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{{#Wiki_filter:Mr. Charles G. Pardee Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) and Senior Vice President Exelon Generation | {{#Wiki_filter:Mr. Charles G. Pardee | ||
Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK GENERATING | Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) and Senior Vice President | ||
STATION -NRC LICENSE | Exelon Generation Company, LLC | ||
REPORT 05000219/2008007 | 200 Exelon Way | ||
Dear Mr. Pardee On December 23, 2008, the | Kennett Square, PA 19348 | ||
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed | SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC LICENSE RENEWAL | ||
FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2008007 | |||
your Oyster Creek | Dear Mr. Pardee | ||
Generating | On December 23, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an | ||
Station. The enclosed report documents | inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the | ||
inspection results, which were discussed on December 23, 2008, with Mr. T. Rausch, Site Vice | |||
results, which were discussed | President, Mr. M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal, and other members of your staff | ||
on December 23, 2008, with Mr. T. Rausch, Site Vice President, Mr. M. Gallagher, Vice President | in a telephone conference observed by representatives from the State of New Jersey. | ||
License Renewal, and other members of your staff in a telephone | An appeal of a licensing board decision regarding the Oyster Creek application for a renewed | ||
conference | license is pending before the Commission. The NRC concluded Oyster Creek should not enter | ||
observed by representatives | the extended period of operation without directly observing continuing license renewal activities | ||
from the State of New Jersey.An appeal of a licensing board decision regarding the Oyster | at Oyster Creek. Therefore, the NRC performed an inspection using Inspection Procedure (IP) | ||
Creek application | 71003 "Post-Approval Site Inspection'for License Renewal" and observed Oyster Creek license | ||
for a renewed license is pending before | renewal activities during the last refuel outage prior to entering the period of extended | ||
the Commission. | operation. | ||
The NRC concluded | IP 71003 verifies license conditions added as part of a renewed license, license renewal | ||
Oyster Creek should not enter the extended period of operation | commitments, selected aging management programs, and license renewal commitments | ||
without directly observing | revised after the renewed license was granted, are implemented in accordance with Title 10 of | ||
continuing | the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Pert 54 "Reouirements for the Renewal of Ooeratino | ||
license renewal | Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants."E (b)(5) | ||
an inspection using | (b)(5) | ||
Inspection | (b)(5) 'The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed | ||
Procedure (IP)71003 "Post-Approval | activities, and interviewed personnel. The enclosed report records the inspector's observations, | ||
Site Inspection'for | absent any conclusions of adequacy, pending the final decision of the Commissioners on the | ||
License Renewal" and observed Oyster Creek license renewal activities | appeal of the renewed license. | ||
during the last refuel outage prior to entering the period of extended operation. | o WMthf Freedompo Inftomutl | ||
IP 71003 verifies license conditions | _______. -______/t- | ||
added as part of a renewed license, license renewal commitments, selected aging management | |||
programs, and license | P | ||
renewal commitments | C. Pardee 3 | ||
revised after the renewed license was granted, are implemented | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its | ||
in accordance | enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document | ||
with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Pert 54 "Reouirements | Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system | ||
for the Renewal | (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/readincq- | ||
of Ooeratino Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants."E (b)(5)(b)(5)(b)(5) 'The inspectors | rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | ||
reviewed selected procedures | We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at (610) 337-5183 if you have any | ||
and records, observed activities, and interviewed | questions regarding this letter. | ||
personnel. | Sincerely, | ||
The enclosed report records the inspector's | Richard Conte, Chief | ||
observations, absent any conclusions | Engineering Branch 1 | ||
of adequacy, pending the final decision of the Commissioners | Division of Reactor Safety | ||
on the appeal of the renewed license.o | Docket No. 50-219 | ||
P C. Pardee 3 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure | License No. DPR-16 | ||
will be available | Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000219/2008007 | ||
electronically | w/Attachment: Supplemental Information | ||
for public inspection | |||
in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available | C. Pardee 4 | ||
Records (PARS) component | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its | ||
of NRC's document system(ADAMS). ADAMS | enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document | ||
is accessible | Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system | ||
from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/readincq- | (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading- | ||
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic | rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | ||
Reading Room).We appreciate | We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at (610) 337-5183 if you have any | ||
your cooperation. | questions regarding this letter. | ||
Please contact me at (610) 337-5183 if you have any questions | Sincerely, | ||
