ML20249B763

Supplemental & Amended Petition for Institution of Proceeding & for Intervention Pursuant to 10CFR2.714 on Behalf of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League & New England Coalition on Nuclear Power.*

ML20249B763
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	06/18/1998
From:	Backus R BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20249B759	List: ML20249B758 ML20249B763
References
LA, NUDOCS 9806240172
Download: ML20249B763 (15)

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DOCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFoRE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFW . w y: ..

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In the Matter of ) ADJUdF'2-'t- I

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) O WAFF North Atlantic Energy )

Service Corporation )

) Docket No. 50-443 Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 )

)

Rockingham County, New Hampshire )

)

BUPPMMENTAL AND ANENDED PETITIoM FOR

,I]JBTITUTION OF PROCEEDING AND FOR INTERVENTION PURBURNT TO 10 CFR 2.71(

ON BEHALF OF THE SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE AND THE NEN ENGLAND C01LITION ON NUCLEAR POWER NOW COMES the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) and the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP), and having, through SAPL, sought a proceeding pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act, in regard to a May 6, 1998 license exemption requested by North Atlantic Energy Service Co. (NAESCO) by a letter to the Commission dated June 5, 1998, and now supplement the SAPL request and amend the request for a proceeding as follows:

1. As set forth in SAPL's June 5** letter, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, NAESCO has sought a relaxation of surveillance requirements found in the Technical Specifications for Seabrook Station to accommodate a 24 j

month fuel cycle. i

2. SAPL, for reasons set forth in its June 5*" letter, opposes the granting of the exemption and requested the institution of a proceeding under $189 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. f2239.  ;

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3.- SAPL is entitled to-institution of a proceeding regarding the exemption and to be allowed to intervene in the proceeding, on the following grounds:

A. As required by 10 CTR 2.714(2), SAPL has an interest'in'the proceeding. SAPL is a duly organized New l

Hampshire non-profit citizen organization, with itsLoffice at 127.High Street, Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802. SAPL's 1 membership: includes many citizens resident within the 10 mile >

Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone, including-members resident within the Massachusetts portion of the zone. . .These individual i

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members may be endangered by offsite releases of radioactivity as a result of an accident or transient at Seabrook. SAPL's standing as an intervener has been long established in proceedings before the Commission's adjudicatory boards and the Commission itself, in both the construction permit proceeding and the operating license proceeding for Seabrook. SAPL's interest in the proceeding would not be " proprietary or financial," but l 'othe r" , to wit, in assuring the safe operation of Seabrook in-l order to minimize the risk, or consequences of, an accident at seabrook. The risk and/or the conseques.cos of an accident at Seabrook could be increased should the requested exemption be i

allowed.

B. AsLa party whose interests will be affected, SAPL

.has afright_to intervene under $189 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42

U.S.C.si2239.

. C. An Order entered in the proceeding which permitted the. requested' exemption will affect SAPL's interest in that, for e__-

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I the reasons set forth SAPL'a June 5" letter to the Commission, the exemption would create an increased risk of an accident or increased consequences of an accident at Seabrook that could have

-adverse offsite consequences to persons within the ten mile J

emergency planning zone, including SAPL's members, on the i following bases:

1. Less Freauent Steam Generator Survalliance Increasing by 25% the time between inspections of the steam generators, will increase the risk of failure of the steam generator tubes, which could provide a mechanism for a by-pass of the containment, in the event of certain accident scenarios.- A failure to promptly detect and remedy could result in degraded steam generator tubes, a condition which could constitute an increase in the nuclear. hazard, with the potential for adverse offsite consequences.

ii. Fuel Rarrior (Eladdina) Degradation A 24 month fuel cycle will require the use of l

more highly enriched fuel, and a higher burn up of the fuel, which will increase the stress on the fuel cladding, the first of three primary barriers against radioactive release at Seabrook.

The exemption, if granted, would therefore increase the risk of l adverse offsite consequences.

iii. Increased on Line Maintenance-Increasing the use of online maintenance, a practice'which the NRC had'formerly prohibited at seabrook, and which, by< definition, involves the intentional disabling of

' systems, structures and' components important to safety, may

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1 increase the danger that an accident will not be mitigated as f planned, increasing the risk of adverse offsite consequences in l

the event of an accident.

iv. Decreased Safety Tuportant Surveillance Decreased opportunity for timely inspection and detection of deliberate mispositioning of valves or other control components, in the high radiation area, will increase the risk of an accident with offsite consequences, if as a result of failure to correct a mispositioned valve or other component a

. transient is initiated.

