ML070380337
| ML070380337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/2006 |
| From: | Vanwyen T Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Todd Fish Operations Branch I |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML060800089 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML070380337 (50) | |
Text
SHIFT TURNOVER
.u PLANT CONDITIONS:
0 Unit 2 is starting up at 5% reactor power 0 The drywell is de-inerted INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:
0 None SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
0 Continue the reactor startup using GP-2 beginning with Step 6.2.54 and Rod Group 12 0 Secure Drywell Purge per step 6.2.43 of GP-2.
0 Commence inerting the containment IAW SO 76. I.A-2 Containment Atmosphere Inerting SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
None
-.4 GENERAL INFORMATION:
After turnover the crew will resume power ascension. GP-2 is complete through step 6.2.54; begin with Step 6.3. A Reactivity Briefing was already completed and you are ready to begin withdrawing rods at the beginning of Rod Group 12, control rod 14-55.
.W' Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page: 1 of13 Event
Description:
Power ascension with control rods Cause: N/A Effects: N/A
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Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct the URO to commence rod withdrawal in accordance with the Startup REMA and the Startup Sequence beginning with Rod Group 12, control rod 14-55.
URO Commence rod withdrawal beginning with Rod group 12, Rod 14-55.
Withdraw control rods by selecting the rod on the matrix and then using the Single Notch Withdrawal switch to withdraw control rods.
Monitor nuclear instrumentation and reactor power during control rod withdrawal.
PRO Monitor balance of plant conditions during rod withdrawal.
NOTE: The scenario will continue when the Lead Examiner is satisfied with the reactivity manipulation.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
-LJ Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 2 Page: 2of 13 Event
Description:
Control rod drifts out Cause: Leaking directional control valve on HCU Effects: Uncontrolled reactivity change
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Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior UROIPRO Acknowledge annunciator 21 1 (D-4) ROD DRIFT and inform CRS of alarm condition and that control rod 46-55 is drifting out.
CRS Enter ON-I 21 Drifting Control Rod.
Direct an Equipment Operator go inspect HCU 46-55 Request Shift Manager to notify Reactor Engineering URO Per ON-I 21 Drifting Control Rod:
Select control rod 46-55 on the select matrix
. .
Monitor changes in reactor power, level, pressure Insert control rod 46-55 to full in position using the Emergency-In control switch and HOLD at full in position for 30 seconds (perform this step for a total of 5 times since rod will continue to drift)
Insert control rod 46-55 to full in position using the Emergency-In control switch and HOLD at full in position prior to each scram attempt using scram toggle switch for control rod 46-55 (total of 3 times)
Release the Emergency-In control switch after each individual scram attempt using scram toggle switch for control rod 46-55.
Insert control rod 46-55 to full in position using the Emergency-In control switch and HOLD at full in position until individual scram is completed prior to isolating the HCU per step 2.10 of ON-121.
Release the Emergency-In control switch after the last individual scram attempt using scram toggle switch for control rod 46-55.
Reset the ROD DRIFT alarm after the control rod is isolated.
4 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: I Event No.: 2 Page: 3of13 Event
Description:
Control rod drifts out.. .(continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Direct an Equipment Operator to inspect HCU 46-55 Perform individual scram of control rod 46-55 by placing its associated scram toggle switch in the DOWN position on panel 20C016. After 15 seconds, return the toggle switch to the UP position.
Prior to isolating the HCU per step 2.10 of ON-I21 perform individual scram of control rod 46-55 by placing its associated scram toggle switch in the DOWN position on panel 20C016 AND keep in the DOWN position until the HCU is isolated.
Direct an Equipment Operator to isolate HCU 46-55 using SO 3.7.E-2 CRD Isolation During Reactor Operation (W/ Cooling Flow Maintained)
When control rod 46-55 is isolated, place the scram toggle switch in the UP position.
CRS Direct isolating control rod 46-55 using SO 3.7.E-2 per ON-I21 step 2.10.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.1.3.C. for one inoperable control rod. Fully insert within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and disarm within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
i/ Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page: 4of 13 Event
Description:
Secure drywell purge Cause: NIA Effects: NIA
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Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct drywell purge secured per step 6.2.43 of GP-2.
PRO Secure drywell purge starting at step 4.19 of SO 7B.4.A-2 Containment Atmosphere De-inerting and Purging Via SBGT System.
0 Place the standby Drywell Purge Fan to OFF 0 Stop the running Drywell Purge Fan 0 Shutdown SBGT using SO 9A.2.B SBGT System Shutdown Following Manual Start 0 Close AO-20459 and AO-20460 on panel 20C012.
0 Verify HCS-00522-1 is OPEN on panel OBC452 0 Close the following valves using SO 7B.7.A-2:
o AO-2505 o AO-2520 o AO-2506 o AO-2507 e Close SBGT valves AO-20469-7 and AO-20469-2 on the 20C012 panel.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
-u Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 4 Page: 5of13 Event
Description:
Inadvertent RClC initiation Cause: Fault in RClC initiation logic Effects: RClC initiates and injects into the RPV
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Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize the RClC System has inadvertently initiated.
CRS Direct securing the RClC System.
PRO Secure RCIC by depressing the "TRIP" pushbutton on RCIC panel.
CRS Request troubleshooting/technical assistance through the Shift Manager.
Reference Tech. Spec. 3.5.3.A - verify HPCI operable immediately and restore RClC to operable within 14 days.
Reference Tech. Spec. 3.3.5.2.B (RCIC Instrumentation) - declare RClC inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 5 Page: 6of 13 Event
Description:
CRD flow control valve failure Cause: In-service CRD System flow control valve controller fails.
Annunciator 21I(G-4) CRD CHARGING WATER HEADER HIGH PRESSURE Effects: Loss of CRD System regulating function
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize and acknowledge annunciator 21 1 (G-4) CRD CHARGING WATER HEADER HIGH PRESSURE. Report condition to Control Room Supervisor.
Recognize failure of in-service ACRD flow control valve (valve closed).
CRS Enter ON-I 07 Loss of CRD Regulating Function.
Direct performance of SO 3.6.D-2 CRD Hydraulic System Flow Control Valve Swapping.
URO Dispatch Equipment Operator to B CRD flow control station to perform step 4.1 .Iof SO 3.6.D-2.
Place CRD flow controller FC-2-3-301 in MANUAL and adjust flow to zero.
Direct Equipment Operator at B CRD flow control station to perform step 4.1.3 of SO 3.6.D-2 (instrument air and flow control selector switch to B).
Open flow control valve AO-2-3-198 using FC-2-3-301 to establish 55 to 65gpm system flow.
Place FC-2-3-301 in AUTOMATIC.