regarding | Richard Conte, Chief | ||
this letter.Sincerely, Richard Conte, Chief Engineering | Engineering Branch 1 | ||
Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16 Enclosure: | Division of Reactor Safety | ||
Inspection | Docket No. 50-219 | ||
Report No. 05000219/2008007 | License No. DPR-16 | ||
w/Attachment: | Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000219/2008007 | ||
Supplemental | w/Attachment: Supplemental Information | ||
SUNSI Review Complete: _ (Reviewer's Initials) | |||
C. Pardee 4 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure | ADAMS ACCESSION NO. | ||
will be available | DOCUMENT NAME: C:\Doc\_.OC LRI 2008-07\_. Report\OC 2008-07 LRIrev-3.doc | ||
electronically | After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public. | ||
for public inspection | To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure | ||
in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available | "E"= Copy with attachment/enclosure | ||
Records (PARS) component | "N" = No copy | ||
of NRC's document system(ADAMS). ADAMS | OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS | ||
is accessible | NAME JRichmond/ RConte/ RBellamy/ DRoberts/ | ||
from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the | DATE //09 /09 / /09 / /09 | ||
Public Electronic | OFF FIAL RErORD7PY | ||
Reading Room).We appreciate | |||
your cooperation. | C. Pardee 3 | ||
Please contact me at (610) 337-5183 if you have any questions | Distribution w/encl: | ||
regarding | |||
this letter.Sincerely, Richard Conte, Chief Engineering | C. Pardee | ||
Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.License No. | Distribution w/encl: (VIA E-MAIL) | ||
Inspection | |||
Report No. 05000219/2008007 | U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
w/Attachment: | REGION I | ||
Supplemental | Docket No.: 50-219 | ||
Information | License No.: DPR-16 | ||
SUNSI Review Complete: | Report No.: 05000219/2008007 | ||
_ (Reviewer's | Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC | ||
Initials)ADAMS ACCESSION | Facility: Oyster Creek Generating Station | ||
NO.DOCUMENT NAME: C:\Doc\_.OC | Location: Forked River, New Jersey | ||
LRI 2008-07\_. | Dates: October 27 to November 7, 2008 (on-site inspection activities) | ||
Report\OC | November 13, 15, and 17, 2008 (on-site inspection activities) | ||
2008-07 LRIrev-3.doc | November 10 to December 23, 2008 (in-office review) | ||
After declaring | Inspectors: J. Richmond, Lead | ||
this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure"E"= Copy with attachment/enclosure"N" = No copy OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME JRichmond/ | M. Modes, Senior Reactor Engineer | ||
RConte/ RBellamy/ | G. Meyer, Senior Reactor Engineer | ||
DRoberts/DATE //09 /09 / /09 / /09 OFF FIAL RErORD7PY | T. O'Hara, Reactor Inspector | ||
C. Pardee 3 Distribution | J. Heinly, Reactor Engineer | ||
w/encl: | J. Kulp, Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek | ||
C. Pardee Distribution | Approved by: Richard Conte, Chief | ||
w/encl: (VIA E-MAIL) | Engineering Branch 1 | ||
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY | Division of Reactor Safety | ||
COMMISSION | ii | ||
REGION I Docket No.: License No.: Report No.: | |||
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS | |||
Exelon Generation | IR 05000219/2008007; 10/27/2008 - 12/23/2008; Exelon, LLC, Oyster Creek | ||
Company, LLC Oyster Creek Generating | Generating Station; License Renewal Follow-up | ||
The report covers a multi-week inspection of license renewal follow-up items. It was conducted | |||
activities) | by five region based engineering inspectors and the Oyster Creek resident inspector. The | ||
November 13, 15, and 17, 2008 (on-site inspection | inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71003 "Post-Approval Site | ||
activities) | Insiection for License Renewal.'" (b)(5) | ||
November 10 to December 23, 2008 (in-office | (b)(5) | ||
review)J. Richmond, Lead M. Modes, Senior Reactor Engineer G. Meyer, Senior Reactor Engineer T. O'Hara, Reactor Inspector J. Heinly, Reactor | (b)(5) "1The report documents the inspector observations, absent any conclusions OT | ||
Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety ii | adequac7, pending the final decision of the Commissioners on the appeal of the renewed | ||
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000219/2008007; | license. | ||
10/27/2008 -12/23/2008; | |||
Exelon, LLC, Oyster Creek Generating | 2 | ||
Station; License Renewal Follow-up The report covers a multi-week | REPORT DETAILS | ||
inspection | 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA) | ||
of license renewal follow-up items. It | 4OA2 License Renewal Follow-up (IP 71003) | ||
was conducted by five region based engineering | 1. Inspection Sample Selection Process | ||
inspectors | This inspection was conducted in order to observe AmerGen's continuing license | ||
and the Oyster Creek | renewal activities during the last refueling outage prior to Oyster Creek (OC) entering | ||
resident inspector. | the extended period of operation. The inspection team selected a number of inspection | ||
samples for review, using the NRC accepted guidance based on their importance in the | |||
was conducted | license renewal aq.lication Drocess, as an opportunity to make observations on license | ||
in accordance | renewal activities.L. (b)(5) | ||
with Inspection | (b)(5) | ||
Procedure | Accordingly, the inspectors recorded observations, without any assessment of | ||
71003 "Post-Approval | implementation adequacy or safety significance. Inspection observations were | ||
considered, in light of pending 10 CFR 54 license renewal commitments and license | |||
for License Renewal.'" (b)(5)(b)(5)(b)(5) " | conditions, as documented in NUREG-1875, "Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Related | ||
the inspector | to the License Renewal of Oyster Creek Generating Station," as well as programmatic | ||
