ML20027D654

LER 82-108/01T-0:on 821016,performance of TOP-100 Disclosed Valves 1-CS-116 & 1-CS-118 Were Closed.Caused by Valves Being Closed During Leak Test/Troubleshooting of MOV-CS 10A & B During Maint.Valves Opened

ML20027D654
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/29/1982
From:	Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20027D643	List: ML20027D642 ML20027D654
References
LER-82-108-01T, LER-82-108-1T, NUDOCS 8211080205
Download: ML20027D654 (3)

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,,, ;MOV-CS-102A and B during maintenance with the unit at cold shutdown.

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l' ATTACHMENT 1 (PAGE 1 0F 2)

SURRY 10WER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET Not 50-280

' REPORT NO: 82-108/01T-0 .

-EVENT DATE: 10-16-82 TITLE OF THE EVENT: Chemical Addition Flow Path Isolated

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With the unit at hot shutdown, the performance of TOP-1000 (RWST Special Sample -

Program) disclosed that valves 1-CS-ll6 and 1-CS-llS were closed. These valves are the chemical addition tank discharge valves to the containment spray pump suctions.

This event is contrary to T.S. 3.4.A.5 and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.a.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The containment spray system is an engineered safeguards system comprised of spray rings, pumps, valves, tanks, and interconnecting piping. The chemical addi-tion subsystem supplies NaOH from the chemical addition tank to the containment spray pump suctions. NaOH is used for: (1) ultimate sump pH (long term corrosion control and retention of iodine) and (2) to enhance the spray removal of radioactive iodine from the containment atmosphere. The performance of the containment spray system including the CAT tank level and automatic valves is displayed in the control room.

Closure of the subject valves did not affect the capability of the containment spray pumps to draw from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to perform the containment de-pressurization function. Observation and evaluation of control room indication would have resulted in the manual addition of the Chemical Addition Tank Volume thus assuring proper-ultimate sump pH and long-term iodine retention. .

Analynis of the iodine removal capability of the containment spray system was performed. Using the expected iodine partition coefficient for boric acid spray without NaOH addition, the site boundary dose limit of 10CFR100 would not have been exceeded.

Since established dose limits would not have been exceeded and the NaOH isolation was identified and corrected promptly, the health and safety of the public were not affected. .

3. CAUSE:

It has been determined that these valves were shut while leak test / troubleshooting of MOV-CS-102A and B. This testing was performed with the unit at cold shutdown.

The scheduled valve lineup for the system was not performed prior to returning the unit to service.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Valves 1-CS-ll6 and 118 were immediately reopened and a complete system valve lineup was performed.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None required.

o '%

. ATTACHMENT 1 (PAGE 2 0F 2)

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO 1 DOCKET No: 50-280 REPORT NO: 82-108/01T-0 EVENT DATE: 10-16-82 1

TITLE OF THE EVENT: Chemical Addition Flow Path Isolated 1

.l

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Valves 1-CS-116 and 118 were added to the Engineered Safeguards Valve Alignment

-Checklist.. This checklist has been added to Operating Procedure (OP) 1.3, Unit Startup Procedure from 350/450 to Hot Shutdown,'cnd has also been added to OP-1.4, Unit Startup Procedure from Hot Shutdown to 2% Power. Valve line ups for. systems undergoing significant maintenance during an outage will be included in all future startup hold points.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: '!

I None, i

.