ML20235W815
| ML20235W815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235W807 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-87-23, NUDOCS 8710190041 | |
| Download: ML20235W815 (33) | |
See also: IR 05000395/1987023
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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ENCLOSURE
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SALP BOARD REPORT
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER
50-395/87-23
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
V. C. SUMMER
JANUARY 1, 1986 THROUGH JULY 31, 1987
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.I.
INTRODUCTION
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The Systematic. Assessment of. Licensee - Performance (SALP) program is an
integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations and. data on
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a; periodic. basis and to evaluate licensee performance based upon this
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information.
SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory processes used to
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. ensure compliance with NRC rules -and regulations.: SALP is intended to be
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. sufficiently diagnostic to' provide a rational basis for allocati, J.NRC
resources and-to provide meaningful guidance to the licensee's management
to promote quality'and safety of plant construction and operation.
An NRC SALP. Board, composed of the of the staff members listed below, met'
on September 28,
1987, to review the collection of performance
observations and data- to assess the licensee performance in accordance
. with' the guidance . in' NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment
Performance."
.A summary of the guidance and' evaluation criteria is
provided II of this report.
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety
performance at
V..C. Summer for the period January 1,
1986, through
July 31, 1987.
SALP Board'for Summer:
L.'A. Reyes, (Chairman) Director Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII
A. R. Herdt, Chief, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII
J. P. Stehr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS)
RII
E- G. Adensam, Director, Project Directorate II-1, NRR
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J. B. Hopkins, Project Manager, NRR
D. M. Verre111, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, DRP, RII
R
L. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector, Summer, DRP, RII
Attendees at SALP Meeting:
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K, D. Landis, Chief, Technical Support Staff (TSS), DRP, RII
H. C. Dance, Chief, Projects Section IB (PS1B), DRP, RII
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W. J. Tobin, Physical Security Section, DRSS, RII
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L. P. Modenos, Project Engineer, PS18, DRP, RII
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P. C. Hopkins, Resident Inspector, Summer, DRP, RII
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T. E. Conlon, Chief, Plant Systems Section, DRS, RII
R. W. Wright, Quality Assurance, DRS, RII
L. S. Mellen, Quality Assurance, DRS, RII
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C. M. Hosey, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, DRSS, RII
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J. B. Kahle, Chief,-Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section, DRSS, RII
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D. M. Collins, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection
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Branch, DRSS, RII
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R. A. Becker, Operations Engineer, NRR/PEB
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II.
CRITERIA
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Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas, depending
upon whether the facility has been in construction, preoperational, or
operating phase during the SALP review period.
Each functional area
normally represents areas which are significant to nuclear safety and'the
environment and which are normal programmatic areas.
Some functional
areas may not be assessed because of little or no licensee activities or.
lack of meaningful observations. .Special areas may be added to highlight
significant observations.
a
One.or more of the following evaluation criteria was used to assess each
functional area; however, the SALP Board is not limited to these criteria
and others may have been used where appropriate.
A.
Management involvement in assuring quality
B.
Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint
C.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives
D.
Enforcement history
E.
Reporting and analysis of reportable events (including responses to,
Analysis of, and corrective actions for)
F.
Staffing (including management)
G.
Training effectiveness and qualification effectiveness
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Based upon the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated is
classified into one of three performance categories.
The definitions of
these performance categories are:
Category 1:
Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
Licensee
management attention and involvement are aggressive. and oriented
toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively
used so that a high level of performance with respect to operational
safety or construtt W is being achieved.
Category 2:
NRC attention should be maintained at normal level.
Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are
concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and
are reasonably effective so that satisfactory performance with
respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Category 3:
Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and
considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee
resources appear to be strained or not effectively used such that
minimally satisfactory performance with respect
to operational
safety or construction is being achieved.
The functional area being evaluated may have some attributes that would
place the evaluation in Category 1, and others that would place it in
either Category 2 or 3.
The final rating for each functional area is a
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composite of the attrib'utes tempered with,the-judgement of NRC management
as to theLsignificance of. individual items.
' The"SALP Board may also-include an appraisal 'of the performance trend. of a-
functional ' area.
This' performance trend. will' only be .used when both a
' definite trend of' performance within the' evaluation period'is discernible'
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- and- the Board believes that continuation of the trend may result in a
change of performance level. 'The trend,.if used, is defined as:
Improving:
Licensee performance was determined 'to be improving .near the
close of:the assessment period.
Declining: . Licensee performance was determined to be declining' near the~
close of.the assessment period.
III.' SUMMARY OF RESULTS
A-
Overall . Facility Evaluation
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The
licensee displayed an aggressive . attitude toward problem
identification arid solution.
The level
of
performance - was
satisfactory in all areas. Of the eleven program arens rated, six
were evaluated as Category. I and five as Category
2..
No Category 3
ratings : were assigned.
Problems in the Fire Protection and Plant
Operations areas,. identified in the ' previous SALP, received strict
management attention and oversight.
These' areas exhibited significant
improvement during'this evaluation period. A strength, also noted in=
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the previous SALP, was again identified in the areas-of Security and
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Safeguards,
Radiological
Controls and Maintenance.
Additional.
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-strengths were ' identified in the Surveillance,
Training and
Qualifications Effectiveness and Outages areas.
The licensee has
initiated a number of programs, - such as, ' scram ' reduction, personnel
error reduction, and system review that has helped focus attention on
proper operation and system identification.
B.
The performance categories for the current and previous SALP period
in each area are as follows:
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July 1, 1984-
Jan. 1, 1986-
Functional-Area
Dec. 31, 1985
July 31, 1987
Plant Operations
3
2
Radiological Control
1
1
Maintenance
1
1
Surveillance
2
1
Fire Protection
3
2
1
2
Security and Safeguards
1
1
Outages
2
1
Quality Programs and Administrative
2
2
Controls Affecting Quality
- Licensing Activities
2
2
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Training and Qualifications
2
1
Effectiveness
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IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A.
Plant Operations
1.
Analysis
During the assessment period, inspections were performed by the
resident and regional staffs.
Plant operations experienced two alignment problems associated
with the operation of swing pumps during the first few months of
the evaluation period.
As a result of these problems and
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weaknesses identified in the previous SALP, the licensee
initiated extensive changes to provide better control over plant
operations.
These changes included:
modifications to improve
plant system reliability in the condensate /feedwater system; an
employee awareness program;
root cause determination of
personnel errors; improvement in operator training; a team
building program; industrial safety awareness; a professional
awareness program; human performance error correction; increased
staffing and management presence to support operations during
plant startups. A management review board which consists of the
Vice President, Nuclear Operations; the Director, Nuclear Plant
Operation; the Director, Nuclear Services; the Director, Quality
Services; and the Plant Management Staff was initiated in 1986.
This group reviews all reactor trips and other plant significant
events to insure that the efforts and resources needed to insure
timely corrective action are available and actions are initiated
to preclude recurrence.
During the last twelve months of the SALP period, positive
results were achieved as a result of the above actions.
A
significant reduction in the number of overall violations (21
vs. 33 from last SALP period) and an improved operating
performance was achieved.
A comparison with the previous SALP
shows that reactor trips were reduced from 13 to 7 with only 2
trips in the last 12 months of the SALP period.
