Information Notice 1990-26, Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems

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Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems
ML031140228
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/24/1990
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-026, NUDOCS 9004180107
Download: ML031140228 (7)


- v

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 24, 1990

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-26: INADEQUATE FLOW OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER

TO ROOM COOLERS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS FOR

ENGINEERED SAFETY-FEATURE SYSTEMS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is intended to alert addressees to potential problems

resulting from using the wrong flow and pressure drop relationship in estab- lishing adequate flow of essential service water to room coolers for engineered

safety-feature systems and from failing to establish or maintain balanced flows

in essential service water systems. It is expected that recipients will review

the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this

information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On March 9, 1990, the reactor at the Clinton Power Station was in cold shutdown, and the licensee was taking action to implement the recommendations contained

in Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related

Equipment." The licensee discovered that the flow of essential service water

being supplied to several room coolers serving safety-related equipment was

approximately half of the design flow. The safety-related equipment included

components in the high-pressure and low-pressure core spray systems, the low- pressure injection system, the residual heat removal system, the standby gas

treatment system, the combustible gas control system, and the nuclear protection

system. After discovering the problem, the licensee declared these systems to

be inoperable. The room coolers were supplied to the Clinton Power Station by

American Air Filter, a subsidiary of Snyder General Corporation.

Before initial operation of the Clinton Power Station, the licensee obtained

the relationship of the flow and pressure drop on the water side of the room

coolers from the supplier. Plant personnel adjusted valving to establish the

pressure drop across each room cooler which would provide the design flow.

Plant personnel did not actually measure the flow to each room cooler.

IN 90-26 April 24, 1990 On March 9, 1990, the licensee discovered that the relationship between flow

and pressure drop for the room coolers was wrong and that flows of essential

service water to the room coolers were too low. Subsequently, the licensee

also found that the flows of essential service water to several other coolers

and heat exchangers were too low.

To balance the flow of essential service water through the system, plant

personnel measured the flow using qualified instrumentation and adjusted

flows to the room coolers according to these measurements. In some instances, the adjusted flows to specific components were somewhat less than design flows.

However, the licensee is performing analyses to determine whether these flows

are acceptable. Modifications to the updated final safety analysis report

will be submitted as necessary.

Discussion:

American Air Filter has supplied room coolers to approximately 50 nuclear

power plants including the Clinton Power Station. The room coolers consist

of bundles of folded tubes with supply and return headers at the ends of the

tubes. American Air Filter supplies the room coolers either with or without

pairs of cleanout plugs at the bends in the tubes. At design flow, room

coolers with cleanout plugs have a significantly greater pressure drop across

the tube bundle than room coolers without cleanout plugs.

On April 3, 1990, Illinois Power Company, licensee for the Clinton Power

Station, stated in a report submitted to NRC under 10 CFR 21.21 that pressure

drop data provided by American Air Filter for 22 of 23 room coolers was incor- rect. Twenty-two room coolers had cleanout plugs while the 23rd room cooler

did not. On April 5, 1990, Illinois Power Company submitted a licensee event

report which indicated that actual flows for the room coolers with cleanout

plugs ranged from 10 percent to 80 percent less than the design flows.

The licensee event report also indicated that 7 of 25 cooling components pro- vided by vendors other than American Air Filter and connected to the essential

service water system had flows that were less than the design flows. For these

cooling components, actual flows ranged from 2 percent to 42 percent less than

the design flows. The components include: two residual heat removal (RHR) heat

exchangers supplied by General Electric Company, two RHR pump seal coolers sup- plied by Byron Jackson, a switchgear heat removal condenser supplied by Carrier

Corporation, a fuel pool cooling and cleanup heat exchanger supplied by Yuba

Heat Exchanger, and a standby gas treatment system radiation monitor cooler

supplied by Sentry Equipment Corporation. Other components served by the

essential service water system were receiving excess flow. These flows ranged

up to 213 percent more than design flows.

