ML070610511
| ML070610511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2007 |
| From: | Marvin Sykes Operations Branch I |
| To: | Crane C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML060800089 | List: |
| References | |
| ES-D-1 | |
| Download: ML070610511 (35) | |
Text
Scenario Outline ES-D-I Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No. #1 Op Test No. 2007 NRC Examiners Operators CRS (SRO)
URO (ATC)
PRO (BOP)
Scenario The scenario begins with the reactor at approximately 5% power during a reactor startup. Following Summary shift turnover, the crew should continue with the reactor startup, pulling control rods in accordance with the approved startup sequence. A control rod will drift out, requiring the crew to execute ON-121 Drifting Control Rod and declare the affected control rod inoperable.
Following the control rod drift, the crew should secure drywell purge in preparation for inerting the drywell. Once drywell purge is secured, an inadvertent RClC initiation will occur, requiring the crew to perform a RClC shutdown and declare it inoperable. This event will be followed by a failure of the in-service CRD flow control valve, which will require the crew to enter ON-I 07 Loss of CRD Regulating Function and shift to the alternate flow control valve.
Next, a Recirc system leak will develop in the drywell requiring entry into OT-101 High Drywell Pressure. The crew should take actions for the rising drywell pressure and should manually scram the reactor and enter T-100 Scram. During the scram, seven rods will fail to insert resulting in an ATWS. When drywell pressure reaches 2 psig, the crew should enter T-101 RPV Control and T-102 Primary Containment Control. Multiple failures of drywell spray valves will prevent spraying the drywell, requiring the crew to perform T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown when drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 281 degrees F. With several rods stuck out, the crew should terminate and prevent injection in accordance with T-240 prior to the emergency depressurization.
Initial IC-70, 5% power Conditions Turnover See Attached Shift Turnover Sheet Event Malfunction Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R URO Power ascension with control rods CRS 2 C ALL Control rod drifts out TS
~ ~~ ~~~~
3 N PRO Secure drywell purge CRS 4 TS CRS Inadvertent RClC initiation 5 C URO CRD flow control valve failure CRS 6 M ALL Recirculation system leak in the drywell 7 C URO Seven rods stick full out during the scram CRS 8 C PRO Drywell spray valve failures - prevents drywell spray CRS
- Op Test No.: 1 Operator Actions Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page:
ES-D-2 I of12 Event
Description:
Power ascension with control rods Cause: N/A Effects: NIA Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct the URO to commence rod withdrawal in accordance with the Startup REMA and the Startup Sequence beginning with Rod Group 12, control rod 14-55.
URO Commence rod withdrawal beginning with Rod group 12, Rod 14-55.
Withdraw control rods by selecting the rod on the matrix and then using the Single Notch Withdrawal switch to withdraw control rods.
Monitor nuclear instrumentation and reactor power during control rod withdrawal.
PRO Monitor balance of plant conditions during rod withdrawal.
NOTE: The scenario will continue when the Lead Examiner is satisfied with the reactivity manipulation.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 4
Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: I Event No.: 2 Page: 2of12 Event
Description:
Control rod drifts out Cause: Leaking directional control valve on HCU Effects: Uncontrolled reactivity change Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Acknowledge annunciator 211 (D-4) ROD DRIFT and inform CRS of alarm condition and that control rod 14-55 is drifting out.
CRS Enter ON-I 21 Drifting Control Rod.
Direct an Equipment Operator to inspect HCU 14-55.
Request Shift Manager to notify Reactor Engineering.
URO Per ON-I21 Drifting Control Rod:
Select control rod 14-55 on the select matrix.
Monitor changes in reactor power, level, pressure.
--- Insert control rod 14-55 to full in position using the Emergency-In control switch and HOLD at the full in position for 30 seconds (perform this step for a total of 5 times since the control rod will continue to drift).
Insert control rod 14-55 to full in position using the Emergency-In control switch and HOLD at the full in position prior to the individual rod scram.
After the individual rod scram for control rod 14-55 has been performed, release the Emergency-In control switch.
Reset the ROD DRIFT alarm when control rod 14-55 is no longer drifting.
PRO Direct an Equipment Operator to inspect HCU 14-55.
Perform an individual scram of control rod 14-55 by placing its associated scram toggle switch in the DOWN position on panel 20C016.
After 15 seconds, return the toggle switch to the UP position.
CRS Refer to Tech Spec 3.1.3.C. for one inoperable control rod. Fully insert within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and disarm within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
~ 4 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page: 3of12 Event
Description:
Secure drywell purge Cause: N/A Effects: N/A Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct drywell purge secured per step 6.2.43 of GP-2.
PRO Secure drywell purge starting at step 4. I 9 of SO 7B.4.A-2 Containment Atmosphere De-inerting and Purging Via SBGT System.
0 Place the standby Drywell Purge Fan to OFF 0 Stop the running Drywell Purge Fan 0 Shutdown SBGT using SO 9A.2.B SBGT System Shutdown Following Manual Start 0 Close AO-20459 and AO-20460 on panel 20C012.
0 Verify HCS-00522-1 is OPEN on panel OBC452 0 Close the following valves using SO 7B.7.A-2:
o AO-2505 o AO-2520 o AO-2506 o AO-2507 0 Close SBGT valves AO-20469-1 and AO-20469-2 on the 20C012 panel.
