ML070780098
| ML070780098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/2007 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRS/PSB2 |
| To: | Tynan T Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-07-007 | |
| Download: ML070780098 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000424/2007007
Text
March 16, 2007
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. T. E. Tynan
Vice President - Vogtle
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
7821 River Road
Waynesboro, GA 30830
SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2007007
AND 05000425/2007007
Dear Mr. Tynan:
On February 16, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection
report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 16, 2007, with you
and other members of your staff during the exit meeting.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to the
identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and
regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected
procedures and records, conducted plant observations, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the sample selected for review, no findings of significance were identified. The team
concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem
identification and resolution programs. However, minor examples of issues not being entered
into the corrective action program or entered into programs outside of the corrective action
program, narrowly focused condition report effectiveness reviews, corrective actions that were
ineffectively tracked or were not implemented in a timely manner, and weaknesses in the
trending of issues entered into the corrective action program were identified. It was recognized
that management has placed additional attention on the corrective action program and has
initiated actions to improve performance in this area since late 2006.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system
2
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000424/2007007 and 05000425/2007007
Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: (See page 3)
_________________________
OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS
SIGNATURE SMS ATS1 via email SMS for JER6 via email
NAME S. Shaeffer A. Sabisch G. McCoy J. Rivera-Ortiz
DATE 03/ /07 03/16/07 03/15/07 03/16/07 03/15/07
3
cc w/encls: Resident Manager
J. T. Gasser Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Executive Vice President Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
Arthur H. Domby, Esq.
L. M. Stinson, Vice President, Fleet Troutman Sanders
Operations Support Electronic Mail Distribution
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution Senior Engineer - Power Supply
Municipal Electric Authority
N. J. Stringfellow of Georgia
Manager-Licensing Electronic Mail Distribution
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution Reece McAlister
Executive Secretary
Bentina C. Terry Georgia Public Service Commission
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. 244 Washington Street, SW
Bin B-022 Atlanta, GA 30334
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Distribution w/encls: (See page 4)
Director, Consumers' Utility Counsel
Division
Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs
2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive
Plaza Level East; Suite 356
Atlanta, GA 30334-4600
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4
Letter to T. E. Tynan from Scott M. Shaeffer dated March 16, 2007
SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
& RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2007007 AND
Distribution w/encls:
B. Singal, NRR
C. Evans, RII EICS
L. Slack, RII EICS
RIDSNRRDIRS
OE Mail
PUBLIC
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-424, 50-425
Report No: 05000424/2007007, 05000425/2007007
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location: Waynesboro, GA
Dates: January 29 - February 2, 2007
February 12 - 16, 2007
Inspectors: A. Sabisch, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba Nuclear Station
G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle
J. Rivera-Ortiz, Reactor Inspector
Approved by: S. Shaeffer, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000424/2007-007, 05000425/2007-007; 1/29/2007-2/16/2007; Vogtle Electric Generating
Plant, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems.
The inspection was conducted by two senior resident inspectors and a reactor inspector. The
NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
Identification and Resolution of Problems Summary
No findings of significance were identified. The licensee was generally effective in identifying
problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee
properly prioritized issues entered into the corrective action program (CAP) and routinely
performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth to address the
issue documented in the condition reports (CRs). Station management has recently been
providing increased focus and attention on the quality of root cause and apparent cause
determinations based on the results of internal self assessments. Improvements were noted in
the documents produced over the past quarter. Operating experience was found to be used
both proactively and reactively by personnel involved in the corrective action program. The
licensees programmatic self-assessments and audits were generally effective in identifying
weaknesses in the corrective action program. Weaknesses in the performance of required
effectiveness reviews by the department(s) responsible for specific CRs were identified by the
inspectors which have the potential to allow similar events to occur at the station by not
ensuring corrective action deficiencies are identified and corrected. The inspectors concluded
that the workers at Vogtle felt free to report safety concerns.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
(1) Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed procedures associated with the CAP which described the
administrative process for identifying, evaluating and resolving problems via CRs. The
inspectors reviewed selected CRs from the approximately 26,250 that had been issued
between January 2005 and December 2006. The inspectors also reviewed NRC reports
that documented NRC inspections over the last two years to assess how the licensee
addressed findings documented in these reports. Corrective action documents
associated with Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were also reviewed to ensure the
actions contained in the LERs were appropriate, comprehensive in nature, and had been
implemented.
