ML20070M378

Licensee Response to 910222 Appeal Board Order.* Response Opposing Suspending or Otherwise Affecting OL for Plant Re Offsite Emergency Plan That Has Been Twice Exercised W/No Weakness Identified.W/Certificate of Svc & Svc List

ML20070M378
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	03/11/1991
From:	Dignan T DIGNAN, T.G., PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
CON-#191-11530 OL, NUDOCS 9103210182
Download: ML20070M378 (36)

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I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY Docket Nos. 50-443-OL OF NEW liAMPSHIRE, at al. 50-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 (Offsite Emergency

, and 2) Planning Issues; B

On Romand From the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit I

LICENBEES' RESPONBE TO APPEAL I- DOARD ORDER OF FEBRUARY 22, 1991 1

Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.

George li. Lewald Kathryn Selleck Shea i Ropes & Gray One International Placo Boston, MA 02110-2624 (617) 951-7000

{ Coansel for Lice. '

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R1MANDSR.58 l 9103210182 910311 PDR ADOCK 05000443 9 0 PDR -

I TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s)

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS . . . . . . . . . . 2 THE INITIAL INSPECTION REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 l THE INTERVENORS' MOTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 l THE LICENSEES' REPLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ,

THE SECOND INSPECTION REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 THE LICENSING BOARD DECISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -11 THIS APPEAL BOARD'S DECISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 i

I. THE DECEMBER 1990 EXERCISE HAS MOOTED THE ISSUE REMANDED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 II. IF THIS APPEAL BOARD CONCLUDES THAT THE MATTER IS NOT MOOT, THEN THE MATTER SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY I ADOPTION AND AFFIRMANCE OF THE LICENSING BOARD'S ANALYSIS AS TO THE SAFETY GIGNIFICANCE AND MATERIALITY OF THE ALLEGATIONS MADE . . . . . . . . 19 III. ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC APP 1,AL BOARD QUESTIONS . . . . 23 I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page (s) l

(

Casess l

Massacbasetts v. NRC, ___ F.2d ,

s Nos. 89-1306 et al. (D.C. Cir.,

Jan. 25, 1991) . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 14-17, 21, 22, 24, 26 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984),

vacated in part, 760 F.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1985),

and aff'd, 789 F.2d 26 #D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. S23 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Union of Concerned Scientists v. NFC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . 15, 22-24, 26 '

Administrative Decisionss Commonwealth Edison Company (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2),

CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ,

A LAB-9 0 3 , 28 NRC 499 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 26 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

CLI-88-7, 28 NRC 271 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

Order, (October 25, 1988) (unpublished) . . . . . . . . . 10 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Se? brook Station, Units 1 and 2),

A LAB-918 , 29 NRC 473 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 23, 26 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

A LAB-9 4 0, 32 NRC 225 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

CLI-89-8, 29 NRC 399 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 f Public Service Company of New Hampshire

! (Seabrook Station, Unita 1 and 2),

LBP-89-04, 29 NRC 62 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-13, 19 l

E L

I Public Service Company of New Harpshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

Unpublished ASLB Order (Directing Additional Briefing and Affidavits) (Oct. 25, 1988). . . .. . . . . . 10 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.

(Vertont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),

ALAB-118, G AEC 520 (1973) . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 25,-26 Regulationst 10 C.F.R. App. E . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714 (a) (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10 C.F.R. 5 2.734 . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 19, 21, 25 10 C.F.R. 5 2.734(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10 C.F.R. 5 2.734(d) . . . . . - , . - , . . . . . - - . . . . . .. . 11 __

i 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 4 Hiscellaneous t Atomic Energy Act 5 189 . . . . . . . . . .. . . . -. . . 16, 21

-111-

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i

, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

( NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD l

j In the Matter of i PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY Docket Nos. 50-443-OL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, at al. 444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 (Offsite Emergency 4

and 2) Planning-Issues) i i

)

! On Renand'From the United States Court of i Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit i

LICENSEE 8' RESPON8E TO APPEAL

BOARD ORDER OF FEBRUARY 22, 1991 I

INTRODUCTION

-Under date of February 22, 1991, this Appeal Board issued an j order calling upon the interested parties-to set forth their j positions as to certain-matters pertaining to the ruling-of.the United States. Court of Appeals for the-District of Columbia

) Circuit in Massachuset-ts v. EEG, .. i 'A -, Nos. 89-1306_g1' i

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A1. (D.C. Cir., Jan. 25, 1991).' Herein the Licensees respond to that order. This response begins with a statement of the relevant prior proceecings und facts and is followed by a discussion in three parts. Part I is an argument that the matter has been mooted by the recent 1990 graded exercise; Part II is an argument that the matter can, and should be, resolved by this Appeal Beard addressing and affirming that portion of the Licensing Board decision at issue which this Appeal Board previously refrained from addressing; Part III addresses each of the questions set forth in this Appeal Board's order which are not fully addressed in Parts I and II.

STATEMENT OF PRIOR PROCEEDING 8 AND FACTS THE INITIAL INSPECTION REPORT The prior procedural and factual matters which are of relevance to the remand at bar are the following:

On June 28-29, 1988, a full-participation exercise of the emergency plans for Seabrook Station (Seabrook) was conducted.

On July 6, 1988, Region I of the Staff of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an-inspection report 2 with respect to so much of the graded exercise as dealt with the "onsite" emergency plan. In that report, while. finding that overall "(e]mergency actions were adequate to provide protective 3 'All citations to Massachusetts v. HEC are to the slip opinion.

2 Inspection Report No. 50-443/88-09 (July. 6, 1988)

(hereinafter referred to and cited as "IR No. 1."

]

measures for the health and safety of the public,"3 Region I also noted in its discussion of " Exercise Observations,"' that there were certain " weaknesses" observed. Included in the discussion of " weaknesses" was the following item "1. The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff displayed questionable engineering judgment and/or did not address technical concerns (50-443/89-08-01).

For example:

. Neither the EOF or TSC staff questioned a release of greater than 7000 curies per second with only clad damage and no core uncovery; 1 . Efforts continued to restore the Emergency Feedwater Pump after a large break LOCA;

. A questionable fix for the f Containment Building Spray System;

. A lack of effort to locate and isclate the release path; and

. No effort was noted to blowdown Steam Generators to lpssen the heat load in containment."

THE INTERVENORS8 MOTION On the basis of IR No. 1, under date of September 16, 1988, the Attorney General of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, and the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire (hereinafter referred to collectively as the Intervenors) filed with the 3

IR No. 1 at 1.

'IR No._1 at 4-5.

5 IR No. 1 at 5.

l Atomic Safety and Licensing Board a document entitled Motion to Admit Exercise contention or, in the Alternative. to Recoen thg q Record (the Motion). The thrust of the Motion was to attempt to

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inject into the proceeding a new contention which would permit the litigation of issues arising from alleged mistakes made by Seabrook Station Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency

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Operations Facility (EOF) staff personnel during the graded "

exercise. In particular, the proposed contention alleged j noncompliance with planning standards 2 (staffing), 14 (correction of exercise revealed deficiencies), and 15 (training) of 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b), and Sections IV.A.2.a (discussion of authorities, responsibilities, and duties) and IV.F. (scope of l l

exercise) of 10 C.F.R. App. E.

The Motion was accompanied by an affidavit of Robert D.

Pollard6 which addressed the various specifics which had been reported in IR No. 1 with respect to the above quoted " weakness."

In this affidavit, each of the " examples" was discussed and argued to be evidence tending to shew a lack of competence and training on the part of the Licensens' operating personnel.7 6

Affidavit of Robert D. Pollard (Sept. 16, 1988),-

hereinafter referred to and cited as " Pollard No. 1."

I Pollard No. 1 at 7-13.

