ML20080U024
| ML20080U024 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1984 |
| From: | PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080U011 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8403020136 | |
| Download: ML20080U024 (29) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:o-REVISED 2/28/84 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CKETED USNRC Rg_ fore the Atomic Saf etv and Licensina Board In the Matter of ) '04 IUS ~l IN 25
)
Philadelphia Electric Company ) Docket Hos. 50-352
) 50-353 (Limerick Generating Station, ) RELATED CORRESPONDEN,CE,
' Units I and 2) )
TESTIMONY OF PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY REGARDING THE ABILITY OF SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES TO WITHSTAND THE EFFECTS OF POSTULATED DETOHATIDH RESULTING FROM THE ASSUMED . RUPTURES OF THE ARCO AND COLUMBI A GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINES INTRODUCTI0tt
- 1. On January 9, 1984, the Atomic Safety end Licensing Board-(" Licensing Board") requested additional testimony f rns the parties regarding the ability of safety related structures at the Limerick Generating Station to withstand the . effects of postulated detonations resulting from the assumed rupture of the ARCO and Columbia Gas Transmission pipelines. The Licensing
-Board expressed an interest both in the ability of the safety related structures to withstand such postulated detonatior.s and the margins above such values inherent
.in building design. (TR 5934-44). This test imony is responsive to that request' and includes the followings o A discussion of the various terms related to the analysis such that they can be understood and used consistently throughout.
8403020136 840228
-{DRADOCK 05000352 PDR
f_ . o A d2teription cnd rotults of tha cnalysis regarding the ability of safety related structures to withstand pressures determined for the postulated
- accidents previously analyzed in testimony before the Licensing Board related to contentions V-3a and V-3b.
o A disc <tsion of t he TNT explosion on the Reading Railroad described in t he Final Safety Analysis Report as indicative of the pressures to which certain safety related structures have been designed, A discussion of the margins above the calculated
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o pressures for which the integrity of safety related structures can be assured. o A discussion of the 'enalysis used to demonstrate t hat a f ailure of the cooling towers resulting f rom a pipeline explosion would not affect safety related structures, components, te systems. The witnesses sponsoring 'particular portions of this testimony are indicated on Attachment I hereto. t_
e DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
- 2. Because there has been confusion regarding the terms associated with pressures resulting from detonations, the following are the definitions utilized in this tastimony:
Incident Pressure is (La sudden rise in pressure due to the violent release of energy from a detonatien. The peak oositive incident oressure (Pso) is the maximum incident pressure above the ambient pressure. Reflected Pressure is the total pressuro which results instantaneously at a surface when a shock wave travelling in one medium strikes another medium, 222s, the ground. Peak Positive Reflected Pressure (Pr) is the maximum reflected pressure developed above the ambient pressure. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF EXPLOSIVE PHONEMENA
- 3. In the design of structures to resist the effects of accidental explosions, the effect to be considered is the resulting pressure. This pressure is in the form of a shock wave composed of a high pressure shock front which expands outward f rom the center of the detonat ion with intensity of the pressure decaying with distance.
As the wave front impinges on a structure,'a portion of
._. -- _ . ~ . __, _ _ _ - _ ._ . - _ - _ _ .
t he structuro isr the structuro, en a whale, will
. experience a structural loading as a result of the shock pressure. For the purpose of this report the terms explosion, blast, burst and detonation are .used interchangeably.
TYPES OF BLAST ENVIRONMENT
- 4. . T he possible types of detonation _ loading on plant facilities can be' identified as free-air burst loads, air burst loads and surface burst loads. The free-air burst environment is produced by the blast wave propogating away from the center of the explosion
. striking the structure without intermediate amplification of t he initial shock wave (Figure l')
7 (Applicants', Exhibit 15 ) '. The air burst environment is produced by a detonation which occurs above the ground surface and'at a distance away from the structure so
- t hat 'the init ial shock wave, propagat ing away f rom t he explosion, impinges on the ground surface prior to
, arrival at the structuae. As the blast wave continues l- ~
~to propagate outward, a front known as the " Mach front" (Figure 1) (Applicants' Exhibit 16) is formed by the interaction of the incident wave and the reflected wave l; which is the result of the reinforcement of the incident
! ~. wave by the ground. The height of the . intersection of l: L. l
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t he incid:nt w:vo, roficcted w vo end M ch front, which increases as the. wave propogates away f rom the center of t he 'det onat ion 'is called the triple point. A structure is subjected to a plane wave when the height of the triple point ' exceeds the height of the striscture. Above
- the triple point two separate shocks will be seen, the
'first being due to the incident wave and the second to t he reflected wave.
