ML17219A301

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Forwards Justification for 861010 Request for Exemption to 10CFR50,App J,Paragraph III.D.2(b)(ii) & Addl Documentation Re NSHC in Support of Application for Amend to License DPR-67 Re Requirements for Testing of Containment Air Locks
ML17219A301
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/09/1987
From: WOODY C O
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
L-86-9, NUDOCS 8701130269
Download: ML17219A301 (11)


Text

REGULATORY FORNATION DISTRIBUTION SY-N(RIDS).ACCESSlON NBR:8701130269 DOC.DATE:87/Oi/OVNOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlantiUnit1>FloridaPowerZcLightCo.AUTH.NANEAUTHORAFFILIATION MOODY'.Q.FloridaPower8cLightCo.RECIP.NAI'lERECIPIENT AFFILIATION RecordServicesBranch(Document ControlDesk)DOCKET05000335

SUBJECT:

Forwardsjustification for861010requestforexemption to10CFR50>AppJ~Paragraph III.D.2(b)(ii)8caddidocumentati onreNSHCinsupportofapplication foramendtoLicenseDPR-67rerequirements fortestingofcontainment airlocks.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A017DCOPIESRECEIVED:

LTR+ENCLSIZE:TITLE:QRSubmittal:

AppendJContainment LeakRateTestingNOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAI'lE PNR-8ADTSPNR-8PEICSBPNR-8PDBLATQURIQNY>

EPNR-8RSBINTERNAL:

ADN/LFNBNRRBARADTSNRRPNR-8ADTSNRR/DSRO/RSIB COPIESLTTRENCL1221011101111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAI'1E PNR-8EBPMR-8FOBPMR-8PDSPD01PWR-8PEICSBELD/HDS208NRRPAR-AADTSEIB04COPIESLTTRENCL1115511111EXTERNAL:

LPDRNSIC0305111NRCPDR02TOTALNU})BEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR25ENCL23

~11Ih4h'.'C<<i'-i<<.AC/

h'"'}'Ih.,4I"4$<<v P.O.B4000,JUNOBEACH,FL33408-0420" gNUwY09lSAL-87-9U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:

Re:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Containment AirLocksByletterL-86-412, datedOctober10,1986,FloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)appliedforanamendment toFacilityOperating LicenseDPR-67regarding surveillance requirements fortestingofcontainment airlocks.Theintentofthisproposedamendment istobringtheSt.LucieUnitITechnical Specifications tothesameformasthoseofUnit2forairlocktesting.ByletterdatedNovember25,1986(E.G.TourignytoC.O.Woody),theNRCstatedthatthespecificexemption includedintheamendment shouldbemadeinaccordance with10CFR50.12.Thestaffalsorequested additional information toaddresseachfactorunder10CFR50.92(c),

theNoSignificant HazardsConsideration.

Attachment Iisthejustification fortherequested exemption to10CFR50,AppendixJ,Paragraph 111.D.2(b)

(ii).Attachment llisadditional documentation regarding theNoSignificant HazardsConsideration.

Pleasecontactusifyouhaveanyquestions aboutthissubmittal.

Verytrulyyours,.WoodyroupVicePresident NuclearEnergyCOW/EJW/gpAttachments (2)cc:Dr.J.NelsonGrace,Regionll,USNRCMr.AlanSchubert, FloridaDept.ofHealthandRehabilitative ServicesHaroldF.Reis,Esquiret8701130269 870109PDRADOCK05000335I PPDRI~jPEOPLE...

SERVINGPEOPLE

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JUSTIFICATION FORTHEREUESTEDEXEMPTIONS TO10CFR50APPENDIXJ10CFR50.12(a)

(1)Inaccordance with10CFR50.12(a)

(1),theCommission maygrantexemptions underthefollowing circumstances:

(I)theactivities tobeconducted areauthorized bylaw,(IZ)operation withtheexemption willnotpresentunduerisktothehealthandsafetyofthepublic,and(ZIZ)thecommondefenseandsecurityarenotendangered.