I
\--j Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page: 4of 12 Event
Description:
Inadvertent RClC initiation Cause: Fault in RClC initiation logic Effects: RClC initiates and injects into the RPV Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize the RClC System has inadvertently initiated.
CRS Direct securing the RClC System.
PRO Secure RClC by depressing the TRIP pushbutton at Panel 20C004C.
CRS Request troubleshooting/technical assistance through the Shift Manager.
Reference Tech. Spec. 3.5.3.A - verify HPCl operable immediately and restore RClC to operable within 14 days.
Reference Tech. Spec. 3.3.5.2.B (RCIC Instrumentation) - declare RClC inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page: 5of 12 Event
Description:
CRD flow control valve failure Cause: In-service CRD System flow control valve controller fails.
Annunciator 21 1 (G-4) CRD CHARGING WATER HEADER HIGH PRESSURE Effects: Loss of CRD System regulating function Time Position ApDlicants Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize and acknowledge annunciator 211 (G-4) CRD CHARGING WATER HEADER HIGH PRESSURE. Report condition to Control Room Supervisor.
Recognize failure of in-service A CRD flow control valve (valve closed).
CRS Enter ON-I 07 Loss of CRD Regulating Function.
Direct performance of SO 3.6.D-2 CRD Hydraulic System Flow Control Valve Swapping.
URO Dispatch Equipment Operator to 6CRD flow control station to perform
-v-step 4.1.1 of SO 3.6.D-2.
Place CRD flow controller FC-2-3-301 in MANUAL and adjust flow to zero.
Direct Equipment Operator at 6 CRD flow control station to perform step 4.1.3 of SO 3.6.D-2 (instrument air and flow control selector switch to B).
Open flow control valve AO-2-3-19B using FC-2-3-301 to establish 55 to 65gpm system flow.
Place FC-2-3-301 in AUTOMATIC.
Direct Equipment Operator at B CRD flow control station to perform step 4.1.5 of SO 3.6.D-2 (isolate AO-2-3-19A).
Operator Actions ES-D-2
..+-,
Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page: 6of 12 Event
Description:
Small recirc system leak in the drywell Cause: Small recirc leak results in drywell temperature and pressure rising but not fully depressurizing the RPV.
Effects: Drywell Hi-Lo Press alarms (210 F-2, 225 A-4)
High Drywell Pressure Scram Signal, Isolations, Diesel and HPCl auto starts.
Rising drywell pressure indicated. Manual scram at 1.2 psig or auto scram at 2 psig with isolations, HPCl and diesel starts.
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize Drywell High Pressure alarms.
Recognize Drywell pressure is going up and announce entry into OT-101 for High Drywell Pressure.
Trend the Drywell pressure increase.
CRS Enterldirect actions in accordance with OT-I 01, High Drywell Pressure:
Verify Drywell lnerting is not in progress.
Direct placing additional drywell cooling in service.
Direct actions to monitor components e.g., RRP seals.
Direct crew to isolate and restore systems IAW OT-I 01 to stop the source of the leak. OT-101 systems include: RWCU, HPCl and RClC (Le.
close HPCl MO-15 steam supply valve, close RClC MO-15 steam supply valve.. .).
PRO Perform OT-101 actions as directed:
Monitor drywell pressure and plant parameters.
If directed, verify that inerting is not in progress.
If directed, place additional drywell cooling in service.
Monitor components for abnormal indications as directed by the CRS.
Isolate plant systems to include RWCU, HPCI, and RClC as directed by the CRS IAW OT-101 (Le. close HPCl MO-15 steam supply valve, close RClC MO-15 steam supply valve...).
CRS Direct a GP-4 Manual Scram when drywell pressure reaches 1.2 psig.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page: 7of 12 Event
Description:
Small recirc system leak in the drywell...(continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Perform GP-4 Manual Scram actions:
Place the Mode Switch to Shutdown.
Verify Rods inserting.
Manually control the Reactor Feed Water System to control reactor level.
Press Emergency Stop for the C RFP.
Verify shut MO-2149C, the C RFP discharge valve.
Verify open MO-8090 the Startup Level Controller isolation.
Verify APRMs are downscale and report to the CRS.
Verify all control rods inserted and report to the CRS (see Event #7).
Perform GP-8.B PCIS Isolations - Groups 2&3.
PRO Perform scram actions.
Verify all isolations.
Restore Instrument Nitrogen to the DW when directed by the CRS.
CRS Enter and execute T-100 Scram:
0 Direct level restored and maintained +5 to +35 inches.
Direct restoration of drywell instrument nitrogen IAW GP-8.E Primary Containment Isolation Bypass.
U Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page: 8of12 Event
Description:
Seven rods stick full out during the scram Cause: Rods are mechanically stuck in the full out position Effects: ATWS actions must be completed for the stuck control rods. This will require injection to be terminated and prevented prior to completing a RPV Blowdown.
Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize by reporting that NOT all control rods inserted on the scram.
CRS Enter the RC/Q-RODS section of T - I 01 RPV Control due to the ATWS.
Direct manual insertion of control rods using:
0 T-220, Driving Control Rods During a Scram.
0 T-216, Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram or Individual Scram Test Switches, OR 0 T-246, Maximizing CRD Flow to the Reactor Vessel NOTE: T-220 is typically directed first because it is the most expedient method to insert a few control rods that failed to scram URO Attempt insertion of the control rods by the method specified by the CRS.