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4 l

THE LICENSIBS' REPLY On September 28, 1989, Licensees replied to the motion, with supporting affidavits.8 These affidavits-addressed each of the

) " examples" where the TSC or EOF staffs supposedly " displayed i i questionable engineering judgement and/or did-not address technical concerns." With respect to the release of greater than 7000 curies per:second, it was shown that_(a) the release _ figure was supplied by the centrollers and, therefore, was an exercise "given" which was not to be questioned under the exercise rules, (b) a review of exercise events revealed that, in fact, the lack l of correlation between the release condition and-core cooling i indications was recognized and discussed by TSC personnel, and (c) the lack of correlation in no way hindered the response and implementation of emergency procedures.' The continued efforts to restore the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump (a) did not hinder, nor would it have affected, the response of the TSC to higher priority activities, (b) was recognized as an effort which may

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not be needed to mitigate a large break LOCA, and (c) was continued for good and sufficient reason anyway in light 1of the fact that no higher priority item was being interfered with."

8 Acolicants' Response to Motion to Admit Exercise Contention, or, in the Alternative. to Reecen the Record (Sept. 28, 1988), hereinafter cited as " Applicants' Response,"

and enclosing Affidavit of James A. MacDonald ("MacDonald Aff.");

Affidavit of Gary J. Kline ("Kline Aff."); and-Affidavit of Greca F. Sessler ("Sessler Aff."), all also dated September 28,-

1988.

'MacDonald Aff. 11 4-6.

'"Kline Aff. 11 4-10.

5-4

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The " questionable fix for the containment Building Spray System" j L yo, <,3 fn ,,c ,conting.ncy pion e,y,1cp a in c.,,e3,nor,,1 flow path of ' ' system could not be reer isblished (the y controllers li. ;eded and declared efforts to reestablish the flow to be ineffectual on four occasions), (b) was technically sound, and (c) if needed, the fix would have been reviewed by NRC l l

before implementation, a review not carried out because-the normal flow path was reestablished." In fact, a concerted effort was made to locate and isolate the containment bypass leakage but was curtailed because of the fact that entry into the areas .iecessary for ultimate isolation or repair had to be postponed due to high radiation levels therein." As to the assertion that "(n]o effort was noted to blowdown the Steam Generators to lessen the heat load in the containment," it was demonstrated that (a) in fact such an effort was considered and temporarily postponed to assess its possible radiological consequences, (b) prior to completion of the assessment necessary to determine whether such an actio'n'would lead to introduction of high levels of radioactivity to areas of the. plant as yet unaffected, Day #1 of the exercise ended, and (c) subseqvent analysis has shown that such action-would have had no practical effect in reducing the temperature and pressure of interest.u "Epssler Aff.. 11 4-11.

"Kline Aff. 11 11-14.

u Sessler Aff. 11 13-21.

I TME SECOND INSPECTION REPORT On October 6, 1988, the Staff issued a follow-up inspection I report which, inter alla, addressed the " weaknesses" discussed above, and wholly confirmed the facts and views expressed in Licer.sces' Affidavits.

As to the 7000 curies relcase matter, IR No. 2 stated:

"The inspector reviewed the player I and controller logs for selected TSC, EOF and engineering support center (ESC) staff. These logs reveal that several staff members did I

question and/or comment on the mismatch between the reactor coolant activity and tha release rate. Subsequent discussions with the TSC and EOF controllers and players also I intlicated that they were aware of this mismatch. In actuality, the ESC Staff made very accurate core damage assessments based upon the data supplied by the TSC I . . . .

[T]his level of activity is recognized to be an unrealistic number, which is required to provide the offsite dose races necessary to I exercise the entire emergency planning zone.

The technical staffs had repeatedly identified and questioned those mismatches in I previous drilla and were told by the controllers that this high release rate was necessary to test ?!.e offsite plans,9and that they should not challenge the data."

As to the continued efforts to restore the EFW pump, 1R No.

2 stated:

"The licensee correctly stated that the EFW pump would be regaired to operate to I support steam generator cooldown in the recovery phase and continued repair efforts were prudent. The inspector agrees and I determined that the stated activity did not detract from the overall recovery effort, nor did it diminish other higher priority actiote

Inspection Report No. 50-443/88-30 at 8-10 (hereafter referred to and cited as "IR No. 2").

"IR No. 1, Item 5.

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I in progress or planned, and that TSC judgments,'were made with long term recovery in mind."

With respoct to the allegedly "qvestionable" fix for the containinent bullding spray system, IR No. 2 stated:

"The inspector met with the Technical Support Manager and a Technical Support I Engineer and discussed the rationale behind the corrective action taken to rig an alternative water source for the CBS system.

I Although the capability of the proposed modification was never proven due to the eventual repair of a CBS pump, the inspector determined, based on this additional information, that the engineering judgment and methodology involved in the proposed '

system and operating procedures changes were I acceptable. The licensee actions were appropriate since this fix was considered to be a 'last resort' measure after all prudent and subsequent extraordinary reasures had I failed to provide containment spray by other meansduetoafditionalscenariocontroller intervention."

With respect to the supposed lack of effort to locate and isolate the release path, IR No. 2 stated:

"This apparent lack of effort was the result of licensee decisions not to pursue entry into the contvinment enclosure due to high

.I radiation levels. Discussion with the licensee confirmed that indirect measures, such as remote temperature, pressure and sump jI level indications, were taken in a timely 1 fashion to provide an alternate assessment of potential leakage paths. The Inspector was unaware of these activities during the drill. The licensee decision to postpone entry into the containment enclosure was intentional, based upon other recovery efforts associated with depressuring the containment. Restoration of a CBS pump was imminent and activation of this system would 16 IR No. 2, Item 1.

'5TRNo. 2, Item 2.

l have stopped the release. CBS restor-Lion

( was subsequel'itly, and repeatedly, deleyed by l controller intervention so that the operators were prevented from affecting repairs. The licensee deci appropriate."gions in th2s regard were l With respect to the charge that no effort had been made to blowdown the steam generators, IR No. 2 had the following to say:

"This comment implied that S/G blowdown was appropriate. The actual concern was that a <

step in the emergency procedure required the-S/G to be depressurized. This step was not performed because the TSC staff was unsure of the integrity of the S/G tubes because no '

sample was available due to blowdown system isolation. This TSC staff concern was expressed to the inspector when he questioned them during the exercise. The NRC position in this area is that improved guidance to the operator may be warranted and should be evaluated, however the decision not to vent or blowdown the S/Gs without sampling appgars to have been reasonable and appropriate."

As an overall conclusion, IR No. 2 stated:

"With respect to tne above identified weaknesses, the exercise inspection confirmed that the TSC/ EOF staff possesses adequate capabilities to protect public health and safgty. This open item is considered closed."

! FURTRER PLEADINGC I The above-described follow-up report, inter alia , having i

!, been brought to its attention, the Licensing Board requested l

"IR No. 2, Item 3.

"IR No._2, Item 4.

20 IR No. 3 at 10.

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further briefing on the matter.D All parties complied with this order,22 and, in its reply, the Staff raised the issue of whether, assuming that the contention was either not, or properly, late filed as a mottar of law, it must be rejected in any event as an exercise contention because it did not raise a

" fundamental flaw" question as that term had then recently been k discussed and illuminated in an Appeal Board decision issued in the shoreham proceeding.23 For their part, the Intervenors included in their submission a second offidavit of Robert D.

Pollard in which Mr. Pollard essentially argued the case for why the Staff's IR No. 2 and the Licensees' affidavits did not resolve the " weaknesses" set forth-in IR No. 1. Thereafter, a l reply to the Staff was filed by intervenors and a rejoinder thereto was filed by the Staff.35 I'Public Service Comnany of New Hamoshire (Seabrock Station, Units 1 and 2), Unpublished ASLB order (Directing Additional Briefing and Affidavits) (Oct. 25, 1988).