4. NECNP is entitled to a proceeding regarding the I

exemption to be allowed to intervene in the proceeding, on the following grounds:

A. As required by 10 CFR 2.714(2), NECNP has an interest in the proceeding. NECNP is a duly organized Vermont i non-profit corporation, with its office at 8.3 Main Street, Brattleboro, vermont. NECNP's membership includes persons recidant within the Saabrook 10 mile emergency planning zone.

NECNP, like SAPL, was an active intervener both in the construction and permanent operating license proceedings for Seabrook. NECNP's long standing concern for assuring the safe operation or nuclear power reactors in New England, consistent with all applicable rules and regulations, as the principal l

guarantee against the possibility of an accident involving adverse offsite consequences, is the reason NECNP is joining this petition.

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A. As party whose interest will be affected, NECNP has

! a right to intervene under $189a(ii)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act

! 42 U.S.C.2239. i I

l B. An Order to enter the proceeding which permitted i

the requested exemption will affect NECNP's interest for the same reasons applicabla to SAPL.

5. As set forth in SAPL's June 5*h letter, each of these potentiel areas as a result of a 24 month fuel cycle, should the j exemption be granted, can increase the nuclear hazard and would constitute a "significant hazards consideration" within the f i

meaning of 10 CFR 550.92.

6. Pursuant to Section 189a(2) (A) of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 C.F.R. 50.92(c), the NRC may not issue an operating license amendment before granting a public hearing unless it determines that the proposed amendment poses "no significant hazards consideration,", i.e., that the amendment would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the I probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated:

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

In passing the enabling legislation for this regulatory provision, Congress recognized that:

issuing the order in advance of a hearing would as a practical matter, foreclose the public's right to have its views considered.

In addition, the licensing board would often be unable to order any substantial relief as a result of an after-the-fact hearing. l l

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Conf. Rep. No.97-884, 97'" Cong. , 2d Sess. , at 37-38 1982).

Thus, the confereas noted their intent that:

in determining whether a proposed license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, the commission should be especially sensitive to the-issues proposed by license amendments'that have irreversible consequences: (such_as those permitting an increase in the amount of effluents or radiation emitted-from a ficility or allowina a facility to enerate for a neriod of time without full safety ~ nrotections. )

-Id. (Emphasis added)

In response to congress' expression of concern, the Commission "made clear" in the preamble to 55o.92 that an amendment.which allows a plant to operate at full power during which one or more safety systems are not operable would be treated in the same way as other examples considered likely to involve a significant hazards consideration.

Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Considerations, 51 Fed. Reg. 7,744, 7,750, Col. 3 (March 6, 1986). In additiob, the Commission " charge (d) the NRC staff to assure that doubtful or borderline cases are not found to involve no significant hazards consideration." 51 Fed. Reg. at 7,753, Cols. 2-3.

.7. Since the requested exemption seeks authority for a 24 month. fuel cycle, and'the next scheduled refueling without the exemption will not occur until 1999, there is no " emergency" that would-permit immediate action on the requested exemption. In.

addition, SAPL has been' informed, through press accounts, that, despite the request, NAEsco is not planning immediate implementation of the two year refueling in any event.

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.Accordingly, the Commission has time to provide the proceeding and the full on-the-record exploration of the issues raised concerning expanding the operational run at seabrook by 25%.

8. If necessary, both SAPL and NECNP are prepared to l provide affidavits from members living within the ten mile zone-verifying their membership in the respective organizations, and their. agreement to have the organizations represent their interest in a proceeding regarding the May 6, 1998 license exemption request.

9. SAPL and NECNP state that, should a proceeding be 3 granted, they are authorized to state that they would have available as an expert witness in support of the contention that the proposed exemption involves a significant hazard consideration, Mr. David Lockbaum, staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists.

_I_N COMcLUSTOM For the reasons stated, SAPL and NECNP submit that they have standing to seek a proceeding under the Atomic Energy Act regarding the NAESCO exemption request of May 6, 1998 and that l

the staff's preliminary determination that the exemption request involves "no significant hazards consideration will be found not to be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR SO.92(c).

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Respectfully submitted, Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights

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' DATED: June 18, 1998 BY:

,.,,, .r Robert A. Backus, President i

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B.J.SRANCH ,7 SPCOWNGEL DARIN HOoO TUCKCR ac ocRT 4. 3Acnus rAJt 860J sec=G72C NANCYC.MARf June 5,1998 Chief Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Office Administration U. S. Nuclear ReSulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 ATTN: Secretary Hoyle Re: May 6,1998 NAESCO License Exemption Request

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

The purpose of this letter is to submit comments on a license exemption requested by North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation. The exemption request was published in Volume 62 of the Federal Register at page 25113 under date ofMay 6,1998.

