ML15083A083: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:PRIORITY NormalDISPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WILL BE TOTHE TRANSMITTAL SIGNATURE UNLESS RECIPIENT ISOTHERWISE IDENTIFIED BELOWDate: 03/10115Document Transmittal #:DUK1506900311) 01820 J R ELKINS- EC0812) 02361 QATS-MG01MM3) 02388 BOB SCHOMAKER LYNCHBG, VA4) 02532 RESIDENT NRC INSPECT MG01 NRC5) 03044 MCG DOC CNTRL MISC MAN MG05DM6) 03614 MCG OPS PROCEDURE GP MG01OP7) 03744 OPS TRNG MGR. MG030T8) 03759 U S NUC REG WASHINGTON, DC9) 03796 SCIENTECH CLEARWTR, FL10) 04809 MCG PLANT ENG. LIBR. MG05SE11) 05262 J L FREEZE MG01IE12) 05606 J C MORTON MG01EP13) 08103 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CO LLC14) 09665 JON H THOMPSON, USNRCDuke EnergyDOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORMREFERENCEMCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES(TSB)RECORD RETENTION #421734Page 2 of 2QA CONDITION [] Yes 0 NoOTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REQUIRED 0 YesIF QA OR OTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REQUIRED, PLEASEACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY RETURNING THIS FORM TO:Duke EnergyMcGuireDCRM MGO2DM13225 Hagers Ferry RoadHuntersville, N.C. 28078Rec'd ByDateDOCUMENT NOQACONDREV #/ DATEDISTR CODE123456789101112131415TOTALMNS TSB 3.7.7N/A135 03/10/15MADM-04BV1V1V1xV3V1V1V1V1viV129REMARKS:PLEASE UPDATE ACCORDINGLY.TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASESLOES REVISION 122 DATED 02/25/15S D CAPPSVICE PRESIDENTMCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATIONBY:B C BEAVER MG01RC BCB/BRG-~
{{#Wiki_filter:PRIORITY NormalDISPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WILL BE TOTHE TRANSMITTAL SIGNATURE UNLESS RECIPIENT ISOTHERWISE IDENTIFIED BELOWDate: 03/10115Document Transmittal  
#:DUK150690031
: 1) 01820 J R ELKINS- EC0812) 02361 QATS-MG01MM
: 3) 02388 BOB SCHOMAKER  
: LYNCHBG, VA4) 02532 RESIDENT NRC INSPECT MG01 NRC5) 03044 MCG DOC CNTRL MISC MAN MG05DM6) 03614 MCG OPS PROCEDURE GP MG01OP7) 03744 OPS TRNG MGR. MG030T8) 03759 U S NUC REG WASHINGTON, DC9) 03796 SCIENTECH  
: CLEARWTR, FL10) 04809 MCG PLANT ENG. LIBR. MG05SE11) 05262 J L FREEZE MG01IE12) 05606 J C MORTON MG01EP13) 08103 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CO LLC14) 09665 JON H THOMPSON, USNRCDuke EnergyDOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORMREFERENCE MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES(TSB)RECORD RETENTION  
#421734Page 2 of 2QA CONDITION  
[] Yes 0 NoOTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REQUIRED 0 YesIF QA OR OTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  
: REQUIRED, PLEASEACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY RETURNING THIS FORM TO:Duke EnergyMcGuireDCRM MGO2DM13225 Hagers Ferry RoadHuntersville, N.C. 28078Rec'd ByDateDOCUMENT NOQACONDREV #/ DATEDISTR CODE123456789101112131415TOTALMNS TSB 3.7.7N/A135 03/10/15MADM-04BV1V1V1xV3V1V1V1V1viV129REMARKS:PLEASE UPDATE ACCORDINGLY.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASESLOES REVISION 122 DATED 02/25/15S D CAPPSVICE PRESIDENT MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATIONBY:B C BEAVER MG01RC BCB/BRG-~
February 25, 2015MEMORANDUM
February 25, 2015MEMORANDUM


