ML17332A780

Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Relocation of Tables of Instrument Response Time Limits to UFSAR

ML17332A780
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/26/1995
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17332A781	List: ML17332A780 ML17334B546
References
NUDOCS 9506060454
Download: ML17332A780 (77)

Text

ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:1210 EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES MARKED TO REFLECT PROPOSED CHANGES 9506060454 950526 PDR ADOCK 050003'i5 P PDR

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~~3 4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

~34.3.I RRACZOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMiTINQ CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE~"~="-9~

APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.ACTION:.As shown in Table 3.3-1.SURVEILZANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days.The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at le~st once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the"Total No.of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.W~,'f p S4~~+p~f E<b~Ip~Pg spo<ac.o~I" I<~L ())i Ea I 3)Iic I, I JPCP S JC j(v S../P>I COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NO.)gg,ggg.3144 4a TABLE 3.3 2-SMWI~S l.Manual eactor Trip 2.Power Range, Neutron Flux (High and Low Secpoint)3.Power Range, ,eucron Flux, Hi.gh,Positive Rate 4.Power'ange, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate 5.Incermediate Range, eutron Flux 6.Source Range, Neutzon Flux ss than or equal co 0,5 seconds+NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE RESPONSE TIME/NOT APPLICAB~g i.~.(Less th or equal to 0,5 seconds+.NOT APPLICABLE 7.Qvertemperatuze delta T Less chan or equal to 6.0 seconds*8.Ovezpovez delta T Less than or equal to 6.0 seconds+9.Pressurizer Pressure--Lov Less than or equal co l.0.seconds lO.Pressurizer Pressure--High Less than or equal to 1.0 seconds 11.Pressurizer Mater Level--High Less than or equal to 2.0 seconds*euczon dececcors are exempt fzom response time testing.Response time of the neutron flux signal porcion of che channel shall be measured from dececcor oucput or inpuc of first elecczonic componenc in channel.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 3P 3-10 eummrr No.98, XZH, X~158 TABLE 3.3-2 Continued-P~GR-'Rep~gTKH-HF~%W~Y;RC g.S)e.12.Loss of low-Single Loop~(g J (Above P-/r RESPONSE TIME Less than or equal to 1.0 seconds 13.Loss of Flow-Two Loops (Above P-7 and.low.;P-8) 14.Steam Generator Wat r Level--Low-Low ess than or equal to 1,0 seconds Less than or equal to 1.5 seconds 15.Steam/Feedwater Flow Mi match and Low St am Generator Water Level NOT APPLICABLE 16.Undervoltage-Reactor Coolan Pumps Less than or equal to 1.2 seconds 17.l:nderfrequency-Reactor Co'olant ps Less than or equal to 0'seconds 18.Turbine Trip P A.Low Fluid Oil Pres re B.Turbine Stop Valv 19.Safety Inj ection nput from ESF 20.Reactor Coola e Pump Breaker Position Trip NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE COOK NUCLEAR PIANT-'UNIT 1 3/4 3-11.rt ,.'IW//I MJZ'MENDMENT NO..XkS,.158~-~r INSTRUMENTATION 3 4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown jn the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4;end-with-RZSPQNS~

~~dixl~>~J~APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3-3.ACTEON: ah With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint les's conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Tabl'e 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable.

ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint ad]usted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.b.With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3."SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test.The total interlock function shalL be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once,per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operatiod.

4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.Each test shall include at least one logic train such that bath logic trains are tested at'least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the"Total No.of Channels" Column'f Table 3'~3'OOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 3/4 3-15 AMENDMENT NO.igg, iP.i, iN,~53 TABLE 3.3 5 IN IATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION 1.Nannal a.RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS r e (,w)z Eaty Xn)ccthon (ECCS)ca.I~~f Not hpplicabl~Fe ater Isolation Not hppli'cable Reac or Trip (SI)Not hpplicable Conta ent Isolation-Phase h"..Not Applicable Contai ent Purge and Exhaust Isolation Not hpplicable huxi lie Feedvater Pumps Not hpplicable Essential rvice Vater System Not Applicable f b.Containment S ay Containment Iso tion-Phase"B" Containment Purge and Exhause.Isolation Containmcnt hir Re rculation Fan c.Containmcnt Isolation-Pase"hg Containment Purge and aust~Isolation Not hpplicable Not hpplicable Not hpplicable Not Applicable Not hpplicable Not Applicable d.Steam Line Isolation Not hpplicable 2.Containment PressureoHi a.b.Ca d.'e.g Safety Injection (CCS)Reactor Trip (from SI)Feedvater Iso aeion Containment solation-Phase"A" Contai nt Purge and Exhaust Isolation'Auxili ry Feedvaeer Pumps Esse ial Service Vater System Less than or equal 27.OQQ/27.0++Less than or equal Less chan or equal Less than or equal 18.0g/28.00 ot Applicable No hpplicable Les than or equal 13.0 48.00 to to 3.0 to 8.0 to to o~COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 3/4 3-27 a i...:,':;J;,,-agji AMENDMENT.