NAESCO, the requestor, is the operator of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. The request seeks changes to the Technical Specifications to permit a 24 month refueling cycle at Seabrook.

The staff, based upon the review of the licensee's application, has made a determination that the requested exemption involves no "significant hazards considerations."

This is to advise the Commission that the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL), a concerned citizens organization, disagrees with the staff and believes that the Commission should either deny the exemption or institute a proceeding and grant a hearing on the exemption request. At the least, the Commission should afford the citizens in the Seabrook area an opportunity for a public hearing prior to granting the request.

SAPL's concerns about the exemption are based on four grounds: 1) the request will substantially lengthen the intervals between necessary surveillance of the steam generators; 2) the request will

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provide additional stress on and increase the likelihood of the fuel assembly degradation; 3) the exemption request will inevitably lead to the performance of more online maintenance, and 4) the exemption request rt.4y delay the discovery of either inadvenent or deliberate mispositioning of values or other co nponents. Each of these factors can only result in an increase in the nuclear hazard and should eherefore be held to involve a "significant hazards consideration."

For these reasons, discussed further below, SAPL believes the stafican not justify the granting of an exemption on the grounds that this action does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

1. Steam Generator Tube Degradation:

The staff, in recommending the exemption, discusses only the issue ofless frequent steam

" " generator surveillance, referencing Technical Specification 4.4.5.3. The staff states:

"While the proposed changes will lengthen the intervals between surveillance, the increased interval has been evaluated; and based on the reviews of the steam generator tube Eddy Current Tests (ECT) inspections, it is concluded that the real growth rate of the only active degradation mechanism (Anti-Vibration Bar) (AVB) wear) identified to date at Seabrook Station is such that sufficiem margin exists between the plugging criteria and structural limit such that no tubes are predicted to exceed the structural limit even with the longer surveillance interval."

Steam generator tube degradation is discussed, ini_er alia, in Inspection Repon 97-03 which indicates, that, as of the date of the inspection,36 tubes had been plugged. The repon notes:

"Although the number of tubes requiring plugs is low. the inspector recogmzed that the operating life is les,$ than seven years. Most steam generated degradation problems have been found only after longer periods of operation. The E/C results to date indicate wall thinning attributable to flow induced vibratory relative motion between the tube and its intended support."

Based on the foregoing, it appears unreasonable for the staff to rely on the past Browth rate of l degradation due to AVB wear and then to boot strap from this alleged growth rate into a l conclusion that extending the surveillance intervals by six months does not present a safety concern, since, as the staff has stated, major tube degradation may only develop after approximately seven years of operation. Seabrook began commercial operation in August,1990.

S APL. whose membership includes citizens of the State ofMaine, is well aware of the rapid growth of steam generator tube degradation at the Maine Yankee plant and believes it is 2

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extremely unwise for the staff to conclude, with no supporting independent analysis, that increasing the interval for steam generator inspection at Seabrook by 25% is without safety significance.

S APL is aware that extending the refueling intervals to 24 months is not in any way intended to enhance the safe operation of the plant, but only the economic viability of the plant on behalf ofits utility owners, all of whom are facing competitive pressures. Given this circumstance, it is unacceptable for the staff to conclude that a major increase in the steam generator surveillance intervals, beyond that allowed by the cunent t&l specifications,is acceptable.

2. Stress on Nuclear Fuel Claddina:

As the staffwill be aware, at the time of original full power licensing, Seabrook was anticipated to have annual refuelings. Subsequently, the staff approved extending the refuelings to 18 months. If the present exemption is allowed, the refuelings will be double that anticipated when the plant wentinto operation.

It is SAPL's understanding that this increased operational period is achieved both by the use of more highly enriched fuel and an increase in the burn up ofthat fuel.

Both of these factors may cause additional stresses on fuel cladding, through the build up of gaseous by products near the end of the run. This potential has not been suf5ciently evaluated by ,

the Commission. The problem is addressed in a paper submitted by G. Rothwell and J. Russ "On (

the Optimal Life of Nuclear Power Plants." (1995). Rothwell and Russ acknowledge that

" refueling durations are the most important factors limiting achievable availability factors." They add:

"One of the difficult problems confronting nuclear plant operators is to determine the optimal length of operating (or refueling) cycles.