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW),
Component Cooling Water (CCW), Chemical Volume & Control System (CVCS), and the
Diesel Generators (DGs), to verify that problems were being properly identified,
appropriately characterized, and processed in accordance with the licensees
established CAP procedures. These systems were selected based on risk insights from
the licensees probabilistic risk analysis. For these systems and associated
components, the inspectors reviewed CRs, system health reports, the maintenance
work history, and open Work Orders (WOs). The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns
of these systems to assess the material condition and to determine if any identified
deficiencies had not been entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed selected
industry and NRC operating experience items associated with plant systems and
components to verify that these were appropriately evaluated for applicability and that
issues identified were entered into the CAP.
The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which
focused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify that
findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessments
were consistent with the NRCs assessment of the licensees CAP. The inspectors
attended selected daily Management Review Meetings and Corrective Action Program
Coordinator (CAPCO) CR screening meetings to observe management and oversight
functions of the CAP. The inspectors attended a Corrective Action Review Board
(CARB) meeting and reviewed the 2006 CARB meeting minutes to assess how effective
the oversight provided by the CARB has been.
The inspectors also held discussions with various personnel to evaluate their threshold
for identifying issues and entering them into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in
the Attachment.
Enclosure
4
(2) Assessment
Effectiveness of Problems Identification. The inspectors determined that the licensee
was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. The
threshold for initiating CRs was low and employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for
plant issues. Equipment performance issues were being identified and entered into the
CAP for monitoring, follow-up, and resolution. Some minor issues, identified during the
system walkdowns, had not been captured in the CAP including small oil leaks, minor
boric acid buildup on components, housekeeping issues, and unofficial markings on
plant components. Over the past few years, station management has enhanced their
expectations related to the identification and reporting of equipment issues and
communicated these expectations to plant personnel. Improved performance in this
area was noted over the two-year inspection period based on a review of the CR
database and interviews with station personnel and the Vogtle resident inspectors.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues. The inspectors determined that
the licensee had adequately prioritized issues entered into the CAP. Generally, the
licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth to
ensure the issue was understood and appropriate corrective actions developed to
prevent recurrence.
The station conducts trending on condition reports based on event codes assigned
during the daily CAPCO meeting and generates quarterly trend reports. For
consistency, a limited number of department CAPCOs were used to assign the event
codes. The identification of trends was based on an automated screening process.
When a threshold was reached, the resulting graphs and tables were sent to individual
departments to review and they, in turn, provided issue summaries for inclusion into the
quarterly CAP trend report. While these reports receive wide-spread distribution,
internal and external assessments of the CAP have determined that they have been less
than effective in providing station management with the tools necessary to focus
attention on specific performance weaknesses. This was confirmed by the team through
interviews and reviewing past trend reports. As a result of these licensee assessments,
enhancements in the process for identification of trends and development of
management reports were being developed by the station. Interviews with department
CAPCOs revealed that informal knowledge trending was routinely performed when a
CAPCO recognizes an issue as having occurred previously. Trend CRs have been
initiated based on this informal process. Cause codes assigned to CRs following
completion of Root Cause and Corrective Action Analysis (RCCA), Apparent Cause
Determination (ACD), or Basic Cause Determination (BCD) have not been used for
trending purposes due to the perceived limited population size. However, due to
identified weaknesses in the stations trending program, this data was being evaluated
for inclusion in a semi-annual consolidated Plant Performance Report which was under
development.
The inspectors determined that the station conducted an adequate number of formal
cause determinations based on the overall number and significance of issues entered
into the CAP. The cause determinations were consistent with established CAP
Enclosure
5
procedures based on the number of Severity Level 1 (one), Severity Level 2 (46), and
Severity Level 3 (392) CRs initiated between January 2005 and December 2006. The
processes used ranged from the most formal tool, the RCCA, to less rigorous methods
such as an ACD or a BCD. In 2006, the station performed approximately 325 cause
determinations.