The forced
outage rate was reduced from 8.44 percent to 4.01 percent.
The
plant capacity factor was increased from 56.8 percent to 77.2
percent and the plant availability was increased from 63.4
percent to 80.5 percent.
V.C.
Summer achieved the second
highest capacity factor, 92.4 percent, and the highest plant
availability, 95.3 percent, for domestic Westinghouse Plants in
1986.
A shift engineer program to provide a degreed engineer on shift
was implemented in 1987.
The licensee also implemented a
college degree program in 1987. This program, conducted by the
University of Maryland, allows personnel in Operations and
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Nuclear Training areas to obtain a Bachelor of Science Degree in
Nuclear Science.
Several of the courses in this program are
being developed through funding provided by four utilities. The
above program should strengthen the onshift expertise and
improve plant safety.
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company initiated a program in
1986 to document and verify the detailed design basis for
selected plant systems, structures and components. This program
integrates
project
engineering
data,
historical
project
correspondence and engineering inputs to provide a detailed
description of the plant designs.
Three system reports have
been issued.
These documents provide a better technical
understanding of the present design and provide better data for
future design changes.
Seventeen systems, structures and
component designs are now under review with anticipated
completion dates of March 1988.
The Licensee also initiated a program in 1986 to perform safety
systems functional inspections. The inspection of the Emergency
Feedwater System has been completed.
The inspection of the
Emergency Power System is currently being conducted with an
anticipated completion date of December 1987.
Inspections are
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currently planned on ten other systems, at a rate of approxi-
mately two systems per year.
Deficiencies that have been
identified in the completed inspections are prioritized,
assigned required completion dates are tracked to completion.
Identified problems are also reviewed for generic application to
other systems. This program and the above detailed design basis
review have led to the identification and correction of safety
problems and increased licensee's k.nowlodge and understanding of
installed systems.
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The plant is clean and well maintained.
Plant and corporate
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management make frequent tours in the plant during normal work
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hours, back shif ts and weekends.
A control room enhancement
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program has provided an improved control room supervisors
console; upgraded equipment and habitability have provided an
atmosphere which promotes a more professional appearance and
attitude.
The operators are well trained, alert and responsive
to plant transients and events.
Control room demeanor has
improved since the previous assessment.
Four violations were identified. Violations (a) and (b), which
were associated with the alignment and operation of swing pumps,
led to the imposition of civil penalties. These items were the
result of the licensee's lack of documented design information
and knowledge of a complicated design.
The licensee's overall
corrective action on these two items was detailed and extensive
with positive results.
Violation (c) was the result of the
licensee transferring the engineered Safety Features Electrical
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busses from offsite power to the Emergency Diesel Generator
because of an imminent electrical storm. The licensee's action
reduced the independence between the onsite and offsite power
system, and reduced the availability of the preferred offsite
power source and with a potential to overload the ' diesel
generators under worst case accident conditions.
Violation (d)
was the result of a procedure not containing specific steps
required to start a service water booster pump if it should trip
on low suction pressure.
The violations are listed below,
a.
Severity Level III violation and a civil penalty for
failure to maintain two service water and two component
cooling water pumps operable.
(86-06)
b.
Severity Level III violation and a civil penalty for
failure to maintain the required charging / safety injection
pumps operable under certain design basis conditions.
(86-12)
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c.
Severity Level IV violation for failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 review prior to operating the Engineering Safety
Features electrical
busses on the Emergency Diesel
Generators.
(86-15)
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d.
Severity Level V violation for an inadequate operating
procedure for the service water booster pumps.
(87-14)
2.
Conclusions
Category:
2
3.
Board Recommendation
The board noted an improving trend towards the end of the SALP
period.
No change in NRC inspection activity is recommended.
B.
Radiological Controls
1.
Analysis
During the assessment period, inspections were performed by the
resident and regional staffs.
This included a confirmatory
measurements inspection using the Region Il mobile laboratory.
The licensee's health physics (HP) and radwaste processing
staffing levels compared favorably with other utilities having a
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facility of similar size. An adequate number of ANSI qualified
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licensee HP technicians were available to support routine
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operations.
During the 1987 refueling outage approximately 120
contract technicians were utilized to support the licensee's
staff.
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One- strength noted in-the health physics, radiological effluent
and environmental l surveillance program was the ' stability : of' the-
staff.
A low' turnover rate resulted in'an experienced group of
individuals: and provided the time ~ necessary to . implement an
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effective' and continuing training program for the technicians.
LThe licensee's radiation. work permit and respiratory protection
programs. are adequate . The licensee documented five skin' and
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ten clothing contaminations in 1986. .Through July 31-1987, the
licensee documented'74 cases"of skin contamination and 48 cases
of clothing contamination.
The 1987 increases..in skin / clothing
contaminations are 'related to the increased work activity during
the 1987 refueling and maintenance outage, the only major outage
.during the assessment period.
A Severity Level III violation was issued during the evaluation
period for a calculated overexposure to the hand of a worker.
The violation identified the failure to have a procedure for -
addressing the methodology for calculating the dose to the skin
from. highly radioactive particles.
The calculated overexposure
resulted from a high specific activity particle (hot particle)
on the skin of the hand which occurred while the individual was
working . in a clean area.
In the response to the Notice of
Violation,
the. licensee
requested
that
more
current
. international standards be used to calculate the dose to the
skin- for this ' exposure rather than the standards used as the
basis of 10 CFR 20. The methods proposed would result in a dose
significantly .less than the NRC quarterly limit.
On July 13,
1987, the NRC rejected the licensee's position and stated that
the Notice .of ' Violation was correct as written.
A second
request for reconsideration of- the Violation was received on-
August 7,
1987, and is being evaluated by the NRC.
The
violation represents an isolated occurrence in an usually strong
and aggressive radiation protection program maintained by the
licensee and did not indicate a significant program weakness.
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Management support and involvement in matters related to
radiation protection is evident.
During the evaluation period
licensee management authorized the purchase of whole body
friskers to improve the personnel monitoring program and
constructed a new building to house the dosimetry, whole body
counting, and respiratory fit testing activities.
Management
commitment to keeping radiation expcsure as low as reasonably
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achievable ( ALARA) is indicated by their involvement in the
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activities of the ALARA committee.
The licensee participated in the National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program (NVLAP) for personnel dosimetry and
received NVLAP accreditation for the program during the
evaluation period.
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The . licensee's; approach. to resolving health physics technical'
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overexposure event.
The' licensee ~ -routinely utilizes ccontract~
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issues'wasl excellent.as. evidenced by the dose evaluation forLthe-
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support toL supplement the. staff in:the various technical aspects-
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of the_ radiation protection program'.
The . licensee. exercised an ' aggressive contamination control
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program .with the decontamination crew reporting .to health
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- physics.
The contamination control program is .consideredJ the
- best in Region II. 'In 1986 the licensee reduced the total:
- contaminated area (excluding' the reactor building)' to 714 ft -
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(0.5%).. - The . total contaminated area increased to_5% just after
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the refueling outage and was back down to 1.8% or ,2,785 ft2 tv;
July 31, 1987. The licensee routinely' maintains less than 1% of
- the radiation control _ area (2000 square feet) as contaminated
during non-outage conditions.- The licensee's contro'1 of
contamination, useL of contamination containmentsand process
controls allowed personnel in . street clothes to enter the:
reactor. building (containment) during the refueling' outage.