Direct Equipment Operator at B CRD flow control station to perform step 4.1.5 of SO 3.6.D-2 (isolate AO-2-3-19A).
,
.-: . Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 6 Page: 7of 13 Event
Description:
Small recirc system leak in the drywell Cause: Small recirc leak results in drywell temperature and pressure rising but not fully depressurizingthe RPV.
Effects: Drywell Hi-Lo Press alarms (210 F-2, 225 A-4)
High Drywell Pressure Scram Signal, Isolations, Diesel and HPCl auto starts.
Rising drywell pressure indicated. Manual scram at 1.2 psig or auto scram at 2 psig with isolations, HPCl and diesel starts.
-
Time Position ADplicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize Drywell High Pressure alarms.
Recognize Drywell pressure is going up and announce entry into OT-I 01 for High Drywell Pressure.
Trend the Drywell pressure increase.
CRS Enterjdirect actions in accordance with OT-I 01, High Drywell Pressure:
Verify Drywell lnerting is not in progress.
Direct placing additional drywell cooling in service.
Direct actions to monitor components e.g., RRP seals.
Direct crew to isolate and restore systems IAW OT-101 to stop the source of the leak. OT-101 systems include: RWCU, HPCl and RClC (Le.
close HPCl MO-15 steam supply valve, close RClC MO-15 steam supply valve...).
PRO Perform OT-101 actions as directed:
Monitor drywell pressure and plant parameters.
If directed, verify that inerting is not in progress.
If directed, place additional drywell cooling in service.
Monitor components for abnormal indications as directed by the CRS.
Isolate plant systems to include RWCU, HPCI, and RClC as directed by the CRS IAW OT-I 01 (Le. close HPCl MO-I 5 steam supply valve, close RClC MO-15 steam supply valve.. .).
CRS Direct a GP-4 Manual Scram when drywell pressure reaches 1.2 psig.
u Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page: 8of 13 Event
Description:
Small recirc system leak in the drywell.. . (continued)
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Perform GP-4 Manual Scram actions:
Place the Mode Switch to Shutdown.
Verify Rods inserting.
Manually control the Reactor Feed Water System to control reactor level.
Press Emergency Stop for the C RFP.
Shut MO-2149C, the C RFP discharge valve.
Open MO-8090 the Startup Level Controller isolation.
Verify APRMs are downscale and report to the CRS.
Verify all control rods inserted and report to the CRS.
Perform GP-8.B PCIS Isolations - Groups 2233.
PRO Perform scram actions.
Verify all isolations.
\ --- I Restore Instrument Nitrogen to the DW when directed by the CRS.
CRS Enter and execute T - I 00 Scram:
0 Direct level restored and maintained +5 to +35 inches.
0 Direct restoration of drywell instrument nitrogen IAW GP-8.E Primary Containment Isolation Bypass.
W* Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page: 9of 13 Event
Description:
Seven rods stick full out during the scram Cause: Rods are mechanically stuck in the full out position Effects: ATWS actions must be completed for the stuck control rods. This will require injection to be terminated and prevented prior to completing a RPV Blowdown.
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Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CT URO Recognize by reporting that NOT all control rods inserted on the scram.
CRS Enter the RC/Q-RODS section of T-101 RPV Control due to the ATWS.
Direct manual insertion of control rods using:
T-220, Driving Control Rods During a Scram.
T-216, Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram or Individual Scram Test Switches, OR T-246, Maximizing CRD Flow to the Reactor Vessel NOTE: T-220 is typically directed first because it is the most expedient method to insert a few control rods that failed to scram URO Attempt insertion of the control rods by the method specified by the CRS.
For T-220:
Place the CRD Flow Control in MANUAL and open the Flow Control Valve Fully OR Direct an Operator to close HV-2-3-56, the Charging Wtr Hdr Blk Vv to Hydraulic Control Units.
e Request permission and by pass the Rod Worth Minimizer.
e Attempt to insert the rods using the Emergency In/Notch Override Switch.
0 Report to the CRS the inability to insert the control rods.
PRO Note that the PRO will be required to perform T-240, Termination and Prevention of Injection into the RPV, later in the scenario as a result of the ATWS condition.
W Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page: 10of 13 Event
Description:
Drywell spray valve failures - prevents drywell spray Cause: Failure of drywell spray valves to open on both loops of RHR system Effects: 2 psig isolations, HPCl auto start, emergency diesel starts Drywell pressure continues to rise above 2 psig and requires the crew to perform an Emergency Blowdown when drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281OF
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and respond to 2 psig drywell pressure and announce entry into T-I 01 and T-I 02:
Recognize and verify Group 11/111 isolations.
Recognize and verify Diesel Generator starts and has cooling water.
Recognize and report the HPCI auto start if it has not been previously identified by the CRS.
Trend and report containment parameters.
J
- CRS Recognize and respond to 2 psig drywell pressure and announce entry into T-I01 and T-102
Reenter T-I 01 RPV Control, and enter T-I 02, Primary Containment Control.
Verify adequate level and may direct either a HPCl shutdown or isolation.
PRO Perform an isolation or shutdown of HPCI as directed by the CRS.
For isolation, depress the HPCl isolation pushbutton and verify that HPCl shuts down and the HPCl Steam Line Isolation Valves close.
For a HPCl shutdown, trip HPCI, verify that the HPCl aux oil pump starts as required, and place the HPCl Aux Oil Pump in Pull to Lock when HPCl stops rotating.
CRS Direct T-I 02 actions:
Direct Torus sprays IAW T-204 using B Loop RHR Direct T-223 actions to restore drywell ventilation.
Trend containment parameters, specifically drywell pressure and bulk average temperature.
u Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: I Event No.: 8 Page: I 1 of 13 Event
Description:
Drywell spray valve failures - prevents drywell spray.. . (continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Perform Torus Sprays IAW T-204, Initiation of Torus Sprays using RHR:
Open the MO-39B, Torus Hdr. Valve.
Open the MO-89D HPSW Outlet Valve.
Place the S18B switch in Manual Override.
Momentarily place the S17B switch in MAN.
Start the D HPSW Pump.
Start the D RHR Pump.
URO/PRO Recognize and report containment parameters:
Bulk Drywell temperature at 145°F and entry into T-I 02.
CRS Re-enter T-102 on Bulk Average temperature 145°F.
Continue T-101 Actions:
Direct RPV level controlled +5 to +35 inches.
May direct closing MSlVs to slow down RPV cooldown rate.
URO Maintain RPV level using additional feedwater that is required to keep up with the recirc leak.
URO/PRO Trend and report containment parameters.
