IR 05000220/2011008

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IR 05000220-11-008, 05000412-11-008; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report
ML113260049
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/22/2011
From: Dentel G T
Reactor Projects Branch 1
To: Langdon K
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group
Dentel G T
References
IR-11-008
Download: ML113260049 (18)


Text

UNITED STATESN UCLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSIONREGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406.1415November 22, 2OL1Mr. Kenneth Langdon, Vice PresidentNine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLCConstellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLCP.O. Box 63Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONAND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO22O/2011008 AND05000410/201 1008

Dear Mr. Langdon:

On October 21,2011, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed reportdocuments the inspection results discussed with Mr. George Gellrich and other members ofyour staff.This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identificationand resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations andconditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selectedprocedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews withpersonnel.Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that Constellation wasgenerally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Nine Mile Point personnelidentified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold.Nine Mile Point personnel prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safetysignificance of the problems and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timelymanner.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the K. LangdonNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of theNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website athttp://www.nrc.oov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,Docket Nos.: 50-220, 50-410License Nos.: DPR-63, NPF-69

Enclosure:

cc Mencl:rue-1rGlenn T. Dentel, ChiefProjects Branch 1Division of Reactor ProjectsI nspection Report 05000220 120 1 1 008 and 05000 41 0 l 201 1 008M

Attachment:

Supplementary InformationDistribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500022012011008, 0500041012011008; 1010312011 - 101211201 1; Nine Mile Point NuclearStation, Units 1 and2; Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem ldentification and Resolution.This NRC team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and one residentinspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear powerreactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, datedDecember 2006.Problem ldentification and ResolutionThe inspectors concluded that Constellation was generally effective in identifying, evaluating,and resolving problems. Constellation personnel identified problems, entered them into thecorrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with theirsafety significance. In most cases, Constellation appropriately screened issues for operabilityand reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent ofcondition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined thatConstellation typically implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in thecorrective action program in a timely manner.The inspectors concluded that, in general, Constellation adequately identified, reviewed, andapplied relevant industry operating experience to Nine Mile Point operations. In addition, basedon those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that Constellation's self-assessments and audits were thorough.Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection,observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program andemployee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that sitepersonnel were unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that couldhave had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment.No findings were identified.Enclosure

