ML061720368
| ML061720368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/2006 |
| From: | Mccree V Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Grissette D Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| EA-06-132 IR-06-009 | |
| Download: ML061720368 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000424/2006009
Text
June 20, 2006
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN:
Mr. D. E. Grissette, Vice President
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION REPORT NO. 5000424/2006009 AND
5000425/2006009; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING
Dear Mr. Grissette:
On March 24, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report
documents the inspection results, which were discussed on June 5, 2006, with you and other
members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel. The inspection also included a review of the circumstances involving the failure of
the Vogtle full-scale exercise critique to identify a weakness associated with a risk-significant
planning standard (RSPS) that was determined to be a Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)
Performance Indicator (PI) opportunity failure.
Based on the NRCs review of this issue, the failure of the licensees full-scale exercise critique
to identify a weakness associated with an RSPS that was determined to be a DEP PI
opportunity failure is a performance deficiency and an apparent violation associated with
emergency preparedness planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR 50.54(b)(4)
and the requirements of Section IV.F.2.g of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
This finding was assessed using the applicable Emergency Preparedness Significance
Determination Process (SDP) and was preliminarily determined to be of low-to-moderate safety
significance (White) because the planning standard (PS) function was lost in that the critique
failed to identify a DEP PI opportunity failure during a full-scale exercise, where there are
multiple emergency response facilities (ERFs) participating and a team of evaluators as
discussed in NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Section 4.14. Additional details
associated with this determination are discussed in Section 1EP1 of the enclosed inspection
report.
2
Before we make a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to:
(1) present to the NRC your perspectives on the facts and assumptions used by the NRC to
arrive at the finding and its significance, at a Regulatory Conference, or (2) submit your position
on the finding to the NRC in writing. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held
within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting
documentation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference
more efficient and effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public
observation. The NRC will also issue a press release to announce the conference. If you
decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within
30 days of the receipt of this letter.
Please contact Mr. Brian Bonser at (404) 562-4653 within 10 business days of the date of your
receipt of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within
10 days, we will continue with our significance determination decision and you will be advised
by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
Since this finding is an apparent violation of NRC requirements, escalated enforcement action
is being considered in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement
Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at www.nrc.gov; select What We Do, Enforcement,
then Enforcement Policy.
Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being
issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number
and characterization of apparent violations described in the enclosed inspection report may
change as a result of further NRC review.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
theNRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http:/www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA: original signed by Harold Christensen for/
Victor M. McCree, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-424, 50-425
Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report No. 05000424/2006009 and 05000425/2006009
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: (See page 3)
3
cc w/encl:
J. T. Gasser
Executive Vice President
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
T. E. Tynan
General Manager, Plant Vogtle
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
N. J. Stringfellow
Manager-Licensing
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Bentina C. Terry
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Bin B-022
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295
Director, Consumers' Utility Counsel Division
Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs
2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive
Plaza Level East; Suite 356
Atlanta, GA 30334-4600
Office of the County Commissioner
Burke County Commission
Waynesboro, GA 30830
Director, Department of Natural Resources
205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252
Atlanta, GA 30334
Manager, Radioactive Materials Program
Department of Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
Attorney General
Law Department
132 Judicial Building
Atlanta, GA 30334
(cc w/encl contd - See page 4)
4
(cc w/encl contd)
Laurence Bergen
Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution
Resident Manager
Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Arthur H. Domby, Esq.
Troutman Sanders
Electronic Mail Distributioin
Senior Engineer - Power Supply
Municipal Electric Authority
of Georgia
Electronic Mail Distribution
Reece McAlister
Executive Secretary
Georgia Public Service Commission
244 Washington Street, SW
Atlanta, GA 30334
_________________________
OFFICE
RII:DRS
RII;DRS
RII:DRP
RII:DRP
RII:DRP
RII:DRS
RII:EICS
SIGNATURE
RA
RA
RA
NAME
KREH
MILLER
ANDERSON
MCCOY
SHAEFFER
BONSER
EVANS
DATE
6/15/2006
6/15/2006
6/14/2006
6/13/2006
6/15/2006
6/ /2006
6/15/2006
E-MAIL COPY?
YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO
Enclosure
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.:
50-424, 50-425
License Nos.:
Report No.:
05000424/2006009 and 05000425/2006009
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
7821 River Road
Waynesboro, GA 30830
Dates:
March 20-24, 2006
Inspectors:
L. Miller, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
(Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, 4OA1)
J. Kreh, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Section 1EP1)
G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector (Section 1EP1)
B. Anderson, Resident Inspector (Section 1EP1)
Approved by:
Brian R. Bonser, Chief
Plant Support Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000424/2006009, 05000425/2006009; 03/20-24/2006; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,
Units 1 and 2; Exercise Evaluation
The report covered an announced inspection by a team of two emergency preparedness
inspectors and two resident inspectors. One apparent violation (AV) item, with potential safety
significance greater than Green, was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated
by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may
be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program
for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
TBD. The NRC identified an AV for failure of the licensees exercise critique process
to properly identify a weakness associated with a risk-significant planning standard
(RSPS) that was determined to be a Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Performance
Indicator (PI) opportunity failure during a full-scale exercise. The AV is associated
with emergency preparedness planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR
50.47(b)(4) and the requirements of Section IV.F.2.g of Appendix E to 10 CFR
Part 50. This finding was not entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The failure of the licensees exercise critique process was a performance deficiency.
This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Emergency
Preparedness Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure that the
licensee was capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and
safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The finding was an
identified weakness that demonstrated a level of performance that could preclude
effective implementation of the Emergency Plan in an actual emergency. This
finding was also determined to potentially have greater significance because the
licensees exercise critique process failed to properly identify a weakness associated
with an RSPS that was determined to be a DEP PI opportunity failure during a full-
scale exercise (Section 1EP1).
B.
Licensee-Identified Violations.
None
3
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
Prior to the inspection activity, the inspectors conducted an in-office review of the
exercise objectives and scenario submitted to the NRC to determine if the exercise
would test major elements of the emergency plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14).
This inspection activity represents one sample on a biennial cycle.
The onsite inspection consisted of the following review and assessment:
The adequacy of the licensees performance in the biennial exercise conducted on
March 22, 2006, was reviewed and assessed regarding the implementation of the
risk-significant planning standards (RSPSs) in 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (4), (5), (9), and
(10), which address emergency classification, offsite notification, radiological
assessment, and protective action recommendations, respectively.
The overall adequacy of the licensees emergency response facilities with regard to
NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities and
Emergency Plan commitments. The facilities assessed were the Control Room
Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center
(OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Other performance areas not addressed by the RSPSs, such as recognition by the
emergency response organization (ERO) of abnormal plant conditions, command
and control, intra- and inter-facility communications, prioritization of mitigation
activities, utilization of repair and field monitoring teams, interface with offsite
agencies, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan and its
implementing procedures.
Past performance issues from NRC inspection reports and Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) exercise reports to determine effectiveness of
corrective actions as demonstrated during this exercise to ensure compliance with
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14).
The post-exercise critique conducted on March 24, 2006, to evaluate the licensees
self-assessment of its ERO performance during the exercise and to ensure
compliance with Section IV.F.2.g of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment to this
report.
4
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified an apparent violation associated with emergency
preparedness planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the
requirements of Section IV.F.2.g of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Description. The Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone licensee response band is
established by the PI scheme and the licensees corrective action program. Data for the
DEP and ERO PI values come from the drill and exercise critiques. The baseline
inspection program is based on accurate PI data that properly reflects licensee
performance. The DEP PI is based on the licensees ability to determine whether a PI
opportunity is successful. A single failure to identify a weakness associated with an
RSPS during a full-scale exercise is a high standard based on NRCs need to ensure
the efficacy of the licensees critique program. Thus, a licensees ability to observe,
evaluate, and critique a weakness associated with an RSPS is critical.
The inspectors identified a risk-significant performance deficiency involving a failure of
the licensees exercise critique process to identify a weakness associated with an RSPS
that was determined to be a DEP PI opportunity failure. The inspectors determined that
the licensees exercise critique did not identify a weakness that occurred during the
exercise on March 22, 2006. The weakness occurred when the Shift Manager (SM)
evaluated plant conditions as meeting the Emergency Action Level (EAL) criteria for a
Site Area Emergency (SAE) without verifying and validating that the subject criteria had
been met, resulting in an incorrect SAE emergency classification. The SM announced
his decision to declare a SAE based on:
(1) reactor coolant system (RCS) activity greater than 300 µCi/gram I-131 equivalent
(Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier)
AND
(2) a non-isolable RCS leak in excess of the capacity of one charging pump in the
normal charging mode (Potential Loss of RCS Barrier).