CRS Direct URO/PRO to perform T-223, Drywell Cooler Fan Bypass, to bypass and restore drywell ventilation.
UROIPRO Perform T-223:
Direct EO to place drywell fans in slow.
Verify T-223 requirements.
\ i 5*
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 8 Page: 120f 13 Event
Description:
Drywell spray valve failures - prevents drywell spray.. . (continued)
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS When torus pressure cannot be maintained below 9 psig, and when drywell pressure and temperature plot within the safe region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit Curve, direct drywell fans shut down and drywell sprays initiated IAW T-204, Initiation of DW Sprays Using RHR.
PRO Spray the drywell in accordance with T-204, Initiation of Drywell Sprays Using RHR.
Recognize and report inability to spray the drywell using either RHR loop.
CRS When drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 281°F (drywell sprays and fans have not controlled drywell temperature) direct:
T-240, Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV (due to the 5 rod ATWS) .
CT T-112, Emergency Blowdown.
URO/PRO When directed, perform T-240 to Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV.
Verify that HPCl is not injecting.
Shutdown any running Reactor Feedwater Pumps by depressing the trip pushbuttons.
Contact the floor operator and direct the isolation of Stayfull from RHR and Core Spray.
NOTE: this step should be directed but actual isolation does not need to be completed prior to the blowdown.
CT PRO When directed, perform an Emergency Blowdown by opening all five ADS valves.
URO Control reactor level as directed following the blowdown.
(Note that level will swell high during the actual blowdown.)
'=/-. Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: Page: 13of13 TERMINATION CRITERIA:
The scenario may be terminated when 5 SRVS are open, the RPV is depressurized, and RPV level is under control.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
Classification is an Alert IAW EAL FA?.
SHIFT TURNOVER
.-2 PLANT CONDITIONS:
0 Unit 2 at 41% power with a shutdown in progress IAW GP-3 Normal Plant Shutdown INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:
0 None SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
Continue with plant shutdown IAW GP-3-2 Normal Plant Shutdown SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
0 None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
0 None GENERAL INFORMATION:
GP-3-2 is complete through step 6.18 L
0 Control rods have been inserted IAW GP-3-2 and NF-AB-720-F-1 0 Fifth stage feedwater heaters are out of service
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: I Page: I of 14 Event
Description:
Lower reactor power with reactor recirculationflow Cause: NIA Effects: N/A
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct URO to continue power reduction to 35% IAW GP-3-2, step 6.19.
URO Reduce recirculation pump speeds to reduce total core flow to 512 5 MLBIHR.
Verify both Moore Controllers are set to monitor the V (Oh output) variable.
0 Slowly reduce Moore controller demand signals for A and B recirc pumps.
Observe recirc system response for approximately 30 seconds before making additional speed changes.
..~ .
--- PRO Monitor plant equipment during power reduction.
W Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page: 2of14 Event
Description:
Secure a condensate pump Cause: NIA Effects: NIA Time 7 Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS When reactor power drops to approximately 35%, direct the PRO to shutdown a condensate pump in accordance with SO 5.2.A-2.
PRO Review SO 5.2.A-2 Condensate System Condensate Pump Shutdown and ensure prerequisites are met.
Secure one condensate pump, as directed:
Close the discharge valve for the pump to be shut down.
Stop the selected pump by turning the control switch to STOP (within 2 minutes of closing the discharge valve).
a Direct an Equipment Operator to close the Seal Water Supply Valve for the condensate pump that was shut down.
URO Monitor reactor parameters during condensate pump shutdown.
LJ Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page: 3of14 Event
Description:
LOSSOf 480 VAC MCC E324-D-A Cause: MCC fault Effects: I. Alarm: 004 F-I E324 MCC Fdr Bkr Trip
- 2. Loss of power to E-3 diesel generator auxiliaries
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize and report alarm 004 F-I E324 MCC Fdr Bkr Trip and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card.
Dispatch Equipment Operator to investigate the loss of MCC E324-D-A.
Green flag the tripped breaker by placing its control switch to the TRIP position.
Make a list of affected control room systems/loads (MOVs, etc.).
CRS Enter and direct actions of ARC 004 F-I E324 MCC Fdr Bkr Trip.
Review load list to determine affected loads ( A 0 56E.4-2 and/or E-I 619).
CRS Recognize entry into Tech Spec 3.8.1 .B for inoperable E-3 EDG.
Determine the following are required to meet the 14-day LCO:
0 Breaker alignment IAW ST-0-054-951-2.
0 SBO operability verification IAW ST-0-51 H-200-2.
(Otherwise, a 7-day LCO applies)
May also reference LCO 3.8.3 for loss of E-3 EDG auxiliary equipment.
Direct PRO to perform ST-0-054-951-2 and ST-0-51H-200-2.
PRO Perform ST-0-054-951-2 and ST-0-51H-200-2 (as time permits).
NOTE: the next event may be initiated before the STs are completed.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page: 4 o f 14 Event
Description:
Recirc RPT breaker trip (Arecirc pump)
Cause: Failure of breaker control logic Effects: 1. Alarms:
0 214 A-3 A Recirc Pump RPT Trip 0 214 B-4 A Recirc Pump Low Diff Press 214 C-2 A Recirc Gen Lockout Trip 214 C-3 A Recirc Drive Motor Trip
- 2. Trip of the Arecirc pump, causing reduction in core flow and reactor power
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize and report trip of the A reactor recirc pump and entry into OT-I 12 Unexpected/UnexplainedChange in Core Flow.
Enter the corresponding Alarm Response Cards for alarms 214 A-3 A Recirc Pump RPT Trip, 214 C-2 A Recirc Gen Lockout Trip, and 214 C-3 A Recirc Drive Motor Trip (as time permits).
Perform rapid shutdown of B feed pump as necessary to maintain RPV level in normal band using section 4.3 of SO 6D.2.A-2 Reactor Feed
- --- Pump Shutdown 0 Open AO-2139B Recirc Valve 0 Close AO-21476 Check Valve 0 Place the B RFP M/A Station in MANUAL Close MO-2149B Discharge Verify feed pump responds.
CRS Enter and execute OT-112 Unexpected/Unexplained Change in Core Flow.
Determine current operating point on Power-Flow Operation Map.
Direct monitoring for THI.
Direct closing A recirc pump suction valve MO-O53A, then re-opening valve after 5 minutes.
Direct performing SO 2A.2.A-2 Recirculation System Shutdown.
URO Monitor for THI.
Close A recirc pump suction valve MO-053A; re-open after 5 minutes.
Perform SO 2A.2.A-2 Recirculation System Shutdown (as time permits).
