05000325/LER-1981-093, Updated LER 81-093/01T-2:on 811226,reactor Protection Sys Vessel Low Level Trip instrument,1-B21-LT-NO17D-1,was Indicating Upscale.Caused by Personnel Failure to Recognize & Perform Tech Specs.Personnel Counseled

Updated LER 81-093/01T-2:on 811226,reactor Protection Sys Vessel Low Level Trip instrument,1-B21-LT-NO17D-1,was Indicating Upscale.Caused by Personnel Failure to Recognize & Perform Tech Specs.Personnel Counseled

ML20054H551
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	06/18/1982
From:	Pastva M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20054H543	List: 05000325/LER-1981-093, Updated LER 81-093/01T-2:on 811226,reactor Protection Sys Vessel Low Level Trip instrument,1-B21-LT-NO17D-1,was Indicating Upscale.Caused by Personnel Failure to Recognize & Perform Tech Specs.Personnel Counseled
References
LER-81-093-01T, LER-81-93-1T, NUDOCS 8206240192
Download: ML20054H551 (3)

LER-2081-093, Updated LER 81-093/01T-2:on 811226,reactor Protection Sys Vessel Low Level Trip instrument,1-B21-LT-NO17D-1,was Indicating Upscale.Caused by Personnel Failure to Recognize & Perform Tech Specs.Personnel Counseled

Event date:
Report date:
3252081093R00 - NRC Website

text

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT UPDATE REPORT:

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 1-25-82 CONTROL BLOCX: l 1

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) lo l1l 7 8 9 lN l LICENSEE C l BCODE lE lP l1 l@l0 l0 l- l0LICENSE 14 15 l0 l0 l0 l0 l- l0 l026l@l4 NUMBER 26 l1LICENSE l1 l1l1TYPE JO l@l$7 CATl l@

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2 7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUVBER 68 69 EVENT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBA8LE CONSEQUENCES h golg l On December 31, 1981, during a discussion of problems associated with non-technical l 10 l 31 i specification related instrumentation, it was brought to the duty SRO's attention thatl go g [ the RPS vessel low level trip instrument, 1-B21-LT-N017D-1, was indicating upscale. l 0 s l A review of plant documentation revealed this problem was first identified on auxiliaqy a

o o l logs on December 26, 1981; however, the appropriate action statement was not entered.l l o l 7 l l This could have caused a f ailure to scram at 162.5 inches if additional channels woulq also fail. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public. l l

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42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h lilOll This event occurred because Onerations nersonnel failed to recoenize and perform the l 1 1 l technical specification reautred action within the snecified Hme frnme The nnnrn- I

, , l priate RPS action statement was immediately entered. Involved personnel have been l

, 3 l counseled on the importance of prompt and thorough review of identified instrument l

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LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-81-93 Facility: BSEP Unit No. 1 Event Date: December 26, 1981 This event occurred because Operations personnel failed to recognize an identified instrument problem affecting RPS instrument 1-B21-LT-N017D-1 as requiring technical specification corrective action. As a result, the required corrective actions were not performed within the specified time frame.

On December 26, 1981, the on-duty auxiliary operator observed and recorded on the auxiliary operator's Daily Surveillance Report (DSR) a > 210" reading for the N017D-1 instrument, which was significantly higher than shown by the other redundant level instruments. This person failed to recognize the operability requirement associated with the instrument; consequently, he did not alert the Control Operator to the problem either by word of mouth or submission of a Work Request and Authorization form to investigate and repair the problem. In addition, the Control Operator and Shift Foreman, in reviewing the auxiliary operator's Daily Surveillance Report, also failed to recognize that a possible problem existed. This sequence of these events was duplicated on December 27, 1981.

On December 28, 1981, a different auxiliary operator identified and documented this problem in the auxiliary operator's DSR. He also submitted a Work Request and Authorization form to investigate and repair the instrument. In reviewing the Work Request and Authorization form, the on-duty Senior Control Operator failed to recognize this was N017D-1, a technical specification related instrument. Therefore, the correct action statement was not entered.

On December 29, 1981, a Work Request and Authorization form was written on B21-LT-N017D-2, a non-technical specification related instrument, which stated that it failed to upscale. While repair work was in progress on N017D-2 on December 31, 1981, a discussion between Maintenance personnel and the on-duty Control Operator alerted him to the questionable operability of N017D-1 which was also pegged high. Following an immediate review of the technical specification requirements involving the operability of N017D-1, a half scram was manually initiated on channel B.

2 As a result of this event, the involved personnel were counseled concerning the importance of immediate identification and notification of any abnormal indications relating to technical specification instruments and a more thorough review of Work Authorization and Request form documentation for applicability to technical specifications.

l

In addition, the following corrective actions have been accomplished or are in

. progress in an effort to prevent future events of this type:

1. The Control Operator and auxiliary operator DSRs have been thoroughly reviewed and extensively revised. Where practical, the responsibility for technical specification related surveillance responsibility has been assigned to the Control Operator. In both DSRs, applicable technical specification tolerances have been identified. In addition, all required monthly surveillances are identified in separate pts and do not appear in either DSR. Also, where applicable, all instrument channel checks are now performed by comparison with similar required instrument indications.

2. A new procedure has been developed with expected implementation by July 31, 1982, to provide a cross reference of technical specification related plant instrumentation. This procedure will define which instruments comprise a particular reactor instrumentation trip channel in order to provide the Control Operator with a more concise understanding of each required technical specification's action statement in a uniform and timely manner. All licensed personnel will receive instruction on the use of this procedure.

3. Each operating shift has conducted a thorough review of this event with emphasis on the need to be alert to changes in plant instrumentation trending. In addition, an on-shift seminar with each operating shift was conducted which covered DSR readings and trending, the basis and purpose of instrumentation checks, and the operability concerns of recently installed analog type instrumentation.