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'~1 c'(1 A thgi@

l TAELE 3.3 5 Continue RESPONSE TINE~7 gl e,$(LIAR~~~RIRH.~~ASS~~ZN ZATZNC SIGNAL AND FUNCTION 3.P&ssurizer Pressure-Law a.afety Injection (ECCS)b.Co dO B~go Rea tor Trip (fram SZ)Feed ater Zsolation Contai ent Isolation-Phase"A" Containm nt Purge and Exhaust Isolation Auxiliary eedwater Pumps Essential S rvice Water System Loss than or equal 27.086/27.'0++

Less than or equal Less than or equal Less/than or equal Not'ppl icabl e Not Applicable ,Less mohan ar equal 48 0/13 Of to to 3.0 ta'8.0 to 18.0f to 4.Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-H h a.b.C~d.e~go Safety Injection (E CS)Reactor Trip (from SZ)Feedwater Isolation Containment Isolation-Pha Containment Purge and ExPaus Isolation Auxiliary Feedwater Pus)ps Essential Service Wats'r System Less than or equal to 27.088/37.08 Less than or equal to 3.0 Less than or equal to 8.0 Less than ar equal to 18.0f/28.0ff Not Applicable Not Applicable Less than ar equal to 13.0f/48.0ff 5.Steam Flaw in Two Steam Lines-Hi h Coin ident with Tav-Low-Law a.b.C~d.e.go S afety Zn j ec ion (ECCS)Reactor+rip (fram SZ)FeedwaPer Isolation Containment Isolation-Phase"A" Cpntainment Purge ar'xhaust Isolation Cuxiliary Feedwater Pumps Essential Service Water System Steam I,ine Isolation Less than or equal 9.0I39/39.08 L s than ar equal Les than or equal Less han or equal 20.0f/0.0ff Not App ica.'-.'~.

Not Applicable Less than o equal 15-Of/50.0ff Less than or e al to to 5.0 ta 10.0 ta ta to 13.0 COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 3/4 3 28 AHENDHENT NO.29, X/7, 158

TA3LI'.3 5 Continued~~.RY~~M~~fig I g.->p"~.-Il RESPONSE TXYZ IN SECONDS~04K~O'I~INIT TINC SIGNAL AND FUNCTION 6.Ste Flay fn Tvo Steam Lines.Hf h Caine dent Vf th Steam L fne Pressure-Lov

~~Sa ty In)ection (ECCS)e.f.b.Reacto Tzip (fzom SI)c.Feedvat (Isolation d.Contafnme c Isolation-Phase h Containment urge and Exhaust Isolatfan Auxiliary Fee ater Pumps Essential Servi e Mater System h.Sceam Line Isolation 7.Cancairaenc Pres'sure--Hfzh-Hfah Lass than or equal 27.~7.%Less or equal Les chan or equal Leis than or equal 18.&e/28.0~

Not hpplicable Not Applicable Lass than or equal 14.0e/48.0~

Less than or equal to ta 3.0 to 8.0 ca co co 11.0 9.a.Concafr~enc Spray b.Contafraenc.