The EALs contained other possible criteria for identifying a Potential Loss of RCS
Barrier: either Heat Sink CSFST [Critical Safety Function Status Tree] RED or RCS
Integrity CSFST RED, but neither of these conditions was present. Furthermore, the
Emergency Director Judgment criterion was not invoked with respect to the RCS
Barrier being Lost or Potentially Lost OR the inability to determine the status of the RCS
Barrier.
In the licensees emergency classification scheme, a Loss of ONE barrier AND a
Potential Loss of a SECOND barrier meets the criteria for an SAE. Loss of ONE
barrier was based on correct and validated information, and met the criterion for an
Alert declaration (an Alert had already been declared). The SM had indicated that a
Potential Loss of a SECOND barrier was met by having a NON-Isolable RCS leak
(including SG [Steam Generator] Tube Leakage) GREATER THAN the capacity of one
charging pump in normal charging mode. A non-isolable RCS leak had not occurred
5
before the SM made his declaration of the SAE. Immediately after the SM declared the
SAE and before the SAE notification was made, a licensee exercise controller
intervened to inform the SM that an RCS barrier failure had not occurred, that a safety
injection had not been required for RCS leak mitigation purposes, and that the exercise
would continue at the previously declared Alert classification level. The exercise
participants outside the CRS had not been informed of the SAE declaration.
The licensees critique determined that the SAE classification was appropriate and
correct given the plant conditions, and that the classification was a successful DEP PI
opportunity. The critique also stated that the SAE declaration was blocked by the
controller only to keep the exercise scenario on the designated time line in order to
avoid potential confusion for offsite responders.
At the exit meeting on March 24, 2006, the inspectors requested CRS data from the
exercise. Licensee management stated that the simulator data were not available
because they had not been saved at the conclusion of the exercise. The inspectors
then requested that the licensee perform three additional simulator runs under various
specified conditions using the same exercise scenario in order to provide more
information for the NRCs determination as to the validity of the SMs decision that SAE
criteria had been met. The requested additional information was provided to the NRC
on April 14, 2006. On April 18, 2006, a teleconference was held with licensee technical
staff and management in order to ask questions and to obtain clarification of certain
matters with respect to the submitted information.
Following the NRCs preliminary analysis of the additional information provided by the
licensee, a re-exit meeting was conducted by teleconference on May 8, 2006, in which
the licensee was informed that, pending further NRC staff review using the Significance
Determination Process, the subject issue would be classified as an Unresolved Item in a
separate inspection report to be issued within 30 days, and that the NRC would process
the issue as a potential greater than Green finding.
During a teleconference on June 2, 2006, the licensee discussed the sequence of
events and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) which the crew utilized leading up
to the SMs classification of the SAE. It is understood that the EOPs are symptom-
based and provide direction to address those symptoms. Where the EOPs are
symptom-based, the licensees Emergency Plan EALs, written to NUMARC/NESP-007,
Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, Revision 2, use a
combination of event-based, barrier-based, and symptom-based criteria. The licensee
stated that the SM used EOP 19000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, step 32, to
transition to EOP 19010-C, E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and declare the
SAE. There was no direction in EOP 19000 -C, step 32, to go to EOP 91001-C,
Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions, and declare an SAE. The
licensee stated that the SM and the crew had not taken actions to verify that a non-
isolable RCS leak had occurred. The SM did not ensure that the potential loss of the
RCS barrier, indicated by a non-isolable RCS leak in excess of the capacity of one
charging pump in the normal charging mode, was in fact met.