During 1986,~the' license's cumulative exposure'was approximately
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23 person-rem ~ as- measured by' thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD),
which was well below the 1986 national average of 397 person-rem
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per unit. This represents the lowest cumulative exposure for an.
' operating. light water reactor in the United States -in 1986.
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' Through July 31, 1987,. the cumulative exposure' as measured by-
TLD.was 558 person-rem. .The increase in dose from 1986.to 1987
is' explained by the fact that a major refueling and maintenance-
outage was conducted-in ,1987 while no significant outages' took
place in 1986. The majority of outage exposure resulted from
activities.
Approximately- 300 person-rem
resulted from the peening, plugging, plug removal, eddy current
testing, and U-bend heat stress relief on the three generators.
The refueling outage in 1987 exceeded the outage exposure goal
of 485 person-rem by 62.7_ person-rem.
Participation in the NRC spiked sample analysis program showed
agreement with NRC results for all four nuclides. Confirmatory
measurements showed the ' licensee's measurement program to be
adequate with the exception of an incorrect volume being used to
determine radionuclides concentrations. This error, conservative
with respect to radiological safety,
resulted in a violation
but had no serious effect on the. program.
- The licensee
responded quickly to this finding, initiating corrective action
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prior to completion of the inspection.
Both liquid and gaseous effluents were within limits for total
quantities of radioactive material released, with the gaseous
effluents being the lowest in the Region. Effluent releases for
the past three years are summarized in the Supporting Data and
Summaries,Section V. K.
1:e,see estimates of air dose and
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doses to the maximum exposed individuals were variable between
reporting periods, but were within the limits in the Technical
Specifications'.
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Significant progress has been made in developing the expertise
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and qualifications of the chemistry staff; however, the level of
staffing lacks depth.
Improvements were made during the
assessment period when the plant chemist returned to the
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chemistry staff from a special assignment.
The licensee was
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aggressive in the resolution of a problem related to oil
inleakage into the secondary coolant which required considerable
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chemistry staff manpower.
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In the areas of corrosion and water chemistry, the integrity of
the primary coolant pressure boundary had started to degrade
through primary-side stress induced cracking of steam generator
tubes.
The licensee's control of prima ry and secondary
chemistry was better than the criteria recommended by the Steam
Generator Owners Group.
The general corrosion (wastage) of
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carbon steel components has been maintained to a relatively
insignificant level as measured by the cleanliness of the
secondary water system.
A new computer system for chemistry
data has been installed, and a management system for trending
and statistical analysis has been implemented.
The licensee
iritisted prompt and adequate responses to the pipe thinning
issues described in IE Bulletin 87-01 and IE Notice 86-106 with
. Supplements.
During 1986, the licensee shipped a total of 3,966 ft3 of
radioactive waste with a total activity of 14.6 curies.
This
value is well below the 1986 national average of 7,448 f t3 per
reactor.
Through July 31, 1987, the licensee had shipped a
3 with a total activity of 488.4 curies. The
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total of 9,490 ft
total volume shipped as July 31, 1987, showed a significant
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increase (240%) in the volume of over the previous year. This
was due to the increased dry active waste generated in the 1987
refueling outage.
Radiological surveillance
and internal audits conducted by the
licensee were comprehensive and of sufficient depth to identify
problems and trends.
Five violations were identified.
a.
Severity Level III violation for extremity exposure in
excess of the limits of 20.101(a) for a one individual and
failure to have an adequate procedure to address skin dose
calculations due to high levels of skin contamination.
(86-22)
Note:
Licensee has partially denied tM s violation.
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b.
Severity Level
IV violation for failure to specify
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quantities :of carbon-14 and iodine-129 - on a shipment
manifest.
(86-04)
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c.
Severity Level IV violation for failure to adhere to -
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procedures
for
health
physics.
computer
software
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verification.
(86-04)
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d.
. Severity Level IV violation for failure to classify a
radioactive waste shipment properly.
(86-10)
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Severity Level: V violation for failure to verify the volume
of 'the geometries used to conduct surveys of gaseous
radioactive material releases to the environment.
(87-21)
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2.
Conclusion
Category:
1
3.
Board Recommendations
A reduced NRC inspection activity is recommended.
C.
Maintenance
1.
Analysis
During the assessment period, inspections were performed by the
resident and regional staffs.
The maintenance organization is adequately staffed and trained
to support the operation of the plant.
In 1986, a procedure
writer and a spare parts specialist were added to each
discipline and a maintenance engineer was assigned for heating,
ventilation
and
air conditioning.
Work activities are
controlled by well developed procedures and instructions.
The licensee continues to expand its use of the motor operated
valve analysis test system (MOVATS),
infrared analysis,
ferrographic oil analysis and vibration analysis to assist in
predictive maintenance.
Additional equipment has been obtained
for MOVATS and the data bank has been enlarged as additional
equipment is tested. The licensee has achieved success in their
use of INP0's Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System to predict
and identify failed parts.
The use of predictive maintenance
data to revise the schedule of preventative maintenance has led
to a reduction in equipment failures.
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A three year program to develop instrumentation and control (I &
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C) loop diagrams is approximately one-third complete.
An
in-depth NRC review of the inservice inspection and test program
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was conducted to insure that all required tests and inspections
are being performed.
The maintenance group has started a maintenance self-assessment
program review using INPO guidelines for the " Conduct of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Stations".
This effort will take
several months to complete.
A new hot machine shop and calibration facility have been
constructed and placed in operation.
A metrology group was
formed to control all measuring and test equipment.
This group
consolidates under one supervisor and at one location those
functions which were previously performed in the I & C
electrical, mechanical and construction craf t area. All site
tools have been consolidated into one central tool issue room
for improved control and accountability.
A weakness in first line supervisory planning and direct
involvement in corrective maintenance was identified by licensee
,
management and other auditing groups. To correct this weakness,
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the licensee implemented formalized instruction to insure inore
direct involvement by supervisors in work planning, scheduling,
observation and review of werA activities.
A team building
program was implemented in 1986, to improve communication and
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supervisory insight 1.nto their responsibilities.
Specialized
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technical, supervisory and communications courses are being
develop and implemented to increase the skills and awareness of
first line supervisors.
Maintenance management has used quality assurance audits, QC
inspection reports, trend analysis reports and INP0 good
practices to monitor equipment performance and work practices.
The maintenance group interfaces well and is receptive to
constructive criticism from outside observers.
No violations were identified in this area.
2.
Conclusions
Category:
1
3.
Board Recommendation
A reduced NRC inspection activity is recommended.
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Surveillance
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During this assessment period, inspections 'were. performed by.
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.the resident ~ and regional staffs.
Areas inspected . included
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ins'ervice inspection, routine. surveillance testing, startup
testing following: re f uel i ng ~,
reactor physics' surveillance
testing,. ' integrated engineered safety. features' testing and 18
month and five year _ diesel.~ generator surveillance.
Staffing
and " training was: adequate and surveillance
were ' conducted
within the allotted time frame,
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The computerized Technical Specification Cross Reference system
has ~ been completed and is currently being validated.
This
system permits tracking .to insure technical
specification
compliance.
