ML20195C736

Insp Rept 50-440/98-18 on 980909-1020.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20195C736
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	11/10/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195C715	List: ML20195C709 ML20195C723 ML20195C736
References
50-440-98-18, NUDOCS 9811170204
Download: ML20195C736 (19)

See also: IR 05000440/1998018

Text

. . - . .-. . . . . . . . .. = - .. .. . _ - . . . - . -

,

I

l

, U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

l

REGIONlli

Docket No: 50-440 i

License No: NPF-58 l

Report No: 50-440/98018(DRP)

Licensee: Centerior Service Company

P.O. Box 97 A200

Perry, OH 44081

~

Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Location: Perry, OH

Dates: September 9 - October 20,1998

l

Inspectors: C. Lipa, Senior Resident inspector

D. Calhoun, Resident inspector

J. Clark, Resident inspector

S. Dupont, Project Engineer

Approved by: Thomas J. Kozak, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 4

l

'ke

9811170204 981110

~

PDR ADOCK 05000440

G PDR r,

-_ -_-__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

NRC Inspection Report 50-440/98018(DRP)

This inspection report included resident inspectors' evaluation of aspects of licensee operations,

engineering, maintenance, and plant support.

Operations

.

The inspectors concluded that operators appropriately followed procedures and that

shift tumovers were consistent from shift to shift. The overall conduct of operations

continued to be effective with an appropriate safety focus. (Section O1.1)

.

The inspectors concluded that a special evolution was effectively conducted to isolate

and suppress a small fuel leak. Operations department personnel maintained a high

level of reactivity control awareness during the several hundred control rod

-

manipulations which occurrea during the special evolution. (Section 01.2)

.

The licensee took prompt and conservative actions upon the report of possible seismic

activity in the vicinity of the plant. Operations department personnel conducted

verifications of key indicators and plant walkdowns, even though no seismic alarm was

received. (Section 01.3)

.

Operations department personnel responded appropriately to abnormal indications for x

the rod control and information system. The coordination between the workgroups

involved in the troubleshooting and repair was good, distractions to the operators were

kept to a minimum, and the problem was repaired in a timely manner.

(Section 01.4)

Maintenance

.

Plant management demonstrated good involvement in the prioritization of the control

complex chill water motor replacement, the assignment of a project manager for the

work activity, and during the oversight of the activity, which resulted in the motor being

replaced in an efficient and timely manner. (Section M1.2)

.

The inspectors concluded that a fire watch demonstrated inadequate knowledge of his

fire watch responsibilities during welding activities on the Division 1 diesel generator

silencer. One violation was identified when a fire watch inappropriately allowed welders

to perform hot work with a significant quantity of wood in the immediate work area. In

addition, after c.cciding to use the wood, maintenance department personnel did not

initiate a transient combustible permit (TCP) for the temporary staging of the wood. The

fai!ure to generate a TCP was similar to, but not a direct repeat of, other recent

examples of problems with station personnel's awareness of when a TCP is required.

(Section M1.3)

2

<

-.

______ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. . . . . __

,

l

.

Enaineerina

'. The inspectors concluded that a chemistry technician properly analyzed a routine off

gas sample which indicated a small fuel pin leak had occurred and promptly notified the

appropriate station personnel. Also, engineering department personnel provided good

support for determining the location and suppressing the leak. (Section E1.1)

Plant Suooort

=

Although the licensee's contamination control program allowed plant personnel to

extend contamination area boundaries in certain situations, this policy was not

consistently understood or implemented by radiation protection technicians.

(Section R1.1)

-

9e

3

i

. - _ _ _ - _ _ _

-- .. .

.. - ; - - - .- . .- . - - - - - _

.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

At the beginning of this inspection period, the plant was operated at 100 percent power. Plant

power was reduced to 60 percent on September 12,1998, to determine the location of a small

fuel leak which had been detected through the identification of a slight increase in reactor

coolant activity. The leak was localized and suppressed on September 14,1998, and the plant

was returned to full power. In order to maintain the leak suppression, plant management

directed that the weekly control rod surveillance testing activities would be conducted at

90 percent power instead of 100 percent, and that power changes would be limited to 1 percent

per hour. These restrictions continued throughout the remainder of the inspection period, and l

were expected to remain in effect until the April 1999 refueling outage.  !

l

1

1. Operations

- 01 Conduct of Operations

l

O1.1 General Comments

l

a. Inspection Scoce (71707)

The inspectors followed the guidance of inspection Procedure 71707 and conducted

frequent reviews of plant operations. This included observing routine control room

activities, reviewing system tagouts, attending shift tumovers and crew briefings, and

performing panel walkdowns. The inspectors also observed operators performing  !

routine equipment cycling.

l

b. Observations and Findinas l

I

Operations management initiated several improvements to crew briefings including i

moving the briefing out of the Unit 1 control roorr to prevent distractions. Shift turnovers  ;

were thorough and consistent from shift to shift. The inspectors observed that operators i

consistently followed equipment operating procedures and alarm response instructions.