Isolation'-Phas"B" c.Steam Line Isolation d.Contafnmenc Afz Recirculation an 8.Steam Ceneracor"acer Le el.--Hfsh-Hitch a.Turbine Trip b.Feedvater Isolation 5=earn Ceneratori ate.Level--Lav-Lav a.~otor Driven huxili,ary Feedvacer Pu"ps b.Turbjite Driven Auxflfa~" Feedvacer P"~s 10.4160 volt Emergency Bus Lass of VoLtase a.y4oter Driver Atxt.jerry peetvater rt"ps 11, Lass af Ma'n Feedvacer Pumps Less chan or equal Nac hpplf cable Less than ar equal Less than ar equal to 45.0 to 10.0 to 600.0 Less than or equal ta 2.5 Less than or equal co 11.0 Less than or equal co 60.0 Less than or equal to 60.0 Les than or equal ca 50.0 a.Motor Driven huxilfary Feedvacer Pumps 12.Reactor Coolant Pump Bus Undervalta e than or equal to 60.0 a.Turbine Driven huxflfary Feedvarer Pumps Less than or equal co 60 o COOK NUC~~PLANT-UNIT 1 3/4 3-29 AMEND~NO.gV, S2~.Xl~168 ThBLE OTATXOH T~Up 3.3-5 Continued 4<+Diese generator starting and sequence loading delays not included.Offsite over avaQable, Response time limit includes opening, of valves to establ sh SZ path and attainment of discharge pressuz'e for centzifuga chazging pumps.Di~~~l genezat r starting and sequence loading delays included.Response time 1 it includea opening of valves to establish SZ path and attainment of dis azge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps.'+Diesel generator sta ing and sequence loading delays included.Response time limit includes op ing of valves to establish SZ path and attainment of'ischarge pzessuze fo centrifugal chazging, SZ.and RHR pumps Sequential transfer of ch rging pump'suction from the VCT to the RVST{Rggy valves open, then VCT valves tlos~)gi NOT lntlndad.hiatal generator starting and gnente~loading delays lnelndad.Response time limit includes opening of v lvey'to establish SZ path and attainment of discharge pressure foz centzifu al charging pumps.Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the V to the RUST (RVST valves'open, then VCT valves close)is included.QQ Diesel generator starting an sequence 1 ading delays NOT included.Offsite pover available.

sponse time 1 it includes opening of valves to establish SZ path and ttainmcnt of disch rge pressure foz centzifugal charging pumps.Sequen al tzansfez of chazg g pump suction from the VCT to the RVST (RVST valves open, then VCT valves lose)is included.COOK NUC~~PLhNT-UHET 1 3/4 3-30 hMEHDMEFf NO.g7, 158~st vygrvT+At>>a~i~'g>>

'+>~2'>>vk'aad&pdg dt eaiA~v K II de a a e a d nde e ue v e ta Cao The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump bus trips provide reactor core pxotcction against DHB as a result af loss of voltage or underfrequcncy to more than one reactor coolant pump.Xhc specified se-points assure'reactor txip signal i gen'crated bcforc the la@floM trip set point is reached.h time delay is incorporated in etch of.these trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical powez transients.

ub e A Tuxbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip shen apezaling above P-?.Each of the turbine tzips provide turbine protection and reduce the severity of the ensuing transient.

No czedit Mas taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips.Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is requix'ed to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactox Protection System.Safet In ection In t fram ESF If a reactor trip has not already been generated by the reactor protective instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels vill initiate a reactor tzip upon any signal which initiates a safety injection.

This tzip is pravided to protect the core in the event of a fAXA.Thc ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a safety injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.Reactor Coalant~Breaker Position Tri The Reactor Coolant.Pump Breaker Position Trip is an anticipatory trip which provides reactor core protection against DNB resulting from the apening of t~o or more pump breakers above P-7.This trip is blocked below P-7 The open/close position trip assures a reactor trip signal is generated before the lov fla~trip setpoint is reached.Na credit vas taken in the accident analyses for operation af this.txip.The functional capability at the open/close pasition settings is required to enhance the overall reliability af the Reactor Protection System.D.'C.COOK-UNIT 1 B 2-7 AtlFHDREHT HO.QP,140

3 4.3 INS hTION BASES e 4.3.1 and 3 4,3.2 PROTECTIVE hND ENGINEERED ShFETY YEhTURES ESP INSTRUMENThTION The OPERhBILITY of the protective and ESP instrumentation systems and interlocks ensuze that I:)the associated ESP action and/or reactor trip vill be inieiated vhen the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its aetpoint, 2)the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3)sufficient zedundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service foz testing oz maintenance, and 4)sufficient system functional capability is available foz protective and ESP purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERhBILITY of these systems is zequized to provide the overall reliabilitye redundancy a'nd diversity assumed available in the facility design ior the proecction and mitigation of acct.dent and transient conditions, The integrated operation of each of these systems is const.stene vith the assumptions used in ehe accident analyses.The surveilLancc requirements specifi.ed for these systems ensure that ehe overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.

The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies aze sufficiene to demonstrate this capability.