-..,
/ Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page: 5 o f 14 Event
Description:
Recirc RPT breaker trip.. . (continued)
Time Position ADplicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Perform A 0 2A. 1-2 Recirculation System Single Loop Operation.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.4. Iand determine requirements for operating in single loop.
NOTE: since OT-I12 and Tech Spec 3.4.1 allow up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for transitioning to single loop, these actions may be assessed as follow-up questions after the scenario is complete, as determined by the Lead Examiner.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page: 6of14 Event
Description:
Loss of off-site power Cause: Loss of the grid Effects: Reactor scrams, emergency diesels receive start signal, emergency buses transfer to the diesels when available
-
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize by reporting the loss of off-site power.
URO Perform scram actions:
0 Verify control rods are inserting.
0 Place the mode switch in Shutdown.
0 Verify APRMs are downscale (when power is available).
0 Report to the CRS that the mode switch is in Shutdown, control rods are inserting, and the APRMs are downscale (when power is available).
0 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.
CRS Recognize by reporting the event is an entry condition for T-I 00 "Scram".
Enter and execute T-I 00 "Scram".
Direct the URO to maintain RPV level between +5 to +35 inches using RCIC and/or HPCI.
Direct the URO to stabilize RPV pressure below 1050 psig using SRVs and/or HPCI in CST-to-CST mode.
Direct placing torus cooling in service.
PRO Recognize by reporting that the E-2 diesel is running but the E-22 breaker failed to close (see Event #6 for details).
Recognize by reporting that the E-3 and E-4 diesels failed to start (see Event #6 for details).
CRS Recognize by reporting the loss of off-site power as an entry into SE-1I "Loss of Off-Site Power".
Enter and execute SE-11 "Loss of Off-Site Power".
.
--
. ,, Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page: 7of14 Event
Description:
Loss of off-site power ...(continued)
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO Perform scram actions:
Verify main turbine trip and generator lockout.
0 Verify Group I, II, and Ill isolations and verify SGTS initiation, as applicable.
0 Verify scram discharge volume vents and drains are closed.
0 Verify Hydrogen Water Chemistry is isolated.
0 Verify recirc pumps are tripped.
Monitor Instrument Air header pressure and drywell pressure.
URO Maintain RPV level +5 to +35 inches using RCIC.
Place RClC in service IAW RRC 13.1-2:
0 Arm and depress RClC Manual Initiation Pushbutton.
0 Verify MO-131, MO-021, MO-132 open.
0 Verify AO-034 and AO-035 close.
0 Verify vacuum pump starts.
0 Verify RClC system flow rate is 600 gpm.
0 Place RClC Manual Initiation Pushbutton in DISARM.
UROIPRO Place torus cooling in service IAW RRC 10.1-2:
0 Open MO-O39A(B).
e Open MO-O89A(B).
e Verify associated diesel load is I 1400 KW.
0 Start RHR pump.
e Open MO-O34A(B) while verifying diesel loading.
e Verify flow is 11,500-12,200 gpm for one RHR pump in service.
0 Verify associated diesel load is S 2300 KW.
0 Start HPSW pump in each loop to be used for torus cooling.
0 Start additional RHR and HPSW pumps as necessary/directed (verifying diesel generator load as indicated above).
Verify flow is 2 20,000 gpm for two RHR pumps in service.
0 Direct Equipment Operator to close stay full injection valve(s) for the RHR loop(s) in service.
u-Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page: 8of14 Event
Description:
Loss of off-site power .. .(continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Stabilize RPV pressure below 1050 psig using SRVs and/or HPCl in CST to CST mode for pressure control IAW RRC 23.1-2 Section D:
0 Open MO-2-23-24 Cond Tank Return.
0 Verify closed MO-2-23-19 To Feed Line.
0 Startvacuum Pump.
0 Throttle OPEN MO-2-23-21 Full Flow Test for 3 to 4 seconds.
0 Simultaneously START Aux Oil Pump AND OPEN MO-2-23-14 Steam Supply.
0 Verify HPCl system flow rate is 5000 gpm (see Event #7).
CRS Direct restoration of instrument nitrogen using either:
0 Backup Instrument Nitrogen to ADS using SO 16A.7.A-2 o Place SV-8130A and SV-8130B control switches on panel 2OCOO3-03 to RESET and then in AUTOIOPEN.
o Verify open SV-813OA & 6.
o Verify Pl-8142 Backup N2 on the 2OCOO3-03 panel is 2 85 psig.
0 T-261 Placing the Backup Instrument Nitrogen Supply From the CAD Tank in Service.
URO Restore drywell instrument nitrogen as directed.
0 If directed to use Backup Instrument Nitrogen to ADS using SO 16A.7.A-2:
o Place SV-8130A and SV-8130B control switches on panel 2OCOO3-03 to RESET and then in AUTO/OPEN.
o Verify open SV-813OA & 6.
o Verify Pl-8142 Backup N2 on the 2OCOO3-03 panel is 2 85 psig.
0 If directed to perform T-261 Placing the Backup Instrument Nitrogen Supply From the CAD Tank in Service:
o Verify closed AO-2969B on panel 2OCOO3-03.
o Dispatch an Equipment Operator to the CAD Building perform step 4.2 (manual valving).
Operator Actions ES-D-2
-./
Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page: 9of 14 Event
Description:
E-2 diesel generator breaker auto closure failure Cause: Timer contact in breaker auto close circuit fails to close Effects: Diesel will auto start but the output breaker will not close on the loss of off-site power (breaker can be closed manually).
-
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize E-2 Diesel output breaker failure to auto close.
Verify that no bus faults exist.
Turn on the Sync Selector switch for E-22 output breaker.
CT Close the E-22 output breaker.
Verify that the bus reenergizes.
Inform the CRS that the bus has been restored.
Start the 'AESW pump.
CT CRS Direct the E-2 diesel output breaker closed, if not done.
NOTE: this task is critical in that it provides the electrical power required for containment sprays, which will be needed in Event #8.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 W.
Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page: 10of14 Event
Description:
E-3 and E 4 diesel generator auto start failure Cause: Various Effects: E-3 diesel generator cannot be started; E-4 diesel generator fails to start automatically but can be manually started using the quick start pushbutton
-
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize E-3 and E-4 diesel generator failure to start.
CT Attempt a quick start of the E-3 and E-4 diesels by depressing the associated QUICK START pushbuttons.
Recognize E-4 diesel starts and loads its busses.
Report the E-3 diesel failed to start from the control room.
Dispatch Equipment Operator to the E-3 diesel generator.
CT CRS Direct E-3 and E-4 diesels quick started, if not done.
NOTE: this task is critical in that it provides the electrical power required for containment sprays, which will be needed in Event #8.
.i.