3

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTTVTTTES (OA)4OA2 Problem ldentification and Resolution (711528)This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolutionas defined by Inspection Procedure71152. All documents reviewed during thisinspection are listed in the Attachment to this report..1 Assessment of Corrective Action Proqram Effectivenessa. lnspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the procedures that described Constellation's corrective actionprogram at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS). To assess the effectiveness ofthe corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primaryareas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective actionimplementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to therequirements and standards contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVl,"Corrective Action," and Constellation procedure CNG-CA-1.01-1000, "Corrective ActionProgram." For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from thestation's risk analysis and reviewed condition reports (CRs) selected across the sevencornerstones of safety in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, theinspectors attended multiple Plan-of-the-Day meetings, screening meetings, andManagement Review Committee meetings. The inspectors selected items from thefollowing functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergencypreparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and oversight programs.(1) Effectiveness of Problem ldentificationln addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports,a sample of completed corrective and preventive maintenance work orders, completedsurveillance test procedures, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completedfield walkdowns of various systems on site, such as the emergency diesel generator(EDG) and liquid poison systems. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of CRswritten to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits,emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectorscompleted this review to verify that Constellation entered conditions adverse to qualityinto their corrective action program as appropriate.(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of lssuesThe inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of CRs issuedsince the last NRC biennial Problem ldentification and Resolution inspection completedin October 2009. The inspectors also reviewed CRs that were assigned lower levels ofsignificance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they wereproperly classified. The inspectors' reviews included the appropriateness of theassigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness ofresolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes forthe issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identifiedEnclosure 4causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations,reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems toverify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issuesto the NRC, and the extent of the issues.(3) Effectiveness of Corrective ActionsThe inspectors reviewed Constellation's completed corrective actions throughdocumentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether theactions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewedCRs for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actionswere effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewedConstellation's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness inprecluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors alsoreviewed a sample of CRs associated with selected non-cited violations (NCVs) andfindings to verify that Constellation personnel properly evaluated and resolved theseissues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years toevaluate Constellation actions related to Unit 1 liquid poison deficiencies and Unit 2feedwater issues.b. Assessment(1) Effectiveness of Problem ldentificationBased on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel inmultiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that Constellation generallyidentified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a lowthreshold. Constellation staff at NMPNS initiated approximately 23,000 CRs betweenOctober 2009 and September 2011. The inspectors observed supervisors at the Plan-of{he-Day meetings, screening meetings, and Management Review Committeemeetings appropriately questioning and challenging CRs to ensure clarification of theissues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that Constellationtrended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems inCRs. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through thisreview were entered into the corective action program as appropriate. Additionally, theinspectors concluded that personnelwere identifying trends at low levels. Althoughissues and concerns were generally identified and entered into the corrective actionprogram, the inspectors identified some instances not yet identified by Constellationincluding the Unit 2 EDG air start system valves inadequately locked, carts improperlystored in the power block, broken clips on the 103 EDG valve covers, and water on thefloor in the 102 EDG switchgear room.The inspectors independently evaluated these deficiencies for significance inaccordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (lMC) 0612, Appendix B, "lssue Screening,"and IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor lssues." None of the examples had asignificant impact on plant operations or equipment operability. The inspectorsconsidered these issues to be of minor significance, and, as a result, not subject toenforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.Enclosure 5(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of lssuesThe inspectors determined that, in general, Constellation appropriately prioritized andevaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem.Constellation screened CRs for operability and reportability, categorized the CRs bysignificance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation andresolution. The CR screening process considered human performance issues,radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on thesafety conscious work environment.Based on the sample of CRs reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance providedby Constellation corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficientto ensure consistency in categorization of issues. Operability and reportabilitydeterminations were generally performed when conditions warranted and in most cases,the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses appropriately considered theextent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue.However, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URl) where NMPNS personnelwere not effective in evaluating an issue and implementing effective corrective actions.This URI is documented in Section 4OA2.1.c.(3) Effectiveness of Corrective ActionsThe inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies weregenerally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse toquality, Constellation identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concludedthat corrective actions to address the sample of NRC NCVs and findings since the lastproblem identification and resolution inspection were timely and effective. Theinspectors did observe some weaknesses in Constellation's resolution of degradedconditions. Forexample:. A corrective action was not completed as detailed in the corrective action programfor adding a step to a maintenance procedure for the Unit 2 EDGs regarding addinga normal temperature band for the jacket water system. The temperature band wasfor trending and did not affect alarms that the operators would receive for abnormaltemperatures.. A corrective action was not completed for adding a step to an operations procedurefor draining the reactor cavity regarding establishing the accuracy of the utilized levelindications. Numerous other actions were taken to ensure the reactor cavity drainingwould be completed in a controlled manner with accurate, redundant indication.o An issue regarding the reduced capacity of the floor drain system in Unit 1 wasidentified in March and August2011. However, corrective actions to address theissue were not aggressively pursued until October 2011.o An adverse trend regarding poor plant lighting conditions (bulbs needingreplacement) was identified in June 2011. However, long term corrective actionswere not implemented until October 2011. Temporary lighting and flashlights werebeing relied upon until the permanent lighting was properly restored.Enclosure 6The inspectors independently evaluated these issues for significance in accordance withIMC 4612, Appendix B, "lssue Screening," and IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples ofMinor lssues." None of the examples had a significant impact on plant operations orequipment operability. The inspectors consider these issues to be of minor significance,and, as a result, not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC'sEnforcement Policy.FindinqsNon-Safetv Related Molded-Case Circuit Breaker Preventive MaintenanceIntroduction: The inspectors identified a URI associated with NMPNS's failure to meetthe fleet standard for applying preventive maintenance (PM) templates for Critical, non-safety related (NSR) molded-case circuit breakers (MCCBS).Description: In 2006, NMPNS began to apply Electric Power Research lnstitute (EPRI)recommended PM templates to NSR MCCBS. During the application process, NMPNSclassified NSR MCCBS as Critical, Significant, Economic, or Run-to-Failure, anddetermined the PM activities to be performed. NMPNS appropriately classified breakersand assigned PM tasks using the site procedures and industry guidance available at thattime.In 2007, two new procedures, CNG-AM-1.01-1018 "Preventive Maintenance Program,"and CNG-AM-1.01-2000 "Scoping and ldentification of Critical Components," wereissued. CNG-AM-1.01-2000 requires a component to be classified as Critical if afunctional failure would result in one of the following undesirable plant consequences:reactor scram/trip from any power level; loss of generation (shutdown,downpower/derate >2Qo/o, or delay a unit Mode Change in startup); unplanned technicalspecification entry that requires shutdown with an action constraint of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or less;engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation, half-scram or half-ESF actuation that cannotbe immediately reset; failure to control a criticalfunction (level, temperature, pressure) ofany of the following: reactor, primary containment, secondary containment, or fuel pool,or loss of any Maintenance Rule High Risk function; degradation of primary or secondarycontainment; degradation of capability to achieve or maintain cold shutdown; or loss ofEmergency Operating Procedure function. NMPNS reviewed components that hadpreviously been classified as Critical to ensure that the classification and PM activitiescomplied with the new procedures.In 2009, fleet engineering standard CNG-FES-039 "Preventive Maintenance TemplateDevelopment, Review, Analysis and Application," was issued. This standard states that"PM Template deviations for Critical components should be rarely applied and shouldonly be reserved for severe/hardship situations," for non-conservative deviations. Theinspectors identified several differences between the templates and actual PMscompleted for NSR breakers, including scope and frequency of clean and inspect ofCritical breakers, and thermography of breakers.ln 2008, NMPNS missed an opportunity to re-evaluate if the "clean and inspect" PM taskshould be performed on NSR MCCBs based on operating experience. In 2008, NRCInformation Notice (lN) 08-18 "Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused bya Bus Fault," identified high resistance stab connections as the primary cause of a fire.The lN identified poor PM as one of the causes of the high resistance connection. UponEnclosure

