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| {{#Wiki_filter:.* -*UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY | | {{#Wiki_filter:. * - * |
| | UNITED STATES |
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| |
|
| COMMISSION | | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
|
| |
|
| ===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
| | OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION |
| WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 16, 1990 NRC INFORMATION
| |
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| |
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| NOTICE NO. 90-25: LOSS OF VITAL AC POWER WITH SUBSEQUENT | | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 16, 1990 |
| | NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-25: LOSS OF VITAL AC POWER WITH SUBSEQUENT |
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| |
|
| REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEAT-UP | | REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEAT-UP |
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| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| : | | : |
| All holders of operating | | All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power |
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| |
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| licenses or construction
| | reactors. |
| | |
| permits for nuclear power reactors.
| |
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| |
|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| : This information | | : |
| | This information notice is being provided to inform addressees of a significant |
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| |
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| notice is being provided to inform addressees
| | operating event which occurred at the Georgia Power Company's Vogtle Nuclear |
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| |
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| of a significant
| | Plant on March 20, 1990. The event took place while Unit 1 was in mid-loop |
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| |
|
| operating | | in operational mde 6 and demonstrates the need for operating personnel to be |
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| |
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| event which occurred at the Georgia Power Company's
| | prudent in removing equipment from service or establishing atypical equipment |
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| |
|
| Vogtle Nuclear Plant on March 20, 1990. The event took place while Unit 1 was in mid-loop in operational
| | alignments during shutdown. It is expected that recipients will review the |
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| |
|
| mde 6 and demonstrates
| | information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as |
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| |
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| the need for operating
| | appropriate,.to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in |
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| |
|
| personnel
| | this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no |
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| |
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| to be prudent in removing equipment
| | specific action or written response is required. |
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| |
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| from service or establishing
| | ==Description of Circumstances== |
| | : |
| | On March 20, 1990, a loss of vital ac power occurred while Vogtle Unit 2 was |
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| |
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| atypical equipment alignments
| | operating at 100 percent power and Unit 1 had been in a refueling outage for |
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| |
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| during shutdown.
| | about 4 weeks. Unit 1 was in mid-loop in operational mode 6 with plant equip- ment conditions as follows: |
| | o The Unit 1 B reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) was tagged out of |
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| |
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| It is expected that recipients
| | service for maintenance |
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| |
|
| will review the information
| | o The Unit 1 B emergency diesel generator (EDG) was tagged out of |
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| |
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| for applicability | | service and disassembled for maintenance |
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| |
|
| to their facilities | | o The Unit 1 A RAT was supplying offsite power to the crosstied Unit 1 A and B vital buses |
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| |
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| and consider actions, as appropriate,.to
| | o The reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature was being maintained at |
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| |
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| avoid similar problems.
| | around 90 degrees Fahrenheit (F) via the train A residual heat removal |
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| |
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| However, suggestions
| | (RHR) pump, the-train B pump was in standby |
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| |
|
| contained
| | o The vessel head was in place with the bolts not fully tensioned |
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| |
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| in this information
| | o The pressurizer manway cover was removed |
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| |
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| notice do not constitute
| | _ __ Al e, |
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| |
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| NRC requirements;
| | IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 o The manways for steam generators 2 and 3 were partially bolted in place |
| therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
| |
|
| |
|
| of Circumstances:
| | and the manways for steam generators 1 and 4 were in place with bolts |
| On March 20, 1990, a loss of vital ac power occurred while Vogtle Unit 2 was operating
| |
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| |
|
| at 100 percent power and Unit 1 had been in a refueling
| | fully tensioned |
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| |
|
| outage for about 4 weeks. Unit 1 was in mid-loop in operational
| | o The inboard charging line check valve and an accumulator isolation |
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| |
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| mode 6 with plant equip-ment conditions
| | valve were open for inspection |
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| |
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| as follows: o The Unit 1 B reserve auxiliary
| | o The containment equipment hatch and the containment personnel hatch |
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| |
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| transformer (RAT) was tagged out of service for maintenance
| | were open |
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| |
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| o The Unit 1 B emergency
| | At about 9:20 a.m., a truck carrying fuel and lubricants in the plant low |
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| |
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| diesel generator (EDG) was tagged out of service and disassembled
| | voltage switchyard backed into a support column for the feeder line supplying |
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| |
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| for maintenance | | power to the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RAT. The insulator for the C phase |
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| |
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| o The Unit 1 A RAT was supplying
| | of the feeder line fractured and initiated a phase-to-ground electrical fault. |
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| |
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| offsite power to the crosstied
| | The fault resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RAT. |