The measuremcnt of res'ponae time at the spetcified frequencies provi.des assurance that thc protective and ESP action function associated vt.th each channel is completed.vithtn ehe time limit assumed in the accident analyses.Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, over-lapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.Sensor zesponse time verification may be demonstrated by ei.ther 1)in place, onsite or offsite test measurements oz 2)utilizing replacement sensors vith certified response times.45k ration oi ne RVST and VCT valves (Notes g and)are based on values.~assume ehe non-LOCh safety analyses.These analyses take credit for injection of cd vatez from the RWST.Injection of~oraced vater is assumed not.to'ccur 1 the VCT charging p~mo~uctWon vaLves are closed folloving opening of ehe RWS~ha ing um~uceion valves.%hen sequential operation of the RVST and VCT va oe included in the response times (Note'+), the values spa Pie are based'n h~LOCh analyses.The LOCh analyses take cre or injection flov regardless of-tbe source.Vcrificat the response times'specified in Table 3.3-3 vill assure that th unption used for VCT and REST valves are valid.COOX NUCLEhR PLhNT-UNIT 1.B 3/4 3-1 l

343 S E 4 3 EACTOR TRIP SYSTEM I STRVMENT T 0 G CO I ON 0 0 0 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels h+Yt&~CABIL: As shown in Table 3.3-1.hCXXQE: As shown in Table 3.3-1.LANCE E EM S 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the GEMMA.CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days.The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

~4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated

'to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the"Total No.of Channels"'olumn of Table 3.3-1.$P c'~f The prov'isions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 AM')MENT NO.M, M, 434, 158 1 r h , lj I 0 TABLE 3.3-2 RRAUi~CL Qtl.J~B ZD J 4 FUNCTIONAL UNIT (Q,A(j 1.Man 1 Reactor Trip G 2.Power nge, Neutron Flux (High an Low Setpoint)RESPONSE TIME NOT APPLICABLE Less than or equal to 0.5 seconds*3.Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive te NOT APPLICABLE 4.Power Range, Neu ron Flux High Negative Rate Less tha or equal to 0.5 seconds+5.Intermediate Range, N tron Flux 6.Source Range, Neutron Fl 7.Overtemperature Delta T NO APPLICABLE OT APPLICABLE Less than or equal to 6.0 seconds*8.Overpower Delta T Less than seconds*or equal to 6 0 9'.Pressurizer Pressure--Low.Less than seconds or equal to 2.0 10.Pressurizer Pressure--

gh Less than or equal to 2.0 seconds 11.Pressurizer Wate Level--High Les than or equal to 2.0 seconds*Neutron'de'ctors are exempt from response time testing.esponse time of the neutr flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from de'ecto output or input of first electronic component in channel.h~COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 3/4 3-9 AM1M)MENT NO.yg, gZg,/gal 142 lN'k t Less than or equal to seconds Less than or e ual to seconds 13.Loss of ov-Tvo Loops (hbove P-and belov P-8)ThBLE 3.3-2 Continued~~l E.CTZONhL UNZ-=<'<'j'ESPONSE TnZ 12~Los of Flov~S in']~Loop (hbo P-8)C i,~c;1.0 1.0 I I'/'g 14.Steam Cenerato Vater Level--Lov-Lov Less than or equal to 2.0 seconds 1S.Steam/Feedvater Flo mismatch and Lov Steaa Generator Mater Level 16.Undervoltage-Reactor Coo ant Pumps Less than or equal to 1.S seconds 17.Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Less than or equal to 0.6 seconds 18.Turbine.Trfp h.Lov Fluid Oil Pressure B.Turbine Stop Valve 19.Safety Infection In t from ESF NOT hPPLIChBLE NOT hPPLIChBLE hPPLIChBLE 20.Reacto&Coo1.ant Breaker Position Trip NOT PLIChBLE...-

COOK NUCLEhR PlhNT.-UNIT 2 3/4 3-10~mar N0.134 I 1,g 0 S 0 GCO I 0 0 0 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Sa="ety Feature Actuatioa System (ESFAS)ias~eata-tion channeLs and intarloc3cs shown jn Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent vith the values showa in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4-am~~

RUJBSuat As showa in Table 3.3-3.h<GZ With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoiat less conserva-tive than the value showa in the Allovable VaLues column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable aad apply the applicable ACTION recpxfremeat of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status vith the trip setpoiat adjusted consistent vith the Trip Setpoint value.Pith an ESFAS instrumeatatioa channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS iastrumeatatioa chaaael shall be demons~ted OPERABLE by the performance of the CHAHNEL CHECK, CHAHHEL CALIBRATION, CHAHHZZ FUNCTIONAL TEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES aad, at the frequencies showa in Table 4.3-2.j 4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuatioa logic test.The total interlock function shaLl be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months duriag QDLNHEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.j 4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAKZY FUTURES RESPONSE TIME of.each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be vithin the limit at least once per 18 months.Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both 1'ogic trains are tested at least once per 36 months aad one channel per function such that all channeLs are tested at least once per N times-18 months where N is the total number of redundant chaaaels in a specific ESFAS function as showa in the Total No.of Channels" Column of Table 3-3-3 j j The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 AK2G)MENT HO.M, W, M4,~, 159 I