Overall, the conduct of operations was appropriately focused on safety.

c. Conclusions 4

The inspectors concluded that operators appropriately followed procedures and that

shift tumovers were consistent from shift to shift. The overall conduct of operations

continued to be effective with an appropriate safety focus.

4

.

.

01.2 Fuel Leakaoe Testina and Suporession

a. Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors followcd the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in assessing

operations department personnel performance in isolating and suppressing a small fuel

leak which was detected through the identification of a slight increase in reactor coolant

activity.

b. Observations and Findinas

Operations and engineering personnel developed a special evolution to localize and

suppress a fuel leak that was detected on September 1,1998. On September 12,1998,

the evolution was commenced. The inspectors observed the briefings associated with

this evolution and determined that the briefings were formal and had an appropriate

focus on human performance and plant safety.

- The evolution involved a large number of repetitive control rod manipulations, with

subsequent chemistry samples, to determine the specific location of the lesk. The test

was conducted throughout the weekend. In all, operations department personnel

performed several hundred control rod manipulations without error. The operators

maintained their sensitivity for reactivity controls throughout the evolution. In addition,

operators used appropriate three-way communications amongst themselves and with

other personnel.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that a special evolution was effectively conducted to isolate

and suppress a small fuel leak. Operations department personnel maintained a high

level of reactivity control awareness during the several hundred control rod

manipulations which occurred during the special evolution.

01.3 Ooerations Response to Report of Seismic Activity

a. Inspect'on Scope (71707)

The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in assessing the

operations department personnel response to a report of seismic activity in the vicinity of

the plant. The inspectors also reviewed logs and conducted interviews with operations

department personnel.

b. Observations and Findinas

On September 25,1998, control room personnel received several reports from outside

personnel that there had been a seismic event in the area. The licensee subsequently

confirmed, through media reports and information from the National Earthquake Center,

that a seismic event had been reported in Sharon, Pennsylvania (approximately 45 miles

southeast of the Perry Plant). Control room personnel had no direct indication of the

5

_ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _

,

.

activity, and had no abnormal alarms or indications. Operations department personnel

also verified that the seismic monitors were in operation, but not alarming.

Operations department personnel conservatively entered the Off Normal Instruction

(ONI) for seismic activity. Post seismic event walkdowns of plant systems were

conducted, which determined there were no abnormalindications. Operations

department personnel exited the ONI after all walkdowns and verifications were

complete. The licensee also notified the NRC and issued a press release describing the

plant status.

The licensee subsequently reviewed the seismic instrumentation for indications over the

reportable 0.05g ground acceleration limit. Both the active and passive sensors showed

no indication of the event. The inspectors were informed by operations and engineering

personnel that based upon the available information, the earthquake produced less than

0.03g of ground acceleration in the vicinity of the plan *.

c. Conclusions

.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee took prompt and conservative actions upon

receiving a report of possible seismic activity in the plant vicinity. Operations

department personnei conducted verifications of key indicators and plant walkdowns,

even though no seismic alarm was received.

O1.4 Operations Response to Rod Gana Drive System Power Suoolv Failure

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in assessing the

operations department personnel response to a failure of a power supply in the rod gang

drive system.

b. Observations and Findinas

On October 2,1998, operations department personnel informed the inspectors of an

entry into ONI-C11, " inability to Move Control Rods." This was due to an apparent

lockup of the rod control and information system (RCIS). The inspectors monitored

initial control room operator actions for the event. Operations department personnel

thoroughly assessed the situation and used appropriate procedures. The licensee

formed a team of operators, maintenance technicians, and engineers to investigate and

correct the problem. The inspectors noted that the licensee kept activities of the group

l outside the control room as much as possible, to allow operators to focus on continued

'

plant operations.

The investigation team determined that a 5-volt power supply in the rod gang drive

system had failed. Briefings were held to discuss repair plans and plant operations.