There is a primary trade off between (1) the potential improvement and capacity factor with longer operating cycles and (2) the potential increased risk of unplanned mid-cycle outages due to fuel and othe- failures... . The high energy released by fission has deleterious effects on the structure of fuel rods. Some fission products appear as gasses that eventually create pressure within the fuel rods. As a result, a fuel rod can swell, crack, and become physically distorted to such an extent that it is no longer usable. l The loss in fuel reactivity due to gradual depletion of radioactive uranium and build up of fission products, combined with the effect of radiation-induced fuel swelling and distortion, are limiting factors determming how long an NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) can run

. between refuelings. Maximum safe duration between refuelings is a function of the initial level of enrichment of the uranium. the design 3

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of the fuel rods, and the fuel management strategy adopted by the I operator."

With the 18 month fuel cycle currently in effect, Seabrook has already had fuel failure problems.

As the result of detecting increases in noble gasses and iodine on December 10,19%, it was determined that there were five failed fuel rods, in the first burned batch ofWer.inghouse Vantage ZH Zurlo clad fuel assemblies.

Inspection Report 97-03 states, at p. 20:

"The licensee root cause evaluation determined that a probable cause of the fuel failures was the combined effects of power history, core design and an operational strategy that resulted in interaction between the fuel pellets and the fuel cladding. The affeced fuel assemblics apparemly carried a very large load (produced high power) for all of the last cycle."

Since the staff has already concluded that the " power history" played a role in a fuel rod failure, on an 18 month cycle, it is inconceivable to SAPL how the staff can fail to assess, or give consideration to an increased risk, from extending that power history by 25% to two years.

I l SAPL calls on the Cc. mission to demonstrate that these additional stresses, resulting from the longer operational run, will not result in a loss of the safety capability of the first barrier of i defense against radioa:tive releases, the fuel assemblies themselves.

3. Online Maintena,2cc SAPL is aware, but regrets, that pursuant to a letter of August 22,1996, from Richard W.

Cooper, II, Director ofDivision ofReactors Projects, the NRC staff authorized the use of online maintenance at Seabrook Station as of July 19,1996. Online mamtenance, by definition, involves i.

the intentional disabling of safety related structures and components (SSC's)"that could initiate or effect a transient accident..." Reg. Guide 1.160, Introduction, June,1993. SAPL would point out that Mr. Cooper's Letter of Authorization fails to mention, :nuch less explain, the fact that this constitutes a complete reversal of the position the staff took on this very issue in 1987. In an Inspection Report (37-16,10/21/87), the staff stated as fb!!ows:

"Also, during this inspection period, the inspector confirmed with the station operations manager [New Hampshire Yankee, (the former Seabrook Station operator)] positan that TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.0 is not intended for you as an operational c.onvenience to permit redundant safety systems to be removed from service for a limited period oftime. Based upon p<>blems ofinterpretation efLCO 3.0.3 at other plants, the NRC 4

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wirion is thar voluntarv entry into LCO 3.0 3 is marcantable."

(Emphasis added.)

SAPL has neverbeen afforded an explanation ofwhy the NRC changed its position Rom one that would not tolerate online maintenance, to one that permits online maintenance. Any claim that online maintenance is justified as a safety measure must be viewed with extreme scepticism given the obvious economic advantages cf performing online maintenance, thereby shottening refueling outages, or now, under the proposed exemption, extending operational mas.

SAPL, in fact, believes that online maintenance is not properly authorized by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(II). Nothing in the regulation authorizes voluntary, i.e., deliberate, disabling of the safety systems. This is documented by the fact that this requirement was part of the

" " Commission's regulations prior to 1987, the time when the Commission's inspector advised Seabrook's former licensee that voluntary entry into the LCO's was not authorized. Furthermore, not one word on the regulatory analysis supporting the adoption of the Commission's maintenance mie,10 CFR 50.65(A)(3), supports the use of online maintenance, and the environmental assessment fails to mention it.