.27 receiving lN08-18, NMPNS reviewed the PM templates for safety-related MCCBs, butnot NSR MCCBS. In June 2011, NMPNS experienced a fire on a Significant NSRbreaker, resulting in the declaration of an Unusual Event.The differences between the PM templates and actual station practices is unresolvedpending inspector determination if a performance deficiency exists and if this issue ismore than minor. (URl 05000220,41012011008-01, lnconsistencies Between Non-Safety Related Breaker Preventive Maintenance Templates and Station Practices.Assessment of the Use of Operatinq ExperienceInspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs associated with review of industry operatingexperience to determine whether Constellation appropriately evaluated the operatingexperience information for applicability to NMPNS and had taken appropriate actions,when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experiencedocuments associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure thatConstellation adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issuesfor resolution via their corrective action program. ln addition, the inspectors observedvarious plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operatingexperience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.AssessmentThe inspectors determined that Constellation appropriately considered industryoperating experience information for applicability, and used the information for correctiveand preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. Theinspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessonslearned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedureswhen applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience wasroutinely discussed and considered during the conduct of Plan-of-the-Day meetings andpre-job briefs.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Assessment of Self-Assessments and AuditsInspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of thecorrective action program, departmental self-assessments, and assessments performedby independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine ifConstellation entered problems identified through these assessments into the correctiveaction program, when appropriate, and whether Constellation initiated corrective actionsto address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of theaudits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.a.b.c.a..3Enclosure

8AssessmentThe inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal Constellationassessments were generally critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. Theinspectors observed that Constellation personnel knowledgeable in the subjectcompleted these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. Constellationcompleted these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issueswhich were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. ln general,the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issuescommensurate with their safety significance.FindinosNo findings were identified.Assessment of Safetv Conscious Work EnvironmentInspection ScopeDuring interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety consciouswork environment at NMPNS. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel todetermine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their managementand/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station Employee ConcernsProgram coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employeeswere aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns.The inspectors reviewed the Employee Concerns Program files to ensure thatConstellation entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate.AssessmentDuring interviews, NMPNS staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective actionprogram to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing toraise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that theypersonally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had beenretaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated anadequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee ConcernsProgram. Based on these limited interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was noevidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significantchallenges to the free flow of information.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Meetinqs. Includinq ExitOn October 21,2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results toMr. George Gellrich, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the NMPNS staff.The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors ordocumented in this report.b.c..4a.40A6b.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

G. Gellrich, Acting Site Vice President
M. Flaherty, Acting Plant General Manager
L. Martiniano, Quality and Performance Assessment
M. Shanbhag, LicensingP Swift, Engineering Manager
D. Wolniak, Performance lmprovement Unit Director

NRC Personnel

K. Kolaczyk, Senior Resident lnspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened05000220,410t2011008-01 uRlInconsistencies Between Non-Safety RelatedBreaker Preventive Maintenance Templates andStation Practices

