ML20245B045

Final SALP Rept 50-395/88-32 for Aug 1987 to Dec 1988

ML20245B045
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	12/31/1988
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245B038	List: ML20245B036 ML20245B045
References
50-395-88-32, NUDOCS 8906220361
Download: ML20245B045 (28)

See also: IR 05000395/1988032

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ENCLOSURE 5

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FINAL SALP REPORT

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER

50-395/88-32

' SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

V. C. SUMMER

August 1, 1987 - December 31, 1988

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

P_ age.

I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 2

A, Licensee Activities ......................................... 2

B. Direct Inspection and Review Activi ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS ............................................... 4

O v e r v i e w . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

.III. CRITERIA ......................................................... 6

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ............................................. 7

A. P l a n t O pe ra t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

B. Radiological Controls ....................................... 11

C. Maintenance / Surveillance .................................... 14

D. Emergency Preparedness ...................................... 17

E. S e c u r i ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

F. Engineering / Technical Support ............................... 20

G. Safety Assessment / Quality Verification ...................... 24

V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES .................................... 27

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A. Escalated Enforcement Action ................................ 27 i

B. Management Conferences ...................................... 27

C. Review of Licensee Event Reports ............................ 28

D. Licensing Activities ......................................... 28

E. Re a c to r T ri p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

F. Effluent Release Summary .................................... 30

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1. . INTRODUCTION-

The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is an

integrated NRC ctaff effort to collect available observations and data on

a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance on the basis of this

information. The program is supplemental to normal regulatory processes

used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations. It is intended

to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocation

of NRC resources and to provide meaningful feedback to the licensee's

management regarding the NRC's assessment of their facility's performance

in each functional area.

An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on

February 21, 1989, to review the observations and data on performance, and

to assess licensee performance in accordance with the quidance in NRC

Manual Chapter-0516. " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance." The

guidance and evaluation criteria are sumarized in Section III of this

report. The Board's findings and recommendations were forwarded to the

NRC Regional Administrator for approval and issuance.

This report is the NRC's assessment of the licensee's safety performance

at V. C. Summer for the period August 1, 1987 through December 31, 1988.

The SALP Board for V. C. Sumer was composed of:

C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Reactor Projects Division (DRP), Region II

(RII) (Chairman)

A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII

D. M. Collins, Acting Director, Division of Radiation Safety and

Safeguards (DRSS), RII

D. M. Verrelli, Chief, Reactor Prc.jects Branch 1, DRP, RII

E. A. Reeves, Acting Director, Project Directorate II-1, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR)

R. L. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector, V. C. Sumer, DRP, RII

J. J. Hayes, Project Manager, Project Directorate II-1, NRR

Attendees at SALP Board Meeting:

F. S. Cantrell, Chief, Project Section 1B, DRP, RII

H. C. Dance, Chief, Project Section 1A, DRP, RII

L. P. Modenos, Project Engineer, Project Section 1B, DRP, RI!

P. C. Hopkins, Resident Inspector, V. C. Summer DRP, RII

P. A. Balmain, Reactor Engineer, Technical Support Staff (TSS),

DRP, RII

A. Licensee Activities

The assessment period was from August 1,1987 to December 31, 1988.

The unit experienced three plant shutdowns and one power reduction

during the 1987 evaluation period. The first shutdown on l

September 2-12, 1987 was initiated by a reactor trip from 100 percent

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power due to a failed main generator bushing. After repair to the {

bushing, a leak was discovered in the main condenser boot seal which

required replacement in order to draw a vacuum. A second shutdown

occurred from September 24-25, 1987, due to a reactor trip caused by 3

a personnel error made while replacing a faulty power supply in the '

rod control cabinet. On October 14-17, 1987, power was reduced to

30 percent to allow for containment entry and equipment qualification

inspections of electrical connections on reactor building ccoling

units.

On October 29, 1987, the failure of the primary and backup power

supplies to a Westinghouse 7300 system process rack, due to a faulty

capacitor, resulted in a reactor trip. On October 30, 1987, with the

reactor subcritical and the control rod shutdown banks withdrawn, a

reactor trip occurred while replacing an indicator light in a source

range drawer. The use of an incorrect type bulb resulted in a blown

fuse and resulted in a reactor trip. The unit was restarted on

October 30, 1987, and remained at power through the end of 1987.

During 1987, the unit had a capacity factor of 63.7 percent and a

unit availability factor cf 67.7% including a 93 day refueling

outage.

During 1988, the unit experienced one scheduled shutdown and six

forced power reductions of greater than 20 percent which exceeded

four hours of duration. The first shutdown occurred on February 16,

1988, when 'a technician contacted a loose terminal post inside a

power range channel drawer while performing a test for quadrant power

tilt ratio. This resulted in a reactor trip. The unit remained shut

down from February 16-19, 1988. A defective test switch for the main

steam isolation valve resulted in a reactor trip and subsequent

safety injection during the performance of a surveillance test on

May 12, 1988. After repair, the unit was restarted on May 13, 1988.

On May 27, 1988, power was reduced to approximately 40 percent for

66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> while repairing condenser tube leaks. On May 30, 1988, power

was again reduced to 40 percent due to out of specification secondary

chemistry and additional condensor tube leaks. While at 40 percent

power, a reactor trip occurred during testing of the B train solid

state protection system. The cause of this trip was evaluated to be

incorrect operation of the main control board reactor trip switch

during reactor trip breaker testing. The main condensor tube leaks

were attributed to the failure of a flexible flange in the extraction

steam lines. Repairs were completed and the unit was returned to

power on June 10, 1988. On July 5-6, 1988, power was reduced to

40 percent for 34.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to allow repairs to the reactor coolant

drain tank pump. On July 26, 1988, the reactor again tripped during

testing of B train solid state protection system. This event is

similar to the event that occurred on June 10, 1988 and was related

to the operation of the main control board reactor trip switch. This

event was attributed to personnel error and the unit was returned to

power on July 28, 1988.

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n September 16, 1988, the plant shut down and entered the fourth

fueling outage. Major work activities in the outage included core

re oad, eddy current examination of 100 percent of the steam

gen ator tubes, tube plugging, equipment qualification upgrades, a

cont nment integrated leak rate test, inservice inspection; and

valve acking replacement. The outage exceeded the planned schedule

of 75 d s by 28 days.

The nuclea operations division was consolidated by relocating the

vice presid t. nuclear operations and the corporate staff to the

V.C. Summer ant in the last quarter of 1987. -The division underwent

a reorganizati in the first quarter of 1988 to reduce the number of

management and upervisory levels. The relocation moves were

supported by con, ructing new administrative and support facilities

and upgrading exis ing ones.