While most of the cause determinations reviewed were detailed and thorough, a few
examples of weak or less than fully effective causal analyses were identified resulting in
similar events occurring after the initial event had been evaluated. The following are
examples noted by the inspectors.
- CRs 2005100664 and 2006101010 both described a jacket water pressure
instrument on the 2A diesel generator, 2PI-19172, which indicated outside of normal
operable range. In each case, the licensee used other alternative indications in
order to demonstrate the operability of the system. Also, in each case the licensee
wrote a work order to check the calibration of the instrument. Each time the
instrument calibration was checked, the calibration was found to be satisfactory, and
the work order and the condition reports closed with no further action taken.
Discussions with the system engineer indicated that this instrument had a tendency
to drift in and out of tolerance, and that it was intended to have the instrument
replaced. There is no open work order or formal tracking document which commits
to the replacement of 2PI-19172.
- CR 2005107840 documented a Train B CCW pump trip during the implementation of
a design change in 2B Safety Features Sequencer System, which involved
manipulation of conductors associated with CCW-2 pump. The cause of the pump
trip was not specifically determined in the CR; however, based on NRC inspectors
discussions with plant staff, it was attributed to inadequate evaluation of clearances.
The licensee generated corrective actions to review, in part, scheduled plant
modifications to prevent recurrence of this event. As part of the completion of two
corrective actions, the licensee took credit for corrective actions completed for CR
2005102185, which documented a previous event where a cable was found
energized during work in an Auxiliary Feed Water Turbine Control Panel. The cause
of the previous event was attributed to inadequate tag-out preparation and
inadequate evaluation of cables that had to be de-energized. Even though the
corrective actions for the previous event were completed at the time of the CCW
pump trip, they were less than fully effective to correct deficiencies in the design
change process regarding the evaluation of clearances that could impact personnel
safety and plant operating equipment.
The station generates a monthly CAP performance indicator overview containing
statistics on overdue action items, action item extensions, CR age, and an overall CAP
composite program assessment which was provided to station management to ensure
the appropriate level of attention was maintained on the CAP. In general, the licensee
identified and implemented corrective actions in a timely manner; however, in the
following instance, the licensee had been slow in completing corrective actions and the
reasons were not documented in the CR.
Enclosure
6
- CR 2005102333 was written to evaluate information provided by Westinghouse
which indicated there may be non-conservatism in the P-14 nominal trip setpoint.
Once identified and verified, the licensee followed the guidance of NRC
Administrative Letter (AL) 98-10 and established the administrative controls
necessary to change the P-14 setpoint to the proper level. This change was on both
units. It is also an expectation of AL 98-10 that, following the imposition of
administrative controls, an amendment to the TS, with appropriate justification and
schedule, will be submitted in a timely fashion. The issue of instrument setpoints in
technical specifications was a topic of discussion between the industry and the NRC
in TSTF-493. Discussions with the licensee indicated that they were withholding this
change pending resolution of these discussions. The inspectors discussed this issue
with NRC staff and it was determined that this topic was expected to be resolved by
the end of 2007 and it was reasonable for the licensee to wait for the resolution to
develop the change to their technical specifications.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions. The team found, generally, that corrective actions
developed and implemented for problems were appropriate in scope and commensurate
with the safety significance of the issues.
The fleet CAP (NMP-GM-002) required that effectiveness reviews be performed on all
Severity Level 1 and 2 CRs and selected Severity Level 3 CRs. Effectiveness reviews
were intended to determine if corrective actions taken were effective by ensuring the
causes identified in the CR have been corrected, there has been no recurrence of the
same or similar event, and the corrective actions had been adequately challenged. A
review of all Severity Level 1 and 2 CRs issued over the period reviewed identified that
this was not being implemented consistently with approximately 35% of the affected
CRs missing effectiveness reviews as an action item. Following discussions with the
licensee, this deficiency was entered into the CAP and an immediate corrective action
was developed to initiate action items to conduct effectiveness reviews on the affected
CRs.
In addition, a review of completed effectiveness reviews determined that many of the
reviews were narrowly focused and only looked for the recurrence of the identical issue
or problem that had resulted in the original CR being initiated which does not meet the
expectations contained in NMP-GM-002-001. The following are examples noted by the
inspectors.