'-4 e
.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page: 11 of14 Event
Description:
HPCl flow controller fails in automatic Cause: Instrument failure Effects: When HPCl is initiated, it will not reach sufficient speed to inject water into the reactor due to the flow controller failure. Operator action will be required in order to inject and/or control RPV pressure with HPCI.
-
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize HPCl is not injecting after system startup.
Respond to the failure by taking manual control of the HPCl flow controller and raising turbine speed.
Manually control HPCl turbine speed as necessary to establish and control HPCl injectionlRPV level.
Report the HPCl flow control failure and current status of HPCl to CRS.
4 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page: 120f 14 Event
Description:
Steam leak in the primary containment Cause: Unknown Effects: Various
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior UROIPRO Recognize by reporting the rise in drywell pressure.
Recognize by reporting the condition as an entry into OT-I01 High Drywell Pressure.
CRS Enter and execute OT-I01 High Drywell Pressure Direct drywell cooling maximized as necessary.
UROIPRO Recognize by reporting drywell pressure > 2 psig as an entry condition for T - I 01 RPV Control and T-I 02 Primary Containment Control.
CRS Enter and execute T-I 01 RPV Control.
Enter and execute T-102 Primary Containment Control:
For PCIP:
0 Direct GP-8B, Manual lsol of RBCCW and DWCW 0 Direct torus sprays initiated IAW T-204, Initiation of Torus Sprays Using RHR For DW/T:
0 Direct drywell cooling maximized by performing T-223, DW Cooler Fan Bypass CT 0 Before drywell temperature reaches 281O F , and when drywell pressure and temperature plot within the safe region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit Curve, direct drywell fans shut down and drywell sprays initiated IAW T-204, Initiation of DW Sprays Using RHR.
For PUG:
Direct CAD placed in service.
---4 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page: 130f 14 Event
Description:
Steam leak in the primary containment...(continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior UROIPRO Monitor T-I 02 parameters (torus temperature, torus level, drywell pressure, torus pressure, drywell temperature) and provide trends to the CRS, as appropriate.
Perform GP8B, Manual Isolation of RBCCW and DWCW (no isolation actions are required, however the Operator may modify system flow paths due to RBCCW system pressure/flow oscillations).
UROIPRO Spray the torus in accordance with T-204-2, Initiation of Containment Sprays using RHR 0 Verify System 1 and 2 Drywell Pressure Permits Containment Spray annunciators (224 D-3, 225 B-3) are lit.
0 Place keylock switch 10A-S18A(B) in MANUAL OVERRIDE.
0 Momentarily place switch 10A-S17A(B) in MANUAL.
0 Open or verify open M0-2-10-39A(B) Torus Header.
0 Open or verify open MO-2-10-89A(B,CID) HPSW Hx Outlet.
0 Verify load on EDG supplying selected pumps is below 1400 KW.
Start an RHR Pump.
Start a HPSW Pump.
0 Close or verify closed MO-2-10-34A(B) Full Flow Test.
0 Throttle open MO-2-10-38A(B) Torus Spray to obtain 1,000 gpm on FI-2-10-136A(B).
URO/PRO Maximize drywell cooling by performing T-223, DW Cooler Fan Bypass.
Verify operation on safe side of Figure IDWCW Saturation Curve.
0 Place all Drywell Cooler Fan control switches to OFF at panel 20c012.
0 Momentarily place DW Cooler Fans switch 43-S-J165 control switch in BYPASS and let it spring return to NORMAL at panel 20C05A.
0 Direct Equipment Operator to place Drywell Cooler Fan speed control switches to SLOW at their respective MCC in the Reactor Building.
0 Operate Drywell Cooler Fans to reduce Drywell temperature and pressure.
<
- --
I
-4 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page: 14of14 Event
Description:
Steam leak in the primary containment...(continued)
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO When directed, shutdown the drywell cooler fans by placing all fan control switches in OFF.
CT URO/PRO Spray the drywell in accordance with T-204, Initiation of Drywell Sprays Using RHR.
0 Verify Recirc Pumps are tripped.
0 Verify all Drywell coolers are OFF.
0 Open MO-2-10-31A(B) DW Spray Inboard.
0 Open MO-2-10-26A(B) DW Spray Outboard.
0 Close or verify closed MO-2-10-34A(B) Full Flow Test.
0 Monitor containment pressure.
0 Adjust spray flow rate by throttling MO-2-10-26A(B) as necessary.
URO/PRO Place CAD in service when directed.
TERMINATION CRITERIA:
The scenario may be terminated when Primary Containment parameters, RPV pressure and level are stable and under control.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
Classification is an Alert IAW EAL FAI.
SHIFT TURNOVER
=-J PLANT CONDITIONS:
0 Unit 2 is at 100% power.
INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:
2B EHC Pump is blocked 00s for fullers earth filter replacement.
SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
Transfer of 28 RPS to alternate feed to facilitate repairs for a failed trip coil continuity check of the B RPS feeder breaker 52-BC757B.
SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
0 2BEHCPump GENERAL INFORMATION:
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: I Page: I of10 Event
Description:
Transfer B RPS bus to alternate supply Cause: N/A Effects: Temporary loss of power, which will cause a reactor half scram and half Group 1 and Group 3 isolations
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct that 26 RPS power supply be transferred to alternate using SO 60F.6.A-2, Transferring Reactor Protection System Power Supplies.
PRO At the 20C017 panel verify:
Alt. Source Available light is on, Control Rod Drive Scram Solenoid Group 1,2,3,4 indicating lights are lit on the 20C015 panel, Place B RPS M/G Set Alt. Feed Transfer Switch to ALTERNATE position.
.-.--- URO Reset the half scram using GP-11.E Reset Reactor Protection System-Scram Reset:
Place the Scram Reset switch in the Group 1 & 4 position, then in the Group 2 & 3 position.
Verifies the four scram group white lights are lit on the 20C015 and 20C017 panels.
Verifies that the A and B Reactor Auto Scram annunciators are clear.
Places SDV Inboard Valve switch 5A-SI4A to OPEN position and verifies the inboard SDV vents and drains are open.
Places SDV Outboard Valve switch 5A-SI4B to OPEN position and verifies the outboard SDV vents and drains are open.
Verifies SDV not drained annunciators 210(C-1) and 210 (B-2) for are clear.
-.-. Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page: 2of I O Event
Description:
Transfer 6 RPS bus to alternate supply...(continued)
-
Time Position Apdicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Reset the Group 1 and 3 half isolations using GP-8.D Group 1,2,3 Outboard Half Isolation:
Verifies that the isolation has occurred IAW COL GP-8.D Required Position column.
