ML071830436

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LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Request for a License Amendment to Technical Specification 3.7.3, Ultimate Heat Sink
ML071830436
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/29/2007
From: Benyak D M
Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-07-069
Download: ML071830436 (57)


Text

Exelon Generation wwwexeloncorp.co m 4300 Winf,eld Road Warrenville, IL 60`:55 RS-07-069 June 29, 2007 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 5 0-373 and 50-374 Exeltba, Nuclear 10 CFR 50.90

Subject:

Request for a License Amendment to Technical Specification 3.7.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink" In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) is requesting a change to the Technical Specifications (TS) of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2. Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.3.1 verifies the cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the Core Standby Cooling System (CSCS) pond (i.e., the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)) is :5 100°F. Currently, if the temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond is > 100°F, the UHS must be declared inoperable in accordance with TS 3.7.3. TS 3.7.3 Required Action B.1 requires that both units be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and Required Action B.2 requires that both units be placed in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Prolonged hot weather in the area over the past few summers has resulted in sustained elevated cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond. High temperatures and humidity during the daytime, in conjunction with minimal cooling at night and little precipitation, have resulted in elevated water temperatures in the LSCS UHS. Continued hot weather conditions in the future may result in the temperature of the CSCS cooling pond challenging the current TS limit of 100°F. This license amendment is being sought to increase the TS temperature limit of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond to <_ 101.5°F, by reducing the temperature measurement uncertainty through the use of higher precision temperature measuring equipment. Should the UHS indicated temperature exceed 101.5°F, Required Action B.1 would be entered and both units would be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Required Action B.2 would be entered requiring both units to be in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

June 29, 2007 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 This proposed change is supported by an engineering calculation of the instrument loop uncertainty values associated with the upgraded precision temperature measuring equipment. With a higher precision method of temperature monitoring, there is an increased instrument loop accuracy and a corresponding reduction in the uncertainty value assumed in the heat removal calculations supporting the design basis events evaluated in the current analysis. The upgraded precision temperature measuring instrumentation is installed and fully functional for both Units 1 and 2. The temperature instrumentation indicating loops are of an equivalent design to the original thermocouples and the method and procedures used to determine the CSCS pond temperature (i.e., the UHS) are unchanged from the thermocouples previously installed. The attached amendment request is subdivided as shown below. Attachment 1 provides an evaluation of the proposed change. Attachment 2 provides the uncertainty analysis for the upgraded precision measuring equipment and the applicable vendor data sheets. Attachment 3 provides a simple schematic of the CW system for LSCS. Attachment 4 includes the markup TS page with the proposed changes indicated. Attachment 5 includes the associated typed TS page with the proposed changes incorporated. Attachment 6 includes the typed TS Bases pages with the proposed changes incorporated. The TS Bases pages are provided for information only, and do not require NRC approval. EGC requests approval of the proposed change by December 1, 2007, with the amendment being implemented within 30 days of issuance. The proposed amendment has been reviewed by the LSCS Plant Operations Review Committee and approved by the Nuclear Safety Review Board in accordance with the requirements of the EGC Quality Assurance Program. EGC is notifying the State of Illinois of this application for a change to the TS by sending a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation," paragraph (b). Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Ms. Alison Mackellar at (630) 657-2817.

June 29, 2007 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 29'h day of June 2007. Respectfully, Darin M. Benyak Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Attachment 1: Evaluation of Proposed Change Attachment 2: Uncertainty Analysis and Vendor Data Sheets Attachment 3: Simple schematic of the CW system for LSCS Attachment 4: Mark-up of Proposed Technical Specifications Page Change Attachment 5: Typed Page for Technical Specifications Change Attachment 6: Typed Pages for Technical Specifications Bases Page Changes ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change INDEX

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL

ANALYSIS 4.1 Safety Analysis and Design Basis 4.2 Operating Limits and Design Analyses 4.3 Instrument Uncertainty

4.4 Diurnal

Cycle 4.5 Operational Considerations

5.0 REGULATORY

ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration

5.2 Applicable

Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL

EVALUATION

7.0 REFERENCES

Page 1 of 16

1.0 DESCRIPTION

ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) is requesting a change to the Technical Specifications (TS) of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2. Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.3.1 verifies the cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the Core Standby Cooling System (CSCS) pond (i.e., the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)) is s 100°F. Currently, if the temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond is > 100°F, the UHS must be declared inoperable in accordance with TS 3.7.3. TS 3.7.3 Required Action B.1 requires that both units be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and Required Action B.2 requires that both units be placed in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Prolonged hot weather in the area over the past few summers has resulted in sustained elevated cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond. High temperatures and humidity during the daytime, in conjunction with minimal cooling at night and little precipitation, have resulted in elevated water temperatures in the LSCS UHS. Continued hot weather conditions in the future may result in the temperature of the CSCS cooling pond challenging the current TS limit of 100°F. This license amendment is being sought to increase the TS temperature limit of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond to <_ 101.5°F, by reducing the temperature measurement uncertainty through the use of higher precision temperature measuring equipment. Should the UHS indicated temperature exceed 101.5°F, Required Action B.1 would be entered and both units would be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Required Action 6.2 would be entered requiring both units to be in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Since the proposed increase in the allowable indicated temperature is based solely on a reduction of the existing instrument loop uncertainty value, there is no change in the containment pressure response, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and non-LOCA analyses, and there is no increase in risk associated with the post-accident heat removal. In addition, there are no identified adverse influences on risk associated with any other Design Basis Accident (DBA) and therefore a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) assessment is not needed for this change. This proposed change is supported by an engineering calculation of the instrument loop uncertainty values associated with the upgraded precision temperature measuring equipment. With a higher precision method of temperature monitoring, there is an increased instrument loop accuracy and a corresponding reduction in the uncertainty value assumed in the heat removal calculations supporting the design basis events evaluated in the current analysis. The upgraded precision temperature measuring instrumentation is installed and fully functional for both Units 1 and 2. The temperature instrumentation indicating loops are of an equivalent design to the original thermocouples and the method and procedures used to determine the CSCS pond temperature (i.e., the UHS) are unchanged from the thermocouples previously installed. Page 2 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S The proposed change to SR 3.7.3.1 is identified as follows:

3.0 BACKGROUND

The UHS provides a heat sink for process and operating heat from safety related components during a transient or accident, as well as during normal operation. The Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) and Diesel Generator Cooling Water System (DGCW) are the principal systems that utilize the UHS to reject heat from safety related plant loads. The UHS consists of an excavated CSCS pond integral with the cooling lake. The volume of the CSCS pond is sized to permit the safe shutdown and cooldown of both units for a 30-day period with no additional makeup water source available for normal and accident conditions. The UHS is the heat sink for heat removed from both units' reactor cores following all postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in which the units are cooled down and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) is placed in service. The function of the CSCS pond is to provide for cooling of the RHR heat exchangers, diesel generator coolers, CSCS cubicle area cooling coils, RHR pump seal coolers, and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump motor cooling coils. The CSCS pond provides indirect heat rejection for the containment through the RHR heat exchangers. The CSCS pond also provides a backup source of emergency makeup water for spent fuel pool cooling and can provide water for fire protection equipment. Neither the ability to provide emergency makeup water for spent fuel pool cooling nor fire protection is limited by heat rejection considerations. The operating limits for heat rejection capability are based on conservative heat transfer analyses for the design basis LOCA. A single UHS supports both Units 1 and 2. The Circulating Water (CW) suction is drawn from a single intake canal and piped underground to the respective units' main condensers. The intake canal is relatively narrow with a high flow rate ensuring that there is thorough mixing prior to being drawn into the suction of the six (i.e., three per unit) circulating water pumps. The difference in piping configurations between the two units' underground supplies is minor. There are four temperature measuring devices located in the CW inlet thermowells (i.e., two per unit), that provide input to the Plant Process Computer (PPC) and are used to verify the UHS cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond, therefore meeting the requirements of SR 3.7.3.1. A simple schematic of the CW system for LSCS is included in Attachment

3. The reduction in the existing instrument loop uncertainty value does not affect the results of the heat removal calculations that ensure the post accident heat loads can be removed for 30 days without challenging the design bases of the mitigation systems. Page 3 of 16 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond is <_ 101.5°F. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

4.0 TECHNICAL

ANALYSIS 4.1 Safety Analysis and Design_ Basis ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change Prolonged hot weather in the area over the past few summers has resulted in sustained elevated cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond. High temperatures and humidity during the daytime, in conjunction with minimal cooling at night and little precipitation, have resulted in elevated water temperatures in the LSCS UHS. Continued hot weather conditions in the future may result in the temperature of the CSCS cooling pond challenging the current TS limit of 100°F. This license amendment is being sought to increase the TS temperature limit of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond to <_ 101.5°F, by reducing the temperature measurement uncertainty through the use of higher precision temperature measuring equipment. Should the UHS temperature exceed 101.5°F, Required Action B.1 would be entered and both units would be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Required Action B.2 would be entered requiring both units to be in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The UHS removes heat from both units' reactor cores following all postulated accidents and anticipated operational occurrences in which the units are cooled down and placed in Residual Heat Removal (RHR) operation. The function of the CSCS pond is to provide for cooling of the RHR heat exchangers, Diesel Generator (DG) coolers, CSCS cubicle area cooling coils, RHR pump seal coolers, and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump motor cooling coils. The CSCS pond provides indirect heat rejection for the containment through the RHR heat exchangers. The safety design basis for UHS are documented in the LSCS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). In the unlikely event that the cooling lake dike is breached, the submerged pond (i.e., the CSCS cooling pond) is designed to provide the UHS for LSCS. The UHS is designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, dated March 1974, which requires a 30-day supply of cooling water in the UHS. The basis provided in Regulatory Guide 1.27 was employed for the temperature analysis of the LSCS UHS to implement General Design Criteria 2, "Design bases for protection against natural phenomena," and Criteria 44, "Cooling water," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants." Verification of the temperature of the water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond (i.e., the UHS) ensures that the heat removal capabilities of the RHRSW System and DGCW System are within the assumptions of the Design Basis Analysis. To ensure that the maximum post-accident temperature of water supplied to the plant is not exceeded (i.e., 104°F), the temperature during normal plant operation must be maintained less than the TS limit. This TS limit accounts for the CSCS pond design requirement that it provide adequate cooling water supply to the plant (i.e., temperature 5 104°F) for 30 days without makeup, while taking into account solar heat loads and plant decay heat during the worst historical weather conditions. In addition, since the lake temperature follows a diurnal cycle (i.e., it heats up during the day and cools off at night), the allowable initial UHS temperature varies with the time of day. The allowable initial UHS temperatures, based on the actual sediment level and the time of day have been determined by analysis (i.e., Reference 9). The limiting initial UHS temperature Page 4 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change determined in this analysis ensures the maximum post-accident temperature of 104°F is not exceeded. This calculated initial temperature is an analytical limit that does not include instrument uncertainty or additional margin. This limiting initial temperature remains bounded by the proposed TS SR 3.7.3.1 limit of s 101.5°F. 4.2 Operating Limits and Design Analvses In 2005, LSCS performed an engineering evaluation (i.e., Reference

10) to assess the impact of higher inlet cooling water temperatures on plant components. This evaluation addressed the consequences of an increase in the temperature of cooling water supplied to the plant on both safety-related and non-safety related systems. For safety-related systems, the applicable components are part of the CSCS cooling system. These systems were evaluated at a conservatively higher inlet cooling water temperature of 106°F, versus the post accident peak inlet temperature of 104°F. The assessment was based on current plant equipment conditions (e.g., current equipment inspections, monitoring, heat exchanger tube plugging, and performance testing information). The results of the evaluation demonstrated that the increased maximum inlet temperature of cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond will have no adverse affect on the safety-related plant heat exchangers or the heat loads they serve. The design requirements of these interfacing components (i.e., heat exchangers) have been reviewed and a determination made that thermal margin exists to allow for an increased cooling water inlet temperature, while maintaining an acceptable heat transfer capability. Although margin exists to support increasing the actual inlet temperature, the proposed increase in the allowable indicated temperature is based solely on a reduction of the existing instrument loop uncertainty value, there is no change in the actual inlet temperature, therefore there is no change in the containment pressure response, LOCA and non-LOCH analyses, and there is no increase in risk associated with the post-accident heat removal. In addition, there are no identified adverse influences on risk associated with any other DBA and therefore, a PRA assessment is not needed for this change. 4.3 Instrument Uncertaintv This license amendment is being sought to increase the TS temperature limit of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond to << 101.5°F by reducing the temperature measurement uncertainty through the use of higher precision temperature measuring equipment. The existing conservative instrument uncertainty margin of 2°F is based on the previously installed thermocouple instrument loop uncertainty value of approximately