The inspectors observed that the briefings were open and informative. Operations

department personnel entered 12-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.1.3 due

to the loss of rod position indication to replace the power supply. Maintenance

,

d

e

l

i

'

._ _. _ _.._._ ____. _ - . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _

l

I i

t

,

i

I

personnel subsequently replaced the power supply and retested the RCIS. Operations

department personnel verified proper rod position indication and RCIS operation and

subsequently exited the LCO, '

L

c. Conclusions

!

Operations department personnel responded appropriately to abnormal indications for

the rod control and information system. The coordination between the workgroups .i

.

involved in the troubleshooting and repair was good, distractions to the operators were

'

. kept to a minimum, and the problem was repaired in a timely manner.

l-  :

07- - Quality Assurance in Opentions '

'~

L 07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors observed multiple licensee self-assessment I

y activities, including:

L Plant Onsite Review Committee, September 17,1998 ,

l Corrective Action Review Board, September 30,1998

.

Daily Management Review of New Condition Reports 1

l-

The meetings were attended by appropriate personnel and there was good discussion

.

'

of issues. The inspectors observed that s 3veral items were identified for priority

upgrades or additional work during these meetings. The inspectors concluded that the

observed self-assessment activities were thorough, self-critical, and effective in

identifying problems and developing appropriate corrective actions. )

i 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700,92901)

I

-

'

08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-440/98002-00(DRP): On July 1,1998, a trip

unit failure initiated reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) with a subsequent reactor

scram. This event was documented in inspection Report 50-440/97013. The inspectors

'

l concluded in the inspection report that the licensee's preliminary root cause

I

investigation had determined that the root cause of the scram was due to RCIC

j. - initiation, and that RCIC had initiated due to the failure of a capacitor on a

instrumentation card. The inspectors subsequently reviewed the licensee's completed

l Category 2 investigation and concluded that the licensee had conducted a very thorough

l investigation. The licensee's preliminary root causes were documented in the root  !

l. cause report. The licensee replaced the damaged card and conducted testing to

!

restore the system to service. This item is closed.

08.2 (Closed) Violation 50-440/97009-02(DRP): Engineering personnel did not give

l procedure guidance on how to handle post test changes to previous acceptance criteria.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to this violation dated i

December 23,1997. The licensee changed plant administrative procedure, PAP-1105,  !

, " Surveillance Test Control," Revision 8, August 1998, for changing maintenance and

. test procedure acceptance criteria. Additional training was also given to responsible

<

.

.

engineers as to the effeas of procedure changes. The inspectors have noted no repeat

occurrences of this issue. The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions for this

violation are adequate and this item is closed.

11. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Comments

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities.

.

Surveillance instruction SVI-E22-T1202, *High Pressure Core Spray System

Flow Rate - Low (Bypass) Channel Functional for 1E22-N656," Revision 3

.

Work Order (WO) No. 98-5174, emergency service water altemate tunnel sitt

-

inspection

.

WO No.97-298, replacement of operator for E1200028A, containment spray "A"

first shutoff valve

.

gel-0006, " General Maintenance of Motor Control Centers," Revision 5, on main

steam isolation valve leakage control inboard valve,1E32-F002N-EF1B07-TT

.

WO No. 91-4164, welding of the Division 1 diesel generator silencer

.

WO No. 98-4174, replace hydraulic power Unit "A" subloop filter elements

Noteworthy observations are discussed below in Sections M1.2 and M1.3.

M1.2 Proactive Actions to Replace the "A" Control Comolex Chill Water Chiller Motor

a. Insoection Scope (62707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the unexpected trip of the "A"

contro! complex chill water chiller motor. The inspectors interviewed operators and

mechanics and observed motor replacement activities.-

b. Observations and Findinas

On September 15,1998, operators started the "A" control complex chill water chiller

P47A to support a 2-hour run of motor control center switchgear and miscellaneous area

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system. However, the chiller tripped

approximately 15 minutes into the run. The operating crew on shift determined that the

failure of the chiller placed the plant in a 30-day Technical Specification LCO. The

licensee investigated the problem and determined that P47A tripped on a motor low

temperature alarm due to the failure of the motor's temperature sensors. The motor

8

<

. __ __ _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ - _ _ __

,

'

i

!