Direct an Equipment Operator to verify all RB and Refuel Floor fans are tripped and to place all fan control switches to OFF.
Place control switches in COL GP-8.D to the position listed in the PLACE SWITCH TO column.
Reset Exhaust Radiation Monitors RIS-2-17-452B & D, AND RIS-2-17-458B & D on the 2OCO10 panel.
Place Outboard Isolation Logic Reset Switch 16A-S33 on the 20C05A panel to the GRP 2/3 position AND verify Group 2/3 Outboard Isolation Relays Not Reset annunciator is clear.
Shutdown SBGT System using SO 9A.2.A SBGT System Shutdown Following an Automatic Start.
Restore RB and Refuel Floor ventilation using SO 40B. 1.A-2 RB Ventilation System Startup and Normal Operation PRO Direct an Equipment Operator to measure voltage at the 20x040 transformer per step 4.1.6 of SO 60F.6.A-2.
-.-.-/ Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page: 3of10 Event
Description:
RClC 250 VDC bus failure Cause: Blown RClC 250 VDC bus fuses Effects: RClC is inoperable and unavailable for operation
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Reference ARC 209 (C-2) 2 DA RClC 250 VDC BUS LO VOLTAGE Dispatch Equipment Operator to perform ARC Operator Actions:
0 Check operation of battery chargers 2AD003 and 2CD003 (output voltage) 0 Check bus feed fuses at Panel 2ADO18.
CRS Refer to Tech Spec 3.5.3 for RClC being inoperable.
Enter Tech Spec 3.5.3.A. Verify HPCl is operable immediately and restore RCIC to operable within 14 days.
May also refer to Tech Spec 3.8.7 (for RClC 250 VDC Distribution System).
Requests assistance for troubleshooting/investigation from Shift Manager.
--*-./
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page: 4 o f 10 Event
Description:
Loss of RBCCW Cause: Trip of both the 2A and 2B RBCCW pumps Effects: Loss of cooling to RWCU System and recirc pumps
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct entry into ON-I 13 Loss of RBCCW including:
0 Shutdown of RWCU pumps 0 Close MO-2-12-068 RWCU Outlet 0 Monitoring Recirc Pump temperatures on TR-2-2-2-031 on panel 20c021.
0 Performance of GP-4 Manual Reactor Scram when it is determined that both recirc pumps need to be tripped (at approx.
200°F on bearings and seal cavities)
URO/PRO Shut down running RWCU pumps.
Close MO-2-12-068 RWCU Outlet.
PRO Monitor recirc pump motor bearing and seal cavity temperatures on TR-2-2-2-031 on panel 20C021
\..-,- Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page: 5of I O Event
Description:
Reduce reactor power Cause: Fast power reduction per GP-9-2 driven by ON-I 13 (Loss of RBCCW)
Effects: Reactor power is quickly lowered using recirc flow
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct reactor power be lowered IAW GP-9-2 Fast Power Reduction.
URO Lower reactor power IAW GP-9-2 Fast Power Reduction.
0 Lowers recirc flow until total core flow reaches 61.5Mlb/hr on FR-2-02-3-095 on the 20C05A panel OR An APRM HIGH alarm occurs.
0 If further power reduction is required, then insert GP-9-2 Appendix 1 control rods using the Rod Control Handswitch OR the Emergency In/Notch Override Handswitch on the 20C05A panel.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page: 6 o f 10 Event
Description:
ATWS (hydraulic)
Cause: Control rods insert to various positions due to limited Scram Discharge Volume Effects: Requires the crew to take actions to terminate the ATWS, as well as control RPV IeveVpower
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct performance of GP-4 Manual Reactor Scram URO Perform GP-4 Manual Reactor Scram Reduce recirc flow controllers to minimum (20% demand)
Place the reactor mode switch to shutdown position.
PRO Perform of GP-4 Manual Reactor Scram 0 Transfer house loads using Rapid Response Card RRC 53.1-2.
-
-v
, CRS Direct T-I 01, RC/Q ATWS actions:
0 Initiation of ARI 0 Trip Recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart CT 0 T-216, Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram 0 T-220, Drive Rods 0 Enter T-I 17, LeveVPower Control 0 SLC injection
u, Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page: 7 o f 10 Event
Description:
ATWS (hydraulic).. . (continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Perform T-I 01 RC/Q actions:
0 Initiate ARI; report that the scram air header is depressurized.
0 Trip Recirc pumps at least I O seconds apart.
CT 0 Direct an Equipment Operator to perform T-216 steps 4.1 and 4.2 (install jumpers in Cable Spreading Room and Main Control Room to defeat ARI Initiation Logic and bypass all RPS Auto scrams signals).
CT 0 Per T-216 (on the 20C05A panel) o Reset ARI by placing ARI A & B manual pushbutton collars in Disarm, o Depress the A & B ARI reset pushbuttons, o Place the Scram Reset switch 5A-S9 to the Group 1&4 and Group 2&3positions o Open Scram Discharge Volume inboard and outboard vents and drains.
0 Perform T-220.
CRS Direct T-I 17 actions:
0 Inhibit ADS.
T-221, Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass.
CT 0 T-240, Termination And Prevention Of Injection Into The R P V PRO Perform T-I 17 actions:
0 Inhibit ADS.
0 Direct Equipment Operator to perform T-221.
CT 0 Perform T-240: terminate and prevent injection from all injection sources except RCIC, SLC and CRD; control RPV level below -
60 and within the specific RPV level band directed by the CRS.
o Place HPCl Aux. Oil Pump in the Pull to Lock position.
o Press Emergency Stop for all reactor feed umps o Close reactor feed pump discharge valves MO-2149A,B,C o Verify closed MO-8090 IC RFP Discharge Bypass
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page: 8of 10 Event
Description:
Standby liquid control pump trips Cause: SLC Pump first placed into service trips on overcurrent Effects: Standby SLC Pump must be placed into service manually to mitigate ATWS
-
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize that the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Pump placed into service has tripped.
Place the standby SLC Pump in service using keylock control switch on the 20C05A panel.
\
-.-*.
I Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page: 9of 10 Event
Description:
Drywell vent valve (AO-2509) fails to isolate Cause: Group 3 isolation signal fails to close AO-2509 on RPV low level during scram Effects: AO-2509 stays open potentially affecting Secondary Containment isolation capability
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize that AO-2509 did not auto close on Group 3 signal.
Close AO-2509 by placing valve control switch to close position on panel 20C484B.
c-
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page: 10of 10 Event
Description:
AEHC pump trips / loss of turbine bypass valves Cause: AEHC pump trips on overcurrent condition Effects: Complete loss of Turbine EHC System causing a turbine trip and bypass valve to close Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize turbine trip condition.