observations, absent any conclusions | performance under on-going implementation of 10 CFR 50 current licensing basis (CLB) | ||
requirements. | |||
on the appeal | The reviewed SER proposed commitments and license conditions were selected based | ||
of the renewed license. | on several attributes including: the risk significance using insights gained from sources | ||
2 REPORT DETAILS 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)4OA2 License Renewal Follow-up (IP 71003)1. Inspection | such as the NRC's "Significance Determination Process Risk Informed Inspection | ||
Sample Selection | Notebooks," revision 2; the extent and results of previous license renewal audits and | ||
inspections of aging management programs; the extent or complexity of a commitment; | |||
was conducted | and the extent that baseline inspection programs will inspect a system, structure, or | ||
in order to observe AmerGen's continuing license | component (SSC), or commodity group. | ||
renewal activities | For each commitment and on a sampling basis, the inspectors reviewed supporting | ||
during the last refueling | documents including completed surveillances, conducted interviews, performed visual | ||
outage prior to Oyster Creek (OC) entering the extended period of operation. | inspection of structures and components including those not accessible during power | ||
The inspection | operation, and observed selected activities described below. The inspectors also | ||
team selected a number of inspection | reviewed selected corrective actions taken as a consequence of previous license | ||
samples for review, using the NRC accepted guidance based on their importance | renewal inspections. | ||
in the license renewal aq.lication | At the time of the inspection, AmerGen Energy Company, LLC was the licensee for | ||
Drocess, as an opportunity | Oyster Creek Generating Station. As of January 8, 2009, the OC license was | ||
to make observations | transferred to Exelon Generating Company, LLC by license amendment No. 271 | ||
on license renewal activities.L. (b)(5)(b)(5)Accordingly, the inspectors | (ML082750072). | ||
recorded observations, without any assessment | |||
2. NRC Unresolved Item | |||
adequacy or safety significance. | e Observed actions to evaluate primary containment structural integrity | ||
Inspection | 10 CFR 50 existing requirements (e.g., current licensing basis (CLB) | ||
observations | xxx USE words from PN | ||
* The conclusions of PNO-1-08-012 remain unchanged | |||
and license conditions, as documented | " An Unresolved Item (URI) will be opened to evaluate whether existing current licensing basis | ||
in NUREG-1875, "Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Related to the License Renewal | commitments were adequately performed and, if necessary, assess the safety significance for | ||
of Oyster Creek Generating | any related performance deficiency. | ||
Station," as well as programmatic | e The issues for follow-up include the strippable coating de-lamination, reactor cavity trough | ||
performance | drain monitoring, and sand bed drain monitoring. | ||
under on-going implementation | * The commitment tracking, implementation, and work control processes will be reviewed, | ||
of 10 CFR 50 current licensing | based on corrective actions resulting from AmerGen's review of deficiencies and operating | ||
basis (CLB)requirements. | experience, as a Part 50 activity. | ||
The reviewed SER proposed commitments and license | |||
conditions | 3. Detailed Reviews | ||
were selected based on several attributes | 3.1 Reactor Refuel Cavity Liner Strippable Coating | ||
including: | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
the risk significance | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement | ||
using insights gained from sources such as the NRC's "Significance | (2), stated: | ||
Determination | A strippable coating will be applied to the reactor cavity liner to prevent water | ||
Process Risk Informed Inspection | intrusion into the gap between the drywell shield wall and the drywell shell during | ||
Notebooks," revision 2; the extent and results of previous license renewal audits and inspections | periods when the reactor cavity is flooded. Refueling outages prior to and during | ||
of aging management | the period of extended operation. | ||
programs; | The inspector reviewed work order R2098682-06, "Coating application to cavity walls | ||
the extent or complexity | and floors." | ||
of a commitment; | b. Observations | ||
and the extent that baseline | From Oct. 29 to Nov. 6, the strippable coating limited leakage into the cavity trough | ||
inspection | drain at less than 1 gallon per minute (gpm). On Nov. 6, the observed leakage rate in | ||
programs will inspect a system, structure, | the cavity trough drain took a step change to 4 to 6 gpm. Water puddles were | ||
group.For each commitment | subsequently identified in 4 sand bed bays. AmerGen stated follow-up UTs would be | ||
and on a sampling basis, the inspectors | performed to evaluate the drywell shell during the next refuel outage. AmerGen | ||
reviewed supporting | identified several likely or contributing causes, including: | ||
documents | 9 A portable water filtration unit was improperly placed in the reactor cavity, | ||
including completed surveillances, conducted | which resulted in flow discharged directly on the strippable coating. | ||
interviews, performed | " An oil spill into the cavity may have affected the coating integrity. | ||
* No post installation inspection of the coating had been performed. | |||
of structures | 3.2 Reactor Refuel Cavity Seal Leakage Trbuqh Drain Monitoring | ||
and components | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
including | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement | ||
those not accessible | (3), stated: | ||
during power operation, and observed selected | The reactor cavity seal leakage trough drains and the drywell sand bed region | ||