A. computerized Set Point Verification Data system
was purchased and was used to set the safety. . valve on the
pressurizer and steam generators during the last outage. This
system provides a printout of set point and the force used to
lift.the valves, Tests during the last outage demonstrated that-
the use of this system resulted in tests and data that. were
' repeatable and superior to previously used equipment.
,
A weakness in responsiveness to NRC. concerns was identified in .
,
the previous SALP. The licensee has' placed additional emph' sis
a
in this-area.
Managers are now assigned to each NRC item to
. provide single point accountability and insure that they are
-
addressed in a timely manner.
This increased sensitivity has
resulted in no identified NRC concern in this area.
The use of field standards for the majority of surveillance
tests has reduced the number of repetitive tests that must be
accomplished to achieve satisfactory results.
All changes to
surveillance tests are required to be routed through the
operations procedure writers group to insure correctness.
Errors noted in the review of surveillance tests'are now rcuted
back to the individual making the mistake for correction.
The Regulatory Support Group, which tracks all surveillance
tests, has been transferred from Regulatory Compliance to
Scheduling and Project Management.
This change places the
responsibility for scheduling and tracking completion of
surveillance tests under the same manager. Under this' single
manager, surveillance
are more easily incorporated into the
plant overall schedule.
This has additionally resulted in
improved coordination and a reduction in surveillance test
interface problems.
. !
,. . -
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..The . licensee comple.ted L a review of the Inservice I'nspection
~
Program .to; insure Lthe- testing supported components required toi
.
achieve; plant cold shutdown. As a result of this review, .over
100-valves were added to this inspection program and additional
L
tests' are now required on some valves that were already in. the
'
!
program. A weakness associated with the training of operations
. personnel for-visual examination for' leakage was identified in
,
"
.the. previous. SALP.
The' responsibility for training and
<
qualification of ' operators for this ' function has been placed
m --
under the direction of Quality Control' Training. 'The. changes-
have led to a marked improvement in.this area.
On the advice- of a consultant, a- new thermal power program was
installed for -monitoring thermal power in August 1985.
The
program had errors in mathematics, statistics, engineering and
in the correlation between turbine pressure and thermal power.
In June 1986, in response to a report by another consultant and
errors identified by an ISEGl engineer, the program was changed
to an acceptable calculation based upon feedwater flow
measurement and enthalpy change. .Despite the difficulties the
thermal power did not exceed the technical specification' limit.
-The acceptance of the first change is indicative of a weakness
in the licensee' in utilizing consultants without critical
,
evaluation of their qualification and performance.
One violation was identified.
Severity Level V violation for failure to follow an
--
operating procedure and an indequate operating procedure.
(87-20)
2.
Conclusion
f
Category:
I
a
]
3.
Board Recommendation'
A reduced NRC inspection activity is recommended.
E.
Fire Protection
1.
Analysis
During this assessment period, inspections were conducted by the
,
regional- and resident inspection staffs of the licensee's
J
routine fire protection / prevention program and the corrective
actions associated with the outstanding issues from the June
,
1985. Appendix R inspection.
l
l
!
_
. . . _ . _ _ _
_._._._____.____________________J
_ _ -
_ _ - ._
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_ - _ _ _
_
_
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.
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The licensee's
implementation
o f.
the fire: . prevention
.
b
administrative controls, general housekeeping'and.the control of
l
h
combustible and flammable materials in safety related areas of.
'
'
. the. plant were ' found to be satisf actory. -The fire . protection :
'"
,
J
l
exting'uishing, systems', fire detection . system . and fire barrier
- assemblies - protecting systems requiredfor safe L shutdown. were
-found to be; functional.
.In. addition ~
the surveillance
,
inspection,' tests . and - maintenance' instructions for the' plant-
1
< fire protection systems' were found satisfactory cand met L the-
'd
criteria of the plant- technical. specifications.
The . licensee's ' fire. brigade organization,' staffing and training
were-evaluated. The: organization and staffing.of the ' brigade
'
+
meet'the~NRC guidelines and the plant'technica.1 specifications.
The. ' training . and drills for the- brigade were found to be
comprehensive with respect to assuring effective. and ' efficient
manual fire fighting operations.
The frequency, of brigade
<
- training and drills met. or exceeded the NRC guidelines.
'
Overall,
the fire brigade training program is strictly
. implemented and well defined.
The. annual fire protection / prevention audit, the 24 month QA
fire protection program. audit performed by the licensee, and the
triennial ~ audit performed by an outside fire protection
organization were conducted within the specified frequency and
,
covered
all
of
the
essential
elements
of
the. fire
protection / prevention program.
The licensee had taken the
appropriate corrective actions on the discrepancies identified
by=these audits.
As ~
result of .' the issues stemming from the ' Appendix R
a
inspection conducted in' June 1985, and the licensee's' Appendix R
compliance re-evaluation, the ' licensee implemented a number of
plant modifications which resolved the separation concerns
associated with redundant hot standby' systems, the alternative
shutdown system concerns associated with inadequate remote
shutdown
stations,
and the associated circuit concerns
associated with fire. induced spurious signals.
All previous
identified discrepancy items have .been corrected during this
assessment period. The licensee's implementation of Appendix R
modifications was
timely and consistent with scheduled
commitments. In additior., the licensee's approach to resolving
. Appendix R technical issues was supported by intense management
involvement and control in assuring quality and indicated a
clear understanding of the technical issues by the licensee's
staff and a technically sound approach toward implementing
complex plant modifications.
_ _ _
_ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ -
-_
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Staffing for the routine : fire: protection ' program is~adequatecto
,
.
accomplish thel' goals of . the : position _within: normal work hours
'
with -only . occasional
overtime being:' expended. ..The; fire-
.,_
protection staff- positions, authorities and responsibilities' are
clearly defined; and personnel holding these' p'ositions.are wel1~
.
qualified lfo'r their. assigned duties.
'Three' violations were identified. Violation:(a) w'hich resulted.
'from the June 1985' Appendix' R Linspection: was Lissued in March 11,
1987; as'a Severity Level .III violation; this was discussed in
the ~1ast' SALP. Violations'(b) and'(c) were a result of failure
.to post' fire watches.
The violations are listed below.
a.
Severity : Level? III . violation- forf failure ~ to maintain one
train 1 of redundant systems - necessary. to maintain 'and
achieve hot standby conditions free from damage; and fire
barriers were. rendered' inoperable and action were not taken
i
to establish a' continuous or' hourly fire watch.
(85-26)
.b.
Severity Level IV violation involving failure to post fire
watch patrols while fire barriers were inoperable. '(86-06)-
c.
Severity Level IV violation involving failure to perform
,
Lhourly fire watch patrols.
(86-13)
2.
Conclusion.
Category:
2
..
3;
Board Recommendations
The board noted an improving trend. No change in NRC inspection
activity is recommended.
F.
1.
Analysis
During the assessment period, inspections were performed by
resident and regional staffs. There were two inspections of the
radiological emergency plan and procedures, and observation of
two annual radiological emergency preparedness exercises. Three
emergency plan revisions were reviewed.
!
The annual emergency preparedness exercises disclosed no adverse
findings regarding the licensee's emergency organization and
staffing.
An adequately staffed corporate emergency response
and planning organization routinely provided support to the
i
- -
- - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
._
_.
_
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
b'
a.
6
E
16
.
plant.