22 Acolicants' Response to Board Order of Oqtober 25, 1988, LDirectina Additional Briefino and Affidavits). (Nov. 8, 1988); )

Memorandum of Joint Intervenors in ResDonse to October 5. 1988 Order of Licensino BotIA (Nov. 9, 1988); NRC-Staff ResDonse to Licensina Board Order of October 25. 1988 (Nov. 28, 1988).

23 Staff ResDonse to Licensina Board Order of October 25.

12.S.S. ( Nov . 2 8, 1988) at 7 citing Lena Island Lichtina Comeajly (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC 499 (1988).

24 Affidavit of Robert D. Pollard (Nov.-8, 1988) (hereinafter cited as " Pollard No. 2").

25 Joint Intervenors' Resnonse to "NRC Staff Resoonse to Licensino Board order of OctQber 25. 1988" (Dec. 7, 1988); N.B.C gaf f ResDonse to Jcint Intervenors' Motion for Leave to Submit Response to NRC Starf Resnonse to Licensina Board Order of October 25. 1988 (Dec. 27, 1988).

I I TER LICIWSING BOARD DECISICW The Licensing Board issued its decision on January 30, 1989.

Public jervice company of New Hameshirt (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-04, 29 NRC 62 (1989). The Licensing Board rejected an argument that it was without jurisdiction in the matter and also an argument that the contention at bar could not be considered " late-flied."#' Mext, the Licensing Board analyzed the Intervenors' filing against the "five factors" test for late-filed contentions, and held that the proper balance of the factors weighed against admission of the contention.II Although the holding with resp 0ct to the "five factors" operated as a matter of law to preclude satisfaction of the first of the criteria for reopening set out in 10 C.F.R. $ 2.734(a) and the provisions of 10 C.F.R. I 2.734(d), the Licensing Board nevertheless went on to address the issues of whether the Motion, as a motion to reopen the record, raised a significant safety question and whe'.nar the prof fered evidence would have been likely to produce a materially different result. As part of this analysis, the Licensing Board addressed each of the five examples of supposed questionable engineering judgement and/or failure to address technical concerns which had been set out in IR No. l.I8 Turning to the first example (failure to question a release of greater than 7000 curies per second), the Licensing Board 36 LBP-89-04 at 66-68.

27 LBP-89-04 at 68-71.

28 LBP-89-04 at 74-86.

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4 noteC that despite whatever differences of opinions were revealed by che various affidavits and filings, it was undisputed that the example was included in IR No. 1 simply and clearly because the Staff did not have certain information at the time the report was written.i' As to the second example (continued efforts to fix the ETW pump), the Licensing Board noted that it was ur. disputed i

that this effort in no way compromised the carrying out of higher priority items, and that it was also undisputed that ETW repair )

would be necessary at some point, although there was disagreement as to how soon the results of such efforts, if successful, would have been useful.30 Thus, these undisputed facts gave rise to the Licensing Board's conclusion that there had been no showing of lack of competence or less than adequate training.

The Licensing Board next turned to the third example (alleged questionable fix of the containment building spray system). With respect to this mattee

• was undisputed that the original citation of this matter as an example of the " weakness" had been based on less than complete information, and it was also undisputed that the efforts involved did not compromise any higher priority activity. Finally, it was undisputed that the validity of the "fixt* was never analyzed because a superior engineering solution was derived by the Licensees in the form of repairing one of the CBS spray pumps.3' As to the fourth example 29 LBP-89-04 at 74-77.

30 LBP-89-04 at 77-79.

3'LBP-89-04 at 79-81.

F L

(alleged failure to locate and isolate the release path), the Licensing Board noted that it was undisputed that this mattar also was included as an " example" of " weakness" only because the Staff at the time it issued IR No. 1 did not have certain inf ormation. 32 And, finally, with respect to the fifth example

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(alleged lack of effort to blowdown the steam generators), the

( Licensing Board found that it was actually undisputed that the postponement of blowdown was deliberate, that the concern of the Staff was not that the decision was wrong necessarily, but rather that it represented the nonperformance of a step in the procedures, and that the proper "fix" was the writing of a clearer and more comprehensive procedure, which the Licensing Board correctly found was not a major task.33 THIS APPEAL BOARD 88 DECISION 1 On June 20, 1989, this Appeal Board affirmed the Licensing l Board's decision. Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshire )

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989).

This Appeal Board affirmed the Licensing Board on two grounds.

First, it held that the Licensing Board had not abused its' l' discretion in its analysis of whether the Motion met the late-filed contention criteria." In so doing, this Appeal Board found that even if it had disagreed with the Licensing Board's handling of the critical " third factor," this-would not have 32 LBP-89-04 at 81-83.

33 LBP-89-04 at 83-86.

3'29 NRC at 480-85. 4 1

P l

affected the result because there still would have been no L " compelling" showing as to that factor, or any of the other factors two through four, as would have been required in light of the finding, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the "first factor" weighed against admission.33 This Apneal Board also specifically affirmed the Licensing Board result on the

" independent basis" of the " fundamental flaw" grounde which had been presented by the NRC Staff to the Licensing Board.3' This Appeal Board did.not, in light of its ruling as to the late-filed contention criteria, reach the issue of whether a significant safety question had been raised or otherwise address the safety significance and " materially different result" analyses undertaken by the Licensing Board and described in detail above. The Commission declined further review.

I THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 8 The United States Court of Appeals, in Massachusetts v. E ,

supra, remanded "for further explanation"37 the decision of e is Appeal Board. The court began by questioning the utility of the "five factors" test in the setting of late filed exercise '

i contentions.38 The court deemed the "first factor" to be "less 1

35 ALAB-918 at 484-85.

3'29 NRC at 485-86.

37 Massachusetts v. E , supra at 39.

38 1.d. at 41-42.

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central" in such a setting, the " fourth factor" not relevant,3' and the "fifth factor" to be potentially inconsistent Vith the holding in Union of concerned scientists v. liRS, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("UCS I"), that emergency preparedness exercises

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are material to licensing. Despite these misgivings, the court was willing to see how the "five factors" test was applied in the particular case. The court fully upheld the ruling of this Appeal Board (and the Licensing Board) to the effect that the "first factor" (although apparently "less central") was properly weighed against the Intervenors. In addition, although the court stated that "[t)he problem with the Appeal Board's reasoning relates to its application of the remaining four f actors, n42 in fact, the court found fault only with the ,

application of the " third factor." And with respect to that factor, the court did not fault this Appeal Board's holding that the procedural steps required under that fact.m.r had not been accomplished, but rather seems to have read into that factor, pernaps for lack of a better " slot," a requirement on the part of adjudicatory boards in analyzing this factor "to provide an affirmative explanation as to whether (Intervenor's) allegation 3'M. at 41. Of course, this really does not affect the analysis in any event because the fourth factor is almost always weighed in favor of the intervenor. gas commonwealth Edison comoany (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units-1 and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 245 (1986).

'hassachusetts-V. liRC, suora at 41-42.

M. at 42-43.

42 M at 43.

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I raised any material issue and, if they did how that materiality was to be weighed against petitioner's delay in promptly filing the contention."'3 This was required, held the court, by )

[ Section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act. The court went on to note

{ that the Licensing Board "did engage in an extended discussion of I tne safety significance of the exercise issues," but that this

( reasoning could not be imputed to this Appeal Board because this Appeal Board had not addressed this portion of the Licensing Board's decision."

Next, the court addressed this Appeal Board's independent ground for affirming the Licensing Board, 1.g., the lack of a showing by the Intervenors of a " fundamental flaw." Essentially, the court was unwAlling to accept the conclusury statement of this Appeal Board that the alleged shortcomings could be ::eadily '

corrected by minor modifications in operating procedures and supplemental training.'5 Rather, what was required, according to the court, was an analysis of the allegations, presumably the same or similar to that provided by the Licensing Board in its

( consideration of the "significant safety question" issue and an analysis as to why these allegations did not demonstrate a

" fundamental flaw."

