ML070780098
| ML070780098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/2007 |
| From: | Shaeffer S M NRC/RGN-II/DRS/PSB2 |
| To: | Tynan T E Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-07-007 | |
| Download: ML070780098 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000424/2007007
Text
March 16, 2007Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.ATTN: Mr. T. E. TynanVice President - Vogtle Vogtle Electric Generating Plant7821 River RoadWaynesboro, GA 30830SUBJECT:VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC PROBLEMIDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2007007AND 05000425/2007007Dear Mr. Tynan:
On February 16, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspectionreport documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 16, 2007, with youand other members of your staff during the exit meeting.The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to theidentification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules andregulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selectedprocedures and records, conducted plant observations, and interviewed personnel.Based on the sample selected for review, no findings of significance were identified. The teamconcluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problemidentification and resolution programs. However, minor examples of issues not being enteredinto the corrective action program or entered into programs outside of the corrective actionprogram, narrowly focused condition report effectiveness reviews, corrective actions that wereineffectively tracked or were not implemented in a timely manner, and weaknesses in thetrending of issues entered into the corrective action program were identified. It was recognizedthat management has placed additional attention on the corrective action program and hasinitiated actions to improve performance in this area since late 2006.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be available electronically for public
inspection in the NRC Public DocumentRoom or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system
2(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).Sincerely,
/RA/Scott M. Shaeffer, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 2Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000424/2007007 and 05000425/2007007Attachment: Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 3)
2(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 2Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000424/2007007 and 05000425/2007007Attachment: Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 3)X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
G SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVEADAMS: X YesACCESSION NUM
BER:_________________________OFFICERII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRSSIGNATURESMSATS1 via emailSMS forJER6 via emailNAMES. ShaefferA. SabischG. McCoyJ. Rivera-OrtizDATE03/ /0703/16/0703/15/0703/16/0703/15/07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\FileNet\ML070780098.wpd
3cc w/encls:J. T. GasserExecutive Vice PresidentSouthern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.Electronic Mail DistributionL. M. Stinson, Vice President, FleetOperations SupportSouthern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.Electronic Mail DistributionN. J. StringfellowManager-LicensingSouthern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.Electronic Mail DistributionBentina C. TerrySouthern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.Bin B-022P. O. Box 1295Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
Director, Consumers' Utility CounselDivisionGovernor's Office of Consumer Affairs2 M. L. King, Jr. DrivePlaza Level East; Suite 356Atlanta, GA 30334-4600Office of the County CommissionerBurke County CommissionWaynesboro, GA 30830Director, Department of Natural Resources205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252Atlanta, GA 30334Manager, Radioactive Materials ProgramDepartment of Natural ResourcesElectronic Mail DistributionAttorney GeneralLaw Department132 Judicial BuildingAtlanta, GA 30334Laurence BergenOglethorpe Power CorporationElectronic Mail DistributionResident ManagerOglethorpe Power CorporationAlvin W. Vogtle Nuclear PlantElectronic Mail DistributionArthur H. Domby, Esq.Troutman SandersElectronic Mail DistributionSenior Engineer - Power SupplyMunicipal Electric Authority of GeorgiaElectronic Mail DistributionReece McAlisterExecutive SecretaryGeorgia Public Service Commission244 Washington Street, SWAtlanta, GA 30334Distribution w/encls: (See page 4)
4Letter to T. E. Tynan from Scott M. Shaeffer dated March 16, 2007SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2007007 AND 05000425/2007007Distribution w/encls
- B. Singal, NRRC. Evans, RII EICSL. Slack, RII EICSRIDSNRRDIRSOE MailPUBLIC
EnclosureU. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIDocket Nos: 50-424, 50-425
Report No: 05000424/2007007, 05000425/2007007
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle El
ectric Generating
Plant, Units 1 and 2Location: Waynesboro, GA
Dates: January 29 - February 2, 2007February 12 - 16, 2007Inspectors: A. Sabisch, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba Nuclear StationG. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector, VogtleJ. Rivera-Ortiz, Reactor Inspector Approved by: S. Shaeffer, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 2Division of Reactor Projects
EnclosureSUMMARY OF FINDINGSIR 05000424/2007-007, 05000425/2007-007; 1/29/2007-2/16/2007; Vogtle Electric GeneratingPlant, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems.The inspection was conducted by two senior resident inspectors and a reactor inspector. TheNRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors isdescribed in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000. Identification and Resolution of Problems SummaryNo findings of significance were identified. The licensee was generally effective in identifyingproblems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licenseeproperly prioritized issues entered into the corrective action program (CAP) and routinelyperformed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth to address theissue documented in the condition reports (CRs). Station management has recently beenproviding increased focus and attention on the quality of root cause and apparent causedeterminations based on the results of internal self assessments. Improvements were noted inthe documents produced over the past quarter. Operating experience was found to be usedboth proactively and reactively by personnel involved in the corrective action program. Thelicensee's programmatic self-assessments and audits were generally effective in identifyingweaknesses in the corrective action program. Weaknesses in the performance of requiredeffectiveness reviews by the department(s) responsible for specific CRs were identified by theinspectors which have the potential to allow similar events to occur at the station by notensuring corrective action deficiencies are identified and corrected. The inspectors concludedthat the workers at Vogtle felt free to report safety concerns.