For T-220:
0 Place the CRD Flow Control in MANUAL and open the Flow Control Valve Fully OR Direct an Operator to close HV-2-3-56, the Charging Wtr Hdr Blk Vv to Hydraulic Control Units.
0 Request permission and by pass the Rod Worth Minimizer.
0 Attempt to insert the rods using the Emergency In/Notch Override Switch.
0 Report to the CRS the inability to insert the control rods.
PRO Note that the PRO will be required to perform T-240, Termination and Prevention of Injection into the RPV, later in the scenario as a result of the ATWS condition.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
\U Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page: 9of 12 Event
Description:
Drywell spray valve failures - prevents drywell spray Cause: Failure of drywell spray valves to open on both loops of RHR system Effects: 2 psig isolations, HPCl auto start, emergency diesel starts Drywell pressure continues to rise above 2 psig and requires the crew to perform an Emergency Blowdown when drywell temperature cannot be maintained below 281OF Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and respond to 2 psig drywell pressure and announce entry into T - I 01 and T-I 02:
Recognize and verify Group 111111 isolations.
Recognize and verify Diesel Generator starts and has cooling water.
Recognize and report the HPCl auto start if it has not been previously identified by the CRS.
Trend and report containment parameters.
-1
. CRS Recognize and respond to 2 psig drywell pressure and announce entry into T - I 01 and T-102:
Reenter T-I 01, RPV Control, and enter T-I 02, Primary Containment Control.
Verify adequate level and may direct either a HPCl shutdown or isolation.
PRO Perform an isolation or shutdown of HPCl as directed by the CRS.
For isolation, depress the HPCI isolation pushbutton and verify that HPCl shuts down and the HPCl Steam Line Isolation Valves close.
For a HPCl shutdown, trip HPCI, verify that the HPCl aux oil pump starts as required, and place the HPCI Aux Oil Pump in Pull to Lock when HPCl stops rotating.
CRS Direct T-I 02 actions:
Direct Torus sprays IAW T-204 using A(B) Loop RHR Direct T-223 actions to restore drywell ventilation.
Trend containment parameters, specifically drywell pressure and bulk average temperature.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 I l l Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page: 10of12 Event
Description:
Drywell spray valve failures - prevents drywell spray.. . (continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Perform Torus Sprays IAW T-204, Initiation of Torus Sprays using RHR:
Momentarily place the S I 7B switch in MAN.
Open the MO-39A(B), Torus Hdr. Valve.
Open the MO-89C(D) HPSW Outlet Valve.
Place the S I 9A(B) switch in Manual Override.
Start a HPSW Pump in the respective loop.
Start an RHR Pump in the respective loop.
Throttle open MO-38A(B) to obtain 1000 gpm on FI-2-10-136A(B).
URO/PRO Recognize and report containment parameters:
Bulk Drywell temperature at 145°F and entry into T-I 02.
CRS Re-enter T - I 02 on Bulk Average temperature 145°F.
Continue T-I 01 Actions:
Direct RPV level controlled +5 to +35 inches.
May direct closing MSlVs to slow down RPV cooldown rate.
URO Maintain RPV level using additional feedwater that is required to keep up with the recirc leak.
URO/PRO Trend and report containment parameters.
CRS Direct URO/PRO to perform T-223, Drywell Cooler Fan Bypass, to bypass and restore drywell ventilation.
URO/PRO Perform T-223:
Direct EO to place drywell fans in slow.
Verify T-223 requirements.
/
Operator Actions ES-D-2 b
Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 8 Page: 11 of12 Event
Description:
Drywell spray valve failures - prevents drywell spray.. .(continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS When torus pressure cannot be maintained below 9 psig, and when drywell pressure and temperature plot within the safe region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit Curve, direct drywell fans shut down and drywell sprays initiated IAW T-204, Initiation of DW Sprays Using RHR.
PRO Spray the drywell in accordance with T-204, Initiation of Drywell Sprays Using RHR.
Recognize and report inability to spray the drywell using either RHR loop (due to a drywell spray valve failure in both RHR loops).
CT CRS When drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 281OF (drywell sprays and fans have not controlled drywell temperature) direct:
T-240, Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV (due to the 7 rod A W S ).
L .
T - I 12, Emergency Blowdown.
CT URO/PRO When directed, perform T-240 to Terminate and Prevent Injection into the RPV.
Verify that HPCl is not injecting.
Shutdown any running Reactor Feedwater Pumps by depressing the trip pushbuttons.
Contact the floor operator and direct the isolation of Stayfull from RHR and Core Spray.
NOTE: this step should be directed but actual isolation does not need to be completed prior to the blowdown.
CT PRO When directed, perform an Emergency Blowdown by opening all five ADS valves.
URO Control reactor level as directed following the blowdown.
(Note that level will swell high during the actual blowdown.)
Operator Actions ES-D-2
- -J Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: I Event No.: Page: 120f 12 TERMINATION CRITERIA:
The scenario may be terminated when 5 SRVS are open, the RPV is depressurized, and RPV level is under control.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
Classification is an Alert IAW EAL FA1.
Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No. E Op Test No. 2007 NRC Examiners Operators CRS (SRO)
URO (ATC)
PRO (BOP)
Scenario The scenario begins with the plant at 76% power and the B RHR pump blocked for motor Summary replacement. Following turnover the crew will perform a main turbine master trip solenoid valves routine test. Following this test, the SBO line will fail, requiring a Tech Spec (TRM) entry. A loss of feedwater heaters will require the crew to respond to a positive reactivity addition and reduce reactor power to ensure thermal limits are not exceeded. The crew will then receive an RPS half scram due to a failed low vacuum pressure transmitter (blown fuse). This will require a Tech Spec entry.
Troubleshooting and repairs will be time-compressed, allowing the crew to reset the half scram.
After RPS is reset, a steam leak will develop in the Turbine Building. As the steam leak grows in magnitude, the crew should recognize the need to shutdown the plant. During the manual scram, a reactor mode switch failure will require the crew to use the manual pushbuttons or Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) to terminate the ATWS.
A failure of the Group I isolation will require a manual isolation but the D MSL will fail to isolate. The crew should enter T-104Radioactive Release to evaluate and control the release. The inability to restore instrument nitrogen to the SRVs will result in a loss of all non-ADS SRVs.
When the release exceeds the General Emergency level, the crew should perform an Emergency Blowdown in accordance with T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown.
Initial IC-71,76% power Conditions Turnover See Attached Shift Turnover Sheet Event Malfunction Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N PRO Perform the main turbine master trip solenoid valves routine test CRS 2 TS CRS SBO line failure (TRM)
-P-Loss of extraction steam to feedwater heaters / power reduction I TL UCE Failure of a vacuum transmitter / RPS half scram & reset S I I M ALL Steam leak in the turbine building I I URO CRS Reactor mode switch failure (manual scram / ARI work) 7l 1 C PRO CRS Group I failure to auto isolate / failure of the DMSL to manually isolate
- I I I
I C PRO CRS Unable to restore drywell nitrogen I only ADS SRVs available for pressure control / depressurization
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page: 1 of10 Event
Description:
Main turbine master trip solenoid valves routine test Cause: N/A Effects: N/A Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct PRO to perform RT-0-01D-402-2, Master Trip Solenoid Valves Operability Test.
PRO Perform RT-0-01D-402-2, Master Trip Solenoid Valves Operability Test:
0 Review RT 0 Place the Master Trip Test Selector switch to TRIP A 0 Verify Test A lamp if OFF 0 Release and place Master Trip Test Selector switch to RESET 0 Verify Test A lamp if ON 0 Place the Master Trip Test Selector switch to TRIP B 0 Verify Test 6lamp if OFF 0 Release and place Master Trip Test Selector switch to RESET 0 Verify Test 6 lamp if ON 0 Complete RT papework CRS Review RT for completeness/satisfactoryresults.
URO Monitor plant parameters/assist as directed.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
.~
Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page: 2of 10 Event
Description:
SBO line failure Cause: Differential overcurrent trip of transformer OOXOl9 Effects: 1. Alarm: 006 G-2SBO Circuit Trouble
- 2. Trip of the SBO-1005breaker Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize and report alarm 006 G-2, SBO Circuit Trouble and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card.
Dispatch Equipment Operator to the SBO switchgear.
CRS Review TRM 3.18; determine the SBO line must be returned to service within 15 days.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
-J Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page: 3of 10 Event
Description:
Loss of extraction steam to 3A and 4A feedwater heaters Cause: A 0 valves supplying the heaters fail closed Effects: 1. No alarms
- 2. Reduced feedwater temperature; rising reactor power Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize rising reactor power (and/or PMS computer alarm); inform CRS and announce entry into OT-I 04 Positive Reactivity Insertion.
URO/PRO Investigate cause of power rise.
Recognize lowering feedwater temperatures, inform CRS.
Recognize loss of extraction steam to feedwater heaters, inform CRS.
CRS Enteddirect actions IAW OT-I 04 Positive Reactivity Insertion.
0 Monitor position on Figure 1 of OT-104.
0 Direct the insertion of control rods as required to reduce power to 10% below the pre-transient level, IAW GP-9-2 Fast Reactor Power Reduction.
Direct troubleshooting of feedwater heater problem.
URO Reduce power by driving GP-9-2 rods as required to reduce power to at least 10% below the pre-transient power level (to 66% power).
CRS Evaluate position on Figure 1 of OT-104 to determine whether Tech Spec action is required to implement Thermal Limit penalties, recover FW heating, or drop power ~ 2 5 % .
Determine feedwater heating is asymmetric due to > 5°F feedwater temperature AT.
Determine need to perform A 0 6.7-2 Asymmetric Feedwater Temperature Operation within two hours to comply with Tech Specs 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
PRO Inform Power Systems Director of the power reduction.
Monitor plant parameters (especially feedwater flow status) and assist as necessary.
Assist with troubleshooting feedwater heaters as directed.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 4
Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page: 4of 10 Event
Description:
Failure of a vacuum transmitter / RPS half scram & reset Cause: PT-2-5-1I C fails resulting in an RPS half scram Effects: 1. Alarms:
0 210 D-I Condenser Lo Vacuum Trip 0 211 B-I A Channel Reactor Auto Scram
- 2. ARPS channel half scram; no rod motion Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and report alarms 210 D-I Condenser Lo Vacuum Trip and 21 1 B-I A Channel Reactor Auto Scram and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Cards.