TABLE 3.3-5~PtB~MCk:~Q<;.4-n o~<<.g (()g 4'sf INI IATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIKE IN SECONDS 1.Man 1 b.c~d.S ety Injection (ECCS)Fee ater Isolation Reac r Trip (SI)Contai ent Isolation-Phase

'h" Containm t Purge and Exhaust Isolation Auxiliary eedwater Pumps.Essential Se ice Vater System Containment Spr Containment Isola ion-Phase B" Containment Purge d Exhaust Iso ation Containment Air Recir ulation F n Containment Isolation-Ph se A" Containment Purge and Exh t Isolation Steam Line Isolation Not Applicable Not hpyXicable Not Applicable No Applicable N~t Applicable Rot Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable P 0)2.Containment Pressure-Hi e.f.a.Safety In]ection (ECCS)b.Reactor Trip (from SI)Feedvate Isolation Contai ent Isolation-Phase"A" Cont nment Purge and Exhaust Isolation h Sary Feedvater Pumps g.E sential Sexvice Vater System P Less than or equal to 27.OQQ/27.0++Less chan or equal to 3.0 Less than or equal to 8.0 ot Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not h'icable~j)'=~COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 3/4 3-26~HENT NO.PN, ZV:-'42 TABLE 3.3-5 Continued c~d.Less t an or~qual to 60.0 Less han or equal to 48.++/13.0¹~CTN INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION.RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS 3, Pr ssurizer Pressure-Lov j/ma (p HJ a.afety Injection (ECCS)Less than or equal to 27.088/27.0++

b.Rea tor Trip (from SI)Less than or equal to 3.0 Feed ater Isolation Less than or equal to 8.0 0onta tnt Isolation-Phasa"0" Lass than or dtnsl to 18.0a e.Contai ent Purge and Exhaust Zsolatio Not hppli.cable f.Motor Driv n Auxiliary Feedvater Pumps g.Essential Se ice Vater System-Hih 4.Differenti.al Pressure Betveen Steam Line a.Saf ety In5 ection (EC S)Less than or equal to 27.0QQ/37.0Q Less than or equal to Less than or equal to Less than or equal to 18.0¹/28.0¹¹ b.Reactor Trip (from SI)c.Feedvater Isolation d.Containment Isolation-Ph e"A" Containment Purge and E aust Isolation Motor Driven Auxi.lie Feedvate Pumps Essential Service ater System Not Applicable 5.Safety 5ection (ECCS)React Trip (from SZ)Fee ater I<<1~'.'.on Co tainment Isolation-Phase"h".ntainment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Auxiliary Feedvater Pumps Essential Service Vater System Steam Line Isolation a.b.Cs d.Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Less than or equal to Less than or equal to g~Less than or equal to 3.0¹/48.0¹¹ Steam Flov'n Tv Steam Lines-Hi h Coincident vith Tav<<-Lov v Not Applicable

.";."Not hppl cable'ot Applicable Not Applicable 3.0 8.0 60.0 13~0 COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 3/4 3-27 AMENDMENT NO.gg, XPS.XS$'142

'E~

TABLE 3.3-5 Continued.~NSI~W~Z~M-~5-FBc~hBS-P

~SIGNAL AND FUNCTION~Q4 w RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS 6.team Line Pressure--Low a.Safety Injection (ECCS)b.actor Trip (from SI)c.Fe dwater Isolation d.Con inment Isolation-Phase"A" e.Contai gent Purge and Exhaust Isolatioq f...Motor Dri n Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps g.Essential Se ice Mater System h.Ste'am Line Isol tion 7.Containment Pressure--H h-Hi h Less than or equal to 27.0QQ/37.0Q Less than or equal to 3.0 Less than or equal~to 8.0 i Le'ss than or equal to 18.0¹/28.0¹¹ Not Applicable r Less than or equal to 60 0 Less j:han or equal to 14.4/48.0¹¹Le s than or equal to 11.0 a.b.C.d.Containment Spray Containment Isolation-ase"B" Steam Line Isolation Containment Air Recirculat n Fan Less than or equal to 45.0 Not Applicable Less than or equal to 10.0 Less than or equal to 600.0 8.Steam Generator Mater Level-i h-i h 9.a.b.Turbine Trip Feedwater Isolatio Steam Generator Wate Level--Low-Low Less than or equal to 2.5 Less than or equal to 11.0 a~b.Motor Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Turbine riven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Less than or equal to 60.0 Less th n or equal to 60.0 10.4160 vo Emer enc Bus Lc, c I Volta e a.otor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Less than or e 1 to 60.0 11.oss of Main Feedwater Pum s a.Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 12.Reactor Coolant Pum Bus Undervolta e Less than or equal to 0.0 Less than or equal to 60.0 134'.""-~AMENDMENT NO.gg, F7, PAP.=.': 142 3/4 3-28 COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 a.Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps I 0 TABLE 3.3-5 Continued l TABLE NOTATION¹D esel genezator stazting and sequence loading delays not inc ded.Of&ite povez available.