Key positions in the corporate and plant emergency
response organizations were filled.
Corporate management was
directly involved . in the 1986 and 1987 annual emergency
preparedness exercises and followup critiques. .The licensee
continues to respond to. the NRC initiatives regarding emergency
c
preparedness issues promptly and effectively.
The essential elements of emergency response, demonstrated
during the . referenced exercises, were determined to be
acceptable.
Observation and critique of the annual emergency
preparedness exercises disclosed that the Emergency Preparedness
Plan. and procedures could be effectively implemented by the
licensee, although one violation, one weakness and several areas
for improvement were observed by the NRC. . These items were
formally documented, and the licensee committed to corrective
action consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance.
The principal items involved (1) a violation concerning an
inadequate procedure for notifying offsite authorities of an
emergency classification within 15 minutes (notification times
.
ranged from 15 minutes to 33 minutes during the course of the
l
exercise) and; (2) an exercise weakness for failure to include
offsite radiological emergency monitoring and surveillance
proceduns in field team kits, and identification of such
documents as " controlled procedures."
During the assessment period there was a violation for failure
to provide training to a key member of the Emergency
Organization regarding the " Fission Product Barrier Approach"
(FPBA) for Emergency Action Level (EAL) defining emergency
classifications.
This could lead to improper or delayed
classification of an emergency in an actual event. The. licensee
took prompt corrective action on this finding.
Inspections
disclosed that all other training of onsite and offsite
emergency organization personnel was consistent with the
requirements defined in the Emergency Plan and implementing
procedures.
The licensee, on December 10, 1985, changed the Emergency Plan
to implement a symptomatic EAL Matrix.
This matrix was
determined by the NRC as an unacceptable alternative to the
NUREG-0654, " Event-oriented Classification Scheme," in that it
appeared.to classify events as lower level emergencies than as
outlined in NUREG-0654 and because certain event based
classifications, such as loss of control of facilities to
intruders and station blackout, would be delayed.
After
correspondence and meetings with the NRC on the issues, the
licensee deleted proposed use of their form of FPBA and
reinstated the event oriented EALs consistent with NUREG-0654
guidance.
The other Emergency Plan revisions reviewed during
the subject assessment period were found to be consistent with
NRC guidance.
\\
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.
17
S
Two violations were identified and as indicated above were not
indicative of a programmatic deficiency:
a.
Severity Level IV violation for an inadequate procedure
defining notification of offsite authorities of an
emergency.
(86-08)
b.
Severity Level V violation for failure to provide training
to a key member of the Emergency Organization regarding the
" Fission Product Barrier Approach" to event classification.
(86-05)
2.
Conclusion
Category:
2
3.
Board Recommendation
No change in NRC inspection activity is recommended.
G.
Security and Safeguards
1.
Analysis
During the evaluation period, inspections were performed by the
resident and regional staffs.
A Regulatory Effectiveness
Review (RER) was conducted in March 1986.
Security force staffing was adequate and consistent with that of
plants of similar size. The security staff had been trained to
perform required duties. The training program was extensive and
innovative with a well balanced mixture of hands-on and
classroom instruction which resulted in a highly capable and
motivated security force.
Observation of security force
activities during periods of inspection verified a quality
training program and a commitment to excellence by individual
members of the security force.
Site
management
exhibited
an
excellent
knowledge
and
understanding of security requirements and demonstrated support
of the security program.
l
The RER team visited the site and found no safeguards
I
vulnerabilities. Although not considered requirements, several
inadequacies and weaknesses were identified and received
immediate corrective action by the licensee.
The RER team
identified strengths in the Summer security program, in such
areas as barriers, maintenance program, training and tactical
deployment of the security force.
_ _ _ _
._
_ - _ _ - _ - _ - _ .
- _ - _ -
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18
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4 '
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.
.The licensee recently - installed ai new' securityf computer to
enhanceithe: effectiveness of the security program. - Functional
operability:of the computer and associated systems .is pending
~
completion of testing and acceptance L of the? systems.
In
addition, .the construction of .a ' new access' control facility,
relocation of the affected protected. area fencing.: necessitated
by- the ,new access' control facility, installation.of: additional
closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras and an-- enhanced alarm
system is : indicative of an ongoing management commitment.. to. a
quality ' security program. The ; security equipment and facility
_
enhancements clearly add to the: effectiveness and operational-
capabilities of-the security organization.
l
One violation was identified.
The licensee had identified the
violation and provided prompt.and effective corrective action.
Severity Level IV violation for an unsecured vital area
-
floor grating. (87-12)
'2.
Conclusion
Category:
1
3
Bcard Recommendation
A reduced NRC inspection activity is recommended.
H.
Outages
1.
Analysis
During the . assessment period the unit underwent a 95 day.
refueling outage.
The resident inspectors observed refueling
operations.
Resident and regional based inspectors observed
outage activities.
j
I
The third refueling outage was completed on June 9, 1987. Major
"
activities accomplished during this outage included: refueling;
shot peening, stress relieving, tube plugging, tube removal and
eddy current testing of steam generator tubes; five year
overhaul on diesel generator B; overhaul of reactor coolant pump
A motor; seal replacement on reactor coolant pumps A and B;
reactor vessel inservice inspection; reactor baffle inspection
for jet impingement; inspection of the service water system for
microbiological induced corrosion and corbicula infestation;
inspection of feedwater piping as related to the Surry steam
,
line break and completion of design changes and modifications.
j
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.
19
!
The licensee's activities associated with the steam generator
-l
work appeared to be well planned and managed. , This work was
anticipated to be critical path and controlled other outage
-activities. Good communication, coupled with an excellent and
.
'
cooperative work relationship with the contractor, permitted
this work'to be-accomplished with minimal time on critical path
and little effect on other activities in the reactor building.
Taking 'into consideration the amount of work performed, the
number of concurrent activities being accomplished, and the fact
that some of the activities were a first for a " hot" plant, the
overall performance in this area was noteworthy.
Unanticipated problems such as relugging 1000 connections on the
Engineered Safety Features Load Sequencer, replacement of valve
internals on a RTD bypass manifold valve, rework of a ' reactor
coolant system leak on a reactor coolant pump and higher than
anticipated radiological conditions in the reactor building
extended the refueling outage by approximately 30 days.
Ninety-five design changes and modifications were completed
during the outage. These modifications consisted of 16 Appendix
R, 43 plant reliability, 28 TMI backfits for post accident
monitoring and control room human factors improvement, and eight
other miscellaneous items.
The maintenance group completed
the major portion of the work associated with Appendix R
modifications and feedwater piping inspections.
Maintenance
efforts in repairing the failed valve in the RTD bypass manifold
and the leak in a reactor coolant pump seal injection line were
examples of excellent work coordination and accomplishment under
difficult and demanding circumstances.
The licensee performed an inadequate design analysis and
modification that relocated the Service Water Pump air
temperature detectors near the pump room ceiling.
Correlation
testing was not done to ensure the ceiling air temperature
readings were representative of the air entering the pump motors
at floor level.
Subsequent temperature comparisons by the NRC
disclosed the ceiling detector readings were less (cooler) than
the actual air temperatures at pump level and the TS limit was
exceeded.
A new staff position of Associate Manager, Project Management
was added to the scheduling and project management area to
provide better scheduling and control of design changes and
modifications.
