ML20217P778

Petition to Suspend Operating License Until Root Cause Analysis of Leaks in Piping in Train B of RHR Sys Conducted, Per 10CFR2.206

ML20217P778
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	12/18/1997
From:	Doughty J SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
To:	Callan L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML20212H198	List: ML20212H204 ML20217P778
References
2.206, DD-98-03, DD-98-3, NUDOCS 9805070081
Download: ML20217P778 (1)

Text

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December 18, 1997 sos.435.soe9 Y OFFiCt. P SE0fg@J RULEhWE ~

ADJUDICnY!ONS GTAFF L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations U.S. NRC 1 White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

Dear Mr. Callan:

This is the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's petition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations, that the operating license for the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant be suspended until such time as a thorough root cause analysis of the reasons underlying the development of leaks earlier this month in piping,in the "B" train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system is conducted, including but not limited to a review of the documentation associated with welds in the area of the leakage and their associated inspection documentation, a review of the qualification of the piping involved, and a review of the procedures for ongoing assurance of weld and piping quality at the plant.

On or around December 5, 1997, moisture was detected on or near the upper and lower welds on a line to a pump in the "B" train of RHR. In the past, there have been allegations brought forward to the NRC concerning improper welding practices, improper welding documentation, and substandard piping at Seabrook Station. A report by the NRC's Inspector General, prepared pursuant to a request for investigation by members of Congress in 1991, found that the NRC had no evidence that a 100 percent review of the safety documentation on the plant's safety-related welds was done prior to licensing.

The investigation of this incident of leakage in a safety-related system must properly include findings related to the quality of the welding, the welding documentation and the inspection of the welding on the pipe involved in this incident and the quality of the pipe itself. Implications of this incident for other plant systems should be determined and corrective actions taken before any decision to restart the plant.

Sincerely, Jane Doughty g EDO -- G970873 L