Response time limit includes openi g of valve to establish SI path ahd attainment of discharge pr sure for ce rifugal charging pumps.¹¹Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays ncluded.Response-tim limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainnent of disoharge pressers for eentrifngal oharging pumps.++Diesel generator starting and sequence loadin delays included.Response time limit includes opening of valves to espablish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure d'or centzifugal charging, SI, and RHR pumps.Sequential transfer of charging pump sue+ion from the VCT to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close)is HOT included.Q Diesel generator'tarting and sequence loading delays included.Response time limit includes opening of hives to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps.Sequential transfer of charging pump suction fzom the V0.to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close)is included.QQ Diesel generator startin and sequence loading delays NOT included.Offsite po~er available.<

Response time limit includes opening of valves to/establish SI path and,attainment of discharge.,pressure for centzifugal charging pumps.Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close)is included.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 3/4 3-29 ANENDHEHT NO.142 i-~~f I LIHITINC ShFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS ShSES Undervolta e and Underfre uenc Reactor Coolant Susses..The Undervoltage and Undezfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump bus trips provide x'eactox'ore protection against DNB as a result of loss of voltage or underfrequency to more than one reactor coolant pump.The specified set r'.<::Z points assure a reactor trip signal is generated'before the lov floe trip set point is reached.Time delays are incoxpox'ated in the undex'fxequency and undervoltage tx'ips to pzevent spuxious reactor trips from momentary electrical pover transients.

oL t e xeq e a, gn each the react g trip breakers loving the imultaneous tr of evo or more eactor coolangpump bus circuit reakers'-".g'all nero.nosed 2 seconds F.or d rafa qauanoygth edalay fs sac so rhac.the+time required f a signal to re%eh the reictor trip bxeakers afteqthe'ndezErequency tx'ip set point is reached shall not exceed 0.3 seconds'.The tot'al response times for>these functional'niti include an additional 0.3~ncLs-for-trip-breaker-operation-and-CRDM-'releas

.h Turbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip vhen operating above P-7.Each of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduce the sbverity of the ensuing-transient.

No czedit vas taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips.Theix functional cipability at the specified txip'~ttings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Pzotection System.a~I COOK NUCLEhR PLANT-UNIT 2.527 r'j'~'/'d.'a F~MENT NO gSF t34'-'j""s.~sl e e)~~~s 4

3 4.3 XRSTRR62lTATION BASES 3 4.3.1 and 3 4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND BfCIHEERED SA~c,s.FEATURES ESF I NS TRUHEVI'ATIOH The OPERABILITY of che protective and ESF instrumentation systems and fntarl,ocks ensuza thac L)rhe associated ESF action and/or reactor trip vill.be iniriared vhen che paramecer monicored by each channel or'ombinac'on thereof exceeds its secpoinr, 2)rhe specified coincidence logf.c is maintained, 3).,sufficient redundancy is maincained to permi.t a channaL to be ouc of service for testing or maintenance, and 4)sufficient system funcrianaL capabilicy is available for protecrive and ESF proposes from diverse pazamecers.

The OP~VILITY of these system is required to pzovide che overall, reliability, redundance and diversicy assumed available in the facility design for rhe protect'on and mitigacion of accident and czansianc conditions.

The incegraced operacion of each of chase syscem f.s cansistanc virh rhe assu pcians used f.n rhe accident analyses.Protection has been provided f'r main feedvarar system malfunctions in NODES 3 and 4.Th's proteccion is required vhen main faedpumps are aligned co feed steam generators f.n NODES 3 and 4.The avaiLability of feedvatez isol.acian on high-high steam generator level terminates the addition of'old varer ca the steam generacors in any main feedvarer system malfunction.

The coral.volume thar can be added ro the steam generators by the main feedvarer system in NODES 3 and 4 is limited by this safaguards actuacion ind the fac" rhac feedvacer isolation on l.ov T secpoinc coincident vith reactor trip ave can only be cleared above rhe Lov-l5v steam gene aror level trip setpoinc.The restrict'ons associacad vich bypassing ESF tzip functions belov e'cher P-ll or P-12 provide proreccion against an increase in scaam flov transient and are consistent vich assumptions made in che safety analysis.The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensuza thar the overall system functional.

capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.

