ML20029C176
| ML20029C176 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1991 |
| From: | Bynum J, Whittmore C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LER-91-002-02, LER-91-2-2, NUDOCS 9103260369 | |
| Download: ML20029C176 (9) | |
Text
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hmesses laney Aut*wty.1101 M,chet 5'reet Cnr ,am x xp levenee 3?402 Joseph R Bynum Vce hesdent, Nuc! ear Ooerates March 21. 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Centlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOfAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LE-) 50-328/91002 The ;nclosed LER provides detail concerning a failure to comply with SQN's technical specifiestion Limited Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 action statement for fire detection instrumentation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(1) as an operation prohibited by technical specifications.
Very truly yours.
TENNESSEE VALLEY A'JTFORITY I
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. R. Bynum ec: see page 2
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9103260369 910321 j PDR ADOCK 05000328 v I I
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2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 21, 1991 Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
Mr. J. N. Donohew, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 INPO Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339
=
NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou F_rry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 a
Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief
[ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Guite 29n0 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 b
k NRC forn 366
_(6-89)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGUtATORY COMMISSION-- Approved OMB tb. 3150-0104 Expires 4/33/02 b '
k FACILITY NAME (i) l DOCKET NUMBER (2)- Q AJ(_{3,1
-,,jeauovah Nuclear Elat.LMt ? ' [f[5101010p ILl.LLLLQf_LQLk
-TITLE (4) failure to comply =ith Technical Specification Action Statement and estabilsh the appropriate ';
/.M21alatorv meAidrAL. -
_[ VENT DAY (5) I _ LER NUMER (6) 1 REPORT CATE (7) l OTHER FACILIJ1[$ INVOLVED (O
] l l- l lSEQUENTIA1 l l REVISION l l l l FACILITY NAMES l00CKETNUMBER(S) dQMTHl' DAY lYEAR lYEAR ! I NU@ rq (l N3)pjEq j m NTH l day lytap l g$,[q[ggL((
l i I Li LI I I l l l 01 21 11 11 91 11 91 il 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 01 31 21 11 91 11 10151010101 1 !
OPERATING l lTHIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED 'URSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS Of 10 CFR ,
MODE l l'(CheckoneormoeoftQ.igilnw.Jaa)(ll)
(9) I 11 _l20.402(b) L h 0,405(c) Ll50.73(a)(2)(iv) L l73.71(b)
POWER l l_l20.40S(a)(1)(i) 1._. l 50. 36( c ) ( 1 ) Ll50.73(a)(2)(v) Ll73.71(c)
LEVEtl Ll20.405(a)(1)(li) L l50.35(c)(2) l_l50.73(a)(2)(vil) l_l0THER(Specifyin
( laLLLLDLaL l 20. 405 (a ) ( i l ( o i , lul 50. 73 ( a ) ( 2 )( i ) Ll50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) l Abstract bilow and in Ll20.405(a)(1)(iv) Ll50.73(a)(2)(i f ) l_l50.73(a)(2)(viit)(B) l Text NRC form 366A)
, l 120,4011al(1)(v) L l 50.73(a)(2)Lili.L1 d50.73(a)(2)f x) .L _
LICENSEE rob LAfLEQR IlilS_LER _ (12)
NAME l TL ru@LILUMSE1 lAREACODEl C. H._Whittemore. Comoliance Licensino , _ . , l L .LLL5J.3 1 4 1 3 l - I LL2 l i La_
C0MPLETE ONL11hL,[QLQCtL(Qtf0NENT FAIREf.11CEfu1QJLitil5 "R.QRT (13) .
l l l ;l REPORTABLE l l l l l lREPORTABLEl CAQSilSYSTEMI CQt!PONENT lMAl*lfACluat1 LIQ NPR05 l ICAUSEISYSTEMI (QtiEONENT IMAhufACIURERI TO NPRa$_ L I- I -
1 i I i i I l- 1 I l- 1 I I I l-l- 1 I I I I _I I I I I I i 1 1 1 1 1 I I: -l i I I I I I I I I I ~l~ 'l I l-'I I I I I I I I I I I I I i 1 I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REMRT EXPECTED (14) l EXPECTED ldQflid l3ALLt(ajl.