Theevaluations tothesestandards, contained herein,areinaccordance with10CFR50.12 asrevisedbyfinalruledatedJanuary13,1986.I.TheReuestedExemtionsandtheActivities WhichWouldBeAllowedThereunder AreAuthorized bLawTherearenootherprohibitions oflawtoprecludetheactivities whichwouldbeauthorized bytherequested exemption.

Therefore, theCommission isauthorized bylawtograntthisexemption request.IZ.TheReuestedExemtionsWillNotPresentUndueRisktotheHealthandSafetofthePublicTheevaluation of"nounduerisk"considers suchfactorsasthetypeofplantoperation contemplated, thelengthoftimetheexemption wouldbeineffect,theexistence ofalternative meansofcompliance orcompensatory

measures, andothersafetyfactors.Theresultsoftheevaluations considering thesefactorsarediscussed below.Containment AirLockTestinExemtionReuest10CFR50,AppendixJ,Paragraph III.D.2(b) detailsthreeexplicitairlocktestingrequirements.

Intheproposedamendment toSt.LucieUnit1,Technical Specification 4.6.1.3,itemsa,b,andccomplywithAppendixJrequirements withoneexception.

AppendixJ,Paragraph III.D.2(b)

(ii)requiresthat"Airlocksopenedduringperiodswhencontainment integrity isnotrequiredbytheplant'sTechnical Specifications shallbetestedattheendofsuchperiodsatnotlessthanPa.".WhenevertheplantisinMode5or6CONTAINMENT>

VESSELINTEGRITY isnotrequired.

Therefore, ifanairlockisopenedduringeitheroftheseconditions, paragraph 1ZZ.D.2(b)

(ii)requiresthatanoverallairlockleakagetestatnotlessthanPabeconducted priortoentryintoMode4.Thisrequirement isexcessively restrictive since.itrequiresatermination ofcontainment entrieswhilepreparing toleaveMode5untiltheairlockthatwasopenedandoperatedin Mode5or6istestedpursuanttoparagraph IIZ.D.2(b)

(ii).PrimaryContainment entriesduringMode5areimportant toensurethatsurveillance requirements andminormaintenance activities arecompleted.

Therequirements ofparagraph IIZ.DE2(b)(ii.)wouldapplyevenifthesixmonthtestingrequirement ofparagraph ZII.D.2(b)

(i)hadbeensatisfied.

Subsequent containment entrieswhileinMode5wouldrequireretesting oftheairlockuti.lized.

Accesstocontainment duringPeriodswhenCONTAINMENT

.VESSELINTEGRITY isrequiredbyplantTechnical Specifications isgovernedbyparagraph ZIZ.D.2(b)

(iii).TheexistingairlockdoorsaresodesignedthatafullpressuretestatPaofanentireairlockcanonlybeperformed afterstrongbacks (structural bracing)havebeeninstalled ontheinnerdoor.Thisisbecausethepressureexertedontheinnerdoorduringthetestisinadirection oppositetothatofforceexperienced duringapostulated accidentandthelockingmechanisms arenotdesignedtowi.thstand suchreverseforces..Installing strongbacks, performing thetest,andremovingthestrongbacks, isacumbersome processrequiring atleast14hoursduringwhichaccessthroughtheairlockisprohibited.

TheAppendixJperiodic6-monthtestrequirement ofparagraph ZII.D.2(b)

(i)andthe3-daytestrequirement ofparagraph ZZI.D.2(b)

(iii)provideassurance thattheairlockwillnotleakexcessively ifnomaintenance whichcouldaffecttheabilityoftheairlocktosealhasbeenperformed ontheairlockandiftheairlockisproperlyengagedandsealed.Anexempti.on fromparagraph ZZI.D.2(b)

(ii)ofAppendixJisrequested sincetheproposedamendment toTechni,cal Specification (FPLletterL-86-412,datedOctober10,1986)issubstantially assafeastherequirement itself.Thisexemption isincludedasapartoftheNRC'sCEStandardTechnical Specifications approvedDecember31,1981,andisconsistent withcurrentregulatory practiceandpoli.cy.BecauseoftheproposedTechni.cal Specification surveillance requirements, therequested exemption involvesadefactorequirement foranairlocksealtestinlieuoftheZIZ.D.2(b)

(ii)test.AppendixJ,Paragraph III.D.2(b)

(ii.i)alreadyallowsanairlocksealtestinlieuofasimi.larrequiredairlocktestatapressureofnotlessthan,Pa.Thusthefunctional equivalence ofthesetestsundersimilar.circumstances hasbeenrecognized.