(

( '3 M. at 43-4 4.

( " M. at 44.

45 M at 45.

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l 1 l

Finally, the court went on to give its reasons for not l

disturbing the outstanding operating license pending the remand, stating, inter alia I

'E "Most important, we note that Seabrook was g scheduled for a second full participation exercise in December 1990. A clean record in that exercise will likely moot this issue.  !

Hence, we decide against imposing an l immensely disruptive interim status quo that l may itself be displaced by the Appeal Board's  ;

I subsequent reasoning or by the more recent full participation exercise.""

The court closed by leaving to this Appeal Board the question of whether the court's opinion suggested any reason for altering the plant 's operational status.

THE 1990 EXERCISE I or December 13, 1990, the full-participation exercise referred to by the court was held. On February 20, 1990, the Region I staff issued its inspection report with respect to the onsite portion of that exercise.'s A copy of this report is l

attached hereto as " Appendix A." The results, as stated in the report were:

"No exercise weaknesses or plan deficiencies were identified. The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement their emergency plan L in a manner which would pro and safety of the public." ,tect the health "M . a t 4 7 ,

M .

's Inspection Report No. 50-443/90-85 (hereinafter referred to and cited as IR No. 3).

IR No. 3 at 1.

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x L

f 1

, In particular, it is to be noted that the activities of the Licensees' personnel at both the TSC" and the EOF" were observed and no weaknesses were found.

RISCUSSION I. THE DECEMBER 1990 EXERCISE HAS MOOTED THE ISSUE REMANDED.

As noted above, the Court of Appeals stated that e. " clean record" in the December 1990 full-participation exarcise "will likely moot" the issue remanded. There can be no doubt that the Licensees had a " clean record" in the onsite portion of the exercise as seen above. This being the case, tne second aspect of the court's prophecy follows. The matter is moot.

Conceivably an argument will be made that because the scenario was not identical to that utilized in 1988, the matter is not moot because the exact same problems were not faced by the Licensees' personnel in the 1990 exercise as those experienced in 1988. Such an argumont, if made, would be fallacious. To begin with, to run the exact same scenario a second time would be tantamount to giving operating personnel a " free pass" on the examination. More to the point, the various alleged mistakes articulated in IR No.1 were never pleaded by the Intervenors as being anything but evidence of alleged lack of competence and/or training. Competence and training are as well tested by one scenario as another provided only that the scenario is of "Id. at 6.

. "Id. at 7.

i

~

~ sufficient scope to provide a fair test of those characteristics L

of the operating personnel. The court of Appeals has stated that its concerns would be mooted by a " clean record" in %e 1990 exerciser such a record has Dean attained; the remand should be

{ resolved on the basis that the matter is now moot.

II. IF THIS APPEAL BOARD CONCLUDES THAT THE

_ MATTER IS NOT MOOT, THEN THE MATTER SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY ADOPTION n b AFFIRMANCE OF THE LICENSING BOARD'S ANALYSIS AS TO THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND MATERIALITY OF THE ALLEGATIONS MADE.

As noted above, the Court of Appeals indicated that the

{

discussion by the Licensing Board of the safety significance of

( the issues sought to be raised would resolve the problem perceived by that court to exist with respect to this Appeal

{

Board's decision.52 To this might be added the Commission's observations with respect to this same Licensing Board analysis

[ in its decision denying a stay of the issuance of Seabrook's low power license:

{

"The Commission is also satisfied that, wnether it was required or not, the Board's

[ diligent threshold examination of the significant safety question provides important assurance that no significant

{ safety matter has been ogerlooked. San LBP-89-04, 29 NRC at 72-86."

Intervenors are likely to continue to argue that they should never have been required to satisfy the regulation that gave rise to that analysis, 10 C.F.R. 5 2.734, because the record was not

{

52 Massachusetts v. HBs, a pin at 44.

53

) Public Service Consany of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, J Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-8, 29 NRC 399, 414 (1989).

~

-19 p ,

L r

L yet closed in the docket in which the Motion was filed. As seen f

L below, the record was closed, but, even assuming to the contrary, the Licensing Board analysis is still dispositive in light of the Court of Appeals rulings as to what is requisite in the analysis of a late filed exercise contention.

The evidentiary record in the onsite docket, which was the Intervenors' docket of choice for the filing, was closed at the time the Motion was filed. The Commission stated on September 22, 1988, with reference to that docket:

"The procedural posture of this case reflects that the record is closed for the consideration of new issues, and litigation on (the issue before the commission) may only be pursued if a motion to reopen is granted and at one late-filed contention is admitted."3'1 east Intervenors havo claimed in the past that this statement by the Commission is not dispositive because the Commission did not make reference in its September 22, 1988 decision to exercise contentions and, in any event, the statement was made six days af ter the Motion was filed 55 These arguments avail the Intervenors nothing. The Commission statement referred to a status this docket had as of September 22, 1988 and had had for a long time previously. And, while it is true that the Commission,

, in that decision, was not addressing " issues arising from the June 1988 onsite exercise," it was referring to the status of an 54 Public Service Comoany of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-88-7, 28 NRC 271, 273 (1988) (emphases added).

55 Intervenors' Brief to Acceal Board on Acceal of LBP-89-04 (Feb. 13, 1989) at 15.

i u

entire docket; the docket that Intervenors elected to file in.

In short, the Commission's language, quoted above, is dispositive of the issue of whether there had to be a reopening of the evidentiary record so as to bring the criteria of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.734 into play.

Even if this Appeal Board should conclude that there was no need to reopen the record at the time the Motion was filed, the result is the same. The Court of Appeals made clear that the analysis of the " third factor" of the five factor" test for late filed contentions should and, indeed, must, include an analysis of the potential materiality and r.ignificance of the safety issue involved. Just preceding its reference to the portion of the Licensing Board decision which this Appeal Board found it unnecessary to review in light of its determinations in applying the "five factors" test, the Court of Appeals, as noted above, stated that AEA i 189 required this Appeal Board:

"to provide an affirmative explanation as to whether (Intervenor's) allegation raised any material issue and, if they did how that I materiality was to be weiched aaainst cetitioner's delay in promptly filing the contention."**

What is clear from this section of the Court's opinion is that in a case such as that at bar, where the contention is properly deemed untimely filed, even assuming it to be potentially l " material" in the sense that the Commission deems it to be material to licensing, admission can still be deniec on the ground that the issue is one of little or no safety significance

sassachesetes v. tias, supra at 43-44 cemphasis added).

(

and, hence, unlikely, if heard, to produce a materially different result. In short, the court has placed further gloss on the holding in Ucs I by holding that " materiality" embraces safety significance in addition to the aspect of being a matter which i

the Commission, by regulation, makes " material" to its licensing decision.57 In other words, under Massachusetts v. HEC, in a case where a contention is not one where there has been a showing i

of " good caura" under " factor one" of the "five factors" test, a counter-balancing test of materiality with regard to " factor three" should include an assessment of the significance of the safety issue allegedly presented. Thus, even assuming this Appeal Board concludes that a reopening test was not required under commission regulations, the safety significance analysis by the Licensing Board is still relevant and dispositive, we submit, on the issue of materiality.

The Licensing Board analysis should be affirmed. As pointed out in the Statement of Facts earlier, it relies entirely on matters which are not in dispute. It also correctly rejects the credibility argument that was made with respect to the Staff change in position. It should be adopted and affirmed. The effect of such an action will also be to moot the substantive issues raised.

57 EgS_I, cassim.

I tII. AN5WERS To SPECIFIC APPEAL BOARD QUESTIONS.

i f

1. Did the December 1990 exercise moot in whole or in part the issue sought to be raised in the contention addressed in ALAB-918? If not, is 3 there any other basis for a conclusion that the g issue is moot?

' The Licensees have addressed these questions in Parts I and II above.

