ML20199J042: Difference between revisions

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| document type = SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES, TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| document type = SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES, TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 2
| page count = 2
| project =  
| project = TAC:61259
| stage = Approval
| stage = Approval
}}
}}
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4;:?        o g                          UNITED STATES e              o              NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 h
4;:?        o g                          UNITED STATES e              o              NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 h
l SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO APPENDIX R, 10 CFR PART 50, FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-285 INTRODUCTION In a safety evaluation (SE) dated July 3, 1985, the staff granted a number of exemptions to the fire protection requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
l SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO APPENDIX R, 10 CFR PART 50, FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-285 INTRODUCTION In a safety evaluation (SE) dated July 3, 1985, the staff granted a number of exemptions to the fire protection requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
By letter dated April 9,1986, the licensee provided clarifications to certain statements in the SE and requested approval of several changes in their approach toward satisfying previous commitments.
By {{letter dated|date=April 9, 1986|text=letter dated April 9,1986}}, the licensee provided clarifications to certain statements in the SE and requested approval of several changes in their approach toward satisfying previous commitments.
EVALUATION In the SE, the staff stated that the licensee had committed to install a radiant energy shield between junction boxes JB-103C and JB-252C. Sub-sequently, JB-252C was relocated such that both junction boxes are separated by a radiant energy shield between two other components. The new configuration conforms with Section III.G. of Appendix R and is, therefore, acceptable.
EVALUATION In the SE, the staff stated that the licensee had committed to install a radiant energy shield between junction boxes JB-103C and JB-252C. Sub-sequently, JB-252C was relocated such that both junction boxes are separated by a radiant energy shield between two other components. The new configuration conforms with Section III.G. of Appendix R and is, therefore, acceptable.
In the SE, the staff stated that the cables for valves HCV-240 and HCV-249 would be protected by either a " fire wrap or a thermal energy shield." The licensee subsequently completed modifications that resulted in these cables being protected by radiant energy shielding and 20 feet of special separation as described in the April 9, 1985 letter.        The stcff's conclusion as to the acceptability of the protection for these cables remains valid.
In the SE, the staff stated that the cables for valves HCV-240 and HCV-249 would be protected by either a " fire wrap or a thermal energy shield." The licensee subsequently completed modifications that resulted in these cables being protected by radiant energy shielding and 20 feet of special separation as described in the {{letter dated|date=April 9, 1985|text=April 9, 1985 letter}}.        The stcff's conclusion as to the acceptability of the protection for these cables remains valid.
In the SE, the staff stated that shields will be erected in the air compressor room to protect safe shutdown equipment such as the motor driven auxiliary I            feedwater pump. However, the installation of shielding above the equipment could adversely affect fire protection capability by dissipating the thermal column from a fire detector that is necessary for detection and could obstruct the water pattern from the ceiling-level sprinkler heads. For these reasons, the licensee has not installed the shields. Because the Preaction-type sprinkler system is not prone to inadvertent water discharge and because a horizontal barrier exists between the motor driven and steam powered auxiliary feedwater pumps, the staff considers the absence of umbrella-type shields above the electrical equipment to be acceptable.
In the SE, the staff stated that shields will be erected in the air compressor room to protect safe shutdown equipment such as the motor driven auxiliary I            feedwater pump. However, the installation of shielding above the equipment could adversely affect fire protection capability by dissipating the thermal column from a fire detector that is necessary for detection and could obstruct the water pattern from the ceiling-level sprinkler heads. For these reasons, the licensee has not installed the shields. Because the Preaction-type sprinkler system is not prone to inadvertent water discharge and because a horizontal barrier exists between the motor driven and steam powered auxiliary feedwater pumps, the staff considers the absence of umbrella-type shields above the electrical equipment to be acceptable.
l            In the SE, the staff stated that an area-wide sprinkler system was to be installed in fire area 32. Fire area 32 consists of the air compressor room at elevation 989 feet and a small corridor at elevation 1011 feet. The l
l            In the SE, the staff stated that an area-wide sprinkler system was to be installed in fire area 32. Fire area 32 consists of the air compressor room at elevation 989 feet and a small corridor at elevation 1011 feet. The l
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In the SE, the staff stated that power feeder cables in the lower electrical penetration room for MCC's - 3A1, 381 and 3C1 would be rerouted inside the room in conduits and protected by a 1-hour fire-rated barrier. Instead of the above, the licensee indicated that these cables have been rerouted outside of the fire area. This change conforms with the requirements of Section III.G.
In the SE, the staff stated that power feeder cables in the lower electrical penetration room for MCC's - 3A1, 381 and 3C1 would be rerouted inside the room in conduits and protected by a 1-hour fire-rated barrier. Instead of the above, the licensee indicated that these cables have been rerouted outside of the fire area. This change conforms with the requirements of Section III.G.
of Appendix R and is therefore, acceptable.
of Appendix R and is therefore, acceptable.
CONCULSION Based on the evaluation of the information contained in the licensee's April 9, 1986 letter, the staff considers the above referenced changes and clarifi-cations to be in conformance with the requirements of Section III.G. of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and are acceptable. Thus, the staff's previous conclusion regarding Appendix R compliance for Ft. Calhoun is still valid.
CONCULSION Based on the evaluation of the information contained in the licensee's {{letter dated|date=April 9, 1986|text=April 9, 1986 letter}}, the staff considers the above referenced changes and clarifi-cations to be in conformance with the requirements of Section III.G. of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and are acceptable. Thus, the staff's previous conclusion regarding Appendix R compliance for Ft. Calhoun is still valid.
Principal Contributor:    D. Kubicki Date:
Principal Contributor:    D. Kubicki Date:
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                                                   ,_            -}}
                                                   ,_            -}}

