ML18153B264

LER 95-003-00:on 950224, as Found Calibration Test Data for Three RPS Transmitters Not within Allowable Tolerance. Caused by Faulty Pressure Gauge Used in Calibration.Pressure Gauge Replaced & Repeated Calibration check.W/950324 Ltr

ML18153B264
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	03/24/1995
From:	Christian D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
95-159, LER-95-003, LER-95-3, NUDOCS 9503300095
Download: ML18153B264 (10)

Text

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• DRIORI'TY 1 9ccELERATED RIDS PROCESSING) e REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9503300095 DOC.DATE: 95/03/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET#

FACIL:50-281 Surry Power Station, Unit 2, Virginia Electric & Powe 05000281 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION CHRISTIAN,D.A. Virginia Power (Virginia Electric & Power Co.) p RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R

SUBJECT:

LER 95-003-00:on 950224, "as found" calibration test data for three RPS transmitters not within allowable tolerance ..

Caused by faulty pressure gau~e used in calibration.Pressure gauge replaced & repeated calibration check.W/950324 ltr.

0 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR _JENCL I SIZE: Cf TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident°"Rpt, et-c-.---~~~

R NOTES: 05000281 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL T PD2-2 PD 1 1 BUCKLEY,B 1 1 y

INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AE0DfSPD7*RAB 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 ~ - CENJ'.;ER~ 02 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 -NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 1 1 NRR/DOPS/OECB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRSS/PRPB 2 2 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 D RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 0 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 C NOTES: 1 1 u

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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACTTHE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2083) TO ELHvHNATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 29 ENCL 29

10CFR50.73 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station 5570 Hog Island Road Surry, Virginia 23883-0315 March 24, 1995 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 95-159 Document Control Desk SPS:MDK Washington, D. C. 20555 Docket No.: 50-281 License No.: DPR-37

Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Unit 2.

REPORT NUMBER 50-281 /95-003 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours, D. A. Christian Station Manager Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 M. W. Branch NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station 3Gnn')n v.._,,._,.._J 9503300095 950324 PDR ADOCK 05000281 S PDR

i.

e e NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160.0104

• (5-92) EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH 11-IIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER) AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE(3)

SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000-281 1 OF8 TITLE (4)

Pressurizer Pressure Protection Transmitters Out of Calibration Due to Faulty Gauge EVENT DATE 61 LER NUMBER (6 REPORT DATE ') OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 181 MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 05000-281 Surry Unit 2 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 24 95 95 - 003 - 00 03 24 95 05000.

OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR:(Check one or more) (11) .

MODE (9) N 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(c)

POWER 20.405(a)(1 )(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 0 20.405(a)(1 )(Ii) 50.36(c)(2) X 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a)(1 )(Iii) X 50. 73(a)(2)0) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in Abstract below and 20.405(a)(1 )(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) in Text, NRC Form 388A)

... ::::..... 20.405(a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12)

NAME I(804r357~3184ing

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Area Code)

D. A Christian, Station Manaaer COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTA TO NPRDS ... ,.. Mf:f ;-: BLETO NPRDS NO i,

..... x**

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DA YEA y R I YESyes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

(1f XINO SUBMISSION DATE (16)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On February 10, 1995, with Unit 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 at Refueling Shutdown, the Unit 2 As Found calibration test data for three Reactor Protection System transmitters was not within allowable tolerance. During performance of scheduled calibrations, technicians calibrating three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters discovered the As Found data was above the allowable tolerance for each of the three transmitters. A Root Cause Evaluation Team determined the event was caused when a faulty pressure gauge that was not temperature compensated, was used to calibrate each of the three transmitters following their installation in June 1994. The transmitters provide pressurizer pressure input to the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features. An assessment of the safety implications has determined that operation of Unit 2 remained within its design basis and safety analysis limits. Unit 2 was in a safe shutdown condition at the time of discovery. Unit 1 pressurizer pressure protection transmitters were not affected. The faulty pressure gauge has been repaired. The Measuring and Test Equipment Program is being assessed for enhancements to prevent recurrence. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for operating in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii) for an event where a single cause resulted in independent protection functions being inoperable.