I

had two sets of temperature sensors and one set had failed earlier in the year. The

backup set of temperature sensors allowed continued operation until its failure on

September 15,1998. The licensee, in discussion with the vendor, determined that the

motor had to be replaced. The licensee planned to install a spare motor which was in

the warehouse. The licensee classified this motor replacement activity as a priority

Level I! and assigned a project manager to ensure the evolution was conducted in a

timely and controlled manner. On September 19,1998, the inspectors noted that the

! maintenance supervisor performed oversight'responsib!!ities during the motor

! replacement activities and that the on-shift operating crew shift supervisor observed

parts of the activities. The motor was replaced in a timely manner well within the 30-day

LCO.

i

l

c Conclusion

1

Plant management demonstrated good involvement in the prioritization of the control l

, complex chill water motor replacement, the assignment of a project manager for the i

!-

work activity, and during the oversight of the activity which resulted in the motor being

- replaced in an efficient and timely manner.

M1.3 Division 1 Diesel Generator Silencer Maintenance

a. Inspection Scooe (71750. 62707)

The inspectors observed the maintenance activities on the Division I diesel generator

(DG) silencer. The inspectors reviewed applicable documentation and interviewed

maintenance and fire protection department personnel.  ;

b. Observations and Findinos

On September 2,1998, the inspectors observed two welders on the Division 1 DG room l

'

,

'

roof performing hot work on the DG silencer. A fire watch was providing control over the

hot work activities and had a portable fire extinguisher. The inspectors noted a

significant amount of wood had been staged to support the welding activities in the

immediate area and questioned the appropriateness of having the wood in the area

while hot work was in progress. The fire watch informed the inspectors that he believed

the wood had been fire treated and therefore it was approved for the area. The

inspectors reviewed Burn Permit No. B98-DG-83, which was in use for the activity, and

determined that it specified that 3.11 combustibles within 35 feet of the hot work be

removed or covered. The fire watch incorrectly still considered the area suitable for hot

work because the portion of the wood on which the welders were sitting was covered.

The inspectors discussed this situation with a fire protection technician (FPT) who

subsequently moved all of the wood to a distance greater than 35 feet from the hot work

area.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a., requires that

written procedures shall be implemented covering the applicable procedures

recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.

Appendix A, of RG 1.33, lists the Plant Fire Protection Program as an activity that

should be covered by written procedures. Perry Administrative Procedure (PAP)1916,

! 9

l

!

-

l -

-

.

" Duties of the Fire Watch," Revision 4, Step 6.3.5, specified that prior to and during hot

work activities, the fire watch person shall be responsible for verifying that the special

instructions of the applicable Bum Permit have been met, and that no fire hazards exist

i that would prohibit commencement of work. The failure of the fire watch to ensure the ,

specialinstructions of the Burn Permit were met is a violation of TS 5.4.1.a

(VIO 50-440/98018-01(DRP)).

During the FPT's assessment of the situation ~ he determined that a Transient

,

Combustible Permit (TCP) should have been generated for the wood in the hot work

area but was not. Specifically, PAP-1913, " Control of Transient Combustibles,"

Revision 4, Section 6.4.1, states that a TCP was required to authorize, track, and

document the use of transient combustible materials when the quantity of the

flamrnable/ combustible material exceeds the minimum requirement listed on

Attachment 1. Attachment 1, " Listing of Combustible Material Quantities not Requiring a

Transient Combustible Permit," Item No. 4, Lumber Treated Fire Resistant, specified i

that a transient combustible permit was required for a quantity of lumber that exceeded ,'

50 board feet (1 board foot = 12" X 12" X 1"). The amount of lumber on the DG room

-

roof exceeded 50 board feet. '

In addition to moving the wood to a cistance greater than 35 feet from the area, the FPT

initiated the following corrective actions: 1) informed the fire protection and mechanical

'

maintenance supervisors of the prob!em; 2) interviewed the workers involved in the

incident; and 3) generated a condition report. Subsequently, the maintenance

supervisor generated a TCP for the wood. The failure to initially generate a TCP for the

wood is a violation of TS 5.4.1.a. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected

violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1, of the .

NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-440/98018-02(DRP)).

l

The inspectors considered that the safety significance of this event was low because the

fire watch was present during the hot work activity and could have used a portable fire

extinguisher to quench a fire. However, the inspectors were concerned with the

licensee's failure to generate a TCP when the wood was staged during the welding

activity and with the inadequate knowledge level of the fire watch during the

performance of his duties. The licensee's failure to generate the TCP was similar to, but

i

not a direct repeat of, other recent examples of problems with station personnel's

l awareness of when a TCP is required (see inspection Reports 50-440/97021

l and 50-440/98010). The licensee indicated that a collective significar% condition report

would be initiated to assess this aspect of the fire protection program and to develop )

corrective actions to improve performance in this area.