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| |
|
| Unit 1 A and B vital buses o The reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature | | The Unit 2 B EDG started and loaded to the deenergized Unit 2 B vital bus. How- ever, a Unit 2 turbine trip and reactor trip occurred because of an improperly |
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| |
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| was being maintained
| | connected (wrong tap) differential current transformer (DCT). The DCT initiated |
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| |
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| at around 90 degrees Fahrenheit (F) via the train A residual heat removal (RHR) pump, the-train
| | the trip when the current surge associated with the phase-to-ground fault was |
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| |
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| B pump was in standby o The vessel head was in place with the bolts not fully tensioned o The pressurizer
| | sensed. The Unit 2 trip was uncomplicated. |
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| |
|
| manway cover was removed_ __ A l e ,
| | Because both of the Unit 1 vital buses were crosstied and being supplied by |
| IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 o The manways for steam generators
| |
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| |
|
| 2 and 3 were partially
| | the Unit 1 A RAT, the loss of the transformer deenergized both vital buses. |
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| |
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| bolted in place and the manways for steam generators
| | Deenergizing these buses resulted in the loss of power to the operating RHR |
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| |
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| 1 and 4 were in place with bolts fully tensioned o The inboard charging line check valve and an accumulator | | pump. Since the Unit 1 B EDG was tagged out of service and disassembled for |
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| |
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| isolation valve were open for inspection
| | maintenance, the emergency power supply for the B vital bus was unavailable |
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| |
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| o The containment
| | and the standby B RHR pump could not be started. |
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| |
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| equipment
| | The available Unit 1 A EDG started on bus undervoltage, but for unknown reasons, it shut down automatically after 1 minute and 20 seconds. At 9:40 a.m., plant |
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| |
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| hatch and the containment
| | operators declared a site area emergency. A loss of all onsite and offsite ac |
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| |
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| personnel
| | power at Vogtle for more than 15 minutes is classified as a site area emergency. |
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| |
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| hatch were open At about 9:20 a.m., a truck carrying fuel and lubricants
| | The licensee made their declaration because all vital ac power was lost for |
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| |
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| in the plant low voltage switchyard
| | greater than 15 minutes. Approximately 18 minutes after the first start of |
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| |
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| backed into a support column for the feeder line supplying power to the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RAT. The insulator
| | the A EDG, the operators locally reset the load sequencer which automatically |
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| |
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| for the C phase of the feeder line fractured
| | restarted the A EDG on undervoltage. However, after 1 minute and 10 seconds, the diesel again shut down automatically. At 9:56 a.m., plant operators per- formed an "emergency" manual start of the diesel, which bypassed most of the |
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| |
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| and initiated | | diesel's protective trips. The diesel started and loaded to the bus, the A |
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| |
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| a phase-to-ground
| | RHR pump was restarted, and core cooling was reestablished to Unit 1. With |
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| |
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| electrical
| | the start of the diesel, the site area emergency was downgraded to an "alert" |
| | at 10:15 a.m. Containment integrity was established at 11:03 a.m. |
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| |
|
| fault.The fault resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RAT.The Unit 2 B EDG started and loaded to the deenergized
| | Plant personnel returned the Unit 1 B RAT to service after completing formal |
|
| |
|
| Unit 2 B vital bus. How-ever, a Unit 2 turbine trip and reactor trip occurred because of an improperly
| | tagout removal procedures. However, attempts to energize the transformer were |
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| |
|
| connected (wrong tap) differential
| | delayed for several minutes because of a sticking mechanical interlock in the |
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| |
|
| current transformer (DCT). The DCT initiated the trip when the current surge associated
| | control circuitry for a motor-operated disconnect switch on the high side of |
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| |
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| with the phase-to-ground
| | the B RAT. Power was restored to the B vital bus via the B RAT at 11:40 a.m. |
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| |
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| fault was sensed. The Unit 2 trip was uncomplicated.
| | At 12:38 a.m., core cooling was shifted to the B RHR train to facilitate sub- sequent electrical alignment changes. |
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| |
|
| Because both of the Unit 1 vital buses were crosstied
| | e. v - % |
| | IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 According to control roon indication, RCS temperature increased from 90 to |
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| |
|
| and being supplied by the Unit 1 A RAT, the loss of the transformer
| | 136 degrees F during the 36 minutes required to reenergize the A bus (1.3 degrees F/min). |
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| |
|
| deenergized
| | Throughout the event, non-vital power was continuously provided to Unit 1 from |
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| |
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| both vital buses.Deenergizing
| | offsite sources, via backfeed through the main generator transformer. Also, the Unit 2 electrical distribution system remained energized (aside from the |
|
| |
|
| these buses resulted in the loss of power to the operating
| | momentary loss of power before the reactor trip). However, the Vogtle electrical |
|
| |
|
| RHR pump. Since the Unit 1 B EDG was tagged out of service and disassembled
| | system was not designed to permit easy interconnection of the Unit 1 vital buses |
|
| |
|
| for maintenance, the emergency
| | to nonvital power or to the Unit 2 electrical buses. Therefore, there were no |
|
| |
|
| power supply for the B vital bus was unavailable
| | procedures in place to provide guidance on interconnecting the Unit 1 vital and |
|
| |
|
| and the standby B RHR pump could not be started.The available
| | nonvital buses or for interconnecting the Unit 1 electrical distribution system |
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| |
|
| Unit 1 A EDG started on bus undervoltage, but for unknown reasons, it shut down automatically | | with the distribution system at Unit 2. (There are no regulatory requirements |
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| |
|
| after 1 minute and 20 seconds. At 9:40 a.m., plant operators
| | that direct the licensee to develop Interconnection procedures.) |
| | Discussion: |
| | The NRC has previously identified concerns with the operability of necessary |
|
| |
|
| declared a site area emergency.
| | equipment in shutdown modes. In Information Notice (IN)80-2O, "Loss of Decay |
|
| |
|
| A loss of all onsite and offsite ac power at Vogtle for more than 15 minutes is classified
| | Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit 1 While in a Refueling Mode" an |
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| |
|
| as a site area emergency.
| | extended loss of decay heat removal capability was attributed to a number of |
|
| |
|
| The licensee made their declaration
| | factors, including inadequate procedures, inadequate administrative controls, and the conduct of extensive maintenance activities. |
|
| |
|
| because all vital ac power was lost for greater than 15 minutes. Approximately
| | Information Notice 84-42, "Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages |
|
| |
|
| 18 minutes after the first start of the A EDG, the operators
| | Not Covered by Technical Specifications," describes an event at the Palisades |
|
| |
|
| locally reset the load sequencer
| | Nuclear Plant involving the total loss of all ac power. The Palisades event |
|
| |
|
| which automatically
| | was precipitated by personnel performing actions during a refueling outage |
|
| |
|
| restarted
| | without an appreciation for the effect of those actions on the plant as it |
|
| |
|
| the A EDG on undervoltage.
| | was configured. Many pieces of equipment were tagged out of service for |
|
| |
|
| However, after 1 minute and 10 seconds, the diesel again shut down automatically.
| | maintenance. Personnel intentionally interrupted offsite power. This action |
|
| |
|
| At 9:56 a.m., plant operators
| | caused the loss of the only available service water pump. As a result, cooling |
|
| |
|
| per-formed an "emergency" manual start of the diesel, which bypassed most of the diesel's protective
| | water was interrupted to the only available (and operating) diesel generator. |
|
| |
|
| trips. The diesel started and loaded to the bus, the A RHR pump was restarted, and core cooling was reestablished
| | The diesel overheated and was manually tripped. As a result, all station ac |
|
| |
|
| to Unit 1. With the start of the diesel, the site area emergency
| | power was interrupted, causing the loss of fuel pool cooling. (The reactor |
|
| |
|
| was downgraded | | had been defueled, and its fuel was being stored in the spent fuel pool). |
|
| |
|
| to an "alert" at 10:15 a.m. Containment
| | The recent Vogtle event reemphasizes the need for careful planning of equipment |
|
| |
|
| integrity
| | outages during shutdown. Licensees, in general, have considerable latitude in |
|
| |
|
| was established
| | removing equipment from service and altering normal system lineups while in |
|
| |
|
| at 11:03 a.m.Plant personnel
| | shutdown modes if only the minimum technical specification requirements are |
|
| |
|
| returned the Unit 1 B RAT to service after completing
| | considered. The desire to return nuclear units to service as quickly as |
|
| |
|
| formal tagout removal procedures.
| | possible can result in maintenance being conducted on redundant, safety- related systems, concurrently. The appropriateness of conducting parallel |
|
| |
|
| However, attempts to energize the transformer
| | maintenance activities should be considered in light of the availability of |
|
| |
|
| were delayed for several minutes because of a sticking mechanical
| | alternate equipment and procedures to mitigate the consequences of potential |
|
| |
|
| interlock
| | operational problems. It is important that plant outage plans assure that |
|
| |
|
| in the control circuitry
| | an adequate complement of equipment capable of responding to potential events |
|
| |
|
| for a motor-operated
| | remains available throughout the outage. Particular care is needed when the |
|
| |
|
| disconnect
| | reactor pressure boundary is not intact or the reactor coolant system is at |
|
| |
|
| switch on the high side of the B RAT. Power was restored to the B vital bus via the B RAT at 11:40 a.m.At 12:38 a.m., core cooling was shifted to the B RHR train to facilitate
| | mid-loop. |
|
| |
|
| sub-sequent electrical
| | IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 A special investigation of the Vogtle event is being conducted by an NRC |
|
| |
|
| alignment
| | Incident Investigation Team (1IT). The information contained in this notice |
|
| |
|
| changes.
| | is preliminary and is subject to change, pending the findings made by the IIT. |
|
| |
|
| e. v -%IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 According
| | This Information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| to control roon indication, RCS temperature
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact |
|
| |
|
| increased
| | one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project |
|
| |
|
| from 90 to 136 degrees F during the 36 minutes required to reenergize
| | manager. |
|
| |
|
| the A bus (1.3 degrees F/min).Throughout
| | ~6hfares Eossi, Director |
|
| |
|
| the event, non-vital
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
|
| |
|
| power was continuously
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| provided to Unit 1 from offsite sources, via backfeed through the main generator
| |
| | |
| transformer.