- 5. The' surface burst environment is produced by- a
- detonation which occurs at or very. near the ground surface. The reflected wave merges with the incident wave at t he point of detonat ion to ' f orm a single wave, which is' essentially hemispherical in s hape, and l~ resembles a Mach front as in an air burst below the triple front (Figure 2) (Applicants' Exhibit 17).
i 5'. This analysis assumes that detonation of an unconfined natural gas mixture could occur although the evidence in this proceeding is clear and uncontradicted that this is t not possible. Furthermore, the assumption that an L _ elevated detonation can occur.is also not credible d;e l l. l
~
to the lack of an ignition source, let alone a source of l onergy sufficient In the initial . to cause detonation. n testimony a surface burst was analyzed very l conservatively to determine- the pressure on walls of I safet'y related structures. When it was recognized t hat I i l ! l l l I L l
en #cpt ioiz:d" height air burst ceuld givo thmorat ically higher values, it ess decided to attempt to more
. realistically, but still conservatively, evaluate this case as well as to reexamine the case previously presented.
BASIS OF ANALYSIS
- 6. ~As discussed in more detail below, the blast effects from the Columbia Gas Transmission pipeline have been recalculated using the percentage of gas-air mixture that theoretically could detonate in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.91 Rev. 1, and with all other assumptions contained in Walsh's original testimony remaining unchanged. (Testimony of John D. Walsh related to contentions V-3a and V-3b) (Tr. ff 54f1).
That test imony discussed the maximum pressure that would be developed at any of the safety related structures for the Station assuming a surface burst and a detonable mixture approximately four times t hat suggested by Regulatory Guide 1.91 Rev. 1. 6'. A maximum pressure would result from a rupture at the
- closest approach of the of the Columbia Gas Transmission i
. pipeline to such structures, laja., approximately 3500 f eet, leading to a postulated detonation approximately 1200 feet from the structure. However, to analyze the i
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.cffcct cn oll.safoty roloted structures, it must b3 c.
recognized that the detonation could be assumed to occur at locat ions f arther away than that assumed to give the maximum pressure, but which could produce more limiting pressure for particular structures, East, spray pond pump nouse. .Theref ore, Hut ili zing t he same methodology for predicting the centroid of the explosion as used in r t he Walsh Testimony, the Columbia Gas Transmissicn pipeline explosion was assumed to occur along a line parallel to and 700 meters (approximately 2300 feet) from the pipeline (see Figure 3) (Applicants' Exhibit 18). Utilizing . the distances f rom t his line to safety related structures, the resulting pressure for each of the particular structures was determined as discussed
'below.
- 7. It was not necessary to calculate the pressures resulting from the assumed rupture and detonation of
. gasoline- from the ARCO pipeline inasmuch as the resulting pressure, assuming an explosion centroid along i ' the Possum Hollow streambed, as did Walsh, is always significantly less than that resulting f rom the assumed detonation of - t he vapor from the Columbia Gas transmission pipeline in this testimony. As calculated by Walsh, the maximum peak positive reflected pressure from an ARCO pipeline explosion is 1.9 psi.
i
, - . ., , . _ . _ _ _ . . , _ _ _ . . . . - . . . . _ . ._ , ~ , - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _
- 8. Initictly,_ pressuras en walls cnd roofs sisco calculated assuming a surface blast and the Regulatory Guide 1.91 Rev. 1 assumption. Table II, Column 1 presents the results of -this evaluation. Using Figure 4-12 o?