,

c. Conclusions

l

l

'

The inspe:: tors concluded that a fire watch demonstrated inadequate knowledge of his

fire watch responsibilities during welding activities on the Division 1 DG silencer. One

violation was identified when the fire watch inappropriately allowed welders to perform

hot work with a significant quantity of wood in the immediate work area. In addition,

after deciding to use the wood, maintenance department personnel did not initiate a

'

TCP for the temporary staging of the wood. The failure to generate a TCP was similar

"

10

. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .__ , - - , . . ._ _ . . . . - . .-

. ._ - . . _ . . _ ~

.

to, but not a direct repeat of, other recent examples of problems with station personnel's

awareness of when a TCP is required.

M1.4 Time-out Meetina for Plant Personnel to Address Human Performance

On September 14,1998, the licensee conducted a " Human Performance Time-out"

meeting to inform station personnel of the results of assessments, done by an outside

organization, of the station's performance, to discuss recent human performance errors,

and to review tools to enhance human performance. The licensee planned to have j

periodic meetings of this nature to keep site personnel aware of their progress in '

meeting station management's expectation toward improving human performance. The

! inspectors obsented one maintenance department personnel meeting and determined

that the meeting became more effective as it progressed because the meeting became

more interactive. The third speaker effectively communicated that the station needed to

l continue to make progress in the area of human performance and that through the J

l implementation of procedure adherence, peer checking, and the stop, think, act, and  !

review efforts, the station's performance would be enhanced. The inspectors concluded

-

that during the meeting, the licensee effectively communicated the status of personnel

performance in the area of human performance and reinforced management

expectations and commitments to effect change in this area.

l M2 Maintenance and Materiel Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M2.1 Plant Materiel Condition

!

l The inspectors conducted numerous observations and tours in areas of the plant where

l work on safety-related equipment was being conducted. The inspectors noted that

several areas of the plant where maintenance activities were recently conducted were

not thoroughly cleaned up after the work. Items such as tie wraps, tape, and small

foreign material covers were found around the equipment. The inspectors concluded l

I

that there were no regulatory requirements involved in these occurrences. However, the

inspectors brought the observations to the attention of plant management. Plant

management indicated that they had independently observed similar housekeeping

issues and were implementing actions to improve performances in this area.

M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700,92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50440/96017-02: Failure to obtain motor operated

valve stroke time data. The inspectors observed that an operator failed to obtain stroke

I time data due to an error during the performance of a surveillance test. The inspectors

were concerned that the data was taken during a subsequent stroke ar,J that this data

may not be valid due to a possible preconditioning of the motor operated valve. Upon

further review, the inspectors concluded that the data was valid. There were no further

l concerns. This item is closed.

M8.2 (Closed) LER 50-440/97006-00(DRP): A technician error issulted in a high pressure

i core spray (HPCS) system actuation without injection. Ca June 10,1997, while

performing reactor vessel level instrument check valve operability checks, a technician

11

. . ..

. . .

.

.

failed to follow procedures and did not correctly restore a reference leg purge valve. A

pressure spike was induced into the reference leg and resulted in the level transmitters

sensing an erroneous low reactor water level indication which completed the logic to

actuate HPCS. However, because the reactor was shutdown and vessel level was

above the HPCS injection valve closure set point, the injection valve did not open and

HPCS did not inject into the vessel. The licensee took appropriate corrective actions

with the individuals involved with the event, as well as providing lessons learned training

to other technicians and supervisors. This failure to follow procedures constitutes a

violation of the TSs with minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement

action.

M8.3 (Closed) Inspection Followuo item (IFI) 50-440/98009-03(DRP): On April 10,1998, the

Division 2 emergency DG was tested under surveillance instruction (SVI)

SVI-R43-T1318, " Division 2 Diesel Generator Start and Load." While unloading the DG,

operations department personnel observed erratic swings of approximately 1500 kW in

electrical loading and secured the DG. The load swings were considered to originate

from a problem with the DG regulator. The licensee conducted thorough testing and

-

increased monitoring of the DG. However, the problem was not seen again. A root

cause analysis failed to determine a definite cause for the problem. The licensee

determined that some initial work performed before instrument testing, including

lubrication of the governor linkage and tightening of an amphenol connector, could have

repaired the problem. Due to repeated successful runs of the DG since the April

occurrence, the licensee has closed their investigation. The inspectors concluded that

the corrective actions for this item were adequate and this item is closed.

Ill. Enaineerina

E1 Conduct of Engineering

E1,1 Fuel Defect Indicated by Samole from Off Gas System

.a inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to indications of a minor leak in a fuel

! assembly. The inspectors reviewed applicable data and interviewed engineering and

chemistry department personnel.

b. Observations and Findinat.

