ML20128H166
| ML20128H166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1985 |
| From: | Case J PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128H164 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507090438 | |
| Download: ML20128H166 (5) | |
Text
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RELATED CORRESPONDENC4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
$ETED q
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION the Atomic Safety and Licebik BOafd I49 Before I
CH.a s m.,
! In the Matter of 00CKEimG A Semi BRANCH PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 AND 2)
- Dockets No. 50-352, 50-353 i
I i
t STATEMENT OF MAJOR JOHN D. CASE I
j' I.
QUALIFICATIONS I
i i
i Major John D. Case hereby incorporates by reference his il;l curriculum vitae, which has been marked as applicant's Exhibit I
l j "1" during his deposition of July 1, 1985.
I would also like to l
i that I have served as Brig Commander of LeJeune, d[ stress the fact i North Carolina, and as the custody officer of the Naval Prison l
t in Port Smouth, New Hampshire during my service in the United h
I' il S tates Marine Corps.
Both of these jobs are similar to the l!I civilian position of a prison warden.
I would also like to stress that I was both warden and director of the Depart-ment of Corrections of Bucks County after I was released j
" from the service.
As Director of the Department of Correc-k i
l
! tions, I was in charge of the adult jail facility, the Bucks *
\\
County Rehabiliation Center, one juvenile home, and three half-way houses.
I would also like to note for the record I
I that I do have prior experience in moving large numbers of individuals as I was in charge of the planning and the even-;
utal evacuation of 3,000 troops during the Korean Conflict i
8507090438 850703 PDR ADOCK 05000352 I
T PDR
from the front lines of that conflict to the rear.
My plans called for an evacuation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and this was in fact j
achieved despite adverse weather conditions which prevailed at f
the time.
I concluded that my original estimates were con-servative in that they were met despite the adverse conditions.
I.
I also note for the record that I am currently the Field i
l!
i l
Director of the Pennsylvania Prison Society, which was founded l
ii
[
in 1787 by Dr. Benjamin Rush.
I also note that I have been I
i a trainer and trainee on numerous occasions throughout my l
I career, which are listed in greater detail in my curriculum 1
I vitae.
i II.
ESTIMATED TIME OF EVACUTION It is my opinion that the overall plan is specula-tive based upon a number of contingencies.
These contingen-cies include the inmate knowledge and education of the plan, time of day of the accident, weather conditions, correc-i tional officer training, inmate response, bus driver training, j
traffic patterns, ability to conduct simultaneous tasks men-tioned in the flow chart, and the availability of the necess-ary resources.
It is my opinion that an equally realistic estimate of the estimated time of evacuation as it has been presented to me and with the information currently available
A is 12 to 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
I am also concerned about certain specific 1
items mentioned in the sequential analysis.
Initially, I l
l would like to discuss the estimated lock down time which is l
I given as 30 minutes in the flow chart.
Given the current i
knowledge of the inmate population with respect to the plan, l
it is unrealistic to assume a 30 minute lock down time could be achieved.
This time is estimated during the best of condi-l i'
i, tions during the normal operation af the facility.
If..the inmate population hears of a nuclear accident through radio or other means at Limerick and has no concept of the evacuation plan, the lock down could go as long as 4 or 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Past incidents such as the power outage and subsequent riot on C Block on 9/12/83 suggests this time frame to be appropriate.
l i
This incident occurred at 5:15 P.M. and D Block was not secured l I
until 10:05 P.M.
The lock down time for the hostage siege in October of 1981 also took over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to complete.
Based l
upon my experience being involved in past lock downs and the l
i l
data regarding prior emergency situations at S.C.I.G.
leads me i
to believe that a lock down could take as long as 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to complete.
With respect to the portion of the sequential analy-sis dealing with the arrival of the buses and other vehicles ll i
at the Institution within 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, I believe this esti-mate may also be too conservative.
If the buses are coming from up to 190 miles away during a simultaneous evacuation of I
the general public, I do not know if the 2 to 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> estimate l
t can be achieved.
The factors that contributed include the I
i distance the buses will be required to travel, the training I
the bus drivers have received, the weather conditions and the l
time of day, the congestion of the-roadways, the ability to l
h l
.use main roads as opposed to secondary roads, potential bottle h
necks, the possibility of spontaneous evacuations by individ-t uals not conforming to traffic signals and evacuation plans, I
and the type of buses to be utilized.
b i
I have also some concerns as to the ability to i
conduct the other activities mentioned such as the mobiliza-l Il i
I l
tion of manpower, assembly of loading teams, securing and loading inmates, and vehicle exit times; within the suggested I
time frames.
Due to the obvious need to conduct many of these l
l activities simultaneously, the time estimates are speculative.
S h
With a more thorough knowledge of the mechanics of the plan i
i by someone such as Superintendent Zimmerman or another indivi-dual who has knowledge of the development of the time frames, it may be possible to achieve these tasks within the required time.
Today, however, without any additional knowledge, I
e cannot state that these tasks can be performed with any reason-able certainty within the time frame suggested.
8 III.
BUS DRIVER TRAINING With respect to bus driver training, my concern is to the guarantee that such training will in fact be offered 1
l to the drivers and other civilian personnel.
I believe there il is e need for an incentive to be offered in order to guarantee i
participation of the civilian personnel in said training.
To date, no such incentive has been offered.
Such possible i
incentives should include primarily financial inducement such as overtime or extra pay for participation in the training.
I i
This would insure that all training would in fact occur.
I i
s also believe that whatever type of training should also be i
offered on an ongoing basis and not as a once-only event.
,n ye - mee