- CR 2005103989 documents the June 2, 2005, event in which both trains of the Unit
2 solid state protection system were placed in input error inhibit which rendered the
High Flux Alarm at Shutdown circuit inoperable when it was required by TS. While
the corrective actions developed were comprehensive, the effectiveness review
stated that the actions prevented the same or similar event based on the fact that
...between the two units, there have been five instances of entering Mode 5 without
rendering the High Flux Alarm at Shutdown circuit inoperable. The root cause
identified contributors as the operators can-do mindset and the willingness to use
procedures that did not cover the activity being performed; however, the actions
taken to address these human performance issues were not assessed in the
Enclosure
7
effectiveness review.
- CR 2005102333 documents the Hi-Hi steam generator water level setpoint
calculation error that was identified in 2005. The root cause analysis identified
weaknesses in TS setpoint basis control; however, this was not assessed as part of
the effectiveness review.
- CR 2005102460 documents damage to the Unit 1 steam generator manways during
the 2005 refueling outage. The root cause analysis identified inadequate pre-job
briefings, procedure quality, lack of physical barriers to protect the seating surface,
and insufficient oversight of the work as causal factors; however, the effectiveness
review only states that ...during the subsequent refueling outage no similar issue
was encountered or documented with respect to steam generator manway removal,
inspection and installation.
(3) Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)
(1) Inspection Scope
The team interviewed station personnel, attended selected daily Management Review
Meetings and CAPCO CR screening meetings, and evaluated CAP documentation to
determine if OE was being used effectively. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the
licensees evaluation of selected Southern Nuclear Operating Company and industry
operating experience information, including CRs from Farley and Hatch, INPO OE, NRC
Regulatory Information Summaries (RIS) and Information Notices (IN), and generic
vendor notifications to verify that issues applicable to Vogtle were appropriately
addressed. Procedure NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program, was reviewed to
verify that the requirements delineated in the program were being implemented at the
station. NMP-GM-002-GL03, Cause Determination Guideline, was reviewed to verify
that guidance was provided for reviewing internal and external operating experience
when evaluating issues in the corrective action program, with more detailed guidance
provided when conducting broadness reviews on more significant issues. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
(2) Assessment
The inspectors determined that OE was regularly used proactively to prevent events
from occurring and to address events or near-misses. Station personnel routinely used
an automated screening tool which filters OE reports received from INPO on a daily
basis and sends relevant information to individuals, using specific filter criteria, as an e-
mail attachment. OE was regularly included in System Health Reports and CRs
associated with station events as part of the causal investigations and corrective action
development process.
Enclosure
8
Industry OE was processed at either the corporate or plant level depending on the
source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the
applicable department for further action or informational purposes. Any documents
requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure.
The inspectors did note that the Vendor Technical Information Program within the
licensees OE program may warrant additional focus. Information was readily distributed
to the three stations from the corporate program administrator once processed in
Birmingham. However, the conduit to extract relevant information when reviewing plant
issues that may subsequently occur was not well-defined or used by station personnel.
(3) Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
(1) Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed completed self assessments and audits conducted by station
and corporate organizations to assess the thoroughness of the actions items that
resulted from these activities and these action items were appropriately prioritized and
entered into the CAP. The inspectors verified that the self assessments and audits were
consistent with the NRCs assessment of the CAP and supporting programs.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
(2) Assessment
The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits conducted over
the review period were adequate and were self-critical in nature. Corrective actions
were incorporated into the CAP and were being tracked to completion. Updates on the
status of these action items were provided to station management at department and
site-level CARB meetings. The inspectors determined that the licensee had adequately
prioritized issues identified by these assessments and audits in the CAP.
(3) Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment
(1) Inspection Scope
The inspectors interviewed members of the plant staff to develop a general perspective
of the safety-conscious work environment and to determine if any conditions existed that
would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors
reviewed the licensees Employee Concerns Program (ECP) which provides an alternate
Enclosure
9
method to the CAP for employees to raise concerns and remain anonymous if so
desired. The inspectors interviewed both the ECP Corporate Program Manager and the
Plant Hatch ECP Coordinator (due to the unavailability of the Vogtle ECP Coordinator),
and reviewed ECP documents to verify that concerns were being identified, properly
reviewed and resolved. ECP documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
(2) Assessment
Based on the interviews held with plant staff, reviews of CRs and selected Employee
Concern packages, ECP metrics, and an assessment of the implementation of the
licensees ECP, the inspectors concluded that personnel were willing to promptly identify
and report problems using available administrative programs.