These changes have resulted in a definite
improvement in the number and timeliness of modification
,
completions.
A Modification and Contractor Services Group to
l
manage modification work and control contractor services was
j
established in 1987.
This group's handling of contractor
l
acquisition, training and day-to-day job management relieved
!
other site management of these functions and proved to be an
j
asset during the outage.
i
4
- - - - _ . _ _ - - . - - - _ - . . - _ _ _
_
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,
" Integrated safeguards testing, . plant startup. and '. low L power
physics ' testing was closely monitored by the ' resident-inspectors
d
.and regional specialists. .Each activity appeared.'to be: well-
controlled'with adequate _ supervision and management oversight.
,
,
Inspectors reviewed the ISI/IST Program, procedures and records,
l
and ' observed inservice inspect' ion in progress.
Other ~ areas
l
examined by regional based inspectors included: .The licensee's
response'to license _ condition 2.C.'11. dealing with the volume of
material required to be examined - ultrasonically;. valve test
stroke' time -limits; . and steam generator' tube,
U-Bend,
stress-relief and tube-sheet-roll, transition-area, and ' shot
peening processing.
Acceptable evidence.of prior planning and-
control of. activities was noted.
Procedures and policies were
adhered to in the-ISI/IST area.
Training, qualification, and
certification of ISI/IST personnel continued to be good.
Licensee management involvement in the outage was evident by
-their daily presence in the . field observing critical work
activities and attendance at off hours outage staff meetings. A
critique. was conducted upon completion of outage.
All
identified deficiencies or needed improvements were documented
and given completion dates for corrective action.
,
Two violations were identified:
-a.
Severity level IV violation for failure of quality control
inspectors to adequately inspect and verify that steam
generator tubes were properly plugged in both' ends.
(87-11)
b.
Severity Level V violation for failure to perform an
adequate design analysis.
(87-20)
2.
Conclusion
Category:
1-
3.
Board Recommendation
A reduced NRC inspection activity is recommended.
I.
Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Quality
1.
Analysis
- During the assessment period inspections were performed by the
resident and regional inspection staffs.
I
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21
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L
For the purposes of.this assessment, this area is defined as the
'
~
l..
ability . of the licensee to . identify and correct their own
problems.
It. encompasses all plant activities, . all ' plant' .
. personnel, as well as .those -corporate functions and personnel'
.that provide services to' the plant. . The plant and corporate QA
staff have responsibility for verifyingLquality. The rating in .
,
!
this? area specifically denotes results for various: groups. in
achieving quality as .well 'as the QA . staff in . verifying that
quality.
The site engineering group appeared slightly understaffed t'o
fulfill the increased work' load as design work is shifting'from
,
'
. the design consultant to plant staff. . ~The most significant'
weakness in the program is the_ informality in the documentation
of design packages, particularly in the presentation of design
,
' input'. Another apparent discrepant area was - the inadequacy of
procedures and instructions to accomplish modification work and
inspections as illustrated by'.the electrical ' cable tray.
insulation citation.
The design group has improved the
performance of 10_CFR 50.59 evaluations, 10 CFR 21 evaluations
and Appendix R assessments.
appropriately controlled by the same procedures used for
permanent modifications. Drawings are updated expeditiously
which minimizes the drawing change backlog.
.
'
QA does not orovide audit plans which has resulted in inadequate
prepratf oa and supporting documentation for some audits.
The
inadequate preparation has resulted in the failure to take
appropriate actions to prevent the reoccurrence of existing
problems. An example is the 1985 security audit (II-10-85-I)
and the 1985 security audit (II-14-86-I) which identified
repetitive problems relating to the control and distribution of
security procedures, however the 1987 audit did identify the
i
problem even though the problem continued to exist.
1
The ' review of the maintenance group activities indicated a
strong program which included mechanisms for the identification
and correction of problems in this area. Maintenance activities
appeared to receive adequate review to identify adverse trends.
The overall level of documentation in the maintenance area was
satisfactory.
QA's escalation of deficiencies is adequate. When issues are
escalated
there
is
evidence
of appropriate management
involvement.
The Quality Services area was reorganized in the January 1986
reorganization into three areas:
Quality Control, Quality
Assurance, and Materials and Procurement. These areas report to
the Director, Quality and Procurement Services.
- _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
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,
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22
In the Materials and Procurement area, the reorganization
1
resulted in improved efficiency by eliminating dual functions
I
previously performed in quality and procurement areas. Improved
)
'
communications and better management control led to a reduction
in the time required to obtain needed parts and resulted in a 75
1
percent reduction in the backlog of safety related parts on
order.
The Procurement Engineering Group is over 50 percent
complete on a four year program developing a comprehensive
" piece part" Q list of replacement parts for safety related
components.
The Quality Assurance area continues to perform the required
Type I and Type II surveillance and audits. They have followed
i
industry trends and are slanting these surveillance
toward
hardware and performance. They have initiated technical adequacy
,
audits in the areas of inservice inspection and design changes.
The reorganization. of Quality Services has led to a stronger
j
Quality Control Organization. Increased emphasis on working
i
conditions, training, morale, and professionalism has led to
l
improved and more professional inspections. A QC coordinator
'!
position has been established to address programs and training
]
needs. Improved supervision, management oversight and better
'
communications have resulted in a more professional organization
!
with improved creditability.
1
A review was performed on all sections of the SALP report in an
I
attempt to capture apparent strengths and weaknesses related to
management controls affecting quality.
1
a.
The following are some observed strengths in management
I
controls affecting quality:
1)
Plant supervision and management have assumed very
active rolls in ensuring that efforts and resources
needed to
insure timely corrective action are
available.
This is evident by the following:
a)
The licensee had the highest plant availability
for domestic Westinghouse plants;
b)
The management review board that was established
to review all reactor trips and other plant
significant events;
c)
Frequent management plant tours which encompass
all shifts;
d)
The initiation of a control room enhancement
program;
i
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e)
The high level of commitment in matters-relating
J
to radiation protection program resulting in what
is considered the best contamination control
'
program in the Region;
i
f)
Licensee initiated SSFI inspections;
g)
Continued responsiveness to NRC initiatives; and
h)
Outage
activities
were
well
coordinated,
communication between departments was good, and
the overall performance was good for a plant in a
third refueling outage.
(2) The Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator
requalification
program
is
well
developed
and
administered.
(3) A program has been developed to document detailed
design basis for selected plant systems, structures,
and components.
This should result in a better
technical understanding of the present design and
provide for better future design change documentation.
b.
The following are some observed weaknesses in management
contro'is affecting quality:
(1) Manpower
levels
appear to be insufficient to
completely overview contractor activities and to react
to involved chemistry program needs.
(2) Corrective action is often not completely documented.
This
has
resulted in inadequate planning and
corrective action verification.
(3) Design inputs for design change packages are often not
formally identified, specifically approved, and do not
provide enough detail for a consistent basis for
design verification measures.
Three violations were identified:
1
a.
Severity Level IV violation for failure to provide design
input for modifications.
(87-20)
b.
Severity level V violation for failure to have adequate
procedures
when
installing
thermo-lag
fire
barrier
material.
(86-07)
1
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24
l
c.
Severity Level V violation for inadequate review of
previous audit findings for adequacy of corrective action
,
implementation.
