ML20045A726

LER 93-011-00:on 930507,discovered That Fire Barrier Breached W/O Proper Compensatory Measures Established.On 930505,door Leading to Room Housing Containment Spray HX 1A Breached.Roving Fire Watch Established & LCO 3.7.12 Entered

ML20045A726
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	06/07/1993
From:	Whittemore C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20045A725	List: ML20045A724 ML20045A726
References
LER-93-011, LER-93-11, NUDOCS 9306110273
Download: ML20045A726 (4)

Text

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NRC form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) ,

Enpires 4/30/92

, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) l DOCKET NUMBER (2) l_ EASE _{3L

_1ggggy3 h _14thter Plant (SON). Unit 1 191510101013121711lDfl0]4 TITLE (4) Failure to Establish a Fire Watch as Required by Technical Specifications in Response to

.E s china a Fire Barrier EVENT DAY (S) l LER NUMBER (6) l REPORT DATE (7) l OTH1R E CILITIES INVOLVED _(8) l l l l l SEQUENTIAL l l REVISION l l l l FACILITY NAMES lDOCKETNUMBER(S) 19Ml!![ DAY lYEAR lYEAR l l NUMBER l l NUMBER lHONTHI DAY lYEAR I 10151010101.l_j___

i I I l_I l_I I I I I I

_Q1_5] 01 71 91 31 91 31 1011111 1 0 1 0 1 01 61017 l 91 31 10151010101 1 I OPERATING l lTHISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR6:

MODE l l (Check one or more of the fo110wina)(11)

_(9 ) 16 1 l20.402(b) l_l20.405(c) l_l50.73(a)(2)(iv) l__l73.71(b)

POWER l l_l20.405(a)(1)(i) l_.]50.36(c)(1) l_l50.73(a)(2)(v) ]._l73.71(c)

LEVEL l l_l20.405(a)(1)(ii) l_l50.36(c)(2) l_l50.73(a)(2)(vii) l_l0THER(Specifyin

.__110 LID _.10 _lQ_[_ l 20. 405 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( i i i ) IMl50.73(a)(2)(i) l__l50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) l Abstract below and in l_l20.405(a)(1)(iv) l__l50.73(a)(2)(ii) l_l50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) l Text, NRC Form 366A)

I 120.405(a)(1)(v) l 150.73(a)(2)(iii) l 150.73(a)(2)(x) I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME l TELEPHONE NUMBER lAREACODEl

_C ._tk_Whitt emp ts_,_[ pmol i an c e L i c e n s i n o l6l1l5l81413l-l7l2l1lg_

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) l l l l REPORTABLE l l l l l l REPORTABLE l CAj).SEj$Y3_TLMj_(_QMPQNENTIMANUFACTURERITONPRDSl Y lCAUSElSYSTEMI COMPONENT lHANUFACTURERl TO NPRDS l l l 1 I i i l i I I I I I I l 1 1 I l l I I I i 1 I I I l l l l l l l l 1 I I I I I I I I I I 3 1_] l l 1 1 I I I 1 1 I J l l I i 1 1 I l 1 l i I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (141 l EXPECTED ltiQMTlil_DAYIYEAL

_ l_ l SUBMISSION l l l l YES (If ves. comglgie EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) l X l NO I DATE (15) l I l l l 1 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i .e., approximately fif teen single-space typewritten lines) (16) j On May 7, 1993, with Unit 1 in Mode 6 for the Unit 1 Cycle 6 refueling outage, Fire Operations personnel were conducting a fire protection inspection walkdown of the l auxiliary building when they discovered a fire barrier breached without the proper  ;

l compensatory measures established. On May 5, 1993, the door leading to the room that I houses the 1A containment spray heat exchanger was breached and the appropriate fire j watch was not established. Upon discovery of the breach, the shift operations j supervisor was informed, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 was entered, and j the appropriate compensatory measure was established. An investigation revealed that l the door had been breached by a TVA offsite organization performing eddy-current testing on the heat exchanger. The cause of the event was determined to be lack of knowledge of  ;

SQN fire protection requirements by the IVA offsite organization and a lack of supervision of offsite personnel by SQN personnel. The Plant Manager reinforced expectations to all site organizations regarding their responsibilities for control of offsite organizations' personnel performing work activities at SQN. The eddy-current activities were completed, the fire barrier was reestablished, and LCO 3.7.12 was exited on May 10, 1993.

9306110273 930607 3 PDR ADOCK 05000327 9 S PDR 3 siifform 366(6-89)

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NRC form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approvsd OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) .

Expires 4/30/92

, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBER(2) l LER NUMBER (6) l l PAGE (3) l l l l SEQUENTIAL l l REVISION l l l l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Unit 1 - l lYEAR l l NUMBER l- I NUMBER l l l l l 101510101013 12 17 19 13 l l 0 I 1 1 1 l--l 0 1 0 l of 2!0rl el 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. PLANT CONDITIONS Unit I was in Mode 6 in a refueling outage.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. Event on May 7, 1993, at 0830 Eastern daylight time (EDT), it was discovered that a fire barrier had been breached without establishing the appropriate ,

compensatory measures as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12. On May 5, 1993, auxiliary building Fire Door (EIIS Code DR) A-69 had been breached by routing instrumentation cables through the door to support eddy-current testing of the 1-A containment spray (EIIS Code BE) heat exchanger (EIIS Code HX). The testing was being performed by an offsite organization that was not cognizant of SQN's fire protection requirements. Upon discovery of the condition, the Fire Protection Manager and the shift operations supervisor were informed. Operations personnel entered Limited Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 and Fire Operations established the appropriate compensatory measure, i.e., roving fire watch. The compensatory measure was maintained until the fire barrier was reestablished, and LCO 3.7.12 was exited at 1621 EDT on May 10, 1993.