(3) Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
.1 (Closed) LER 05000425/2006-003; Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump #4 Tripped Resulting
in an Automatic Reactor Trip. On August 27, 2006, the Unit 2 reactor tripped
automatically from 100 percent power following the unexpected trip of the Loop #4
reactor coolant pump (RCP) and subsequent Reactor Protection System actuation on
low reactor coolant system flow. The plant response following the reactor trip was as
designed with no equipment or operational concerns identified. The cause of the event
was attributed to deficiencies in a design change package that added surge protection to
several large frame motors at Vogtle including the RCP motors. The package
deficiencies included specifying the incorrect type of cable for the RCP motors, failure to
provide detailed instructions for the installation of the modification in each type of motor,
and not containing cable spacing criteria in the design change package for any of the
cable / motor combinations. Prior to restarting Unit 2, the RCPs that had received the
surge protection modification were inspected and the modification was verified to be
properly installed. The Unit 1 RCPs affected by this modification were inspected during
the fall 2006 refueling outage. This issue was previously identified as FIN
05000425/2006004. This LER was in the licensees CAP as CR 2006109233. The
inspectors reviewed the LER, the condition report, and associated action items. No
additional findings of significance were identified.
.2 (Closed) LER 05000424, 425/2005-002; Inaccurate Steam Generator Water Level
Setpoint due to Design Calculation Errors: On April 4, 2005, the licensee was informed
by the Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor that the steam generator high-high water
level protection setpoints (P-14) were inadequate to ensure main feedwater isolation
during a design basis event. In accordance with the guidance of NRC Administrative
Letter (AL) 98-10, Dispositioning of Technical Specifications That Are Insufficient to
Assure Plant Safety, the licensee immediately initiated administrative controls to reduce
the steam generator high-high water level protection setpoints to the level necessary to
ensure plant protection during a design basis event. A modification was developed and
Enclosure
10
installed which changed the applicable setpoints on both units. The industry and the
NRC are addressing issues associated with setpoints and allowable value calculation
methodologies as specified in ISA S67.04. A technical specification change will be
submitted to the NRC when this issue has been addressed. The inspectors reviewed
the LER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No findings of significance
were identified.
.3 (Closed) LER 05000425/2005-003; Reactor Coolant System Leakage Leads to
Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications: On December 9, 2005, Unit 2 was
placed in Mode 3 due to pressure boundary leakage from the Reactor Coolant System
(RCS) loop side of the 3/4-inch bypass line around valve 2VH-8701B, the residual heat
removal (RHR) train A suction isolation valve. Based on the information known at that
time, the cause of the leakage was attributed to a lack of fusion when the weld was
installed in October 2002. The weld defect was found to be a circumferential linear flaw,
approximately 1/4 to 1/2 inch long located approximately 1/8 inch from the toe of the weld.
The defective weld was ground out, replaced and examined. The unit was returned to
full power operation on December 18, 2005. This LER was in the licensees CAP as CR
2005111460. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the condition report and associated
action items. No findings of significance were identified.
.4 (Closed) LER 05000425/2005-002; Instrument Setpoint Drift Leads to Operation of the
Unit in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications: On February 26, 2005, the
licensee identified that the output of the reactor coolant system loop 2 overtemperature
delta-T (OTDT) instrument channel 2T-421 was drifting. The instrument was repaired
and returned to service. On February 28, 2005, the instrument drifted again.
Troubleshooting identified that the cause was a component failure which had existed on
February 26, but had not been identified during troubleshooting post-maintenance
testing. The failure to promptly identify and repair this instrument was cited as non-cited
violation 05000425/2005003-01, Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions to
Preclude Repetitive Failure of Unit 2 Channel 2 OTDT Instrument. Licensee evaluation
determined that this channels signal had drifted outside of the Technical Specifications
allowable value longer than allowed by the action requirements. The inspectors
reviewed the LER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No additional
findings of significance were identified.