NRC FORM 388 (~)

NRCFORM366 eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160.0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH lHIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER) AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB n14), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 PAGEl31 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000-281 95 - 003 - 0 2oF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn 368A) {17)

1.0 DESCRIPTION

OF THE EVENT During a Unit 2 scheduled maintenance outage in June 1994, three new pressurizer [EIIS:AB,PZR]

pressure protection transmitters [EIIS:AB,Pn were installed in accordance with the design control program while the Unit was in Cold Shutdown. On June 18, 1994, while Unit 2 remained in Cold Shutdown, technicians performed a field calibration on the newly installed Rosemount Model 1154D pressure transmitters. On June 24, 1994 with the Reactor Coolant System [EIIS:AB] at Hot Shutdown (547 degrees F, 2235 psig), technicians made calibration adjustments to the three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters. Unit 2 operated through the remainder of the fuel cycle and entered a refueling outage on February 3, 1995.

On February 10, 1995,* with Unit 2 in Refueling Shutdown, technicians performing calibration checks discovered the As Found calibration data on the first of three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters was not within the allowable tolerance specified in the calibration procedure. The technicians replaced the pressure gauge used during the calibration, repeated the calibration checks, and confirmed that the As Found data for each of the three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters was not within allowable tolerance. The results of the As Found data for each of the three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters is listed below.

• 2-RC-PT-2455 was reading high by approximately 24 psig.

• 2-RC-PT-2456 was reading high by approximately 28.5 psig.

• 2-RC-PT-2457 was reading high by approximately 30 psig.

A Deviation Report was submitted on February 14, 1995. Assistance was requested from Corporate Engineering's Instrumentation and Controls group. Their assessment of probable causes and possible consequences using the preliminary information gathered, was provided on February 20, 1995. The design change package used during installation of the transmitters was reviewed and personnel involved with the installation effort were questioned with no installation problems identified. Preliminary information indicated that the pressurizer pressure protection transmitters had been miscalibrated.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM366 eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-4104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER) AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 . LER NUMBER (6) PAGEl3l YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SURRY POWER STATION, Unit2 05000-281 95 - 003 - 0 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A Root Cause Evaluation Team was assembled on February 23, 1995 in parallel with a request for a safety assessment from the Nuclear Analysis and Fuels Department. By February 24, 1995, sufficient reviews had been performed to determine that if reactor protection actuation had been required for certain transients during this event, some Technical Specification limits could have been exceeded, and a 30 day report was required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

On March 2, 1995, the Nuclear Analysis and Fuels Department completed an evaluation of the event's impact on existing safety analyses. Operation at rated power was bounded by existing analyses and within the plant's design basis. Nonetheless, a single cause resulted in independent protection functions being inoperable which is also a condition reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(vii).

The three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters provide input to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) [EIIS:JC] and the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) [EIIS:JE]. These three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters provide input for the high-pressure protection, low-pressure protection, and overtemperature delta T protection reactor trip functions. Also, an ESF actuation resulting in Safety Injection (SI) [EIIS:BQ] occurs when a pressurizer low-low pressure condition exists. Technical Specification 3.7, Instrumentation Systems, provides the limiting conditions for these functions.

The postulated transients which could be impacted by any change in the pressurizer low-pressure reactor trip actuation function had been previously analyzed and reviewed. These transients were re-evaluated for the As Found condition of the transmitters. The evaluation concluded that operation at rated power remained conservatively bounded by existing analyses during the period the pressurizer pressure protection transmitters were not calibrated within their allowed tolerance. Nevertheless, the Technical Specifications limit of greater than or equal to 1860 psig for pressurizer low-pressure reactor trip actuation, TS 2.3.A.2.c, could have been exceeded if a postulated accident had occurred during this event. Consequently, Unit 2 had operated in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications which is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM366 eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160~104 (5-92) EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLV WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER) AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB n14), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER 161 PAGEl31 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000-281 95 - 003 - 0 4oF8 TEXT (It more gpace Is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn 368A) (17)