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 4OA2: Problem ldentification and ResolutionAudits and Self-AssessmentsCAP-09-01-N, Corrective Action Program Audit Report 2009FPP-09-01-N, Fire Protection Audit Report 2009MAI-09-01-N, Maintenance Report of Audit 2009QPA Assessment Report 09-049, Elective Maintenance BacklogQPA Assessment Report 09-083,

USA Nuclear Safety Culture AssessmentQPA Assessment Report 09-092, Stations Response to Liquid Poison Pump lssueQPA Assessment Report 1 1-001, Nine Mile Point-Fleet Type ll - Nuclear Safety CultureAssessmentQPA Snap-Shot Self Assessment
SA-2010-000082, Fire Brigade Fire Drill Results 2ndl3rdQuarterQPA Snap-Shot Self Assessment
SA-2010-000113, Training Maintenance Training AdvisoryCommittee (TAC) EffectivenessQPA Snap-Shot Self Assessment
SA-2011-000170, Employee Concerns Program (ECP)Postings, Office Space and FilesAttachment
A-25A-2009-000019, Evaluate Use of OE during Pre-job BriefingsSA-2011-000020, Perform An Interim Self-Assessment Of Cat. 1 And 2 ConditionReportsSA-2011-000059, Use of OE during N1R21SA-2011-000125, Review of prioritized as Priority 1
OESA-201
1-000142, Chemistry Activities during Work StoppageSA-2011-000155, Review of 2nd quarter 2011 ALARA Committee EffectivenessCondition Reports2001 -0096732006-0003362006-001 7302006-0017722046-0033522006-0046422007-0002362007-0004332007-0023322007-0027092007-0027452007-0037062047-0054122007-0055382007-0060122007-0065822007-0070512007-0070742007-0472552008-0000952008-0002402008-00081 82008-0011772008-0012122008-001 51 12008-001 8062008-0032412008-0040012008-0054832008-00561 12008-0066982008-0081 892009-0007792009-0008122009-0010932009-001 1 1 52009-001 1282009-001 41 32009-0026202009-0027262009-0029732009-0030262009-0032092009-0032252009-0033842009-0033942009-00341 52009-0035262009-0036322009-0041 952009-0043082009-0049142009-0050442009-0050912009-0053982009-0055202009-0059432009-0059832009-0060032009-0064222009-0061652009-0062382A09-0062442009-0062992009-0063052009-0063702009-0063962009-0065262009-0065642009-0067012009-0068382009-0069062009-0069142009-0069612009-0070292009-0071292009-0072012009-0074172009-0074422009-0074572009-0075892009-0076242009-0078382009-0079642009-0080242009-0080892009-0081412009-0081 562009-0081 572009-0082482009-0085032009-0085032009-0087472009-0087872009-0087952009-0088482009-008928201 0-0001 01201 0-0001 92201 0-0001 95201 0-0001 952010-0002392010-000429201 0-000604201 0-0006292010-0007012010-000782201 0-001
048201 0-001 4002010-0014292010-0014312010-001457201 0-001
546201 0-001
657201 0-001
901201 0-001 9692010-002002201 0-0020032010-0020042010-0022022010-0023522010-0023562010-0025742010-002586201 0-0026852010-002755201 0-002985201 0-0030602010-0037382010-003746201 0-0038992010-0041102010-0041322010-004257201 0-0044082010-0047032010-0047272010-0052892010-0053032010-0053802010-0055502010-0056532010-0057022010-005709Attachment
201 0-005985201 0-005997201 0-0060692010-0061222010-0062502010-006253201 0-006253201 0-006261201 0-00651 I201 0-006647201 0-0066472010-0071122010-0072182010-0074122010-0074732010-0077522010-007752201 0-0080242010-0080252010-008245201 0-0084432010-0084442010-0084812010-0084812010-0085082010-0085952010-0086452010-0087232410-0088342010-008858LERs201 0-0091 63201 0-0093442010-0095022010-009721201 0-009756201 0-00991 I201 0-01
0023201 0-01
0057201 0-01 03662010-010407201 0-01
0832201 0-01 1
008201 0-01 20392010-012327201 1-000'1432011-000257201
1-000358201
1-0003892011-000421201
1-00051 1201
1-000799201 1 -000820201
1-0008652011-0011312011-0012532011-0014762011-001543201 1 -001 5932011-001656201 1 -001
801201
1-001831201
1-0018332011-001845201 1 -001
968201