.5 (Closed) LER 05000424, 425/2006-002; Three Technical Specification Instruments
Were Determined to be in a Condition Which Was Prohibited by Technical
Specifications: During the week of June 6, 2005, the licensee identified a potential
problem with certain Rosemount transmitters. If the transmitter was installed improperly,
there was a chance that a neck seal was damaged which may allow moisture to enter
the casing and inhibit the safe operation of the transmitter during accident conditions.
The licensee identified a transmitter with a potentially damaged neck seal in December,
2005. The licensee did not immediately search for additional damaged transmitters. In
July, 2006 the licensee identified additional transmitters in risk-significant applications
with potentially damaged seals. The failure to promptly identify and correct this issue
was previously identified as NCV 5000424/2006004-01. The inspectors reviewed the
LER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No additional findings of
Enclosure
11
significance were identified.
4OA6 Management Meetings
On February 16, 2007, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom
Tynan, Vice President - Vogtle, and other members of his staff who acknowledged the
findings. The inspectors asked the licensee if any of the material examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
J. Acree; Operations Shift Supervisor
W. Atkins; Nuclear Supply Chain
T. Beckworth; Plant Hatch Employee Concerns Coordinator
L. Blair, Performance Analysis Specialist
W. Copeland; Performance Analysis Supervisor
C. Duncan; Systems Engineering
C. Eckert, Work Controls
M. Hickox; NSCW System Engineer
P. Hurst; Concerns Program Manager
T. Mattson; Performance Analysis
A. Rickman, Vogtle SEE-IN Coordinator
M. Sharma; Performance Analysis Specialist
R, Shepherd, Nuclear Network Coordinator
K. Stokes; DG System Engineer
T. Tynan, Vice President - Vogtle
NRC Personnel
S. Shaeffer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
LIST OF ITEMS CLOSED
05000425/2006-003 LER Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump #4 Tripped Resulting in an
Automatic Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.1)
05000424, 425/2005-002 LER Inaccurate Steam Generator Water Level Setpoint due to
Design Calculation Errors (Section 4OA3.2)
05000425/2005-003 LER Reactor Coolant System Leakage Leads to Shutdown
Required by Technical Specifications(Section 4OA3.3)
05000425/2005-002 LER Instrument Setpoint Drift Leads to Operation of the Unit in
a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section
4OA3.4)
05000424, 425/2006-002 LER Three Technical Specification Instruments Were
Determined to be in a Condition Which Was Prohibited by
Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3.5)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
NMP-GM-002; Corrective Action Program; Version 5.0
NMP-GM-002-001; Corrective Action Program Instructions; Version 1.0
NMP-GM-008; Operating Experience Program; Version 2.0
Attachment
A-2
NMP-GM-008; Operating Experience Program (Draft); Version 3.0
NMP-GM-002-GL03; Cause Determination Guideline, Version 6.0
NMP-GM-002-GL05; Corrective Action Program, Data Configuration Guideline Rev. 8.0
NMP-ES-001; Equipment Reliability Process Description, Version 5.0
NMP-ES-005; Scoping and Importance Determination for Equipment Reliability, Version 5.0
13503-1; Unit 1 Reactor Control Solid-State Protection System, Rev. 19.2
13503-2; Unit 2 Reactor Control Solid-State Protection System, Rev. 18.1
80200C; Performance Assessment Monitoring, Rev. 01
00163-C; NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal;
Rev. 11.1
1009-C; Operator Aids, Rev. 12.1
13105-1; Safety Injection System; Rev. 45
13105-2; Safety Injection System; Rev. 43
12006-C; Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown, Rev. 73
91001-C; Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions; Rev. 25
91501-C; Recovery; Rev. 16
Operating Experience Documents
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-24; Revised Review and Transmittal Process for
Accident Sequence Precursor Analyses
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2007-01; Clarification of NRC Guidance for Maintaining a
Standard Emergency Action Level Scheme