| |
| | |
| Also, the Unit 2 electrical
| |
| | |
| distribution
| |
| | |
| system remained energized (aside from the momentary
| |
| | |
| loss of power before the reactor trip). However, the Vogtle electrical
| |
| | |
| system was not designed to permit easy interconnection
| |
| | |
| of the Unit 1 vital buses to nonvital power or to the Unit 2 electrical
| |
| | |
| buses. Therefore, there were no procedures
| |
| | |
| in place to provide guidance on interconnecting
| |
| | |
| the Unit 1 vital and nonvital buses or for interconnecting
| |
| | |
| the Unit 1 electrical
| |
| | |
| distribution
| |
| | |
| system with the distribution
| |
| | |
| system at Unit 2. (There are no regulatory
| |
| | |
| requirements
| |
| | |
| that direct the licensee to develop Interconnection
| |
| | |
| procedures.)
| |
| Discussion:
| |
| The NRC has previously
| |
| | |
| identified
| |
| | |
| concerns with the operability
| |
| | |
| of necessary equipment
| |
| | |
| in shutdown modes. In Information
| |
| | |
| Notice (IN) 80-2O, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability
| |
| | |
| at Davis-Besse
| |
| | |
| Unit 1 While in a Refueling
| |
| | |
| Mode" an extended loss of decay heat removal capability
| |
| | |
| was attributed
| |
| | |
| to a number of factors, including
| |
| | |
| inadequate
| |
| | |
| procedures, inadequate
| |
| | |
| administrative
| |
| | |
| controls, and the conduct of extensive
| |
| | |
| maintenance
| |
| | |
| activities.
| |
| | |
| Information
| |
| | |
| Notice 84-42, "Equipment
| |
| | |
| Availability
| |
| | |
| for Conditions
| |
| | |
| During Outages Not Covered by Technical
| |
| | |
| Specifications," describes
| |
| | |
| an event at the Palisades Nuclear Plant involving
| |
| | |
| the total loss of all ac power. The Palisades
| |
| | |
| event was precipitated
| |
| | |
| by personnel
| |
| | |
| performing
| |
| | |
| actions during a refueling
| |
| | |
| outage without an appreciation
| |
| | |
| for the effect of those actions on the plant as it was configured.
| |
|
| |
|
| Many pieces of equipment
| | Technical Contacts: N. Fields, NRR |
|
| |
|
| were tagged out of service for maintenance.
| | (301) 492-1173 E. Trager, AEOD |
|
| |
|
| Personnel
| | (301) 492-4496 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| intentionally
| | , 0 - -u |
|
| |
|
| interrupted
| | Attachment |
|
| |
|
| offsite power. This action caused the loss of the only available
| | IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED |
|
| |
|
| service water pump. As a result, cooling water was interrupted
| | NRC INFORMATION NOTICES |
|
| |
|
| to the only available (and operating)
| | Intormation Date ot |
| diesel generator.
| |
|
| |
|
| The diesel overheated
| | Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to |
|
| |
|
| and was manually tripped. As a result, all station ac power was interrupted, causing the loss of fuel pool cooling. (The reactor had been defueled, and its fuel was being stored in the spent fuel pool).The recent Vogtle event reemphasizes
| | 90-24 Transportation of Model 4/10/90 All NRC licensees |
|
| |
|
| the need for careful planning of equipment outages during shutdown.
| | Spec 2-T Radiographic authorized to use, Exposure Device transport, or operate |
|
| |
|
| Licensees, in general, have considerable
| | radiographic exposure |
|
| |
|
| latitude in removing equipment
| | devices and source |
|
| |
|
| from service and altering normal system lineups while in shutdown modes if only the minimum technical
| | changers. |
|
| |
|
| specification
| | 90-23 Improper Installation of 4/4/90 All holders of OLs |
|
| |
|
| requirements
| | Patel Conduit Seals or CPs for nuclear |
|
| |
|
| are considered.
| | power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| The desire to return nuclear units to service as quickly as possible can result in maintenance
| | 90-22 Unanticipated Equipment 3/23/90 All holders of OLs |
|
| |
|
| being conducted
| | Actuations Following or CPs for nuclear |
|
| |
|
| on redundant, safety-related systems, concurrently.
| | Restoration of Power power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| The appropriateness
| | to Rosemount Transmitter |
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| |
|
| of conducting
| | Trip Units |
|
| |
|
| parallel maintenance
| | 90-21 Potential Failure of Motor- 3/22/90 All holders of OLs |
|
| |
|
| activities
| | Operated Butterfly Valves or CPs for nuclear |
|
| |
|
| should be considered
| | to Operate Because Valve power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| in light of the availability
| | Seat Friction was Under- estimated |
|
| |
|
| of alternate
| | 90-20 Personnel Injuries Resulting 3/22/90 All NRC licensees |
|
| |
|
| equipment
| | from Improper Operation of who process or |
|
| |
|
| and procedures
| | Radwaste Incinerators incinerate radio- active waste. |
|
| |
|
| to mitigate the consequences
| | 90-19 Potential Loss of Effective 3/14/90 All holders of OLs |
|
| |
|
| of potential operational
| | Volume for Containment or CPs for PWRs. |
|
| |
|
| problems.