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
McGuire TS Bases UpdatesREMOVE INSERTTSB List of Effected Sections Rev 121 TSB List of Effected Sections Rev 122TSB 3.7.7 Rev. 115 TSB 3.7.7 Rev 135Due to the revision process used for TS and Bases, revision numbers may be skipped.Please call me if you have questions.Bonnie BeaverRegulatory Compliance875-4180 McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification BasesLOESTS Bases are revised by sectionPage Number Revision Revision DateO BASES(Revised per section)i Revision 87 8/15/07ii Revision 87 8/15/07iii Revision 87 8/15/07B 2.1.1 Revision 51 01/14/04B 2.1.2 Revision 109 9/20/10B 3.0 Revision 81 3/29/07B 3.1.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.3 Revision 10 9/22/00B 3.1.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.7 Revision 58 06/23/04B 3.1.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.1 Revision 124 10/1/12B 3.3.2 Revision 132 8/27/14B 3.3.3 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.3.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.6 Not Used -Revision 87 6129/06B 3.4.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.2 Revision 0 9/30/98B 3.4.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.5 Revision 115 3/29/11McGuire Units 1 and 2Page IRevision 122 Page NumberAmendmentRevision DateB 3.4.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.7 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.9 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.10 Revision 102 8/17/09B 3.4.11 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.12 Revision 134 1/8/15B 3.4.13 Revision 126 5/1/13B 3.4.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.15 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.16 Revision 121 8/5/09B 3.4.17 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.18 Revision 86 6/25/07B 3.5.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.5.2 Revision 116 8/18/11B 3.5.3 Revision 57 4/29/04B 3.5.4 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.5.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.1 Revision 53 2/17/04B 3.6.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.6 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.6.7 Not Used -Revision 63 4/4/05B 3.6.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.9 Revision 131 4/14/14B 3.6.10 Revision 120 4/26/12B 3.6.11 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.6.12 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.13 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.15 Revision 125 10/19/12B 3.6.16 Revision 130 4/7/14McGuire Units 1 and 2Page 2Revision 122 Page NumberAmendmentRevision DateB 3.7.1 Revision 129 10/24/13B 3.7.2 Revision 105 2/22/10B 3.7.3 Revision 102 8/17/09B 3.7.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.6 Revision 127 8/2/13B 3.7.7 Revision 135 2/11/15B 3.7.8 Revision 128 10/2/13B 3.7.9 Revision 120 4/26/12B 3.7.10 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.11 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.12 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.13 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.15 Revision 66 6/30/05B 3.7.16 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.2 Revision 92 1/28/08B 3.8.3 Revision 123 9/29/12B 3.8.4 Revision 133 9/10/14B 3.8.5 Revision 41 7/29/03B 3.8.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.7 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.9 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.10 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.7 Revision 115 3/29/11McGuire Units 1 and 2Page 3Revision 122 NSWSB 3.7.7B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSB 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)BASESBACKGROUND The NSWS provides a transfer mechanism for the removal of processand operating heat from safety related components during a Design BasisAccident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, and a normalshutdown, the NSWS also provides this function for various safety relatedand nonsafety related components. The safety related function iscovered by this LCO.The NSWS is normally supplied from Lake Norman as a non-seismicsource, through a single supply line as shown in Figure B 3.7.7-1. Anadditional safety-related and seismic supply of water to the NSWS, in theevent of a loss of Lake Norman, is the Standby Nuclear Service WaterPond (SNSWP). The supply line from Lake Norman separates into twosupply headers, each header is capable of being isolated by two,independently powered, motor operated valves. The two supply headersfeed into two separate supply trains. The "A" train supplies water to the"A" pump on each unit and the "B" train to the "B" pump on each unit.During normal operation, only one pump, per unit, is in operation tosupply NSWS flow to the essential and non-essential headers for eachunit. The "B" train supply is automatically realigned to the SNSWP andsupplies the "B" header on an SI signal from either unit. The "A" trainsupply is automatically realigned to the low-level supply from LakeNorman and supplies the "A" header on an SI signal from either unit.Essential headers provide flow to the following safety related componentsand systems:1. Component Cooling (CCW) Heat Exchangers and Pump Motor Coolers,2. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers and Pump Motor Coolers,3. Control Room Area Chiller Condensers,4. Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers,5. Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor, Bearing Oil and Gear Oil Coolers,6. Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor Coolers,7. Auxiliary Feedwa-ter Pump Motor Coolers,8. Safety Injection Pump Motor and Bearing Oil Coolers,9. Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor Coolers,10. Fuel Pool Pump Motor Coolers,11. Assured Auxiliary Feedwater Supply,12. Assured Component Cooling System Makeup,13. Assured Fuel Pool Cooling System makeup, and14. Assured Diesel Generator Engine Cooling System makeup.