B. Direct Inspection an Review Activities

During the assessment p ,od, routine inspections were performed at

the V. C. Summer facility 3 the NRC staff. Special team inspections

were conducted as follows:

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Equipment Qualification pections were conducted in October

1987 and January 1988, wi a follow-up inspection conducted in

October 1988.

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Operational Safety Team Inspe ion was conducted in November and

December 1988.

II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Summer was operated in an overall safe manne during the assessment

period. Strengths were identified in the areas f Radiological Controls,

Maintenance and Surveillance. A significant dec ne in performance that

requires additional managerial attention was iden fied in the area of

Security.

Operations performance was mixed. Strengths were not in training of

shifts as a team and the presence of a shift engineer hift technical

advisor on each shift to coordinate shift activities with ther areas and

thereby permit the shift supervisor to concentrate on safe lant operation.

The establishment of the University of Maryland program to tain degrees

for on shift operators represents a substantive management c itment to

. improved shift expertise and safety. Corporate interest and o rsight of

plant activities was very apparent. However, the use of proced es with

known errors and the failure to maintain control room drawings, and

acceptable sistem configuration control at all times indicated a n d for

management attention. Added management attention is also needed to duce

the number of reactor trips. The fire protection area requires additi nal

oversight to preclude repetitious errors that have occurred during th1

period.

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On September 16, 1988, the plant shut down and entered the fourth

refueling outage. Major work activities in the outage included core

reload, eddy current examination of 100 percent of the steam

generator tubes, tube plugging, equipment qualification upgrades, a

containment integrated leak rate test, inservice inspection; and

valve packing replacement. The outage exceeded the planned schedule

of 75 days by 28 days.

The nue. lear operations division was consolidated by relocating the

vice president nuclear operations and the corporate staff to the

V.C. Summer plant in the last quarter of 1987. The division underwent

a reorganization in the first quarter of 1988 to reduce the number of

management and supervisory levels. The relocation moves were

supported by constructing new administrative and support facilities

and upgrading existing ones.

B. Direct Inspection and Review Activities

During the assessment period, routine inspections were performed at

the V. C. Summer facility by the NRC staff. Special team inspections

were conducted as follows:

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Equipment Qualification inspections were conducted in October

1987 and January 1988, with a follow-up inspection conducted in

October 1988.

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Operational Safety Team Inspection was conducted in November and

December 1988.

II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Summer was operated in an overall safe manner during the assessment

period. Strengths were identified in the areas of Radiological Controls,

Maintenance and Surveillance. A significant decline in performance that

requires additional managerial attention was identified in the area of

Security.

Operations performance was mixed. Strengths were noted in training of

shifts as a team and the presence of a shift engineer / shift technical

advisor on each shift to coordinate shift activities with other areas and

thereby permit the shift supervisor to concentrate on safe plant operation.

The establishment of the University of Maryland program to obtain degrees

for on shift operators represents a substantive management connitment to

improved shift expertise and safety. Corporate interest and oversight of

plant activities was very apparent. However, the use of procedures

containing errors, the failure to maintain control room drawings, and the

lack of acceptable system configuration control at all times indicated a

need for management attention. Added management attention is also needed

to reduce the number of reactor trips. The fire protection area requires

additional oversight to preclude repetitious errors that have occurred

during this period.

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The Radiological Controls area was considered a strength. The reduction

of contaminated areas to less than one percent was noteworthy. However,

considering the current problems associated with steam generator tube

integrity and failed fuel, the licensee is faced with challenges that

may require innovative approaches if personnel exposure and contamination

is to be maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

The maintenance / surveillance program was well implemented and considered a

strength. The reduction in maintenance work order backlog, implementation

of a predictive maintenance program, and operations support to the

planning and scheduling group are considered strengths. The timely

completion of surveillance tests indicates that the testing program was

well staffed and supervised.

Emergency Preparedness activities' were conducted in an adequate manner.

In the area of Emergency Preparedness, the licensee demonstrated an

ability to adequately implement the essential elements of their Emergency

Plan. However, inspection results showed that a weakness identified in

the training of key staff personnel during the previous assessment still

existed.

The Security area, long considered a strength at this site, experienced

several significant problems which resulted in escalated enforcement late

in the assessment period. Organizational changes in 1988 resulted in

deteriorating security force performance. Management was slow to

recognize these changes until personnal performance had decreased to a

marginal level. Significant management attention is required to raise the

performance of this area back to its past level of performance.

The Engineering / Technical Support function was performed well during the

evaluation period. The engineering staff was consolidated and relocated

to the plant site to provide more rapid response to plant problems.

- However, during the assessment period instances of ina6quate engineering

evaluations and a concern with the adequacy of review of contractor

evaluations were identified. The system engineer program which was

established in late 1987 has been slow in being implemented. Additional

management attention may be required to achieve the desired benefits of

this program.

The Safety Assessment / Quality Verification area performance was good.

.0perations, engineering and management involvement in safety issues was

apparent. The licensee continued to pursue and realize positive benefits

from their efforts in safety system functional inspections and development

of system design bases documents. In response to the excessive reactor

trip problem, a root cause identification training program has been

started. Repetitious trips from the main control board reactor trip

switch in 1988 indicate a need for additional management attention in this i

area. QA and QC continue to provide good oversight of safety activities. I

Licensee submittals to the NRC were considered acceptable.

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Overview

Rating Last Period Rating This Period

Functional Area 1/1/86 - 7/31/87 8/1/87 - 12/31/88 Trend

Plant Operations 2 2

Radiological Controls 1 1

Maintenance / Surveillance 1 1

Emergency Preparedness 2 2

Security 1 2 Declining

Engineering / Technical Support NR 2

Safety Assessment / 2 2

Quality Verification

III. CRITERIA

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Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas.- depending

on whether the facility is in a construction or operational phase.

Functional areas normally represent areas- significant to nuclear safety

'and the environment. Some functional areas may not be assessed because of

little or no. licensee activities or lack of meaningful observations.

Special areas may be added to highlight significant observations.

The following evaluation criteria were used, as applicable, to assess each

functional area:

1. - Assurance of quality, including management involvement and control;

2. Approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety

standpoint;

3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives;

4. Enforcement history;

5. Operational and construction events (including the response,

analyses, reporting, and corrective actions);

6. Staffing (includingmanagement);and

7. Effectiveness of training and qualification program.

However, the NRC is not limited to these criteria and others may have been

used where appropriate.

On the basis of the NRC assessment, each functional area evaluated is

rated according to three performance categories. The definitions of these

performance categories.are as follows: )

Category 1. Licensee management attention and involvement are readily

evident and place emphasis on superior performance of nuclear safety or

safeguards activities, with the resulting performance substantially

exceeding regulatory requirements. Licensee resources are ample and

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effectively used so that a high level of plant and personnel performance

is being achieved. Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.