L l SUBMISSION l l
- ._.LyLS (If ves. cQ20.lt11L_EXEECIIE_10milSilqN .DATE) ! X l NC l DATE (15) ' _i_ LJ.
I I ABSTRAJT (Limit to 1400 spaces. i.e..-approximately fif teen single space typewritten lines) (10)
-On February 19, 1991,-with. Unit =2 in-Mode 1, it was determined that.on ,
February 111,-1991, Unit 2 had operated in a condition gohibited by Technical-Specification-_(TS) 3.3.3.8: Limited condition for operatit.n (LCO) action statement (a),
- l. Action-statement (a): requires a fire watch to be established within an hour upon snt.ering_the LCO. On February 11, 1991, fire protection panel 0-L-630 was-removed from u rvice for maintenance, and Operaticns entered LCO 3.3.3.8. Because of the' expected- -
short duration, no fire watch was established. Operations o"dered the work stopped and return of the panel to ncirtr.al when all four fire pumps star,ed unexpectedly.
- Operations prerr e.urely exited the-ICO when informed that the panel had been returned to normal. -Communications between Operations personne1'and Maintenance personnel was inadequate causing Operations to consider.the panel to be operable. Troubleshooting later revealed the panel was inoperable'and-0peracions wa.= notified. LCO 3.3. 3.8 was re-e n t e r e.d . Unit 2 operated approximately six hours without establ'. sting a fire
-vatch. Multiple causes .and coctributing f actors have been identif ted, including an.-
ll ' inadequate procedure, poor communication and failure to follow rrocedure. Corrective L -actie*.s are being'taken to address these items. Further evalu.stion of the causes is ongoing -and a revised LER vill be provided to surrmrize the results.
, . NRC f orm 366(6-8'))-
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NRC Form 366. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3)S0-0104 (6-89)~ ,
Empires 4/30/92
$[N(( h/[NI kONI hk)- 1 FACILITY NAME (1) ~ lDOCKETNUMOIR(2) l kCtE L11
.31.qu2yd !iur.ltar Sl e t . .Unill, 101510l g l3 !2 le 1110rl Q L TITLE (4) Failure _to comply with Technical Specification Action Staterrent and establish the appropriate
- cmoenulory measures.
J, VENT DAY (5) i LER HUMBER f6 i REPORT DAIE (7) l OTHER_ FACILITIES INVQly(Q_L'1) l -l l. l l SEQUENT!ALl l REVISION l l l. l FACILITY NAMES l0CKETNUMBER(S; HONTHl DAY lYEAR lYEAR l I NMER l I %HJER IMONTHl DAY lYEAR I . 1315!01010! LL ,
l -- 1 I - Li - Ll i I I I l
_01 ?! 11 11 91 '1Lol 11 1010t?I I QJ 0 1 01 31 21 Il 91 11 10!51qja[0i!!
OPERATINC l lTHIS REPORT IS SUBM_!T40 PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS Of 10 CFR 5:
MODE l j..(ChecL. ant _grmoreofthefollowinal('ll .
-f91 I tl 120 402(b) l_l20.405(c) Ll50.73(a.(2)(lv) Ll73.71(b)
POWER l L ,* J05(a)(1)(1) Ll50.36(c)(1) Ll50.73(a)(2)(v) Ll73.71(c)
LEVEL l l j20.40$(a)(1)(ll) Ll50.36(c)(2) Ll50.73(a)(2)(vit) l_l0THER(Specifyin (10) I 1101 OLl20.405(a)(1)(lii) lul50.73(a)(2)(1) -l _l50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A).l Abstract below and ir.
Li0.405(a)(1)(iv)-
2 Ll50.73(a)(2)(ll) l__l50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) l Text. NRC form 366A)
I 120.405(a)(111vi l 150.73fa111)(1111 l 150.73(a)(2%) I LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME l TELEPHONE H PBER .
7 lAREACODEl C." H. WH ttemore. Comoliar.e licensina I611 l5I8I4l3I.l7l?t 1l0 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OE3CR13ED IN THIS Rf00RT D 31 __
'l l l l REPORTABLE l } l _
l l _
l REPORTABLE l '!
