ML20100K907

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Forwards Response to Request for Addl Info Re Alternative Shutdown Sys & Schedule for Implementation,Per 841102 Meeting.Schedule for Implementation of Alternative Shutdown Concept & Requisite Compensatory Measures Confirmed
ML20100K907
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/07/1984
From: Jens W
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To: Youngblood B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EF2-72025, NUDOCS 8412110336
Download: ML20100K907 (5)


Text

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U w m H. h e i,, r 7 Vice President

' Nuclear Operations -

Fermi-2 . I

,. 64M Neh Du Hgtmay ,

Newport, MicNgan 48166 1914 M6412 EF2-72025 December 7, 1984

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Director of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:: Mr. B. J. Youngblood,-Chief

'LicensingLBranch No. 1 Division:of Licensing 0;?S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Youngblood:

Reference:

1) Fermi 2 s .NRC Docket No.50-341
2) Detroit Edison to NRC Letter,

" Design of Alternative Shutdowng#.u.

Approach",.EF2-72001, dated October 22, 1984

3) Detroit Edison to NRC Letter,

" Implementation'of Alternative Shutdown-

-at Fermi 2",~EF2-71994, dated October 22, 1984 1

Subject:

- Additional Information

.Concerning Fire Protection On November 2,1984, representatives from Detroit Edison met with the NRC concerning the-design of the alternative e shutdown, system 'and the-schedule for implementation.cf that ,

a system".(Referencesi(2) Land (3), respectively). Further clarification.was'provided.during the week of November 5th

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to' Mri W.~ ~LeFave, of the , Auxiliary Systems Branch, concerning the design as_ described in Reference (2). It is

-Edison's understanding, based'on these clarifications,'that tMr. LeFave's questions have been resolved and that'the designJof the alternative shutdown system at Fermi 2 is -

, acceptable. This must, of course, be confirmed in a.

, supplement to the Fermi 2 Safety Evaluation Report. The draft FSAR change.for-the Alternate / Dedicated shutdown design.[ attached to Reference (2)]'only requires minor modifications to account for the clarification given to

.Mr. LeFave..-This FSAR change, including changes to other pertinent'FSAR sections based on the finalLfire protection ,,

design at Fermi 2, will be included in a forthcoming FSAR g amendment. The FSAR change will also include appropriate V information from Edison /NRC correspondence over the past {

several months based on the NRC requests for information and

. clarification.

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D i ADOhKO$00h341 <

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- Mr. B. J. Youngblood December 7, 1984 EF2-72025 1 Page 2 The schedule for implementation of'the alternative shutdown

concept and the requisite compensatory measures [ Reference

'(3)] were also discussed with the NRC staff and agreed upon

. at the November 2nd meeting. Detroit Edison's understanding of-the agreement is as follows, o The operating license for Fermi 2 will be con- -

ditioned to require that, by September 30, 1985,

. all modifications to implement the alterna =

tive shutdown design.[as documented in Reference (2)] that could be installed without impacting plant operation will be installed. In addition, .

by September 30, 1985, appropriate procedures will have been approved to provide for adequate implementation of the alternative shutdown design

'. and applicable operators will have been trained on these procedures. Furthermore, by September 30, 1985, Detroit Edison will submit to NRC a request to amend the Technical Specification, as appli-icable, with appropriate limiting conditions for.

operation and surveillance requirements to account

for implementation of the alternative shutdown design. Detroit Edison will fully implement the-l alternative shutdown' design, as outages permit,=in a time frame not to exceed startup after the first refueling or approval-of the requested Technical Specification changes, which ever is later. Until such time that'the alterna- tive shutdown design is fully implemented, Detroit-Edison will retain the appropriate design features and implement the.

applicable' measures described in Reference (3) for the fire areas of concern.

Subsequent to the November 2nd meeting, Edison was informed of the need for some additional information for the NRC' staff to complete'its review. The questions, informally transmitted, and the Edison responses are included in the attachment .

l' I Please direct any questions to Mr. O. K. Earle at (313) 586-4211.

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Sincerely, l

cc: (All with attachment) j((

f[ f'7 p

! Mr. P. M. Byron /

l Mr. M. D. Lynch U Mr. R. L. Ferguson US NRC Document' Control Desk o . Washington, DC 20555 L

. Mr. B.-'J. Youngblood November 28, 1984 EF2-72025

- Page.3

bec:'_(All with attachment)

Approval Controli F. E. Agosti R. C. Anderson L. P. Bregni W. F. Colbert

0. K. Earle W. J. Fahrner W. R. Holland ~

W. H. Jens R. S. Lenart P. A. Marquardt i

R. D. Olson T. D. Phillips M. S. Rager L. J. Simpkin F. J. Svetkovich G. M. Trahey O. K. Earle (Bethesda Office)

Secretary's Office (2412 WCB)

NRC Chron File I

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4 1

1 cAttachm:nt'to i.: EF2-72025-Responses:to' Informal:

NRC Questions
1. What does it1 require tofraset a fire alarm signal

. received-in the control room?

Response: Upon receiptiof an alarm in the control room, the operator acknowledges the-

! alarm. This silences-the audible

, annunciation,_but leaves'the visual. ,In order for the alarm to be reset, the alarm device must be cleared of'whatever is causing the alarm 1(i.e., if' smoke is causing a smoke detector to give an 4

alarm, the-smoke must have cleared from the detector). -Once this occurs, the alarm is reset at the' applicable fire alarm panel (s) in or'just outside the relay room and finally reset in the control room.

2. How far above the floor of the steam tunnel are the i

HPCI/RCIC valves? l i

Response: The valves are approximately 3 to 4' feet l- above the floor. It.should be noted, i- however, that safe shutdown is;not.

l dependent on the actuation of either1of these valves. Depressurization via.

manual actuation of. safety relief valves-

, or ADS, followed by injection by low pressure ECCS systems, performs'the same.

function as HPCI/RCIC and is'not depend-ent on the integrity or functioning of.  :

7 cable or equipment in the steam tunnel.

L See the PSAR, page 9B.4-37.-

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(. -3. How many cable trays make up the combustible' loading in

[ the SE corner room of the Reactor Building, elev 540' S l and 562'-(Fire Zone 2)?'

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l Response: There are no cable trays on the 540' I- elevation drawing and three, trays on the l 562' evalation drawing. The three trays i are each approximately twenty-feet long.

f Two of these trays are along the north  :

end of the diagonal wall at elevations-F 575' and 573'. The third' tray is at the

! south and of the diagonal wall at eleva-c tion 575'. (See FSAR Figure 9B-3 SE l

corner.) The combustible loading for '

the three trays is estimated at approxi-

[ mately 18,000,000 BTU. (See FSAR page j 9 B.4-5. )

Attachment to EF2-72025 Responses to Informal NRC Questions (Cont'd)

4. What type of suppression system is used in Fire Zone 5 in the Reactor Building?

Response: An automatic sprinkler system is installed in the railroad bay (column A-B, 9-13). See Detroit Edison to NRC-letter, EF2-72717, August 3, 1984 (pages 1.16-1.18 in Attachment 1) for appropriate justification for not providing full area suppression.

A fire would have to traverse through a water-sprinkled area of the railroad bay to damage unprotected redundant divisional circuits. (See FSAR Figure 9B-4.)

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