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-1Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESBACKGROUND (continued)The non-essential channel supply comes from the "A" and "B" traincrossover piping and isolates on an SI or Blackout signal.The Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Air Coolers are not essential for safeshutdown, but are set up to receive cooling flow until the Containment,High-High signal is received. The pumps and valves are remote andmanually aligned, except in the unlikely event of a loss of coolantaccident (LOCA). The pumps aligned to the critical loops areautomatically started upon receipt of a safety injection or StationBlackout signal, and all essential valves are aligned to their post accidentpositions.Additional information about the design and operation of the NSWS,along with a list of the components served, is presented in the UFSAR,Section 9.2 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the NSWS isthe removal of decay heat from the reactor via the CCW System.APPLICABLE The design basis of the NSWS is for one NSWS train, in conjunction withSAFETY ANALYSES the CCW System and the Containment Spray system, to remove coredecay heat following a design basis LOCA as discussed in the UFSAR,Section 6.2 (Ref. 2). This prevents the containment sump fluid fromincreasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following aLOCA and provides for a gradual reduction in the temperature of thisfluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System by the ECCSpumps. The NSWS is designed to perform its function with a singlefailure of any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power.The NSWS, in conjunction with the CCW System, also removes heatfrom the residual heat removal (RHR) system, as discussed in theUFSAR, Section 5.4 (Ref. 3), from RHR entry conditions to MODE 5during normal and post accident operations. The time required for thisevolution is a function of the number of CCW and RHR System trainsthat are operating. One NSWS train is sufficient to remove decay heatduring subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes amaximum NSWS inlet temperature of 1020F is not exceeded.The NSWS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4).LCOTwo NSWS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the requiredredundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accidentMcGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-2Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESLCO (continued)heat loads, assuming that the worst case single active failure occurscoincident with the loss of offsite power.An NSWS train is considered OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4when:a. The associated unit's pump is OPERABLE; andb. The associated piping, valves, and instrumentation and controlsrequired to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.Portions of the NSWS system are shared between the two units (FigureB 3.7.7-1). The shared portions of the system must be OPERABLE foreach unit when that unit is in the MODE of Applicability. Additionally,both normal and emergency power for shared components must also beOPERABLE. If a shared NSWS component becomes inoperable, ornormal or emergency power to shared components becomes inoperable,then the Required Actions of this LCO must be entered independently foreach unit that is in the MODE of applicability of the LCO.APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the NSWS is a normally operating system thatis required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by theNSWS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.In MODES 5 and 6, the requirements of the NSWS are determined by thesystems it supports.ACTIONS A._1If one NSWS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restoreOPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remainingOPERABLE NSWS train is adequate to perform the heat removalfunction. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a singlefailure in the OPERABLE NSWS train could result in loss of NSWSfunction. Required Action A. 1 is modified by two Notes. The first Noteindicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions ofLCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," should be entered if an inoperableNSWS train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator. Thesecond Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and RequiredActions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," should be entered if aninoperable NSWS train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-3Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESACTIONS (continued)This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions aretaken for these components. The 72 hour Completion Time is based onthe redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the lowprobability of a DBA occurring during this time period.B.1 and B.2If the NSWS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within theassociated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE inwhich the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must beplaced in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within36 hours.The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operatingexperience, to reach the required unit conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1REQUIREMENTSThis SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the NSWScomponents or systems may render those components inoperable, butdoes not affect the OPERABILITY of the NSWS.Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, andautomatic valves in the NSWS flow path provides assurance that theproper flow paths exist for NSWS operation. This SR does not apply tovalves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, sincethey are verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed,or secured. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation;rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of beingmispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply tovalves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience,equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-4Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)SR 3.7.7.2This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the NSWS valves on anactual or simulated actuation safety injection signal. The NSWS is anormally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normaltesting. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked,sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position underadministrative controls. The Surveillance Frequency is based onoperating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and iscontrolled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.7.7.3This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the NSWS pumps on anactual or simulated actuation signal. The NSWS is a normally operatingsystem that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal testing duringnormal operation. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operatingexperience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled underthe Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.3. UFSAR, Section 5.4.4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 5, "Sharing of Structures,Systems, and Components".McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-5Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESFIGURE B 3.7.7-1 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM(, C3w zXMcGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-6Revision No. 135}}
 