On September 2,1998, a chemistry technician obtained and analyzed the weekly

sampic from the off gas system. The results indicated that a minor fuel assembly defect

existed, based on a slight increase in Xenon-133 and the ratio of lodine-133 to

lodine-138. Chemistry department personnel promptly communicated the results to

engineering department personnel and station management. As a result, engineering

department personnel implemented the station fuel reliability improvement plan and had

an independent sample taken and analyzed. On September 3,1998, engineering

analysis confirmed that a fuel rod had developed a small pinhole leak. The licensee

12 *

\

!

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _

_. _ . _ ._.._ m _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ ___________ _ _ . ~ _ _ _ _

t contacted the fuel vendor, General Electric (GE), to solicit their support while

concurrently implementing the station fuel reliability plan. The vendor concurred with the

licensee's assessment of the sample analysis.

The licensee decided that fuel defect localization testing would be conducted from

September 11-14,1998, to determine the location and then suppress the leak. The

operators reduced reactor power to 65 percent to perform the testing. The licensee

identified the leak, by using a control rod pull pattem supplied by GE. After identifying

the leaking fuel assembly, the operators inserted control rods to suppress fission activity

in the fuel assembly and prevent further opening of the pinhole leak. Even with the

control rods inserted, the fuel bundle still produced approximately 1 KW/ foot due to the

internal fission of the bundle. The licensee had not determined the root cause of the

fuel defect but suspected it was due to debris.

Licensee management initiated a standing instruction for the operators: 1) weekly

control rod testing was to be conducted at 90 instead of 100 percent power and reactor l

,

'

engineer presence was established for power restoration; 2) increased monitoring of the

-

off gas system was implemented; and 3) engineering representatives were to be

contacted prior to any change in reactor power.

i

c. Conclusions

l

The inspectors concluded that a chemistry technician properly analyzed a routine off

i

gas sample which indicated a small fuel pin leak had occurred and promptly notified the )

appropriate station personnel. Also, engineering department personnel provided good j

'

support for determining the locatien and suppressing the leak.

E8 Miscellaneous Engineedng issues (92903)

E8.1 (Closed) URI SO4Q/06005-06: Description of fue-1 pool sipper in Updated Safety

Analysis Report (USAR). The inspectors originally considered that there was a potential

discrepancy regarding the description of fuel pool sipper in Section 9.1.4.2.3.5 of the

USAR. Upon further review, no discrepancy existed. This item is closed.

E8.2 (Closed) URI 50-440/96006-04: The inspectors initially identified apparent

inconsistencies between the plant configuration and the USAR descriptions for the

! Division 1,2, and 3 emergency DG air start systems. Upon further review, no

inconsistencies existed. This item is closed.

! E8.3 (Closed) LER 50-440/97008-00 and 01: This was a retraction of Event Notification

l

Number 32737 dated August 7,1997, that identified two occurrences when it appeared

that plant cooldown rate exceeded Technical Specification limits. On September 10,

1992, and January 7,1997, the reactor vessel bottom head drain temperature exceeded

a 100 degree F per hour cooldown rate following separate reactor scrams. Both events

were appropriately notified to the NRC (Events Number 24205 and 31549) per

i

10 CFR 50.72 and subsequently per 10 CFR 50.73. On April 4,1998, GE provided an

! analysis of both events and determined that the use of the bottom head drain

temperature was neither the primary nor attemate point of measurement to ensule

l 13

!

I

.- -

- . - - - . - - . - . - . - - - - - -. - - _ _ _ - - . - - - - .

'

l

1

,

compliance to Technical Specifications. The Technical Specification limit is based on

maintaining the reactor vessel bulk temperature at less than 100 degrees F per hour

cooldown rate. Evaluations of both events demonstrated that the vessel was heating up

while the bottom head drain line was cooling down and temperature indications at that

location were not representative of vessel bulk temperatures. These differences in

vessel and drain line temperatures were due to a stagnant flow condition in the drain

line. The drain line temperature measurement is not reliable unless flow exists in the

drain line. The GE engineering personnel concluded, based on evaluation of the

preferred measurement of the steam dome saturation temperature data, that neither

event exceeded TS limits. Based on this conclusion, the licensee retracted the event

notification and revised LER 97008-00. The GE analysis also provided attemate

guidance of using multiple locations of measurements to provide conservatism and

ensure that TS liinits were not exceeded. The licensee implemented Revision 5 to

SVI B21-T1176, " Reactor Coolant System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance," to

include multiple monitoring points. During on-site inspection, the inspectors reviewed  !