[AU1EISYSTEMI COMPQfi[td IMANUFACTURER! TO NPROS I lCAUSL{$YSTEt! COMPONENT IMANUFACTUREol TO NDRDS L ,
-l -l. I I I I l I I I I X- lC l-B lP l l I IP1012IS I Y l l I l. l' l i l I I I l I l
-l_ .l I. I I I I i ! I I I I le i I I I I i 1 1 I I JJ l i I I l 1 1 -1 1 I _
SUPPLEMENTAL _ REPORT EXPECTED (14) _ l EXFECTED lMONTHI DALj, JJJi ,
L I SUBMISSION l l l l YES (If ves. englgte. EX#ECTED $UEtil1$1QtLQAIE) IL.LJto 1 04TE <!5) i l i I I __ L .
ABSTRACT _(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fif teen singleapc 0 typenritten ;11nes) (16) -
- On February 19_, 1991, wi th; Unit -2 :in Mode .1, it was det ermined that on
- February 11,-1991, Unit _.2-had operated in n condftion prohibited by Technical-
- SpecificationL(TS) 3.3.3.8 Limited Condition for Opetstion (LCO) action statement (a).
Action statement .(a) requires a fire watch to be established within an. hour upon entering the_LCO. - On February 11, 1991, fire protecticn panel 0-L-630-was remcved from
. service-for maintenance, and Operations-entered LCO 3.3.3.8. Because of the expected short duration, no. fire watch was established. Operations _ ordered the work stopped and
, return'of 'the panel ti normal when_ all for.r fire pumps started. unexpectedly.
' _ Operations prematurely exited the LCO when informed that -the panel _ had been returned to ' ,
normal.-' Communications-between Operations 1arsonnel and Maintenance personnel was Linadaquate causing Operations to consider the panel to be operable.. Troubleshooting _
, /later. revealed the' panel wa_s inoperable'and Operations was notified- LCO 3.3.3.8-was= .
re-entered._ Unit 2' operated approximately six hours without establishing a fire "atch. Multiple causes and contributing factors have been identified, including an itnadequate procedure, poor con 2nunication and f ailure to follow procedure. Corrective actions are being-taken to address-these items. Further evaluation of the caures is
-ongoing-and a revised LEl will be provided to-summarize the results.
l NRL form 366(6-of U - , . , - .- _ -,, .a. _
NR'C Form 366A U.S. ' NUCLEAR REGULAVODY CONH!$$!0N Aporoved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6 39)~ Empires 4/30/92 z i
e I, b b N f N f h -
TEXT CCHTINUATION FAC!t1TY.NAME (1)- 110CKETNUMBER(2) i LER N M3ER (6) l I PME (3) .,
l l l l SEQUENT!Atl l REVISION l l l l l Se4uoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 l lYEAR l I N#BER I I NUMBER _l l l l l
[fl510101013.12 18 19 11 l--l 0 l 0 1 2 l--LO 1 0 I of 21of_LJ2ut TEXT (If more space is required, use dweitional NRC Form 366A's)-(17)
' DESCRIPTION GF EVENT On February 19, 1991, with Unit 2 in Mode _1 (1007, power, 2235psig and 578 degrees
=Farenheit), it was determined that on February 11, 1991, the unit had operated in a
-condition prohibited by technical specifications (TS) in that limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 " Fire Detection Instrumentation" required fit detectors were
. inoperable (in 10 zones), without the required compensatory measures i V established. On February 11 1991, at 0935 Eastern' standard time (EST) u ' . > was entered to accommodate a work request (WR).to replace the control unit that furnishea power'for the detector and audible signal circuits (CP-30 module) on fire protection '
(EIIS code KP) panel 0-L-630. With the number of operable fire detection instruments less than.the minimum number operable required in Table 3.3-11. LC0 3.3.3.8 requires
- that "Within .1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the-zone (s) with the
-inoperable instrument (s) at least once per hour, unless the instrument (s) is located Lipside the containment, tijen inspect the containment at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or monitor the. containment air temperature at-least once per hour at the locations listed in SpeciEication 4.6.1.5." The LCO was exited approximate 1y'six hours later without a ftre watch being established or monitoring of the containment air temperature being
-perfbrmed.
i On January 14, 1991,. Survelliance Instruct 1un (SI)-234.7 " Technical Specification. Fire
- Detectors,'.' was performed by Maintenance Electrical Group _ (MEG) cn fire panel 0-L-630.