Verify actual condenser vacuum is normal.
CRS Direct troubleshooting of failed instrument.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.1. I to determine that a trip must be inserted in A2 RPS within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Determine need to initiate GP-25 to insert a redundant trip into the A2 RPS logic using Appendix 1 (this procedure is not required to be performed for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) E, Determine need to defeat the half scram IAW A 0 6OF.2-2 Defeat of an RPS Half Scram.
PRO Direct Equipment Operator to inspect PT-2-51I C .
CRS When report is received that PT-2-5-1I C was accidentally bumped (and prompted to reset RPS), direct RPS reset IAW GP-11E.
URO Reset half scram IAW GP-11.E.
0 Place the Scram Reset switch to the Group 1 & 4 position.
0 Place the Scram Reset switch to the Group 2 & 3 position.
0 Verify the scram is reset.
-d Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page: 5of 10 Event
Description:
Steam leak in the Turbine Building Cause: ID MSL weld cracks Effects: 1. Alarms:
0 218 B-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Himrouble A 0 218 C-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Himrouble B
- 2. Initially, alarms will be received indicating vent stack problems and then will progress to Group 1 isolation conditions.
- 3. Subsequent Group Iisolation due to high steam line flow, results in a reactor scram signal on MSlV closure.
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and report alarms 218 B-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor HiTTroubleA and 218 C-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor HiTTrouble B and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Cards.
Monitor Rl-2979 to verify a valid signal.
Enter ON-I 04, Vent Stack High Radiation.
CRS Enter ON-I04 Vent Stack High Radiation and direct search for source of high vent exhaust radiation.
URO/PRO Recognize and report High Area Temperature alarm and potential T-I 03 (Secondary Containment Control) entry.
PRO Monitor area temperatures and determine there is a leak in the turbine building and there is NOT a T-103 entry.
Recognize by reporting the Group 1 alarms and failure of the Group 1 isolation to occur.
CRS Direct a reactor scram and closure of the MSIVs.
Enter T-I 00, Scram.
URO Attempt to scram the reactor and report the mode switch failure (see Event #6 for reactor mode switch failure).
PRO Attempt to manually isolate the MSIVs.
Report inability to isolate the D main steam line to the CRS (see Event
- 7 for Group 1 auto isolation failure / D MSL failure to isolate).
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page: 6of I O Event
Description:
Reactor mode switch failure / B RPS auto scram channel failure Cause: Mode selector switch (MSS) contacts do not make up, MSS remains in Run, B RPS channel does not trip Effects: 1. Alarms 211 D-I A Channel Reactor Manual Scram and E-I A Channel Reactor Manual Scram are NOT received.
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO initiate scram actions by placing the mode selector switch in Shutdown.
Recognize by reporting that the control rods are not inserting and APRMs are NOT downscale.
CT Press manual scram pushbuttons or manually initiate ARI.
Verify and report rods are inserting and APRMs are downscale.
Perform scram actions:
0 When RPV level begins to recover, Emergency Stop RFPTs.
0 Depress SLOW RAISE or FAST RAISE on the RFPT to remain in service.
0 Close all RFP discharge valves and open C RFP discharge bypass valve.
0 Establish and maintain RPV level control with feedwater.
0 Verify all control rods are inserted.
0 Verify RPV pressure, trend, and status of EHC.
0 Notify health physics of changing plant conditions.
CRS May exit T-I 00 and enter T-l 01 based upon scram condition with power greater than 4% (MSS failure).
CT Direct the Manual Scram Pushbuttons depressed or ARI initiated, as necessary.
Direct level maintained +5 to +35 inches.
Direct restoration of drywell instrument nitrogen IAW GP-8.E Primary Containment Isolation Bypass.
Direct a reactor depressurization to 500-600 psig with bypass valves or SRVs (if time allows; RPV is depressurizing slowly through the break).
NOTE: depending on when a reactor depressurization is directed, relative to the fuel failure, the CRS must direct use of the SRVs if MSL radiation levels are above the Group 1 isolation setpoint.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page: 7of10 Event
Description:
Reactor mode switch failure / B RPS auto scram channel failure...(continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Restore and maintain RPV level +5 to +35 inches.
Initiate a reactor depressurization, as directed, using bypass valves or SRVs.
0 For bypass valves, reduce EHC pressure setpoint or use the Bypass Jack.
0 Operate SRVs IAW RRC 1G.2-2 Relief Valve Manual Operation During A Plant Event.
If non-ADS SRVs (D, E, F, H, J, L) are used, recognize SRV failure (see Event #8).
PRO Perform scram actions.
0 Transfer 13 KV house loads.
0 -
Trip main turbine when generator load drops to 50 MWE.
0 Verify main generator lockout.
0 Verify Group II and I l l isolations and SGTS initiation.
0 Verify scram discharge volume vents and drains are closed.
0 Verify hydrogen water chemistry is isolated.
0 Verify both recirc pumps speed have runback to 30%.
0 Monitor instrument air header pressure and drywell pressure.
0 Attempt to restore drywell instrument nitrogen IAW GP-8.E Primary Containment Isolation Bypass (see Event #8).
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page: 8 o f 10 Event
Description:
Group I failure to auto isolate (manual works) / failure of the D MSL to manually isolate Cause: Failure of isolation logic to actuate; D MSL will not isolate manually Effects: 1. No alarms
- 2. Group 1 failure to isolate, manual isolation will work on all MSL with the exception of the D line.