(87-20)
i
2.
Conclusion
Category:
2
1
3.
Board Recommendations
I
i
No change in NRC inspection activity is recommended.
J.
Licensing Activities
1.
Analysis
.
Management involvement has been constantly involved over the
assessment period.
Prior planning and involvement was evident
in both site and licensing activities during normal operation;
however, four needed license amendments were requested within
three months of the start of the last refueling outage. More
planning should be done in order to submit licensing actions
needed for an outage in a more timely manner. This would allow
.
for sufficient time for NRC to review involved submittals, like
the heat flux hot channel factor amendment request without
impacting startup from an outage.
Technical soundness and
,
quality was apparent in most submittals.
Examples of quality
!
submittal were the boron concentration and ESF response. This
level of quality should be maintained for future submittals.
The
licensee's determinations
regarding non significant/
significant hazards considerations have uniformly improved and
are generally of good quality.
The licensee has been very responsive to NRC initiatives. The
licensee provided a prompt and complete response to the NRC
request
for
information
regarding
documentation
of
implementation of approved regulatory as tracked by the Safety
Issues Management Systems.
In addition, the licensee was
extremely cooperative with the NRC control room habitability
survey.
The licensee's responsiveness to the staff's requests
for additional information have been prompt for plant specific
and most generic issues; however, a response on the generic
issue regarding relief and safety valves was not timely. The
licensee keeps the Project Manager informed on the status of
l
ongoing activities and has taken the initiative in discussions
,
L
and meetings.
l
The licensee continues to be informed of industry approaches
of plant safety issues and is aware of programs, problems
and resolution thereto, at other plants. This was accomplished
by participation in major industry advi so ry groups and,
__
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particularly, by participation in owners . groups.
The;.. licensee
. joined EPRI .in July 1987. - This additional -membership . should
7
enhance 'their knowledge 'of - generic. iissues affecting ; the
electrical power industry.
y
The licensee is generally-timely in. reporting operational events
and Licensee Event Reports (LERs). An evaluation of-the content
and quality of a representative sample of LERs was performed.
~ The results 'of this evaluation indicate that, while' the' overall'
quality of the Summer LERs, for the three areas that. are
evaluated (i .e. , the : text, ' abstract,' and coded -fields), has
improved somewhat since the previous evaluation, the improvement
7
was less than expected.
For the current evaluation, Summer's
overall ' average. LER score i s .8.1, which' i s still. below the
current . industry average LER score (8.4)- [ scores are discussed.
in -NUREG-1022].
The quality 'of- seven , text discussions . remain
below' the industry average.
These are safety consequence,
identification of failed components, discussion of root cause,
corrective - actions, personnel error, operator. actions- that
affected the course of.-the event, and safety system responses.
It was noted however, that. starting in 1987 the LERs . were
written using an outline format (i.e., the last five Leks in the
sample).
The average score for these-'LERS may be indicative.of
,
an improvement beyond that shown for the' entire sample.
No-violations wcre. identified during this period
2.
Conclusion
Category:
2
3.
Board Recommendations
None
K.
Training and Qualifications Effectiveness
' 1.
Training Analysis
During the assessment period, inspections were performed.by the
resident and regional staffs.
Four of the five training
programs under Nuclear Operations Education and Training have
been accredited by the Institute of Nuclear Operations (INPO)
since 1984.
These are (1) Non-licensed Operators Training,
(2) Licensed
Operator
Training,
(3) Licensed
Operator
Requalification Training, and (4) Shift Technical Advisor.
The
fifth program, Nuclear Training-for Technical Staff and Managers
was initiated in late 1986, and was reviewed for INP0
accreditation in 1987.
1
l
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--
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.
26
'
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<
'
.
Four.of four Senior Reactor' Operators and eight of nine Reacto.r.
.
,
. 0perators ' passed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Licensing
examinations 'during this evaluation period. This high success
E
rate indicates the. licensed operator. training program is
!
effective.
m
"
The licensee. has a well Ldeveloped and administered Reactor
~
' Operator. 'and Senior ' Reactor Operator Requalification Program.
Feedback from students, supervisors and managers on' classroom-
presentations, . simulator ' activities and on-the-job training is
elicited ~and incorporated into the training program.
This
process also identifies training material deficiencies and
provides management with a stable assessment' of. student
participation as well as maintaining quality trained and updated
instructors in the training program.
There is a well defined, developed' and controlled tracking
system established which insures .that additions and ' changes- to
training . ' material- required - by
plant
changes
through-
modifications, technical specifications, licensee event reports,
INP0 significant operating event reports, industry events and-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Notices are incorporated into.the
training and simulator programs.
,
The simulator. is routinely used to reproduce operational events,
evaluate . operator errors and- determine root causes and
corrective actions.
The training department reviews systems
procedures changes to identify areas of potential operator
errurs.
The Nuclear Technical Education and Training Programs for crafts
were revised to meet the INPD accreditation guidelines. Craft
training is performance based and there is a continuous ongoing
upgrade and development of training materials and lesson plans.
Instructors for craft training are certified.
The licensee
craft training, facilities and staff was evaluated by an INPO
accreditation team in March 1987. The licensee anticipates that
accreditation will be granted by the end of 1987-.
Maintenance has supported the implementation of INPO craft
training programs by providing assistance in developing training
manuals, lesson plans, other course materials and instructors.
A new classroom training facility has been constructed, and a
training laboratory for hands on training is being upgraded.
Management has strongly supported and provided the resources
necessary to implement these items.
No violations were identified in this area,
y,
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q
2.
Conclusion
,
,
Ca.tegory:
1
j
3.
Board Recommendations
,
A reduced NRC inspection activity is recomm'nded.
e
i
-
V
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES
j
A.
Licensee Activities
l
Significant achievements during 1986 iaeluded a piant availability of
I
95.3% and the cumulative radiation exposure of 23 person-rem.
Several self-initiated programs and reviews have. been initiated and
are on going as discussed in this report.
The third refueling was
-complete during a 95 day outage ending in June 1987.
Major
activities included shot peening and stress relieving of steam
generators, overhaul of diesel generator B, seal replacements of A
i
and B reactor coolant pumps, inarvice inspection, /eactor baffle
inspection for jet imp %giment, inspection of service water and
feedwater piping, ninety-five design changes and modifications and
numerous other repairs.
Problem identification, corrective and/or
.
improvement programs are identified in each of the functional areas.
These reflect upon a aggressive management and many pgrson years of
effort.
T
,
1
B.
Inspection Activities
The routine inspection program was performed during this period, with
special inspections conducted to augment the program as follows:
Control Room Habitability Survey, January 12-16, 1987.
-
Regulatory Effectiveness Review, March 3-7, 1986.
-
,
C.
Licensing pctivities
'
/
1.
NRR/ Licensing Meetings
Management site visit
02/05/86
Licensing status
03/21/86
Fire Protection
04/02/E6
l
Licensing status
05/08/86
Licensing status
06/12/86
F-S1 AR analysis
06/27/86
e
_ _ _ _ _
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-.
>
. . . ..
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28
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Licensing status
08/08/86
'3-Loop PWR topics .
10/16/86
Licensing status
01/27/87
Licensing status
03/05/87
Licensing status
03/26/87
,, ,
Management meeting
05/18/87
1
2.