PPLproposesanalternative'est tobeconducted duringthoseperiodswhenCONTAIN-MENTVESSELINTEGRITY isnotrequiredbythePlantTechnical Specifications andpri.ortoenteringMode4.Thealternative testconsistsoftestingthesealsoftheinnerandouterdoorsbypressurizing theareabetweenthesealsandverifying anacceptable leakagerate.Zf,however,maintenance hasbeenperformed ontheairlocksincethelastsuccessful testperformed pursuanttoparagraph IZZ.D.2(b)

(i),anoverallairlocktestwillbeperformed.

Itisconcluded thatthereisreasonable assurance againstundueairlockleakageprovidedundertheexemption andnomaterialincreaseintheprobability orextentofairlockleakageistobeexpected.

Therefore, thereisnosigni'ficant increaseintheprobability ofhigherpost-accident offsiteoronsitedosesrelatedtotheexemption andnosignificant increaseinenvironmental impactbeyondthatexperienced withoutanexemption.

Asaresult,thisexemption willnotpresentunduerisktothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.TheReuestedExemtionWillNotEndanertheCommonDefenseandSecuritTherequested exemption willhavenoimpactonthecommondefenseandsecurity.

Inconclusion, thestandards of10CFR50.12(a)

(1)aremetforthespecificexemption.

10CFR50.12(a)

(2)Inaccordance with10CFR50.12(a)

(2),theCommission willnotconsidergrantinganexemption unlessspecialcircumstances arepresent.Specialcircumstances inwhichtheCommission believesitwouldbereasonable tograntanexemption areidentified inSections50.12(a)(2)(i)through(vi)oftherevisedfinalrule.Thefollowing evaluations pertaintoeachofthesecriteria.

50.12(a)(2)(i)-"Application oftheregulation intheparticular circumstances wouldbeinconflictwithotherrulesorrequirements oftheCommission."

Thespecificexemption requestdiscussed hereinisnotapplicable tothespecialcircumstance ofSection50.12(a)(2)(i).50;12(a)(2)(ii)-"Application oftheregulation intheparticular circumstances wouldnotservetheunderlying purposeoftheruleorisnotnecessary toachievetheunderlying purposeoftherule."4Application ofthisspecialcircumstance showsthatapplication oftheregulation isnotnecessary toservethespecificpurpose.oftheregulation.

~i~'TheContainment AirLockleakageratetestingisperformed toensureCONTAINMENT VESSELINTEGRITY.

CONTAINMENT VESSELINTEGRITY ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materials fromthecontainment atmosphere willberestricted tothoseleakagepathsandassociated leakratesassumedintheaccidentanalyses.

Therestriction, inconjunction withtheleakageratelimitation, willlimitthesiteboundaryradiation dosestowithinthelimitsof10CFRPart100duringaccidentconditions.

3 Thelimitations oncontainment leakageratesensurethatthetotalcontainment leakagevolumewillnotexceedthevalueassumedintheaccidentanalysesatthepeakaccidentpressure.

Asnotedabove,andinthepreviousdiscussion of"nounduerisk",theapplication oftherequirements of10CFR50,AppendixJ,Paragraphs ZII.D.2(b)

(ii)isnotnecessary toservetheunderlying purposeoftheseregulations.

Thisistruesincethealternatives presented limitthepostulated accidentdosestowithinthe10CFR100guidelines.

Therefore, thespecialcircumstances ofSection50.12(a)(2)(ii)applytothesespecificexemption requests.

50.12(a)(2)(iii)-"Compliance wouldresultinunduehardshiporothercoststhataresignificantly inexcessofthoseincurredbyotherssimilarly situated."

Thisspecialcircumstance isintendedtoprovideequitable treatment toallapplicants andlicensees.

