ML18081A636

Forwards LER 79-058/01X-1

ML18081A636
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/10/1979
From:	Librizzi F Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML18081A637	List: ML18081A636 ML18081A638
References
NUDOCS 7911290397
Download: ML18081A636 (3)

Text

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Par!-: Place NJ 071CJ1 Pi,rJnc: 201 430 7CJOO November 10, 1979 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Off ice of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-58/0lT SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting mental Licensee Event Report 79-58/0lX-l.

Sincerely yours, ), /) . F. P.

General Manager -Electric Production CC: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies) Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies) l!111:1m;n

("' tr_,../,:'

d:' .

s Report Number: 79-58/0lX-l Report Date: 11/10/79 Occurrence Date: 9/07/79 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

• Qualification of Control Systems for Adverse Environmental Conditions CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Operational Mode 5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

We have been notified by Westinghouse that a review of the mental qualifications of NSSS equipment has been conducted which showed that several systems were identified which, if subject to an adverse environment, could potentially lead to control system tion which may impact protective functions.

These systems are the steam generator power operated relief valve control, pressurizer power operated relief valve control, main feedwater control and automatic rod control. Each of the above systems could potentially

'malfunction if impacted by adverse environment due to a high energy line break inside or outside containment.

In each case, a limited set of breaks, coupled with possible consequential control tion in an adverse direction, could result in degraded protective system function.

The consequences could yield results which are more limiting than those presented in the plant Safety Analysis Report. DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE; This occurrence is due to the numerous investigations underway which are examining the licensing bases and operating procedures of nuclear generating stations as a result of the Three Mile Island accident.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Three of the four potential interactions (pressurizer power operated relief valves control, main feedwater control and rod control) do not require any action at Salem due to either equipment design, facturers specifications, physical layout, or a combination of the above. The potential adverse impact from interaction concerning the steam generator power operated relief valves is precluded through procedural changes and operator training.

Based on these tions and the evaluations contained in our letter to Mr. Harold R. Denton of the NRC dated October 4, 1979, continued operation of Salem Unit No. 1 is justified and no modifications, suspension or revocation of the operating license is warranted.

LER 79-58/0lX-l ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (continued)

Concerning the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Control System, the particular sequence of events as postulated by house is not a safety consideration in that the loss of all auxiliary feedwater following a feedline rupture was factored into the Salem Safety Analysis.

Operator action will assure auxiliary feedwater flow to the unaffected steam generators and can be accomplished within the alloted-time frame. The Salem design basis considered operator action in recovery from feedwater/steam line break events. The indications and controls required for these operator actions are unaffected by the postulated break. CORRECTIVE ACTION: The Salem operating procedures and operator training program are being revised to address the concerns addressed in our evaluation of the Stearn Generator Power Operated Relief Valve Control System. FAILURE DATA: Not Applicable Prepared By A. W. Kapple Manager L Slem enera ting Station . J .. : / , . -,... * / *.. <-

SORC Meeting No. 82-79