6
The licensee stated that SM was required to make the classification decision before the
15-minute goal for timeliness of classifications, as stated in NEI 99-02, Rev. 3, had
expired. The licensee stated that approximately half of the 15 minutes had passed from
the time that the first condition, reactor coolant system (RCS) activity greater than
300 µCi/gram I-131 equivalent (Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier), was met and that most of
the remaining time had elapsed in determining whether the second condition (potential
loss of the RCS barrier) was met for the SAE; therefore, the SM had only minutes to
make the decision that a SAE existed. Classification is expected to be made promptly
following indication that the conditions have reached an emergency threshold in
accordance with the licensees EAL scheme. With respect to classification of
emergencies, the 15-minute goal is a reasonable period of time for assessing and
classifying an emergency once indications are available to control room operators that
an EAL has been exceeded. The 15-minute classification time does not start until all
indications are available (i.e., both conditions for the SAE are met).
On June 3, 2006, NRC staff review was completed and a determination was made that
an AV had occurred. Licensee management was informed of this determination in a
teleconference on June 5, 2006.
Analysis. The licensees exercise critique process failure was a performance deficiency.
This finding was greater than minor because it affects the Emergency Preparedness
Cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate
measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological
emergency.
The finding is an identified weakness that demonstrated a level of performance that
could preclude effective implementation of the Emergency Plan in an actual emergency.
This finding is also determined to potentially have greater significance because the
licensees exercise critique process failed to properly identify a weakness associated
with an RSPS that was determined to be a DEP PI opportunity failure during a full-scale
exercise.
The inspectors assessed the finding using the Emergency Preparedness Significance
Determination Process (Appendix B to IMC 0609) and preliminarily determined the
finding to be of low-to-moderate safety significance (White). A loss of PS function
occurred when the exercise critique process failed to identify a weakness associated
with an RSPS. Failure to critique the inaccurate classification is considered a loss of PS
function and a white finding. This is because the licensees capacity to observe and
evaluate the process associated with an RSPS is questionable. Appendix B to
IMC 0609, Sheet 1 (Failure to Comply) and Section 4.14 were used to reach this
preliminary determination.
Section IV.F.2.g of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires licensees to identify and
correct weaknesses. The identification and correction of weaknesses is fundamentally
important to the EP Cornerstone Objective. A failure of a critique to identify a weakness
is a finding with a corresponding potential violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and
Section IV.F.2.g of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
7
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) requires, in part, that periodic exercises be
conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities and that
deficiencies identified as a result of exercises are corrected.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires, in part, that a standard emergency classification and
action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters,
is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and that State and local response plans call for
reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum
initial offsite response measures.
Section IV.F.2.g of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that all training, including
exercises, shall provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak or deficient areas
that need correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are identified shall be
corrected.
Contrary to the above, during the critique of the March 22, 2006 exercise, the licensee
failed to identify a DEP PI opportunity failure, in that the licensee counted an incorrect
classification as an opportunity success. The incorrect classification should be
considered a missed opportunity or opportunity failure.
This finding is identified as Apparent Violation (AV) 50-424, 50-425/2006009-001,
Failure of Exercise Critique to identify an RSPS weakness as a DEP PI opportunity
Failure. This issue has not yet been entered into the licensee's corrective action system.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed changes to the emergency plan, implementing procedures and
EALs to determine whether such changes had decreased the effectiveness of the plan.
The inspectors also evaluated the 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews associated with non-
administrative emergency plan, implementing procedures and EAL changes. The
review included Revisions 41 and 42 to the Vogtle Emergency Plan.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
Attachment 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The
applicable PS, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and its related 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E
requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654,
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, Regulatory Guide 1.101
were also used as references. This inspection activity represents one sample on an
annual basis.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment to this
report.
8
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
d.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedure for developing the data for the
Emergency Preparedness PIs, which are: (1) DEP; (2) ERO Drill Participation; and (3)
Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability. The inspectors examined data reported
to the NRC for the period July 1 to December 31, 2005. Procedural guidance for
reporting PI information and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI
occurrences were also reviewed. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for ERO
drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and event records.
The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI for
ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO. The
inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability
through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151,
Performance Indicator Verification. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.9
and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 3, Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Guidelines, were used as reference criteria. This inspection
activity represents three samples on an annual basis.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment to this
report.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
On March 24, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. T. Tynan and
other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was
not provided or taken during the inspection.
