or've Drive .jlG OTSG gpm gpm gpa spe gpm Remarks

! 0 1 1050 1050 440 10 75 220 220 l 1 0 1050 't 1050 660 15 155 330 330 t 0 2 1050 1050 730 20 150 365 365

} 1 1 1050 1050 800 25

225 400 400 1 2 1050 1050 860, 35 300 430 430 '

0, 1 1050 1050 360 10 75 0 0 360 "A" 0TSG Isolated 1 1050 1050 400 15 160 0 2 0 400 "A" 01SG Isolated 1050 1050 '475 20 150 i 0 475 "A" 0TSG Isolated i 1 '1050 1050 '

4do 25 230 0 440 "A" 0TSG Isolated j i 2 '1050 -

1050 475 35 300 l

0 475 "A" 0TSG Isolated 1 0 1 1050 600 520 10.

70 0 520 '"B" DT5G 1solated 1 0 1050 600 800 15 i; 150 240 560 "B" OTSG Is01att.d 0 '2 1050 600 035 20

' 140 270 565 "B" OTSG Isolated

) 1 1050 600 950 25 i 220 360 590 "B" OTSG Isolated 1 2 1050 600 1000 35 300 410 590 "B" OTSG Isolated J

l

March 31, 1985 Paga 24 of 30 TABLE 2 PLANT CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR AUTOMATIC ACTION OF EQUIPMENT RELATED TO EFW MODIFICATION Equipment Action Plant Condition

• Close MFW Isolation Valves FW-VSA/B 1 or 4 Close MFW Isolation Valves MFW-V92A/B 1 or 4 Close MFW Control Valves MFW-V16A/B 1 or 4 Close MFW Control Valves MFW-V17A/8 1 or 4 Start EFW Motor Driven Pumps 2, 5, 6 or 7 Start EFW Turbine Driven Pump 2, 5, 6, or 7 Open EFW Block Valves EF-V52/53/54/55 2, 5, 6 or 7 Open EFW OTSG 1evel control valves 3, S 6 or 7 i) Control OTSG level at 30 inches 3,5,6

11) Control OTSG level at 240 inches 7

• Condition Code 1 - Low MS Line Pressure (less tnan 600 psi) 2 - Low UTSG Water Level (less than 20 inches) 3 - Low-Low UTSG Water Level (less tnan 18 incnes) 4 - Hign OTSG Water Level (greater than 370 inches)

S - Higi Containment Pressure (greater than 4 psig) 6 - Low MFW Pump Differential Pressure 7 - All RC Pumps Tripped

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_ _ - . . _ - _ . . . . . _ . . _ . - . . _ - - . . . . _ . . . , _ ,,_..,..,.______.,__.____.._m. _ _ - - _ . - , - . _ . . , _ - _ _ - - . . - _ - _ _ _

Tw8-March 31, 1985 Page 26 of 30 i

TABLE 4 HSPS MODIFICATION LIST OF COMPUTER INPUTS OTSG A High Level OTSG A Overf111 WW Isolation on OTSG 1 A Hi-hi Level UTSG u Hign Level

^

OTSG u overfill WW Isolation on OTSG 18 Hi-H1 Level OTSG A Low Level EFW Pump Initiation on UTSG a Low-Low Level UTSG B Low Level EFW Pump Initiation on OTSG b Low-Low Level

OTSG A Low Steam Prussure NFh Isolation on OTSG 1 A Low Pressurt OTSG b Low Steam Pressure NFW Isolation on OTSG 1 A Low Pressure EFW Initiation on OTSG 1 A Low Level EFW Initiation on OTSG 1B Low Level EFW Pump Initiation on Low OTSG Level Defeated High-High Level Feedwater Isolation Defeated d

. - - - , - --. . -- , .- -----------,,.m,.,,,, - - - - ,-.c-----,- e- ,- ----,-,-~-,--.---,.,n,- ---

March 31, 1985 Page 27 of 30

! TABLE 5 EFW MODIFICATION LIST OF ADDITIONAL INSTRUENTS

! CHANNEL I CHANNEL II CHANNEL III CHANNEL IV

PARAMETER MONITORED (RED) (GREEN) (YELLOW) (BLUE)

OTSG A Operate Range Level LT-1044 LT-1040 LT-1045 LT-1941 OTSG A Startup Range Level LT-1046 LT-1042 LT-1047 LT-1043 OTSG A full Range Level LT-775 LT-789 OTSG A Ref. Leg. Temp. TE-1046 TE-1044 TE-1047 TE-1045 OTSG A Steam Line Pressure PT-950 PT-ll80 PT-1182 PT-1181

! OTSG B Operate Range Level LT-1052 LT-1048 LT-1053 LT-1049 OTSG B Startup Range Level LT-1054 LT-1050 LT-1055 LT-1051 OTSG B Full Range Level LT-788 LT-776 OTSG B Ref. Leg. Temp. TE-1050 TE-1048 TE-1051 TE-1049 OTSG B Steam Line Pressure PT-1184 PT-951 PT-1185 PT-1183 Containment Pressure PT-1186 PT-1187 PT-1188 PT-1189 1

CST A Level .