1-0020362011-002556201
1-0025662011-002692201
1-003005201
1-003063201
1-003266201
1-003628201
1-003758201 1 -0038572011-0040472011-0044072011-0044082011-004459201 1 -0045362011-004687201 1 -0050232011-0050242011-005592201 1 -0056522011-005712201
1-005993201
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1-0062662011-006273201
1-0063992011-006404201
1-006507201
1-006579201
1-0067532011-0070172011-0070342011-0071042011-0071712011-0072342011-0072692011-0073822011-0074692011-0074822011-008227201 1 -008263201 1 -008364201
1-0086402011-008657201
1-008659201
1-008660201
1-0087182011-008757201
1-008810201
1-0089132011-0092162011-009387201
1-009403201 1 -00941 02011-009411201
1-009514NMP'I 2009-003-00, Manual Scram and High Pressure Coolant Injection Following a Loss ofFeedwater Level Control Due to Firmware DeficiencyNMPl 2010-001-00, Reactor Scram Due to Inadequate Post-Maintenance TestingNMP1 2011-001-00, Turbine Trip Due to Oil Pressure Fluctuations to the Turbine Master TripSolenoidNMP2 2009-001-00, Momentary Loss of Control Power to High Pressure Core Spray Pump Dueto Degraded Fuse Block ConnectionNMP2 2010-001-01 , Reactor Scram Due to Inadvertent Actuation of the Redundant ReactivityControl System During MaintenanceAttachment
A-4NCVs and FindinosUnit 1
NCV 2009005-01, Two APRMs lnoperable Contrary to Procedure RequirementUnit 2
NCV 2009009-01, Failure to ldentify Procedural Inadequacies and Non-Compliances thatContributed to the November 4,2008, SW Pumps Foreign Material Intrusion EventsUnit 1
FIN 2009010-01, Failure to Properly Scope the SPDS Function of the Plant ProcessComputer into the Maintenance RuleUnit 2
FIN 2010002-01, Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Results in Loss of Loads for Non-Vital UPSUnit 2
NCV 2010002-02, Inadequate Performance Testing of Division 1 BatteryUnit 2
NCV 2010002-03, Reactor Scram Due to Inadequate Procedure for RHR DetectorRestorationUnit 2
NCV 2010003-01, Excessive Reactor Pressure Vessel Drain Down Due to lnadequateProcedureUnit 2
FIN 2010004-01, Failure to Maintain Radiation Exposure ALARA During RHR SystemModificationUnit 2 Ff N
2010004-02, Failure to Maintain Radiation Exposure ALARA During Refueling FloorActivitiesUnit 1
NCV 2010005-01, Reactor Scram due to Inadequate Post-Maintenance TestingUnit 2
NCV 201 1002-01, lnadequate ldentification and Corrective Actions for Emergency DieselGenerator Temperature Control Valve DegradationUnit 1
NCV 2011002-02,Inadequate Corrective Actions to Correct Motor Control Center SpringClip Engagement lssuesUnit 1
FIN 2011003-01, Inadequate Procedural Guidance for Main Turbine and GeneratorMa intenance ActivitiesOperatinq ExperienceOE-2009-002707, lN09-16 Spurious Relay Actuations Result in Loss of Power to SafeguardsBusesOE-2009-003154, lN09-26 Degradation of Neutron-absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel PoolOE-2010-000540, lN10-06 Inadvertent Control Rod Withdraw Event While ShutdownOE-2010-001 171 , TYCO (Part 21) Vendor Notification #45862OE-2010-001979, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (Part21) Vendor Notification #46060OE-2010-002172, lN10-13 Failure to Ensure that Post-fire Shutdown Procedure can bePerformedOE-2010-002366, Braidwood - SCRAM #46178OE-2010-002764,lN10-20 Turbine-Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Repetitive FailuresOE-2010-002923, lN10-21 Crack-like Indication in the U-bend Region of a Thermally TreatedAlloy 600 Steam Generator TubeOE-2011-000338, lN11-02 Operator Performance lssues Involving Reactivity Management atNuclear Power PlantsOE-2011-001319, lN11-09 Fixed Gauge Shutter Failures Due to Operating in Harsh WorkingEnvironmentsOE-2011-001601, Fitzpatrick (Part21) Log No. 2011-32-00OE-2011-001861, lN11-14 Component Cooling Water System Gas Accumulation and OtherPerformance lssuesAttachment