Fire panel 0- L-630 monitors the1 fire detectors in- the Unit--2 annulus and reactor s coolant pump (RCP) areas.__
During the testing of panel 0-L-630, a deficiency was
-initiated on'the trouble buzzer. The trouble buzzer ~was:found to function, intermittently. This deficiency was not considered to affeet the.TS-acceptance- ;
critoria of SI-234.7.- The balance of the SI-234.-7 testing of_ panel 0-L-630 was completed and the'_SI-was closed out with=the non-TS deficiercy.' WR C045526 was initiated to correct'the buzzer deficiency.-
LPlanning was; performed for.tho WR and the applicable-portion of SI-234.7 was specified as the required post maintenance test (PMT). The WR was initially worked'on
? January 24,.1991. : Troubleshooting determined that the CP-30 module required
. replacement, however the-operability of the; detection system wassnot affected. The WR was=returv9 to Maintenance for additional planning.
Physical Security Instruction _(PHY3I)-13 " Fire Protection Program," Attachment'C,
~ describes.the administrative. controls required to be established!before removing TS
-fire protection equipment from service. Section 2.0tand Section 3.2.1 of PHYSI-13, Attachment C: delineate the respcnsibilities a'nd re' quire documentation for authorization of equipment to be removed from service and notification of the shift operations
-supervisor (SOS). The-Attachment C permit is the administrative instrument used to document.the removal, approval, and return of fire protection equipment, etc., from I.
, service, sNRC Form 306(6-89)
. - . . . . ~ -
HRC form:366A; U.S.HUftEARREGudTORYCOMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-01 M
.- (6-09 ) E ntres 4 00/12 Dk[ b[NI Nf.hdh '
50NflNUAT10N-LFACILITY NAME (1) l0OCKETNUMBER(2) l LER HUMBER i6) l i PVi_LlL[ _.
l l l l$EQUENTIALl lREVISIOE l' ] l l
'Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Unit 2 l [YEARl_ l UUMBER 1 I UUMBER l l_ l l 10!5101010l W W W R.11 f--! O f 0 1 2_{--I O ! 0_Lijl0f11M r TEXT-(If more space is required use additional 1RC form A6A's) (17)
D,EfCRIPTION OF EVENT On February.11, 1991, the PHYSI-13, Attachment C permit originally written for the January 14, 1991,' performance of SI-234.7 was extended by Fire Operations to cover WR C045526.- PHYSI-13 intends *. hat an Attachment C permit be prepared for each task. The-SOS _was not-notified as-required by PHYSI-13 by the fire captain that a TS fire i:
protection system was being removed from service.
At approximately 0900 EST on February 11, 1991, WR 0045526 was approved for work by the
' Unit 1 assistant shif t operations supervisor (ASOS) by _ telephone, even though panel' 0-L-630 is a Unit 2 panel. The WR was implemented in this manner for three reasons:
,(1) The Unit 1 ASOS routinely signs for. common equipment work activities, (2) the unique identifier for- the panel designated it as a common panel (0-L-630), and (3) the
_ Unit 2 ASOS: was out of the control room responding to a fire alarm as the fire _inciden' L commander at this time. Additionally, the Unit 2 operators were informed'before
' initiation of work on'~ panel 0-L-630.
At approximately 0935'EST panel 0-L-630 was removed from service for replacement of the
-module and LCO 3.3.3.8'was entered. This panel is removed from service by positioning
.-switch, SW-1, to the disconnect position. This switch manipulation disconnects panel 0 L-630.from-the System-13 computer, rendering the fire detection-equipment actuated
-from_ pan >l 0-L-630 inoperable. The result of the switch manipulation requires Operations to_. enter LCO 3.3.3.8.: The SW-1 switch is located inside panel 0-L-630.
