05000325/LER-1983-034, Updated LER 83-034/01T-1:on 830811,following Extended Maint & Refueling Outage,Instrument Isolation Valves to 1CAC-PDS-4222 & 4223 Discovered Closed.Caused by Cancelation of Equipment Clearance.Valves Reopened

Updated LER 83-034/01T-1:on 830811,following Extended Maint & Refueling Outage,Instrument Isolation Valves to 1CAC-PDS-4222 & 4223 Discovered Closed.Caused by Cancelation of Equipment Clearance.Valves Reopened

ML20080G372
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	09/12/1983
From:	Dietz C, Pastva M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
LER-83-034-01T, LER-83-34-1T, RSEP-83-2953, NUDOCS 8309200247
Download: ML20080G372 (4)

LER-2083-034, Updated LER 83-034/01T-1:on 830811,following Extended Maint & Refueling Outage,Instrument Isolation Valves to 1CAC-PDS-4222 & 4223 Discovered Closed.Caused by Cancelation of Equipment Clearance.Valves Reopened

Event date:
Report date:
3252083034R00 - NRC Website

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LICENSEE EVtNI HlwCH T upaa ce nepor LS ,

Previous Report Date: 8-25-83 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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, g ,3 y y and refueling outage, it was discovered that the instrument isolation valves to l

,,,,,y 1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223, which. are the differential pressure sensing switches to the l g 3 g Reactor Building to suppression cha .ber vacuun breakers, were closed. This rendered l yg g ,,the vacuun breakers inoperable. This event did not affect the health and safety of l gg y,y g the public. l Technical Specifications 3.6.4.2, 6.9.1.8f l l 0 la l l 60 7 8 9 DE CODE SLOC E COMPONENT CODE SUSC OE S OE

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,,,,,y valve lineups done prior to reactor startup. The subject valves were reopened to l g,93, l restore the operability of the vacuun breakers. A valve linnun of tochnient enncici- l

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48 Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461-0429 September 12, 1983 FILE: B09-13510C SERIAL: BSEP/83-2953 Mr. James P..O'Reilly, Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street N.W.

Atlanta, GA 30303 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-325 LICENSE NO. DPR-71 SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1-83-34

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.8f of the Technical Specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1, the enclosed supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted, The original report fulfilled the requirement for a written report within fourteen (14) days of a reportable occurrence and both are in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977.

Very truly yours, 0s f C. R. Dietz, General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

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LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-83-34 Facility: Unit No. 1 Event Date: August 11, 1983 .

On July 30, 1983, during the pc.formance of corrective maintenance on a drywell pressure transmitter, it was discovered that the res,pective instrument isolation valves to 1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223 were closed. Immediately following the discovery, the subject valves were opened to return each Instrument to service.

Switches 1-CAC-PDS-4222 and 4223 each provide an actuation signal to the Reactor Building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers' respective butterfly valves, 1-GAC-V16 and V17. Closure of the subject instrument isolation valves prevented the PDS-4222 and 4223 switches from detecting a pressure differential, thus rendering V16 and V17 inoperable.

On August 11, 1983, it was determined that on May 4, 1983, the subject instrument isolation valves were left closed while canceling an equipment clearance to support acceptance testing on new plant equipment. The clearance involved plant modification work on drywell pressure switches which utilize the same pressure sensing legs as PS-4222 and 4223.

Following acceptance testing of the involved plant modification, there was no reference made back to the clearance form to ensure that the inst'rument isolation valves to the PS-4222 and 4223 were reopened. In addition, the subject instrument isolation valves were not part of the system valvo lineup verifications and, therefore, were not reopened prior to initial criticality of the reactor following completion of the extended refueling maintenance outage.

This event was discovered immediately after plant shutdown following the initial reactor criticality after an extended maintenance and refueling outage. The investigation determined plant operation was limited to approximately four hours and thirty-seven minutes and was maintained in the reactor startup power range during the period of time the subject

,s, isolation valves were closed.

-As a result of this event, imacdiate corrective follow-up was performed to verify that proper valve lineups for technical specification-related instrumentation on each unit were in effect. This verification utilized a listing of technical specification-related instrumentation, valve lineups for plant

• instrumentation, and technical specifications to help ensure the accuracy of the applicable valve lineup lists by performing the following:

1.

Ensuring that th valves are included in their respective system lineup by means of a syttem. hand-over-hand verification.

-2. Ensuring that valves are properly identified by use of identification tags.

3. Ensuring that valves were properly positioned for those without identification labels ~or not on the valve lineups.

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4. Ensuring that valves associated with the instruments, including root '

valves, are included in the valve lineup listing.

As a. result of a September 30, 1982, reactor scram, which resulted from the isolation of main condenser vacuum switches and was reported.in LER 2-82-111 and IE Inspection Report 82-39, a program was initiated in 1982 to correct identified problems by improvement within the following areas:

1. Plant operating procedures. A complete rewrite of plant operating procedures was begun to help ensure systems' valves are reflected in the applic,able system valve lineups.

2. Plant modifications. Review of plant modifications performed on both Unit Nos. 1 and 2 to ensure they have been properly completed and that applicable changes to plant operating procedures and system drawings are performed.

3. Plant operating guidelines. Stress, by inclusion in the plant operations standing instructions, that plant valves will have identification tags and that plant system valve lineups cannot be completed unless valves in the lineup are properly tagged for identification. Provide a written general guideline to plant operators on the proper methods for performing plant system valve and electrical lineup verification. This was accomplished by issuance of Operating Instruction 13, Valve and Breaker Alignment.

It must be noted that at the time of this event the subject improvement program was approximately 60% complete. It is felt the program to date indicates that Carolina Power & Light Company's approach to accomplishing the goals of this program is logical and conservative. ,

As a. result of this event, the subject instrument isolation valves were included as part of the system valve position lineup verification listing. In

<s addition, appropriate plant Operations personnel will review this report to ensure their cognizance of the event.

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