+/- 1.8°F, with 0.2°F margin added. The analysis considering the newly installed measuring devices uses the same maximum post accident temperature value of 104°F; however, the new analysis calculated an instrument measurement uncertainty of 0.454°F and conservatively uses a bounding margin of 0.5°F. Therefore the indicated UHS temperature may increase from the existing TS limit of :_100°F to :_101.5°F based on the improved instrument uncertainty. The current accident analyses results remain unchanged since the maximum UHS temperature realized using this new analysis assumption remains unchanged. Page 5 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change Note that the actual calculated value for transient heat up is 1.7°F; the value of 2.0 °F is used for conservatism. The existing instrument uncertainty value of +/-1.8 °F was developed consistent with the lowest level of the EGC graded approach methodology, only considering uncertainties for major loop components and adding an appropriate level of conservatism. It was not based on a rigorous evaluation of all potential uncertainty inputs. The uncertainty value of +/- 0.454 °F was determined by a rigorous evaluation of the same error terms that would be evaluated for an ESF/RPS setpoint, but using a one-sigma (1(y) confidence level. Calculation L-003230 (i.e., Attachment

2) was prepared in accordance with the EGC Setpoint Methodology contained in Nuclear Engineering Standard NES-EIC-20

.04, Revision 4, "Analysis of Instrument Channel Setpoint Error and Instrument Loop Accuracy," (i.e., Reference 11). This calculation determined the uncertainty value of t 0.454 °F used in the analysis. The EGC methodology utilizes a graded approach similar to that of ISA TR67.04.09, "Graded Approaches to Setpoint Determination," (i.e., Reference 12). The EGC graded setpoint methodology has not been specifically approved by the NRC, but similar approaches are widely used in the industry. The general breakdown of the Levels in the EGC graded approach methodology is as follows: Level 1 - Applies to Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS) values and uses the greatest rigor in determining the setpoint value to a 95/95 state (i.e., a 95 percent probability that limits will not be exceeded in 95 percent of the cases in which they are challenged). All uncertainties that could affect the setpoint are evaluated and included in the setpoint determination. Level 2 - Applies to setpoints or limits considered important. All uncertainties that normally could affect the trip are included in the calculations. However, because there is expected conservative design margin in the station design, only one standard deviation is used for setpoint determination. Level 3 - Applies to setpoints or limits useful for plant operation but not safety significant. Normal uncertainties are used for the setpoint calculation, but estimates and general knowledge can be used as the source of information for a given uncertainty. One standard deviation is used for setpoint determination. Level 4 - Applies to non-safety related setpoints. The methodology requires documentation of the engineering justification for the uncertainty used. Page 6 of 16 Existing Proposed TS SR 3.7.3.1 :5100°F :_101.5°F Transient Heat up

  • 2.0 °F 2.0 °F Instrument Uncertainty t 1.8 °F t 0.454 °F Additional Margin +/- 0.2 °F t 0.046 °F UHS Maximum Post Accident Inlet Temperature 104°F 104°F ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," Revision 3, provides guidance on instrument setpoint methodology. It also establishes that instrument settings for safety-related instrumentation should provide a 95 percent probability that limits will not be exceeded in 95 percent of the cases in which they are challenged. This has been interpreted to imply that measurement uncertainties should be established as t 1.96 standard deviations for a normal probability distribution with two-sided uncertainty, or 1.645 standard deviations for one-sided uncertainty. General practice establishes uncertainty rounded to two standard deviations (i.e., 2-sigma (2(3)). The EGC Level 1 graded instrument uncertainty methodology is consistent with this guidance (i.e., evaluating random uncertainties at a 2(y level.) Calculation L-003230 was prepared using the EGC Level 2 graded instrument uncertainty methodology. This level methodology is applied to instrument loops typically associated with setpoints that provide the LSCS operator with specific action values or limits used to verify plant status. This includes instrument loops that provide an indication of acceptable performance for structures, systems, and components in the TS. The Level 2 graded methodology calculates loop uncertainty utilizing the same error terms and rigor that would be evaluated for an ESF/RPS setpoint (i.e., EGC Level 1 methodology), but combines random errors using a 1 a confidence level. Level 2 also allows combining non-random errors by Square-Root-of-the-Sum-of-the-Squares (SRSS) and allows the utilization of single-sided confidence levels where function is only evaluated in a single direction (i.e., increasing or decreasing). The use of the EGC Level 2 graded methodology is considered acceptable for this application because of conservatism in the evaluations supporting the UHS temperature limit; application of a conservative confidence level; relatively slow changing UHS temperatures
the limited seasonal duration of concern; and the 0.5°F allowance for conservatism bounding the instrument uncertainty associated with any combination of operable temperature measurement devices. The acceptability of the EGC Level 2 graded methodology is detailed below
1. There is sufficient conservatism included in the evaluation that established the limit for UHS temperature. This conservatism includes the following: " The UHS follows a diurnal cycle, (i.e., warms up during the day and cools off at night), so its thermal response following an accident is dependent upon the temperature of the lake and the time of day when the postulated failure of the dike occurs. The evaluation analyzed for the worst-case time of day for dike failure. There are multiple parameter limits used in the cooling calculations, all of which would have to be in extreme conditions to adversely affect the use of a graded approach in the calculation for UHS Temperature. These limits include: - UHS dredged level - the UHS analysis evaluated an average silt deposition of the TS maximum of 1.5 ft. LSCS has seen minimal silt deposition since the plant began operations. Page 7 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change Tube fouling in heat exchangers - the UHS analysis evaluated for the design fouling in all associated heat exchangers. These heat exchangers are routinely monitored in a CSCS monitoring program and excessive fouling has not been a significant problem identified during testing. Tube plugging in heat exchangers - the UHS analysis evaluated for the design number of tubes be plugged in each heat exchanger. No heat exchangers at LSCS are plugged to the design limit and most are well below. Post accident weather - the UHS analysis evaluated worst-case weather conditions (i.e., for temperature and evaporative losses) for thirty days post-LOCA. Lake dike breached - the UHS analysis evaluated the LSCS lake drained through a breach in the dike so that only the UHS remains. Transient heat up analysis shows 1.7°F with margin added to a total transient heat up of 2.0°F. The expectation that all of the above would be in extremity is very low. Therefore conservative design margin supports the use of the EGC Level 2 graded approach using 1 o for the instrument uncertainty calculation. 2. The EGC calculation evaluated random errors at the two-sided 1 a confidence level for conservatism. Application of single-sided confidence level would be appropriate for this analysis because the setpoint of concern is only for increasing temperature. Therefore, use of the two-sided confidence level provides additional conservatism. 3. The UHS temperature changes are relatively slow and the UHS temperature is always available for viewing and trending in the Main Control Room using the PPC. This allows increased attention/monitoring of the parameter as it approaches the TS limit. The PPC can display each of the four temperatures as a single point and the average for each unit. In addition, each of the CW inlet temperature data points are set to alarm at the TS limit (note that this is not a Main Control Room board annunciator). The alarm/alert consists of an audible alarm and an alarm message on the PPC. 4. The UHS TS temperature limit is typically a concern only during a period of three months during the summer. During this period, the temperature only challenges the limit for an average of four to five days. Therefore, the probability of reaching the UHS temperature limit is extremely small and supports the use of Level 2 (1 a) methodology. 5. The total instrument measurement uncertainty calculated an instrument measurement uncertainty of 0.454°F. The uncertainty for one available loop is +/- 0.454°F, for two available instrument loops is t 0.326°F, for three available loops is +/- 0.270°F, and for four available loops is +/- 0.236°F. It is considered extremely unlikely that three of the four RTDs or associated circuitry would be out of service simultaneously. In the unlikely event this condition was to occur, the 0.5°F allowance for conservatism bounds the Page 8 of 16

4.4 Diurnal

Cvcle ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change instrument uncertainty associated with any combination of operable temperature measurement devices to meet the requirements of SR 3.7.3.1. LSCS engineering calculation L-003230 which determined the uncertainty for the upgraded instrumentation and the supporting vendor data sheets are presented in Attachment

2. Because the UHS follows a diurnal cycle (i.e., heats up during the day and cools down at night), the thermal response of the UHS following an accident is dependent upon the temperature of the lake and the time of day when the postulated design basis accident and failure of the dike occur. A parametric study of UHS performance was conducted using sediment level, time of day when the postulated failure of the dike occurs, and initial UHS temperature. Historically, the UHS temperature peaks in the late afternoon. Due to diurnal cooling, the UHS temperature slowly drops over the next several hours. If the UHS temperature were to exceed the TS limit, diurnal cooling alone would be expected to return the temperature to less than the TS limit within a few hours. Given the time required to perform a concurrent orderly shutdown of two reactors, the UHS temperature would be returned to within the TS limit before the shutdown of either unit could be accomplished, thus restoring compliance with the Limited Condition for Operation (LCO). Increasing the allowable indicated UHS temperature to 101.5°F will reduce the likelihood of simultaneous and unnecessary transients on two large reactors. 4.5 Operational Considerations There are four temperature measuring devices located in individual CW inlet thermowells (i.e., two per unit), that provide input to the PPC which are used to verify the UHS cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond and therefore meet the requirements of SR 3.7.3.1. The new high precision resistance temperature detector (RTD) temperature measuring devices use the same CW inlet thermowells that were utilized by the thermocouples. The temperature measurements recorded from the newly installed RTDs show extremely close correlation between units and between individual RTDs that is well within the instrument performance predicted by the uncertainty analysis. Thus, it is considered that the CW temperature for any of the installed RTDs on either unit is representative of the UHS temperature. The method for determining UHS temperature did not change with the installation of the upgraded measuring devices (i.e., RTDs). Operators perform a shiftly surveillance procedure, LOS-AA-S101(201), "Unit 1(2) Shiftly Surveillance," which includes recording the daily CW inlet temperature computer point average value for both units. As stated above, the CW temperatures for any of the installed RTDs on either unit is representative of the UHS temperature required to satisfy the 24-hour SR 3.7.3.1. There is no difference in determining the UHS temperature reading to satisfy TS requirements between the old configuration (i.e., thermocouples) and the new configuration (i.e., RTDs). There are two computer points per unit for the actual RTD loop readings (i.e., F285 = LINE A COND INLET and F286 = LINE B COND INLET). There is also one calculated computer point per unit that provides the average inlet temperature (i.e., C361 = [F285 + F286]/2). The Page 9 of 16 operators obtain the UHS temperature by averaging the Unit 1 and Unit 2 temperature readings (i.e., computer points U1C361 for Unit 1 and U2C361 for Unit 2) and perform a simple average by calculating (U1 C361+U2C361)/2. If a unit does not have a CW pump in operation (i.e., the unit is shutdown), the operating department surveillance procedure directs the CW temperature to be recorded from the unit that does have a CW pump in operation. There were no changes to any PPC, I/O, or workstation configuration as a result of installing upgraded measuring devices; however, the PPC database has been updated to reflect the relocation of the CW inlet temperature loop inputs from the thermocouple cards to the analog input cards. The current alarm setpoint on individual computer points are set at 100°F. Upon approval of the proposed change to increase the temperature limit of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond to :5 101.5°F, the individual computer alarm points will be set to the new limit of 101.5°F. The analysis considering the newly installed measuring devices uses the same peak temperature value of 104°F; however, the new analysis calculated an instrument measurement uncertainty of 0.454°F and conservatively uses a bounding margin of 0.5°F; therefore the indicated UHS temperature may increase from the existing TS limit of x100°F to:_101.5°F. The current accident analyses results remain unchanged since the maximum UHS temperature realized using this new analysis assumption remains unchanged. 5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) is requesting a change to the Technical Specifications (TS) of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2. Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.3.1 verifies the cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the Core Standby Cooling System (CSCS) pond (i.e., the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)) is s 100°F. Currently, if the temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond is > 100°F, the UHS must be declared inoperable in accordance with TS 3.7.3. TS 3.7.3 Required Action B.1, requires that both units be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and Required Action B.2 requires that both units be placed in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Prolonged hot weather in the area over the past few summers has resulted in sustained elevated cooling water temperature supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond. High temperatures and humidity during the daytime, in conjunction with minimal cooling at night and little precipitation, have resulted in elevated water temperatures in the LSCS UHS. Continued hot weather conditions in the future may result in the temperature of the CSCS cooling pond challenging the current TS limit of 100°F. This license amendment is being sought to increase the TS temperature limit of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond to :5 101.5°F, by reducing the temperature measurement uncertainty through the use of higher precision temperature measuring equipment. Should the indicated UHS temperature exceed 101.5°F, Required Action B.1 would Page 1 0 of 16 be entered and both units would be placed in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Required Action B.2 would be entered requiring both units to be in Mode 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Since the proposed increase in the allowable indicated temperature is based solely on a reduction of the existing instrument loop uncertainty value, there is no change in the containment pressure response, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCH) and non-LOCA analyses, and there is no increase in risk associated with the post-accident heat removal. In addition, there are no identified adverse influences on risk associated with any other Design Basis Accident (DBA) and therefore a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) assessment is not needed for this change. This proposed change is supported by an engineering calculation of the instrument loop uncertainty values associated with the upgraded precision temperature measuring equipment. With a higher precision method of temperature monitoring, there is an increased instrument loop accuracy and a corresponding reduction in the uncertainty value assumed in the current heat removal calculations supporting the design basis events evaluated in the current analysis. The upgraded precision temperature measuring instrumentation is installed and fully functional for both Units 1 and 2. The temperature instrumentation indicating loops are of an equivalent design to the original thermocouples and the method and procedures used to determine the CSCS pond temperature (i.e., the UHS) are unchanged from the thermocouples previously installed. According to 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," paragraph (c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. In support of this determination, an evaluation of each of the three criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 is provided below regarding the proposed license amendment. 1. The proposed TS change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change will allow the indicated temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond to be increased to <_ 101.5°F based on reducing the temperature measurement uncertainty by use of higher precision temperature measuring equipment. Analyzed accidents are assumed to be initiated by the failure of plant structures, systems, or components. An inoperable UHS is not considered as an initiator of any analyzed events. As such, there is not a significant increase in the probability of a Page 1 1 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change previously evaluated accident. Allowing the UHS to operate at a higher allowable indicated temperature, but still within the design limits of the equipment it supplies, will not affect the failure probability of that equipment. The current heat analysis calculations of record for LSCS, Units 1 and 2, assume a UHS post-accident peak inlet temperature of 104°F. The proposed temperature increase is based solely on a reduction of the existing instrument loop uncertainty value. The current analysis bounds the proposed change. This higher allowable indicated temperature does not impact the LOCA Peak Clad Temperature Analysis, LOCA Containment Analysis or the non-LOCA analyses; therefore, continued operation with a UHS temperature

> 100°F but s 101.5°F will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. Based on the above information, the increase in the allowable indicated temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the UHS to <_ 101.5°F by reducing the existing instrument loop uncertainty value has no effect on the result of the design basis event and will continue to allow each required heat exchanger to perform its safety function. The heat exchangers will continue to provide sufficient cooling for the heat loads during the most severe 30-day period. Based on the above information, increasing the allowable indicated temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond from <_ 100°F to <_ 101.5°F by reducing the instrument uncertainty value has no impact on any analyzed accident; therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. The proposed TS change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change involves newly installed upgraded precision temperature measuring equipment. This proposed action will not alter the manner in which equipment is operated, nor will the functional demands on credited equipment be changed. Raising the indicated UHS temperature limit does not introduce any new or different modes of plant operation, nor does it affect the operational characteristics of any safety-related equipment or systems; as such, no new failure modes are being introduced. The proposed action reduces the instrument uncertainty value but does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. Increasing the allowable indicated temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond from <_ 100°F to <_ 101.5°F has no impact on safety related systems. The plant is designed such that the RHR pumps on the unit undergoing the LOCA/LOOP conditions would start upon the receipt of a signal, and would load onto their respective Emergency Diesel Generators' emergency bus during the LOOP event. The increase in the allowable indicated temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond will not require operation of additional RHR pumps; therefore, system operation is unaffected by the proposed change in the indicated UHS temperature limit. Based on the above information, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Page 1 2 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change 3. The proposed TS change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change allows an increase in the allowable indicated temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond to <_ 101.5°F. The margin of safety is determined by the design and qualification of the plant equipment, the operation of the plant within analyzed limits, and the point at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated. The proposed action does not impact these factors as the analyzed peak inlet temperature of the UHS is unaffected based on the improved instrument uncertainty of the upgraded high precision temperature measurement instrumentation. This change is supported by an engineering calculation of the instrument loop uncertainty values associated with upgraded precision temperature measuring equipment. The reduction in the uncertainty value associated with the temperature measuring equipment from t 1.8°F to t 0.454°F is based solely on the use of more precise equipment. No setpoints are affected, and no other change is being proposed in the plant operational limits as a result of this change. All accident analysis assumptions and conditions will continue to be met. Adequate design margin is available to ensure that the required margin of safety is not significantly reduced. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on the above evaluation, EGC concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c). 5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The design of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) must satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications," paragraph (c)(2)(ii), Criterion

3. These requirements state the following: (ii) A Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (TS LCO) of a nuclear reactor must be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria: Criterion
3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. The proposed change does not relocate the UHS temperature limit from TS 3.7.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink," and therefore the Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) continues to be met. General Design Criteria 2, "Design bases for protection against natural phenomena," and General Design Criteria 44, "Cooling water," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," provides design considerations for the UHS. Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, dated March 1974, provides an acceptable approach for satisfying this criterion. The basis provided in Regulatory Guide 1.27, Revision 1, was employed for the temperature analysis of the LSCS UHS. Page 13 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change The reduction of the existing instrument loop uncertainty value does not affect the results of the heat removal calculations that ensure the post accident heat loads can be removed for 30 days without challenging the design bases of the mitigation systems. Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Setpoints for Safety-Related Instrumentation," Revision 3, provides guidance on instrument setpoint methodology. It also establishes that instrument settings for safety-related instrumentation should provide a 95 percent probability that limits will not be exceeded in 95 percent of the cases in which they are challenged. This has been interpreted to imply that measurement uncertainties should be established as +/- 1.96 standard deviations for a normal probability distribution with two-sided uncertainty, or 1.645 standard deviations for one-sided uncertainty. General practice establishes uncertainty rounded to two standard deviations (i.e., 2(;). The EGC Level 2 graded methodology calculates loop uncertainty utilizing the same error terms and rigor that would be evaluated for an ESF/RPS setpoint (i.e., EGC Level 1 methodology), but combines random errors using a 1 a confidence level. Level 2 also allows combining non-random errors by Square-Root-of-the-Sum-of-the-Squares (SRSS) and allows the utilization of single-sided confidence levels where function is only evaluated in a single direction (i.e., increasing or decreasing). The use of the EGC Level 2 graded methodology is considered acceptable for this application because of conservatism in the evaluations supporting the UHS temperature limit; application of a conservative confidence level; relatively slow changing UHS temperatures
the limited seasonal duration of concern; and the 0.5°F allowance for conservatism bounding the instrument uncertainty associated with any combination of operable temperature measurement devices. This change is supported by an engineering calculation for the instrument loop uncertainty values for the upgraded precision temperature measuring equipment. With a higher precision method of temperature monitoring, there is an increased instrument loop accuracy and a corresponding reduction in the uncertainty value utilized in the current analyzed heat removal calculations for mitigation of the design basis events. Since the proposed temperature increase is based solely on a reduction of the existing instrument loop uncertainty value, there is no change in the containment pressure response, LOCA and non-LOCA analyses, and there is no increase in risk associated with the post-accident heat removal. In addition, there are no identified adverse influences on risk associated with any other Design Basis Accident (DBA) and therefore, a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) assessment is not needed for this change. Impact on Previous Submittals/Precedent EGC has previously submitted and subsequently withdrawn a temporary amendment to increase the UHS temperature limit for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, dated August 2, 2001 as documented in References 1, 2 and 3. This request was withdrawn based on the temporary nature of the amendment and the moderation of local area temperature conditions. EGC previously submitted a license amendment request to increase the LSCS, Units 1 and 2 UHS temperature on March 13, 2006, (i.e., Reference
5) that was subsequently denied by the Page 14 of 16

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL

EVALUATION ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change NRC on November 3, 2006 (i.e., Reference 6). Following public meetings on January 26, 2007 and April 5, 2007 with the NRC, this amendment request is a re-submittal of Reference 5 with the additional information and detail based on insights from these meetings. EGC has evaluated this proposed operating license amendment consistent with the criteria for identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21, "Criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessments

." EGC has determined that this proposed change meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion set forth in paragraph (c)(9) of 10 CFR 51.22, "Criterion for categorical exclusion; identification of licensing and regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or otherwise not requiring environmental review," and as such, has determined that no irreversible consequences exist in accordance with paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment." This determination is based on the fact that this change is being proposed as an amendment to the license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," which changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," or which changes an inspection or a surveillance requirement, and the amendment meets the following specific criteria: The amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. As demonstrated in Section 5.1, "No Significant Hazards Consideration," the proposed change does not involve any significant hazards consideration. (ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite. The proposed change does not result in an increase in power level, does not increase the production nor alter the flow path or method of disposal of radioactive waste or byproducts. The proposed action would allow the operation of LSCS Units 1 and 2 with an increase in the allowable indicated temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond up to :5 101.5°F; however, all accident analyses limits are met. It is expected that all plant equipment would operate as designed in the event of an accident to minimize the potential for any leakage of radioactive effluents; thus, there will be no change in the amounts of radiological effluents released offsite. Based on the above evaluation, the proposed change will not result in a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent released offsite. (iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. There is no net increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure due to the proposed change. The proposed action will not change the level of controls or methodology used for processing of radioactive effluents or handling of solid radioactive Page 1 5 of 16 waste, nor will the proposed action result in any change in the normal radiation levels within the plant. Based on the above information, there will be no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure resulting from this change.

7.0 REFERENCES

ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Change 1. Letter from K. A. Ainger (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to NRC, "Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement for the Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature," dated August 2, 2001 2. Letter from T. W. Simpkin (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to NRC, 'Withdrawal of License Amendment Requests Related to the Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature for the Braidwood and LaSalle County Stations," dated September 21, 2001 3. Letter from NRC to O. D. Kingsley (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Withdrawal of Amendment Request (TAC Nos. MB 2564 and MB2565)," dated October 1, 2001 4. Letter from K. R. Jury (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "Request for a License Amendment to Technical Specification 3.7.3, `Ultimate Heat Sink', dated March 13, 2006 5. Letter from NRC to C. M. Crane (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Denial of License Amendment," dated November 3, 2006 6. U. S. NRC to C. M. Crane (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "LaSalle County Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information Related to Ultimate Heat Sink License Amendment Request," dated June 15, 2006 7. Letter from J. A. Bauer (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "Additional Information Supporting the License Amendment Request to Technical Specification 3.7.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink," dated July 13, 2006 8. Letter from D. M. Benyak (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "Additional Information Supporting the License Amendment Request to Technical Specification 3.7.3, "Ultimate Heat Sink," dated August 4, 2006 9. LSCS Design Analysis L-002457, Revision 5, "LaSalle County Station Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis" 10. LSCS Engineering Evaluation, Revision 1, "Assessment of High Lake Temperature on the Functionality of the Plant (Summer Readiness 2005)" 11. EGC Nuclear Engineering Standard NES-EIC-20

.04, Revision 4, "Analysis of Instrument Channel Setpoint Error and Instrument Loop Accuracy'

12. ISA TR67.04.09, "Graded Approaches to Setpoint Determination" Page 1 6 of 16 ATTACHMENT 2 LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 Uncertainty Analysis for the New Precision RTDs and Vendor Data Sheets ATTACHMENT 1 Design Analysis Cover Sheet CC-AA-309-1001 Revision 1 THIS DESIGN ANALYSIS SUPERCEDES
Last Page N o. 14 Analysis No. L-003230 Revision 000 EC/ECR No. 361689 Revision 000 Title: CW Inlet Temperature Uncertainty Analysis Station(s)

LaSalle Com pone nt(s) Unit No.: 1,2 1TE-CW 01 0 2TE-C W0 10 Discipline I & C 1TE-CW011 2TE-CW011 Description Code/ Keyword 104 1TT-CW010 2TT-CW010 Safety Class NSR 1TT-CW011 2TT-CW011 System Code CW U1 Computer Point F285 U2 Computer Point F285 Structure N/A U1 Computer Point F286 U2 Computer Point F286 CONTROLLED DOCUMENT REFERENCES Document No. From/To Document No. From/To Is this Design Analysis Safeguards?

Yes [] No O Does this Design Analysis Contain Unverified Assumptions?

Yes El No a ATI/AR# Is a Supplemental Review Required?

Y e E] No vv w If yes, complete Attachment 3 Preparer T. ,1. Van W y k Print Name SI Name Date Reviewer V. R. Shah Pmt Name Sign Name c. Date Method of Review Detailed Review E] Alte ate Cal at ns',,- Testing Review Notes: Approver - Print Name "Sign me Date (For Extemal Analyses OMy) Exelon Reviewer N/A Print Name Sign Name Date Approver NIA Print Name Sign Name Date Description of Revision (list affected pages for partials):

CALCULATION TABLE OF CONTENTS CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 2 SECTION: PAGE NO. SUB-PAGE NO. TABLE OF CONTENTS PURPOSE / OBJECTIVE METHODOLOGY AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 3 DESIGN INPUT 3 REFERENCES 6 CALCULATIONS

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS (Total Error) 13 ATTACHMENTS

A. Minco@ Quotation 160056-2, January 26, 2006 Al B. MincoO Drawing S100995, dated 4/27/99 B1 C. E-mail from Keith Jensen of MincoM to Vikram Shah of LaSalle dated C1 7/25/06 D. ifm efector600 TR2432 Operating Instructions, 701724/01, dated D1 -D2 02/04 (Partial)

E. Letter from Ameera Shah of ifm efector to Vikram Shah of LaSalle El dated 7/26/06 F. Fluke 45 Dual Display Multimeter User's Manual, Rev. 4, dated F1 07/97 (Specification Page only) G. SOLAO SDN Power Supplies Specifications for SDN 2.5-24-100P G1 H. RTP RTP2000 Setup and Installation Guide, UG-2000-001, dated H1 9/12/02 (Partial)

1. Minco Report of Calibration for Platinum RTD, Model S100995PD, 11-12 Serial No. P/N366 (Partial)

J. HP 34401A Multimeter User's Guide, Edition 4, printed February J1 1996 (Specification Page only)

CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 3 of 14 1 PURPOSE / OBJECTIVE CALCULATION PAGE 1.1 The purpose of this calculation is to evaluate the loop uncertainty for the CW Inlet Temperature Indication Loops. These are revised instrument loops that were implemented by EC359060 for Unit 1 and EC359114 for Unit 2. 1.2 These instrument loops provide Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) temperature indication via the Plant Process Computer (PPC). These new loop configurations replaced the existing thermocouples 1(2)CW010/011 (the sensing elements for computer points F2851F286) with new RTD temperature sensing elements and new temperature compensators (transmitters), and relocated the computer inputs to the appropriate Input/Output (VO) analog input cards. 2 METHODOLOGY AND ACCEPTANCE 0RITERIA 2.1 The methodology used for this calculation is based on NES-EIC-20

.04 'Analysis of Instrument Channel Setpoint Error and Instrument Loop Accuracy", Rev. 4 (Reference 5.1.2). Additionally, for calculating the average uncertainty using up to four indicating loops, the multiple test criterion of ASME PTC 19.1 (Ref. 5.1.4), Section 3.2 was used. 2.2 The instrumentation evaluated in this calculation provides indication (via the Plant Process Computer) for Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature. This is a non-safety indication loop, but the indication is used to verify the Technical Specification SR 3.7.3.1 is met. In accordance with Reference 5.1.2, Appendix D, a Level 3 evaluation is appropriate for this analysis. However, in response to questions during the NRC review of the License Amendment Request to increase the UHS temperature surveillance requirement value, this analysis will evaluate all uncertainty terms and determine the total uncertainty value using methodology consistent with safety-related indicating loops (Reference 5.1.2, Appendix D, Level 2). 2.3 Temperature, humidity and pressure errors, when available from the manufacturer, are to be evaluated with respect to the conditions specified in the station EQ Zones. If not provided, an evaluation must be made to ensure that the environmental conditions are bounded by the manufacturer's specified operational limits. If the environmental conditions are bounded, these error effects are considered to be included in the manufacturer's reference accuracy. 2.4 Published instrument vendor specifications are considered to be based on sufficiently large samples so that the probability and confidence level meets the 2a criteria, unless stated otherwise by the vendor (Reference 5.1.2, Appendix A, Section 8.0). 2.5 For normal error analysis, normal vibrations and seismic effects are considered negligible or capable of being calibrated out in accordance with Appendix I of Reference 5.1.2. 2.6 The calibration standard error is considered negligible

the calibration standard error (STD) is more accurate than the M&TE by a ratio of at least 4
1 (Reference 5.1.2, Appendix A, Section 5.1.4). 2.7 The insulation resistance error is considered negligible unless the instrumentation is expected to operate in an abnormal or harsh environment (Reference 5.1.2, Appendix A, Section 7.0). 2.8 Reference 5.1.2, Appendix I states that the effects of normal radiation are small and accounted for in the periodic calibration process. Outside of containment during normal operation, the uncertainty introduced by radiation effects on components is considered to be negligible. 3 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

3.1 Evaluation

of M&TE errors for the digital multimeter is based on the assumption that the test equipment listed in Section 4.5 is used. 3.2 It is assumed that the calibration standard of the equipment utilized is more accurate than the M&TE equipment by a ratio of at least 4:1 such that the calibration standard errors can be considered CALCULATION PAGE CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 00 0 PAGE NO. 4 of 14 negligible with respect to the M&TE specification per Section2.6. This is considered a reasonable assumption since M&TE equipment is certified to its required accuracy under laboratory conditions. 4 DESIGN INPUTS 4.1 The new instrument loops will consist of the following components

high accuracy RTD temperature elements, temperature transmitters, precision input resistors at the field input to the I/O card, and the D/A conversion in the PPC VO equipment. The loop components evaluated in this document have the following specifications
4.1.1 New Minco RTDs in the existing thermowells (replacing the existing thermocouples). The new RTDs have the following performance specifications (Ref. 5.4.1): Repeatability
t0.2°F [The RTDs are designed to EN60751 Class A specifications with high precision and repeatability requirements. Thus, this specification could be considered to be at a 3a confidence level. However, for conservatism, this specification will be used as a 2a value.] Drift: *0.1 °F/year (Ref. 5.4.3) [The study in Reference

5.5.3 shows

that RTDs are inherently stable, and after the first few months following installation RTD: attain a stable condition from which it may not drift sufficiently to exceed accuracy limits. RTD cross-calibration is performed to Identify if an element has experienced significant drift. Although the RTDs are not separately calibrated, for conservatism the vendor's drift value will be expanded using the loop calibration interval of 4 years (+ 1 year late factor).] 4.1.2 The resistance value equivalent to the temperature value of interest (101.5°F) for the RTDs was obtained from the Minco calibration reports for the RTDs installed at LaSalle (Ref. 5.4.10). The highest of the four resistance values was 115.013:2. This value will be used to determine the M&TE error for the indicating loop (applied to Module 2). The change in resistance per 1°F change in temperature (0.214WF) was also obtained using the actual resistance values in the calibration reports for 101.5°F and 102.5°F. 4.1.3 New ifm efector600 TR2432 temperature transmitter modules. These new modules have the following performance specification (Ref.5.4.4, 5.4.5): Accuracy (includes drift): *0.54°F / 2 years `Temperature Drift": *0.1 % of measured range/ 10°C [Note: Ref. 5.4.5 indicates that the accuracy specification includes drift error and is warranted to hold the accuracy and drift within the specified value for 2 years. It further states that testing is performed on 100% of the devices after production to verify conformance with these specifications. Therefore, these values are 3a confidence level. It also states that the accuracy specification includes the resolution error and electronic component drift, and that there are no other environmental influences that will affect the accuracy specification

.] 4.1.4 PPC I/O input card. The I/0 input cards have the following performance specification (Ref.5.4.9): [2a] Accuracy: *0.025% of full scale (30°F to 120°F) 4.2 RTD extension wire has the identical conductor types as the RTD, and therefore there is no emf drop or change in conductor size at the point of connection on the RTD (Ref. 5.4.2).

CALCULATION PAGE CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 5 of 14 4.3 The Instrument Loop power supply is a SOLAO SDN 2.5-24-100P (Ref. 5.4.8), which has the following performance specifications

[2a] Output tolerance: t 2% overall (combined Line, load, time, and temperature related changes) Temperature range: -10°C to 60*C Humidity: < 90% RH, non-condensing 4.4 The precision signal resistor at the input terminals of the I/O card (Module 3) is a high-precision resistor with a tolerance of t 0.02% (Reference 5.3.2) [2a] 4.5 The loop is calibrated using a variable resistance input (to simulate the RTD input), measured with either a Fluke 45 DMM or an HP 34401 A, and reading the indicated temperature at the PPC. The calibration procedures (Ref. 5.2.1 and 5.2.2) each specify that one loop will be calibrated using either the Fluke 45 OR the HP 34401A. The other loop must be calibrated using the other DMM. 4.5.1 Reference Accuracy for the Fluke 45 (medium speed) on the 300f2 range is: (t 0.05% reading + 2 LSD + 0.0252) (Ref. 5.4.6) [2(y] 4.5.2 Reference Accuracy for the HP 34401A on the 1 kf2 range is: t (0.01 % reading + 0.001 % range) (Ref. 5.4.7) [2a] Temperature coefficient for the HP 34401 A on the 1 k12 range Is (for 0*C to 18*C and 28 6 C to 55'C): t (0.0006% of reading + 0.0001 % of range /'C) (Ref. 5.4.7) [2a] 4.6 LOCAL SERVICE ENVIRONMENTS (Ref. 5.5.2) [Note: Per reference 5.5.2, the normal expected humidity in this zone is 20 to 509'6 RH] 4.7 Calibration Tolerance The calibration tolerance for these indication loops is +/- 0.54*F. Per Ref. 5.1.2, this is a 3a value. Table 4.6 RTDs Ifm efector600 TR2432 Plant Process Computer EQ Zone H7 CIA Location Turbine Bldg Control Room (Computer Room Temperature 83°F to 102°F 50 to 104°F (Normal: 65 to 85°F) Pressure 0 "wc 0.125 to +3.0 'we Humidity T 39 to 479'* RH 2.6 to 90'/* RH [see note belowl CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 6 of 14 5 5.1 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.3 LASALLE STATION DRAWINGS 5.3.1 5.3.2 REFERENC ES METHODOLOGY ANSI/ISA-S67

.04-Part 1-1994, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation" NES-EIC-20

.04, "Analysis of Instrument Channel Setpoint Error and Instrument Loop Accuracy," Revision 4 ANSI/ISA TR67.04.09, "Graded Approaches to Setpoint Determination," dated 10/15/05 ASME PTC 19.1, Part 1, "Measurement Uncertainty," 1985 PROCEDURES LIP-CW-501

[New loop-specific calibration procedure in development

tracked by CAP process] LIP-CW-601

[New loop-specific calibration procedure in development

tracked by CAP process] 1 E-1 (2)-4022ZC "Schematic Diagram, Circulating Water System CW Pt. 3," as revised by EC359060 and EC359114. 1 E-1 (2)-4707AA, `Wiring Diagram Analog Input Cabinet 1(2)C91-P607 AITs 1,2,3,4 Left Side," as revised by EC359060 and EC359114. 5.4 VENDOR PRODUCT INFORMATION CALCULATION PAGE MincoO Quotation 160056-2, January 26, 2006 Minco Drawing S100995, dated 4/27/99 E-mail from Keith Johnson or Minco to Vikram Shah of LaSalle dated 7/25/06 ifm efector600 TR2432 Operating Instructions, 701724/01, dated 02/04 Letter from Ameera Shah of ifm efector to Vikram Shah of LaSalle dated 7/26/06 Fluke 45 Dual Display Multimeter Users Manual, Revision 4, dated 07/97 HP 34401A Multimeter User's Guide, Edition 4, printed February 1996 SOLAOD SDN Power Supplies Specifications for SDN 2.5-24100P RTP 8436 Series Analog Input Cards Technical Manual, 981-0021-211 A, Rev. A, dated 04-96 5.4.1 5.4.2 5.4.3 5.4.4 5.4.5 5.4.6 5.4.7 5.4.8 5.4.9 5.4.10 Minco Report of Calibration for Platinum RTD, Model S100995PD, Serial No. P/N366 5.5 OTHER REFERENCES

5.5.1 LaSalle

Technical Specifications, Sections 3.7.3, B 3.7.3, Amendments 178/164 5.5.2 LaSalle UFSAR, Rev. 16, Tables 3.11-18 and 3.11-24 5.5.3 EPRI TR-103099, "Effects of Resistance Temperature Detector Aging on Cross-Calibration Techniques," Final Report dated June 1994 CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 7 of 14 6 CALCULATIONS 6.1 RTD ERRORS (MODULE 1) 6.1.1 Random Errors all 6.1.1.1 RTD Reference Accuracy RA1 The RTD Reference Accuracy is t0.2°F (Section 4.1.1). This is a 26 value. RA1 2a = t 0.2°F / 2 RA1 0.1 °F 6.1.1.2 RTD Calibration Error CAL1 The RTDs are not separately calibrated. Therefore, there is no calibration tolerance for this module. (The loop calibration tolerance is applied to Module 2, which is the module that is adjusted during loop calibration

.) 6.1.1.5 Drift Error DI CAL1 = 0 6.1.1.3 RTD Setting Tolerance ST1 The RTDs are not separately calibrated. Therefore, there is no setting tolerance for this module. (The loop calibration tolerance is applied to Module 2, which is the module that is adjusted during loop calibration

.) ST1 _ 0 6.1.1.4 Random Input Errors a1 in The RTOs are the first modules in the loop. Therefore, a1 to = 0 The RTD Drift value (IDE) specified by the vendor is t 0.1 °F/year. [2a] The RTDs are not separately calibrated

RTD cross-calibration is performed to identify if an RTD has experienced significant drift. For conservatism the vendor's drift value will be expanded using the loop calibration interval (Section 4.1.1). The interval for these indicating loops is 4 years. The 25% late factor is 1 year. (VOP is the vendor drift period, or 1 year in this case.) D 1 2a D1 CALCULATION PAGE [IDE] x [(SI + LF)NDP)]'12

[0.1 °F] x [(4 years + 1 year)/1 year]'12 0.1°F x 2.236 0.224°F 0.112°F 6.1.1.6 RTD Random Error a1 a1 = t [(RAI n)2 +(CAL1)2 +(ST1)2 +(a1 in) 2 +(D1)2],12 = t [(0.1-F)2 + (0)2 + (0)2 + (0)2 + (0.112)2]'12

= t 0.150 °F a1 = t 0.150 °F CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 8 of 14 6.1.2 Non-Random Errors Eel RTDs are passive devices that produce a resistance signal proportional to temperature. As such, they are not affected by the following non-random effects. 6.1.2.1 Insulation Resistance Errors elR1 Insulation Resistance error is to be evaluated where actuation functions are expected to operate in an abnormal or harsh environment (Section 2.7). There are no terminal blocks in 100% relative humidity areas, therefore, 6.1.2.2 Resistance Drop of the Extension Wire eRD1 Since the RTD extension wires are made of the same material as the RTD itself, there is no emf rise or drop across the RTD head terminals (Section 4.2) 9RDI = 0 6.1.2.3 Temperature Errors eTl RTDs are designed to exhibit a precise temperature effect that is used to develop the input signal to the loop. Since the RTDs are designed to function at temperatures well above the system design temperature, there is no temperature error other than the reference accuracy error. Therefore, 6.1.2.4 Non-Random Input Errors el in The RTD is the first module in the loop. Therefore, elfin = 0 6.1.2.5 Non-Random Error Eel Eel Eel = 0°F 6.2 TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER ERRORS (MODULE 2) 6.2.1 Random Error a2 6.2.1.1 Reference Accuracy RA2 Reference Accuracy is +/- 0.54°F (Section 4.1.3). This is a 3a value. RA2 = 1 0.54°F / 3 = 1 0.18°F CALCULATION PAGE eHi + eSP1 + eP1 + eV1 + eS1 + eR1 + 9T1 + eIR1 + ePr1 + eIR1 + eRD1 + ei in 0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0=0°F Humidity Effects: eHi = 0 Static Pressure Effects: eSP1 = 0 Ambient Pressure Effects: eP1 = 0 Power Supply Effects: eV1 = 0 Seismic Effects: eS1 = 0 Radiation Effects: eRl = 0 Process Effects: ePri = 0 6.2.1.2 Calibration Error CAL2 CALCULATION PAGE CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 9 of 14 Per Reference 5.4.5, this accuracy includes drift and is warranted for 2 years. The calibration interval is 4 years. The 25% late factor is 1 year. (VDP is the vendor drift period, or 2 years in this case.) The formula for applying the surveillance interval to Drift will be applied to the entire RA2 error term. RA2 RA2 = t 0.285°F * [IDE] x [(SI + LF)NDP)]'12

+/- [0.18°F] x [(4years + 1 year)/2 years)] 112 * [0.18°F] x [1.581139] The loop is calibrated using a variable resistance input, measured with a Fluke 189 DMM, and reading the indicated temperature at the PPC. 6.2.1.2.1 Measurement

& Test Equipment Error MTE2 H P 34401 A Reference Accuracy is the manufacturers accuracy (+/- 0.01 % reading + 0.001% of range for the 1 W) as a 2a value (Section 5.4.6). The highest reading of interest is 101.5°F. The Minco calibration reports for the RTDs show that the highest resistance value for this temperature is 115.01352. (Section 4.1.2) RAMTE 2 ,, = t 0.01 % x 115.0130 + (0.00001 x 100052) =*0.011552+0.010=0.021552 _ +/- 0.021552 x 1 0 F/0.214 Q = 0.100° F RAMTE2 = t 0.050°F The manufacturer also specifies a Temperature coefficient for this range (1 ka) for 0°C to 18°C and 28°C to 55°C as 0.0006% of reading + 0.0001% of range per °C. The normal turbine building ambient temperature in the zone where the transmitter is installed varies from 83°F to 102 0 F(Ref, 5.5.2). For additional conservatism, this range is expanded to 75°F to 102°F (or 23.9°C to 38.9°C). The lower temperature (23.9°C) Is within the range where the coefficient is not applicable, so the applicable AT is: (38.9°C - 28°C) or 10.9°C TEMTE22,, RAMTE2 = +/- 0.00395°F = *(0.0006% x 115.0130) + (0.000001 x 100052) =+/-0.000690 +0.0010=+/-0.00169i2 = +/- 0.0016952 x 1 ° F/0.214 Q = 0.00789° F The temperature error is a degradation of the specified accuracy and is not considered an additional random error. Therefore, the total M&TE error for the HP 34401 A is: MTE2 = * [(0.050-F)2 + (0.00395°F)2]'1 MTE2 = +/- 0.0502°F Fluke 45 (medium speed) Reference Accuracy is the manufacturer's accuracy [+/- (0.05% reading + 2 LSD + 0.0252)] as a 2a value (Section 5.4.6). [The LSD for the Fluke 45 is 0.0152.] The highest reading of interest is 101.5°F. The Minco calibration reports for the RTDs show that the highest resistance value for this temperature is 115.01352. (Section 4.1.2) RA 2 ,, = +/-(0.05% x 115.01352) + [(2 X 0.010) + 0.0252]

MTE2 = t 0.228°F CALCULATION PAGE CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 10 of 14 = t 0.05750 + 0.0452 = 0.097552 = t 0.09750 x 1 °F/0.2140 = 0.456°F The Fluke 45 (med. speed) M&TE error is bounding and will be used to evaluate total loop uncertainty. 6.2.1.2.2 Calibration Standard Error STD2 The calibration standard error is evaluated as negligible (Section 3.2). STD2 = 0 6.2.1.2.3 Loop Calibration Tolerance ST2 The calibration tolerance for this indicating loop is t 0.54°F (Section 4.7). ST2 = t 0.54°F / 3 ST2 = t 0.18°F 6.2.1.2.4 Calibration Error CAL2 The total calibration error for the M&TE is: CAL2 = t [(MTE2)2 + (STD2) 2 + (ST2)2]"2

= t [(0.228°F)2 + (0)2 + (018)2] 2 CAL2 t 0.29°F 6.2.1.3 Ambient Temperature Error aT2 The vendor states the "temperature drift" error for the temperature transmitter as 0.1 % of measuring range/ 10°C (Ref. 4.1.3) [3a]. This is applied in this calculation as an ambient temperature error. Measuring range: 30 to 120°F = 90°F. The normal turbine building ambient temperature in the zone where the transmitter is installed varies from 83°F to 102°F(Ref. 5.5.2). For additional conservatism, this range is expanded to 75°F to 102°F (27°F difference). 6.2.1.6 Total Random Error a2 aT2 6.2.1.4 Random Input Error (On c2in = a1 = t 0.150°F 6.2.1.5 Power Supply Effects d2PS The transmitter specifications are valid for voltages between 20 and 30 vDC. The 24-volt power supply variability is less than t 2% all errors combined (4.3). This is equal to 23.5vDC to 24.5vDC. Therefore, a2PS = *0'F = f (0.1%

  • Span) = f [(0.001
  • 90°F)/10°C x (27°F x 5°F/8°C) = 10.1519°F/3

= t 0.051 °F d2 a2 a2 6.2.2 Non-Random Error Eel 6.2.2.1 Humidity Error e2H CALCULATION PAGE CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 11 of 14 t [(RA2)2 + (CAL2 )2+ (aT2)2 + (o2in)2 + ((Y2PS)2]"2 t [(0.285°F)2 + (0.290°F)2 + (0-051-F)' + (0.150°F)2 + (0°F)2)'i2 t 0.436°F No humidity effect errors are provided in the manufacturer's specifications, and the humidity conditions at the instrument location are within the operating limits of the module. Humidity errors are negligible during normal conditions. (Reference 5.1.2, Appendix I) e2H = 0 6.2.2.2 Radiation Error e2R No radiation errors are provided in the manufacturer's specifications. Per Section 2.8, it is reasonable to consider the normal radiation effect as negligible. Therefore, e2R = 0 6.2.2.3 Seismic Error e2S No seismic effect errors are provided in the manufacturer's specifications. A seismic event defines a particular type of accident condition. Therefore, there is no seismic error for normal operating conditions e2S = 0 6.2.2.4 Static Pressure Offset Error e2SP The transmitter is an electrical device and therefore not affected by static pressure. e2SP = 0 6.2.2.5 Ambient Pressure Error e2P The transmitter is an electrical device and therefore not affected by ambient pressure. e2P = 0 6.2.2.6 Process Error e2Pr The transmitter receives an analog input from an RTD. Any errors associated with the conversion of temperature to resistance have been accounted for as RTD errors. Therefore, e2Pr = 0 6.2.2.7 Non-Random Input Error e21n e2in=Eel =0 6.2.2.8 Total Non-Random Error Ee2 Ee2 = e2H + e2R + e2S + e2SP + e2P + e2Pr + e2in = 0+0+0+0+0+0+0 6.3 PPC VO MODULE ERRORS (MODULE 3)

CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 12 of 14 6.3.1 Random Error a3 6.3.1.1 Reference Accuracy RA3 CALCULATION PAGE Reference Accuracy is +/- 0.025% calibrated range (Ref. 5.4.9). The calibrated range is 30°F to 120°F (120°F F = 90°F). 6.3.2.1 Humidity Error e3H 6.3.2.2 Radiation Error e3R 6.3.2.3 Seismic Error e2S RA3 2Q = +/-0.00025 x 90O F = 0.022511F RA3 = +/-0.0113°F 6.3.1.2 Calibration Error CAL3 The 110 module is not separately calibrated

indication is verified during loop calibration. CAL3 = t0°F 6.3.1.3 Drift Error D3 The vendor does not specify a drift error specification for the 1/O module. D3 = t 0°F 6.3.1.4 Random Input Error a31n a3iin = a2 = t 0.437°F 6.3.1.5 Total Random Error o3 a3 = t [(RA3)2 + (CAL3 )2 + (aD3)2 + (a31n)2+ ((;3r)2 112 a3 = t [(0.0113°F)2 + (0.0°F)2 + (0°F)2 + (0.4360F)2]