McGuire TS Bases UpdatesREMOVE INSERTTSB List of Effected Sections Rev 121 TSB List of Effected Sections Rev 122TSB 3.7.7 Rev. 115 TSB 3.7.7 Rev 135Due to the revision process used for TS and Bases, revision numbers may be skipped.Please call me if you have questions.
Bonnie BeaverRegulatory Compliance 875-4180 McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification BasesLOESTS Bases are revised by sectionPage Number Revision Revision DateO BASES(Revised per section)i Revision 87 8/15/07ii Revision 87 8/15/07iii Revision 87 8/15/07B 2.1.1 Revision 51 01/14/04B 2.1.2 Revision 109 9/20/10B 3.0 Revision 81 3/29/07B 3.1.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.3 Revision 10 9/22/00B 3.1.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.7 Revision 58 06/23/04B 3.1.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.1 Revision 124 10/1/12B 3.3.2 Revision 132 8/27/14B 3.3.3 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.3.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.6 Not Used -Revision 87 6129/06B 3.4.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.2 Revision 0 9/30/98B 3.4.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.5 Revision 115 3/29/11McGuire Units 1 and 2Page IRevision 122 Page NumberAmendment Revision DateB 3.4.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.7 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.9 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.10 Revision 102 8/17/09B 3.4.11 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.12 Revision 134 1/8/15B 3.4.13 Revision 126 5/1/13B 3.4.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.15 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.16 Revision 121 8/5/09B 3.4.17 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.18 Revision 86 6/25/07B 3.5.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.5.2 Revision 116 8/18/11B 3.5.3 Revision 57 4/29/04B 3.5.4 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.5.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.1 Revision 53 2/17/04B 3.6.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.6 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.6.7 Not Used -Revision 63 4/4/05B 3.6.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.9 Revision 131 4/14/14B 3.6.10 Revision 120 4/26/12B 3.6.11 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.6.12 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.13 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.15 Revision 125 10/19/12B 3.6.16 Revision 130 4/7/14McGuire Units 1 and 2Page 2Revision 122 Page NumberAmendment Revision DateB 3.7.1 Revision 129 10/24/13B 3.7.2 Revision 105 2/22/10B 3.7.3 Revision 102 8/17/09B 3.7.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.6 Revision 127 8/2/13B 3.7.7 Revision 135 2/11/15B 3.7.8 Revision 128 10/2/13B 3.7.9 Revision 120 4/26/12B 3.7.10 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.11 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.12 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.13 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.15 Revision 66 6/30/05B 3.7.16 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.2 Revision 92 1/28/08B 3.8.3 Revision 123 9/29/12B 3.8.4 Revision 133 9/10/14B 3.8.5 Revision 41 7/29/03B 3.8.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.7 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.9 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.10 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.7 Revision 115 3/29/11McGuire Units 1 and 2Page 3Revision 122 NSWSB 3.7.7B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSB 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)BASESBACKGROUND The NSWS provides a transfer mechanism for the removal of processand operating heat from safety related components during a Design BasisAccident (DBA) or transient.
During normal operation, and a normalshutdown, the NSWS also provides this function for various safety relatedand nonsafety related components.
The safety related function iscovered by this LCO.The NSWS is normally supplied from Lake Norman as a non-seismic source, through a single supply line as shown in Figure B 3.7.7-1.
Anadditional safety-related and seismic supply of water to the NSWS, in theevent of a loss of Lake Norman, is the Standby Nuclear Service WaterPond (SNSWP).
The supply line from Lake Norman separates into twosupply headers, each header is capable of being isolated by two,independently  
: powered, motor operated valves. The two supply headersfeed into two separate supply trains. The "A" train supplies water to the"A" pump on each unit and the "B" train to the "B" pump on each unit.During normal operation, only one pump, per unit, is in operation tosupply NSWS flow to the essential and non-essential headers for eachunit. The "B" train supply is automatically realigned to the SNSWP andsupplies the "B" header on an SI signal from either unit. The "A" trainsupply is automatically realigned to the low-level supply from LakeNorman and supplies the "A" header on an SI signal from either unit.Essential headers provide flow to the following safety related components and systems:1. Component Cooling (CCW) Heat Exchangers and Pump Motor Coolers,2. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers and Pump Motor Coolers,3. Control Room Area Chiller Condensers,
: 4. Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers,
: 5. Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor, Bearing Oil and Gear Oil Coolers,6. Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor Coolers,7. Auxiliary Feedwa-ter Pump Motor Coolers,8. Safety Injection Pump Motor and Bearing Oil Coolers,9. Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor Coolers,10. Fuel Pool Pump Motor Coolers,11. Assured Auxiliary Feedwater Supply,12. Assured Component Cooling System Makeup,13. Assured Fuel Pool Cooling System makeup, and14. Assured Diesel Generator Engine Cooling System makeup.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-1Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESBACKGROUND (continued)
The non-essential channel supply comes from the "A" and "B" traincrossover piping and isolates on an SI or Blackout signal.The Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Air Coolers are not essential for safeshutdown, but are set up to receive cooling flow until the Containment, High-High signal is received.
The pumps and valves are remote andmanually  
: aligned, except in the unlikely event of a loss of coolantaccident (LOCA). The pumps aligned to the critical loops areautomatically started upon receipt of a safety injection or StationBlackout signal, and all essential valves are aligned to their post accidentpositions.
Additional information about the design and operation of the NSWS,along with a list of the components served, is presented in the UFSAR,Section 9.2 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the NSWS isthe removal of decay heat from the reactor via the CCW System.APPLICABLE The design basis of the NSWS is for one NSWS train, in conjunction withSAFETY ANALYSES the CCW System and the Containment Spray system, to remove coredecay heat following a design basis LOCA as discussed in the UFSAR,Section 6.2 (Ref. 2). This prevents the containment sump fluid fromincreasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following aLOCA and provides for a gradual reduction in the temperature of thisfluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System by the ECCSpumps. The NSWS is designed to perform its function with a singlefailure of any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power.The NSWS, in conjunction with the CCW System, also removes heatfrom the residual heat removal (RHR) system, as discussed in theUFSAR, Section 5.4 (Ref. 3), from RHR entry conditions to MODE 5during normal and post accident operations.
The time required for thisevolution is a function of the number of CCW and RHR System trainsthat are operating.
One NSWS train is sufficient to remove decay heatduring subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes amaximum NSWS inlet temperature of 1020F is not exceeded.
The NSWS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4).LCOTwo NSWS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the requiredredundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accidentMcGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-2Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESLCO (continued) heat loads, assuming that the worst case single active failure occurscoincident with the loss of offsite power.An NSWS train is considered OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4when:a. The associated unit's pump is OPERABLE; andb. The associated piping, valves, and instrumentation and controlsrequired to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
Portions of the NSWS system are shared between the two units (FigureB 3.7.7-1).
The shared portions of the system must be OPERABLE foreach unit when that unit is in the MODE of Applicability.
Additionally, both normal and emergency power for shared components must also beOPERABLE.
If a shared NSWS component becomes inoperable, ornormal or emergency power to shared components becomes inoperable, then the Required Actions of this LCO must be entered independently foreach unit that is in the MODE of applicability of the LCO.APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the NSWS is a normally operating system thatis required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by theNSWS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.In MODES 5 and 6, the requirements of the NSWS are determined by thesystems it supports.
ACTIONS A._1If one NSWS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restoreOPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE NSWS train is adequate to perform the heat removalfunction.  
: However, the overall reliability is reduced because a singlefailure in the OPERABLE NSWS train could result in loss of NSWSfunction.
Required Action A. 1 is modified by two Notes. The first Noteindicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions ofLCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating,"
should be entered if an inoperable NSWS train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator.
Thesecond Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and RequiredActions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," should be entered if aninoperable NSWS train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-3Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESACTIONS (continued)
This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions aretaken for these components.
The 72 hour Completion Time is based onthe redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the lowprobability of a DBA occurring during this time period.B.1 and B.2If the NSWS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within theassociated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE inwhich the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must beplaced in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within36 hours.The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the NSWScomponents or systems may render those components inoperable, butdoes not affect the OPERABILITY of the NSWS.Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, andautomatic valves in the NSWS flow path provides assurance that theproper flow paths exist for NSWS operation.
This SR does not apply tovalves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, sincethey are verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed,or secured.
This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of beingmispositioned are in the correct position.
This SR does not apply tovalves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-4Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SR 3.7.7.2This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the NSWS valves on anactual or simulated actuation safety injection signal. The NSWS is anormally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normaltesting.
This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked,sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position underadministrative controls.
The Surveillance Frequency is based onoperating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and iscontrolled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.7.7.3This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the NSWS pumps on anactual or simulated actuation signal. The NSWS is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal testing duringnormal operation.
The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled underthe Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES  
: 1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.3. UFSAR, Section 5.4.4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
: 5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 5, "Sharing of Structures,
: Systems, and Components".
McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-5Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESFIGURE B 3.7.7-1 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM(, C3w zXMcGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-6Revision No. 135}}