Failure to properly balance flows of essential service water during pre- operational testing or failure to maintain balanced flows can lead to

degradation of safety-related equipment.

  • %hWJ IN 90-26 April 24, 1990 This information notice requires 'no specific action or written response.

you have questions about the information in this notice, please contact theIf

technical contact listed belowlor the appropriate NAR project manager.

Ear es E. Ross ,Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Roger W. Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

' ttaehment

April 24, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

  • sv?T

NRCINFORMATION NOTICES

f r- i*. Ato ot

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

90-25 Loss of Vital AC Power 4/16/90 All holders, of OLs

with Subsequent Reactor or CPs for nuclear

Coolant System Neat-Up power reactors.

90-24 Transportation of Model 4/10/90 All NRC licensees

Spec 2-T Radiographic authorized to use, Exposure Device transport, or operate

  • radiographic exposure

devices and source

changers.

90-23 Improper Installation of 4/4/90 All holders of OLs

Patel Conduit Seals or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

90-22 Unanticipated Equipment 3/23/90 All holders of OLs

Actuations Following or CPs for nuclear

Restoration of Power power reactors.

to Rosemount Transmitter

Trip Units

90-21 Potential Failure of Motor- 3/22/90 All holders of OLs

Operated Butterfly Valves or CPs for nuclear

to Operate Because Valve power reactors.

Seet Friction was Under- estimated

90-20 Personnel Injuries Resulting 3/22/90 All NRClicensees

froi Improper Operation of who process or

Radwaste Incinerators incinerate radio- active waste.

90-19 Potential Loss of Effective 3/14/90 All holders of OLs

Volume for Containment or CPs for PWRs.

Recirculation Spray at

PWRFacilities

90-18 Potential Problems with 3/9/90 All holders of OLs

Crosby- Safety-fls- or CPs-fo-nuc.ar-.

Used on Diesel Generator power reactors.

Air Start Receiver Tanks

OL

  • Operating License

CP

  • Construction Permit

FIRST CLASS MAIL

UNITED STATES POSTAGE

  • FEES PAID

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USNRC

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20556 PERMIT No. 097 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

IN 90-26 April 24, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have questions about the information in this notice, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Roger W. Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
  • EAB:NRR *TECH EDITOR *EAB:NRR *PM:PD32:NRR *C:RVIB *C:PB3:RIII

RWoodruff BCalure PBaranowsky JHickman WBrach RKnop

4/10/90 4/10/90 4/12/90 4 10/90 4/12/90 4/12/90

  • C:EAB:NRR

PSwetland

4/13/90

  • C:OGCB:NRR

CBerlinger

4/17/90 4//P90

z

NRCIN 90-XX

April XX, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have questions about the information in this notice, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Roger W. Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCE:

  • EAB:NRR *TECH EDITOR *EAB:NRR *R4:PD32:NRR *C:RVIB *CBPB3:RIII

RWoodruff BCalure PBaranowsky JHickman WBrach RKnop

4/10/90 4/ /90 4/ /90 4/ /90 4/ /90 4/ /90

  • C:EAB:NRR D:DOEA:NRR

PSwetland CBerlinger CERossi

4/ /90 4/(7/90 4/ /90

  • See previous copy for concurrences

310c.in

NRCIN 90-XX

April XX, 1990 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have questions about this matter, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Roger W. Woodruff, NRR

(301) 492-1180

Attachment: List of Recently Issued Information Notices

FOCURENCE: IT'vYalnq 9 4 EEB: NRRl TECH EDITOR PM:PD32: C:PB3:RIII

PWoodruff - owsky RKnop

4/10/ 0 4/P0/90 4//190 4/10/90 1- o0 4/17./90

C: OGCB: NRR D:DOEA:NRR

Eltland CBerlinger CERossi

4/%*)/90 4/ /90 4/ /90

310b. in