! 2. on the assumption that the contention is not now moot in its entirety, what should be the outcome of our reconsideration of ALAB-918 in light of the court's expressed views respecting the rationale 4 undergirding the result reached in that decision?

I Licensees have addressed this question in Part II above.

2(a) One underlying premise of ALAB-918 is that the five factors set forth in 10 C.F.R. I 2.714 (a) (1) are solely grocedural requirements that must be met before a late-filed contention can be I admitted. Can that promise be squared with the court's apparent view that the application of factor three contains a " materiality" component?

Do any of the other factors contain such a

" materiality" component?

The Licensees believe the first question is addressed, for the most part, in Part II above. In further exposition of its

response to the first question, Licensees respond by answering "No." The Court of Appeals was of the view that the NRC could not, under UCS I, summarily dismiss solely on procedural grounds a claim that, on its face, potentially raisad ganuine issues as

, to an emergency plan, or the ability of those responsible to carry out should the need to do so arice. Ilowever, the court also left no doubt that a properly conducted and explained I threshold analysis could serve to eliminate any requirement to

~l

I actually litigate such contentions if they held no safety  ;

significance. As to the second question it would seem that none of the other factors can contain a materiality component at least

< for purposes of the case at bar. The court has eliminated l I consideration of factors four and five it seems, and factor one is procedural and this Appeal Boar. analysis of it has beon upheld. This leaves factor two (availability of other means to protect the petitioner's interest) which would seem to be wholly procedural in nature. It would therefore seem that the Court of Appeals preempted the question by indicating that to the extent a materiality component existed in any other factor, it was subsumed by factor three.

2(b) Under the court's rationale, if a " material issue" is raised what follows? Can the third factor (or

< any other of the five factors) still be weighed

against the intervanor and can the contention still be rejected consistent with pnion of 9.2RE.11Raj Scientists v. ERQ, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C.

Cir., 2_ttt. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1995) and Egg

'I Luis Obispo_ Mothers for Pengt v. erg, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated in part, 760 F.2d 1

1321 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and aff'd, 789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. ) , 19I.1. ignigd, 4 7 9 U. S . 923 (1986)?

If so, on what basis?

As seen in the discussion in Part II the court ruled that the third factor (including the materiality component) need be counter-balanced with the first factor, as analyzed by the a

Licensing Board, and, if the balance weighed against admission, I the contention could, and should, be excluded from litigation.58 I

I

exe et - nac, aunta e 44-I

i O us the answer to the first question is "Yes." The basis for our answer is set out in Part II above.

I 2(d) Under the court's rationale, is the determination of whether a " material issue" is raised I.. independent of any factual issues? If not, what is the relationship between " material issues" and material facts? If, in determining whether a I " material issue" is raised, it is found that, disputed facts or disputed erpart opinions are involved, is a hearing required to resolve the dispute? If not, how in the matter to be resolved?

As set out in Part II, the Licensees believe that the Court of Appeals has, by its decision injected an element of significance into the analysis to be made. Whnther ona views l this as " factual" or not would not appear to be of any moment.

There is no doubt that a determination as to whether a contention is untimely filed is material to the question of whether the contention does or does not raise a significant issue. Material facts presumably are those factual matters, if any, necessary to performing the analysis as to significance. As to the last two questions, the Licensees have already once argued in this proceeding that under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.734, the " avoidance of summary disposition" test articulated in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power core. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520 (1973) is no longer good law, and that argument has been rejected." We merely note it here to preserve it for appeal.

Even assuming the test is to be one of " undisputed facts,"

however, as we have pointed out above, the Licensing Board "Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225, 242 (1990).

W analysis does rest on undisputed facts and, therefore, satisfies even the Vermont Yankee rationale.

2(e) In ALAB-91a, we also upheld the Licensing Board's denial of the Intervenors' action to admit the exercise contention on the ground that the contention did not meet the two-pronged fundamental flaw test of Lona Island Lichtina co.

(Shoreham Wuclear Power station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 2e NRC 499, 505 (1988). In applying that i

test, we assumed the proffered contention met the first prong. With respect to the second prong, we accepted as true the Intervenors' allegations of training inadequacies and concluded that the contention failed to meet that portion of the test. In MassachusA113 v. MRg, the court stated:

"We fail to see how the Appeal Board could reasonably determine the materiality of this contention under the fundamental flaw rubric without considering the supporting allegations.H The court further stated that "[t]here would appear to be a substantial variance between such nonfundamental deficiencies and the serious shortcomings alleged in the Pollard affidavit."

In light of the court's decision, and assuming for (

present purposes that we naed reach this matter, how should the fundamental flaw test be applied to the Intervonors' contention? If, in applying that test there are disputed facts or disputed expert opinion involved, is a hearing required to resolve the dispute?

If not, how is the matte.r to be resolved?

Licensees believe that the key to the court's concern in this area in to be found-in the'following language:

"(In UCS I we) recognized that'even the best i

of plans may be so poorly implemented that it I would be foolhardy to license the plant until i fundamental deficiencies detected in-an '

( exercise, such as serious shortcomings in staff training Werg "

substantially Corrected . . . .

It would seem that where the allegation is a training allegation, the test should be whether the deficiencies involved are so grave

" Massachusetts v. EEC, supra at 44-45.

I as to be viewed as " fundamental" to the execution of the plan in a successful manner. Here there has been no such showing on any basis. Each of the matters were matters of judgment and none of them affectsd the successful handling of the scenario presented.

Indeed, most of them simply did not exist except for a lack of infor:nration on the part of the inspectors when IR No. I was written. As tc the last two questions, see our response to question 2(d).

I 3. On the st3tg assuRRhi9_D that the controversy is not now wholly moot, does the basis assigned by the court for its romand "suggest any reason" for suspending or otherwise affecting Dendente liin I the outstanding full-power operating license fot seabrook.

The answer to this question is "No!" The onsite plan has been twice exercised since 1988 and no weaknesses have been found. There is no reason to believe that the Licensees staff is not fully trained and capable of executing the plan. The court itself has acknowledged this in its opinion.

Respectfully submitted,

.E a,w w j <v?e /

Thomas G.' Dig (afi, Jr.

George H. Lewald I Kathryn Selleck Shea Ropes & Gray One International Place Boston, MA 02110-2624 (617) 951-7000 counsel for Licensces I

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[p* **%g,g UMTED trATES s n NVCLEAR RaQULATORY COMMi& SON 3,

, RteloN 1 g**ee*,/[ 478 ALLaN0 ALE ROAD KINO oF PRustlA. PaNNSYLVANIA 19404 Docket No. 5C443 rc : o ;g Ucense No.NPF.M j Public Seivice Compai.y of New Hampshire ATrN: Mr. T. Feigenbaum, President and Chief Executive Officer I New Hampshire Yankee DMsion Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 I Gentlemen:

Subject:

{

Inspection No. 50 443/90-85 i

This refers to the announced, routine, safety inspection of emergency preparedness activities authorized by Ucense No. NPF 86 conducted by Mr. C. Amato of this offlee on December 11 14,1990 at your Seabrook Station, Unit 1, Seabrook, New Hampshire, the Seabrook Station Emergency Operations Facility, Newington, New Hampshire, and at the headquarters of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Bolton, Massachusetts.

i Discussions of our findings were held by Mr. Amato with you and your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The areas examined during this inspection are described in the NRC Region I inspection report which is enclosed with this letter. Witi.'n these areas, the inspection consisted of I examinution of procedures and records, interviews with personnel by the inspectors, and observation of your annual emergency preparedness exercise.