Recognize loss of only available EHC Pump.
Crew Recognize complete loss of EHC System and eventual loss of turbine bypass valves for RPV pressure control.
Direct RPV pressure control using SRVs URO/PRO Controls RPV pressure below 1050 psig using SRVs OR to stay on safe side of T-I 02 Curve T/L-I SRV Tail Pipe Limit i f Torus water level is high out of normal band.
UROIPRO Place Torus cooling in service using RRC 10.1-2 0 Open MO-2-10-39A(B) 0 Open MO-2-32-89A (B, C, or D) 0 Start a HPSW Pump 0 Start an RHR Pump 0 Open MO-2-10-34A(B) 0 Place additional pumps in service as required TERMINATION CRITERIA:
The scenario may be terminated when the crew has control of RPV power and level using T-240 Termination and Prevention of Injection into the R P V and the crew begins draining the Scram Discharge Volume per T-216 in order to attempt another scram to insert control rods.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
Classification is a Site Area Emergency IAW EAL MS4 Auto and Manual Scram NOT Successful
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
d 0 Approximately 76% power with a GP-2 Startup in progress 0 GP-2 is complete through step 6.3.60 0 Control rod sequence is completed through Group 30 0 RES are currently evaluating the rod pattern changes and will provide an updated REMA following shift turnover 0 The Unit 2 Turbine Building 116 Cardox Tank is being refilled 0 A routine Diesel Fuel Oil delivery is expected this shift INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:
BRHR Pump out of service for motor replacement; day 1 of TSA (LCO 3.5.1). Expected to be returned to service in 2 days SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
None SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
Perform RT-0-01D-402-2, Master Trip Solenoid Valves Operability Test ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
u 0 B RHR Pump GENERAL INFORMATION:
Complete the Master Trip Solenoid Valves RT
Operator Actions ES-D-2
- .-, Op Test No.
- 1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page: 1 of9 Event
Description:
Main turbine master trip solenoid valves routine test Cause: N/A Effects: N/A
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct PRO to perform RT-0-01D-402-2, Master Trip Solenoid Valves Operability Test.
PRO Perform RT-0-01D-402-2, Master Trip Solenoid Valves Operability Test:
0 ReviewRT 0 Place the Master Trip Test Selector switch to TRIP A 0 Verify Test A lamp if OFF 0 Release and place Master Trip Test Selector switch to RESET Verify Test A lamp if ON 0 Place the Master Trip Test Selector switch to TRIP 6 0 Verify Test 8lamp if OFF 0 Release and place Master Trip Test Selector switch to RESET 0 Verify Test B lamp if ON 0 Complete RT paperwork CRS Review RT for cornpleteness/satisfactory results.
URO Monitor plant parameters/assist as directed.
~ - -__
- Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
1 Operator Actions Scenario No.:
SBO line failure 4 Event No.: 2 Page:
ES-D-2 2of9 Cause: Differential overcurrent trip of transformer OOXOl9 Effects: 1. Alarm: 006 G-2SBO Circuit Trouble
- 2. Trip of the SBO-1005 breaker Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize and report alarm 006 G-2,SBO Circuit Trouble and nte th corresponding Alarm Response Card.
Dispatch Equipment Operator to the SBO switchgear.
CRS Review TRM 3.18; determine the SBO line must be returned to service within 15 days.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
---J Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page: 3of9 Event
Description:
Loss of extraction steam to 3A and 4A feedwater heaters Cause: A 0 valves supplying the heaters fail closed Effects: 1. No alarms
- 2. Reduced feedwater temperature; rising reactor power
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize rising reactor power, inform CRS and announce entry into OT-104 Positive Reactivity Insertion.
URO/PRO Investigate cause of power rise.
Recognize lowering feedwater temperatures, inform CRS.
Recognize loss of extraction steam to feedwater heaters, inform CRS.
CRS Enteddirect actions IAW OT-I 04 Positive Reactivity Insertion.
Monitor position on Figure 1 of OT-104.
0 Direct the insertion of control rods as required to reduce power to 10% below the pre-transient level, IAW GP-9-2 Fast Reactor Power Reduction.
0 Direct troubleshooting of feedwater heater problem.
URO Reduce power by driving GP-9-2 rods as required to reduce power to at least 10% below the pre-transient power level (to 66% power).
CRS Evaluate position on Figure 1 of OT-104to determine whether Tech Spec action is required to implement Thermal Limit penalties, recover FW heating, or drop power ~ 2 5 % .
Determine feedwater heating is asymmetric due to > 5°F feedwater temperature AT.
Determine need to perform A 0 6.7-2 Asymmetric Feedwater Temperature Operation within two hours to comply with Tech Specs 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
PRO Inform Power Systems Director of the power reduction.
Monitor plant parameters (especially feedwater flow status) and assist as necessary.
Assist with troubleshooting feedwater heaters as directed.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 LJ Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page: 4of9 Event
Description:
Failure of a vacuum transmitter / RPS half scram & reset Cause: PT-2-5-11C fails resulting in an RPS half scram Effects: 1. Alarms:
0 210 D-I Condenser Lo Vacuum Trip 0 211 B-I AChannel Reactor Auto Scram
- 2. ARPS channel half scram; no rod motion
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and report alarms 210 D-I Condenser Lo Vacuum Trip and 211 B-I A Channel Reactor Auto Scram and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Cards.
Verify actual condenser vacuum is normal.
CRS Direct troubleshooting of failed instrument.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.1. I to determine that a trip must be inserted in A2 RPS within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Determine need to initiate GP-25 to insert a redundant trip into the A2 RPS logic using Appendix 1 (this procedure is not required to be performed for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) OR, Determine need to defeat the half scram IAW A 0 60F.2-2 Defeat of an RPS Half Scram.
PRO Direct Equipment Operator to inspect PT-2-5-11C.
CRS When report is received that PT-2-5-11C was accidentally bumped (and prompted to reset RPS), direct RPS reset IAW GP-11E.
URO Reset half scram IAW GP-11.E.
0 Place the Scram Reset switch to the Group 1 & 4 position, then to the 2 & 3 position; verify scram is reset.
0 Place the SDV Inboard Vent and Drain Valves switch to the OPEN position; verify the valves indicate open.
0 Place the SDV Outboard Vent and Drain Valves switch to the OPEN position; verify the valves indicate open.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
-4,Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page: 5of9 Event
Description:
Steam leak in the Turbine Building Cause: ID MSL weld cracks Effects: 1. Alarms:
0 218 B-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Himrouble A 0 218 C-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Hinrouble B
- 2. Initially, alarms will be received indicating vent stack problems and then will progress to Group 1 isolation conditions.