EnclosureREPORT DETAILS4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolutiona. Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness(1) Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed procedures associated with the CAP which described theadministrative process for identifying, evaluating and resolving problems via CRs. Theinspectors reviewed selected CR's from the approximately 26,250 that had been issuedbetween January 2005 and December 2006. The inspectors also reviewed NRC reportsthat documented NRC inspections over the last two years to assess how the licenseeaddressed findings documented in these reports. Corrective action documentsassociated with Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were also reviewed to ensure theactions contained in the LERs were appropriate, comprehensive in nature, and had beenimplemented.The inspectors conducted a detailed review of Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW),Component Cooling Water (CCW), Chemical Volume & Control System (CVCS), and theDiesel Generators (DGs), to verify that problems were being properly identified,appropriately characterized, and processed in accordance with the licensee'sestablished CAP procedures. These systems were selected based on risk insights from
the licensee's probabilistic risk analysis. For these systems and
associatedcomponents, the inspectors reviewed CR's, system health reports, the maintenancework history, and open Work Orders (WOs). The inspectors conducted plant walkdownsof these systems to assess the material condition and to determine if any identifieddeficiencies had not been entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed selectedindustry and NRC operating experience items associated with plant systems andcomponents to verify that these were appropriately evaluated for applicability and thatissues identified were entered into the CAP.The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those whichfocused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify thatfindings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessmentswere consistent with the NRC's assessment of the licensee's CAP. The inspectorsattended selected daily Management Review Meetings and Corrective Action ProgramCoordinator (CAPCO) CR screening meetings to observe management and oversightfunctions of the CAP. The inspectors attended a Corrective Action Review Board(CARB) meeting and reviewed the 2006 CARB meeting minutes to assess how effectivethe oversight provided by the CARB has been.The inspectors also held discussions with various personnel to evaluate their thresholdfor identifying issues and entering them into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed inthe Attachment.
4Enclosure(2) AssessmentEffectiveness of Problems Identification. The inspectors determined that the licenseewas generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. Thethreshold for initiating CR's was low and employees were encouraged to initiate CRs forplant issues. Equipment performance issues were being identified and entered into theCAP for monitoring, follow-up, and resolution. Some minor issues, identified during thesystem walkdowns, had not been captured in the CAP including small oil leaks, minorboric acid buildup on components, housekeeping issues, and unofficial markings onplant components. Over the past few years, station management has enhanced theirexpectations related to the identification and reporting of equipment issues andcommunicated these expectations to plant personnel. Improved performance in thisarea was noted over the two-year inspection period based on a review of the CRdatabase and interviews with station personnel and the Vogtle resident inspectors.Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues. The inspectors determined thatthe licensee had adequately prioritized issues entered into the CAP. Generally, thelicensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth toensure the issue was understood and appropriate corrective actions developed toprevent recurrence.The station conducts trending on condition reports based on event codes assignedduring the daily CAPCO meeting and generates quarterly trend reports. Forconsistency, a limited number of department CAPCO's were used to assign the eventcodes. The identification of trends was based on an automated screening process. When a threshold was reached, the resulting graphs and tables were sent to individualdepartments to review and they, in turn, provided issue summaries for inclusion into thequarterly CAP trend report. While these reports receive