B. Ingperable Structures. Components. or Systems That Contributed to thelv_ent None.

C. Dates and Approximate Times _ALEajor Occurrences May 5, 1993 Instrumentation cables were routed through the door to at 1100 EDT support the eddy-current testing of the 1-A containment spray heat exchanger.

May 7, 1993 Fire Operations personnel performing an auxiliary at 0830 EDT building walkdown discovered Fire Door A-69 breached.

May 7, 1993 Following verification that the appropriate compensatory at 0940 EST measures were not in place, Operations personnel entered LCO 3.7.12, and a roving fire watch was established.

May 10, 1993 Eddy-current testing was completed, the fire door was at 1620 EDT closed, and LCO 3.7.12 was exited.

D. 01her_Syatema_ntlesandary_Eunction a_ALLecied None.

NRC Form 366(6-89) )

1.. .

NRC form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) , Expires 4/30/92

.. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBER(2) l LER NUMBER _16) I l PAGE (3) l l l l$EQUENTIALl l REVISION l l l l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Unit I l !YEARl l NWBER l l NUMBER l l l l l 10151010 l013 12 17 19 13 l-l 0 l 1 1 1 1-1 0 1 0 1 01 310fl 01 4 ,

TEXT (If mora space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

E. Method of Discovery Fire Operations personnel performing an auxiliary building fire breach and impairment walk-down discovered Fire Door A-69 breached.

F. Op_crator Action Upon discovery of the breached fire barrier, Operations personnel entered LCO 3.7.12. Fire Operations personnel established an hourly, fire watch patrol to comply with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

G. Safety SystenLResponses Not applicable - no safety system responses were required.  ;

III. CAUSE OF EVENT A. lumediate Cause The immediate cause of this event was the failure to comply with TSs and establish a fire watch.

B. Ront_Cause The root cause of this event is failure of SQN site pe :nel to ensure that the performing organization was aware of the associatec. -ce protection requirements and TS compensatory actions.

C. Contributing _Caus.ca None.

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT Fire Door A-69 permits access / egress for Room A-12 on Elevation 690.0 of the auxiliary building. Room A-12 contains the 1-A containment spray heat exchanger and a sm611 amount of fixed combustible material (1.5 gallons of lube oil contained in valve operators). The fire detection system inside the room was operable during the event. The fire detection and fire suppression system outside the room was also operable during the event. Additionally, a roving fire watch patrolled within 12 to 24 feet of Fire Door A-69, but did not physically check it. Based on the above information, the potential safety implication does not create any new or significant safety concerns. Therefore, it can be concluded that there were no adverse consequences to plant personnel or to the public as a result of'this event.

NRC form 366(6-89) i

.c ..

NRC form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION- Approvsd OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) , Expires 4/30/92

. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

. TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBERg?) l LER NUMBER (6) l l PAGE (3) '

l l l l SEQUENTIAL l l REVISION l l l- l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Unit 1 l . lYEAR l l NUtEER l I NUMBER l l l l l 1011[Qj01013 12 17 !9 13 l l 0 l 1 1 1 1-1 0 1 0 l 01 4l0fl 01 4 f TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC form 366A's) (17) i V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A. Jmmediate_ Corrective Action LCO 3.7.12 was entered and a roving fire watch was immediately established.

B. Conective Action to Prevent Recurrence The Plant Manager reinforced expectations to appropriate site managers regarding their responsibilities for control of offsite organizations' personnel assigned to perform activities at SQN. Specifically, the expectation i is that the responsible manager will take action to ensure that proper training ,

or oversight is provided to offsite organizations.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. Eailad_ Comp _onenta None.

B. LteYiona_.Eimilar Events A review of the LER and Nuclear Experience Review data base was conducted to identify previous or similar events. Three events were identified where a fire watch was not established within the TS allowable timeframe. The corrective actions associated with these events included training for craft personnel, >

counseling of individuals involved, and revisions to procedures to clarify the intent of the requirements and regulations. These actions have been relatively effective based on the fact that since 1990, approximately 50 instances have been reported to the NRC through the submittal of special reports where fire barriers and fire detection systems have been taken out of service or made  ;

nonfunctional. In every case, fire watches or appropriate compensatory .

l measures were established. The previous corrective actions were ineffective in the present event because there were not any actions implemented to ensure that TVA offsite personnel were aware of site specific rules and regulation's concerning breaches and compensatory actions.

C. Extent of Condition Fire Operations reviewed the active breach permits and then conducted a plant walkdown to determine if there were any other improper breaches in the plant.

No other discrepancies were identified.

VII. COMMITMENTS None.

NRC form 366(6-89)

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