Reference 1, -the reflected pressure on the wall of each of t he saf ety related structures was obtained as a function of the scaled distance. Inasmuch as the wave front for a surface burst is perpendicular to the ' roof, , no reflection occurs. The roof pressure was determined utilizing Equatinn 4-8 of Reference 1. 8'. Even t hough no source of ignition or detonation could occur in the open air, the caso of an elevated i . detonation was nevertheless examined for the sake of completeness. It is helpful to. discuss the relationship ; between surface bursts and air bursts in order to understand why,;for particular conditions, an elevated burst can produce. greater pressures. For a surface burst,~there is instantaneous reinforcement between the reflected and incident waves. As the elevation of the burst increases, some of the energy is di-ected 7 downward, resulting in a lessening-of blast pressures at a given distance. This can be seen by comparing Figures 4-5 and 4-12 of Reference 1. For very small elevations tho' correction for ground reflect ion is small as shown in . Figure 4-6 of Reference 1. At the height increases,
tws ccupsting cffnets cccur. First, ths esngs Increases, thus lowering the f ree air burst pressure in
. Figure 4-5 of Reference. 1. Second, the reflected pressure coefficient increases to a maximum, t hen decreases to a constant value for peak positive incident pressures of-interest here. The resultant is a maximum pressure at a specific height. For t he case at hand, because t he source cannot rise above 500 feet, this elevation yields the maximum resulting pressures for an air burst. For this case, the peak reflected pressure on the walls is calculated as per Section 4-7(e) of Reference 1. The .results of these calculations are shown in Column 2'of Table 2. -
8". For an air' burst,- the pressures on the roof are calculated in one of two ways. For the case where the elevation. of the triple point exceeds the elevation of tha coof,' equation 4-8 of Reference 1 is used. The roof f pressure is calculated as per Section 4-14(c) of Reference 1. Otherwise, it is calculated as a free air burst using Figure 4-5 of Reference 1. While it is ultraconservative to assume that- -four times th Regulatory Guide 1.91 Rev. 1 mixture would detonate, the
. surface and air burst pressures were calculated in the manner ~ described above lusing Reference 1 methodology.
These cases are presented in Colunns 3 and 4 of Table I _9-
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-II . It shoul d bo noted t hat when camp; ring Column 3 with Column 5 (pressures used in structural assessment in Table I) which 'is a comparable case, the differences result from differences in the interpolation of the figures-in Reference 1 and Regulatory Guide 1.91 Rev. O.
- 9. Various points along the line of the possible explosion, as indicated in Figure 3 (Applicant's Exhibit 18), were examined to determine the pressures applied on saf ety related' structures. The pressures have negligible effects on safety related buried pipes, manholes and ductbanks. The analysis of building wall response to the . calculated peak positive reflected pressure was divided.into two portions. Initially, local response of each structural element was examined. By examining t he structural dra6:irgs of each wall evaluated, the critical elemant of that structuro could be determined based upon the_ peak positive reflected pressure as determined for each -wall . -Once that determination -was made, the critical' element was examined as if it were a beam element with' appropriate end conditions _ representative of those for such element in t he' structure. Physical properties of the structures determined from design values such as location and amount of reinforcing steel and' t he minimum specified 28-day design concrete
' strength were used, except for the reactor building i
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, - =.
whero cctust 23-day cancreto strcngthz waro uscd. Using the methodology of Ref erence le pages 6-1 through 6-13 _- and 6-21 through 6.23, shear end bending capacities were calculated for the crit ical locations and compared to the acceptance criteria presented in Reference I at page 6-48.
- 10. For the reactor enclosure and diesel generator building, inasmuch as the Reading Railroad accident analysis discussed below had already been perf ormed, the wall pressures on critical locations from this event contained in Table I were compared to the maximum for these structures as presented in Table II. For these structures, the Reading Railroad explosion was found to bound the Columbia Gas Transmission pipeline explosion for the structure walls.