GE's analysis and verified that the SVI revision implemented GE's recommendations.

Based on these reviews, this LER is clesed. I

~

l

E8.4 (Closed) URI 50-440/97021-03(DRPk On January 7,1998, the inspectors identified l

numerous tubing support clamps on all three divisional DGs that did not appear to meet

seismic qualification criteria. The licensee conducted a thorough review of the DG .

- tubing supports. The licensee presented documentation to the inspectors to show the I

original design criteria for the supports. The licensee concluded that the DGs were

operable because no maximum spacing between supports was exceeded. However, ,

the licensee identified that several mounting configurations could hamper the proper  ;

torquing of the clamps. The licensee also found several clamps that required retorquing

or replacement. The licensee completed these clamp repairs. The inspectors

concluded that the tubing support clamps met the seismic criteria, that no violations

occurred and that this item is closed.

E8.5 (Closed) URI 50-440/98009-05(DR_P_l: On March 23,1998, the inspectors identified

several cat e trays in the cable spreading rooms that were apparently filled to beyond

50 percent of their volume. Section 8.3 of the Perry USAR stated that cable trays have

4" or 6" side rails and that, by design, will be filled to no more than 50 percent by

volume. When extra fill capacity was needed for trays with 4" side rails, plant design

drawings and construction techniques incorporated the use of 2" extender rails.

'

However, these extender rails were not present on the noted trays.

Initially, engineering personnel could not provide calculations or documentation to the

inspectors to show the reason or justification for not using extender rails. Engineering

l personnel subsequently completed a thorough review of original construction

l documentation, it was determined that ampacity and seismic concerns were properly

f analyzed in the original documentation. However, the instructions in the original design

l drawings were vague. Since the 4" trays were analyzed for increased load, they were

shown as 6" trays. The licensee concluded that it was possible that field personnel, >

during original construction, could have concluded that the 2" extenders were not

needed. Engineering personnel submitted a work request for the addition of the

!

!

14

I

_ . . _ - . . _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ ._ _ _ ._ _ _ _.... _ _ _ . _ _ _ _. _ _ ._..

,

, . 2" extenders on the applicable trays. These extenders have been installed on the trays

that are filled over 50 percent capacity, The inspectors concluded that no violations

occurred and that the 4" trays are rated for increased load. This item is closed.

IV. Plant Suonort

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

R1.1 Radiation Protection Practice of Uncontrolled Extension of Contaminated Area

a. Insoection Scope (71750)

The inspectors observed plant personnel perform an inspection of a valve in a

contaminated area. The inspectors interviewed radiation protection and engineering

department personnel and reviewed applicable procedures.

- b. Observations and Findinas

.

On September 16,1998, the inspectors observed two engineering department

personnel perform a visual inspection of control rod drive hydraulic system "B" flow

. control valve 1C11F00028. The valve was located in the containment building inside a

contaminated area boundary. The engineers were inspecting the valve for wall

thickness. When the engineers arrived at the valve, a foreign material exclusion cover

had been placed on top of the valve body since the valve's bonnet had been previously

removed. The cover was held in place by several bolts and nuts. One engineer entered

the contaminated area boundary while the second engineer stood outside the boundary. i

The second engineer held an open bag across the contaminated boundary for j

temporary storage of the removed bolts and nuts. The engineer then performed his

visualinspection inside the valve. 1

Upon the completion of his inspection, he requested the other engineer to lay out a tarp

so he could exit from the contaminated area. The engineer exited the contaminated

area, stepped onto the tarp, and kept his protective clothing donned. With the engineer

standing outside the contaminated boundary area rope, the inspectors questioned

whether the contaminated boundary had been inappropriately extended without radiation

protection department approval. At that time, a radiation protection technician (RPT)

came by and the inspectors questioned the RPT on the radiological work practice of the

engineers. The RPT contacted the health physics control point and was informed that

the engineers' actions were in accordance with the briefing which had been conducted

for their work activity.