- 3. Reactor scram signal from MSlV closure will not occur until MSlVs closed manually.
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CT PRO Recognize by reporting indications of major steam leak and the MSlVs failing to close.
Close MSlVs with hand switches, recognize and report the D main steam line failed to manually isolate.
CRS Direct manual closure of the MSIVs, as necessary.
Direct the performance of A 0 1A.2-2, Closing Stuck Open MSIVs Direct a GP-15 evacuation of the Turbine Building.
PRO Depress and latch the TEST pushbuttons for D inboard and outboard MSlVs IAW A 0 1A.2-2, Closing Stuck Open MSIVs.
Direct an Equipment Operator perform A 0 1A.2-2 to close the MSIVs.
Perform a GP-15 evacuation of the Turbine Building.
URO/PRO Recognize and report alarms 218 B-4 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Hi-Hi A and 218 8-5 Vent Exh Stack Rad Monitor Hi-Hi B.
Announce T-I 04 Radiation Release entry.
CRS Enter/direct actions IAW T - I 04 Radiation Release.
Initiate dose assessment.
0 Continue to attempt to isolate the MSIVs.
0 Continue to take action IAW T-I01 RPV Control to shutdown and depressurize the plant.
CT When the release cannot be maintained below the General Emergency level as indicated by dose assessment reports, then direct T-I 12, Emergency Blowdown.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page: 9oflO Event
Description:
Unable to restore drywell instrument nitrogen / loss of non-ADS SRVs Cause: Drywell nitrogen not available Effects: Non-ADS SRVs not available for reactor pressure control and/or depressurization Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Recognize by reporting that while attempting to restore drywell instrument nitrogen, the valves did not reopen.
CRS Direct alternate methods of supplying nitrogen to the SRVs:
0 Backup Instrument Nitrogen to ADS using SO 16A.7.A-2 o Place SV-813OA and SV-8130B control switches on panel 2OCOO3-03 to RESET and then in AUTOIOPEN.
o Verify open SV-8130A & B.
o Verify Pl-8142 Backup N2 on the 2OCOO3-03 panel is 2 85 psig.
0 T-261 Placing the Backup Instrument Nitrogen Supply From the Y
CAD Tank in Service.
PRO Restore drywell instrument nitrogen as directed.
0 If directed to use Backup Instrument Nitrogen to ADS using SO 16A.7.A-2:
o Place SV-8130A and SV-8130B control switches on panel 2OCOO3-03 to RESET and then in AUTO/OPEN.
o Verify open SV-8130A & B.
o Verify Pl-8142 Backup N2 on the 2OCOO3-03 panel is 2 85 psig.
0 If directed to perform T-261 Placing the Backup Instrument Nitrogen Supply From the CAD Tank in Service:
o Verify closed AO-2969B on panel 2OCOO3-03.
o Dispatch an Equipment Operator to the CAD Building perform step 4.2 (manual valving).
I Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 8 Page: 10of I O Event
Description:
Unable to restore drywell instrument nitrogen / loss of non-ADS SRVs.. .(continued)
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior CT CRS Direct PRO to open all ADS SRVs.
Direct URO to control condensate injection to restore and maintain RPV level +5 to +35 inches.
URO Prevent uncontrolled condensate injection.
CT PRO Take the switches to OPEN on all ADS valves W'
TERMINATION CRITERIA:
The scenario may be terminated when 5 SRVS are open, the RPV is depressurized, and RPV level is under control.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: t Classification is a General Emergency IAW EAL RGI.
Scenario Outline ES-D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No. #3 Op Test No. 2007 NRC Examiners Operators CRS (SRO)
URO (ATC)
PRO (BOP)
Scenario The scenario begins with the reactor at 100% power. The 2B EHC Pump is blocked out of service for Summary filter replacement. Following shift turnover, the crew should transfer RPS bus B to the alternate supply to facilitate repairs for a failed trip coil on the B RPS bus feeder breaker. The failed B RPS feeder breaker will already be inoperable when the crew takes the shift.
Following the RPS bus transfer, the RClC 250 VDC bus will de-energize, rendering RClC inoperable and requiring a Tech Spec entry. Next, the running RBCCW pump will trip and the standby pump will fail to start, resulting in a complete loss of RBCCW. The crew should reduce RBCCW loads (e.9.
RWCU) and reactor power as directed by ON-I 13 Loss of RBCCW.
The crew should perform a GP-4 manual scram due to the inability to restore RBCCW to the recirculation pump motors. An ATWS will occur requiring the crew to execute T-I01 RPV Control and T - I 17 LeveVPower Control. Shortly after SLC is initiated the SLC pump will trip, requiring the URO to place the alternate SLC pump in service. A drywell vent valve will fail to isolate on low RPV level and the PRO should manually isolate the valve.
A failure of the only available EHC pump will cause the turbine to trip and the turbine bypass valves to close, requiring the crew to utilize SRVs for reactor pressure control. The crew should perform T-216 Control Rod Insertion By Manual Scram or Individual Scram Test Switches to bypass ARI and RPS, drain the scram discharge volume and initiate another scram.