~
-There is-a label' adjacent.to SW-1-which reads " Caution depressing SR 32 switch inops system LCO :3.3.3.8."' The _ CP-30 module was replaced and the _ wire connections were being verified before performing the Postmodification Test'(PMT) when Operations observed .
multiple automatic start signals to the fire pumps. -Operations then contacted Maintenance _personnellat panel 0-L-630 and instructed them to stop work and return the
- panel to normal ~in order to exit the LCO. . Panel 0-L-630 SW-1 switch was_ returned'to its= normal. position.- Maintenance personnel verified the power-on light was illuminated
<and,the absence of trouble alarms on panel.0-L-630. At approximately 1005, Maintenance-personnel _ reported to theLmain' control room (MCR) that the panel was returned to normal. The craft personnel 1then>went to_the MCR'to discuss the situation with.
- Operations. =The discussion did not reveal the cause:of all four fire pumps receivin.g
' auto start signals, but at the-time of the discussion the ftre pump' auto start problem
'had cleared. MEG personnel lef t-the MCR without discussing the PMT for the CP-30 module: replacement. . Operations did not question MEG personnel about the status of the FMT for this activity. The Unit 2 ASOS was under the impression that the panel was operable and exited LCO 3'.3.3.8-at:1003.
b At:1040 EST, Fire Operations personnel observed water on the floor in-the area of fire
-protection deluge. valves and upon further inspection determined that deluge valves o ,2-FCV-26-219 and.-223 were actuated (open). the headers were :harged to the_Unic 2 l- annulus and R0Ps, and that the valves-would not reset. The manual isolation valves l- were closed by Fire Operations _ personnel and LCO 3.7.11.2. was entered.
L L
- NRC form 366(6-89).
n d form 36tA U.S. NUCLEA1 REGULATORY C0: 1!$5!0N App-oved OMB No. 3150-0104 (5-39) Expires 4/30/92 N Mk[bfkkhi h TEX 1 CONTINVATION FAC!t.!TY NAME (1) l00CKETNUMBER(2).I _LER_1MEFJftL_1. l- PAGrg3L _
l l l l5EQUENTIALl lREV1510Nl l l l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 l JJDfL! .,l_EtMLL . I L3utieliL1 I I I i 1911101A1213_11_11ILLLa -LaJ 0 l L1=L3 I o ! 2L31EL3L t TEXT (If more space is required. use additional NRC form 366A's) (M)
DESCRIPTION OF SVENT The system engineer was notified by the Maintenance personnel that the fire uumps had started and that Operations had informed them to get out af the panel. The Maintenance personnel requested the system engineer to provide assistance on this issue. The system engineer then went to the MEG shop to review the System 13 printout. The printout revealed that at npproximately 1005 SW-1 was restored to its normal position and that every zone in the panel was actuated. These tot.e actuations would cause the fire pumps to start and the deluge valves to actuate. While reviewing the printout during discussions with the ME0 foreman, the system engineer determined-that the panel was inoperable because the PMT had not been performed. While reviewing the printout, the system engineer received a call f rom Fire Operations informing him that the two deluge valves (2-FCV-26-219 and -223) were actuated and would not reset. The system engineer and craft toreman then went to the Fire Operations office and informed Fire Operations that a ftre watch was needed because of an incomplete PMT on panel 0-L-630 in accordance with the requirements of LCO 3.3.3.8. Fire Operations called the SOS to discuss the need for a fire watch. The SOS decided a fire watch was not needed; however, the panel PMT and LCO 3.3.3.8 were not discussed, only the deluge valve problem was discussed. The SOS was apparently only considering the inoperable deluge valves and LCO 3.7.11.2. The system engineer then went to the MCR at approximately 1130 EST, surveyed the System 13 console, and observed that each zone f rom panel 0-L-630 was in alarm status. He then notified the Fire Operations captain that this was the reason the deluge valves would not reset. The system engineer then asked the SOS if he was still in the LCO and the SOS replied that he had not instructed anyone to exit it. The SOS was again apparently referring to LC0 3.7.11.2 and the system engineer was referring to LCO 3.3.3.8. The system engineer then went to the Unit 2 ASOS and asked if his log reflected exiting LCO 3.3.3.8; and the response was yes. The systems engineer informed the Unit 2 ASOS of the incoraplete PMT on Panel 0-L-630. The Unit 2 ASOS and the Unit 2 unit operator then lined out their 1,005 log entries that stated LCO 3.3.3.8 had been exited.