- 11. 'The second p a.-t of the analysis involved the global response of each structure. The loadings on the entire s t ruc t u r:2, h, story shear .? oarturning aoment, were cal.;ulated and compared to ib+ la3Jin9s resulting from the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). For each ,
structure, the loading resulting from the SSE was found to be controlling. N i .- . - ._- _ _ - . . _ . . _ ___ _ .
RESPON5ES OF STRUCTURES TO THE READING RAILROAD BLAST
- 12. One of the events which had previously boon analyzed with regard to ' design of the Limerick Generat ing Stat ion was the pressures resulting from the hypothetical explosion of TNT assumed to be carried on the Reading Railroad. The analysis considered a surface detonation and examined the effects on safety related structures of the facility. The' structural analysis utilized the same met hodology as described in the previous section relating to the analysis of the Columbia Gas Transmission pipeline explosion.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
- 13. Table I presents the pressures for each safety related structure as contained in the original testimony. As previous!y discussed above, !t is appropriate to compare the values of Table II, Column 1 with the controlling pressure of Table 1. Becausa t here were already n.argin present, the lower pressures of Columa I would indicate J
a significantly greater mar.in. While Column 2 of Tat!e II represents an air burst which is not considered to be
-possible, margins compared to the pressures in Table I also exist. Merely to show the amount of margin, the results of Table II, Columns 3 and 4, were compared to Column 5. There are two cases where the pressures exceed those which were previously used for structural ?
I t
cesaccacnt. For theno c:scs, thm m:rgins waro recalculated and margins do exist. Because of the postulated location and magnitude of the various explosions, 1.3 . . the track of the railroad versus the locus of the centroid of the assumed Columbia Gas
' Transmission pipeline explosion, the controlling accident is dependent upon the magnitude of the blast, the. distance to the structure and their orientation.
One additional item she be noted. The peak calculated pressure resulting from the railroad car explosion is listed in Table I as 16.1 psi for the reactor building. This is the pressure experienced by the crit ical element of the wall rat her t han t he average wall pressure which is cpproximately 12 psi. IIARGINS OF STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY
- 14. In order to respond to the Licensing Board's questions with regard to margin of structural capabilities of the safety related buildings, the maximum pressure that each structure could experience without exceeding the ecceptance criteria in Reference 1 page 6-48 was calculated. For tho' reactor buildi.,g analysis, the actual strength of the concrete as determined from fleid measurements at 28 days tiss uti18?ed, rather t han the minimum specified 28 day design value. None of the analyses-utilized the additional strength of concrete
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- . - - - . _--= _.
which l o- c. rotult of stecngth coin resulting f rcm tha years of additional aging since the concrete was 28 days
'old. This unaccounted for increase in strength is at least 20 ~ percent above the value utilized in the evaluation _of margin and thus represents an additional conservatism.
- 15. Even at the values contained in Table I for which the acceptance criteria of -Reference 1 were just met, incipient failure of the structure is not implied.
1here is additional margin to failure as a result of additional plastic def ormat ion - which would take place without failure. With regard to shear, the acceptance values ut ilized also have certain inherent margins.
.16. The margins of the global building response to the assumed detonation were also examined against the loadings resulting from the Safe Shutdown Earthquake in order to quantify the margin inherent in the global resconse of the structure. It should be noted t hat
'there is additional margin in the safety related structures wit h respect to_their ability to withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake above the values for which they may have been analyzed. The overturning moment and story shear due to the assumed detonation were developed for each structure. The total force against each critical wall, as determined by the various pressures p
14 - ji e
- cpplied to it, w2o utilizcd in this evolutten. Tha worst case for each structure ams , the Reading Cailroad or columbia Gas Transmission pipeline accident, as appropriate, was utilized in determining the margin which was present, As may be seen from Table 1, margin exists at each location with regard to global building response.