Event Malfunction Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N ALL Transfer RPS bus to alternate supply (failed trip coil on B RPS feeder TS breaker) 2 TS CRS RClC 250 VDC bus failure I C lJJz I LossofRBCCW 4 1 1 URO CRS 1 Reduce reactor power 5 1 I M ALL I ATWS (hydraulic)
I URO CRS I Standby liquid control pump trips 71 1 I PRO CRS 1 Drywell vent valve (AO-2509) fails to isolate 8 l 1 C PRO CRS I AEHC pump trips / loss of turbine bypass valves I I I (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Tech Spec
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: I Page: 1 of10 Event
Description:
Transfer B RPS bus to alternate supply Cause: NIA Effects: Temporary loss of power, which will cause a reactor half scram and half Group 1 and Group 3 isolations Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct 2B RPS power supply transferred to alternate using SO 60F.6.A-2, Transferring Reactor Protection System Power Supplies.
PRO At the 2OCO17 panel verify:
0 Alt. Source Available light is on, 0 Control Rod Drive Scram Solenoid Group 1,2,3,4 indicating lights are lit on the 2OCO15 panel, 0 Place B RPS M/G Set Alt. Feed Transfer Switch to ALTERNATE position.
U URO Reset the half scram using GP-11.E Reset Reactor Protection System-Scram Reset:
0 Place the Scram Reset switch in the Group 1 & 4 position, then in the Group 2 & 3 position.
Verify the four scram group white lights are lit on the 20C015 and 20C017 panels.
0 Verify the A and B Reactor Auto Scram annunciators are clear.
Place SDV Inboard Valve switch 5A-SI4A to OPEN position and verify the inboard SDV vents and drains are open.
0 Place SDV Outboard Valve switch 5A-SI4B to OPEN position and verify the outboard SDV vents and drains are open.
0 Verify SDV not drained annunciators 21O(C-1) and 210 (B-2) for are clear.
7 J Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page: 2 o f 10 Event
Description:
Transfer B RPS bus to alternate supply.. . (continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Reset the Group 1 and 3 half isolations using GP-8.D Group I,2,3 Outboard Half Isolation:
Verify the isolation has occurred IAW COL GP-8.D Required Position column.
Direct an Equipment Operator to verify all RB and Refuel Floor fans are tripped and to place all fan control switches to OFF.
Place control switches in COL GP-8.D to the position listed in the PLACE SWITCH TO column.
Reset Exhaust Radiation Monitors RIS-2-17-452B & D, AND RIS-2-17-4586 & D on the 2OCO10 panel.
Place Outboard Isolation Logic Reset Switch 16A-S33 on the 20C05A panel to the GRP 2/3 position AND verify Group 213 Outboard Isolation Relays Not Reset annunciator is clear.
Shutdown SBGT System using SO 9A.2.A SBGT System Shutdown Following an Automatic Start.
Restore RE3 and Refuel Floor ventilation using SO 40B.1.A-2 RB Ventilation System Startup and Normal Operation PRO Direct an Equipment Operator to measure voltage at the 20x040 transformer per step 4.1.6 of SO 60F.6.A-2.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 e.
Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page: 3of I O Event
Description:
RClC 250 VDC bus failure Cause: Blown RCIC 250 VDC bus fuses Effects: RClC is inoperable and unavailable for operation Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior PRO Reference ARC 209 (C-2) 2 DA RClC 250 VDC BUS LO VOLTAGE Dispatch Equipment Operator to perform ARC Operator Actions:
0 Check operation of battery chargers 2AD003 and 2CD003 (output voIt age) 0 Check bus feed fuses at Panel 2AD018.
CRS May enter SE-13 Lossof a 125 or 250 VDC Safety Related Bus (there are no specific actions required by SE-13 for this event).
Refer to Tech Spec 3.5.3 for RClC being inoperable.
Enter Tech Spec 3.5.3.A. Verify HPCl is operable immediately and restore RClC to operable within 14 days.
May also refer to Tech Spec 3.8.7 (for RClC 250 VDC Distribution System).
Request assistance for troubleshooting/investigationfrom Shift Manager.
.-.4 Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page: 4 o f 10 Event
Description:
Loss of RBCCW Cause: Trip of the 2B RBCCW pump; trip of the 2A RBCCW pump after auto start Effects: Loss of cooling to RWCU System and recirc pumps Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and report alarm 217 C-I, B REACT BLDG COOLING WATER PUMP OVLD and trip of the B RBCCW pump; enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card.
Dispatch an Equipment Operator to the B RBCCW pump and breaker.
Recognize trip of the A RBCCW pump.
Dispatch an Equipment Operator to the A RBCCW pump and breaker.
CRS Direct entry into ON-I 13 Loss of RBCCW including:
0 Shutdown of RWCU pumps 0 Close MO-2-12-068 RWCU Outlet 0 Monitoring Recirc pump temperatures on TR-2-2-2-031 on panel 20c02 1.
0 Performance of GP-4 Manual Reactor Scram when it is determined that both recirc pumps need to be tripped (at approx.
200°F on bearings and seal cavities)
URO/PRO Shut down running RWCU pumps.
Close MO-2-12-068 RWCU Outlet.
PRO Monitor recirc pump motor bearing and seal cavity temperatures on TR-2-2-2-031 on panel 20C021
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page: 5of10 Event
Description:
Reduce reactor power Cause: Fast power reduction per GP-9-2 driven by ON-I13 (Loss of RBCCW)
Effects: Reactor power is quickly lowered using recirc flow Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct reactor power be lowered IAW GP-9-2 Fast Power Reduction.