At 1135 EST, the isolation valves were opened and LCO 3.7.11.2 was exited. At approximately 1230, the MEG craft foreman called Fire Operations to determine if a fire watch had been posted as required by LCO 3.3.3.8. The MEG foreman was told that the SOS.had discussed the problem with the Fire Operations captain and had determined that a fire witch was not needed because the deluge valves were actuated and the headers were charged. The ME0 foreman did not f urther ques tion the Fire Operations cc.ptain, .
since the SOS said no fire watch was t.eeded.
.The WR C045526 was replanned to wire check panel 0-L-630 and work was resumed. The troubleshooting of panel 0-L-630 identifted a loose wire connection on the interconnected control wiring of the CP-30 module. This problem was corrected. The applicable section of SI-234.7 (the PMT) was successfully completed and panel 0-L-630 was declared operable. LCO 3.3.3.8 was exited at 1537 on February 11,199t.
l l l NRC form 366(6-89) a_---_-______ . . .
1
+
NRC Foro 366A- 0,$.' NUCLEAR AEGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No.-3150-0104' )
(6-89): Expires r./30/92 4
LEEMEE EVENT RENRT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION-
-FACitITY NAME (1)- lDOCKETNUMBER(2) 1 JER NUMBER (6) l I PAGE H L l l l l$EQUENTIAL:l lREV!510Nl l l l l Sequoyah.. Nuclear Plant Unit 2 l lYEAR I 1 NUMBER l l NUMBE Q l l l- l 101MQ101Q1 12 18 19 l 1 1-1 0 1 0 l 2 l--I O l 0lOl_Qgr!018 TEXT (if more space it . required, use additional NRC form 366A's) (17)
CAUSE OF EVENT The system engineer continued to pursue the issues involved and initiated an
. Investigation that resulted in the discovery and verification on February 19, 1991, that a firewatch was not established for a period of approximately six hours.
There-are various factors that contributed to this event as described below. Exiting J
of LCO 3.3.3.8 before completion of the PMT on panel 0-L-630 and failing to establish
- the compensatory measures, resulted from inadequate communications between Maintenance and Operations personnel relative to operability requirements. Additionally. this condition was exacerbated by the accumulation of the unexpected events, i.e., au ? ^ d. c starting of the fire pumps;and-deluge ' valve charging. -
'Another,cause.of failing to establish a fire watch was weaknesses in the established -
methods and the administrative. controls for ren.oving fire protectien eouipment frem service. The ' flexibility allowed by'PfiYSI-13 circumvented the SOS and limited the ability of-the SOS to carry _out his responsibilities. The procedure specifles that the Fire Operations foreman will authorize the removal el TS'11re protection equipment from
- service. The Fire Operations foreman is required to notify the SOS, ut_this requirement does not adequately ensure that the SOS has fuli cognir nee over and control _of equipment for which he is responsible. IMis situation was aggravated ay an
--overal1~1ack:of attention ';o detail and a failure to ask questions.
Thetimplementation of the existing procedure was inadequate. The P!IYSI-13, Attachment;C permit that was used did not adequately -address the required compensatory measures and'did not= address the task that'was being performed. The Fire Operations .
foreman did.'not1 notify the: SOS of_.the isruance of the PflYSI-13, Attachment C_pe mit !
that.. allowed! removal of panel 0-L-630.- There was a lack of unders%nding by craft foreman and Fire'. Operation personnel concerning their responsibilities 'in properly -
communicating to Operations personnel relating to operability of fire protection equipment'.
' Inattention to detail is evidenced by a general lack of knowledge about the specifica of... work being-done, status of equipment, and LCO action statement adherence by involved personnel. The situation was aggravated further by reliance on others to do the right-thing by Operations personnel;' questions pere not. asked that if answered, could have '
made the situation understood by. involved personnel._-The u tablished methods and
. administrative controls for removing fire protection equipment from service contributed-largely to this_non-questioning attitude.
Evaluaalon of the above causes and factors is'sti'.1 ongoing to fully assess the role of and' significance of each in this event.