The periadic surveillance cases pezfozmed ac che minimum frequencies aza sufficient to demonstzate this capabil.ity.

The measurement of response cime at the speci.fied fzequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associaced virh each channel is completed vithin cha time limit assumed in the accident analyses.inhered-as-no Response tfme may be demonscracad by any series of sequential, ov<<lapping or rocal channel tesc measuremencs provided chat such cesti demonstrate che tacaL channeL response rime as defined.Sensor zespanse rime verification may be demonsrraced by either 1)in place, onsf.te or test measurements or 2)utilizing replacement sensors vith certified response times.Amendmenr Ho.82,1 l9 B 3)4 3-1 COOK NUCLEAR PL<VT.UNIT 2

'S S INSTRUMENTATION Continued BASES x'esponse times specific'd in Table 3.3-5 vhich include sequenj:ia peration o h RWST and VCT valves (Notes Q and QQ)are base on values ssumed in the non-safety analyses, These analyses e credit for njection of borated vate from the RWST.InjeceiozCof borated vater is ssumed not to occur until the VC charging-primp suction valves are closed.xollowing opening of the RWST char~ump suction valves.When sequeneial peration of the RWST and VCT alves is not Excluded in the x'esponse times Note++), the value~s e fied are based on the Lb~nalyses.

The LOCA nalyses take cmc&e for injection flow regardless of th~eource.

erificat~of the response times specified in Table 3.3-5 vitlassure that he umption used for VCT and RWST valves are valid.3 4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION I 3 4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Noble gas effluent monitox's provide informaeion, during and following an accidene, which is considered helpful to the operator in assessing the plant condition.

Ie is desired that these monitors be OPERABLE at all times during plant operation, but they are not required for safe shutdown of the plant.it'p Jf'9 In addition, a minimum of two in containment radiation-level monitors with a maximum range of 107 R/hr for photon only should be OPERABLE at all times except for cold shutdown and refueling outages.In case of failure of the monitor, appropriate actions should be taken to restore its operational capability as soon as possible.Table 3.3-6 is based on the following Alarm/Trip Setpoints and Measurement Ranges for each instrument listed.For the unit vent noble gas monitors, it should be noted that there is an automatic switchover from the lov/mid-range channels to the high-range channel when the upper limies of the low-and mid-range channel measurement ranges are reached.In this case there is no flov to the low-and mid-range channels from the unit vent sample line.This is considered to represene proper operation of this monitox'.Therefore, if automatic switchover to the high-range should occur, and the'ov-and mid-range detectors are capable of functioning vhen flov is re-established, the lov-and mid-range channels should not be declared inoperable and the ACTION statement in the Technical Specification does not apply.This is also true while purging the lov-and mid-range chambers folloving a large activity excursion prior to resumpeion of lov-level monitoring and establishmene of a nev background.

rP ,>>>>a'~>>~i COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-la AMENDMENT NO.HP.

S ATTACHMENT 3 TO AEP:NRC:1210 PROPOSED REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES r

3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.ACTION: ""As shown'n Table 3.3-1.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days.The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the"Total No.of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing.Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.COOK NUCLEAR PLAi~-UNIT.

1 Page 3/4 3-1 AiWIENDMENT 400)434, 4-W 5~ZI t f ,1 re a r~

3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-2 Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page 3/4 3-10 AMEiVDiHENT QO,~, kA, 4M t~~s, g~

3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-2 Continued.-Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page 3/4 3-11 AMENDMENT 44S, 488 r 1~g 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.34.APPLICABILITY:

ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-3.With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.b.With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 4.3.2.1.2 4.3.2.1.3 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test.The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the Total No.of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page 3/4 3-15 AAIENDMENT 400, 434, 444, 48$

3/4 LIMrI'ING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page 3/4 3-27 AMENDME.i T 48k, 4N 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK iNUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page 3/4 3-28 AMENDMENT A,~, 488

~1 0 l I 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page 3/4 3-29 AMENDMENT 49, kQO, 442, hap 4'

~f tt 4 j 4 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page 3/4 3-30 AillENDMENT

%, 4$S

~~g BASES 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMH'ING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES Undervolta e and Underfre uenc-Reactor Coolant Pum Busses The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump bus trips provide reactor core protection against DNB as a result of loss of voltage or underfrequency to more than one reactor coolant pump.The specified set points assure a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip set point is reached.A time delay is incorporated in each of these trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients.

~Turbine Tri A Turbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip when operating above P-7.Each of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduce the severity of the ensuing transient.

No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips.Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.Safe In'ection In ut from ESF If a reactor trip has not already been generated by the reactor protective instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal which initiates a safety injection.