Category 2. Licensee management attention to and involvement in the

performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are good. The

licensee has attained a level of performance above that needed to meet

regulatory requirements. Licensee resources are adequate and reasonably

allocated so that good plant and personnel performance is being achieved.

NRC attention may be maintained at normal levels.

Category 3. Licensee management attention to and involvement in the

performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are not sufficient.

The licensee's performance does not significantly exceed that needed to

meet minimal regulatory requirements. Licensee resources appear to be

strained or not effectively used. NRC attention should be increased above

normal levels.

The SALP Board may also include an appraisal of the performance trend of a

functional area. This performance trend will only be used when both a

definite trend of performance within the evaluation period is discernable

and the Board believes that continuation of the trend may result in a

change of performance level. The trend, if used, is defined as:

Improving: Licensee performance was determined to be improving near the

close of the assessment period.

Declining: Licensee performance was determined to be declining near the

close of the assessment period and the licensee had not taken meaningful

steps to address this pattern.

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A. Plant Operations

1. Analysis

During the assessment period routine and special inspections

were performed by the NRC staff. The fire protection program

was examined by a special inspect ton in February,1988 and an

Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI) was conducted in

November and December, 1988.

The operations group is well staffed with five shifts that stand

12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> watches. Each shift includes a shift engineer / shift I

technical advisor, shift supervisor (SRO), control room

supervisor (SRO), reactor operator (SR0/RO), a first and second

assistant operator who may be SR0/R0 or in training for a

license and five to six auxiliary operators. All shift

engineers are degreed and six of eight possess SR0 licenses.

The remaining two are currently in training for SR0 licenses.

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he shifts train and operate together as a team. The shift

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e ineer coordinates all shift support functions and thereby

fr s . the shift supervisor to concentrate on -safe plant

ope tion. The reactor operators and first and second assistant

oper ors routinely rotate from the control room to auxiliary

opera r watch stations to maintain their proficiency-' and

utilize their experience throughout the plant. The licensee has

experien d only negligible personnel turnover in this area.

To- improve educational and engineering expertise on shift,

management . itiated a college degree program for licensed

operators in 987. This program is conducted by the University

of Maryland an $ffers a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear

Science. Thirt 4o of the forty initial candidates are still

participating in program. Any nuclear operations personnel

may participate in is program; however, licensed operators and

license candidates

ggivenpriority.

Administrative contro to ensure control room professionalism

were established and a effective. Access to the at-the-control

area is limited and we 1 controlled. Operator logs were

legible and complete w1 h normal conditions, off-normal

conditions, special tests and events identified. Preshift

briefings were conducted an4 shift turnover forms were used by

all operators. Watchstander and duty technician assignments

were clearly posted in the c trol room. Key controls for

operator access to spaces and quipment were well organized.

Operator response to off-normal nditions and plant transients

was prompt and thorough. This wa exemplified during a loss of

reactor coolant letdown event that ccured in 1988. The rapid

identification of an incorrect cont 1 signal resulted in the

operator transferring control of let wn from the main ontrol

board to the remote shutdown panel an thereby bypassing the

faulty control circuit. This timely re onse prevented a plant

shutdown. The licensee has initiated a ogram to enhance the

black board concept for alarm annunciators

The OSTI identified instances where addi 'onal licensee l

attention was needed tc control valve and rcuit breaker

alignment limiting conditions for operation (LCO), and

legibility of control room essential drawings. e licensee was

very responsive in revising LC0 procedures to duce the

potential for reliance on inoperable systems and - corporating

procedural steps to require independent verificati of valve

and circuit breaker positions. System walkdowns the

OSTI team members identified numerous technical nd

typographical errors in existing system operating proce res and ,

attachments used for valve and breaker alignments. hse

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procedures had been implemented and issued to the field fc use,

without a good review, or validation. It was anticipated la t l

operators would make the needed corrections while accomplis

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system lineups and verification of lineups. One illegible i

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The shifts train and operate together as a team. The shif t

engineer coordinates all shift support functions and thereby

frees the shift supervisor to concentrate on safe plant

operation. The reactor operators and first and second assistant

operators routinely rotate from the control room to auxiliary

operator watch stations to maintain their proficiency and

utilize their experience throughout the plant. The licensee has

experienced only negligible personnel turnover .n this area.

To improve educational and engineering . expertise on shift,

management initiated a college degree program for licensed

operators in 1987. This program is conducted by the University

of Maryland and offers a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear

Science. Thirty-two of the forty initial candidates are still i

participating in the program. Any nuclear operations personnel

may participate. in this program; however, licensed operators and

license candidates are given priority.

Administrative controls to ensure control room professionalism

were established and are effective. Access to the at-the-control

area is limited and well controlled. Operator logs were

legible and complete with normal conditions, off-normal

conditions, special tests and events identified. Preshift

briefings were conducted and shift turnover forms were used by

all operators. Watchstanders and duty technician assignments

were clearly posted in the control room. Key controls for

operator access to spaces and equipment were well organized.

Operator response to off-normal conditions and plant transients

was prompt and thorough. This was exemplified during a loss of

reactor coolant letdown event that occured in 1988. The rapid

identification of an incorrect control signal resulted in the

operator transferring centrol of letdown from the main control

board to the remote shutdown panel and thereby bypassing the

faulty control circuit. This timely response prevented a plant

shutdown. The licensee has initiated a program to enhance the

black board concept for alarm annunciators.

The OSTI identified instances where additional licensee

attention was needed to control valve and circuit breaker

alignment limiting conditions for operation ( LCO) , and

legibility of control room essential drawings. The licensee was

very responsive in revising LCO procedures to reduce the

potential for reliance on inoperable systems and incorporating

procedural steps to require independent verification of valve

and circuit breaker positions. System walkdowns by the

OSTI team members identified numerous technical and

typographical errors in existing system operating procedures and

attachments used for valve and breaker alignments. These

procedures had been implemented and issued to the field for use, ,

without a good review, or validation. Operators had to make

the needed corrections while accomplishing system lineups and

verification of lineups. One illegible drawing was identified

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during the OSTI inspection; a resulting followup review by the 'l

licensee identified 28 ~ additional drawings with inadequate or

marginal clarity. These items were the subject of violation b.

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below.

Over the assessment period, plant housekeeping was considered

average. The control room and main control board were repainted

and new carpet was installed during the 1983 refueling outage.

In general plant areas, a program to upgrade painting,

appearance and protective coatings has resulted in an ' improved

appearance. However, it is noted that the number of leaks from

non-radioactive and radioactive systems, although wrapped with

herculite and routed to drains, have . increased. Operation

should pursue the timely correction of these deficiencies.