U p
l l'
i-1 NRC Form 366(6-89)
p~ . . '
NRC Form 366A U.S..NUCtEAR REGULA103Y COMMISSION : Approved CMB No. 3150-0104
( 6-89 ) ._ Excires 4/30/92 LEENSEE EVENT RENRT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACit!TY NAME (1) l DOCKET NUMBER (2) l' LER NUMBER f M I l -FALL .
~
l l l lSEQUENTIAtl lREv!$10Nl l l- l l
-;$equoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 l .lYEAR I -1 JUMBER I LJiuratiLL I i 1 l-1015l010!01312la19!1 l--l 0 1 0 1 2 1-- La_L_tLLaLiL0ELJ11_1 TEXT'.(If more _ space is required.' use additional NRC form 366A's) (17)
ANALYSIS Fire protection-panel'0-L-630 contains circuits for the detector zones listed below and their associated protec.ted equipment:
-Zone Proteeted Equipment
.332 Unit 2 Reactor Building Annulus 333 Unit 2 keactor Building Annulus 353 Unit 2 Lower Reactor Compartment Coolers 355 Unit l2 t;pper Reactor-Compartment Coolnrs 362 Unit 2 Reactor. Coolant Pump, 1 363 Unit 2= Reactor Coolant Pump,1 370- Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump, 4 371' Unit 2_ Reactor Coolant Pamp, 4 374 Unit 2 Reactor Building Annulus 375 -; Unit 2 Reactor Building Annulus The actions of LCO 3.3.3.8 requiring monitoring of containment air temperature anc i
_ placement of-fire watches in the. annulus were not met'for approximately'six hours.
Four of. the detector zones (332, 333,~ 374, and 375) provide automatic cross zone 1 detection and actuation of '.-FCV-26-223. This valveLsupp11es temperature actuated sprinklers for.the annalus cable trays.
Four_ oft the detector zoneF. (362, 363. 370, and;371), provide automatic cross zone
" detection and actuation'of FCV-36-223. . This. valve' supplies tempecature actuated sprinklag for each of: the tour RCPa.
The other two'detectorizones (353 and 355), provide detection only. Zone 353 provides photoel:ctrie smoke detection to the four lower compartment cooling units. Zone 355 provides photoelectric smoke detection'to_the four upper compartment cooling units.
2 Ttiere are no redundant detection and suppression systems installed for the _ subject
. areas, except, manually -i titiated standpipe _ hose stations in the reactor building annulus and in lower containment. Even though no' fire' watch was established in-the
.annalus within one hour after the panel was removed from service, resulting in the fire -
detectors-being incperable, the annulus areas and RCP areas' automatic fire-suppression i system remained operable for.the majority of the six bour period, except-from 1040_to )
1135'EST when the deluge valves were' isolated, as it.was charged with high pressure fire water.- Had e fire occurred, the appropriate temperature actuated sprinkler initiation.would-have taken place. Additional detection was operable._in fire zones
- 353. 359, '366, and 367, for RCP 2 and -3 areas.
As a result of this capability and the short duration of the condition there was no significant adtersa effect on nor-danger to the plant or health and safety of the plan':
- or public.
-NRC Form 366(6-89) -
'AC form 366A U.S. NUCLEM REGULATCRf COMMISSICN Approved i No. 3150-UO4 (6-89)' Exoi- 4/30/92 I.I([IN(([bik[bkIhbh IEXT CONTINUATICH FACILITY NAME (1) ]00CKET NUM13ER (2) 1 LER_titL*fiE.R (M I 1 PL . . _
l l l 15EQUENilAt l l REVISION l l l l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 l L1fJLR. I ! 1 E DER l l N22fjL1 l l l l
_LQ11l0L010ll_lLli_L911 l--! O I O I 2 !-l 0.1 0 1 01 710flJ1L 1 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC form 366A s) (17)
CORRECTIVE ACTION The immediate corrective action was to complete the PMT and return the panel to service.