activities | drains will be monitored for leakage. Periodically. | ||
described | Reactor refuel cavity seal leakage is collected in a concrete trough and gravity drains | ||
below. The inspectors | through a 2 inch drain line into a plant drain system funnel. AmerGen monitored the | ||
cavity seal leakage daily by monitoring the flow in the trough drain line. | |||
actions taken as a consequence | The inspectors independently checked the trough drain flow immediately after the | ||
of previous license renewal inspections. | reactor cavity was filled, and several times throughout the outage. The inspectors also | ||
At the time of the inspection, AmerGen Energy | reviewed the written monitoring logs. | ||
Company, LLC was the licensee | |||
In addition, the inspectors reviewed AmerGen's cavity trough drain flow monitoring plan | |||
Station. As of January 8, 2009, the OC license was transferred | and pre-approved Action Plan. AmerGen had established an administrative limit of 12 | ||
to Exelon Generating | gpm.on the cavity trough drain flow, based on a calculation which indicated that cavity | ||
Company, LLC by license amendment | trough drain flow of less than 60 gpm would not result in trough overflow into the gap | ||
No. 271 (ML082750072). | between the drywell concrete shield wall and the drywell steel shell. | ||
2. NRC Unresolved | b. Observations | ||
On Oct. 27, the cavity trough drain line, was isolated to install a tygon hose to allow drain | |||
structural | flow to be monitored. On Oct. 28, the reactor cavity was filled. Drain line flow was | ||
monitored frequently during cavity flood-up, and daily thereafter. On Oct. 29, a | |||
licensing | boroscope examination of the drain line identified that the isolation valve had been left | ||
basis (CLB)xxx USE words from PN* The conclusions | closed. When the drain line isolation valve was opened, about 3 gallons of water | ||
of PNO-1-08-012 | drained out, then the drain flow subsided to about an 1/8 inch stream (less than 1 gpm). | ||
remain unchanged" An Unresolved | On Nov. 6, the reactor cavity liner strippable coating started to de-laminate. The cavity | ||
Item (URI) will be opened to evaluate whether existing current licensing | trough drain flow took a step change from less than, 1 gpm to approximately 4 to 6 gpm. | ||
AmerGen increased monitoring of the trough drain to every 2 hours and sand bed poly | |||
adequately | bottles to every 4 hours. On Nov. 8, NDE technicians inside sand bed bay 11 identified | ||
performed | dripping water. Subsequently, water puddles were identified in 4 sand bed bays. After | ||
and, if necessary, assess the safety significance | the cavity was drained, all sand bed bays were inspected; no deficiencies identified. | ||
The sand bed bays were originally scheduled to have been closed by Nov. 2. In | |||
deficiency. | addition, on Nov. 15, after cavity was drained, water was found in the sand bed bay 11 | ||
e The issues for follow-up | poly bottle. | ||
include the strippable | The inspectors observed that AmerGen's pre-approved action plan was inconsistent with | ||
coating de-lamination, reactor cavity trough drain monitoring, and sand bed drain monitoring. | the actual actions taken in response to increased cavity seal leakage. The plan did not | ||
* The commitment | direct increased sand bed poly bottle monitoring, and would not have required a sand | ||
tracking, implementation, and work control processes | bed entry or inspection until Nov 15, when water was first found in a poly bottle. The | ||
will be reviewed, based on corrective | pre-approved action plan directed: | ||
actions resulting | * If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 5 gpm, then increase monitoring of the | ||
from AmerGen's | cavity drain flow from daily to every 8 hours. | ||
review of deficiencies | * If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 12 gpm, then increase monitoring of the | ||
and operating experience, as a Part 50 activity. | sand bed poly bottles from daily to every 4 hours. | ||
3. Detailed Reviews | * If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 12 gpm and any water is found in a | ||
3.1 Reactor Refuel Cavity Liner Strippable | sand bed poly bottle, then enter and inspect the sand bed bays. | ||
3.3 Drywell Sand Bed Region Drains Monitoring | |||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement | ||
IWE Enhancement | (3), stated: | ||
(2), stated: A strippable | The sand bed region drains will be monitored daily during refueling outages. | ||
coating will be applied to the reactor cavity liner to prevent water intrusion | There is one drain line for each two sand bed bays (five drains total). A poly bottle was | ||
into the gap between | attached via tygon tubing to a funnel hung below each drain line. AmerGen performed | ||
the drywell shield wall and the drywell shell during periods when the reactor | |||
cavity is flooded. Refueling | the drain line monitoring by checking the poly bottles. | ||
outages prior to and during the period of extended operation. | The inspectors independently checked the poly bottles during the outage, and | ||
The inspector | accompanied AmerGen personnel during routine daily checks. The inspectors also | ||
reviewed work order R2098682-06, "Coating application | reviewed the written monitoring logs. | ||
to cavity walls and floors." b. | b. Observations | ||
29 to Nov. 6, the strippable | The sand bed drains were not directly observed and were not visible from the outer area | ||
coating limited leakage into the cavity trough drain at less than | of the torus room, where the poly bottles were located. After the reactor cavity was | ||
1 gallon per minute (gpm). On Nov. 6, the observed | drained, 2 of the 5 tygon tubes were found disconnected, laying on the floor. In | ||
leakage rate in the cavity trough drain took | addition, sand bed bay 11 drain poly bottle was empty during each daily check until Nov. | ||