Following preliminary review of the additional information provided by the licensee, a re-
exit meeting was held via teleconference on May 8, 2006 with Mr. R. Dedrickson and
other members of his staff.
9
Upon completion of NRC staff review of the potential finding and the determination that
an AV had occurred, licensee management was informed of this determination in a
teleconference on June 5, 2006 with Mr. D. Grissette, Mr. T. Tynan and other members
of their staffs.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
A-
Attachment
1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
R. Brown, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
W. Copeland, Performance Analysis Supervisor
R. Dedrickson, Assistant General Manager - Operations
B. George, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
D. Grissette, Vice President, Vogtle Project
I. Kochery, Health Physics Manager
W. Lee, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager
L. Mayo, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
A. Thornhill, Managing Attorney and Compliance Manager
T. Tynan, General Manager
C. Williams, Operations Support Superintendent
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-424, 50-425/2006009-001 AV
Failure of Exercise Critique to identify an RSPS
weakness as a DEP PI opportunity failure
(Section 1EP1)
Closed
None
Discussed
None
A-
Attachment
2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1EP1: Exercise Evaluation
Plans and Procedures
10020-C, EOP and AOP Rules of Usage, Rev. 3
17007-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 07 on Panel 1A2 on MCB, Rev. 25
17011-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 11 on Panel 1C1 on MCB, Rev. 14
18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Rev. 24
18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Rev. 20
18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Rev. 18
18039-C, Confirmed Loose Part in the RCS or Steam Generator Secondary Side, Rev. 2
19000-C, E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 31.2
19001-C, ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Rev. 28
19010-C, E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev. 29
91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions, Rev. 24
91002-C, Emergency Notifications, Rev 45
91101-C, Emergency Response Organization, Rev. 22
91102-C, Duties of the Emergency Director, Rev. 25
91201-C, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, Rev. 13
91304-C, Estimating Offsite Dose, Rev. 18.1
91305-C, Protective Action Guidelines, Rev. 21
91401-C, Assembly and Accountability, Rev. 16.1
91403-C, Site Dismissal, Rev. 14
NMP-EP-101, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation, Version 2.0
NMP-EP-102, EOF Manager, Version 2.0
NMP-EP-103, Licensing Support, Version 2.0
NMP-EP-104, Dose Assessment, Version 2.0
NMP-EP-105, EOF Technical Supervisor, Version 2.0
Miscellaneous Documents
Background Information for Westinghouse Owners Group - Emergency Response Guideline:
E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, HP-Rev. 2, 04/30/2005
Basis Document for E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 04/18/200
Basis Document for ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, 08/29/2000
Records and Data from 03/22/2006 Exercise
Emergency Notification Forms (Messages Nos. 1-7) transmitted to State and local agencies
Data from additional requested CRS scenario runs: As Ran; As Ran with Loss-of-Coolant
Accident; As Ran with Steam Generator Tube Rupture; 04/14/2006
A-
Attachment
3
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes
Plans and Procedures
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Plan, Rev. 41
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Plan, Rev. 42
91501-C, Recovery, Rev. 16
91304-C, Estimating Offsite Dose, Rev. 18.1
91102-C, Duties of the Emergency Director, Rev. 25
91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions, Rev. 24
91002-C, Emergency Notifications, Rev. 45
Change Packages
LDCR 2005 046 EP, VEGP Emergency Plan Rev. 41
LDCR 2005 053 EP, NRC Bulletin 2005-02 Security EAL Revision to Emergency Plan
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
Procedures
00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and
Submittal, Rev. 9
Records and Data
Documentation package (Scenario/time line/event time line/critique report) for ERO drill held
July 29, 2005
Documentation of DEP opportunities, July - December 2005
Documentation of offsite siren weekly test, July - December 2005
Records of drill and exercise participation by ERO personnel, July - December 2005
A-
Attachment
4
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Abnormal Operating Procedure
Apparent Violation
Control Room Simulator
Drill/Exercise Performance
Emergency Action Level
Emergency Operating Procedure
Emergency Response Organization
Federal Emergency Management Agency
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
MCB
Main Control Board
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operational Support Center
Performance Indicator
PS
Planning Standard
Risk-Significant Planning Standard
Site Area Emergency
Significance Determination Process
Shift Manager