C00 LING TOWER ANALYSIS
- 17. Since the cooling towers are not in and of themselves safety-related structures, they are treated differently in t hat they are conservatively assumed to fall givun
'the occurance of a pipeline explosion resulting from a postulated rupture of the Columbia Gas Transmission line as d.iscussed in _the Walsh testimony. Thus, the discussion of the effect of the failure is limited to the impact of the hypot het i cal failure upon safets related structures, systems and components. Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 (Applicant's Exhibits 19, 20, 21 and 22) show the dimensions of the towers and their locations relative to other structures and components at the Limerick Generating Station. Based upon observations of previous cooling tower failures, model tests and a comparison of the design of the Limerick cooling tower cooling towers to those which have experienced f ailures, 1
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t he folluro ceds of the t e. war le exp cted to ba by buckling. This failure . mode results in the debris falling predominantly within the tower base area (372' tower base diameter), with a small amount falling on outside areas away from the tower. As a limit, all such pieces of concrete would be expected to fall within a target area with a radius equal to one tower base
' diameter measured f rom the cent er of t he tower. This is based upon failures evident in Ferrybridge, Britian (Reference 2); Ardeer, Scotland (Reference 3) and the Grand Gulf plant at Gibson, Mississippi. Model tests by Der and Fidler (Reference 4) also substantiate the inward bending and buckling of the shell.
- 18. For analysis purposes it was conservatively postulated t hat the cooling tower f ailure would produce a piece of concrete about 5' x 5' x l' thick which would fall within a target area with a radius equal to one tower base diameter from the center of the tower (Reference 4, 6 and 7). The striking velocity of the piece of concrete. at the ground is conservat ively assumed to be
~ 200 feet por~second. This compares conservatively with the velocity of 188 feet per second for a free fall of
.approximately 550 feet from the top of the tower lo
-grade at El. 217 feet. The worst orientation, 12e., a corner of the piece hitting the ground, was assumed.
Y L . _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . . . _ __
- 19. The. cizo of the picco of cancroto was solccted becauso
'it is _ conservatively larger than pieces which might be
, generated as a result of consideration of the design of the structure: including the size of the shell and its reinforcement. The analysis also considers the estimated buckling shapa and wave length of the tower shell (Reference 4).
- 20. The assumed concrete piece is calculated to penetrate the soil approximately 2.8 feet using the same i
met hodology as for penetration of tornado missiles. As shown on Figures 8 and 9 ( Applicant's Exhibits 23 and
'24) the minimum soil cover or equivalent protection for i Ethe seismic category I buried pipes and duct bar.ks is 4 feet. Hence, the assumed cooling tower concrete piece is known not to affect these buried structures. The analysis further shows that the impact of the piece of concrete would not overstress the buried pipe or the concrete duct banks due to soil compression. Other category I items requiring protection from the assumed
- tower piece of concrete were examined. .These include manholes f or the duct banks. The top of these manholes are adequately protected from such missiles by steel and concrete covers. Other indirect failure modes, as a result- of the f ailure of the cooling tower basin, have also been examinsd. F Y L1-
~21. The cooling tcw:r cold water basin walls havo been designed as non-seismic Category I structures. They may
~
fall under a safe shutdown earthquake tornado or blast. The water f rom the tower basin could flow through a possible breach in the damaged bassn walls and flood the surrounding area.
~
- 22. The runof f pattern of the water would be similar to that established for the intense storm precipitation (Figures 10 E 11) (Applicant?s Exhibits 25 and 26). Most of the flood water from the cooling-tower basin would run away
'from the power plant complex. The worst-case flood conditions for the power plant complex would be created ,
by a- failure of the south side of the Unit 1 cooling
-tower basin wall. For this case. .a portion of the cooling' tower basin water would flow towards the turbine
-enclosure. Al t hough some. limited turbine enclosure flooding may occur, there would be no impact on safety related components. This scenerlo was discussed in response to MRC Question 410.5 which is attached hereto
~
and incorporated by reference.
- 23. While the differences in elevations between the cooling tower basins and the grade outside the power block buildings is approximately 41 ft, (Figure 6)
(Applicant's Exhibit 21) the hydrostatic head -on the seismic Category I manholes and duct banks would be h c
,6 rolctively small corp red to this diffarance in elevations based on _the runoff pattern. The access openings at the top of. the manholes are protected f rorn runoffs with tight-filling steel covers bolted to the adjacent concrete slabs. Water penetration would be rinimal.