This trip is provided to protect the core, in the event of a LOCA.The ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a safety injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.Reactor Coolant Pum Breaker Position Tri The Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip is an anticipatory trip which provides reactor core protection against DNB resulting from the opening of two or more pump breakers above P-7.This trip is blocked below P-7.The open/close position trip assures a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip setpoint is reached.No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of this trip.The functional capability at the open/close position settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page B 2-7 4~g II~~

3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES S INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and interlocks ensure that 1)the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2)the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3)sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4)sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.

The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either I)in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2)utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT 94, W4, 44S 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days.The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once evety N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the", Total No.of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing.Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT&,%,~, 488

~.4~4 pg 4 1"'*,E IJ~'4 4 If t 4~~3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION.

TABLE 3.3-2~"Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page 3/4 3-9 Ai>IENDMENT

$Q, 4A, 434, 44k

~~~~p~-e El'j W~\~4 t 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-2 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page 3/4 3-10 e.q~~

3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.34.APPLICABILITY:

ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-3.With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.34, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.4.3.2.1.2 4.3.2.1.3 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test.The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the"Total No.of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page 3/4 3-14 AMEibDWIENT 78,%, 434,~, 4$S, 4'

~)p, t!I l i' 3/4 LIMH'ING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page 3/4 3-26 AMENDMENT 434, 4Ã, 44k

~g~t 3/4 I IMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page 3/4 3-27 AMENDMENT 4$, 40S, 43$,~

3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page 3/4 3-2S AMENDMENT 34, 4Ã, 434, 43$,~

J dq 4~I%1~I l'i 3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued'able Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page 3/4 3-29

~.<%J H I,y I l lee$))ru r ve~BASES 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SEITINGS 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Continued)

Undervolta e and Underfre uenc-Reactor Coolant Pum Busses The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump bus trips provide reactor core protection against DNB as a result of loss of voltage or underfrequency to more than one reactor coolant pump.The specified set points assure a reactor trip signal is generated before the low fiow trip set point is reached.Time delays are incorporated in the underfrequency and undervoltage trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients.

T~urbine Tri A Turbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip when operating above P-7.Each of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduce the severity of the ensuing transient.

No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips.Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page B 2-7 AMENDMENT 8R, 434 3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ES INSTRUMENTATION

'he OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and interlocks ensure that 1)the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2)the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3)sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4)sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these system is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these system is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.Protection has been provided for main feedwater system malfunctions in MODES 3 and 4.This protection is required when main feedpumps are aligned to feed steam generators in MODES 3 and 4.The availability of feedwater isolation on high-high steam generator level terminates the addition of cold water to the steam generators in any main feedwater system malfunction.

The total volume that can be added to the steam generators by the main feedwater system in MODES 3 and 4 is limited by this safeguards actuation and the fact that feedwater isolation on low Tavg setpoint coincident with reactor trip can only be cleared above the low-low steam generator level trip setpoint.The restrictions associated with bypassing ESF trip functions below either P-11 or P-12 provide protection against an increase in steam flow transient and are consistent with assumptions made in the safety analysis.The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.

The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action.function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1)in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2)utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page B 3/4 3-1 AVKNDMENT SR, 44'

>-cE P.+'~~%J r"z.3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Noble gas effluent monitors provide information, during and following an accident, which is considered helpful to the operator in assessing the plant condition.

It is desired that these monitors be OPERABLE at all times during plant operation, but they are not required for safe shutdown of the plant.P In addition, a minimum of two in containment radiation-level monitors with a maximum range of 107 R/hr for" photon only should be OPERABLE at all times except for cold shutdown and refueling outages.In case of failure of the monitor, appropriate actions should be taken to restore its operational capability as soon as possible.Table 3.3-6 is based on the following Alarm/Trip Setpoints and Measurement Ranges for each instrument listed.For the unit vent noble gas monitors, it should be noted that there is an automatic switchover from the low/mid-range channels to the high-range channel when the upper limits of the low-and mid-range channel measurement ranges are reached.In this case there is no flow to the low-and mid-range channels from the unit vent sample line.This is considered to represent proper operation of this monitor.Therefore, if automatic switchover to the high-range should occur, and the low-and mid-range detectors are capable of functioning when flow is re-established, the low-and mid-range channels should not be declared inoperable and the ACTION statement in the Technical Specification does not apply.This is also true while purging the low-and mid-range chambers following a large activity excursion prior to resumption of low-level monitoring and establishment of a new background.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 2 Page B 3/4 3-ln AMENDMENT 80, 449,~

l'0