$ Interim corrective Action included issuing a night order to licensed personnel and Fire Operations personnel covering the removal of TS fire protection equipment from service until PHYSI-13 can be revised to adequately control the process of removing TS fire protection equipment from service. Under this night order only an SRO will authorize TS fire protection equipment to be removed f rom service by personally signing tilYSI-13 attachment C permits. Plant work documents, i.e., WRs, sis, PMs etc., related to fire protection equipment will require a separate PHYSI-13 Attachment C. A telt. phone ' 1.1 will not be acceptable.
PilYSI-13 will be revised to adequately control the process of removing TS fire protection from service. In addition PliYSI-13 will be revised to clearly define the process and responsibilities of the Fire Operations supervisor. Establishing the SOS an responsible for authorization of plant work documents related to fire protection will: reduce the potential for miscommunication, clearly define the controls for removing equipment from service, and improve the implementation of compensatory messures. Operations and fire Operations personnel will be trained on this event ano their responsibilities as delineated in the revised PliYSI-13 will be emphasized.
Additionally, Maintenance personnel will be rained on this event; with added emphasis on the-importance of p w per communications.
Fire Operations and-Maintenance personnel involved in the event will be counseled esgarding the need for procedural compliance and cl. ear communication of the status of tork activities to control ?,om personnel.
l After the PilYSI-13 procedure has been revised and implemented, a monitoring effort will be established to verify the proper implementation of the procedure. The results of
.this moni:oring effort will be evaluated to determine the need for further training on ftre protection equipment and processes.
SI-234.7 will be revised to require a PIIYSI-l3, Attachment C permit to be completed.
Operations and Fire Operations personnel involved with the event will be counselled with regard to questioning attitude and inattention to detail when altering configuration of plant equipment.
Evaluation of this event is continuing and may result in identification of additional corrective actions. A revistd LER will be submitted by May 3, 1991 to include the final results of that evaluation.
NRC Form 366(6-89)
NR'C Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA100Y COMMIS$10N Approved OMB No. 3150-0101 (6-89) Expiras 4/30/92 UW6EE MT EMT E TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) (DOCKETNUMBER(2) l MLt!WdER J61 I l h_QL, _
l l l l SEQUENTIAL l l REVISION l l l l l Sequoyah huelear Plant Unit 2 l LYEAR l LJWBER i L'[gg[R_[ l l l l 10.1510l_01013 12 18 19 11 l--l 0 1 0 1 2 1.-l 0 1 0lOL Qq[.LQLL TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A'?) (17)
C0$D1ITTMENTS 1.. PHYSI-13 will be revised by May 3, 1991, to control the process of removing technical specification fire protection equipment from service by requiring an SRO to authorize the activity by signing the Attachment C vermits. Additionally, a T separate permit shall be completed for each work document, i.e., work requests, surveillance instructions and preventive maintenance activities related to fire protection. PHYSI-13 will also be revised to clearly delineate the responsibilities of the Fire Operations personnel and the plant Operations personnel in removing technical specifications fire protection equipment from service.
- 2. . Operations and Fire Operations will be trained by June 1,1991, on this event and their responsibilities as delineated in the revised PHYSI-13 will be emphasized.
- 3. Maintenance personnel will be trained on this event; with added emphasis on the importance of proper communications. This will be accomp'ished by May 3, 1991.
- 4. SI-234.7 will be revised by May 3,1991, to require a PHYSI-13, Attachment C permit to be completed.
- 5. Operations and Fire-Operations personnel involved with the event will be counselled by May 1, 1991, with regard to the questioning attitude and inattention to detail when altering configuration of plant equipment.
- 6. A revised LER will be submitted by May 3, 1991, to include the final results of that evaluation. Evaluation of this event is continuing and may result in
-identification of additional corrective actions. A revised LER will be submitted by May 3, 1991 to include th. final results of that evaluation.
- 7. Af ter the P.'iYS!-13 proceduN has-been revised and implemented, a monitoring effort will be established to verify the proper implementation of the procedure. The results of this monitoring effert will be evaluated to determine the need for further. training on fire protectior. equipment and processer,. J ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
/ search of the LER and NER. data base was performed for similar incidents, enty-three incidents related to fire watches, miscommunications and entries into 0 3.3.3.8 i.:re (N covered. Thb infor.naun is being f actored into the ongoing-investigation.
1342h
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