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-22; Lesson Learned from Recent 10CFR Part 72 Dry
Cask Storage Campaign
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-25; Requirements for the Distribution and Possession of
NRC Information Notice 06-28; Siren System Failures due to Erroneous Siren System Signal
NRC Information Notice 06-26; Failure of Magnesium Rotors in Motor Operated Valve Actuators
NRC Information Notice 06-14, Supplement 1; Potentially Defective External Lead-Wire
Connections in Barton Pressure Transmitters
Part 21 Notice regarding Tyco Crosby Series JLT Spring Loaded Pressure Relief Valves
Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-05-4; Potential Tin Whiskers on Printed Circuit Board
Components
Self- Assessment Documents
Surveillance SNC-2007-001; Fleet QA Surveillance of the implantation and effectiveness of the
Corrective Action Program
QA Audit of the Corrective Action Program (CAP), V-CAP-2006-1
Operating Experience Point of Contact Effectiveness Review; December 13 - 15, 2006
Effectiveness Review for Action Item 2005203075
Condition Reports
2007101485, 2005100146, 2005100178, 2005101787, 2005102333, 2005102571,
2005103063, 2005103632, 2005103989, 2005105374, 2005105859, 2005106118,
2005106877, 2005108493, 2005109484, 2005109531, 2005109973, 2005110364,
2005111178, 2005111254, 2005111460, 2005111583, 2005111982, 2006100539,
2006100755, 2006100839, 2006100906, 2006101112, 2006101137, 2006102023,
Attachment
A-3
2006102295, 2006103134, 2006103594, 2006104417, 2006105424, 2006105426,
2006107236, 2006107383, 2006107603, 2006109187, 2006109233, 2006109869,
2006110322, 2006110981, 2006112318, 2006112454, 2006113261, 2007100013,
2007100130; 2005101787, 2005104571, 1006109233, 2006109187, 2005103989,
2006104417, 2006109233, 2007101722, 2006101127, 2005102333, 2005101325,
2005101343, 2005105374, 2005104189, 2005111542, 2006102910, 2006107580,
2006107603, 2006108450, 2006108514, 2006108517, 2006109187
Action Items
2005201207, 2005201208, 2005201209, 2005201210, 2005201211, 2005201639,
2005201690, 2005201861, 2005201862, 2005201866, 2005201868, 2006203971,
2006203972, 2006203973, 2006203974, 2006203975, 2006203976, 2006203976,
2006203977, 2006203977, 2006204070, 2006204183, 2006204187, 2006204188,
2006204189, 2006204228, 2006205227, 2006205228, 2006205229, 2006205230,
2006205232, 2006205234, 2006205235, 2007200355, 2005202666, 2005202667,
2005202668, 2005202669
Miscellaneous Documents
Vogtle Key Performance Indicator Report; December 2006
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Quarterly CAP Trend Report, August through October 2006
Valuing the CAP, Leadership in Action presented by T. Tynon on 3/17/06
MWOs 1060183801 and 1060183901
Design Change Package 2051624801
Training Handout, Current Events presented during Licensed Operator Requalification
Segment 20052, April - May 2005
Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW)
Condition Reports: 2006100553, 2006105837, 2006105921, 2006106438, 2006110938,
2005109036, 2005117274
Work Orders: 2062103601, 2061070801, 2054150601
Procedures: 83308-C; Testing of Safety-Related NSCW Sys. Coolers; Rev. 30.1
Miscellaneous Documents:
Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:
Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006
Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:
Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006
System Health Reports: 1st Quarter 2005 through 3rd Quarter 2006
Vogtle Key Performance Indicators, December 2006; MSPI - Cooling Water Systems, Unit 1
and Unit 2
Vogtle Maintenance Equipment Reliability Overall Report Card, July 2006
Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS)
Condition Reports
2005108955, 2005103124, 2006108383, 2006107514, 2006105424, 2006105428,
2006100502, 2005104876, 2004003039, 2004003187, 2004003291, 2004003436,
2005110553, 2005101076, 2005105013, 2005109906, 2005110199, 2005111901,
2006105775, 005101693,2005102505, 2006105553, 2005107840
Attachment
A-4
Work Orders
2061290301, 1061046701, 2040097801, 2052151801, 2040242101, 1040333301,
2040324501, 2050374501,2052123701, 1060970401, 1051511401, 1051624401,1061046701
Procedures
13006-1; Chemical and Volume Control; Rev. 80
13006-2; Chemical and Volume Control; Rev. 66.