Later, the inspectors had discussions with the RPT who had conducted the engineers'

briefing. The RPT informed the inspectors that he directed the engineers to use the tarp

as the boundary to stand on while removing their protective clothing. The RPT gave this

direction because step off pads were not used in containment due to the potential for

. them to become entrapped in the emergency core cooling system strainer. The RPT

further informed the inspectors that PAP-0511, " Radiologically Restricted Area"

15

. _

_ _ _ _ _

.. . . . . . - . . - - --

1

l

i

i

i

l l

Revision 6, allowed this practice and that this had been a long-standing practice at the l

l plant. After review of the applicable parts of PAP-0511, the inspectors determined that

i the procedure did not prohibit this practice. The licensee performed a subsequent

survey of the area and did not identify any contamination.

l The inspectors also discussed this practice with the Radiation Protection Manager, who.

l subsequently walked down the area, interviewed the RPT, and generated a condition

l report. The Radiation Protection Manager indicated that a review of this practice would

l

'

be initiated. The licensee conducted interviews among the RPTs and determined that l

this practice was not uniformly understood by radiation protection department personnel.

c. Concbsion

Although the licensee's contamination control program allowed plant personnel to

l extend contamination area boundaries in certain situations, this policy was not

consistently understood or implemented by radiation protection technicians.

- F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues (71750) l

l

F8.1 (Closed) Vio'atin 150-440/97021-04(DRP): On December 8,1997, inspectors found the

fire door betwen the Division 2 and 3 emergency DG rooms stuck open. The licensee

l subsequently discovered that the door stuck on the floor sealant that had been recently

applied. The licensee conducted a review of other fire doors to ensure no other door

would stick open in a similar fashion. No other problems were noted. The inspectors

,

have noted no repeat occurrences of this issue. The inspectors concluded that the

l corrective actions for this item are adequate and this item is closed.

V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at

the conclusion of the inspection on October 20,1998. The licensee acknowledged the

findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined

during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was

identified.

l

!

16

_ _ . . . ._ . . _ . . _ . _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . .

I

.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee  !

! L. Myers, Vice President, Nuclear

H. Bergendahl, Director, Nuclear Services Department

N. Bonner, Director, Nuclear Maintenance Department

'

W. Kanda, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department i

F. Kearney, Superintendent, Plant Operations 1

T. Rausch, Operations Manager l

R. Schrauder, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department  !

J. Sears, Radiation Protection Manager

.

99

i.

.

f

-

17

,

. . ,

. . . _ _

'

l

i

{'

t

l

l INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED  :

i

l lP 37551: Onsite Engineering )

IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing  !

Problems '

IP 61726: Surveillance Observation

l

IP 62707: Maintenance Observation

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 71750: Plant Support

I IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

,

Facilities

! IP 92901: . Followup - Operations  ;

IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance l

lP 92903: Followup - Engineering '

l ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Ocened'

50-440/98018-01 VIO Failure to implement Requirements of Bum Permit

50-440/98018-02 NCV Failure to initiate Permit for Transient Combustibles

Clowd

50-440/96005-06 URI USAR Section 9.1.4.2.3.5 Fuel Pool Sipper

50-440/96006-04 URI USAR Section 9.5.9.2.4, DG Air-Start Description

50-440/96017-02 URI DG and HPCS Test Possible Preconditioning

50-440/97006-00 LER HPCS Actuation Without injection

50-440/97008-00&O1 LER Technical Specification Limits Exceeded and Plant Operation

Continued Without Performing Required Actions

50-440/97009-02 VIO Standby Liquid Control Pump indicated Flow Low

_

-50-440/97021-03 URI - Seismic Tubing Supports for DG  :

50-440/97021-04' VIO Failure to Keep Fire Door Closed

.50-440/98002 00 LER Trip Unit Failure Initiates RCIC With Subsequent Reactor Scram

50-440/98009-03 IFl Division 2 DG Load Swings

[ 50-440/98009-05 URI Cable Tray Loading Not in Conformance with USAR

50-440/98018-01 NCV Failure to initiate Permit for Transient Combustibles

p

r

-

l 18

i

, ,

.

'

.,

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CFR. Code of Federal Regulations l

CV Check Valve

DG Diesel Generators

DRP Division of Reactor Projects i

FPT Fire Protection Technician )

GE' General Electric  !

HPCS. High Pressure Core Spray j

'IFl Inspection Followup item ' l

IP inspection Procedure

LCO Limiting Condition for Operation

LER Licensee Event Report

NCV Non-cited Violation

NRC- Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ONI Off NormalInstruction

PAP Plant Administrative Procedure

- PDR Public Document Room-  !

RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Coohng

I

RCIS Rod _ Control and Information System

RG Regulatory Guide

RHR Residual Heat Removal ,

RPT Radiation Protection Technician j

STAR Stop, Think, Act, and Review j

SVI Surveillance instruction l

TCP- Transient Combustible Permit l

TS Technical Specification

.USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report l

URI Unresolved item l

!

i

p

i

19

t.

o

l

. . - _ _