Revision as of 03:47, 1 July 2018

McGuire TS Bases Updates
ML15083A083
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/10/2015
From: Beaver B C
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
DUK150690031
Download: ML15083A083 (11)
v • d • e


Text

PRIORITY NormalDISPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WILL BE TOTHE TRANSMITTAL SIGNATURE UNLESS RECIPIENT ISOTHERWISE IDENTIFIED BELOWDate: 03/10115Document Transmittal

  1. DUK150690031
1) 01820 J R ELKINS- EC0812) 02361 QATS-MG01MM
3) 02388 BOB SCHOMAKER
LYNCHBG, VA4) 02532 RESIDENT NRC INSPECT MG01 NRC5) 03044 MCG DOC CNTRL MISC MAN MG05DM6) 03614 MCG OPS PROCEDURE GP MG01OP7) 03744 OPS TRNG MGR. MG030T8) 03759 U S NUC REG WASHINGTON, DC9) 03796 SCIENTECH
CLEARWTR, FL10) 04809 MCG PLANT ENG. LIBR. MG05SE11) 05262 J L FREEZE MG01IE12) 05606 J C MORTON MG01EP13) 08103 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CO LLC14) 09665 JON H THOMPSON, USNRCDuke EnergyDOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORMREFERENCE MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TS)TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES(TSB)RECORD RETENTION
  1. 421734Page 2 of 2QA CONDITION

[] Yes 0 NoOTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT REQUIRED 0 YesIF QA OR OTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

REQUIRED, PLEASEACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY RETURNING THIS FORM TO:Duke EnergyMcGuireDCRM MGO2DM13225 Hagers Ferry RoadHuntersville, N.C. 28078Rec'd ByDateDOCUMENT NOQACONDREV #/ DATEDISTR CODE123456789101112131415TOTALMNS TSB 3.7.7N/A135 03/10/15MADM-04BV1V1V1xV3V1V1V1V1viV129REMARKS:PLEASE UPDATE ACCORDINGLY.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASESLOES REVISION 122 DATED 02/25/15S D CAPPSVICE PRESIDENT MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATIONBY:B C BEAVER MG01RC BCB/BRG-~

February 25, 2015MEMORANDUM

Subject:

McGuire TS Bases UpdatesREMOVE INSERTTSB List of Effected Sections Rev 121 TSB List of Effected Sections Rev 122TSB 3.7.7 Rev. 115 TSB 3.7.7 Rev 135Due to the revision process used for TS and Bases, revision numbers may be skipped.Please call me if you have questions.