a step change to 4 to 6 gpm. Water puddles were subsequently | 15 (cavity was drained on Nov 12), when it was found full (greater than 4 gallons). Bay | ||
identified | 11 was entered within a few hours, visually inspected, and found dry. | ||
in 4 sand bed bays. AmerGen stated follow-up UTs would | 3.4 Reactor Cavity Trouqh Drain Inspection for Blockage | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | |||
to evaluate the drywell shell during the next refuel outage. AmerGen identified | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement | ||
several likely or contributing | (13), stated: | ||
causes, including: | The reactor cavity concrete trough drain will be verified to be clear from blockage | ||
9 A portable water filtration | once per refueling cycle. Any identified issues will be addressed via the | ||
unit was improperly | corrective action process. Once per refueling cycle. | ||
placed in the reactor cavity, which resulted in flow discharged | The inspector reviewed a video recording record of a boroscope inspection of the cavity | ||
directly on the strippable | trough drain line. | ||
coating." An oil spill into the cavity may have affected the coating integrity. | b. Observations | ||
* No post installation | See observations in section 2.4 below. | ||
inspection | 3.5 Moisture Barrier Seal Inspection (inside sand bed bays) | ||
of the coating had been performed. | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
3.2 Reactor Refuel Cavity Seal Leakage Trbuqh Drain Monitoring | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | (12 & 21), stated: | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | Inspect the [moisture barrier] seal at the junction between the sand bed region | ||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | concrete [sand bed floor] and the embedded drywell shell. During the 2008 | ||
IWE Enhancement | refueling outage and every other refueling outage thereafter. | ||
(3), stated: The reactor cavity seal leakage trough drains and the drywell sand bed region drains will be monitored | The inspectors directly observed as-found conditions of the moisture barrier seal in 5 | ||
for leakage. Periodically. | sand bed bays, and as-left conditions in 3 sand bed bays. The inspectors reviewed VT | ||
Reactor refuel cavity | examination records for each sand bed bay, and compared their direct observations to | ||
seal leakage is collected | the recorded VT examination results. The inspectors reviewed Exelon VT examination | ||
in a concrete trough and gravity drains through a 2 inch drain line into a plant drain system funnel. AmerGen monitored | procedures, interviewed nondestructive examination (NDE) technicians, and reviewed | ||
daily by monitoring | NDE technician qualifications and certifications. | ||
the flow in the trough drain line.The inspectors | The inspectors observed AmerGen's activities to evaluate and repair the moisture | ||
independently | barrier seal in sand bed bay 3. | ||
checked the trough drain flow immediately | b. Observations | ||
after the reactor cavity was filled, and several times throughout | The VT examinations identified moisture barrier seal deficiencies in 7 of the 10 sand bed | ||
the outage. The inspectors | bays, including surface cracks and partial separation of the seal from the steel shell or | ||
concrete floor. All deficiencies were entered into the corrective action program and | |||
logs. | evaluated. AmerGen determined the as-found moisture barrier function was not | ||
In addition, the inspectors | impaired, because no cracks or separation fully penetrated the seal. All deficiencies | ||
reviewed AmerGen's | were repaired. | ||
cavity trough drain flow monitoring | The VT examination for sand bed bay 3 identified a seal crack and a surface rust stains | ||
below the crack. When the seal was excavated, some drywell shell surface corrosion | |||
Action Plan. AmerGen had established | was identified. A laboratory analysis of removed seal material determined the epoxy | ||
an administrative | seal material had not adequately cured, and concluded it was an original 1992 | ||
limit of 12 gpm.on the cavity trough drain flow, based on a calculation | installation issue. The seal crack and surface rust were repaired. | ||
which indicated | The inspectors compared the 2008 VT results to the 2006 results and noted that in 2006 | ||
that cavity trough drain flow of less than 60 gpm would not result in trough overflow into the gap between the drywell concrete shield wall and the drywell steel shell.b. Observations | no deficiencies were identified. | ||
On Oct. 27, the cavity trough drain line, was isolated to install a tygon hose to allow drain flow to be monitored. | 3.6 Drywell Shell External CoatinQs Inspection (inside sand bed bays) | ||
On Oct. 28, the reactor | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
cavity was filled. Drain line flow was monitored | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements | ||
frequently | (4 & 21), stated: | ||
during cavity flood-up, and daily thereafter. | Perform visual inspections of the drywell external shell epoxy coating in all 10 | ||
On Oct. 29, a boroscope | sand bed bays. During the 2008 refueling outage and every other refueling | ||
examination | outage thereafter, | ||
of the drain line identified that the isolation | AmerGen performed a 100% visual inspection of the epoxy coating in the sand bed | ||
valve had been left closed. When the drain line isolation | region (total of 10 bays). The inspectors directly observed as-found conditions of the | ||
valve was opened, about 3 gallons of water drained out, then the drain flow subsided to about an 1/8 inch stream (less | epoxy coating in 7 sand bed bays, and the as-left condition in sand bed bay 11, after | ||
than 1 gpm).On Nov. 6, the reactor cavity liner strippable | coating repairs. The inspectors reviewed VT examination records for each sand bed | ||