wide-spread distribution,internal and external assessments of the CAP have determined that they have been lessthan effective in providing station management with the tools necessary to focusattention on specific performance weaknesses. This was confirmed by the team throughinterviews and reviewing past trend reports. As a result of these licensee assessments,enhancements in the process for identification of trends and development ofmanagement reports were being developed by the station. Interviews with departmentCAPCO's revealed that informal "knowledge trending" was routinely performed when aCAPCO recognizes an issue as having occurred previously. Trend CRs have beeninitiated based on this informal process. Cause codes assigned to CR's followingcompletion of Root Cause and Corrective Action Analysis (RCCA), Apparent CauseDetermination (ACD), or Basic Cause Determination (BCD) have not been used fortrending purposes due to the perceived limited population size. However, due toidentified weaknesses in the station's trending program, this data was being evaluatedfor inclusion in a semi-annual consolidated Plant Performance Report which was underdevelopment.The inspectors determined that the station conducted an adequate number of formalcause determinations based on the overall number and significance of issues enteredinto the CAP. The cause determinations were consistent with established CAP
5Enclosureprocedures based on the number of Severity Level 1 (one), Severity Level 2 (46), andSeverity Level 3 (392) CR's initiated between January 2005 and December 2006. Theprocesses used ranged from the most formal tool, the RCCA, to less rigorous methodssuch as an ACD or a BCD. In 2006, the station performed approximately 325 causedeterminations.While most of the cause determinations reviewed were detailed and thorough, a fewexamples of weak or less than fully effective causal analyses were identified resulting insimilar events occurring after the initial event had been evaluated. The following are examples noted by the inspectors.*CRs 2005100664 and 2006101010 both described a jacket water pressureinstrument on the 2A diesel generator, 2PI-19172, which indicated outside of normaloperable range. In each case, the licensee used other alternative indications in
order to demonstrate the operability of the system. Also, in each case the licenseewrote a work order to check the calibration of the instrument. Each time theinstrument calibration was checked, the calibration was found to be satisfactory, andthe work order and the condition reports closed with no further action taken. Discussions with the system engineer indicated that this instrument had a tendencyto drift in and out of tolerance, and that it was intended to have the instrumentreplaced. There is no open work order or formal tracking document which commitsto the replacement of 2PI-19172.*CR 2005107840 documented a Train B CCW pump trip during the implementation ofa design change in 2B Safety Features Sequencer System, which involvedmanipulation of conductors associated with CCW-2 pump. The cause of the pumptrip was not specifically determined in the CR; however, based on NRC inspectors'discussions with plant staff, it was attributed to inadequate evaluation of clearances. The licensee generated corrective actions to review, in part, scheduled plantmodifications to prevent recurrence of this event. As part of the completion of twocorrective actions, the licensee took credit for corrective actions completed for CR2005102185, which documented a previous event where a cable was foundenergized during work in an Auxiliary Feed Water Turbine Control Panel. The causeof the previous event was attributed to inadequate tag-out preparation andinadequate evaluation of cables that had to be de-energized. Even though thecorrective actions for the previous event were completed at the time of the CCWpump trip, they were less than fully effective to correct deficiencies in the designchange process regarding the evaluation of clearances that could impact personnelsafety and plant operating equipment.The station generates a monthly CAP performance indicator overview containingstatistics on overdue action items, action item extensions, CR age, and an overall CAPcomposite program assessment which was provided to station management to ensurethe appropriate level of attention was maintained on the CAP. In general, the licenseeidentified and implemented corrective actions in a timely manner; however, in thefollowing instance, the licensee had been slow in completing corrective actions and thereasons were not documented in the CR.
6Enclosure*CR 2005102333 was written to evaluate information provided by Westinghousewhich indicated there may be non-conservatism in the P-14 nominal trip setpoint. Once identified and verified, the licensee followed the guidance of NRCAdministrative Letter (AL) 98-10 and established the administrative controlsnecessary to change the P-14 setpoint to the proper level. This change was on bothunits. It is also an expectation of AL 98-10 that, following the imposition ofadministrative controls, an amendment to the TS, with appropriate justification andschedule, will be submitted in a timely fashion. The issue of in
strument se
tpoints intechnical specifications was a topic of discussion between the industry and the NRCin TSTF-493. Discussions with the licensee indicated that they were withholding thischange pending resolution of these discussions. The inspectors discussed this issuewith NRC staff and it was determined that this topic was expected to be resolved bythe end of 2007 and it was reasonable for the licensee to wait for the resolution todevelop the change to their technical specifications.Effectiveness of Corrective Actions. The team found, generally, that corrective actionsdeveloped and implemented for problems were appropriate in scope and commensuratewith the safety significance of the issues.The fleet CAP (NMP-GM-002) required that effectiveness reviews be performed on allSeverity Level 1 and 2 CRs and selected Severity Level 3 CRs. Effectiveness reviewswere intended to determine if corrective actions taken were effective by ensuring thecauses identified in the CR have been corrected, there has been no recurrence of thesame or similar event, and the corrective actions had been adequately challenged. Areview of all Severity Level 1 and 2 CRs issued over the period reviewed identified thatthis was not being implemented consistently with approximately 35% of the affectedCR's missing effectiveness reviews as an action item. Following discussions with thelicensee, this deficiency was entered into the CAP and an immediate corrective actionwas developed to initiate action items to conduct effectiveness reviews on the affectedCR's.In addition, a review of completed effectiveness reviews determined that many of thereviews were narrowly focused and only looked for the recurrence of the identical issueor problem that had resulted in the original CR being initiated which does not meet theexpectations contained in NMP-GM-002-001. The following are examples noted by theinspectors.*CR 2005103989 documents the June 2, 2005, event in which both trains of the Unit2 solid state protection system were placed in "input error inhibit" which rendered theHigh Flux Alarm at Shutdown circuit inoperable when it was required by TS. Whilethe corrective actions developed were comprehensive, the effectiveness reviewstated that the actions prevented the same or similar event based on the fact that"...between the two units, there have been five instances of entering Mode 5 withoutrendering the High Flux Alarm at Shutdown circuit inoperable." The root causeidentified contri
butors as the oper
ator's "can-do" mindset and the willingness to useprocedures that did not cover the activity being performed; however, the actionstaken to address these human performance issues were not assessed in the
7Enclosureeffectiveness review.*CR 2005102333 documents the Hi-Hi steam generator water level setpointcalculation error that was identified in 2005. The root cause analysis identifiedweaknesses in TS setpoint basis control; however, this was not assessed as part ofthe effectiveness review.*CR 2005102460 documents damage to the Unit 1 steam generator manways duringthe 2005 refueling outage. The root cause analysis identified inadequate pre-jobbriefings, procedure quality, lack of physical barriers to protect the seating surface,and insufficient oversight of the work as causal factors; however, the effectivenessreview only states that "...during the subsequent refueling outage no similar issuewas encountered or documented with respect to steam generator manway removal,inspection and installation."(3) FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)(1) Inspection ScopeThe team interviewed station personnel, attended selected daily Management ReviewMeetings and CAPCO CR screening meetings, and evaluated CAP documentation todetermine if OE was being used effectively. In addition, the inspectors reviewed thelicensee's evaluation of selected Southern Nuclear Operating Company and industryoperating experience information, including CR's from Farley and Hatch, INPO OE, NRCRegulatory Information Summaries (RIS) and Information Notices (IN), and genericvendor notifications to verify that issues applicable to Vogtle were appropriatelyaddressed. Procedure NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program, was reviewed toverify that the requirements delineated in the program were being implemented at thestation. NMP-GM-002-GL03, Cause Determination Guideline, was reviewed to verifythat guidance was provided for reviewing internal and external operating experiencewhen evaluating issues in the corrective action program, with more detailed guidanceprovided when conducting broadness reviews on more significant issues. Documentsreviewed are listed in the Attachment.(2) AssessmentThe inspectors determined that OE was regularly used proactively to prevent eventsfrom occurring and to address events or near-misses. Station personnel routinely usedan automated screening tool which filters OE reports received from INPO on a dailybasis and sends relevant information to individuals, using specific filter criteria, as an e-mail attachment. OE was regularly included in System Health Reports and CRsassociated with station events as part of the causal investigations and corrective actiondevelopment process.
8EnclosureIndustry OE was processed at either the corporate or plant level depending on thesource and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to theapplicable department for further action or informational purposes. Any documentsrequiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure.The inspectors did note that the Vendor Technical Information Program within thelicensee's OE program may warrant additional focus. Information was readily distributedto the three stations from the corporate program administrator once processed inBirmingham. However, the conduit to extract relevant information when reviewing plantissues that may subsequently occur was not well-defined or used by station personnel.(3) FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits(1) Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed completed self assessments and audits conducted by stationand corporate organizations to assess the thoroughness of the actions items thatresulted from these activities and these action items were appropriately prioritized andentered into the CAP. The inspectors verified that the self assessments and audits wereconsistent with the NRC's assessment of the CAP and supporting programs. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.(2) AssessmentThe inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits conducted overthe review period were adequate and were self-critical in nature. Corrective actionswere incorporated into the CAP and were being tracked to completion. Updates on thestatus of these action items were provided to station management at department andsite-level CARB meetings. The inspectors determined that the licensee had adequatelyprioritized issues identified by these assessments and audits in the CAP. (3) FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment(1) Inspection ScopeThe inspectors interviewed members of the plant staff to develop a general perspectiveof the safety-conscious work environment and to determine if any conditions existed thatwould cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectorsreviewed the licensee's Employee Concerns Program (ECP) which provides an alternate
9Enclosuremethod to the CAP for employees to raise concerns and remain anonymous if sodesired. The inspectors interviewed both the ECP Corporate Program Manager and the
Plant Hatch ECP Coordi
nator (due to the unavailability of the V
ogtle ECP Coordinator),and reviewed ECP documents to verify that concerns were being identified, properlyreviewed and resolved. ECP documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.(2) AssessmentBased on the interviews held with plant staff, reviews of CRs and selected EmployeeConcern packages, ECP metrics, and an assessment of the implementation of the
licensee's ECP, the ins
pectors concluded that personnel were willing to promptly identifyand report problems using available administrative programs.(3) FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA3 Event Follow-up.1(Closed) LER 05000425/2006-003; Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump #4 Tripped Resultingin an Automatic Reactor Trip. On August 27, 2006, the Unit 2 reactor trippedautomatically from 100 percent power following the unexpected trip of the Loop #4reactor coolant pump (RCP) and subsequent Reactor Protection System actuation onlow reactor coolant system flow. The plant response following the reactor trip was asdesigned with no equipment or operational concerns identified. The cause of the eventwas attributed to deficiencies in a design change package that added surge protection toseveral large frame motors at Vogtle including the RCP motors. The packagedeficiencies included specifying the incorrect type of cable for the RCP motors, failure toprovide detailed instructions for the installation of the modification in each type of motor,and not containing cable spacing criteria in the design change package for any of thecable / motor combinations. Prior to restarting Unit 2, the RCPs that had received thesurge protection modification were inspected and the modification was verified to beproperly installed. The Unit 1 RCPs affected by this modification were inspected duringthe fall 2006 refueling outage. This issue was previously identified as FIN05000425/2006004. This LER was in the licensee's CAP as CR 2006109233. Theinspectors reviewed the LER, the condition report, and associated action items. Noadditional findings of significance were identified..2(Closed) LER 05000424, 425/2005-002; Inaccurate Steam Generator Water LevelSetpoint due to Design Calculation Errors: On April 4, 2005, the licensee was informedby the Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor that the steam generator high-high waterlevel protection setpoints (P-14) were inadequate to ensure main feedwater isolationduring a design basis event. In accordance with the guidance of NRC AdministrativeLetter (AL) 98-10, Dispositioning of Technical Specifications That Are Insufficient toAssure Plant Safety, the licensee immediately initiated administrative controls to reducethe steam generator high-high water level protection setpoints to the level necessary toensure plant protection during a design basis event. A modification was developed and