URO Lower reactor power IAW GP-9-2 Fast Power Reduction.
0 Lower recirc flow until total core flow reaches 61.5Mlb/hr on FR 02-3-095 on the 20C05A panel OR An APRM HIGH alarm occurs.
0 If further power reduction is required, insert GP-9-2 Appendix 1 control rods using the Rod Control Handswitch OR the Emergency In/Notch Override Handswitch on the 20C05A panel.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 d
Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page: 6 o f 10 Event
Description:
ATWS (hydraulic)
Cause: Control rods insert to various positions due to limited Scram Discharge Volume Effects: Requires the crew to take actions to terminate the ATWS, as well as control RPV IeveVpower Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior CRS Direct performance of GP-4 Manual Reactor Scram URO Perform GP-4 Manual Reactor Scram 0 Reduce recirc flow controllers to minimum (20% demand)
Place the reactor mode switch to shutdown position.
PRO Perform of GP-4 Manual Reactor Scram 0 Transfer house loads using Rapid Response Card RRC 53.1-2.
--../-, CRS Direct T-I 01, RC/Q ATWS actions:
0 Initiation of ARI 0 Trip Recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart CT 0 T-216, Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram CT 0 T-220, Drive Rods 0 Enter T-I 17, LeveVPower Control CT 0 SLC injection
-- Op Test No.: I Operator Actions Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page:
Description:
A l W S (hydraulic).. .(continued)
Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior URO Perform T-I01 RC/Q actions:
0 Initiate ARI; report the scram air header is depressurized.
0 Trip Recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart.
CT 0 Initiate SLC by starting either SLC pump (see Event #6).
0 Direct an Equipment Operator to perform T-216 steps 4.1 and 4.2 CT (install jumpers in Cable Spreading Room and Main Control Room to defeat ARI Initiation Logic and bypass all RPS Auto Scram signals).
0 Per T-2 16 (on the 20C05A panel)
CT o Reset ARI by placing ARI A & B manual pushbutton collars in Disarm, o Depress the A & B ARI reset pushbuttons, o Place the Scram Reset switch 5A-S9 to the Group 184 and Group 2&3 positions
~. o Open Scram Discharge Volume inboard and outboard vents and drains.
CT 0 Perform T-220 Driving Control Rods During Failure To Scram.
CRS Direct T-I 17 actions:
0 Inhibit ADS.
0 T-221, Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass.
CT 0 T-240, Termination And Prevention Of Injection Into The RPV.
PRO Perform T-I 17 actions:
0 Inhibit ADS.
0 Direct Equipment Operator to perform T-221.
0 Perform T-240: terminate and prevent injection from all injection CT sources except RCIC, SLC and CRD; control RPV level below -
60 and within the specific RPV level band directed by the CRS.
o Place HPCl Aux. Oil Pump in the Pull to Lock position.
I o Press Emergency Stop for all reactor feed umps o Close reactor feed pump discharge valves MO-2149A,B,C o Verify closed MO-8090 C RFP Discharge Bypass
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: I Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page: 8of10 Event
Description:
Standby liquid control pump trips Cause: SLC Pump first placed into service trips on overcurrent Effects: Standby SLC Pump must be placed into service manually to mitigate ATWS Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior URO Recognize the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Pump placed into service has tripped.
CT Place the standby SLC Pump in service using keylock control switch on the 20C05A panel.
Operator Actions ES-D-2
--./
Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page: 9of10 Event
Description:
Drywell vent valve (AO-2509) fails to isolate Cause: Group 3 isolation signal fails to close AO-2509 on RPV low level during scram Effects: AO-2509 stays open potentially affecting Secondary Containment isolation capability Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize AO-2509 did not auto close on Group 3 isolation signal.
Close AO-2509 by placing valve control switch to close position on panel 20C484B.
L d Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page: 10of 10 Event
Description:
A EHC pump trips / loss of turbine bypass valves Cause: A EHC pump trips on overcurrent condition Effects: Complete loss of Turbine EHC System causing a turbine trip and bypass valve to close Time Position Applicants Actions Or Behavior UROIPRO Recognize turbine trip condition.
Recognize loss of only available EHC Pump.
Crew Recognize complete loss of EHC System and eventual loss of turbine bypass valves for RPV pressure control.
CRS Direct RPV pressure control using SRVs.
UROIPRO Control RPV pressure below 1050 psig using SRVs, OR to stay on safe side of T-I 02 Curve TIL-I SRV Tail Pipe Limit if Torus water level is high out of normal band.
UROIPRO Place Torus cooling in service using RRC I O . 1-2 Open MO-2-10-39A(B)
Open MO-2-32-89A (B, C, or D)
Start a HPSW Pump 0 Start an RHR Pump Open MO-2-10-34A(B)
Place additional pumps in service as required TERMINATION CRITERIA:
The scenario may be terminated when the crew has control of RPV power and level using T-240 Termination and Prevention of Injection into the R P V and the crew begins draining the Scram Discharge Volume per T-216 in order to attempt another scram to insert control rods.
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
Classification is a Site Area Emergency IAW EAL MS4 Auto and Manual Scram NOT Successful.