- 24. All electrical cables in the duct banks (Figure 12)
(Applicant's Exhibit 27) have been designed to function under water. In addit ion, all electrical conduits that travel to electrical manholes outside the structures are sealed watertight to prevent water from entering the structures through the electrical duct banks. This has been' addressed previously in Section 3.4.1 of FSAR and responses to HRC Questions 410.2 and 410.6 which are attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.
- 25. Most of the seismic Category I piping is supported on rock where erosion from short time water flooding would be : insignificant. To the nort hwes t of the Unit.1 -
. cooling tower portions of the seismic Category I buried pipes are supported on Type I granular fill. However,
, most of the soil cover over this location is more than ! 10 ft., with a small portion having about 5 ft. of t-i cover. . Since t he water would run off rapidly on the L 9round surface, it would take the least resistant flow path with very little penetration into the ground to l l i' h L r
~. _. . ,-
ecuco crocian of the pips b dding (Figure 13) (Applicant's Exhibit 28). Some - soil cover would be washed away, but it would take time to expose the pipes completely. The water flow for a large breach in the basin wall would last approximately 30 minutes. Furthermore, *he adjacent seismic Category I piping could span more t han 39 f eet with no support ing material underneath and still carry the weight of pipe and contents wi t hout loss of function. A considerable time (much longer than 30 minutes) would be' required to cause a large erosion of this size to undermine the supporting capability of t he pipe bedding. The result of this phenomenon is similar to, but less severe t han, the failure of- non-seismic Category I buried pipes as addressed in . response to NRC ouestion 410.47 which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein. Hence, it can be concluded that undermining of seismic
' Category I buried piping would not be a concern.
- 26. Based on the above discussions it is concluded t hat the seismic Category I buildings, buried pipes, duct banks and ' manholes are suitably- located and adequately protected against a conservatively postulated cooling tower failure res.lting in missiles and water flooding.
They will perform their design functions safely without adverse consequences due to such an incident. t
$l
CONCLUSION
- 27. The- foregoing presentation demonstrates both quantitatively and qualitatively that margin exists for loading of t he safety related structures due to the blast resulting from the controlling event.
Furt hermore, the f ailure of the cooling tower would not prevent the safety related structures systems and components from performing their design functions. 4
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s* 1 REFERENC E5 (1 )
'"S true 'eres t e nesist che Ef f ects of Accidental Explosions"
~
-Dept. of ^ the Ar=y. The Navy, and the Air Force (Manual No.
- TMS-1300/NAVFAC ? -397/AFM 88-22) June 1969.
(2) "High Wind Levels British Cooling Towrs", Engineering News - Record, November 25,1965 page !.5.
- (3) " Report of the Conr:ittee of- Inquiry into the Collapse of the
' ' Cooling Tower at Ardeer Nylon Works, Ayrshire on Thursday,
. 27 th September 1973", Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, Petrochemicals Division.
" Buckling of Shell & Shell-Like S tructures",
.(i. ) ' - K. P. Sucher t, K. P. Bachert: 5 Associates,197 3.
(5) T. J. Der and R. Fidler, "A Model Study of Buckling Behavior of Hyperbelic Shells" Proc. Institution of Civil Engineers, Vol . 41, January .1968. (t): K. P. S2:hert, "Preli=inary Stability Analysis of Reinforced Concreto C:chng Towers", IASS , Caigary, Canada, July 1972. (7) K. P . Suc h . r t , " Stress and Buckling Analysis of Cracked Reiricrted Concrete Shells Using Split Rigidity Concept", IASS Sv:posium, Dar:s tad;,1978. i:
. ~,. y .-. ,,
ATTACliMENT 1 WITNESS - 11ESPONSIBILITY ulmAKDOWN FOR CONTENTION V-3a AND V-3b F.EVISED TESTIMONY W i t n.e s s Responsiblity by Paragraphs John W. Benkert, 1-6 1, U - a'/
- Alberc K. Wong and g flanga Palaniswamy a
John W. Walsh 1-11, 13, 2 */ Cordon K.-Ashley, II 1-6 1, 8-9, 13, 27
-11 . William Vollmer 1-6 1, 0 - 2 '(
Kenneth P. Buchert 17-19 Mr. Vincen t S. 13 oyer ,will be t, h e 1 cad witness regarding this: testimony. h 4 I 4 q' O s e
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' LIMERIC PROJECT IJO3 BOSI . .