125039-C; Valve Packing Removal, Installation, and Adjustment; Rev. 13.1
Miscellaneous Documents
Operator Shift Briefing items SB 2005-11, and SB 2006-41
Repetitive Tasks: 200600000911, 200600000912, and LUB70032
Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Units 1:
Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006
Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Units 2:
Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006
System Health Reports: 1st Quarter 2005 through 3rd Quarter 2006
Component Cooling Water (CCW)
Condition Reports:
2006112223, 2005106222, 2005105036, 2005106072, 2006100717, 2006104873,
2006105632, 2006107212, 2005104851, 2006108358, 2005106861, 2005103178,
2005106256, 2005103892, 2005105267, 2005108970, 2005103977, 2006110904,
2006111950, 2006112182, 2005106581
Work Orders
1051942901, 2020292301, 1052097701, 2061437201, 1051922301, 1061975601,
1062142901, 2052492401
Procedures
29401-C; Work Order Functional Tests; Rev. 24.1
35311-C; Chemical Control of Closed Cooling Water Systems; Rev. 39.2
35312-C; Chemical Control of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water Systems; Rev. 13
Miscellaneous Documents
Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:
Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006
Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:
Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006
System Health Reports: 1st Quarter 2005 through 3rd Quarter 2006
Check valve IST results per procedure 14803-1, CCW Pumps and Check Valve IST and
Response Time Tests, Rev. 22.1 (10/5/06)
Attachment
A-5
Diesel Generators
Condition Reports
2005100352, 2005100529, 2005100605, 2005100633, 2005100641, 2005100653,
2005100664, 2005102314, 2005102891, 2005104123, 2005106203, 2005106349,
2005106877, 2005109047, 2005110566, 2005111137, 2005111317, 2006100471,
2006100549, 2006100761, 2006100854, 2006100874, 2006100951, 2006101010,
2006101683, 2006102448, 2006104013, 2006104225, 2006104800, 2006109696,
2006110219, 2006111878, 2006111947, 2006112175, 2006112568, 2006113255, 2006113283
Work Orders
1054160201, 1054160901, 1060689401, 1061157901, 1061964101, 1062066201,
1062106201, 1062158301, 2052155401, 2052331801, 2052331901, 2052443501,
2052443601, 2052543601, 2052550801, 2052551001, 2053733901, 2060097301,
2060167901, 2060201801, 2060202101, 2060319001, 2060462001, 2060497001,
2060786101, 2060994301, 2061267901, 2091294001, 2061660901, 2061860201, 2062211401
Miscellaneous Documents
Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:
Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006
Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:
Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006
System Health Reports: 1st Quarter 2005 through 3rd Quarter 2006
Vogtle Key Performance Indicators, December 2006; MSPI - Emergency AC Power System,
Unit 1 and Unit 2
Vogtle Maintenance Equipment Reliability Overall Report Card, July 2006
Condition Reports/Action Items Generated for NRC-Identified Issues
2007101098; Damaged insulation on piping in the 1A and 1B NSCW cooling towers
2007101099; Debris and equipment found in the 1A NSCW cooling tower electrical tunnel
2007101100; Insulation around NSCW slow fill line check valve 21202U4A09 is missing and
needs to be replaced
2007101487; Effectiveness reviews were not identified as action items in a number of Severity
Level 2 CRs are required by NMP-GM-002, CAP
2007101712; Questions arose concerning the timeliness of picking up quality concerns from
boxes in the plant
2007101734; Scaffolding issues identified by the NRC during a plant walkdown
2005204105; Missing action item to perform effectiveness review for CR 2005109484
2006200614; Missing action item to perform effectiveness review for CR 2005111254
2007101202; Boron residue at the body to bonnet area of valve 1-1208-U4-4293
2007101203; Boron residue at the tail pipes downstream of valves 1-1208-X-4950 and 1-1208-
2007101206; Insulation at flow transmitter 2FT0183 not secured and apparent boron residue on
insulation above the flow transmitter
2007101713; Deficiencies identified in the CR 2005107840 closure package
Attachment