| | Recirculation Spray at |
|
| |
|
| It is important
| | PWR Facilities |
|
| |
|
| that plant outage plans assure that an adequate complement
| | 90-18 Potential Problems with 3/9/90 All holders of OLs |
|
| |
|
| of equipment
| | Crosby Safety Relief Valves or CPs for nuclear |
|
| |
|
| capable of responding
| | Used on Diesel Generator power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| to potential
| | Air Start Receiver Tanks |
|
| |
|
| events remains available
| | 90-17 Weight and Center of 3/8/90 All holders of OLs |
|
| |
|
| throughout
| | Gravity Discrepancies or CPs for nuclear |
|
| |
|
| the outage. Particular
| | for Copes-Vulcan Valves power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| care is needed when the reactor pressure boundary is not intact or the reactor coolant system is at mid-loop.
| | OL = Operating License |
|
| |
|
| IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 A special investigation
| | CP = Construction Permit |
|
| |
|
| of the Vogtle event is being conducted | | tNOW, |
| | IN 90-25 |
| | - -April 16, 1990 A special investigation of the Vogtle event is being conducted by an NRC |
|
| |
|
| by an NRC Incident Investigation
| | Incident Investigation Team (IIT). The information contained in this notice |
|
| |
|
| Team (1IT). The information
| | is preliminary and is subject to change, pending the findings made by the IIT. |
|
| |
|
| contained
| | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| in this notice is preliminary | | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact |
|
| |
|
| and is subject to change, pending the findings made by the IIT.This Information
| | one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project |
|
| |
|
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| | manager. |
|
| |
|
| If you have any questions
| | Charles E. Rossi, Director |
|
| |
|
| about the information
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
|
| |
|
| in this notice, please contact one of the technical
| |
|
| |
| contacts listed below or the appropriate
| |
|
| |
| NRR project manager.~6hfares Eossi, Director Division of Operational
| |
|
| |
| ===Events Assessment===
| |
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| Technical | | Technical Contacts: N. Fields, NRR |
|
| |
|
| Contacts:
| | (301) 492-1173 E. Trager, AEOD |
| N. Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 E. Trager, AEOD (301) 492-4496 Attachment:
| |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
| | |
| Notices
| |
| | |
| , 0 --u Attachment
| |
| | |
| IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
| |
| | |
| NOTICES Intormation
| |
| | |
| Date ot Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 90-24 90-23 90-22 90-21 90-20 90-19 90-18 90-17 Transportation
| |
| | |
| of Model Spec 2-T Radiographic
| |
| | |
| Exposure Device Improper Installation
| |
| | |
| of Patel Conduit Seals Unanticipated
| |
| | |
| Equipment Actuations
| |
| | |
| Following Restoration
| |
| | |
| of Power to Rosemount
| |
| | |
| Transmitter
| |
| | |
| Trip Units Potential
| |
| | |
| Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly
| |
| | |
| Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction was Under-estimated Personnel
| |
| | |
| Injuries Resulting from Improper Operation
| |
| | |
| of Radwaste Incinerators
| |
| | |
| Potential
| |
| | |
| ===Loss of Effective Volume for Containment===
| |
| Recirculation
| |
| | |
| ===Spray at PWR Facilities===
| |
| Potential
| |
| | |
| Problems with Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies
| |
| | |
| for Copes-Vulcan
| |
| | |
| Valves 4/10/90 4/4/90 3/23/90 3/22/90 3/22/90 3/14/90 3/9/90 3/8/90 All NRC licensees authorized
| |
| | |
| to use, transport, or operate radiographic
| |
| | |
| exposure devices and source changers.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees who process or incinerate
| |
| | |
| radio-active waste.All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating
| |
| | |
| License CP = Construction
| |
| | |
| Permit
| |
| | |
| tNOW, IN 90-25--April 16, 1990 A special investigation
| |
| | |
| of the Vogtle event is being conducted
| |
| | |
| by an NRC Incident Investigation
| |
| | |
| Team (IIT). The information
| |
| | |
| contained
| |
| | |
| in this notice is preliminary
| |
| | |
| and is subject to change, pending the findings made by the IIT.This information
| |
| | |
| notice requires no specific action or written response.