TABLE 1
SUMMARY
OF ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION PRESSURES DESIGN / ASSESSMENT VALUES POGITIVE PEAK M-S DIRECTION LOADING ON _ REFLECTED PRESSURE-PSIG MAR 6 ins &,) COMPARISON STRUCTURE COLUMBIA ARCO READING OVER OF GLOBAL PlPELINE PIPELINE RAILROAD BLOG. RESPONSE REMARKS DESIGN /A9SESSMEW NATURAL 6A6 6ASOLINE Bok/TANKGR PRESSURE A)R EXPLDSION EXPLOSION EXPl0510N EXPLo! MON 9ESMTDIMN - EXPLOSION
- BUILDIN6 PRES 6URES EARTHQtMKR FACILITIES RDOF EXT. ROOF EXT. ROOP EXT. ROOF EXT.lMALL OVER- 910RY OVER- STORY WALL WALL WALL * #A _*
- TURNIN6 SHEAR T!*MN6 SIEAR-MowEMT M0We4 ACTOR BLD6 UNT N NC NC NC 53 16.l 'N C N
_ . i s_, 1.s o B,630 1.51 i ' i UNIT 2 54 lo.o 1.9 f.0 NC NC D_ l NC 3.3 , . f N'" NC NC NC NC ; 5.1 16 4 NC I4 gg g5Sgos g39o 4g5,gj c3go
$ 0 * '
6.'l to,o 19 19 NC NC 0 g NC , g ,3 5, 8390 4.65xd c),oso CONTROL BLDG. /.9 f 10.0 (1.9 419,9.3 10. 0 83 / .s 7'g4 > x.t o' IJA NA s NA H A ,.
^ .
/ /
UMP 3.o 5,0 (1.0 (l.O LI 4~l - ! l 1.'lhlo 2,o25 ia,33rg 4, ,gg i j NOTES ~ ! 1. NC MEANS NOT COMPUTED. ELEMENT IS LESS CRtTICA.'_ THAN IN CORRES . l
- 2. NA MEANS NOT STRUCTilRF llNncaAPPLICABLE enMciorRATinM. THE ELEMENT OR LOADINC CASE POES NOT FXICT op APPIv To T5dC
,~
.). . : . 1 c _
\
-TABLE II.
SUPEARY OF PRESSURES RESULTING FROM A NATURAL GAS PIPELINE DETONATION-COLUMN 1 . COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3- COLUMN 4 COLUMN 5 P:' essure REG. GUIDE ' REG. GUIDE 4x h 4x " PRE 33URES (PR) 1.91 REV. 1 1.91 REV.'1 REG. GUIDE REG. GUIDE USED IN PSI SURFACE , AIR SURFACE AIR ~ STRUCTURAL BURST . BURST BORST BURST ASSESSMENT EXT. EXT. EXV. EXT. EXT. BLDG. ROOF WALL ROOF WALL ROOF WALL ROOF WALL ROOF WALL bIESEL GEN. 1.9 5.8 3.5 8.3 4.0 13.0 2.5 16.0 6.7 16.4 REACTOR BLDG. 1.2 5.8 2.8 8.3 2.6 13.0 5.2 16.0 5.4 16.1 e CONTROL STRUCTURE 1.6 5.0 2.8 6.9 3.3 11.0 4.7 14.0 4.9 10.0 SPRAY POND 0.8 2.5 1.2 3.3 1.8 5.0 1.4 6.0 3.0 5.0 PUMP HOUSE I
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- . . '84 MR -1 All :55 LUNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 u r n.E OF 3EUt in.-
- DCCKETING & Sun"O BRANCH
.In the Matter.of -)
)
Philadelphia Electric-Company ) Docket Nos. 50-352
) 50-353 (Limerick. Generating Station, )
Units l!and 2) . ) L CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby4 certify - .that copies. of " Testimony of V Philadelphia Electric: Company. Regarding the Ability of Safety Related Structures to Withstand the- Effects of Postulated Detonation Resulting From the Assumed Ruptures of ,
. - the ARCO . and Columbia - Gas . Transmission Pipelines," dated
~ February 2 8 ,-' 1 9 8 4 , in'the captioned matter have been served -
upon the following by deposit in the United States mail-this 29th day of February,'1984:
- Lawrence- Brenner, Esq. --(2) Atomic Safety and Licensing
( ~ Atomic Safety and' Licensing ' _ Appeal Panel ~
^ Board. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J Commission . Washington, D.C. 20555.