Asnotedinthediscussion oftheContainment AirLocktestexemption request,unduehardships orunnecessary difficulties, intheformofexcessive restrictions toContainment accessandthecumbersome processofinstalling/removing strongbacks ontheinnerdoor,wouldresultfromliteralcompliance to10CFR50,AppendixJ,Paragraph ZZZ.D.2(b)

(ii).Suchliteralcompliance tothisAppendixJrequirement wouldnotresultinanymeasurable difference inprotection tothepublichealthandsafetyrelativetotheprotection affordedifthisexemption isgranted.Inaddition, similarexemptions totheserequirements havebeengrantedbytheNRCfortheGrandGulfNuclearStation,FermiUnit2,andSalemNuclearGenerating Station.Exemption requestsfromthisrequirement havebeenfiledbyPerryNuclearPowerPlant,NineMilePointUnit2,SeabrookandtheClintonPowerStation.Therefore, withrespecttotheContainment AirLocktestexemption, thespecialcircumstance ofSection50.12(a)(2)(iii)applies.Furthermore, compliance tothisrequirement wouldresultinunduehardshipandcostthroughreducedoperational flexibility andunwarranted.

delaysinpowerascension overthelifeoftheplantinexcessofthoseincurredbyothersimilarfacilities thathavereceivedexemption fromthesubjectAppendixJparagraph.

Performance oftheleakageratetestsrequiredbyparagraph ZZI.D.2(b)(ii)takesapproximately 14'oursperairlockandrequiresinstallation ofastrong.backdeviceontheinsid'eairlockdoor(Testpressuieappliedinsidetheairlocktendstounseatthisdoorbecauseitisde'signed tosealwithaccidentpressurefrominsidecontainment).

Thisevolution canpotentially occurseveraltimesduringarefueling outageandultimately candelaymodechangeonstartup.

50.12(a)(2)(iv)-"Theexemption wouldresultinbenefittothepublichealthandsafetythatcompensates foranydecreaseinsafetythatmayresultfromthegrantoftheexemption."

Theabovediscussions

'ontheContainment AirLockleakratetestexemption supportthebasisforthisspecialcircumstance.

Intheexemption request,thedesignand/oralternative testingissubstantially assafeastherequirements themselves.

Therefore, thespecialcircumstance ofSection50.12(a)(2)(iv)appliestothisspecificexemption.

50.12(a)(2)(v)"Theexemption wouldprovideonlytemporary relieffromtheapplicable regulation andthelicenseeorapplicant hasmadegoodfaitheffortstocomplywiththeregulation."

Thisspecialcircumstance doesnotapplytotheseexemption requestssinceitisfortheoperating lifetimeofSt.LucieUnitl.50.12(a)(2)(vi)-"Thereispresentanyothermaterialcircumstance notconsidered whentheregulation wasadoptedforwhichitwouldbeinthepublicinteresttograntanexemption."

Thereisnotpresentanyothermaterialcircumstance notconsidered whentheregulation wasadoptedforwhichitwouldbeinthepublicinteresttograntanexemption.

REATTACHMENT II)'ETERMINATION OPNOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION Thestandards usedtoarriveatadetermination thatarequestforamendment involvesnosignificanthazardsconsideration areincludedintheCommission

'regulations, 10CFR50.92.Theseregulations statethatnosignificant hazardsconsideration areinvolvediftheoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Eachstandardisdiscussed asfollows:(1)Operation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnotinvolveasignificant increaseinthe,probability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theairlockconfiguration

'orcurrentmethodoftestingisnotbeingchanged.Therefore, thePSARanalysisforaccidentprobability, malfunction type,accidenttype,andconsequence offailurehasnotbeenaffected.

(2)Useofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theproposedamendment willresultinnochangestotheplant'sprocedures, structures, systems,modeofoperation orcomponents.

Noadditional testsorexperiments notdescribed intheFSARarenecessary toimplement theproposedchange.(3)Useofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.ThemarginofsafetyforTechnical Specifications hasnotbeenreducedsinceacceptance criteriawillremainunchanged.

Basedontheabove,PPLhasdetermined thattheamendment requestdoesnot(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofaaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createtheprobability ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety;andtherefore doesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.

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