coating started to de-laminate. | bay, and compared their direct observations to the recorded VT examination results. | ||
The cavity trough drain flow took a step change from less than, 1 gpm to approximately | The inspectors reviewed Exelon VT examination procedures, interviewed nondestructive | ||
4 to 6 gpm.AmerGen increased | examination (NDE) technicians, and reviewed NDE technician qualifications and | ||
monitoring | certifications. | ||
of the trough drain to every 2 hours and | The inspectors directly observed AmerGen's activities to evaluate and repair the epoxy | ||
sand bed poly bottles to every 4 hours. On Nov. 8, NDE technicians | coating in sand bed bay 11. | ||
inside sand bed bay 11 identified | b. Observations | ||
dripping water. Subsequently, water puddles were identified | In bay 11, AmerGen identified one small broken blister, about 1/4 inch in diameter, with | ||
in 4 sand bed bays. After the cavity was drained, all sand bed bays were inspected; | |||
no deficiencies | a 6 inch surface rust stain, dry to the touch, trailing down from the blister. During the | ||
identified. | initial investigation, an NRC inspector identified three additional smaller surface | ||
The sand bed bays were originally | irregularities (initially described as surface bumps) within a 1 to 2 square inch area, near | ||
scheduled | the broken blister, which were subsequently determined to be unbroken blisters. All four | ||
to have been closed by Nov. 2. In addition, on Nov. 15, after cavity was drained, water was found in the sand bed bay 11 poly bottle.The inspectors | blisters were evaluated and repaired. | ||
observed that AmerGen's | To confirm the adequacy of the initial coating examination, AmerGen re-inspected 4 | ||
pre-approved | sand bed bays with a different NDE technician. No additional deficiencies were | ||
action plan was inconsistent | identified. A laboratory analysis of the removed blisters determined approximately 0.003 | ||
inches of surface corrosion had occurred directly under the broken blister, and | |||
actions taken in response to increased | concluded the corrosion had taken place over approximately a 16 year period. UT | ||
cavity seal leakage. The plan did not direct increased | dynamic scan thickness measurements from inside the drywell confirmed the drywell | ||
sand bed poly bottle monitoring, and would not have required a sand bed entry or inspection | shell had no significant degradation as a result of the corrosion under the four blisters. | ||
until Nov 15, when water was first found in a poly bottle. The pre-approved | During the final closeout of bay 9, AmerGen identified an area approximately 8 inches | ||
action plan directed:* If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 5 gpm, then increase monitoring | by 8 inches where the color of the epoxy coating appeared different than the | ||
of the cavity drain flow from daily to every 8 hours.* If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 12 gpm, then increase monitoring | surrounding area. Because each of the 3 layers of the epoxy coating is a different color, | ||
of the sand bed poly bottles from daily to every 4 hours.* If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 12 gpm and any water is found in a sand bed poly bottle, then enter and inspect the sand bed bays.3.3 Drywell Sand Bed Region Drains Monitoring | AmerGen questioned whether the color difference could have been indicative of an | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | original installation deficiency. The identified area was re-coated with epoxy. | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | In follow-up, AmerGen reviewed a 2006 video of the sand beds, which had been made | ||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | as a general aid, not as part of an NDE examination. The 2006 video showed the same | ||
IWE Enhancement | 6 inch rust stain in bay 11. The inspectors compared the 2008 VT results to the 2006 | ||
(3), stated: The sand bed region drains will be monitored | results and noted that in 2006 no deficiencies were identified. | ||
daily during refueling | |||
outages.There is one drain line for each two sand bed bays (five drains total). A poly bottle was attached via tygon tubing | |||
to a funnel hung below each drain line. AmerGen performed | |||
the drain line monitoring | |||
by checking the poly bottles.The inspectors | |||
independently | |||
checked the poly bottles during the outage, and accompanied | |||
AmerGen personnel | |||
during routine daily checks. The inspectors | |||
logs.b. Observations | |||
The sand bed drains were not directly observed and were not visible from the outer area | |||
of the torus room, where the poly bottles were located. | |||
After the reactor cavity was drained, 2 of the 5 tygon tubes were found disconnected, laying on the floor. In addition, sand bed bay 11 drain poly bottle was empty during each daily check until Nov.15 (cavity was drained on Nov 12), when it was found full (greater than 4 gallons). | |||
within a few hours, visually inspected, and found dry.3.4 Reactor Cavity Trouqh Drain Inspection | |||
for Blockage a. Scope of Inspection | |||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | |||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | |||
IWE Enhancement | |||
(13), stated: The reactor cavity concrete trough drain will be verified to be clear from blockage once per refueling | |||
cycle. Any identified | |||
issues will be addressed | |||
process. Once per refueling | |||
cycle.The inspector | |||
reviewed a video recording | |||
record of a boroscope | |||
inspection | |||
of the cavity trough drain line.b. Observations | |||
See observations | |||
in section 2.4 below.3.5 Moisture Barrier Seal Inspection (inside sand bed bays)a. Scope of Inspection | |||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | |||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | |||
IWE Enhancements | |||
(12 & 21), stated: Inspect the [moisture | |||