- 3. Subsequent Group Iisolation due to high steam line flow, results in a reactor scram signal on MSlV closure.
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and report alarms 218 B-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Himrouble A and 218 C-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Hinrouble B and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Cards.
Monitor Rl-2979 to verify a valid signal.
Enter ON-I 04, Vent Stack High Radiation.
CRS Enter ON-104 Vent Stack High Radiation and direct search for source
\ ,
W of high vent exhaust radiation.
URO/PRO Recognize and report High Area Temperature alarm and potential T-103 (Secondary Containment Control) entry.
PRO Monitor area temperatures and determine there is a leak in the turbine building and there is NOT a T-I03 entry.
Recognize by reporting the Group 1 alarms and failure of the Group 1 isolation to occur.
CRS Direct a reactor scram and closure of the MSIVs.
Enter T-I 00, Scram.
URO Attempt to scram the reactor and report the mode switch failure (see Event #6 for reactor mode switch failure).
PRO Attempt to manually isolate the MSIVs.
Report inability to isolate the D main steam line to the CRS (see Event
- 7 for Group 1 auto isolation failure / D MSL failure to isolate).
Operator Actions ES-D-2
..-, Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page: 6of9 Event
Description:
Reactor mode switch failure / B RPS auto scram channel failure Cause: Mode selector switch (MSS) contacts do not make up, MSS remains in Run, B RPS channel does not trip Effects: 1. Alarms 211 D-I AChannel Reactor Manual Scram and E-I AChannel Reactor Manual Scram are received.
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Initiate scram actions by placing the mode selector switch in Shutdown.
Recognize by reporting that the control rods are not inserting and APRMs are NOT downscale.
CT Press manual scram pushbuttons or manually initiate ARI.
Verify and report rods are inserting and APRMs are downscale.
Perform scram actions:
0 When RPV level begins to recover, Emergency Stop RFPTs.
0 Depress SLOW RAISE or FAST RAISE on the RFPT to remain in service.
0 Close all RFP discharge valves and open C RFP discharge v
bypass valve.
0 Establish and maintain RPV level control with feedwater.
0 Verify all control rods are inserted.
0 Verify RPV pressure, trend, and status of EHC.
0 Notify health physics of changing plant conditions.
CRS Mav exit T-100 and enter T-101 based upon scram condition with power greater than 4% (MSS failure).
CT Direct the Manual Scram Pushbuttons depressed or ARI initiated, as necessary.
Direct level maintained +5 to +35 inches.
Direct restoration of drywell instrument nitrogen IAW GP-8.E Primary Containment Isolation Bypass.
Direct a reactor depressurization to 500-600 psig with bypass valves or SRVs (if time allows; RPV is depressurizing slowly through the break).
NOTE: depending on when a reactor depressurization is directed, relative to the fuel failure, the CRS must direct use of the SRVs if MSL radiation levels are above the Group 1 isolation setpoint.
0perator Actions ES-D-2
=,L Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page: 7of9 Event
Description:
Reactor mode switch failure / B RPS auto scram channel failure.. .(continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Restore and maintain RPV level +5 to +35 inches.
Initiate a reactor depressurization, as directed, using bypass valves or SRVs.
0 For bypass valves, reduce EHC pressure setpoint or use the Bypass Jack.
0 Operate SRVs IAW RRC 1G.2-2 Relief Valve Manual Operation During A Plant Event.
If non-ADS SRVs (D, E, F, H, J, L) are used, recognize SRV failure (see Event #8).
PRO Perform scram actions.
0 Transfer 13 KV house loads.
0 -
Trip main turbine when generator load drops to 50 MWE.
0 Verify main generator lockout.
0 Verify Group I1 and Ill isolations and SGTS initiation.
. 0 Verify scram discharge volume vents and drains are closed.
0 Verify hydrogen water chemistry is isolated.
0 Verify both recirc pumps speed have runback to 30%.
0 Monitor instrument air header pressure and drywell pressure.
0 Attempt to restore drywell instrument nitrogen IAW GP-8.E Primary Containment Isolation Bypass (see Event #8).
Operator Actions ES-D-2
- .+- . . .~
L Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page: 8of9 Event
Description:
Group I failure to auto isolate (manual works) /failure of the D MSL to manually isolate Cause: Failure of isolation logic to actuate; D MSL will not isolate manually Effects: 1. No alarms
- 2. Group 1 failure to isolate, manual isolation will work on all MSL with the exception of the D line.
-
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize by reporting indications of major steam leak and the MSlVs failing to close.
CT Close MSlVs with hand switches, recognize and report the D main steam line failed to manually isolate.
CT CRS Direct manual closure of the MSIVs, as necessary.
Direct the performance of A 0 1A.2-2, Closing Stuck Open MSIVs.
Direct a GP-15 evacuation of the Turbine Building.
=./--
PRO Depress and latch the TEST pushbuttons for D inboard and outboard MSlVs IAW A 0 lA.2-2, Closing Stuck Open MSIVs.
Direct an Equipment Operator perform A 0 1A.2-2 to close the MSIVs.
Perform a GP-15 evacuation of the Turbine Building.
URO/PRO Recognize and report alarms 218 B-4 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Hi-Hi A and 218 B-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Hi-Hi B.
Announce T-I04 Radiation Release entry.
CRS Enteddirect actions IAW T-I 04 Radiation Release.
0 Initiate dose assessment.
0 Continue to attempt to isolate the MSIVs.
Continue to take action IAW T-101 RPV Control to shutdown and depressurize the plant.
0 When the release cannot be maintained below the General Emergency level as indicated by dose assessment reports, then direct T - I 12, Emergency Blowdown.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 i OpTest No.:
i I Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page: 9of9 Event
Description:
Unable to restore drywell instrument nitrogen / loss of non-ADS SRVs Cause: Drywell nitrogen not available Effects: Non-ADS SRVs not available for reactor pressure control and/or depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize by reporting that while attempting to restore drywell instrument nitrogen, the valves did not reopen.
CRS Direct alternate methods of supplying nitrogen to the SRVs.
Determine that release rates are going to reach General Emergency level by plant indications or outside reports.
CT Emergency depressurize the reactor IAW T-112 Emergency Blowdown.
Direct PRO to open all ADS SRVs.
Direct URO to control condensate injection to restore and maintain RPV level +5 to +35 inches.
URO Prevent uncontrolled condensate injection.
CT PRO Take the switches to OPEN on all ADS valves.
TERMINATION CRITERIA:
The scenario may be terminated when 5 SRVS are open, the RPV is depressurized, and RPV level is under control.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: