Disabling of Diesel Generator Output Circuit Breakers by Anti-Pump CircuitryML031150110 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
09/16/1988 |
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From: |
Rossi C E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-88-075, NUDOCS 8809120197 |
Download: ML031150110 (8) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
I UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September
16, 1988 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE NO. 88-75: DISABLING
OF DIESEL GENERATOR
OUTPUT CIRCUIT BREAKERS BY ANTI-PUMP
CIRCUITRY
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
- This information
notice is being provided to alert addressees
to potential problems where the capability
to either automatically
or manually close diesel generator
circuit breakers from the control room may be lost. It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice do not constitute
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
of Circumstances:
On June 5, 1988, operators
at Browns Ferry Unit 3 were unable to reclose the diesel generator
output breakers to the 4-kV shutdown boards from the control room during a loss-of-power/loss-of-coolant-accident (LOP/LOCA)
test. During the test, the output breakers connected
the diesel generators
to their respec-tive 4-kV shutdown boards after the LOP signal was generated;
however, the breakers tripped and remained open after receiving
the LOCA signal. Operators diagnosed
the output breaker lockout problem using system electrical
configu-ration drawings.
An operator was sent to the 4-kY shutdown board to manually transfer output breaker control power to its alternate
source. This momentarily
removed power, enabling the breaker to close when the power was restored.On October 14, 1987, an operator at Wolf Creek Generating
Station manually tripped the output circuit breaker of the emergency
diesel generator (EDG)from the control room. At the time, the EDG was supplying
a vital bus. When the operators
tried to reenergize
the vital bus from the still-operating
EDG, they found that they could not close the EDG output breaker from the control room. The vital bus was finally reenergized
from the offsite power supply.Through examination
of the breaker control schematics
the licensee later found that the EDG circuit breaker could be closed by cycling the EDG mode switch at the EDG local control station.880920197 IN 88-75 September
16, 1988 Discussion:
The anti-pump
circuit configuration
will protect large breakers from rapid cycling and, under certain circumstances, will prevent breaker closure. At Browns Ferry Unit 3, a unique sequence of events, a LOP signal followed within 6 seconds by a LOCA signal, led to the discovery
of a design deficiency
of this circuit configuration.
Contacts from the undervoltage
relay will seal in the breaker anti-pump
relay until the undervoltage
condition
on the 4-kV boards clears.The circuit is designed such that following
a LOP, the undervoltage
condition must exist for at least 5 seconds and the diesel. must reach rated speed before the diesel generator
output breaker will close on the bus. Once the breaker has closed, the closure spring recharge motor and the breaker anti-pump
relay will be energized.
A fully discharged
closure spring requires 2 seconds for the spring to be fully recharged.
During this 2 second window the anti-pump coil will remain energized
via contacts sensing spring position, and if an undervoltage
condition
exists on the 4-kY bus it will seal in and lock open the breaker.During the Browns Ferry event, the EDG output breaker closed 5 seconds after the LOP signal, the undervoltage
condition
was eliminated, and the undervoltage
relay began its 5 second cycle to reset from the undervoltage
condition.
About 1.5 seconds 1ater. the. LOCA-signaL-retr-ipped-the-breaker-and-created-another--
undervoltage
condition
on the 4-kV bus. At this point, because the undervoltage
relay had not completed
its reset cycle, the undervoltage
relay remained in its undervoltage
state. Therefore, the undervoltage
relay sealed in the still-energized
anti-pump
relay because the undervoltage
condition
occurred before the breaker charging spring was fully charged. Thus, the breaker could not be closed from the control room either manually or automatically
until control power was removed, which deenergized
the anti-pump
relay.The Browns Ferry licensee modified the breaker control logic to prevent the anti-pump relay from sealing in during a LOCA condition
by adding a time-delay
relay in the breaker trip coil circuitry.
This relay will be energized
by a LOCA signal and its contact in the anti-pump
coil seal-in path will open after a 2-to 5-second delay to prevent anti-pump
coil seal-in and breaker lockout.The Wolf Creek EDG output circuit breaker has automatic
closing logic to close the circuit breaker when the following
five permissives
are satisfied:
(1) Both offsite circuit breakers are open'(2 The EDG mode switch is in the automatic
mode.(3 Lockout relays are deenergized.
(4 A 3-second time delay has elapsed.(5) The EDG has reached operating
speed and voltage.This logic sends a constant close signal to the circuit breaker that keeps the breaker's
internal anti-pump
relay energized
as long as the logic permissives
are satisfied.
The anti-pump
relay prevents the circuit breaker from cycling if attempts are made to hold the breaker closed against a valid trip signal.I',
IN 88-75 September
16, 1988 When the Wolf Creek operator manually tripped the EDG output breaker, the auto-matic closing logic permissives
remained satisfied.
Therefore, the anti-pump relay remained energized, preventing
reclosure
of the circuit breaker. Cycling the EDG mode control switch at the local control station allowed the circuit breaker to reclose by momentarily
interrupting
the automatic
close signal, there-by resetting
the anti-pump
logic. When the mode switch contact was reclosed by returning
the switch to the "auto' position, the circuit breaker's
automatic closing logic closed the breaker.The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in the control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from the control room. This switch was originally
intended only as a means of paralleling
the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification, the switch can be used to reset the anti-pump
logic and allow the automatic
circuit to re-close the breaker. The modification
added a contact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" and "pull to lock" positions
of the control switch.When operators
manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to interrupt
the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pump
relay. If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open, he must put the switch in the "pull to lock" position.
Returning
the switch to the "normal" position completes
the automatic
close circuit and the breaker recloses.It should be noted that although the above discussion
has dealt only with EDG output- circuit breakers, anti-pump
circuit problems could also apply to other breakers that use automatic
closing logic, such as load-sequencing
breakers and offsite supply breakers to the emergency
buses.The information
herein is being provided as an early notification
of a potentially
significant
matter that is still under consideration
by the NRC staff. If NRC evaluation
so indicates, specific licensee actions may be requested.
No specific action or written response is required by this information
notice.If you have any questions
about this matter, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate
regional office.Di rector Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contacts:
James Lazevnick, NRR (301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten, NRR (301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows, NRR (301) 492-0783 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
Att"aant IN 88-75 September
16, 1988 Page I of I LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Notice No. Subject Issuance 88-74 Potentially
Inadequate
9/14/88 Perfornance
of ECCS in PWRs During Recirculation
Operation
Following
a LOCA 88-73 Direction-Dependent
Leak 9/8/88 Characteristics
of Containment
Purge Valves 88-72 Inadequacies
in the Design 9/2/88 of dc Motor-Operated
Valves 88-71 Possible Environmental
9/1/88 Effect of the Reentry of COSMOS 1900 and Request for Collection
of Licensee Radioactivity
Measurements
Attributed
to That Event 88-70 Check Valve Inservice
8/29/88 Testing Program Deficiencies
88-69 Movable Contact Finger 8/19/88 Binding in HFA Relays Manufactured
by General Electric (GE)88-48, Licensee Report of Defective
8/24/88 Supplement
I Refurbished
Valves 88-68 Setpoint Testing of Pres- 8/22/88 surizer Safety Valves with Filled Loop Seals Using Hydraulic
Assist Devices 88P67- -P-F Zfiiairy Fiedeaer Pump 8/Z2j88 Turbine Overspeed
Trip Failure OL
License CP
Permit Issued to All holders of OLs or CPs for W and 8&W-designei
nuclear power reactors.All holders of 0Ls or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors, fuel cycle licensees, and Priority I material licensees.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors._UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300 FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE & FEES PAID USNRC PERMIT No. 0-57 IN 88-75 September
16, 1988 When the Wolf Creek operator manually tripped the EDG output breaker, the auto-matic closing logic permissives
remained satisfied.
Therefore, the anti-pump relay remained energized, preventing
reclosure
of the circuit breaker. Cycling the EDG mode control switch at the local control station allowed the circuit breaker to reclose by momentarily
interrupting
the automatic
close signal, there-by resetting
the anti-pump
logic. When the mode switch contact was reclosed by returning
the switch to the "auto" position, the circuit breaker's
automatic closing logic closed the breaker.The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in the control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from the control room. This switch was originally
intended only as a means of paralleling
the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification, the switch can be used to reset the anti-pump
logic and allow the automatic
circuit to re-close the breaker. The modification
added a contact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" and "pull to lock" positions
of the control switch.When operators
manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to interrupt
the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pump
relay. If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open, he must put the switch in the "pull to lock" position.
Returning
the switch to the "normal" position completes
the automatic
close circuit and the breaker recloses.It should be noted that although the above discussion
has dealt only with EDG output circuit breakers, anti-pump
circuit problems could also apply to other breakers that use automatic
closing logic, such as load-sequencing
breakers and offsite supply breakers to the emergency
buses.The information
herein is being provided as an early notification
of a potentially
significant
matter that is still under consideration
by the NRC staff. If NRC evaluation
so indicates, specific licensee actions may be requested.
No specific action or written response is required by this information
notice.If you have any questions
about this matter, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate
regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contacts:
James Lazevnick, NRR (301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten, NRR (301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows, NRR (301) 492-0783 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
OFC *OEAB *Tech Ed *SL:OEAB *C:OEAB *D:DEST *C:OGCB NAME CSchulten
BCalure PBaranowsky
WLanning LShao CBerlinger
e l DATE 9/7/88 7/28/88 9/7/88 9/7/88 8/24/88 9/8/88 9/(,f 88 IN 88-September , 1988 contact was reclosed by returning
the switch to the "auto" position.
the circuit breaker's
automatic
closing logic closed the breaker.The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in the control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from the control room. This switch was originally
intended only as a means of paralleling
the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification.
the switch can be used to reset the anti-pump
logic and allow the automatic
circuit to reclose the breaker. The modification
added a contact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" and"pull to lock" positions
of the control switch. When operators
manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch. the contacts open to interrupt
the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pump
relay.If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open. he must put the switch in the"pull to lock" position.
Returning
the switch to the "normal" position completes
the automatic
close circuit and the breaker recloses.It should be noted that although the above discussion
has dealt only with EDG output circuit breakers.
the anti-pump
circuit problem could also apply to other breakers that use automatic
closing logic, such as load-sequencing
breakers and offsite supply breakers to the emergency
buses.The information
herein is being provided as an early notification
of a potentially
significant
matter that is still under consideration
by the NRC staff. If NRC evaluation
so indicates.
specific licensee actions may be requested.
No specific action or written response is required by this information
notice. If you have any questions
about this matter, please contact any of the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate
regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contacts:
James Lazevnick.
NRR (301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten.
NRR (301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows. NRR (301) 492-0783-e --- --:D: -NAME :CSchu Mn are :P aranowsky
- WLan n :LShao :CBeri nger :ERossi DATE q 88 /8 :1/88 /88 :18188 /88 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 88-August .1988 contact was reclosed by returning
the switch to the "auto" position.
the circuit breaker's
automatic
closing logic closed the breaker.The Wolf Creek licensee modified the EDG breaker control switch located in the control room to enable the operator to reclose the EDG circuit breaker from the control room. This switch was originally
intended only as a means of paralleling
the EDG with the offsite power supply. With the current modification.
the switch can be used to reset the anti-pumping
logic and allow the automatic
circuit to reclose the breaker. The modification
added a contact that is closed in the "normal" position and open in the "trip" and"pull to lock" positions
of the control switch. When operators
manually trip the EDG circuit breaker from this control switch, the contacts open to interrupt
the close circuit and reset the circuit breaker anti-pumping
relay.If the operator wishes to keep the breaker open. he must put the switch in the"pull to lock" position.
Returning
the switch to the "normal" position completes
the automatic
close circuit and the breaker recloses.It should be noted that although the above discussion
has dealt only with EDG output circuit breakers, the same problem could also apply to other breakers that use automatic
closing logic, such as load-sequencing
breakers and offsite supply breakers to the emergency
buses.The information
herein is being provided as an early notification
of a potentially
significant
matter that is still under consideration
by the NRC staff. If NRC evaluation
so indicates.
specific licensee actions may be requested.
No specific action or written responses
is required by this information
notice. If you have any questions
about this matter, please contact either the technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate
regional office.Charles E. Rossi. Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
Contact: James Lazevnick.
NRR (301) 492-0814 Carl Schulten.