A-5ProceduresCNG-CA-1.01-1000, Corrective Action Program, Revision 00500CNG-CA-1.01 -1 000, Corrective Action Program, Revision 00501CNG-CA-1 .01-1004, Root Cause Analysis, Revision 00800CNG-CA-1.01-1005, Apparent Cause Evaluation, Revision 00600CNG-CA- 1 . 0 1 - 1 007, Performance I mprovement Program Trend ing and Analysis,Revision 00300CNG-CA-1.01-1009, Change Management, Revision 001 00CNG-CA-1.01-1010, Use of Operating Experience, Revision 00400CNG-CA-1.01-101 1, Management Observation Program, 00300CNG-CA-2.01-1000, Self-Assessment and Benchmarking Process, Revision 00400CNG-EP-1.01-1006, Drill and Exercise Scheduling and Preparation, Revision 00100CNG-EP-1 .01-1007, Evaluation and Documentation of Drills, Exercises and Classified Events,Revision 00000CNG-FES-0O7 - Preparation of Design lnputs and Change lmpact Screen, Revision 00011CNG-MN-4.01-1000, Work Order Initiation, Screening and Prioritization, Revision 3CNG-MN-4.01-1003, Work Order Planning, Revision 00500CNG-MN-4.01 -1 008, Pre/Post-Maintenance Testing, Revision 001 00CNG-MN-4.01-GL002, Post Maintenance Test and Post Maintenance Operability TestRequirements Guideline, Revision 0CNG-OM-1.01-1000, Outage Management, Revision 00501CNG-OP-1.01-1001, Operational Decision Making, Revision 00300CNG-OP- 1 .01 -1 002, Operability Determi nation Process, Revision 00 1 0 1CNG-OP-4.01-1000, Integrated Risk Management, Revision 00900CNG-QL-1.01-1004, Quality Audit Process, Revision 00400CNG-QL-3.01-1001, Safety Conscious Work Environment and Employee Concerns Program,Revision 00200CNG-TR-1 .01-1000, Conduct of Training, Revision 00600CNG-TR-1 .01 -1 002, Performance/Needs Analysis Worksheet, Revision 200CNG-TR-1 .01-1003, Design Phase Activities, Revision 00200CNG-TR-1 .01 -1 005, lmplementation Phase Activities, Revision 00200CNG-TR-1.01 -1 01 6, Maintenance Supervisor Training Program, Revision 00201EPIP-EPP-20, Emergency Notifications, Revision 02600EPIP-EPP-30, Prompt Notification System Problem Response, Revision 01100EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Technical Bases, Revision 01800GAI-MAl-0'1, Maintenance Pre-job Preparation and Walkdowns, Revision 01500GAI-OPS-20, Transient Mitigation Guidelines (TMG), Revision 05GAP-lNV-02, Controlof Material Storage Areas, Revision 02500GAP-OPS-O1, Administration of Operations, Revision 06001lC-FlC-GRYBT, l&C, Make/Remake Grayboot Connections Lesson Plan, Revision '1lC-FlL-GRYBT, l&C Technician Nuclear Training Program Grayboot LaboratoryN1-EPM-FPM-MO01, Emergency Lighting Inspection, Revision 00101N1-lMP-LEV-MON, Reactor Level Monitoring, Revision 00300N1-lPM-029-010, Rework/Replacement of Valve Positioning Instrumentation for FeedwaterValves lD11A, lD11B, lD12A, and lD128, Revision 00700N1-lSP-036-004, LowLow Reactor Level lnstrument Tip Channel TesUCalibration, Revision 201N1-OP-38A, Source Range Monitors, Revision 02000N1-OP-388, Intermediate Range Monitors, Revision 02000N1-OP-38C, Local Power Range Monitors, Revision 02000N1-PM-34, Reactor Cavity Flood Up and Drain Down, Revision 00300Attachment
A-6N1-PM-S1, Operator's Rounds Guide, Revision 1900N1-SOP-21.1, Fire In Plant, Revision 00400N1-ST-M4A, Emergency Diesel Generator 102 and
PB 102 Operability Test, Revision 00500N1-ST-M48, Emergency Diesel Generator 103 and