The postulated transients that rely on the pressurizer low-low pressure safety injection actuation function were evaluated separately. The evaluation detennined that the existing analyses would bound and conservatively account for the affects of the pressurizer pressure protection transmitters being calibrated above their allowed tolerance. Nevertheless, the Technical Specifications limit of greater than or equal to 1700 psig for pressurizer low-low pressure safety injection actuation, TS Table 3.7-4, Functional Unit 3, Channel Action 'a~ could have been exceeded if a postulated accident had occurred during this event.

Consequently, Unit 2 had operated in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications which is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2){i){B).

2.0 SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The impact of having three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters not calibrated within allowable tolerance was evaluated. The evaluation confinned that existing margins of conservatism within the safety analyses offset any negative impact other than possibly exceeding Technical Specifications limits.

The fixed setpoint pressurizer high-pressure reactor trip remained operable and would have occurred sooner during a postulated accident with no negative consequences. The Technical Specifications limit of less than or equal to 2385 psig associated with the pressurizer high-pressure reactor trip actuation would not have been exceeded during this event if a postulated accident had occurred.

The allowable overtemperature delta T setpoint for this reactor trip function remained capable of perfonning its intended function throughout this event and would not have caused the function to exceed its Technical Specifications limit or safety analysis limit.

The postulated transients which could be impacted by any change in the pressurizer low-pressure reactor trip actuation function had been previously analyzed and reviewed. An evaluation concluded that operation at rated power during the period the pressurizer pressure protection transmitters were not calibrated within their allowed tolerance was conservatively bounded by existing analyses.

NRC FORM 368A (5-92)

NRC FORM366 eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 6/31/95 ESTIMA"TED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER) AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 PAGE131 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000-281 95 - 003 - 0 5oF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn 386A) (17)

The postulated transients that rely on the pressurizer low-low pressure safety injection actuation function were evaluated separately. The evaluation detennined that existing analyses would bound and conservatively account for the affects of the pressurizer pressure protection transmitters being calibrated above their allowed tolerance.

Based on the review of the safety analyses and calibration data for other protection transmitters, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

3.0 CAUSE The cause of this event resulted from technicians perfonning calibrations using a pressure gauge that was not temperature compensated, which also contained a manufacturing defect. The temperature difference between the Metrology Laboratory and the Unit 2 Containment Building [EIIS:NH] while at Hot Shutdown, resulted in the pressure gauge that was not temperature compensated, incorrectly indicating below actual pressure conditions during the calibrations. Consequently, an error of approximately 20 psi (high) was induced on the three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters when the pressure gauge that was not temperature compensated, was used during the calibration adjustments made while at Hot Shutdown. Also, discussions with the gauge manufacturer identified that improper torquing of the pressure gauge during assembly at the factory would induce linkage binding on the lower stop of the internal bourdon tube assembly. The gauge manufacturer identified this condition when repairing the faulty pressure gauge. The manufacturer acknowledged that this problem had been found on some similar gauges and that the problem is being corrected by the manufacturer when the gauges are returned for maintenance. These conditions resulted in each of the three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters being miscalibrated high by approximately 25 to 30 psi.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Technicians replaced the pressure gauge used during the first calibration check performed on February 10, 1995 and repeated the calibration check to confinn the accuracy of the finding.

NRC FORM 386A (5-92)

NRCFORM366 eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160-4104 (5-92) EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER) AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlON, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 PAGEl3l YEAR SEQUEtrrlALNUMBER REVIS10N NUMBER SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000-281 95 - 003 - 0 6oF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fenn 366A) (17)

The results of the calibration checks determined that the As Found data for the three pressurizer pressure protection transmitters was not within allowable tolerance. Due to Unit 2 being in Refueling Shutdown, no immediate safety concerns were associated with the pressure transmitters being outside their allowable tolerance. The pressure gauges used during the calibration checks were verified by the technicians to be properly calibrated and controlled within the Measuring and Test Equipment Program.