LT-1060 LT-1061 CST B Level LT-1062 LT-1063 I EFW Pump A Flow FT 779 FT-788 l EFW Pump B Flow FT 791 FT-782 WW Pump 1 A Diff Press. DPS-829 DPS-542 WW Pump 18 Diff Press. DPS-830 DPS-543 I RC Pump A Power Monitor (PM) PM-1 PM-2 RC Pump B Power Monitor (PM) PM-1 PM-2 RC Pump C Power Monitor (PM) PM-1 PM-2 RC Pump D Power Monitor (PM) PM-1 PM-2

1.B. Flood Detection 1

Transmitters LT 1039 (Sensor)

LY 1039 (receiver)

Turbine Driven Pump Limit Switch ZS-10 (non-divisional)

1 1

I l

! bbrch 31, 1985 j Page 28 of 30 1

TABLE 6 I

EFW Modification list of Contml Room Recorders and Indicators 3

PARAMETER TAG NO. CHANNEL LOCATION OTSG A EFW Flow FI-779 I (RED) CC FI-788 II (GREEN) PLF OTSG B EFW Flow FI-791 I (RED) CC FI-782 II (GREEN) PLF OTSG A LEVEL START UP RANGE LR-1046/1054* I (RED) CC LI-1042 II (GREEN) PLF OPERATE RANGE LR-1044/1052* I (RED) CC LR-1040/1048* II (GREEN) CC LI-1040 II (GREEN) PLF FULL RANGE LI-775B I (RED) CC LI-789B II (GREEN) CL OTSG B LEVEL START UP RANGE LR-1046/1054* I (RED) CC LI-1050 II (GREEN) PLF OPERATE RANGE LR-1044/1052* I (RED) CC LR-1040/1048* II (GREEN) CC LI-1048 II (GREEN) PLF FULL RANGE LI-7888 I (RED) CC LI-7768 II (GREEN) CC CST A LEVEL LI-1060 I (RED) PCL LI-1061 II (GREEN) PCL LI-43 NON-DIVISIONAL CC CST B LEVEL LI-1062 I (RED) PCL LI-1063 II (GREEN) PCL LI-44 NON-DIVISIONAL CC o-Instrument listed twice-instrument is a two pen recortier i

4

l March 31, 1985 Page 29 of 30 EFW Long Term Modifications Drawing List Drawing's Sent August 6, 1984 EFW Bypass Line (Seismic) 0370-039-001 Rev 3 EFW Recirc Line (Seismic) 0370-039-003 Rev 3 Flood Protection Mod. 0370-039-006 Rev 1 EFW Bypass and Recirc Line (Seismic) 0370-039-007 Rev 0 Main Steam Vent Stack (Seismic) 0370-039-009 Rev 3 Main Steam 0370-039-010 Rev 3 Condensate 0370-039-011 Rev 0 Main Steam Vent Stack (Seismic) 0370-39-017 Rev 0 EFW Bypass Line Valve List 0370-39-021 Rev 0 (SHl)

Flood Protection Mod. 0370-39-021 Rev 0 Emergency Feed Water E-304-086 Rev 180 Drawings Sent February 19, 1985 EFW Turbine Driven Pump Overspeed Alarm 202-092 Rev. IA-0 Ovrspd Trip Alarm for EFP-1 SS-201-204 Rev. IB-0 Light Box D SS-209-635 Rev. IF-0 Alarms Intermediate Building Flood Detection 202-093 Rev. IA-0 IB Sump & Flood Level Indicators 521-158 Rev. IA-0 Flood Detector Monitoring Detail C-209-956 Rev. IS-0 PRF 1 Annunciator C-604-009 Rev. IB-1 Cont. Water Level Cab. C C0V-14 A/B and COV-lli A/B Upgrades SS-208-505 Rev. IA-1 Electrical 480V CC SS-202-090 Rev. IA-0 EFW Block Diagrams S5-202-090 Rev. IA-1

March 31, 1985 Heat Sink Protection System 0370-064-014 Rev. 0 EFW Block Valve EFV 52 (Typical) 0370-064-002 Rev. O MS&FW Instrumentation 0370-064-010 Rev. O Main Control Panel CC Revisions 0370-064-011 Rev. O Main Control Panal CC Revisions 0370-064-001 Rev. 1 SH1 HSPS Mod Elec. Blk Diagram SH2 "

1C-640-41-001 Rev. 0 Logic Diagram FW Isolation OTSGA

-002 Hi Lvl

-003 "

EFW Initiation on Lo Lvl

-004 Cont fress-RPS/ES/FWRD

-005 MSRD

-006 "

EF Initiation

-007 Logic Diagram FW Isolation OTSG B

-008 Hi Level

-009 "

EFW Initiation on Lo Lvl

-010 FWRD

-011 MSR0

-012 "

EF Initiation

-013 EF Initiation on Lo "Lvl (Valves) OTSG A

-014 0TSG B

-015 "

FW Isolation on Hi Lyl OTSG A/B

-016 MSRD OTSG A/B IC-640-41-001 Instrument Loop Press /Lvl 0TSG A

-002

-003 EF/FW OTSG A

-004 Press /Lvl 0TSG B

-005

-006 EF/FW OTSG B

-007 CST A/B Level l

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