I Based on the results of this inspection, na violations were identified. Performance during the exercise demonstrated the licensee's ability to implement the Seabrook Station Emergency Plan in a manner which would adequately protect the health and safety of the I public. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluated off site response as well as the response of the New Hampshire Yankee Off site Response Organization. The results of that evaluation will be provided in a separate report by I FE,MA. No reply to this letter is required Your cooperation with us in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,

. /4~ w e

James H. Joy 'hief Facilities Radiological Safety and Safenards Branch DMslon of Radiation Safety and Safeguards QPNNOIA S y rf p eti

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- Public Senice Company 2 IE. ' .g; L of New Harnpshire H

Enclosure:

NRC Region ! Inspection Report No. 50-443/90-85 cc w/ encl:

L E. Maglathin, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, PSNH Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Omcer, NHY J. M. Peschel, Regulatory Compliance Manager, NHY D. E. Moody, Station Manager, NHY T. Harpster. Director of Ucensing Services, NHY R. M. Kacich, Manager of Generation Facilities Ucensing, NUSCO J. F. Opeka, Executive Vice President, NU O. Garfield, Esquire R. Hallisey, Director, Dept. of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts S. Woodhouse, Legislative Assistant State of New Hampshire, SLO Ccmmonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee Nuclear Safety Infonnation Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident inspector Public Document Room (PDR) local Public Document Room (LPDR)

U. S. FEMA !

Seabrook Hearing Service List M

Q ud: lN ,4.L

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- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission L Rqion 1 Report No. 50 443/90 85 Docket No. 50 443 License No. NPT.86 Licensee: Public Service Company of New Hampshire New Hampshire Yankee Division Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Facili:y Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection Dates: December 11 14,1990 Inspection At: Bolton, Massachusetts, and Newington and Seabrook, New IIampshire Inspector: b . -:r-X#M /lh/9/

C. G. Amat6, Regional Team Leade't ' d'te a

NRC Region I N. Dudley, Senior Resident inspector, Seabrook Station E. Fox, NRR/PEPB R. Fuhrmeister, Resident Inspector, Seabrook Station Appioved: -m a4< .2 ---- //5c/ep/

'WgraEarusJhtef. Emergency date Preparedness Section, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on December 11 14,1990 (Inspection Report No. 50 443/90 85)

Arens Inspected: Announced, routine, safety inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness exercise.

( Results: No exercise weaknesses or plan deficiencies were identified. The licensee demonstrated the ab!!ity to implement their emergency plan in a manner which would protect the health and safety of the public.

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T;. -; . ..  ; - - -

L j DETMLS l

1. PERSONS CONTACTED Unless indicated otherwise the following personnel are Public Service Company of New Hampshire, New Hampshire Yankee DMston, Seabrook Station (NHY) staff, who attended the exercise exit meeting at Seabrook on December 14,1990.

R. Boyd, Jr., Manager, Performance Services E. Darois, Health Physics Supenisor B. Drawbridge, Executive Director, Nuclear Production S. Ellis, Emergency Preparedness Manager, Response and Implementation T. Feigenbaum, President and Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire DMsion, Public Service Company of New Hampshire G. Gram, Executive Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness and Community Relations T. Grew, Specialty Training Manager J. MacDonald, Emergency Preparedness Technical Issues Coordinator D. McLain, Production Services Manager D. Moody, Seabrook Station Manager J. Peschel, Corporate Support Manager J. Peterson, Assistant Operations Manager N. Pillsbury, Director of Quality Programs D. Scanzoni, Corporate Communications Manager S. Schultz, Vice President, Yankee Atomic Electric Company P. Stroup, Director, Emergency Preparedness W. Sturgen, Nuclear Senices Manager D. Tailleart, Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Young, Scenario Department Supenisor The inspectors also inteniewed and obsened the actions of other licensee personnel.

2. EMERGENCY EXERCISE The Seabrook Station, Unit No.1 announced, full participation exercise was

. conducted on December 13,1990, from 11:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. The State of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire Yankee Off Site Response Organization, and surrounding New Hampshire Towns participated.

2.1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on August 27,1990 and, the complete scenario package on September 24,1990 for NRC review and evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scent.rio which allowed M

w y ' ." "s

n d

e 3 L adequate testing of the major portions of the Seabrook Station Unit No.1 Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures and also provided the opportunity for the Ikensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action. NRC observers attended a licensee brieting on December 13,1990. NRC suggested changes to the scenario made by the licensee were discussed during the brieung. The licensee identifled which emergency response acthities would be simulated and indicated that controllers would intercede in exercise aethities if necessary to prevent disruption to normal plant actisities.

2.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following events:

• Initial condition equipment out of service a charging pump, a containment spray pump, a Waste Building Exhaust Fan, and a Control Building Intake Fan; A reactor coolant system loop piping weld falls and a leak into the containment results; Declaration of an Alert (reactor coolant leak greater than 70 gallons per minute);

( -

The irradiation specimen basket and specimens fall to the bottom of the reactor vessel:

( -

The resulting loose parts from the irradiation specimen basket caused fuel damage and the release of fission products to the reactor coolant system water; A high radiation alarm on let down system monitor occurs as a result of Ngh fission product aethity;

+

, Solar storm induced geomagnetic disturbances cause damage to unit r substations at the Seabrook Station site and the Newington Emergency 1 Operations Facility (EOF), One alternating current supply to the EOF is lost and several Waste Processing Building electrical loads are lost;

, The high range post loss of coolant monitor indicates exposure rates in excess of 2,500 rem /hr inside the containment as a result of the failed fuel and coolant system teak, causing declaration of a Site Area Emergency;

8 4

I The leaking reactor coolant loop piping weld falls completely, resulting in a large break loss of-coolant accident followed by a reactor trip and safety injection; The less of coolant accident results in a high range post. loss of coolant monitor reading of 25,000 retn/hr inside contalment and declaration of a General Emergency; As a result of a damaged containment spray pump, radioactive materialis released into the environment.

I 2 3 Acthitles Observed l During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC inspection team members made detailed obser Mns of the activation and augmentetion of the Emergency Responst F 'lities and the Emergency R:sponse Organization staff l and actions of the Eme.pncy Response Organization staff during operation of the Emergency Response Facilities in response to the cimulated emergency. The following activities were observed:

I

• Use of operations and emergency plan implementing procedures; j '

Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; Direction and coordination of emergency response; Notification of licensee and New Hampshire State government personnel and communication of pertinent plant status infcrmation to State personnel; Communications /information flow, and record keeping; g .

Asse,sment ane p,c;ection ef off. site ,adioiogicai eo,e ane con,iec,a, ion ef protective actions:

Accident analysis and mitigation.

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3. CLASSIFICATION OF EXERCISE FINDINGS Emergency preparedness exercise findings are classified as follows:

Exercise Strengths Exercise strengths are areas of the licensee's staff response that provide strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnorntal plant conditions and implement the emergency plan implementing procedures.

Exercise Weaknesses Exercise weaknesses are areas of the licensee's staff response in which the performance was such that it could have precluded effective implementation of the emergency plan implementing procedures in the event of an actual emergency in the area being observed. Existence of an exercise weakness does not of itself indicate that overall response was inadequate to protect public health and safety.

Areas for Improvement An area for improvement is an area of the licensee's staff response which did not have a significant negative impact on the licensee's abiUty to implement the emergency plan and implementing procedures and response was adequate.

However, it should be evaluated by the licensee to determine if corrective action

{ could improve performance.

4. EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation of the Emergency Response Organization, Emergency Response Facilities, and use of these facilities were consistent with their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

No exercise weaknesses were identified. Following are the detailed observations of performance in each of the emergency response faciuties.

~

4.1 Control Room

, The following strengths were identified:

, 1. Reactor operators recognized symptoms and selected the correct control room procedures and used them properly,

2. Operators correctly interpreted changing containment conditions indicating a 1 reactor coolant leak and took corrective action including estimation of the

+

leak rate.

I 6

3. When control room habitabDity was challenged following loss of positive pressure, air samples were taken and the correct evaluation was made preventing an ureccessary control room evacuation.

h 4 Operators responded correctly to an anomalous safety parameter display system indication for subtoolWg margin and reactor coolant system integrity.

l So exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.