barrier] seal at the junction between the sand bed region concrete [sand bed floor] and the embedded drywell shell. During the 2008 refueling | |||
outage and every other refueling | |||
outage thereafter. | |||
The inspectors | |||
directly observed as-found conditions | |||
of the moisture barrier seal in 5 sand bed bays, and as-left conditions | |||
in 3 sand bed bays. The inspectors | |||
reviewed VT examination | |||
records for each sand bed bay, and compared their direct | |||
observations | |||
results. The inspectors | |||
reviewed Exelon VT examination | |||
procedures, interviewed | |||
nondestructive | |||
examination (NDE) technicians, and reviewed | |||
NDE technician | |||
qualifications | |||
and certifications. | |||
The inspectors | |||
observed AmerGen's | |||
activities | |||
to evaluate and repair the | |||
The VT examinations | |||
identified | |||
moisture barrier seal deficiencies | |||
in 7 of the 10 sand bed bays, including | |||
surface cracks and partial separation | |||
of the seal from the steel shell or concrete floor. All deficiencies | |||
were entered into the corrective | |||
action program and | |||
evaluated. | |||
AmerGen determined | |||
the as-found moisture barrier | |||
function was not impaired, because no cracks or separation | |||
fully penetrated | |||
the seal. All deficiencies | |||
were repaired.The VT examination | |||
for sand bed bay 3 identified a | |||
seal crack and a surface rust stains below the crack. When the seal was | |||
excavated, some drywell shell surface corrosion was identified. | |||
A laboratory | |||
analysis of removed seal material determined | |||
the epoxy seal material had | |||
not adequately | |||
cured, and concluded | |||
it was an original 1992 installation | |||
issue. The seal crack and surface rust were repaired.The inspectors | |||
compared the 2008 VT results to the 2006 results and noted that | |||
in 2006 no deficiencies were | |||
identified. | |||
3.6 Drywell Shell External CoatinQs Inspection (inside sand bed bays)a. Scope of Inspection | |||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | |||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | |||
IWE Enhancements | |||
(4 & 21), stated:Perform visual | |||
inspections | |||
of the drywell external shell epoxy coating in all 10 sand bed bays. During the 2008 refueling | |||
outage and every other refueling outage thereafter,AmerGen performed a 100% visual inspection | |||
of the epoxy coating in the sand bed region (total of 10 bays). The inspectors | |||
directly observed as-found | |||
conditions | |||
of the epoxy coating in 7 sand bed bays, and the as-left | |||
condition | |||
in sand bed bay 11, after coating repairs. The inspectors | |||
reviewed VT examination | |||
records for each sand bed bay, and compared | |||
their direct observations | |||
to the recorded VT examination | |||
results.The inspectors | |||
reviewed Exelon VT examination | |||
procedures, interviewed | |||
nondestructive | |||
examination (NDE) technicians, and reviewed NDE technician | |||
qualifications | |||
The inspectors | |||
directly observed AmerGen's | |||
activities | |||
to evaluate and repair the epoxy coating in sand bed bay 11.b. | |||
one small broken blister, about 1/4 inch in diameter, with | |||
a 6 inch surface rust stain, dry to the touch, trailing down from the blister. During the initial investigation, an NRC inspector | |||
identified | |||
three additional | |||
smaller surface irregularities (initially | |||
described | |||
as surface bumps) within a 1 to 2 square inch area, near the broken blister, which were subsequently | |||
determined | |||
to be unbroken blisters. | |||
All four blisters were evaluated | |||
and repaired.To confirm the adequacy of the initial coating examination, AmerGen re-inspected | |||
NDE technician. | |||
No additional | |||
deficiencies | |||
A laboratory | |||
analysis of the removed | |||
blisters determined | |||
approximately | |||
0.003 inches of surface corrosion | |||
had occurred directly under the broken | |||
blister, and concluded | |||
the corrosion | |||
had taken place over approximately | |||
a 16 year period. UT dynamic scan thickness | |||
measurements | |||
from inside the drywell confirmed | |||
the drywell shell had no significant | |||
degradation | |||
as a result of the corrosion | |||
under the four blisters.During the final closeout of bay 9, AmerGen identified | |||
an area approximately | |||
8 inches by 8 inches where the color of the epoxy coating appeared different | |||
than the surrounding area. Because each | |||
of the 3 layers of the epoxy coating is a different | |||
color, AmerGen questioned | |||
whether the color difference | |||
could have been indicative | |||
of an original installation | |||
deficiency. | |||
The identified | |||
area was re-coated | |||
with epoxy.In follow-up, AmerGen reviewed a 2006 video of the sand beds, which had been made as a general aid, not as part of an NDE examination. | |||
The 2006 video showed the same 6 inch rust stain in bay 11. The inspectors | |||
compared the 2008 VT results to the 2006 results and noted that in 2006 no deficiencies | |||
were identified. | |||
3.7 Drywell Floor Trench Inspections | 3.7 Drywell Floor Trench Inspections | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements | ||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | (5, 16, & 20), stated: | ||
IWE Enhancements | Perform visual test (VT) and Ultrasonic test (UT) examinations of the drywell shell | ||
(5, 16, & 20), stated: Perform visual test (VT) and Ultrasonic | inside the drywell floor inspection trenches in bay 5 and bay 17 during the 2008 | ||
test (UT) examinations | refueling outage, at the same locations that were examined in 2006. In addition, | ||
of the drywell shell inside the drywell floor inspection | monitor the trenches for the presence of water during refueling outages. | ||
trenches in bay 5 and bay 17 during the 2008 refueling | The inspectors observed non-destructive examination (NDE) activities and reviewed UT | ||