Bonnie BeaverRegulatory Compliance 875-4180 McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification BasesLOESTS Bases are revised by sectionPage Number Revision Revision DateO BASES(Revised per section)i Revision 87 8/15/07ii Revision 87 8/15/07iii Revision 87 8/15/07B 2.1.1 Revision 51 01/14/04B 2.1.2 Revision 109 9/20/10B 3.0 Revision 81 3/29/07B 3.1.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.3 Revision 10 9/22/00B 3.1.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.1.7 Revision 58 06/23/04B 3.1.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.2.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.1 Revision 124 10/1/12B 3.3.2 Revision 132 8/27/14B 3.3.3 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.3.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.3.6 Not Used -Revision 87 6129/06B 3.4.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.2 Revision 0 9/30/98B 3.4.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.5 Revision 115 3/29/11McGuire Units 1 and 2Page IRevision 122 Page NumberAmendment Revision DateB 3.4.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.7 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.9 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.10 Revision 102 8/17/09B 3.4.11 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.12 Revision 134 1/8/15B 3.4.13 Revision 126 5/1/13B 3.4.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.15 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.16 Revision 121 8/5/09B 3.4.17 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.4.18 Revision 86 6/25/07B 3.5.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.5.2 Revision 116 8/18/11B 3.5.3 Revision 57 4/29/04B 3.5.4 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.5.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.1 Revision 53 2/17/04B 3.6.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.6 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.6.7 Not Used -Revision 63 4/4/05B 3.6.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.9 Revision 131 4/14/14B 3.6.10 Revision 120 4/26/12B 3.6.11 Revision 122 10/25/12B 3.6.12 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.13 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.6.15 Revision 125 10/19/12B 3.6.16 Revision 130 4/7/14McGuire Units 1 and 2Page 2Revision 122 Page NumberAmendment Revision DateB 3.7.1 Revision 129 10/24/13B 3.7.2 Revision 105 2/22/10B 3.7.3 Revision 102 8/17/09B 3.7.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.6 Revision 127 8/2/13B 3.7.7 Revision 135 2/11/15B 3.7.8 Revision 128 10/2/13B 3.7.9 Revision 120 4/26/12B 3.7.10 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.11 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.12 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.13 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.14 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.7.15 Revision 66 6/30/05B 3.7.16 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.2 Revision 92 1/28/08B 3.8.3 Revision 123 9/29/12B 3.8.4 Revision 133 9/10/14B 3.8.5 Revision 41 7/29/03B 3.8.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.7 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.8 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.9 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.8.10 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.1 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.2 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.3 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.4 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.5 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.6 Revision 115 3/29/11B 3.9.7 Revision 115 3/29/11McGuire Units 1 and 2Page 3Revision 122 NSWSB 3.7.7B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSB 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)BASESBACKGROUND The NSWS provides a transfer mechanism for the removal of processand operating heat from safety related components during a Design BasisAccident (DBA) or transient.

During normal operation, and a normalshutdown, the NSWS also provides this function for various safety relatedand nonsafety related components.

The safety related function iscovered by this LCO.The NSWS is normally supplied from Lake Norman as a non-seismic source, through a single supply line as shown in Figure B 3.7.7-1.

Anadditional safety-related and seismic supply of water to the NSWS, in theevent of a loss of Lake Norman, is the Standby Nuclear Service WaterPond (SNSWP).

The supply line from Lake Norman separates into twosupply headers, each header is capable of being isolated by two,independently

powered, motor operated valves. The two supply headersfeed into two separate supply trains. The "A" train supplies water to the"A" pump on each unit and the "B" train to the "B" pump on each unit.During normal operation, only one pump, per unit, is in operation tosupply NSWS flow to the essential and non-essential headers for eachunit. The "B" train supply is automatically realigned to the SNSWP andsupplies the "B" header on an SI signal from either unit. The "A" trainsupply is automatically realigned to the low-level supply from LakeNorman and supplies the "A" header on an SI signal from either unit.Essential headers provide flow to the following safety related components and systems:1. Component Cooling (CCW) Heat Exchangers and Pump Motor Coolers,2. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers and Pump Motor Coolers,3. Control Room Area Chiller Condensers,
4. Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers,
5. Centrifugal Charging Pump Motor, Bearing Oil and Gear Oil Coolers,6. Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor Coolers,7. Auxiliary Feedwa-ter Pump Motor Coolers,8. Safety Injection Pump Motor and Bearing Oil Coolers,9. Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor Coolers,10. Fuel Pool Pump Motor Coolers,11. Assured Auxiliary Feedwater Supply,12. Assured Component Cooling System Makeup,13. Assured Fuel Pool Cooling System makeup, and14. Assured Diesel Generator Engine Cooling System makeup.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-1Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESBACKGROUND (continued)

The non-essential channel supply comes from the "A" and "B" traincrossover piping and isolates on an SI or Blackout signal.The Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Air Coolers are not essential for safeshutdown, but are set up to receive cooling flow until the Containment, High-High signal is received.