1M a3 = t 0.436°F 6.3.2 Non-Random Error Fre3 No humidity effect errors are provided by the manufacturer'

specified RH for PPC equipment is 20 to 80% RH. The UO module is located in EQ Zone C1 A, (Section 4.6), where expected RH levels are 20 to 50%. Humidity errors are negligible. (Reference 5.1.2, Appendix I) e3H = 0 No radiation errors are provided in the manufacturer's specifications. Per Section 2.8, it is reasonable to consider the normal radiation effect as negligible. Therefore, e3R = 0 No seismic effect errors are provided in the manufacturer's specifications. A seismic event defines a particular accident condition. Therefore, there is no seismic error for normal operating conditions e3S = 0 6.3.2.4 Static Pressure Offset Error e3SP CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 13 Of 14 The I/0 module is an electrical device and therefore not affected by static pressure. e3SP = 0 6.3.2.5 Ambient Pressure Error e3P The I/0 module is an electrical device and therefore not affected by ambient pressure. e3P = 0 6.3.2.6 Process Error e3Pr The I/0 module receives an analog current input from the transmitter. Any errors associated with the conversions of temperature to resistance, and resistance to current have been accounted for as errors associated with modules 1 and 2. Therefore, e3Pr = 0 6.3.2.7 Input Signal Resistor Error e3SR e3SR = f (0.02% Span) (Section 4.4) = t 0.0002 90°F = t 0.018 °F e3SR =
t 0.018°F 6.3.2.8 Non-Random Input Error e31n e31n=Fe2=0 6.3.2.9 Total Non-Random Error Ee3 Ee3 = e3H + e3R + e3S + e3SP + e3P + e3Pr + e3SR + e3in =0+0+0+0+0+0+0

.018+0 Ee3 = 0.018 6.4

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION (TOTAL ERROR) 6.4.1 As discussed in Methodology Section 2.2, Level 2 methodology is applied for determining Total Error for this indication loop: TE TE CALCULATION PAGE In conclusion, the total uncertainty for the CW Inlet Temperature Indication loop is t 0.454°F 6.4.2 To obtain a more accurate value of the UHS temperature using these instruments, the average of the available values can be taken. This assumes that the four readings are sensing the same input temperature and that there is little effect between the input and the measurement point. _ T_ ITE-CW 010 + T ,TE-CW 0 t 1 + T 2TE-CW 010 + T 2TE-CW 01 1 T CWAvernge

= a3 + Ee3 = t (0.436°F)+ 0.018°F = t 0.454°F t 0.454°F CALCULATION NO. L-003230 Revision 000 PAGE NO. 14 of 14 The accuracy of this process is considered the same as the accuracy of summing networks addressed in References 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, or by the multiple test criterion of Reference

5.1.4 Section

3.2. In all of these cases the final random uncertainty (a) is the square root sum of the squares of the individual channel random uncertainties considering the multiplier for each of the uncertainties is one divided by the number of channels that are being averaged. The non-random uncertainty (e) will remain the same as for a single loop (Ref. 5.1.4, Section 3.2). CALCULATION PAGE 2 11 '1-+1 2 1+1 63 1 a+, , , +I Yn I n) fin) fin) ~n i If all of the Instrument loops are identical then this equation will reduce to: (TAverage

_ n V+e Thus for the CW temperatures, the accuracy of the average of the readings for two loops will be: Average 0436+e=0.308+0.018=0.326°F The accuracy of the average of the readings for three loops will be: Average =0~6+e=0.252+0.018=0.270°F ~ The accuracy of the average of the readings for four loops will be: CT Average lJ Average IVI I N C O A critical component of your success Item Descripti on j 1 Minco Part # ASSEMBLY Assembly Consisting Of l CGASSY `CH359P2T6 FG113-1 1 FG750F8M12 XS853PD157X4 L-003230 Rev. 0 Attachment A PAg e A I (final) 7300 Commerce Lane Minneapolis, MN 55432 U.S.A. Customer Service Telephone: 763-571-3123 Sales Inquiries Fax: 763-571-0927 Purchase Order Fax: 763-571-0942 E-Mail: custserv@minco.co m Please Reference Above Quote Number When Placing Your Order. Unit Price 162.60 I i I X = Class A sensor. i Single Element RTD assernbly___

_, . __-_p -- 2: Minco Part # XRT07 Test charge for a chart of temperature readings at. 1F intervals

___._from_-272F to 9 32F _Notes: -__ 1. These assemblies will replace the existing head that is on the thermowell. This is due to not knowing how long the replacement probe would need to be. The drawing does not provide all of this information to determine the proper length. Lead time for these parts is also relatively short as compared to a special probe. 2. 1. Probe length is 15.6". This is the necessary length of the probe to fit in the thermowell and fit into the connection head. 2. The probe diameter is .25", but will fit in the thermowell without any reduction in performance. 3. Drift specifications on the S852 sensor is listed as +/- .2 F per year, repeatability is also +/- .2 F. This specification assumes cycling throughout the full temperature range of the sensor, from - 50C to 260C. A smaller temperuture cycle will change the amount of drift. 425.00 QUOTATION To: Vikram Shah Quote No: 160056-2 Exelon Corporation Page: 1 LaSalle County Nuclear Station Date: January 26, 2006 2601 N 21st Marsailles Road RFQ: RTD Assemblies Marseilles IL 61341-9757 Phone: 815-415-3828 CC: Thermo/Cense, Inc. Fax: 942 Turret Court Mundelein, IL 60060 Fax Order to 763-571-0942 or Phone: 847-949-8070,8071 E-Mail Order to custserv@minco.co m Fax: 847-949-8074 WHEN ORDERING SPECIFY CASE LENGTH, NUMBER OF LEADS, AND LEAD 36 LEAD LENGTH B IN INCHES. Print Date: 07128/2006 10:12 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAMS 2-LEAD MODEL 3-LEAD MODEL 4-LEAD MODEL 1. ELEMENT: PLATINUM. 2. RESISTANCE

100.00 OHMS 1.06% (100.06/99.94) AT 0°C (32'F), EXCLUDING LEADWIAE RESISTANCE
RlT TABLES +Y5-100 (°C) AND +06-100 ('F). 3. RESISTANCE-TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT
.00385 OHMIOHMJ'C NOMINAL FROM 0°C TO 100°C. 4. TEMPERATURE RANGE: -80'C TO 260°C (-58°F TO SOOT). YELLOW (2) WHITE (2) w,~rEraw. uESCas~ M1NC0 !IG ~ MK USA nm~ax ~c - Hor ~=~ 10. THE RESISTANCE THERMOMETER WILL MEET THE RESISTANCE- S100995 TEMPERATURE RELATIONSHIP AND TOLERANCES SPECIFIED IN IEC 751, Rrv CGP Tranaferred 04/27/N WA8 CLASS A. 6- ~7_ r- NONE 1 5 2 7"' 8 SHEET 1 OF 1 onus - jES 11. ~ ," 5. INSULATION RESISTANCE
1000 MEGOHMS MINIMUM AT 500 VOLTS DC, LEADS TO CASE. YELLOW WHITE 'FELLOW WHITE (2) 6. LEADS: AWG #22, STRANDED, TFE INSULATED. © TOLERANCE ON LEAD LENGTH; ors OTHERWM ~ xRrw.s oW1e say xma rArrr/sroac W Tt ° [1803] AND UNDER: +21-0' (+511-Dj; ~~ oosphlorB ql [ ) ME H INIUACOM 09 WAS 13_ m~ 72" TO 119" (1629 TO 9023]: +4/-0' [+1021-D]; ONE rlyM .M :.oso (moaO iw wxc ~m) f.oso ao,2sl 120° (3048] AND OVER: +-6l-0" (+152/-0]. Two pure (m°) a.oos ~s~ PHP 04-27-99 RESISTANCE THERMOMETER
8. CASE: STAINLESS STEEL, COPPER ALLOY TIP. CASE MAY BE CUT TO SHORTER LENGTH. USE CARE NOT TO DAMAGE MiGLts: PROBE TYPE, TIP-SENSTTNE LEADWIRE INSULATION. LQCATE THE SLIP-FIT TFE SLEEVE IN ENO OF ruwu u: DLW 04- 27-99 S100995 SERIES CUT-OFF CASE TO PROTECT LF~OWIRE INSULATION AT POINT OF EMERGENCE. MINIMUM A FOR CUT-OFF CASE IS 28 (2.8') [71]. LENGTH. o~cRPlrow I DATE 1 -I 510099SPD48236 F EXAMPLE OF MODEL NUMBER -( S100995 SPECIFICATIONS DRAWING NUMBER PD SENSING ELEMENT: PD = 100 OHM +/-.06%, .00385 PLATINUM. Pi - 0'4 CD ~" r 48 CASE LENGTH A IN .1' INCREMENTS (48 = 4.8"). v MINIMUM A = 28 (2.8") (71) ; N! MAXIMUM A = 480 (48A') [1219]. ~ W C Z NUMBER Of LEADS: Y = 2 LEADS; Z = 3 LEADS; u X = 4 LEADS. C VanWyk, Thomas J. From: Keith Jensen [Keith.JenSen@rninco.corn] Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 9:22 AM To: Shah, Vikram R.

Subject:

Fwd: Exelon Corporation 100995. pdf >>> Keith Jensen 7/25/2006 3:50 Vikram Shah 815-415-3828 Exelon Corporation Marsailles IL vikram.shaheexelon.co m XS853PD157X4 RFQ 160056-2 The 5100995 probe meets the EN60751 Class A +/- 0.06% Q OC sensor accuracy requirements Minco estimates the drift per year over the range of 30F to 120F would be expected to be around 0.1F or less (PHP) The drawing is attached Keith Jensen 763-586-2908 Applications Engineer MINCO PRODUCTS INC. Minneapolis MN keith.jensenCaminco.co m 1-003230 Rev. 0 Attachment C Page C 1 (final)

N n O n C U rp N Bedienungsanleitung Operating instructions Notice utilisateurs ef¢ctarisai Auswerteelektronik fur Temperatursensoren Control monitor for temperature sensors Amplificateur pour sondes de temperature TR2432 Technical data Operating voltage [V]............................. 20 ... 30 DC 1) Current rating [mA] .......................... ............ 250 Short-circuit prot., reverse polarity prat. / overload prot., watchdog Voltage drop Cu]. .......................................... < 2 consumption

[mA] ................................ < 552) Constant current sensor [mA] ................. v 01 (Pt 1000 element) rent sensor [mA] . , . . ............... 2.0 (Pt 100 element) er-on delay time [s] .................................... 1.5 ponse time switching output [ms] ..................... : .... 130 alogue output (measuring range scaleable)

...... 4 ... 20 mA / 0... 10 V . load current output [,C2]. .......... (Uq - 10) x 50; 700 at Ue = 24 V load with voltage output [a] ........................... 2000 se time analogue output [ms] ................ , I .......... 384 itching output [°C/°F1............................ *0.3/*0.54 / alog output [°C/°F] ............................. +/- 0.31 :t 0.54 lay ['C/'F] ........................... +/- (0.3 / +/- 0.54 + Y., Digit) Won thing output [°C/"1 / .F] ................................ 0. 0.1 nalogue output [°C/°F] ......... I .......... I ........... 011 / 0.1 Display f'CrFj . .................................... . 0.1 /0.1 i?mperature drift [% of value of measuring range/10 KI ........... +/- 0. stainless steel {304515); EPDMfX (Santoprene)

PC (Macrolon)
Pocan; FPM (Viton) ting temperature

[OC] ............................. 25...+701 Storage temperature

[°C]. .............................. 40...+85 Protection

... ................................... IP 67, 111 ulation resistance (MD] ........................ > 100 (500 V DC) I Shock resistance

[g] .................... 50 (DIN / IEC 68-2-27, 11 ms) Vibration resistance

[g) ...... I ...... 20 (DIN / JEC 68-2-6, 10 - 2000 Hz) EMC EN 61000-4-2 ESD: .................................. 4/8 KV EN 61000-4-3 HF radiated: ............................... 10 V/m 61000-4-4 Burst: ..................................... 2 KV EN 61000-4-6 HF conducted: ............................... 10V to EN50178, SEM PEM, referring to UL see page 21 (Electrical connection). 2) 41 mA when the display is switched off; the values apply to the operating voltage = 24 V and unloaded outputs. L-003230 Rev, 0 Attachment D Page D2 (final) 29 ifm efector inc. 7 92 Springdale Drrve, Ex on, PA 14341 " 400-44I-3246 " Fax. 800-32°-0436 " ewtrn4.itrYI tCtiTr~Y.CJYrt July 26, 2006 Mr. Vikram Shah Exelon Corporation 2601 N 21 st Rd. Marseilles, Illinois 61341