4.2 Technical Support Center (TSC)

The following exercise strengths were identified

1. Excellent command and control was demonstrated and frequent staff briefings were conducted.

2. Data were trended and extrapolated. Problems were anticipated. As a result, the time to reach conditions justifying a Site Area Emergency declaration were accurately predicted.

8 3. The need to identify plant vulnerabilities as early as possible led to a request to use probabilistic risk assessment.

I 4 Support resources from Yankee Nuclear Service Division engineers were -

i appropriately requested and utilized.

'I No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.

l 43 Operations Support Center (OSC)

The following exercise strengths were identified.

1. The OSC was promptly staffed with health physics personnel and the various disciplines of maintenance personnel.

2. Command and control were excellent. OSC operations were conducted in a quiet professional atmosphere.

B '

3. Repair teams were quickly established, well controlled, and dispatched with adequate protection from hazards.

I No weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.

I I '

I .

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O l l

l 7

! I 4.4 Emergency Operations Facility (eor) l l The following exercise strengths were identified:

1. There was excellen; support of and interaction with represematives of the )

New Hampshire State government and the New Hampshire Yankee l Massachusetts Off Site Respon.'e Organir.ation. l

2. There was prompt and correct response to a simulated loss of the main electrical supply to the EOF.

3. Dose assessment personnel anticipated possible release pathways and I performed a "what if" calculation based on possible containment breach in anticipation of a possible release.

l 4 There was good command and control, frequent staff briefings and EOF manager's meetings, which included government representatives and the l NHY Massachusetts Off Site Response Organization.

l S. Environt ental monitoring teams were repositioned to minimize mission dose.

6. Feedback was obtained regarding implementation of off site protective actions. This information was announced to EOF staff and relayed to other Emergency Response Facilities and Seabrook Station staff.

No exercises weaknesses were identified.

l The following areas for improvement were identified:

1.

The resp, .sibilities of the NH'Y staff member processing inhalation pathway samples should be reviewed to ensure that activities which might impede his performance are assigned to other response personnel.

2. The. procedure for processing of inholation pathway samples could be streamlined by restricting concerns to iodine and noble gas concentrations.

4.5 Media Center The following strengths were identified:

1. There were good press briefings using language understandable to the public.

2. There was good response to the inquiries of real and simulated reporters.

-a . ... r .. . , .~..i: ..a ..:a n.. 1 l

8 h

No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified. j i

4.6 Correction of Previously Identitled Exercise Weaknesses and Areas for l Improvement The inspectors observed licensee response in areas which had previously been identified as weaknesses or areas for irnprovement during the 1988 and 1989 evaluated emergency exercises.

Four exercise weaknesses were identified during the June,1988 exercise. All of these weaknesses were re addressed and closed in a specialinspection. The satisfactory resolution of these weaknesses is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50 443/88 10.

1 Three areas for improvement were identified during the 1989 exercise:

1. Transfer of authority from the Short Term Emergency Director (Shift i Supervisor) to the Site Emergency Director was not announced on the plant pagin3 system.

2. Telephone line noise caused some minor communications problems in a

the Technical Support Centc7.

These items did not recur. Performance in the above areas was acceptable during this exercise.

3. Baron concentration curves should be reviewed to verify that they cover all reasonably expected conditions.

This item was the result of the scenario which involved a core at end of-life while the plant was actually at beginning of core life. The curves used during the exercise were appropriate for the actual plant conditions. As the core ages the licensee revises the curves as appropriate. The inspector has no further concerns regarding this item.

~

The inspector considers each of the previously identified weaknesses or areas for impravement to be satisfactorily resolved.

aan .m: 4. d .c.a r .4

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9 I 5. YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY (YAEC) SUPPORT OF SEABROOK STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES l

j i

5.1 Emergency Response Support Througn contractual arrangement YAEC provides emergency response support to I New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) (as well as several other New England area utilities) to supplement emergency response funtions performed by the station emergency response organization. Generally, the support services provided are u back up to

)

j functions performed by the NHY staff, however in two cases the functions are the  !

i primary tasks of YAEC. '

I The first of these is the task of core damage assessment, which is conducted for NHY by the Yankee Nuclear Service Division (YNSD) of Yankee Atomic Electric Company at the YAEC Engineering Support Center. The relationship and function I are described in the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan. During the exercise, core damage assessments were conducted promptly, resuhs were consistent with the scenario informa: ion available to the emergency response organization, and l

l the information was promptly communicated to the Site Emergency Director in the B TSC. '

I The other emergency response task is the analysis of non airborne environmental samples (water, soil, milk, vegett. tion, etc.). As this exercise was not an ingestion pathway exercise, demonstration of this capability was not an objective of the exercise. The YNSD support personnel responsible for this function were observed to arrive at the EOF and set up and test their equipment and would have been ready l to perform the appropriate sample analyses if necessary.

5.2 Audit of YNSD Functions The inspector interviewed YAEC Quality Assurance (QA) personnel and NHY personnel to ascertain wnether audits are performed of the emergency response functions that YNSD provides under the Seabroou Emergency Plan. Although YAEC performs audits of the support provided by YNSD to several utilities, the

., audits are not specific to services provided to NHY. NHY performs project managment reviews of the YAEC Nuclear Service Division program. A NHY representative indicated that he believed that a combination of the YAEC audits, YAEC program reviews, and the NHY management reviews adequately ensured the quality of emergency response services provided by YNSD. However, based on the inspector's concerns, NHY agreed to add the audit of the YNSD supplied services to

'the routine 10 CFR 50.54(t) audit of the NHY emergency preparedness program.

The inspector had no further qutstions in this area.

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6. LICENSEE CRITIQUE l The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on December 14,1990  !

3 during which the licensee's lead controllers and observers discussed observations of l the exercise. The licensee's critique was critical and thorough. i 7.

SEABROOK STATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO)

TRAINING STATUS To determine if an adequate number of perse.mel were qualified to implement the on site portion of the Seabrook Radiological Ett,vgency Plan, the inspector reviewed trcining summaries, the qualification list, and the crill schedule.

There are 242 positions described in the emergency response organization (ERO).

l The training status at the time of this inspection indicated that 1088 persona were p qualified to fill these positions. A check of the ERO qualification list indicated an i

adequate number of personnel were qualified for each key position. During 1990 the licensee conducted 14 drills as follows: one dress rehearsal, six medical drills, one radiation monitormg drill, two evacuation drills, two combined functional drills, one NHY Off site Response Organization call in drill, and one Post Accident Sampling System drill.

Based on the above review, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is ac' ;ptable.

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8. EXIT MEETING Following the licensee's exercise self critique, the NRC team met with the licensec's a representatives listed in Section 1 on December 14,1990 to discuss' findings as g detailed in this report. The NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise. The licensee was advised that no exercise weaknesses were e identified and that all previously identified exercise weaknesses und areas for l , improvement had been adequately demonstrated. The NRC team also determined that within the scope and limitation of the scenario, the licensee's performance e demonstrated the capability to implement the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan l Implementing Procedures in a manner that would adequately protect the health and safety of the public.

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SEABROOK w!ARING SERVICE LIST Edwin J. Reis, Esg. Ashed N. Amirian, Eso, Office of the General Counsel 145 Main Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C:mmission P. O. Box 38 Washington, D.C. 20555 Bradford, Massachusetts 08130 thair an, Board of Sele:t. men Seacoast Anti-Collution League P. O. Box 710 5 Market Street I N0rtn Hamoton, New HamDshire 03962 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03801 l

.;ane See: tor Administrative Judge eceral Energy Regulatory C: emission Ivan W. Smith, Chairrian (2)

!!5 Nerin Capitol Street, N.E. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

{4 sn- 5105

,.asnie;un. 0.C.

0,5, Nuclear Regulatory Commission I 20426 W. George =. , ve se J', Director Washingten, D.C. 20555 John Traficonte, Esc.