NRR (301) 492-1192 Fred Burrows. NRR (301) 492-0783 OFC _: T EOGCB :D:DOEA t "4i> -:-8{tjA---:-4og-yF---:---4-----------------
- -----------
NAME :CSchulten
- B& lure :PB pnowsky :WLanni:LS
- CBerlinger
- ERossi DATE 1&/ : //88 F./ A1/88 1.V 1.8 8 4f8 8 8 DAT O F:I g/ECORD : / /88COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
NRC INFO NOTICE 88-XX. DIESEL GENERATOR
CIRCUIT BREAKERS FAIL TO AUTOMATICALLY
CLOSE OFC :OEAB :Te h Ed :SL:OEAB :C:OEAb :L:SELB :C:OGCB :D:DUEA NAME :CSchulten
lure :PBaranowsky
- WLanning
- FRosa :CBerlinger
- ERossl DATE : / 88 /88 : I /88 / /88 : / /88 : / /88 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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list | - Information Notice 1988-01, Safety Injection Pipe Failure (27 January 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-03, Cracks in Shroud Support Access Hole Cover Welds (2 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals (5 February 1988, Topic: Fire Barrier, Fire Watch, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-05, Fire in Annunciator Control Cabinets (12 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-06, Foreign Objects in Steam Generators (29 February 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-07, Inadvertent Transfer of Licensed Material to Uncontrolled Locations (7 March 1988, Topic: Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-08, Chemical Reactions with Radioactive Waste Solification Agents (14 March 1988, Topic: Process Control Program, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1988-09, Reduced Reliability of Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Caused by Instability of Woodward PG-PL Type Governors (18 March 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 FR 43950, October 31, 1988) (23 December 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memo of Understanding Between NRC and OSHA Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988) (23 December 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-10, Memorandum of Understanding Between NRC and Osha Relating to NRC-Licensed Facilities (53 Fr 43950, October 31, 1988. (23 December 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-11, Potential Loss of Motor Control Center And/Or Switchboard Function Due to Faulty Tie Bolts (7 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-12, Overgreasing of Electric Motor Bearings (12 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-13, Water Hammer & Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-14, Potential Problems with Electrical Relays (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-15, Availability of Us Food & Drug Administration (Fda) Approved Potassium Iodide for Use in Emergencies Involving Radioactive Iodine (18 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-16, Identify Waste Generators in Shipments of Low-Level Waste to Land Disposal Facilities (22 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-17, Summary of Responses to NRC Bulletin 87-01, Thinning of Pipe Walls in Nuclear Power Plants. (22 April 1988, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Weld Overlay, Through-Wall Leak)
- Information Notice 1988-18, Malfunction of Lockbox on Radiography Device (25 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class Ie Components (26 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-19, Questionable Certification of Class IE Components (26 April 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-20, Unauthorized Individuals Manipulating Controls and Performing Control Room Activities (5 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-21, Inadvertent Criticality Events at Oskarshamn and at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (9 May 1988, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1988-22, Disposal of Sludge from Onsite Sewage Treatment Facilities at Nuclear Power Stations (12 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-23, Potential for Gas Binding of High-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps During a Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (12 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-24, Failures of Air-Operated Valves Affecting Safety-Related Systems (13 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-25, Minimum Edge Distance for Expansion Anchor Bolts (16 May 1988, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1988-26, Falsified Pre-Employment Screening Records (16 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-27, Deficient Electrical Terminations Identified in Safety-Related Components (18 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-28, Potential for Loss of Post-Loca Recirculation Capability Due to Insulation Debris Blockage (19 May 1988, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1988-29, Deficiencies in Primary Containment Low-Voltage Electrical Penetration Assemblies (24 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-30, Target Rock Two-State SRV Setpoint Drift Update (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-31, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Deficiency (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-32, Prompt Reporting to NRC of Significant Incidents Involving Radioactive Material (25 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-33, Recent Problems Involving the Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (27 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-34, Nuclear Material Control & Accountability of Non-Fuel Special Nuclear Material at Power Reactors (31 May 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-36, Possible Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant Level Operation (8 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-37, Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components (14 June 1988, Topic: Ultimate heat sink)
- Information Notice 1988-38, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment of General Electric Circuit Breakers (15 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-39, Loss of Recirculation Pumps with Power Oscillation Event (15 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-40, Examiners' Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Examinations (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs) (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-41, Physical Protection Weaknesses Identified Through Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (Rers) (22 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-42, Circuit Breaker Failures Due to Loose Charging Spring Motor Mounting Bolts (23 June 1988, Topic: Loctite)
- Information Notice 1988-43, Solenoid Valve Problems (23 June 1988, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1988-44, Mechanical Binding of Spring Release Device in Westinghouse Type DS-416 Circuit Breakers (24 June 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-45, Problems in Protective Relay & Circuit Breaker Coordination (7 July 1988, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1988-46, Licensee Report of Defective Refurbished Circuit Breakers (8 July 1988)
- Information Notice 1988-47, Slower-than-Expected Rod-drop Times (14 July 1988)
... further results |
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