Dear Vikram:

This letter is in response to your concern about the specifications of the ifm efector TR2432 temperature sensor. The following points should clarify the questions that you had: Please contact me if you have any further questions, or if you require any additional information. Best regards, " After production, 100% of the sensors are verified and tested to the specifications listed on our datasheet. " The analog accuracy specification of (+/- 0.54°F) already includes the analog resolution value of (0.1 °F), and is inclusive of any electronic component drift. " The temperature drift specification is the electronic drift that occurs for every 10°C change in temperature that occurs in the application. This drift is in addition to the accuracy specification. " There are no other environmental influences that will affect the accuracy specification. " These sensors have a warranty period of 2 years. Ameera Shah Product Support Engineer Fluid Sensors Team L-003230 Rev. 0 Attachment E Page E1 (final) .-71 '4 " ... rr'rri SPECIFICATIONS - OHMS Attachment F: Fluke 45 Accuracy Specifications OHMS Open Circuit Voltage 3.2 volts maximum on the 1000, 3000,30 MO, 100 MO, and 300 MO ranges, 1.5 volts maximum on all other ranges. Input Protection 500V do or rms ac on all ranges L-003230 Rev. 0 Attachment F Page F1 (final Resolution Typical Full Max Current Range Accuracy Full Scale Through the Slow Medium Fast Voltage Unknown 30001 --- 10 m0 100 M0 0.05% + 2 + 0.020 0.25 1 mA 3 1<0 --- 100 Mrl 10 0.05%+2 0.24 120 uA 30 kf1 - 10 loci 0.05%+2 0.29 14 uA 300 k0 - 100 1000 0.05%+2 0.29 1.5 uA 3 M0 - 10011 1 k0 0.06%+2 0.3 150 uA 30 Mfg - 1 k0 10 kO 0.25%+3 2.25 320 uA 300 MO* - 100 kit 1 M0 2% 2.9 320 jjA 10011 1 m0 - - 0.05% + 8 + 0.020 0.09 1 mA 10000 10 m0 - - 0.05% + 8 + 0.020 0.10 120 uA 10 kO 100 m0 - - 0.05% + 8 0.11 14 jjA 100 k0 10 - - 0.05%+8 0.11 1.5 jjA 1000 kO 1011 - - 0.06% + 8 0.12 150 uA 10 M0 1000 - - 0.25%+6 1.5 150 jjA 100 MO* 1001<0 - - 2%+2 2.75 3201jA Because of the method used to measure resistance, the 100 M0 (slow) and 300 MO (medium and fast) ranges cannot measure below 3.2 Wand 20 M0, respectively. "UL" is shown on the for resistances (underload) below these nominal display points, and the computer interface outputs "+1 E-9".

SDN TM Specifications (Single Phase) Power Supplies Visit our website at www.solahevAduty.co m or ~~L-003230 Rev. 0 Attachment G Page Gl (final) Input current ratings are conservatively, specified wish low input avow wee efficiency and power factor. At peak errant is cacWaled at 24 Volt levels. Losses are heat dissipation in welts at full load. nominal input line. ' FUN load, 100 VAC Input M T om b --25'C Ripple noise Is stated as typical values when measured with a 20 W2, bandwidth scope and 50 Ohm resalor. ' Not UL Listed for OC input. contact Technical Services at (800) 377-4384 with any questions. HE/I-011LITY If Catalog Number Description SDN 2.5-24-100P SDN 4-24-1 GOLF SDN 5-24-100P SON 10-24-100P SDN 20-24-1 GOP Input Nominal Voltage 115/230 VAC auto soled -AC Range 35-1321176-264 VAC -OC Range"90-375 VDC 210-375 VDC N/A -Frequency 47 - 63 Hz Nominal Current' 1.3 A./0.7A 2.1AII.OA 2.2A11.OA 5Al2Atyp. 9A13.9A -inrush current max, typ, , 26 A IYp. < 20 A typ. < 40 A Efficiency (Losses')

> 87.5% typ (8.6 W) > 889. typ (13.1 W) > 88% typ (18.4 W) > 88% Hp (327 W) > 90% typ (48 W) Power Factor Correction Units Fulfill EN61WO-3-2 output Nominal Votage 24 VDC (22.5 - 28.5 VDC at$.) 24 VDC (223 - 25,5 VDC ad/.) 24 VDC (22.5 -28.5 VOC adij -Tolerance

< t2% overali (combination lint, bad firm and temperature related changes) -Ripple' < 50 MVPP Nominal Current 2.5A(60W) 3.8A(92W) 5A(120W) 10A(240W) 20A(480W) -Peak CurmrV t.6x Nominal Current < 2 sec. 4.2 A mmf m 23.8V 6 A 2x Nominal Current < 2 sec. 12 A 2x Nominal Current < 2 sec. 25A 2x Nominal Current t 2 sec. -Current Limit Fold Forward (Current rtes, voltage drops to maintain constant power during overload up to max peak current) Holdup nine' > 50 ms > 100 ms > 100 ms > 20 ms Parallel Operation Single or Parallel use is selectable Aa From Panel Switch (SON4 should not be used in parallel as Class 2 rating would be violated.) General EMC: -Emlestons EN81000-6-3, 4; Claw B EN55011, E1455022 Radiated and Conducted including Annex A. -immunity EN51000-6-1, -2; EN610WA-2 Level 4, EN61000-4-3 Level 3; EN61000-4-6 Level 3; ENBIOD0-4-4 Level 4 input and Level 3 output ENOIODO-4-5 isolation Claw 4, EN810W-4-11

Transient resistance according to VDE 016002 over entire load range. Approvals EN60950; EN50178; EN8021M; UL508 Listed, d1Lus; UL60950, cRUus, CE (LVD 73723 6 931681EEC). EN81000-3-2, IFC60079-15 (Class 1, Zone 2, Hazardous Location, Groups A, B, C, 0 ad T3A temp class up to 60'C Ambient.) SEMI F47 Sag Immunity. SDN2.6 3 SDN4 - UL60950 testing to include approval as Class 2 power supply, Temperature Storage
-25oC_" 85 0 C Operation. -10e-60DC ftA power wit operation to 70 0 0 possible with a Ineer dwekg to half power from 60QC to 70 0 C (Correction coding, no forced air required). Operation lap to 50% load penrdssable with sideways o front side up mounting orientation. The relative humk&ty is < 90% RH, noncondenaing
IEC 68,2-2, 68-2-3. For operation below -10`C, contact Technical Services. YT13F
> 820,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> > 840,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> > 600,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> 510,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> - Standard eedcore Issue 6 Mettiod 1 Case 3 (4 40C MIL217F @ 30C Warranty 5 years General ProteenortISafHy Protected against continuous short-circuit, overload, open-cirmit. Protection class 1 (IEC536), degree of protection IP20 (IEC 529) Safe low voltage: SELV (a=EN609r50)

Status Indicators Green LED and DC OK signal (N.O. Solid State Contact rated 200 MA l 60 VDC) Installation Fusing 4nput Internally fused. External 10 A slow acting hiring for the input is recommended b protect input wiring. -outpul Outputs are capable of providing high curreds for short periods of time for inductive bad startup or switching. Fusing may be required for wireacads if 2x Nominal O/P ctrrerd rating cannot be tolerated. Continuous current overload allows for mliable fuse tripping. Mounting Simple snap-on system fix DIN Red TS3577.5 or 7335/15 or chassb-mounted (optional screw mounting set SON-PMORK2 required). Connections Input IP20-rated screw terminals, connector size range: 16-10 AWG (1.5-6 mm2) for solid conductors. 16-12 AWG (05-4 mm2) for flexible conductors. Output: Two connectors par output, connector size range: 16-10 AWG (1.5 - 6 mm2) for solid conductors. Case Fully andused metal housing with fine ventilation grid m keep out small parts. -Free Space 25 mm above and below. 25 mm left and right 10 mm in front 25 mm above and below, 25 mm left and right. 15 rrmn in front 70 ram above and below, 25 mm left and right, 15 mm in front H x W x D (Inchaslmm) 4.88 in. x 1.97 in. x 4.56 in. 4.88 in. x 2.68 in. x 4.55 in. (124 mm x 50 mm x 116 mm) (124 ran x 65 mm x ire mm) 4.88 in. x 3.26 in, x 4.55 in. (124 mm x 63 mar x 116 mm) 4.88 M. x 6.86 in. x 4.56 in. (124 mm x 175 mm x 116 mm) Weight ((bslg) l Ib (460g) 1.5lbs (8209) 2.2Itts (11 Cog) 3 tls (15209)

L-003230 Rev. 0 a436/32 8-Channel Isolated Low-Level Analog Input Card Attachment H Page Hl (final) 8436132 8-Channel Isolated Low-Level Analog Input Card The RTP8436/32 8-Channel Isolated Analog Input Card provides high accuracy low-level

(+/-160 mV) analog measurements. Sampling transformers provide channel-to-channel isolation. Very high noise immunity is characteristic of the transformer multiplexer, achieving 160 dB of common mode rejection. Immunity to noise is further enhanced with a two-pole low pass filter, set to provide 70 dB of normal mode rejection at 60 Hz. Analog to digital conversion is performed by a 16-bit switched capacitor successive approximation A/D converter. A precision voltage source provides a self-test function for the card's amplifiers and A/D converter. No field adjustments are necessary after the initial factory setup. Specifications Input Signal Range: +/- 160 mV Multiplexer Type: 8-channel solid state multiplexer with individual transformers for complete channel-to-channel isolation Sample Rate: 50 samples per second per channel Accuracy: 0.025% of Full Scale Temperature Ranges: -25° to +85°C (-13° to +185°F), storage 0° to +55°C (+32° to +131°F), standard operating

-20° to +60°C (-4° to +140°F), extended operating Note: Input measurements may not meet the accuracy specification at the upper or lower ends of the extended operating range. Isolation: 600 VAC RMS or 400 VDC 1500 VAC 0 60 Hz for 60 seconds withstand Common Mode Voltage: 600 VAC RMS or 400 VDC continuous Common Mode Rejection: -160 dB at 60 Hz (10012 unbalanced)

Common Mode Crosstalk: -150 dB at 60 Hz Normal Mode Rejection: 2-pole low-pass filter, -70 dB at 60 Hz Input Impedance: 5 M52 in parallel with 10 pF at 50 samples/second per channel Input Bias Current: 8 nA maximum at 50 samples/second per channel Input Source Impedance: 10052 maximum to meet accuracy specification