The results of the Unit 2 calibration effort were compared with the Unit 1 experience gained during similar transmitter replacements performed during the Unit 1 1994 refueling outage. Unit 1 did not experience any calibration difficulties. With Engineering's assistance, the Maintenance . Supervisor reviewed the data with the manufacturer of the transmitters. The cause of the pressure transmitters being outside the allowable tolerance could not be immediately determined. A Deviation Report was submitted.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Assistance was requested from Corporate Engineering's Instrumentation and Controls group. An assessment of probable causes and possible consequences, using the preliminary information gathered, was provided on February 20, 1995. The design change package used during installation of the transmitters was reviewed and personnel involved with the instaliation effort were questioned with no installation problems identified.

A Root Cause Evaluation Team was assembled on February 23, 1995 in parallel with a request for a safety assessment from the Nuclear Analysis and Fuels Department. The Nuclear Analysis and Fuels Department completed an evaluation of the event's impact on existing safety analyses. Operation at rated power remained bounded by existing analyses and within the plant's design basis.

Additional Corrective Actions also included:

• A series of tests performed on the installed pressure transmitters. No unacceptable results were identified.

• A verification of the operability of the associated instrumentation in each protection channel.

No problems were identified.

• A review of the calibration procedures. No problems were identified.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM366 e

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160~104 (5-92) EXPIRES 6/31/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER) AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB n14), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER (61 PAGE(31 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000-281 95 - 003 - 0 TEXT (II more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

• A review of the design control package and installation documentation. No problems were identified.

• A determination that the pressure gauge used during the calibrations was not temperature compensated, which contributed directly to the calibration error (3 psi for each 5 degrees F variation from 73 degrees F). The pressure gauges that were not temperature compensated have been collected and are being held in locked storage for later disposition.

• A determination that the pressure gauge used during the calibrations was identified as having a torquing problem which occurred during assembly. This torquing problem contributed directly to the calibration error resulting in non-repeatable calibration results. The pressure gauge has been corrected and remains in locked storage for later disposition.

• An evaluation for human error. No human error issues were identified.

• A Nuclear Network Operating Experience search. No similar issues were identified.

• A review of the equipment that had been calibrated using the pressure gauge that was not temperature compensated and contained the manufacturer's flaw. No safety significant equipment required re-calibration.

• A review of the gauges in the Measuring and Test Equipment program which determined that other pressure gauges that were not temperature compensated, were in use. These gauges are restricted from use pending future disposition. The protection transmitters calibrated with other pressure gauges that were not temperature compensated, were reviewed. No other problems were found where transmitters were calibrated outside of specified tolerances.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE Recommendations for enhancements will be contained within the Root Cause Evaluation Report. A summary of affected areas is provided below:

• Measuring and Test Equipment Program.

• Use of pressure gauges that are not temperature compensated.

• The Measuring and Test Equipment Program gauge calibration process.

• The procurement process.

• Training programs.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM366 eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3160-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES &/31/9&

EST1MA1ED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH lHIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO lHE INFORMATION LICENSING EVENT REPORT (LER) AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315().()104), OFRCE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 PAGE131 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 2 05000-281 95 - 003 - 0 TEXT (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 368A) (17) 7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS The following Licensee Event Reports for Surry Units 1 and 2 exceeded Technical Specification limits due to a common cause, though not similar to this event. No similar LERs were identified in which Technical Specification limits were exceeded due to faulty calibration equipment.

• LER S1-92-002, Undervoltage Relay Trip Setpoints Set Below Technical Specifications Limit Due to Procedure Error.

• LER S1-82-109, Steam Flow Setpoints greater than Technical Specification Limits Due to Calculation Error.

8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER Manufacturer: Heise Model: CMM Serial Number: 113194 NRC FORM 368A (5-92)