| |
| | |
| If you have any questions
| |
| | |
| about the information
| |
| | |
| in this notice, please contact one of the technical
| |
| | |
| contacts listed below or the appropriate
| |
| | |
| NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
| |
| | |
| ===Events Assessment===
| |
| Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
| |
|
| |
|
| Technical
| | (301) 492-4496 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| Contacts: N. Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 E. Trager, AEOD (301) 492-4496 Attachment:
| | *SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information
| |
|
| |
|
| Notices*SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
| | OFC *OEAB:DOEA *TECH ED *REGION I (IIT) *PD23 NAME NFields WLazarus TReed |
|
| |
|
| OFC NAME DATE OFC NAME DATE*OEAB:DOEA
| | DATE 4/11/90 4/11/90 4/11/90 4/11/90 |
| | OFC *OEAB:DOEA *C:OEAB:DOEA *C:GCB:DOEA |
|
| |
|
| NFields 4/11/90*OEAB:DOEA
| | NAME DFISCHER PSwetland CBERLINGER |
|
| |
|
| DFISCHER 4/11/90*TECH ED 4/11/90*C:OEAB:DOEA
| | DATE 4/11/90 4/11/90 4/11/90 4/1 3/90 |
| | OFFICIAL RECORD COPY |
|
| |
|
| PSwetland 4/11/90*REGION I (IIT)WLazarus 4/11/90*C:GCB:DOEA
| | ===OFFICIAL RECORD COPY=== |
| | Document Name: VOGTLE |
|
| |
|
| CBERLINGER
| | ===OFC O .DOEA p=== |
| | NAME NFlelds |
|
| |
|
| 4/11/90*PD23 TReed 4/11/90 4/1 3/90 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
| | DATE yv"1/90 |
| | OFC O X -DOEA |
|
| |
|
| OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: VOGTLE OFC O .DOEA p NAME NFlelds DATE yv"1/90 OFC O X -DOEA NAME DFISCHER DATE f /11/90}}
| | ===NAME DFISCHER=== |
| | DATE f /11/90}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-UpML031130253 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, 05000370 |
---|
Issue date: |
04/16/1990 |
---|
From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-90-025, NUDOCS 9004120133 |
Download: ML031130253 (8) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, 05000370 |
---|
Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:05000370]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:05000370]] </code>. |
. * - *
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 16, 1990
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-25: LOSS OF VITAL AC POWER WITH SUBSEQUENT
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEAT-UP
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is being provided to inform addressees of a significant
operating event which occurred at the Georgia Power Company's Vogtle Nuclear
Plant on March 20, 1990. The event took place while Unit 1 was in mid-loop
in operational mde 6 and demonstrates the need for operating personnel to be
prudent in removing equipment from service or establishing atypical equipment
alignments during shutdown. It is expected that recipients will review the
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate,.to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in
this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On March 20, 1990, a loss of vital ac power occurred while Vogtle Unit 2 was
operating at 100 percent power and Unit 1 had been in a refueling outage for
about 4 weeks. Unit 1 was in mid-loop in operational mode 6 with plant equip- ment conditions as follows:
o The Unit 1 B reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) was tagged out of
service for maintenance
o The Unit 1 B emergency diesel generator (EDG) was tagged out of
service and disassembled for maintenance
o The Unit 1 A RAT was supplying offsite power to the crosstied Unit 1 A and B vital buses
o The reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature was being maintained at
around 90 degrees Fahrenheit (F) via the train A residual heat removal
(RHR) pump, the-train B pump was in standby
o The vessel head was in place with the bolts not fully tensioned
o The pressurizer manway cover was removed
_ __ Al e,
IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 o The manways for steam generators 2 and 3 were partially bolted in place
and the manways for steam generators 1 and 4 were in place with bolts
fully tensioned
o The inboard charging line check valve and an accumulator isolation
valve were open for inspection
o The containment equipment hatch and the containment personnel hatch
were open
At about 9:20 a.m., a truck carrying fuel and lubricants in the plant low
voltage switchyard backed into a support column for the feeder line supplying
power to the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RAT. The insulator for the C phase
of the feeder line fractured and initiated a phase-to-ground electrical fault.
The fault resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 1 A RAT and the Unit 2 B RAT.
The Unit 2 B EDG started and loaded to the deenergized Unit 2 B vital bus. How- ever, a Unit 2 turbine trip and reactor trip occurred because of an improperly
connected (wrong tap) differential current transformer (DCT). The DCT initiated
the trip when the current surge associated with the phase-to-ground fault was
sensed. The Unit 2 trip was uncomplicated.
Because both of the Unit 1 vital buses were crosstied and being supplied by
the Unit 1 A RAT, the loss of the transformer deenergized both vital buses.
Deenergizing these buses resulted in the loss of power to the operating RHR
pump. Since the Unit 1 B EDG was tagged out of service and disassembled for
maintenance, the emergency power supply for the B vital bus was unavailable
and the standby B RHR pump could not be started.
The available Unit 1 A EDG started on bus undervoltage, but for unknown reasons, it shut down automatically after 1 minute and 20 seconds. At 9:40 a.m., plant
operators declared a site area emergency. A loss of all onsite and offsite ac
power at Vogtle for more than 15 minutes is classified as a site area emergency.