  • *
  • Report of Calibration for Platinum Resistance Thermometer Model S100995PD Serial No. P/N366 1-7 T ,:~- -Cw0// L-003230 Rev. 0 Attachment I Page 11 14 T("F) R(ohms) T('F) R(ohms) I T(°F) L-003230 Rev. Attachment I Pa e I2 (fmal) R(ohms) 0 1 T(O F) R(ohms) 100.0 114.692 105.0 115.762 110.0 116.832 115.0 117.901 100.1 114.713 105.1 115.784 110.1 116.854 115.1 117.922 100.2 114.735 105.2 115.805 110.2 116.875 115.2 117.944 100.3 114.756 105.3 115.827 110.3 116.896 115.3 117.965 100.4 114.777 105.4 115.848 110.4 116.918 115.4 117.986 100.5 114.799 105.5 115.869 110.5 116.939 115.5 118.OD8 100.6 114.820 105.6 115.891 110.6 116.961 115.6 118.029 100.7 114.842 105.7 115.912 110.7 116.982 115.7 118.051 100.8 114.863 105.8 115.934 110.8 117.003 115.8 118.072 100.9 114.884 105.9 115.955 110.9 117.025 115.9 118.093 101.0 114.906 106.0 115.976 111.0 117.046 116.0 118.115 101.1 114.927 106.1 115.998 111.1 117.067 116.1 118.136 101.2 114.949 106.2 116.019 111.2 117.089 116.2 118.157 101.3 114.970 106.3 116.041 111.3 117.110 116.3 118.179 101.4 114.992 106.4 116.062 111.4 117.132 116.4 118.200 101.5 115.013 106.5 116.083 111.5 117.153 116.5 118.221 101.6 115.034 106.6 116.105 111.6 117.174 116.6 118.243 101.7 115.056 106.7 116.126 111.7 117.196 116.7 118.264 101.8 115.077 106.8 116.148 111.8 117.217 116.8 118.286 101.9 115.099 106.9 116.169 111.9 117.238 116.9 118.307 102.0 115.120 107.0 116.190 112.0 117.260 117.0 118.328 102.1 115.142 107.1 116.212 112.1 117.281 117.1 118.350 102.2 115.163 107.2 116.233 112.2 117.303 117.2 118.371 102.3 115.184 107.3 116.255 112.3 117.324 117.3 118.392 102.4 115.206 107.4 116.276 112.4 117.345 117.4 118.414 102.5 115.227 107.5 116.297 112.5 117.367 117.5 118.435 102.6 115.249 107.6 116.319 112.6 117.388 117.6 118.456 102.7 115.270 107.7 116.340 112.7 117.410 117.7 118.478 102.8 115.291 107.8 116.362 112.8 117.431 117.8 118.499 102.9 115.313 107.9 116.383 112.9 117.452 117.9 118.520 103.0 115.334 108.0 116.404 113.0 117.474 118.0 1.18.542 103.1 115.356 108.1 116.426 113.1 117.495 118.1 118.563 103.2 115.377 108.2 116.447 113.2 117.516 118.2 118.585 103.3 115.399 108.3 116.469 113.3 117.538 118.3 118.606 103.4 115.420 108.4 116.490 113.4 117.559 118.4 118.627 103.5 115.441 108.5 116.511 113.5 117.580 118.5 118.649 103.6 115.463 108.6 116.533 113.6 117.602 118.6 118.670 103.7 115.484 108.7 116.554 113.7 117.623 118.7 118.691 103.8 115.506 108.8 116.576 113.8 117.645 118.8 118.713 103.9 115.527 108.9 116.597 113.9 117.666 118.9 118.734 104.0 115.548 109.0 116.618 114.0 117.687 119.0 118.755 104.1 115.570 109.1 116.640 114.1 117.709 119.1 118.777 104.2 115.591 109.2 116.661 114.2 117.730 119.2 118.798 104.3 115.613 109.3 116.683 114.3 117.751 119.3 118.819 104.4 115.634 109.4 116.704 114.4 117.773 119.4 118.841 104.5 115.655 109.5 116.725 114.5 117.794 119.5 118.862 104.6 115.677 109.6 116.747 114.6 117.816 119.6 118.883 104.7 115.698 109.7 116.768 114.7 117.837 119.7 118.905 104.8 115.720 109.8 116.789 114.8 117.858 119.8 118.926 104.9 115.741 109.9 116.811 114.9 117.880 119.9 118.947 105.0 115.762 110.0 116.832 115.0 117.901 120.0 118.969 i DC Characteristics Transfer Accuracy ( typical ) Chapter 8 Specifications DC Characteristics i 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> °o of range error) Conditions
2 " Within 10 minutes and = 0.5°C. " Within =10°,0 of initial value. " Following a 2-hour warm-up. " Fixed range between 10% and 100% of full scale. " Using 6 1 ,2 digit slow resolution ( 100 PLC ). " Measurements are made using accepted metrology practices. Attachment J: HP 34401 A Accuracy Specifications Accuracy Specifications

+/- ( % of reading +% of range ) [ 1 ] L-003230 Rev. 0 Attachment J Page Jl (final) Temperature Test Current or 24 Hour 121 90 Day 1 Year Coefficient f°C Function Range ( 3 ] Burden Voftsge 23°C f I 'C 23°C +/- 5'C 23°C +/- 5°C 0°C -18°C 28' C - 55°C DC Voltage 100. 0000 mV 0.0030 + 0.0030 0.0040 + 0.0035 + 0.0035 0.0005 + 0.0005 1.000000 V 0.0020 + 0.0006 0.0030 + 0.0007 10.0050 0.0040 + 0.0007 0.0005 + 0.0001 10.00000 V i 0.0015 + 0.0004 0.0020 + 0.0005 0.0035 + 0.0005 0.0005 + 0.0001 100.0000 V 0.0020 + 0.0006 0.0035 + 0.0006 0.0045 + 0.0006 0.0005 + 0.0001 1000. 000 V ( 0.0020 + 0.0006 0.0035 + 0.0010 0.0045 + 0.0010 0.0005 + 0.0001 Resistance 100.00000 1 mA 0.0030 + 0.0030 0.008 + 0.004 0.010 + 0.004 0.0008 + 0.0005 [4] 1 000000 kn 1 mA 0.0020 + 0.0005 0.008 + 0.001 0.010 + 0.001 0.0006 + 0.0001 10.00000 ko 100 N A 0.0020 + 0.0005 0.008 + 0.001 0.010 + 0.001 0.0006 + 0.0001 100. 0000 ka 10 p A 0.0020 + 0.0005 0.008 + 0.001 0.010 + 0.001 0.0006 + 0.0001 1.000000 Mil 5 N A 0.002 + 0.001 0.008 + 0.001 0.010 + 0.001 0.0010 + 0.0002 10.000OO Ma 500 nA 0.015 + 0.001 0.020 + 0.001 0.040 + 0.001 0.0030 + 0.0O04 100.0000 Mrl 500 nA 1110 Ma 0.300 + 0.010 0.800 + 0.010 0.800 + 0.010 0.1500 + 0.0002 DC Current 10.00000 MA <0.1 V 0.005 + 0.010 0.030 + 0.020 0.050 + 0.020 0.002 + 0.0020 100.0000 mA < 0.6 V 0.01+0.004 0.030 + 0.005 0.050 + 0.005 0.002 + 0.0005 1.000000 A < 1 V 0.05+0.006 0.080 + 0.010 0.100 + 0.010 0.005 + 0.0010 3.000000 A < 2 V 0,10+0.020 0.120 + 0.020 0.120 + 0.020 0.005 + 0.0020 Continuity 1000.00 1 mA 0.002 + 0.010 0.008 + 0.020 0.010 + 0.020 0.001 + 0.002 Diode Test 1.0000 V 1 mA 0.002 + 0.010 0.008 + 0.020 0.010 + 0.020 0.001 + 0.002 DC:DC Ratio 100 mV ( Input Accuracy)

+ ( Reference Accuracy ] to 1000 V Input Accuracy=

accuracy specification for the HI-LO input signal. Reference Accuracy=

accuracy specification for the HI-LO reference input signal.

ATTACHMENT 3 LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 Simple schematic of the CW system ATTACHMENT 3 Simplified Circulating Water System CIISCS G.w)g Water Screen eyposs Supply brr& /A both grits Gwc Omber C(7.2 Ini--chion ffE12-F3OO Travsifrq Sciamem Fish Shocker c4rculati 1 11vate'r dumps an denser 9 R F Do Memo" eRs cut I Circ Water 1117"1 frrTrT11 7 111 1 10V OR Turbine BuRding-" Unit I Intake Flume Dic r-harge Fh line E3-fqzlocvmoe Unit 2 Cirqvvater ATTACHMENT 4 LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Page Change REVISED TS PAGE 3.7.3-2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS UHS 3.7.3 LaSalle 1 and 2 3.7.3-2 Amendment No. 1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify cooling water temperature supplied 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the plant from the CSCS pond is 5 le6'F. SR 3.7.3.2 Verify sediment level is 5 1.5 ft in the 24 months intake flume and the CSCS pond. SR 3.7.3.3 Verify CSCS pond bottom elevation is 24 months 5 686.5 ft.

ATTACHMENT 5 LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 Typed Page for Technical Specifications Change REVISED TS PAGE 3.7.3-2 SUR VEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS LaSalle 1 and 2 3.7.3-2 Amendment No. / UHS 3.7.3 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Verify cooling water temperature supplied 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the plant from the CSCS pond is < 101.5°F. SR 3.7.3.2 Verify sediment level is s 1.5 ft in the 24 months intake flume and the CSCS pond. SR 3.7.3.3 Verify CSCS pond bottom elevation is 24 months s 686.5 ft.

ATTACHMENT 6 LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 Typed Pages of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Page Changes REVISED TS BASES PAGES B 3.7.3-2 to B 3.7.3-5 BASES APPLICABLE The UHS post-accident temperature is based on heat removal SAFETY ANALYSES calculations (Ref. 5) that analyze for a maximum allowable (continued) post accident inlet cooling water temperature of 104°F. To account for the worst-case scenario and to apply conservatism, the post accident CSCS pond cooling water inlet temperature of 104°F consists of the CSCS pond TS temperature maximum of 101.5°F plus 2°F for transient heat up plus 0.5°F to account for instrument uncertainty (Ref. 6). There are four temperature measuring devices located in the Circulating Water inlet thermowells (i.e., two per unit). The 0.5°F allowance bounds the instrument uncertainty associated with any combination of operable temperature measurement devices. The UHS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). LCO OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on a maximum water temperature being supplied to the plant of 101.5°F and a minimum pond water level at or above elevation 690 ft mean sea level. In addition, to ensure the volume of water available in the CSCS pond is sufficient to maintain adequate long term cooling, sediment deposition (in the intake flume and in the pond) must be <_ 1.5 ft and CSCS pond bottom elevation must be < 686.5 ft. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the UHS is required to be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the UHS, and is required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the UHS are determined by the systems it supports. Therefore, the requirements are not the same for all facets of operation in MODES 4 and 5. The LCOs of the systems supported by the UHS will govern UHS OPERABILITY requirements in MODES 4 and 5. LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.7.3-2 Revision UHS B 3.7.3 (continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A 1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS UHS B 3.7.3 If the CSCS pond is inoperable, due to sediment deposition

> 1.5 ft (in the intake flume, CSCS pond, or both) or the pond bottom elevation

> 686.5 ft, action must be taken to restore the inoperable UHS to an OPERABLE status within 90 days. The 90 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of an accident occurring during that time, historical data corroborating the low probability of continued degradation (i.e., further excessive sediment deposition or pond bottom elevation changes) of the CSCS pond during that time, and the time required to complete the Required Action. B-1 and B,2 If the CSCS pond cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or the CSCS pond is determined inoperable for reasons other than Condition A (e.g., inoperable due to the temperature of the cooling water supplied to the plant from the CSCS, pond > 101.5°F, corrected for sediment level and time of day), the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. Verification of the temperature of the water supplied to the plant from the CSCS pond ensures that the heat removal capabilities of the RHRSW System and DGCW System are within the assumptions of the DBA analysis. To ensure that the maximum post-accident temperature of water supplied to the plant is not exceeded (i.e., 104°F determined in Ref. 4), the temperature during normal plant operation must be _< 101.5°F (Ref. 3). This is to account for the CSCS pond design requirement that it provide adequate cooling water supply to the plant (i.e., temperature

<_ 104°F) for 30 days (continued)

LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.7.3-3 Revision BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.3.2 S R 3-7-3.3 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.7.3-4 Revision UHS B 3.7.3 without makeup, while taking into account solar heat loads and plant decay heat during the worst historical weather conditions. In addition, since the lake temperature follows a diurnal cycle (it heats up during the day and cools off at night), the allowable initial UHS temperature varies with the time of day. The allowable initial UHS temperatures, based on the actual sediment level and the time of day have been determined by analysis (Ref. 5). The limiting initial UHS temperature of 102.3°F determined in this analysis ensures the maximum post-accident temperature of 104°F is not exceeded. These temperatures are analytical limits that do not include instrument uncertainty or additional margin. For example, if the lake temperature uncertainty and additional margin are determined to be 0.5°F, the limiting initial UHS temperature becomes 101.8°F. This limiting initial temperature remains bounded by the SR 3.7.3.1 limit of <_ 101.5°F. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES. This SR ensures adequate long term (30 days) cooling can be maintained, by verifying the sediment level in the intake flume and the CSCS pond is <_ 1.5 feet. Sediment level is determined by a series of sounding cross-sections compared to as-built soundings. The 24 month Frequency is based on historical data and engineering judgment regarding sediment deposition rate. This SR ensures adequate long term (30 days) cooling can be maintained, by verifying the CSCS pond bottom elevation is <_ 686.5 feet. The 24-month Frequency is based on historical data and engineering judgment regarding pond bottom elevation changes. (continued)

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1.27, Revision 2, January 1976. 2. UFSAR, Section 9.2.1. 3. UFSAR, Section 9.2.6. 4. EC 334017, Rev. 0, "Increased Cooling Water Temperature Evaluation to a New Maximum Allowable of 104°F." 5. L-002457, Rev. 5, "LaSalle County Station Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis." 6. L-003230, Rev. 0, "CW Inlet Temperature Uncertainty Analysis." LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.7.3-5 Revision UHS B 3.7.3