NRR Site Visits
Licensing status meeting & plant tour
05/05/86
Badge training & Regulatory Effectiveness
03/5-7/86
Review
SPDS Audit
11/4-6/86
Badge Training & QA inspection exit
07/23-24/87
3.
Reliefs Granted
ASME Section XI Relief
06/03/87
4.
Licensee Amendments
19 issued (Amendments 49-67)
m
D.
Investigation Review
No major investigative activities occured during this time period.
['
E.
Escalated Enforcement Actions
1.
Civil Penalties
a.
Severity Level III problem with four violations and one
Severity Level IV violation on Component Cooling Water
trains inoperable - LCO. A $50,000 Civil Penalty (Issued:
April 15, 1986; 86E009).
b.
Severity Level III problem for misalignment of Charging
Pumps.
Two violations with a $50,000 Civil Penalty.
(Issued:
September 22, 1986; 86E033).
.
________m.
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29
c.
Severity: Level
III ' problem
for. fire
protection
requirements - Appendix R. LTwo violation with two examples,
each.
This matter was discussed in the ' previous SALP
report.
(Issued: March 11, 1987; 85E039).
l
.
2.
Actions without Civil Penalties-
<
Severity Level III problem with two violations, for. hand
-
The licensee is currently appealing this
y
matter.
(Issued:
March 10, 1987;'86E055)-,
3
Orders
Order imposing $50,000. Civil Penalty' was issued on September .19,.
1986 . for the Severity . Level III problem on the Component
,
Cooling Water trains inoperability. The Civil Penalty was paid
on October 17, 1986.-
F.
Enforcement Conferences Held During Appraisal Period
'1.
~ An ~ enforcement conference was. held in. the Region II office on
. February 28,-1986, to discuss the inoperability of Component
Cooling Water trains.
,
2.
An enforcement conference was held in the Region .II office on
July.3, 1986, to discuss the misalignment of the Charging-Pumps.
3.
An enforcement conference was held in the Region II office on
December 16, 1986, to discuss the' hand overexposure issue.
G.
Confirmation of Action Letters
None
H.
Licensee Event Report
During the evaluation period, 25 of 37 LERs submitted by the licensee
i
were' evaluated by the NRC staff to determine the event cause ' and
'
review the content. Summary of comments provided to the' licensee are
!
in the Licensing Activities section of this report. The distribution
!
of these events were as follows:
Cause
Number
Component Failure
5
-
Design
1
-
Construction, Fabrication,
or Installation
2
Personnel
- Operating Activity
6
i
..
-
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mm_
_.._._____________m_
_ . _
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p
'30
-
- Maintenance Activity
2
,
- Test / Calibration Activity
6
- Other
1
Out of Calibration
0
Other
2
>
Total
25
2.
10 CFR Part 21 Reports
-
Anchor Darling Check Valves, February 19, 1986, discussed
in LER 86-01
-
ESF Load Sequencer, June 5,1987, discussed in LER 87-10.
I.
Enforcement Activity
A summary of violations tabulated per SALP functional areas are
shown in the following table.
FUNCTIONAL
NUMBER OF DEVIATIO"S AND VIOLATIONS
AREA
IN EACH SEVERITY LEVEL
D
V
IV
III
II
I
Plant Operations-
1
1
2
Radiological Control
1
3
1
Maintenance
Surveillance
1
Fire Protection
2
1*
1
1
Security
1
Outages
1
1
Quality Programs and
2
1
Administrative Controls
Affecting Quality
!
Licensing Activities
Training and Qualifications
Effectiveness
Total
7
10
4*
u
- 0ne Severity Level III violation was discussed but not tabulated in the
previous SALP.
_
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Reactor: Trips
.1.
February 2, 1986, reactor. power was 100% when_ power was removed
fromia condensate polisher control. panel;to support maintenance
activities. The-removal of power caused the condensate polisher
bypass valve deaerating tank 'to-
fail
closed. .i sol ati ng
.
4
condensate flow. The resulting low deaerating' tank water ~ level
'
' '
tripped- the feedwater pumps causing .a . turbine trip.
The-
electrical feeder . list did ' not identify the bypass valve as
receiving its control power from the panel.
2.
February 3,1986, the main turbine was =being rolled up to 1800;
. RPM at the fast startup rate. When turbine ' speed.. reached about
400 RPM, it . appears that the turbine control valves opened
'
rapidly causing a' sudden increase in speed,
The.. large. steam
'
demand caused a rapid decrease in main steamlinel pressure. The,
rate of decrease in.steamline pressure was sufficient.to' actuate
the steamline low pressure.bistables due to rate compensation
and cause a safety injection.
3.
April 2, .1986, while operating at 100% power, the loss 1 of
excitation of'. the- main. generator occurred when the exciter
brushes failed.
This
caused the generator and turbine to
,
trip.
4.
P,ay'31, 1986, reactor power was 100% and a surveillance test was
in progress. The bistables were tripped for one channel of the
,
power range nuclear instrumentation 'and a test signal was
j
inadvertently inserted in another channel.
The test signal
tripped the' .overtemperature delta-bistables and with the
bistables in the other instrument channel in the tripped-
condition, a 2 L out of 3 coincidence was met and tripped' the
reactor.
5.
June 26, 1986, reactor power was reduced to 90% in preparation
for the weekly turbine valve tests.
Before the testing was
begun, the feedwater isolation valve for Steam Generator'"A
failed closed causing a reactor trip.
Investigation revealed
that a solenoid valve had' an electrical connection which was
discolored and; appeared to have been contaminated with oil or
dirt.
Interruption of power to this solenoid failed the
feedwater isolation valve shut.
6.
July 27, 1986, reactor power was reduced to 90% for the monthly
test to the turbine control valves.
Three of the turbine
control valves were tested without incident. During the test of
the fourth control valve, the spurious operation of one of the
two pressure switches on the other control valves coincident
with the actual low EHC fluid pressure on the valve being tested
apparently indicated a turbine trip which caused a reactor trip.
- - _ _ _
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32
7.
June 16, 1987, reactor power 100% when Inverter 5904 failed,
deenergizing' protection Channel IV.
Power Range NI-44 failed
low, reducing programmed S/G 1evel to the no-load value.
Feedwater flow decreased responding to the new false low
programmed level.
The low-low S/G level trip setpoints which
are derived from the other three power range nuclear instruments
remained at full load values. Actual levels decreased below
the trip setpoints resulting in a low level trip.
.
K.
Effulent Summary for V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
TOTAL RELEASE IN CURIES
1984
1985
1986
. Gaseous Effluents
Fission and Activation Gases
1.64 E+1
1.41 E+2
1.39 E+1
(1,06E+4)
(9.37E+3)
(8.04E+3)
Iodine and Particulate
1.04 E-5
4.17 E-5
4.39 E-5
(9.56E-2)
(9.62E-2)
(4.60E-2)
Liquid Effluents
Fission and Activation Products 4.58
7.15 E-1
3.29 E-1
(3.27E+0)
(2.59E+0)
(2.11E+0)
i
2.25 E+2
3.11 E+2
3.74 E+2
(7.23E+2)
(7.35E+2)
(7.42E+2)
Values in parentheses are Region II averages for PWRs.
Maximum Whole Body Dose Offsite in 1986:
4.55 E-2 mrem
,
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