Washington,'D.C. ..20555 D^cksting and . Service Saction
- Dr. : Richard F. ' Cole -. C~.... c f the Secretary
, --Atcmic.'Salety and. U.C . % clear Regule. tory Conc.is sion
~
-Licensing Board
- U.S'.: Nuclear.. R6gulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission-
-Washington,'D.'C. 20555
- Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq.
Counsel for NRC Staff Office
- Dr. PeterL A. Morris of the Executive Atomic 2SafetyJandf . Legal. Director 7
Licensing. Board' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory , Commission 20555
.~ Commission Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C.. 20555_ h.b t = ,
.r-1 -* 'jHand Delivery.
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-Atomic Safety and Licensing Steven P. Hershey, Esq.
Board Panel Community Legal
~U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Services, Inc. s Commission. Law Center West North
- Washington, D.C. 20555 5219 Chestnut Street Philadelphia,'PA 19139 Philadelphia Electric Company ,
ATTN: Edward G. Bauer, Jr. Angus Love, Esq. Vice President & 107 East Main Street General Counsel Norristown, PA 19401 2301 Market Street-Philadelphia, PA 19101 Mr. Joseph H. White, III 15 Ardmore Avenue Mr. Frank 1R. Romano Ardmore, PA 19003 61 Forest Avenue Ambler, Pennsylvania 19002 Robert J. Sugarman, Esq. Sugarman & Denworth Suite
- Mr. Robert L. Anthony 510 North American Building Friends of the Earth of 121 South Broad Street the Delaware Valley Philadelphia, PA 19107 106 Vernon Lane, Box 186 .
.Moylan, Pennsylvania 19065 Director, Pennsylvania
. . Emergency Management Agency
~ Mr. Marvin I. Lewis Basement, Transportation 6504 Bradford Terrace and Safety Building Philadelphia, PA 19149 Harrisburg, PA 17120
'Phyllis Zitzer, Esq.- Martha W. Bush, Esq.
Limerick Ecology Action- Kathryn S. Lewis, Esq. P.O. Box 761 City of Philadelphia 762 Queen Street . Municipal Services Bldg. Pottstown, PA 19464 15th and JFK Blvd. Philadelphia, PA 19107 Charles W.'Elliott, Esq. Brose and Postwistilo -Spence W. Perry, Esq. 1101 Building llth & . Associate General Counsel Northampton Streets ' Federal Emergency Easton, PA 18042 Management Agency
< . 500 C Street, S.W., Rm. 840 Zori G. Ferkin,.Esq. . Washington, DC 20472
' Assistant Counsel' Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Thomas Gerusky, Director-Governor's Energy Council- Bureau of Radiation 1625 N. Front Street Protection Harrisburg, PA 17102; Department of Environmental Resources Sth Floor, Fulton Bank Bldg.
.'_ Third and Locust Streets Harrisburg, PA 17120
- Delivered on February 28, 1984
7. 4 C
~ Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Ave 7ue King of Prussia, PA 19406 James Wiggins Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 47
- Sanatoga, PA 19464 Timothy R.S. Campbell Director-Department of Emergency Services 14 East Biddle Street West Chester, PA 19380 m
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