The pumps and valves are remote andmanually

aligned, except in the unlikely event of a loss of coolantaccident (LOCA). The pumps aligned to the critical loops areautomatically started upon receipt of a safety injection or StationBlackout signal, and all essential valves are aligned to their post accidentpositions.

Additional information about the design and operation of the NSWS,along with a list of the components served, is presented in the UFSAR,Section 9.2 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the NSWS isthe removal of decay heat from the reactor via the CCW System.APPLICABLE The design basis of the NSWS is for one NSWS train, in conjunction withSAFETY ANALYSES the CCW System and the Containment Spray system, to remove coredecay heat following a design basis LOCA as discussed in the UFSAR,Section 6.2 (Ref. 2). This prevents the containment sump fluid fromincreasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following aLOCA and provides for a gradual reduction in the temperature of thisfluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System by the ECCSpumps. The NSWS is designed to perform its function with a singlefailure of any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power.The NSWS, in conjunction with the CCW System, also removes heatfrom the residual heat removal (RHR) system, as discussed in theUFSAR, Section 5.4 (Ref. 3), from RHR entry conditions to MODE 5during normal and post accident operations.

The time required for thisevolution is a function of the number of CCW and RHR System trainsthat are operating.

One NSWS train is sufficient to remove decay heatduring subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes amaximum NSWS inlet temperature of 1020F is not exceeded.

The NSWS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4).LCOTwo NSWS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the requiredredundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accidentMcGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-2Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESLCO (continued) heat loads, assuming that the worst case single active failure occurscoincident with the loss of offsite power.An NSWS train is considered OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4when:a. The associated unit's pump is OPERABLE; andb. The associated piping, valves, and instrumentation and controlsrequired to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.

Portions of the NSWS system are shared between the two units (FigureB 3.7.7-1).

The shared portions of the system must be OPERABLE foreach unit when that unit is in the MODE of Applicability.

Additionally, both normal and emergency power for shared components must also beOPERABLE.

If a shared NSWS component becomes inoperable, ornormal or emergency power to shared components becomes inoperable, then the Required Actions of this LCO must be entered independently foreach unit that is in the MODE of applicability of the LCO.APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the NSWS is a normally operating system thatis required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by theNSWS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.In MODES 5 and 6, the requirements of the NSWS are determined by thesystems it supports.

ACTIONS A._1If one NSWS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restoreOPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE NSWS train is adequate to perform the heat removalfunction.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a singlefailure in the OPERABLE NSWS train could result in loss of NSWSfunction.

Required Action A. 1 is modified by two Notes. The first Noteindicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions ofLCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating,"

should be entered if an inoperable NSWS train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator.

Thesecond Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and RequiredActions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," should be entered if aninoperable NSWS train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-3Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESACTIONS (continued)

This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions aretaken for these components.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based onthe redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the lowprobability of a DBA occurring during this time period.B.1 and B.2If the NSWS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within theassociated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE inwhich the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must beplaced in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within36 hours.The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the NSWScomponents or systems may render those components inoperable, butdoes not affect the OPERABILITY of the NSWS.Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, andautomatic valves in the NSWS flow path provides assurance that theproper flow paths exist for NSWS operation.

This SR does not apply tovalves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, sincethey are verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed,or secured.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of beingmispositioned are in the correct position.

This SR does not apply tovalves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under theSurveillance Frequency Control Program.McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-4Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.7.7.2This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the NSWS valves on anactual or simulated actuation safety injection signal. The NSWS is anormally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normaltesting.

This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked,sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position underadministrative controls.

The Surveillance Frequency is based onoperating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and iscontrolled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.SR 3.7.7.3This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the NSWS pumps on anactual or simulated actuation signal. The NSWS is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal testing duringnormal operation.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled underthe Surveillance Frequency Control Program.REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.3. UFSAR, Section 5.4.4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 5, "Sharing of Structures,
Systems, and Components".

McGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-5Revision No. 135 NSWSB 3.7.7BASESFIGURE B 3.7.7-1 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM(, C3w zXMcGuire Units 1 and 2B 3.7.7-6Revision No. 135

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