Regular plant tours are accomplished by the Vice president

Nuclear Operations, the plant manager and the plant ranager's

staff. Corporate interest and oversight of the plant was

evident from frequent visits and plant tours by senior

management. Monthly trend reports and performance indicators

are published to keep plant and corporate management appraised

of plant status and potential plant.probl' ems.

The plant capacity factor for the SALP period was 72.4 percent

even with a 103 day refueling outage at the end of 1988. A

comparison with the previous SALP shows that the unit forced

outage rate increased from 4.01 to 6.20 percent. The outage

rate-is above the industry mid 1988 one year median of 4.8. The

reactor trips, when compared with the previous SALP increased

from seven to eight. The trip rate, even though some improve-

ment was shown in 1988, is still above the industry one year

median of approximately two. A review of the reactor trips

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determined that four trips were related to equipment failure,

two trips were due to equipment design and two trips were the

result of personnel errors. Five of eight trips occurred during

the performance of surveillance tests.

Management responded to the excessive reactor trip problem by

initiating actions to improve labelling of procedural steps that

present trip hazards and providing dditional technical training

on surveillar.ce tests which expose the unit to high trip risk. l

Studies are <:urrently underway to justify a reduction in

periodicity of high trip potential surveillance.

The adequacy of the licensee's post trip reviews was questioned

in May 1988 as the result of a reactor trip and reduced service

water flow to the reactor building cooling units during a

subsequent safety injection. The reduced service water flow

problem was not detected during the post trip review. The

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diligence of the Independent Safety Evaluation Group resulted in

the identification of this problem after the plant restarted.

This item was the subject of a severity level III violation 3

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issued in August 1988. (See violation a. below).

A problem was identified on the previous SALP concerning the

correct alignment of swing pumps. The corrective actions taken

and discussed in the previous SALP appeared to be effective and

no new or repeat problems were identified in this area.

Control of combustible and flammable materials in safety related

related areas of the plant was considered good. An identified

exception included an area in the auxiliary building where

approximately 4.5 tons of combustible charcoal had been

temporarily stored. (See violation g below).

The required drills and training of Fire Brigade members were

conducted within the frequency outlined in plant procedures.

Satisfactory performance of the Fire Brigade in an unannounced

drill witnessed by NRC staff demonstrated the effectiveness of

the Fire Brigade training program.

The licensee has experienced events where compensatory fire

watches were not established for degraded fire barriers or

inoperable fire e These events were the subject of

five violations (quipment.

c through g) and five LER's during the

evaluation period. Extensive management attention was directed

to this area. A Fire Protection Officer was placed on each

operating shift to monitor and provide improved response for

degraded fire barriers and protection equipment. This single

point accountability had additionally resulted in improved

communications and better equipment status control.

Staffing in the fire protection area increased in 1988 from a

fire protection supervisor and five technicians to a fire i

protection supervisor; a fire protection coordinator; two

specialists who supervise fire protection officers and

surveillance testing; three technicians and five operation shift

fire protection officers. These changes occurred in the last

quarter of 1988 and have not been implemented long enough to

allow full evaluation.

Seven violations were identified of which five involved

inadequate fire protection or compensatory actions.

L a. Severity level III violation for making a mode change with

{ both trains of RBCU's inoperable. (395/88-13-01)

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b. Severity level IV violation for illegible control room

! drawings and incorrect valve lineup procedures.

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c. Severity level IV violation for failure to take adequate

compensatory action for inoperable fire detection

equipment. (395/88-24-01)

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d. Severity level IV violation for failure to take adequate

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compensatory action for inoperable fire detection equipment

and a breached fire barrier. (395/88-03-01)

e. Severity level IV violation for failure to take adequate

L compensatory action for inoperab'e fire suppression

equipment. (395/88-10-01)

f. Severity level IV violation for failure to take adequate

action for

equipment. compensatory (395/88-19-01) inoperable fire detection

g. Severity level IV violation for failure to establish

adequate compensatory fire protection measures for

increased transient fire loading due to temporary storage

of 4.5 tons of combustible charcoal and for-failure to have

an important procedure at a control panel. (395/88-26-01)

2. Performance Rating:

I

Category: 2 Previous rating - Operation: 2

Fire Protection: 2

3. Recommendations:

Management support of operations needs to be improved. This

need is indicated by procedures being issued that still contain

errors that should have been identified by a procedure

review / verification program. Another indication is control room

drawings issued for operations use when numerous drawings were

illegible. Operations personnel need to be more aggressive in

raising these type problems to management's attention and in

pursuing a satisfactory resolution of identified problems.

B. Radiological Controls

1. Analysis

During the assessment period, inspections were performed by the

resident and regional inspection staffs. Inspections were

conducted in the areas of radiation protection, radiological '

effluents, and confirmatory measurements.

During the assessment period, the licensee reorganized the

chemistry and Health Physics departments in the first quarter of

1988. A chemistry and health physics manager position was

established and filled with a former corporate health physicist.

1

4

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The - former . Manager .of Technical and Support Services at the-

.~ plant was assigned to the position .of. Corporate Manager of

Health ~ Physics.: The licensee also-established the position of

, Radwaste Coordinator and filled the_ position with an engineer

<

who had been serving as a shift technical advisor.

The;11censee's' health physics (HP) and radwaste staffing levels

.

appear; to be slightly lower than other. utilities having a

, facility of similar size. In additior. .to the regular plant HP

technicians,.-the licensee retains 14 ' to 16 contract HP

technicians to augment the HP staff for routine operations. The

smaller-permanent staff has not had any deleterious' effects on

the performance of the HP staff. Tha knowledge'and experience

' level' off the HP- staff were excellent. The overall quality of

the staff was a program strength.

Radiation protection training was considered good. .The.

licensee's general, employee training in radition protection was

well defined. The licensee enhanced training by establishing a

training program for HP supervisors. 'Since this program is in

addition to regulatory requirements, it -indicates management's

support for and commitment to high training standards.

Management support and involvement in . matters related to

radiation protection were demonstrated by upgrading the whole

body counters with germanium detectors and the procurement;of a

standup whole body counter. . Inspection during the evaluation

period indicated that the . radiation protection program received

strong support from other plant departments.

At the.end of 1988, the contaminated area of the plant was less

than one percent of the total . areas monitored. Ma licensee's

aggressive -contamination control program allows plant personnel

to . access containment without protective clothing. Resulting

benefits are a reduction in the amount of radioactive waste

generated and less restrictions on workers and supervisors

during performance of their assigned tasks.

In 1987, the collective dose was 562 person-rem with 547

person-rem being attributed to a refueling outage and

maintenance on steam generators. In 1986, the collective dose

was'23 person-rem, however, there were no outages in 1986. In

1988, the licensee expended 18 person-rem for normal operations

and 503 person-rem for outage related work. Primary

contributors to the high collective dose in the last two years

have been the increase in reactor coolant system (RCS)

radioactivity and increased steam generator maintenance. In

some high traffic areas of the plant radiation in the residual

heat removal-(RHR) lines has caused dose rates in adjacent areas

to increase by a factor of 20. Significant increases in dose

rates'were also observed during reactor head work, fuel movement

_ - _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ __ _- - _____ _ _

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.

-e 13

and reactor cavity decontamination. The collective doses' for

1987 and 1988 are representative for plants experiencing steam

generator and fuel problems.

.The licensee has a number of initiatives underway to limit and

reduce dose rates within the plant including elimination of the

resistance temperature detector bypass- manifold, evaluation of

the replacement of primary system filters with smaller mesh

filters to reduce the particulate in the RCS, evaluation of

raising the pH of the RCS, and chemical decon of various

RHR/RCS-systems and/or components in 1989.

The licensee's respiratory protection and radiation work permit

programs .were found to be satisfactory. The licensee

experienced a total of 130 personnel contaminations in 1987, l

76 skin contaminations and 54 clothing contaminations. In 1988,

the number of personnel contaminations increased 240 percent to

141 skin and 171 clothing contaminations. The licensee

experienced 52 discrete radioactive particle contaminations in

1988, due' to failed fuel and the increased amount of system

-maintenance. Previously, the licensee had only three hot

particle contaminations with the majority of the particles being

fission products. The licensee has an aggressive program for

the identification and control of discrete radioactive

particles.

During the assessment period, the licensee contracted with a

vendor to perform super compaction of dry radioactive waste to

reduce the volume of dry radioactive waste shipped to a low

level waste burial facility.

Participation in the NRC spiked sample analysis program for beta

emitting radionuclides showed agreement with NRC results for all

four nuclides.

Liquid and gaseous effluents were within regulatory limits for

concentrations of radioactive material releases. There were

slightly increasing trends in the annual quantities of

radioactive material effluent releases for the past three years.

Annual effluent releases are summarized in the Supporting Data

L

and Summaries,Section V.K. Licensee estimates of doses to

.

maximum exposed individuals were well below the limits in the

L technical specifications.

Radiological audits and surveillance conducted by the licensee

were comprehensive and sufficiently in-depth to identify problem

areas and trends. Management was responsive to the problems

identified. '

1

No violations or deviations were identified.

L

. - _ _ _ - _ _ _ -

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l

2. Performance Rating

')

Category: 1 Previous rating: 1

3. Recommendations

The Board recognized your continuous high level of performance

in this area. The Board does note that there have been

increases in fuel leakage in the recent past with the resultant

potential for increase in radiation levels and contamination.

The Board recommends you continue a high level of management

attention to this area because of this increased challenge.

C. Maintenance / Surveillance

1. Analysis

During the assessment period routine and special inspections

were performed by the NRC staff. Equipment Qualification (EQ)

team inspections were conducted in October 1987, January 1988,

and October 1988. A Containment Integra.ted Leak Rate Test

(CILRT) inspection was conducted in September, 1988. An OSTI in

November and December 1988, evaluated maintenance support of

operations.

The maintenance organization is adequately staffed and trained

to support operation of the plant. The staff is supplemented by

contractors, as needed, to support plant outages. This unit has

experienced a very low turnover of maintenance personnel.

The corrective maintenance and preventive program was planned

and performed in accordance with established procedures.

Supervisors provided adequate direction and assistance, as

needed, to complete activities. QC provided adequate coverage

of safety related activities. Maintenance activities were

scheduled and tracked with a history maintained by computerized

systems.

The predictive maintenance program used vibration analysis,

temperature monitoring, ferrography (lube oil), infrared surveys

and motor operated valve analysis and tests systems (M0 VATS) to

determine the need for equipment maintenance. Success

experienced in this program included vibration monitoring of the

main feed pumps which led to early identification and correction

of coupling grease loss and alignment problems. The use of

vibration analysis and ferrography on the reactor coolant pumps

(RCP) permitted the licensee to extend the scheduled maintenance

on "B" RCP to refueling outage 5. This extension will allow

concurrent motor tear down and seaI replacement on the RCP's for

-__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

., .

15

11 future outages. The M0 VATS equipment has been upgraded and

t e data bank has been expanded to approximately 80 percent of

th installed motor operator valves.

The erations Section of Scheduling was staffed with three SR0s

and on R0. The application of licensed expertise was a strong

point i the maintenance scheduling process. Another strong

point wa the daily preparation of a " trip package" which

contained lanned maintenance activities requiring a duration of

less than ight hours to perform. Additionally, a "short

duration out e package" was also planned for those activities

which could b completed in the event plant trip recovery took

longer than ei t hours but less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

A weakness was i ntified in the previous SAll' in the area of

first line superv ory involvement on planning and directing

maintenance activit s. Management has provided team building '

and additional trai ' to those supervisors. The shift

engineer program has so improved operations interface with

maintenance activities. However, it is still evident from the

excessive time required complete some task, such as M0V

lubricant change and dur the refueling outage, that first

line supervisors are stil ot sufficiently involved in work

planning activities. Altho this weakness was noted, and it

is apparent that licensee se eduled more work than they were

able to accomplish during the time allotted for the fourth

refueling outage, they are comm ded for not cancelling scheduled

work, and for extending the outa to insure that essential work ,

was completed.

During a Phase I review of Environm tal Qualification (EQ) of

Electrical Equipment in January 1988, a problem was identified

in the area of EQ maintenance. The EQ aintenance rcanirements

for the lubrication of the Emergency F dwater Pump were not

accomplished for two consecutive 12 mont periods. In response

to the violation "c" below, the licensee rformed an indepth

review of all EQ maintenance requirements a d incorporated the

requirements into a comprehensive EQ Mainten nce Manual which

will schedule specific maintenance task over o tage periods.

A maintenance self-assessment program using INP0 utdelines was

completed by the licensee in March 1988. Base upon that ,

assessmat the licensee concluded that they met he INPO

criteria through their established programs. A sma' number of

weaknesses were identified in the area of planning an outages.

l

These items have been assigned to a task manager to nsure

l timely completion. .

!

l The maintenance backlog contained approximately 600 mainte nce l

work requests (MWR) at the end of the SALP period. The bac og

had been reduced by approximately 20 percent in the past 1

months. Nonoutage MWR's that are over three months old are

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15

all future outages. The M0 VATS equipment has been upgraded and

the data bank has been expanded to approximately 80 percent of

the installed motor operator valves.

The Operations Section of Scheduling was staffed with three SR0s

and one R0. The application of licensed expertise was a strong

point in' the maintenance scheduling process. Another strong

-point was the daily preparation of a " trip package" which

contained planned maintenance activities requiring a duration of

less than eight hours to perform. Additionally, a "short

duration outage package" was also planned for those activities

which could be completed in the event plant trip recovery took

longer than eight hours but less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

A weakness was identified in the previous SALP in the area of

first line supervisory involvement in planning and directing

maintenance activities. In response to this item, management

implemented additional training and a team building program for

those supervisors. The shift -engineer program has lead to

improvement in operations and maintenance. work and

communications interface. However, it is apparent- from the

increased amount of time taken to complete scheduled outage

work, that adequate input from the field and feedback to the

work scheduling process are not being considered in.

establishing schedules. 'The time allotted for MOV lubricant

changeout during the outage, far exceeded the time allotted.

Improved use of maintenance history data for task time

requirements and training exercises on new tasks could provide

more realistic . planning data. Although this weakness was

noted, the licensee is comended for not cancelling scheduling

work, and extending the outage to insure that essential work

was completed.

During a Phase I review of Environmental Qualification (EQ) of

Electrical Equipment in January 1988, a problem was identified

in the area of EQ maintenance. The EQ maintenance requirements

for the lubrication of the Emergency Feedwater Pump were not

accomplished for two consecutive 12 month periods. In response

to the violation "c" below, the licensee performed an indepth

review of all EQ maintenance requirements and incorporated the

requirements into a comprehensive EQ Maintenance Manual which

will schedule specific maintenance task over outage periods.

A maintenance self-assessment program using INP0 guidelines was

completed by the licensee in March 1988. Based upon that

assessment the licensee concluded that they met the INP0

criteria through their established programs. A small number of

weaknesses were identified in the area of planning and outages.

These items have been assigned to a task manager to ensure l

timely completion. {

The maintenance backlog contained approximately 600 maintenance

work requests (MWR) at the end of the SALP period. The backlog

had_been reduced by approximately 20 percent in the pas,t 18

_ _ _

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!

16

!

trended for management attention. The timely review of the MWR

backlog and the relatively small number of MWRs older than three

months were considered strengths.

The licensee's overall CILRT program was conducted in a

controlled and acceptable manner. The CILRT showed evidence of

. prior planning and management. involvement in the use of detailed

-O test controls and experienced leak rate test consultants. A

conservative approach to . technical issues was observed in the

resolution of instrumentation and leakage problems encountered

during the performance of the test. The conduct and quality of

the testing was acceptable. Surveillance test records were

complete, legible, and readily retrievable. Local leak rate .'

test personnel were well qualified for their job functions and

were knowledgeable in procedural and regulatory requirements.

Staffing in this area was adequate for the level of activity.

. The instrument calibrations facility was found to have well

organized records and well maintained and calibrated equipment.

The licensee's control, issue and accountability of tools showed

a significant improvement during the recent refueling outage.

Tools were more readily available for work performance.

Approximately 9,000 surveillance were conducted during the SALP

period and only two were not documented as have being completed

within the prescribed time limits. Both of the' tests were on

the diesel fire pump batteries. These deficiencies were

identified and corrected by the licensee in a timely manner.

These results indicate a strong and effective program with good

management oversight of this area. However, it is noted that

five of the eight reactor trips occurred during surveillance

tests. Three violations were identified.

a. Severity Level IV violation for failure to properly

implement Administrative Procedure SAP-134 thereby

performing an inadequate post-test review of test results

for surveillance test procedure STP-210.002.

(395/88-07-01)

b. Severity Level IV violation for failure to maintain plant

procedures which provide instructions for operation of the

service water "A" pumps screen wash pump and traveling

l

screen. (395/88-15-01)

c. Severity Level V violation for failure to perform EQ '

maintenance requirements for lubrication of the emergency i

feedwater pump for two consecutive twelve month periods. l

(395/88-01-01)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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17

2. Performance Rating

Category: 1 Previous rating - Maintenance: 1 Surveillance: 1

3. Recommendations

D. Emergency Preparedness

1. Analysis

The inspections conducted during this assessment period by NRC

staff included one routine EP inspection in M6y 1988, and an

Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Appraisal conducted in March

1988.

Based on the inspection activity noted above, the licensee

demonstrated an ability to adequately implement the essential  ;

elements of the Summer Emergency Plan during a simulated or

'

actual emergency event. However, declining performance in the

area of Emergency Plan required trair.ing was identified as noted  !

below.

The routine inspection, conducted in May 1988, disclosed a

recurrent licensee problem involving the failure to follow their

Emergency Plan with re. sect to requirements for training. A

violation was identifieo for failure to provide required

training to two key members (Radiological Assessment Supervisor

and Maintenance Supervisor) of the onsite emergency organization

assessment staff in accordance with Emergency Plan procedures.

The licensee's planned corrective action appeared adequate. All

other training of key members of the emergency organization

appeared to be consistent with approved procedures. However, a

similar violation was identified during the preceding assessment

period involving training of key members of the emergency

organization on the fission product barrier approach to

emergency event classification.

During the ERF Appraisal walkthroughs, a Shift Supervisor made

an untimely event classification, as well as an incorrect

emergency declaration in response to a postulated casualty

presented by the inspector. It was noted that an artificiality

in the scenario may have been a contributing factor. However,

the licensee acknowledged that improvements were needed in the

Emergency Plan training program. The General Manager for

Operations connitted to provide additional training for

Emergency Directors to include, as a minimum, event

classification and protective action recommendations.

The March 1988 ERF Appraisal disclosed that the emergency

i response facilities, including the Control Room, Technical

'

Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),

fully met the regulatory criteria, orders, and license

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I

)

conditions issued to implement Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. The

ERFs provided all necessary equipment, systems, documents, and

supplies to assist the licensee in the identification and 1

mitigation of plant emergency events, and implemented all

elements of the Emergency Plan required to protect onsite

personnel and the public within the assigned emergency planning

zone.

The licensee maintains the ERFs, and all equipment and systems 4

therein, in an adequate state of operational readiness for

responding to emergencies.. The licensee also established an

effective management and control program fer the Early Warning

Siren System, and installed a redundant transmitter and encoder

for the . system. Shift staffing augmentation appeared to be  ;

i

consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance. Although

no violations were identified during the Appraisal, the licensee

committed to review several dose assessment followup items and

to provide a response. The licensee's response has been reviewed

and determined to be acceptable.

During the assessment period, five revisions were submitted to

'the Emergency Plan for NRC review and approval. The proposed

revisions were determined to be consistent with regulatory

requirements and guidance.

One violation was identified. Although the finding was not

indicative of a significant programmatic breakdown in the EP

program as a whole, it is clear that performance in Emergency

Plan required training has declined. The licensee continued to

demonstrate overall the capability to fully implement key

elements of the Emergency Plan during simulated or actual plant

emergency events.

a. Severity Level IV violation for failure of two key members

of the onsite emergency response organization to complete

training in accordance with Emergency Plan Procedure

EPP-018, Emergency Training and Drills. (395/87-23)

2. Performance Rating

Category: 2 Previous rating: 2

3. Recommendations

The Board note: that during an inspection after the close of the

assessment period (in January 1989) there was another finding of

failure to provide training to members of the emergency response

team. We encouragt. licensee management to give increased

emphasis to emergency response training and retraining and

recommend increased NRC inspection resources be provided in this

area.

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'l

E. -Security

l

1. ' Analysis

Two routine and one reactive inspections were conducted by the

.NRC staff.

~

The licensee - expended extensive resources ~ in constructing a

secondary access portal, installing a new security computer, a

new access control system, a' new . secondary alarm station.

upgrading the closed circuit TV system and central alarm station

-

and providing additional protection for the secondary power

supply system.

Historically, this licensee has been one of the Region's

+ ' outstanding . security performers. The problems discussed below

became' apparent during the last half of the rating period.

The ' security organizat'on, after the loss of- the security

manager and the captain in charge of security personnel in late

1987,.was reorganized and incorporated into the Nuclear Protec-

tion Service lwith a new manager, associate manager and several

supervisory changes brought about by attrition. . Changes in

management, supervision style and philosophy were not readily

accepted by the security force. Management was also slow in

recognizing situations which resulted in a deteriorating

security morale and perfonnance. As a result, certain viola-

tions were. identified in the latter part of the SALP period _and-

an Enforcement Conference was held on January 6, 1989 to discuss

the following items: failure to control access .to vital and

protected areas; failure to control access to the

area; failure to control access to a vital area (protected

sleeping

guard); failure to rotate locks and cores after terminating

- members of the security force; failure to implement contingency

-

measure; inadequate perimeter intrusion detection system; and

. inadequate-reporting of safeguards events.

Serious management attention to these weaknesses was provided

after.this series of events which occurred in the last quarter

of 1988. These events and a resulting NRC inspection indicated

that security performance in the area of personnel access

control had reached a level of marginal performance.

The repetitive access control violations indicate: a. breakdown

in the supervisory oversight of the security force; a failure on

the part -of the security force to recognize and correct

problems; and a failure of management to implement effective

corrective measures. The root cause analyses for the first

access control problem was not effective in preventing recur- i

rence. Management also demonstrated a lack of familiarity with  !

basic security requirements as evidenced by the failure to

e

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.

,3 ...

20

search a vital area when the security force member posted to

control area access was discovered asleep. Further examples of

lack of. familiarity with requirements was evident when the

licensee failed to rotate security locks following the

termination of members of the security' force on several

occasions.

Although the licensee employs a dedicated security maintenance

staff, a lack of attention to detail.a lack 'of technical

<

' expertise or incorrect implementation of regulatory

requirements, was' found by the NRC in the areas of intrusion

detection equipment. Critical self-assessment was lacking,

therefore problems were not identified at an early stage.

After initial identification of the above problems, the licensee

responded by assigning a new General Manager Station Support and

redefinition of responsibilities for licensee and contractor

employees has been implemented.

I

One violation was identified during this assessment period.

.However, subsequent to the end of the assessment period,

escalated enforcement action involving multiple examples of

security deficiencies was issued.

a. Severity level IV violation for inadequate perimeter

intrusion detection capability. (395/87-31-01)

2. Performance Rating

Category: 2 (Declining) Previous rating: 1

-3. Recommendations

The Board has noted that during the first half of this SALP

period the licensee enjoyed a favorable security program without .

the negative impact of enforcement issues. However, a serious

degradation during the second half of this SALP period that

could result, if unchecked, in a SALP 3 rating. In order to

alleviate this situation the Board recommends that a high level

of management attention continue to be given to this program

area.

F. Engineering / Technical Support

1. Analysis

The Engineering Technical Support functional area addresses the

adequacy of technical and engineering support for all plant

activities. To determine the adequacy of support provided,

specific attention was given to the identification and resolu-

tion of technical issues, responsiveness to NRC initiatives,

enforcement history, staffing, effectiveness of training, and

qualification. The scope of this assessment includes all

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21

icensee activities associated with plant modifications,

t hnical support provided for. operation, maintenance, testing

an surveillance, operator training, procurement, and configu-

rat n control.

The li nsee has initiated or continued several major efforts to

improve r maintain the quality of engineering performance. The

Corporat Nuclear Operations Division relocated to the plant

site,in 1 e 1987. This move consolidated engineering proce-

dures, work activities and placed the design expertise close to

plant activi ies. The relocation provides an enhancement to the

operations /en neering interface. In conjunction with the

relocation, a organization initiated a system engineering

program. This ogram is designed to improve overall system

performance tren and provide a designated system interface

for operational an etechnical issues. However, the licensee's

progress in impleme g this program has been slow.

The licensee's progra Yrto document and verify major systems

design bases was contin from the previous assessment period.

The design basis docume jion (DBD) effort integrated system

and component requirement actual as-built information, project

commitments, and engineeri accident analysis and margins.

Sixteen DBDs were completed his assessment period. The DBDs

have provided a good referenc resource for engineering activity

and contributed to the identi cation and correction of plant

problems. This design base ef rt is a long term continuing

activity with approximately 50 BDs planned for future

completion.

The licensee's steam generators co tinue to exhibit the

deleterious effects of primary water tress cracking corrosion

as evidenced by the number of tubes r uiring plugging during

the fourth refueling outage. Steam ge rators A, B and C

presently have 6.0, 10.9 and 6.5 percent their tubes plugged.

Although preventive measures such as Roto ening, shot peening

and stress relieving have been accomplished during previous

outages. These measures and engineering st ies which have

reduced plugging requirements have not provi d an ultimate

solution to this problem.

Engineering performance on specific technical iss es has been

good and overall performance resulted in a modific ion backlog

reduction. Engineering provided timely assistance problem

definition, solution, corrective action, and develo ent of

Justifications for Continued Operation when required t support

plant activities. Specifically, engineering support to apera-

tions and maintenance was effective in the evaluation o' the

hydraulic lock-up of the pressurizer and steam generator vel

transmitters, and re-evaluation of Intermediate Building s am

line break analysis. Response and evaluation to NRC bulleti

related to nonconforming materials from Piping Supplies Inc.

