ML20043H575

LER 90-009-00:on 900523,discovered That Paperwork for Mod to Replace Feedwater Vent Valve Still Open 12 Months After Work Completed.Caused by Lost Blanket Work Request Re post-maint Testing.New Work Request initiated.W/900622 Ltr

ML20043H575
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	06/22/1990
From:	Boldt G, Stephenson W FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F0690-21, 3F690-21, LER-90-009, LER-90-9, NUDOCS 9006260128
Download: ML20043H575 (4)

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C 0hP Q R AliON June 22, 1990 3F0690 21 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk

. Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50 302 Operating License No. DPR-72 .

Licensee Event Report No. 90 009

Dear Sir:

l Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 90 009 which is submitted in

.accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

.Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Very truly yours, l'

G. L. Boldt i Vice President l Nuclear Production WLR: mag Enclosure xc: Regional Administrator, Region 11 Senior Resident Inspector 9006260128 900622 /

{>DR ADOCK 05000302 /

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On June 5,1990, Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) was in MODE 6 (REfVELING). The American Nuclear Insurers' (ANI) resident inspector, while performing a routine i audit, discovered that paperwork for a modification to replace feedwater vent i valve (FWV-163) was still open twelve months after work was completed.

An investigation determined that a blanket Work Request (WR) to perform Post Maintenance (PM) testing during plant startup from a previous outage had been lost, resulting in a required Initial Service Leak Check not being performed. The

. loss of the blanket WR was the result of a personnel error, The weld for the replacement valve has been subjected to operational conditions and has performed satisfactorily for nine months of power operation. The feedwater train to the 'B' steam generator and both trains of Emergency feedwater have remained operable and capable of performing their design and safety functions.

l Therefore, there were no safety consequences as a result of this error.

l A WR has been initiated to perform the Initial Service Leak Check on FWV-163. A i review to determine if any other PM testing was missed is being conducted and any l

omitted testing will be performed by October 30, 1990. CR-3 management will take appropriate action to insure that WRs not being worked are properly stored, l

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On June 5, 1990, while performing a routine audit, the American Nuclear Insurers'  ;

Resident inspector discovered that the paperwork for a plant modification to replace

! a Feedwater valve (FWV-163) (SJ,VTV] was still open twelve months after the work was completed. Crystal River Unit 3 was in Mode 6 (Refueling) and no immediate action was required. The inspector notified the Nuclear Compliance Section of this situation and a Nonconforming Operations Report (NCOR) was initiated.

FWV-163 is a two inch vent valve on the feedwater header to the 'B' steam generator (AB,BLR]. It is located outside the containment (NH] downstream of the last isolation valve (SJ,lSV). A plant modification was approved to replace the valve.

The new valve was installed while in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, during an outage in the spring of 1989.

The Modification Approval Record (MAR) specified that Post Maintenance (PM) Testing would be an Initial Service Leak Check because a hydrostatic test was not feasible.

This test could not be performed until the steam generator was at operating pressure, 885 psig. The MAR was returned to the MAR files to hold for documentation of the required testing.

During the 1989 spring outage, three WRs were generated to cover all the necessary testing in each of three general areas of the plant. One WR was developoJ to perform PM Testing in the Auxiliary (NF] (WR-lll513), Reactor (NH] (WR-lll512), and Turbine Buildings [NM] (WR-lll514) that could not be performed with the plant in cold shut down conditions.

During startup following the 1989 spring outage, the PM Testing for maintenance performed in the Reactor Building (WR-lll512) was completed. Some of the PM Testing for maintenance performed in the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings may have been completed, but the PM Testing WR work packages were lost and have not been found.

WRs are normally kept in filing cabinets in the Mechanical Maintenance Shop when not being worked. The shop supervisors are instructed to return WRs to these cabinets l at the end of each shift if the work is not being turned over to the following shift.

This practice has been effective in the past; however, in this case, two WRs were L

not returned and were lost.

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This incident is attributed to personnel error in failure to follow approved practices. WRs issued to the Mechanical Maintenance Shop are supposed to be kept in a filing cabinet when not being worked. This approved practice apparently was not followed.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

A WR has been initiated to perform the Initial Service Leak Check on FWV-163.

All WR packages who;e PM Testing was specified on the lost WRs (WR 111513 and 111514) will he reviewed to determine if other PM Testing was not performed. This review l is in progress and will be completed by September 30, 1990. WRs will be initiated and any delinquent PM Testing will be conducted as required by October 30, 1990.

As of May 1, 1990, WRs requiring PM Testing will not be closed by initiation of a blanket WR to perform the specified tests. The original WR must have documentation of completion of PM Testing. ,

plant management will take appropriate actions to insure WRs that are not being worked are properly stored.

SAFETY ANALYSIS:

The weld for the replacement valve has been subjected to operational conditions and >

has performed satisfactorily for nine months of power operation. The feedwater train to the 'B' steam generator and both trains of Emergency feedwater have remained operable and capable of performing their design and safety functions. Therefore, there were no safety consequences as a result of this error.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

A review of previous LERs indicates that this is our first LER due to a lost work package although there have been other LERs due to personnel error, i

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