The licensee made their declaration because all vital ac power was lost for
greater than 15 minutes. Approximately 18 minutes after the first start of
the A EDG, the operators locally reset the load sequencer which automatically
restarted the A EDG on undervoltage. However, after 1 minute and 10 seconds, the diesel again shut down automatically. At 9:56 a.m., plant operators per- formed an "emergency" manual start of the diesel, which bypassed most of the
diesel's protective trips. The diesel started and loaded to the bus, the A
RHR pump was restarted, and core cooling was reestablished to Unit 1. With
the start of the diesel, the site area emergency was downgraded to an "alert"
at 10:15 a.m. Containment integrity was established at 11:03 a.m.
Plant personnel returned the Unit 1 B RAT to service after completing formal
tagout removal procedures. However, attempts to energize the transformer were
delayed for several minutes because of a sticking mechanical interlock in the
control circuitry for a motor-operated disconnect switch on the high side of
the B RAT. Power was restored to the B vital bus via the B RAT at 11:40 a.m.
At 12:38 a.m., core cooling was shifted to the B RHR train to facilitate sub- sequent electrical alignment changes.
e. v - %
IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 According to control roon indication, RCS temperature increased from 90 to
136 degrees F during the 36 minutes required to reenergize the A bus (1.3 degrees F/min).
Throughout the event, non-vital power was continuously provided to Unit 1 from
offsite sources, via backfeed through the main generator transformer. Also, the Unit 2 electrical distribution system remained energized (aside from the
momentary loss of power before the reactor trip). However, the Vogtle electrical
system was not designed to permit easy interconnection of the Unit 1 vital buses
to nonvital power or to the Unit 2 electrical buses. Therefore, there were no
procedures in place to provide guidance on interconnecting the Unit 1 vital and
nonvital buses or for interconnecting the Unit 1 electrical distribution system
with the distribution system at Unit 2. (There are no regulatory requirements
that direct the licensee to develop Interconnection procedures.)
Discussion:
The NRC has previously identified concerns with the operability of necessary
equipment in shutdown modes. In Information Notice (IN)80-2O, "Loss of Decay
Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit 1 While in a Refueling Mode" an
extended loss of decay heat removal capability was attributed to a number of
factors, including inadequate procedures, inadequate administrative controls, and the conduct of extensive maintenance activities.
Information Notice 84-42, "Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages
Not Covered by Technical Specifications," describes an event at the Palisades
Nuclear Plant involving the total loss of all ac power. The Palisades event
was precipitated by personnel performing actions during a refueling outage
without an appreciation for the effect of those actions on the plant as it
was configured. Many pieces of equipment were tagged out of service for
maintenance. Personnel intentionally interrupted offsite power. This action
caused the loss of the only available service water pump. As a result, cooling
water was interrupted to the only available (and operating) diesel generator.
The diesel overheated and was manually tripped. As a result, all station ac
power was interrupted, causing the loss of fuel pool cooling. (The reactor
had been defueled, and its fuel was being stored in the spent fuel pool).
The recent Vogtle event reemphasizes the need for careful planning of equipment
outages during shutdown. Licensees, in general, have considerable latitude in
removing equipment from service and altering normal system lineups while in
shutdown modes if only the minimum technical specification requirements are
considered. The desire to return nuclear units to service as quickly as
possible can result in maintenance being conducted on redundant, safety- related systems, concurrently. The appropriateness of conducting parallel
maintenance activities should be considered in light of the availability of
alternate equipment and procedures to mitigate the consequences of potential
operational problems. It is important that plant outage plans assure that
an adequate complement of equipment capable of responding to potential events
remains available throughout the outage. Particular care is needed when the
reactor pressure boundary is not intact or the reactor coolant system is at
mid-loop.
IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 A special investigation of the Vogtle event is being conducted by an NRC
Incident Investigation Team (1IT). The information contained in this notice
is preliminary and is subject to change, pending the findings made by the IIT.
This Information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project
manager.
~6hfares Eossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: N. Fields, NRR
(301) 492-1173 E. Trager, AEOD
(301) 492-4496 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
, 0 - -u
Attachment
IN 90-25 April 16, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Intormation Date ot
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
90-24 Transportation of Model 4/10/90 All NRC licensees
Spec 2-T Radiographic authorized to use, Exposure Device transport, or operate
radiographic exposure
devices and source
changers.
90-23 Improper Installation of 4/4/90 All holders of OLs
Patel Conduit Seals or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
90-22 Unanticipated Equipment 3/23/90 All holders of OLs
Actuations Following or CPs for nuclear
Restoration of Power power reactors.
to Rosemount Transmitter
Trip Units
90-21 Potential Failure of Motor- 3/22/90 All holders of OLs
Operated Butterfly Valves or CPs for nuclear
to Operate Because Valve power reactors.
Seat Friction was Under- estimated
90-20 Personnel Injuries Resulting 3/22/90 All NRC licensees
from Improper Operation of who process or
Radwaste Incinerators incinerate radio- active waste.