10Enclosureinstalled which changed the applicable setpoints on both units. The industry and theNRC are addressing issues associated with setpoints and allowable value calculationmethodologies as specified in
ISA S67.04. A technical specification change will besubmitted to the NRC when this issue has been addressed. The inspectors reviewedthe LER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No findings of significancewere identified..3(Closed) LER 05000425/2005-003; Reactor Coolant System Leakage Leads toShutdown Required by Technical Specifications: On December 9, 2005, Unit 2 wasplaced in Mode 3 due to pressure boundary leakage from the Reactor Coolant System(RCS) loop side of the 3/4-inch bypass line around valve 2VH-8701B, the residual heatremoval (RHR) train A suction isolation valve. Based on the information known at thattime, the cause of the leakage was attributed to a lack of fusion when the weld wasinstalled in October 2002. The weld defect was found to be a circumferential linear flaw,approximately 1/4 to 1/2 inch long located approximately 1/8 inch from the toe of the weld. The defective weld was ground out, replaced and examined. The unit was returned tofull power operation on December 18, 2005. This LER was in the licensee's CAP as CR2005111460. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the condition report and associatedaction items. No findings of significance were identified..4(Closed) LER 05000425/2005-002; Instrument Setpoint Drift Leads to Operation of theUnit in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications: On February 26, 2005, thelicensee identified that the output of the reactor coolant system loop 2 overtemperaturedelta-T (OTDT) instrument channel 2T-421 was drifting. The instrument was repairedand returned to service. On February 28, 2005, the instrument drifted again. Troubleshooting identified that the cause was a component failure which had existed onFebruary 26, but had not been identified during troubleshooting post-maintenancetesting. The failure to promptly identify and repair this instrument was cited as non-citedviolation 05000425/2005003-01, Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions toPreclude Repetitive Failure of Unit 2 Channel 2 OTDT Instrument. Licensee evaluationdetermined that this channel's signal had drifted outside of the Technical Specificationsallowable value longer than allowed by the action requirements. The inspectorsreviewed the LER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No additionalfindings of significance were identified..5(Closed) LER 05000424, 425/2006-002; Three Technical Specification InstrumentsWere Determined to be in a Condition Which Was Prohibited by TechnicalSpecifications: During the week of June 6, 2005, the licensee identified a potentialproblem with certain Rosemount transmitters. If the transmitter was installed improperly,there was a chance that a neck seal was damaged which may allow moisture to enterthe casing and inhibit the safe operation of the transmitter during accident conditions. The licensee identified a transmitter with a potentially damaged neck seal in December,2005. The licensee did not immediately search for additional damaged transmitters. InJuly, 2006 the licensee identified additional transmitters in risk-significant applicationswith potentially damaged seals. The failure to promptly identify and correct this issuewas previously identified as NCV 5000424/2006004-01. The inspectors reviewed theLER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No additional findings of
11Enclosuresignificance were identified.4OA6 Management MeetingsOn February 16, 2007, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. TomTynan, Vice President - Vogtle, and other members of his staff who acknowledged thefindings. The inspectors asked the licensee if any of the material examined during theinspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
AttachmentSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATIONKEY POINTS OF CONTACTLicensee PersonnelJ. Acree; Operations Shift SupervisorW. Atkins; Nuclear Supply ChainT. Beckworth; Plant Hatch Employee Concerns CoordinatorL. Blair, Performance Analysis SpecialistW. Copeland; Performance Analysis SupervisorC. Duncan; Systems EngineeringC. Eckert, Work ControlsM. Hickox; NSCW System EngineerP. Hurst; Concerns Program ManagerT. Mattson; Performance AnalysisA. Rickman, Vogtle SEE-IN CoordinatorM. Sharma; Performance Analysis SpecialistR, Shepherd, Nuclear Network CoordinatorK. Stokes; DG System EngineerT. Tynan, Vice President - VogtleNRC PersonnelS. Shaeffer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2LIST OF ITEMS