NRC Inspection Manua162706 illustrates methods for licensee compliance with the maintenance rule. This manual. which the staff cited when SAPL protested the use of online maintenance, states, at page 17C, " Assessment ofEquipment Out of Service":

"In order to minimize outage time and reduce costs, many licensees are increasing the amount of preventive maintenance being perfonned during power operation. This can result in the simultaneous removal of multiole systems from service. which can result in significant incr>a=>s in risk durine these oeriods. The NRC is concerned that some licensees may not be adequately analyzing the risk or safety impact associated with these unavailabilities. The failure to adequately evaluate safety when planning and scheduling maintenance has lead to simultaneous unavailabilities of multiple redundant or diverse systems at some sites, possibly leading to unacceptable increases in risk despite the fact that such configurations may not be prohibited by technical specifications. Technical speci5 cations for most sites were crafted for random failure; voluntary removal of multiple systems from service may not be bounded by worst case single failure assumptions and technical specifications. De NRC is concemed that risk is significantly incr==M durina neriods when multiole radn idance or diverse safety sve+==== are unav*Hahle due to prevemive maintenance " (Emphasis added.)

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. o This Manual clearly sets fonh a concern about the improper use of online maintenance, which will be exacerbated if the proposed exemption is granted.

Mr. Cooper's letter of August 22,1996, although authorizing online maintenance, acknowledged a "small risk associated with the unavailability" of certain safety systems due to online maintenance. No basis for assessins the dsk to be small was provided, either in Mr. Cooper's letter, or by any of the regulatory analysis underlymg the maintenance mie, nor is any basis provided for believing that "online maintenance can show a high degree of reliability that the equipment will perfonn its function if required,' as the Cooper letter assens.

Since, by definition, the systems taken deliberately out of service are important to safety, online maintenance represents an increase of the nuclear hazard which may not be offset by the claimed

' benefits.

The extension of the operational run to two years, before a refueling outage, obviously increases .

the need for online maintenance, increasmg the very hazards that the NRC staffin the position  ;

taken in 1987 thought sufficiemly serious to prohibit the practice. The exemption request provides no discussion of the increased risk that would be caused by the additional online maintenance required by the proposed exemption. Therefore, the exemption should not be deemed C.thout safety significance.

4. Inadeounte Surveillance of Other Safety Items:

In addition to the steam generators, the technical specifications indicate that the hydrogen recombiner system is to be subject to verification "at least once per 18 months dudng shutdown."

A similar requirement exists for portions of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Clean-up System and the emergency diesel5enerators.' These items illustrate that a previously deemed necessary interval of surveillance, during shutdown, of 18 mornhs for important systems is now no longer considered important to safety. SAPL protests this change of position, for which no rationale is offered.

In addition, SAPL is advised, and believes, that a refueling outage is the best opportunity for a licensee to find misaligned valves, either inadvertently or othetwise, or other evidence of tampering as well as numerous other conditions which may be important to safe operation.

Nothing in the staff's proposed approval of the exemption addresses this aspect of increased tisk.

'SAPL is aware that under a previous exemption request, which, SAPL also protested (see letter to the Commission's Secretary from Mr. Steve Haberman ofMay 22,1998), that NAESCO has requested a waiver of the current required surveillance frequency for the emergency diesel generators.

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CONCLUSION SAPL strongly protests the staff's preliminary conclusion that the Ece's request to extend Seabrook's run to two years between refbelings does not involve a significant hazards consideration. The staff has failed to evaluate many of the risks involved, and failed to properly justify its conclusion for the one risk it discusses, less frequent steam generator tube inspectio In addition, the staff fails to acknowledge that, according to the last SALP report, perfonnance at Seabrook is declining. As noted in Inspection Report 97-08, April 1,1998," Failure to correct these [3] conditions sooner indicates the' decline in your performance with respect to analysis of root cause of problems as well as implementation of appropriate corrective action. This concern was previously highlighted in my January 23,1998 letter tras-'% the latest SALP report to

" you." (p.2.) A plant recently cited for fourviolations and considered to be in a state of declining performance should not be given the benefit of a 25% increase in its operational run without c justification..

SAPL notes, finally, that NAESCO is a wholly owned subsidiary ofNortheast Utilities which through another wholly' owned subsidiary, pennitted the disastrous decline in the three Millstone Units, which has proved to be both costly for Northeast Utilities and embarrassing for the NRC.

To suggest that the fourth, and currently only operatmg NU plant, should be given a " bonus" of permitting extended operation, with unresolved safety issues as a result, is unjustifiable.

We call on the Commission to reject the exemption request or, in the alternative, direct the institution of a proceeding under the Atomic Energy Act. We also request an opportunity to meet f with the Commission concerning this issue.

Respectfully submitted,

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, kh/W

/ Robert A. Backus RAB/acw

!- ec: Governor Jeanne Shaheen Congressman John Sununu l

Senator Judd Gegg

' Senator Bob Smith 6

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