Nr 4 wam:snire Of fice of Emergency Chief, Nuclear Safety Unit

• anagement Office of the Attorney General State Office Para South One Ashburton Place

'.07 Pleasant Street 19th Floor Concord, New dampsnire 03301 90ston, Massachusetts 02108 v . Gaey W. Holmes, Eso.

e Administrative Judge

-el es arc Ellis Kennetn A. McCollom I

O Winea:unnet Road

-am: ton, New Hamosnire 03842 1107 West Knaco Street Stillwater, Oklahoma 74057 Acm n'strative Juegt Adjudicatory File (2)

3. :aul Sollwert, 111, ;nateman Atomic Safety ano Licensing Boarc Atoti: Safety anc Lteensir.g Acceal Board Panel Docket

,.S %c' esc ;egulatory Co m ssion U.S. Nucisar Regulatory C; mission aasnirgt:n, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Acministrative Jucge Mitzi A. Young Ricnarc F. Cole Attorney At omic Safety and Licensing Board Office of tne General Counsel J.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wasnington, D.C. 20555 Wuhington, D.C. 20555

ocert R. Pierce, Eso. Congressman Nicholas Mavroules.

Atom.1c Safety and Licensing Scard U.S. House of Representatives U.S. Nuclear Regu'atory Comrnission 70 Washington Street

' wasnington, D. C. 20555 Salem, Massachusetts 01970 Barbara J. Saint Andre. Esq. Judith H Mitner, Esc.

Keoleman and Paige, P.C. Counsel for West Newoury 101 Arcn Street 79 State-$treet Boston, Massacnusetts 02110 Newburyport, Massacnusetts 01950

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SEABROOK HEARING SERVICE t.!ST l

Robert A. Backus, Iso. Jack Oolan Backus, Meyer and Solomon 116 L.owell Street Federal Emergency Management Agency Manenester, New Hampshire 442 J. W. McCormack (POCH) 03106 Boston, Massachusetts 02109 Dhillio Ahren, Esq. Gerald Garfield, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General Day, Berry and Howard Offi:e of the Attorney General City Place State House Station #6 Hartford, Connecticut '

augusta, Mai.ie 04333 05103-3499 u

s. Suzance Breiseth Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Boarc of Selectmen ATTN: Tom Burack

'cwn of Hamoton Falls V,$. Senate Cr'n water Roac

-amoton Falls, New Hamosntre 33344 531 Hart Senate Office autiding Wasnington, D.C. 20510 vc R. Sweeney l New aamosnire Yankee Olvision o

Administrative Judge Howard A. Wilber B ccite Service Company of New Hamosntre Suite 610, ihree Petro Center Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boarc Setnesca, Marylanc U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Commission 20814 Washington. 0,C.

i Acministrative Jucge 20555 Alan S. Rosentnal, Chairman Administrative Judge Thomas S. Moore, Esc.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Acceti Board I U.S. % clear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Acceal Boarc U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission aasnington, D.C, 20555 Wasnington, O.C. 20555 I acministrative Judge E- etn A. Luecke Administrative Judge Jerry Harbour Ato nc Safety anc Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

. 5, Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission 1 Wasnington, D.C. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis51on 20555 Washington 0.C. 20555 3aul M:Eachern, Esc.

H. Joseph Flynn, Esq.

I Snaines and McEachern 25 Maclewood Avenue Assistant General Counsel Po tsmouth, New Hamosnire Federal Emergency Management Agency 03801 Washington 0.C. .20472

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ott Hill-Wnilton, Esc. Olane Curran, Esq.

Suzanne P. Egan, Esq. Andrea Fenster, Eso.

Lagoulis, Hill-Wnilton Harmon, Curran, & Tousley I & Rotonei 70 State Street 2001 S Street, N.W.

Suite 430 j NewDurycort, Massachusetts 01950 Washington, D.C. 20009

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I SEABROOK HEARING SERVICE L!sT Mr. R. M. Kacien Mr. J. F. Opeka Northeast Utilities Service Company Northeast Utilities Service Company P. O. Box 270 P. O. Box 270 Hartfore, Connecticut 06141 0270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 l John P. Arnold, Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal t

George Dana Biseee, Associate Board Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3

Attorney General's Office Washington, D.C. 20555 l 25 Cacitol Street Concere, New Hampshire 03301 I

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l I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE DOLKC1ED U%M l

I I I, Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. , one of the atterneys f 6d th's 12 Licensees herein, hereby certify that on March 11, 1991, I made service of the within document by depositing copies-P4MB I thereof with Federal Express, prepaid, for delivery to (or, where indicated, by depositing in the United States mail, first class postage paid, addressed to):

Alan S. Rosenthal, Esquire Mr. Howard A. Wilber Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomac Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel Appeal Panel

B U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory jg Commission Commission Fifth Floor Fifth Floor 4350 East-West Highway 4350 East-West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 Thomas S. Moore, Esquire Mr. Richard R. Donovan I Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Regional Center Commission 130 228th Street, S.W.

Fifth Floor Bothell, Washington 98021-9796 I 4350 East-West Highway l Bethesda, MD 20814 Administrative Judge Ivan W. H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire l Smith, Chairman, Atomic Safety Office of General Counsel

's and Licensing Board Federal Emergency Management g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency Commission 500 C Street, S.W.

East West Towers Building Washington, DC 20472 I 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Gary W. Holmes, Esquire I Administrative Judge Richard F.

Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Holmes & Ells 47 Winnacunnet Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hampton, NH 03842 I East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Administrative Judge Kenneth A. Judith H. Mizner, Esquire McCollom 79 State Street, 2nd Floor 1107 West Knapp Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Stillwater, OK 74075

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John P. Arnold, Attorney General Robert R. Pierce, Esquire George Dana Bisbee, Associate Atomic Safety and Licensing Attorney General Board I Office of the Attorney General 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301-6397 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building l 4350 East West Highway 3 Bethesda, MD 20814 Mitzi A. Young, Esquire Diane Curran, Esquire I Edwin J. Reis, Esquire Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Andrea C. Ferster, Esquire Harmon, Curran & Tousley l

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Suite 430 I One White Flint North, 15th F1.

11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 2001 S Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20009 Adjudicatory file Robert A. Backus, Esquire I. Atomic Safety and Licensing 116 Lowell Street Board Panel Docket (2 copies) P.O. Box 516 I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building Manchester, NH 03105 4350 East West Highway I Bethesda, MD 20814

• Atomic Safety ar.d Licensing Suzanne P. Egan, City Solicitor I Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton &

Rotondi 79 State Street Mail Stop EWW-529 I Washington, DC 20555 Newburyport, MA 01950 Jeffrey Pidot, Esquire Leslie Greer, Esquire I

l Deputy Attorney General Department of the Attorney General Matthew Brock, Esquire Massachusetts Attorney General One Ashburton Place Augusta, ME 04333 Boston, iia 02108 Paul McEachern, Esquire Barbara J. Saint Andre, Esquire Shaines & McEachern Kopelman and Paige, P.C.

I 25 Maplewood Avenue P.O. Box 360 101 Arch Street Boston, MA 02110 Portsmouth, NH 03901 R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esquire Ashed N. Amirian, Esquire Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton & 145 South Main Street i

Rotondi P.O. Box 38 79 State Street Bradford, MA 01835 1

l Newburyport, MA 01950 m

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G. Paul Bollwerk, III, Esquire ' George Iverson,- Director Atomic Saraty and Licensing u.a. orrice or Emergency Appeal Panel Management U'S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission State House Office Park South Fifth Floor 107 Pleasant Street 4350 East-West Highway concord, NH 03301 Bethesda, MD 20814 Mr. Jack Dolan Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I J.W. McCormack Post Office &_

Courthouse Building, Room 442 Boston, MA 02109

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The~Hiais Gf DicfMK Jr.

(*= Ordinary U.S. First Class Mail.)

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