CLOSED05000425/2006-003LERUnit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump #4 Tripped Resulting in anAutomatic Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.1)05000424, 425/2005-002LERInaccurate Steam Generator Water Level Setpoint due toDesign Calculation Errors (Section 4OA3.2)05000425/2005-003LERReactor Coolant System Leakage Leads to ShutdownRequired by Technical Specifications(Section 4OA3.3)05000425/2005-002LERInstrument Setpoint Drift Leads to Operation of the Unit ina Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section4OA3.4)05000424, 425/2006-002LERThree Technical Specification Instruments WereDetermined to be in a Condition Which Was Prohibited byTechnical Specifications (Section 4OA3.5) LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDProceduresNMP-GM-002; Corrective Action Program; Version 5.0NMP-GM-002-001; Corrective Action Program Instructions; Version 1.0NMP-GM-008; Operating Experience Program; Version 2.0
A-2AttachmentNMP-GM-008; Operating Experience Program (Draft); Version 3.0NMP-GM-002-GL03; Cause Determination Guideline, Version 6.0NMP-GM-002-GL05; Corrective Action Program, Data Configuration Guideline Rev. 8.0NMP-ES-001; Equipment Reliability Process De
scription, Ve
rsion 5.0NMP-ES-005; Scopi
ng and Importance Determination for Equipment Reliability, Version 5.013503-1; Unit 1 Reactor Control Solid-State Protection System, Rev. 19.213503-2; Unit 2 Reactor Control Solid-State Protection System, Rev. 18.180200C; Performance Assessment Monitoring, Rev. 0100163-C; NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal;Rev. 11.11009-C; Operator Aids, Rev. 12.113105-1; Safety Injection System; Rev. 4513105-2; Safety Injection System; Rev. 4312006-C; Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown, Rev. 7391001-C; Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions; Rev. 2591501-C; Recovery; Rev. 16Operating Experience DocumentsNRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-24; Revised Review and Transmittal Process forAccident Sequence Precursor AnalysesNRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2007-01; Clarification of NRC Guidance for Maintaining aStandard Emergency Action Level SchemeNRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-22; Lesson Learned from Recent 10CFR Part 72 DryCask Storage CampaignNRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-25; Requirements for the Distribution and Possession ofTritium Exit SignsNRC Information Notice 06-28; Siren System Failures due to Erroneous Siren System SignalNRC Information Notice 06-26; Failure of Magnesium Rotors in Motor Operated Valve ActuatorsNRC Information Notice 06-14, Supplement 1; Potentially Defective External Lead-WireConnections in Barton Pressure TransmittersPart 21 Notice regarding Tyco Crosby Series JLT Spring Loaded Pressure Relief ValvesWestinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-05-4; Potential Tin Whiskers on Printed Circuit BoardComponentsSelf- Assessment DocumentsSurveillance SNC-2007-001; Fleet QA Surveillance of the im
plantation and effectiveness of theCorrective Action ProgramQA Audit of the Corrective Action Program (CAP), V-CAP-2006-1Operating Experience Point of Contact Effectiveness Review; December 13 - 15, 2006Effectiveness Review for Action Item 2005203075Condition Reports2007101485, 2005100146, 2005100178, 2005101787, 2005102333, 2005102571,2005103063, 2005103632, 2005103989, 2005105374, 2005105859, 2005106118,2005106877, 2005108493, 2005109484, 2005109531, 2005109973, 2005110364,2005111178, 2005111254, 2005111460, 2005111583, 2005111982, 2006100539,2006100755, 2006100839, 2006100906, 2006101112, 2006101137, 2006102023,
A-3Attachment2006102295, 2006103134, 2006103594, 2006104417, 2006105424, 2006105426,2006107236, 2006107383, 2006107603, 2006109187, 2006109233, 2006109869,2006110322, 2006110981, 2006112318, 2006112454, 2006113261, 2007100013,2007100130; 2005101787, 2005104571, 1006109233, 2006109187, 2005103989,2006104417, 2006109233, 2007101722, 2006101127, 2005102333, 2005101325,2005101343, 2005105374, 2005104189, 2005111542, 2006102910, 2006107580,2006107603, 2006108450, 2006108514, 2006108517, 2006109187Action Items2005201207, 2005201208, 2005201209, 2005201210, 2005201211, 2005201639,2005201690, 2005201861, 2005201862, 2005201866, 2005201868, 2006203971,2006203972, 2006203973, 2006203974, 2006203975, 2006203976, 2006203976,2006203977, 2006203977, 2006204070, 2006204183, 2006204187, 2006204188,2006204189, 2006204228, 2006205227, 2006205228, 2006205229, 2006205230,2006205232, 2006205234, 2006205235, 2007200355, 2005202666, 2005202667,2005202668, 2005202669Miscellaneous DocumentsVogtle Key Performance Indicator Report; December 2006Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Quarterly CAP Trend Report, August through October 2006"Valuing the CAP, Leadership in Action" presented by T. Tynon on 3/17/06MWOs 1060183801 and 1060183901Design Change Package 2051624801Training Handout, "Current Events" presented during Licensed Operator RequalificationSegment 20052, April - May 2005Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW)Condition Reports: 2006100553, 2006105837, 2006105921, 2006106438, 2006110938, 2005109036, 2005117274 Work Orders: 2062103601, 2061070801, 2054150601Procedures: 83308-C; Testing of Safety-Related NSCW Sys. Coolers; Rev. 30.1Miscellaneous Documents:Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006System Health Reports: 1