90-19 Potential Loss of Effective 3/14/90 All holders of OLs
Volume for Containment or CPs for PWRs.
Recirculation Spray at
PWR Facilities
90-18 Potential Problems with 3/9/90 All holders of OLs
Crosby Safety Relief Valves or CPs for nuclear
Used on Diesel Generator power reactors.
Air Start Receiver Tanks
90-17 Weight and Center of 3/8/90 All holders of OLs
Gravity Discrepancies or CPs for nuclear
for Copes-Vulcan Valves power reactors.
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
tNOW,
IN 90-25
- -April 16, 1990 A special investigation of the Vogtle event is being conducted by an NRC
Incident Investigation Team (IIT). The information contained in this notice
is preliminary and is subject to change, pending the findings made by the IIT.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project
manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: N. Fields, NRR
(301) 492-1173 E. Trager, AEOD
(301) 492-4496 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
OFC *OEAB:DOEA *TECH ED *REGION I (IIT) *PD23 NAME NFields WLazarus TReed
DATE 4/11/90 4/11/90 4/11/90 4/11/90
OFC *OEAB:DOEA *C:OEAB:DOEA *C:GCB:DOEA
NAME DFISCHER PSwetland CBERLINGER
DATE 4/11/90 4/11/90 4/11/90 4/1 3/90
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: VOGTLE
OFC O .DOEA p
NAME NFlelds
DATE yv"1/90
OFC O X -DOEA
NAME DFISCHER
DATE f /11/90
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list | - Information Notice 1990-01, Importance of Proper Response to Self-Identified Violations by Licensees (12 January 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-02, Potential Degradation of Secondary Containment (22 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-03, Malfunction of Borg-Warner Bolted Bonnet Check Valves Caused by Failure of the Swing Arm (23 January 1990, Topic: Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-04, Cracking of the Upper Shell-to-Transition Cone Girth Welds in Steam Generators, (26 January 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination, Thermal fatigue)
- Information Notice 1990-05, Inter-System Discharge of Reactor Coolant (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-06, Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-07, New Information Regarding Insulation Material Performance and Debris Blockage of PWR Containment Sumps (30 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards From Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-09, Extended Interim Storage of Low-Level Radioactive Waste by Fuel Cycle and Materials Licensees (5 February 1990, Topic: Decommissioning Funding Plan, Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Nondestructive Examination, Stress corrosion cracking, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-11, Maintenance Deficiency Associated with Solenoid-Operated Valves (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-12, Monitoring or Interruption of Plant Communications (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-13, Importance of Review and Analysis of Safeguards Event Logs (5 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-14, Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials (6 March 1990, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1990-15, Reciprocity Notification of Agreement State Radiation Control Directors Before Beginning Work in Agreement States (17 March 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-16, Compliance with New Decommissioning Rule (7 March 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-17, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Valves (8 March 1990, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems with Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems With Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-19, Potential Loss of Effective Volume for Containment Recirculation Spray at PWR Facilities (14 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-20, Personnel Injuries Resulting from Improper Operation of Radwaste Incinerators (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction Was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-22, Unanticipated Equipment Actuations Following Restoration of Power to Rosemount Transmitter Trip Units (23 March 1990, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1990-23, Improper Installation of Patel Conduit Seals (4 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990, Topic: Exclusive Use)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model SPEC 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990, Topic: Exclusive Use)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power With Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-26, Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems (24 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-27, Clarification of the Recent Revisions to the Regulatory Requirements for Packaging of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) for Transportation (30 April 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error In High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error in High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-29, Cracking of Cladding and Its Heat-Affected Zone in the Base Metal of a Reactor Vessel Head (30 April 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-30, Ultrasonic Inspection Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Welds (1 May 1999, Topic: Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, Dissimilar Metal Weld, Exclusive Use)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste Form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-32, Surface Crack and Subsurface Indications in the Weld of a Reactor Vessel Head (3 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-33, Sources of Unexpected Occupational Radiation Exposures at Spent Fuel Storage Pools (9 May 1990, Topic: Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1990-34, Response to False Siren Activations (10 May 1990, Topic: Siren)
- Information Notice 1990-35, Transportation of Type a Quantities of Non-Fissile Radioactive Materials (24 May 1990, Topic: Siren)
- Information Notice 1990-37, Sheared Pinion Gear-To-Shaft Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-38, License and Fee Requirements for Processing Financial Assurance Submittals for Decommissioning (6 November 1990, Topic: Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1990-39, Recent Problems with Service Water Systems (1 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-40, Results of NRC-Sponsored Testing of Motor-Operated Valves (5 June 1990, Topic: Weak link, Siren)
- Information Notice 1990-41, Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and Ak Circuit Breakers (12 June 1990, Topic: Siren)
- Information Notice 1990-42, Failure of Electrical Power Equipment Due to Solar Magnetic Disturbances (19 June 1990, Topic: Siren)
- Information Notice 1990-43, Mechanical Interference with Thermal Trip Function in GE Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (29 June 1990)
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