ML13063A717

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Second Request for Additional Information Deletion of Condition for Inoperable Control Area Air Condition System/Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Isolation Dampers (TAC Nos. ME9095 and ME9096)
ML13063A717
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 03/11/2013
From: John Hughey
Plant Licensing Branch 1
To: Joyce T
Public Service Enterprise Group
Hughey J
References
TAC ME9095, TAC ME9096
Download: ML13063A717 (5)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 11, 2013 Mr. Thomas Joyce President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, N09 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT:

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - SECOND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: DELETION OF CONDITION FOR INOPERABLE CONTROL AREA AIR CONDITION SYSTEM/CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM ISOLATION DAMPERS (TAC NOS. ME9095 AND ME9096)

Dear Mr. Joyce:

By letter dated July 17, 2012,1 as supplemented by letter dated, January 28,2013,2 PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG, the licensee), submitted a license amendment request for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem). Units 1 and 2. Specifically, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.90, PSEG requested a license amendment to revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.6.1 (Unit 1) and 3/4.7.6 (Unit 2), "Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System." by removing the separate action for securing an inoperable Control Area Air Conditioning System and Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System isolation damper in the closed position and entering the actions for an inoperable control room envelope boundary. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has reviewed the request submitted by the licensee and has determined that additional information is required, as provided in the enclosure, in order to complete its review .

. The draft questions were sent to Mr. Brian Thomas of your staff, to ensure that the questions were understandable, the regulatory basis for the questions was clear, and to determine if the information was previously docketed. On March 4,2013, Mr. Thomas indicated that the licensee will submit a response by March 29. 2013.

1 Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12199A426.

2 ADAMS Accession No. ML13028A268.

T. Joyce -2 If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-3204 or via e-mail at John. Hughey@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

~!J John D. Hughey, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc: Distribution via ListServ

SECOND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DELETION OF CONDITION FOR INOPERABLE CONTROL AREA AIR CONDITION SYSTEM/

CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM ISOLATION DAMPERS DOCKET NUMBERS 50-272 AND 50-311 By letter dated July 17, 2012,1 as supplemented by letter dated, January 28, 2013,2 PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG, the licensee), submitted a license amendment request for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem), Units 1 and 2. Specifically, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.90, PSEG requested a license amendment to revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.6.1 (Unit 1) and 3/4.7.6 (Unit 2), "Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System," by removing the separate action for securing an inoperable Control Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) and Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS) isolation damper in the closed position and entering the actions for an inoperable control room envelope boundary. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has reviewed the information submitted by the licensee, and based on this review, determined the following information is required to complete the evaluation.

Containment and Ventilation Branch (SCVB) Request for Additional Information:

Salem Unit 1 TS 6.18, "Control Room Envelope Habitability Program," and Unit 2 TS 6.17, "Control Room Envelope Habitability Program," address "Elements a through Element f,"

regarding control room habitability following a radiological event, hazardous release, or a smoke challenge.

PSEG stated in Section 4.0 of Attachment 1, to the submittal dated July 17, 2012, that the current actions for an inoperable control room boundary would allow the implementation of mitigating actions that ensure the control room envelope boundary is able to meet the limits of the radiological, smoke and chemical hazards analyses. Performance of these actions in lieu of isolating an inoperable CAACS/CREACS damper in the closed position would allow the performance of preventative maintenance and avoid the unnecessary shutdown of the Salem Units when actions can be implemented that ensure the plant operates within the bounds of the radiological, smoke and chemical hazards analyses.

1 Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12199A426.

2 ADAMS Accession No. ML13028A268.

Enclosure

-2 PSEG also stated that for preventative maintenance activities that require the inoperability of the CMCS/CREACS isolation dampers, the mitigating actions would be developed and reviewed prior to implementation, to ensure the mitigating actions maintain operation of the plant within the limits of the radiological, smoke and chemical hazards analyses.

The NRC staff requests that PSEG provide clarification for the following:

SCVB RAI 1: What is the fail position of the isolation damper(s) under loss of air or loss of power?

SCVB RAI 2: Under the circumstances the isolation damper(s) are inoperable due to preventive maintenance, what compensatory measures will be taken to make sure that the control room boundary is maintained?

SCVB RAI 3: Please describe what mitigating actions and any compensatory measures that would be developed and reviewed prior to implementation to maintain operation of the plant within the limits of the radiological, smoke and chemical hazards analyses during inoperability of the CMCS/CREACS isolation dampers.

SCVB RAI 4: Also, clarify that these mitigating actions conform to Salem Unit 1 TS 6.18, "Control Room Envelope Habitability Program," and Unit 2 TS 6.17, "Control Room Envelope Habitability Program."

SCVB RAI 5: Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.1.d.4 involves the operability of the isolation dampers discussed in action statement 3.7.6.1.f/g (Salem Unit 1) and 3.7.6.f/g (Salem Unit 2). These dampers are active components, since they are required to change position (from open to close) on applicable actuation signals. If an 18 month surveillance test fails for reasons of failure of the isolation damper from an active component viewpoint, entrance into action statement 3.7.6.1.f/g. or 3.7.6.f/g would be required. Therefore, please address why action statements 3.7.6.1.f/g and 3.7.6.f/g can be deleted as opposed to revised to accommodate maintenance on the dampers.

' .. ML13063A717 "Via email dated OFFICE LPL1-2/PM LPL 1-2/LA DSS/SCVB LPL 1-2/BC LPL 1-2/PM NAME JHl!9hey ABaxter .. RDennig .. MKhanna JHughev 02/07/2013 DATE 03/08/2013 03/07/2013 and 03/01/2013 03/11/2013 03/11/2013