st Quarter 2005 through 3
rd Quarter 2006Vogtle Key Performance Indicators, December 2006; MSPI - Cooling Water Systems, Unit 1and Unit 2Vogtle Maintenance Equipment Reliability Overall Report Card, July 2006Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS)Condition Reports2005108955, 2005103124, 2006108383, 2006107514, 2006105424, 2006105428,2006100502, 2005104876, 2004003039, 2004003187, 2004003291, 2004003436,2005110553, 2005101076, 2005105013, 2005109906, 2005110199, 2005111901,2006105775, 005101693,2005102505, 2006105553, 2005107840
A-4AttachmentWork Orders2061290301, 1061046701, 2040097801, 2052151801, 2040242101, 1040333301,2040324501, 2050374501,2052123701, 1060970401, 1051511401, 1051624401,1061046701Procedures13006-1; Chemical and Volume Control; Rev. 80 13006-2; Chemical and Volume Control; Rev. 66.125039-C; Valve Packing Removal, Installation, and Adjustment; Rev. 13.1Miscellaneous DocumentsOperator Shift Briefing items SB 2005-11, and SB 2006-41Repetitive Tasks: 200600000911, 200600000912, and LUB70032Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Units 1:Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Units 2:Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006System Health Reports: 1
st Quarter 2005 through 3
rd Quarter 2006Component Cooling Water (CCW)Condition Reports:2006112223, 2005106222, 2005105036, 2005106072, 2006100717, 2006104873,2006105632, 2006107212, 2005104851, 2006108358, 2005106861, 2005103178,2005106256, 2005103892, 2005105267, 2005108970, 2005103977, 2006110904,2006111950, 2006112182, 2005106581Work Orders1051942901, 2020292301, 1052097701, 2061437201, 1051922301, 1061975601,1062142901, 2052492401Procedures29401-C; Work Order Functional Tests; Rev. 24.135311-C; Chemical Control of Closed Cooling Water Systems; Rev. 39.235312-C; Chemical Control of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water Systems; Rev. 13Miscellaneous DocumentsVogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006System Health Reports: 1
st Quarter 2005 through 3
rd Quarter 2006Check valve IST results per procedure 14803-1, "CCW Pumps and Check Valve IST andResponse Time Tests," Rev. 22.1 (10/5/06)
A-5AttachmentDiesel GeneratorsCondition Reports2005100352, 2005100529, 2005100605, 2005100633, 2005100641, 2005100653,2005100664, 2005102314, 2005102891, 2005104123, 2005106203, 2005106349,2005106877, 2005109047, 2005110566, 2005111137, 2005111317, 2006100471,2006100549, 2006100761, 2006100854, 2006100874, 2006100951, 2006101010,2006101683, 2006102448, 2006104013, 2006104225, 2006104800, 2006109696,2006110219, 2006111878, 2006111947, 2006112175, 2006112568, 2006113255, 2006113283Work Orders1054160201, 1054160901, 1060689401, 1061157901, 1061964101, 1062066201,1062106201, 1062158301, 2052155401, 2052331801, 2052331901, 2052443501,2052443601, 2052543601, 2052550801, 2052551001, 2053733901, 2060097301,2060167901, 2060201801, 2060202101, 2060319001, 2060462001, 2060497001,2060786101, 2060994301, 2061267901, 2091294001, 2061660901, 2061860201, 2062211401Miscellaneous DocumentsVogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006System Health Reports: 1
st Quarter 2005 through 3
rd Quarter 2006Vogtle Key Performance Indicators, December 2006; MSPI - Emergency AC Power System,Unit 1 and Unit 2Vogtle Maintenance Equipment Reliability Overall Report Card, July 2006Condition Reports/Action Items Generated for NRC-Identified Issues2007101098; Damaged insulation on piping in the 1A and 1B NSCW cooling towers2007101099; Debris and equipment found in the 1A NSCW cooling tower electrical tunnel2007101100; Insulation around NSCW slow fill line check valve 21202U4A09 is missing andneeds to be replaced2007101487; Effectiveness reviews were not identified as action items in a number of SeverityLevel 2 CR's are required by NMP-GM-002, CAP2007101712; Questions arose concerning the timeliness of picking up quality concerns fromboxes in the plant2007101734; Scaffolding issues identified by the NRC during a plant walkdown2005204105; Missing action item to perform effectiveness review for CR 20051094842006200614; Missing action item to perform effectiveness review for CR 20051112542007101202; Boron residue at the body to bonnet area of valve 1-1208-U4-42932007101203; Boron residue at the tail pipes downstream of valves 1-1208-X-4950 and 1-1208-U-46002007101206; Insulation at flow transmitter 2FT0183 not secured and apparent boron residue oninsulation above the flow transmitter 2007101713; Deficiencies identified in the CR 2005107840 closure package