__

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21

,

licensee activities associated with plant modifications,

technical support provided for operation, maintenance, testing

and surveillance, operator training, procurement, and configu-

ration control.

The licensee has initiated or continued several major efforts to

improve or maintain the quality of engineering performance. The

Corporate Nuclear Operations Division relocated to the plant

site in late 1987. This move consolidated engineering proce-

dures, work activities and placed the design expertise close to

plant activities. The relocation provides an enhancement to the

operations / engineering interface. In conjunction with the

relocation, a reorganization initiated' a system engineering

'

program. This program is designed to improve overall system

performance trending and provide a designated system interface

for operational and technical issues. However, the licensee's

progress in implementing this program has been slow.

The licensee's program to document and verify major systems

design bases was continued from the previous assessment period.

The cesign basis documentation (DBD) effort integrated system

and component requirements, actual as-built information, project

commitments, and engineering accident analysis and margins.

Sixteen DBDs were completed this assessment period. The DBDs

r-

have provided a good reference resource for engineering activity

and contributed to the identification and correction of plant

problems. This design base effort is a long term continuing

activity with approximately 40 DBDs planned for future

completion.

'The licensee's steam generators continue to exhibit the

deleterious effects of primary water stress cracking corrosion

as evidenced by the number of tubes requiring plugging during

the fourth refueling outage. Steam generators A, B and C

presently have 6.0, 10.9 and 6.5 percent of their tubes plugged.

Although preventive measures such as Roto peening, shot peening

and stress relieving have been accomplished during previous'

outages. These measures and engineering studies which have

reduced plugging requirements have not provided an ultimate

solution to this problem.

Engineering performance on specific technical issues has been

good and overall performance resulted in a modification backlog

reduction. Engineering provided timely assistance in problem

definition, solution, corrective action, and development of

Justifications for Continued Operation when required to support

plant activities. Specifically, engineering support to opera- ,

tions and maintenance was effective in the evaluation of the  ;

hydraulic lock-up of the pressurizer and steam generator level "

transmitters, and re-evaluation of Intermediate Building steam l

line break analysis. Response and evaluation to NRC bulletins

related to nonconforming materials from Pipina Supplies Inc. of

~

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, , , -

22

l

rsey, Steam Generator Crack Propagation, Fastener Testing, and

P e Wall Thinning was timely and aggressive. Engineering

su ort and program management to complete all modifications

poss ' le at power, has resulted in a 17 per cent reduction in

outst ding modifications.

e 1987 refueling outage the as-found Pressurizer Safety

During

Valves (P V) setpoints were significantly higher than allowed by

technical )ecifications. In order to determine the cause of

the high ou'. of tolerance PSV setpoints, the licensee performed

extensive res arch into the effects of test temperature and test

medium on PSV setpoint. The licensee's approach to the

resolution of e setpoint deviation demonstrated a clear

understanding of he issue. The licensee's present PSV and Main

Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) setpoin; test program utilizes one of

the most advanced est methods presently available. This

program exceeds the irements of the test code to which the

licensee is committed.

Toward the end of the as sment period, it was identified that

the licensee performed a Jnadequate design evaluation and

modification that changed fire protection deluge sprinkler

control valves for charcoal hterunitsfromtheopenposition,

~

as described in the FSAR, to 1. e closed position. These changes

were made without adequate e luation and initiation of

appropriate actions to revise he FSAR and operational

procedures where required. These examples suggest an apparent

weakness i_n engineering support th has the potential to leave

an important safety question unre iewed er inadequately

reviewed.

Licensee efforts have been directed the control of

microbiologically induced corrosion, cor cula and soft water

attack in service water piping. EPRI an consultants have

provided assistance in resolving this item. The licensee has

submitted an application to the state depar nt of health and

environmental control requesting permission to chemically treat

this system. With this treatment the license expec ts to

prevent future occurrence of problems such as he reduced

service water flow to the RBCU discussed in the op ations area.

V. C. Sunener has a strong procurement program. The ocurement

staff includes 15 engineers, nine technicians, three i pectors,

and 29 administrative and warehouse personnel. This gr p has a

fully operational commercial grade procurement program ith

testing equipment and technicians to verify material ad

equipment critical parameters. This program has allowed e

licensee to upgrade such parts as transformers, circuit

breakers, switches, relays, fasteners, insulation, and Bellvi e

washers.

m_,_m_n. _ , .u.+-:-.-,------ . - --:---a-- -- - - - - - - - -

_ _ _. .__ . - _ _ _ _ _ _

'

h 22

4

Jersey, Steam Generator Crack Propagation, Fastener Testing, and

Pips Wall Thinning was timely and aggressive. Engineering

support and program management to complete all modifications

.possible at power, has resulted in a 17 per cent reduction in

outstanding modifications.

During the 1987 refueling outage the as-found Pressurizer Safety

Valves (PSV) setpoints were significantly higher than allowed.by

technical specifications. In order to determine the cause of

the high out of tolerance pSV setpoints, the licensee performed

extensive research'into the effects of test temperature and test

medium on PSV setpoint. The licensee's approach to the

resolution of the setpoint deviation demonstrated a clear

understanding of the-issue. The licensee's present PSV and Main

Steam Safety Valves (MSSV) setpoint test program utilizes one of

the most advanced test methods presently available. This

program exceeds the requirements of the test code to which the

licensee is committed.

Toward the end of the assessment period, it was identified that

the licensee performed an inadequate design evaluation and

modification that changed ten fire protection deluge sprinkler

control valves for charcoal filter units from the open. position,

as described in the FSAR, to the closed position. These changes

were made without adequate evaluation and initiation of

appropriate actions to revise the FSAR and operational

procedures where required. These examples suggest an apparent

weakness in modifications control that has the potential to

leave an important safety question unreviewed or inadequately

reviewed.

.

Licensee efforts have been directed at the control of

microbiological 1y induced corrosion, corbicula and oft water

attack in service water piping. EPRI and consultants have

provided assistance in resolving this item. The licensee has

submitted an application to the state department of health and

environmental control requesting permission to chemically treat

this system. With this treatment the licensee expects to

prevent future occurrence of- problems such as the reduced

service water flow to the RBCU discussed in the operations area.

V. C. Sunner has a strong procurement program. The procurement

staff includer 15 engineers, nine technicians, three inspectors,

and 29 administrative and warehouse personnel. This group has a

fully operational commercial grade procurement program with

testing equipment and technicians to verify material and

equipment critical parameters. This program has allowed the

licensee to upgrade such parts as transformers, ci rcuit

breakers, switches, relays, fasteners, insulation, and Bellville

washers.

- - _ - - - .