Latest revision as of 00:11, 8 December 2021

Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 860409 Clarifications to NRC 850703 Safety Evaluation Granting Exemptions to Fire Protection Requirements of App R to 10CFR50
ML20199J042
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 07/01/1986
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20199J040 List:
References
TAC-61259, NUDOCS 8607080092
Download: ML20199J042 (2)
v • d • e


Text

- ,

4;:? o g UNITED STATES e o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 h

l SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO APPENDIX R, 10 CFR PART 50, FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-285 INTRODUCTION In a safety evaluation (SE) dated July 3, 1985, the staff granted a number of exemptions to the fire protection requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

By letter dated April 9,1986, the licensee provided clarifications to certain statements in the SE and requested approval of several changes in their approach toward satisfying previous commitments.

EVALUATION In the SE, the staff stated that the licensee had committed to install a radiant energy shield between junction boxes JB-103C and JB-252C. Sub-sequently, JB-252C was relocated such that both junction boxes are separated by a radiant energy shield between two other components. The new configuration conforms with Section III.G. of Appendix R and is, therefore, acceptable.

In the SE, the staff stated that the cables for valves HCV-240 and HCV-249 would be protected by either a " fire wrap or a thermal energy shield." The licensee subsequently completed modifications that resulted in these cables being protected by radiant energy shielding and 20 feet of special separation as described in the April 9, 1985 letter. The stcff's conclusion as to the acceptability of the protection for these cables remains valid.

In the SE, the staff stated that shields will be erected in the air compressor room to protect safe shutdown equipment such as the motor driven auxiliary I feedwater pump. However, the installation of shielding above the equipment could adversely affect fire protection capability by dissipating the thermal column from a fire detector that is necessary for detection and could obstruct the water pattern from the ceiling-level sprinkler heads. For these reasons, the licensee has not installed the shields. Because the Preaction-type sprinkler system is not prone to inadvertent water discharge and because a horizontal barrier exists between the motor driven and steam powered auxiliary feedwater pumps, the staff considers the absence of umbrella-type shields above the electrical equipment to be acceptable.

l In the SE, the staff stated that an area-wide sprinkler system was to be installed in fire area 32. Fire area 32 consists of the air compressor room at elevation 989 feet and a small corridor at elevation 1011 feet. The l

1 l e607080092 e60701 PDR ADOCK 05000285 F PDR

staff's concern for adequate fire protection features centered on the air compressor room only since no redundant cables or equipment required for safe shutdown are located in the corridor. The licensee has provided automatic sprinkler protection for the air compressor room, but not in the corridor.

Because there are no shutdown systems in the corridor and because it is not credible for a fire to start on elevation 1011 feet and spread downward, the absence of sprinklers in the corridor is considered acceptable.

In the SE, the staff stated that "... spray nozzles will be installed with cable trays to provide adequate coverage ...". This language is incorrect and should read "... spray nozzles will be installed along the cable trays to provide adequate coverage ..." (emphasis added).

In the SE, the staff stated that power feeder cables in the lower electrical penetration room for MCC's - 3A1, 381 and 3C1 would be rerouted inside the room in conduits and protected by a 1-hour fire-rated barrier. Instead of the above, the licensee indicated that these cables have been rerouted outside of the fire area. This change conforms with the requirements of Section III.G.

of Appendix R and is therefore, acceptable.

CONCULSION Based on the evaluation of the information contained in the licensee's April 9, 1986 letter, the staff considers the above referenced changes and clarifi-cations to be in conformance with the requirements of Section III.G. of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and are acceptable. Thus, the staff's previous conclusion regarding Appendix R compliance for Ft. Calhoun is still valid.

Principal Contributor: D. Kubicki Date:

l

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