PB 103 Operability Test, Revision 00500N1-VLU-01, Valve Lineup and Valve Operations, Revision 02N2-EPM-GEN-V624, UPS lnverter Functional Checks, Cleaning and Inspection, Revision 01000N2-lPM-RRC-R005, Standby Liquid ControlTank Level Calibration, Revision 00600N2-lPM-UPS-100, Control Alignment Procedure for EXIDE 75 KVA Uninterruptable PowerSystems, Revision 00101N2-MFT-184, Feedwater Pump/Min Flow Valve Testing, Revision 00100N2-MSP-CNT-R005, Primary Containment Structural I ntegrity I nspection andSuppression Pool Cleaning, Revision 01101N2-OP-34, Condensate and Feedwater System, Revision 02900N2-OP-92, Neutron Monitoring, Revision 00701N2-OP-115, Alternate Decay heat Removal System, Revision 00700N2-OSP-EGS-M@001, Diesel Generator and Diesel Air Start Valve Operability Test - Division Iand ll, Revision 00800N2-OSP-EGS-M@002, Diesel Generator and Diesel Air Start Valve Operability Test - Divisionlll, Revision 00800N2-OSP-lSC-R301, ATWS Recirc Pump Trip Logic System Functional Test, Revision 00401N2-PM-082, RPV Flood up / Draindown, Revision 00400N2-PM-S014, Building Rounds, Revision 1300N2-SOP-08, Unplanned Power Changes, Revision 00701N2-SOP-29, Sudden Reduction in Flow, Revision 01200N2-SOP-31R, Refueling Operations Alternate Shutdown Cooling, Revision 00800N2-SOP-71, Loss of 2VBB-UPS1A, 18, 1G, Revision 04N2-VLU-O1, Walkdown Order Valve Lineup and Valve Operations, Revision 00NAI-MAI-10, Maintenance Crew Level Management Review Meeting, Revision 03.01NER-1M-080, Miscellaneous Non-Safety Related Vessel Internals lnspection and Evaluation,Revision 04NIP-EPP-O1, Emergency Response Organization Expectations and Responsibilities,Revision 03000NMP-TR-1.01-500, Common Site Training Programs, Revision 00600S-EMP-GEN-004, lnsulation of Power, Control, and Instrument Cable Connections,Revision 00200S-EPM-GEN-063, Limitorque MOV Testing, Revision 00600S-EPM-GEN-081, Site 13.8 & 4.16 KV Motor Inspection P.M., Revision 00102S-EPM-GEN-813, Annual Inspection of Emergency Battery Light (EBL) Units, Revision 00100S-SAD-FP-O105, Compensatory Measures for Inoperable Fire Protection Systems andComponents, Revision 01 800Work Ordersc91062295c91 106136c91 106138c91403808c91 15981 1Attachment
A-7MiscellaneousA10.2-A-090, MOV Sizing Calculation for 2FWS-LV1OA/B/C, Revision 02Calculation 1000646.302, Nine Mile Point 2 Min Flow Line Evaluation, Revision 1Feedwater System Health Report, July 1, 201 1-September 30, 201 1H21C-027, Shield Plug, Revision 1July 2011 Results Nuclear Safety Culture Electronic SurveyNDE Report 2-6.05-08-0027,21AS-TK1C Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement, datedAugust 15,2008Nine Mile Point Nuclear Safety Culture Electronic Survey Final Data 710612011NUREG-1047, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Nine Mile Point NuclearStation Unit No. 2, Supplement No. 4, dated September 1986Refuel Services ALARA Plan513.4-70HX03, Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Heat Exchanger Thermal PerformanceEvaluation, Revision 03.00S22.4-68AOV001, Component Level Assessment of lV 68-08, -09, 10, Revision 00Unit One Liquid Poison System Health Report (41112011 -613012011)Unit One Process Computer System Health Report (41112011 - 613012011)Vendor Manual N1 E09669M1SE002Vendor Manual N2E09669M1SE001ADAMSCFRCRDRPEDGEPRIESFrMcINMCCBNCVNMPNSNRCNSRPARSPCMPMSDPSRVTSURI

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management SystemCode of Federal RegulationsCondition ReportDivision of Reactor ProjectsEmergency Diesel GeneratorElectric Power Research InstituteEngineered Safety Featurelnspection Manual Chapterlnformation NoticeMolded-Case Circuit BreakerNon-Cited ViolationNine Mile Point Nuclear Station,

LLCN uclear Regulatory CommissionNon-Safety RelatedPublicly Available Records SystemPerformance Centered MaintenancePreventive MaintenanceSignificance Determination ProcessSafety Relief ValveTechnical SpecificationsUnresolved ltemAttachment