outage, at the same locations | examination records. In addition, the inspectors directly observed conditions in the | ||
that were examined in 2006. In addition, monitor the trenches for the presence of water during refueling | trenches on multiple occasions during the outage. The inspectors compared UT data to | ||
outages.The inspectors | licensee established acceptance criteria in Specification IS-318227-004, revision 14, | ||
observed non-destructive | "Functional Requirements for Drywell Containment Vessel Thickness Examinations," | ||
examination (NDE) activities | and to design analysis values for minimum wall thickness in calculations C-1302-187- | ||
and reviewed UT examination | E310-041, revision 0, "Statistical Analysis of Drywell Sand Bed Thickness Data 1992, | ||
records. In addition, the inspectors | 1994, 1996, and 2006," and C-1302-187-5320-024, revision 2, "Drywell External UT | ||
directly observed conditions | Evaluation in the Sand Bed." In addition, the inspectors reviewed Technical Evaluation | ||
in the trenches on multiple occasions | (TE) 330592.27.43, "2008 UT Data of the Sand Bed Trenches," | ||
during the outage. The inspectors | The inspectors reviewed Exelon UT examination procedures, interviewed NDE | ||
compared UT data to licensee established | |||
acceptance | 4 | ||
criteria in Specification | technicians, reviewed NDE technician qualifications and certifications. The inspectors | ||
IS-318227-004, revision 14,"Functional | also reviewed records of trench inspections performed during two non-refueling plant | ||
Requirements | outages during the last operating cycle. | ||
for Drywell Containment | b. Observations | ||
Vessel Thickness | TE 330592.27.43 determined the UT thickness values satisfied the general uniform | ||
Examinations," and to design analysis values for minimum wall thickness | minimum wall thickness criteria (e.g., average thickness of an area) and the locally | ||
in calculations C-1302-187- | thinned minimum wall thickness criteria (e.g., areas 2 inches or less in diameter), as | ||
E310-041, revision 0, "Statistical | applicable. For UT data sets, such as 7x7 arrays (i.e., 49 UT readings in a 6 inch by 6 | ||
Analysis of Drywell Sand Bed Thickness | inch grid), the TE calculated statistical parameters and determined the data sets had a | ||
Data 1992, 1994, 1996, and 2006," and C-1302-187-5320-024, revision 2, "Drywell External UT Evaluation | normal distribution. The TE also compared the data set values to the corresponding | ||
in the Sand Bed." In addition, the inspectors | 2006 values and concluded there were no significant differences and no observable on- | ||
reviewed Technical | going corrosion. | ||
During two non-refueling plant outages during the last operating cycle, both trenches | |||
reviewed Exelon UT examination | were inspected for the presence of water, and found dry. | ||
procedures, interviewed | During the initial drywell entry on Oct. 25, the inspectors observed that both floor | ||
trenches were dry. On subsequent drywell entries for routine inspection activities, the | |||
4 technicians, reviewed NDE technician | inspectors also observed the trenches to be dry. During the final drywell closeout | ||
qualifications | inspection on Nov. 17, the inspectors observed the following: | ||
and certifications. | e Bay 17 trench was dry and had newly installed sealant on the trench edge | ||
The inspectors | where concrete meets shell, and on the floor curb near the trench. | ||
also reviewed records of trench inspections | * Bay 5 trench had a few ounces of water in it. The inspector noted that within | ||
performed | the last day there had been several system flushes conducted in the immediate | ||
during two non-refueling | area. AmerGen stated the trench would be dried prior to final drywell closeout. | ||
* Bay 5 trench had the lower 6 inches of grout re-installed and had newly | |||
cycle.b. Observations | installed sealant on the trench edge where concrete meets shell, and on the floor | ||
TE 330592.27.43 | curb near the trench. | ||
determined | 3.8 Drywell Shell Thickness Measurements | ||
the UT thickness | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
values satisfied | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements | ||
the general uniform minimum wall thickness | (1, 9, 14, and 21), stated: | ||
criteria (e.g., average thickness | Perform full scope drywell inspections [in the sand bed region], including UT | ||
of an area) and the locally thinned minimum wall thickness | thickness measurements of the drywell shell, from inside and outside the drywell. | ||
criteria (e.g., areas 2 inches or less in diameter), as applicable. | During the 2008 refueling outage and every other refueling outage thereafter. | ||
For UT data sets, such as 7x7 arrays (i.e., 49 UT readings in a 6 inch by 6 inch grid), the TE calculated | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements | ||
statistical | (7, 10, and 11) stated: | ||
parameters | Conduct UT thickness measurements in the upper regions of the drywell shell. | ||
and determined | |||
the data sets had a normal distribution. | Prior to the period of extended operation and two refueling outages later. | ||
The TE also compared | The inspectors observed non-destructive examination (NDE) activities and reviewed UT | ||
the data set values to the corresponding | examination records. The inspectors compared UT data results to licensee established | ||
2006 values and concluded | acceptance criteria in Specification IS-318227-004, revision 14, "Functional | ||
there were no significant | Requirements for Drywell Containment Vessel Thickness Examinations," and to design | ||
differences | analysis values for minimum wall thickness in calculations C-1302-187-E310-041, | ||
and no observable | revision 0, "Statistical Analysis of Drywell Vessel Sand Bed Thickness Data 1992, 1994, | ||
on-going corrosion. | 1996, and 2006," and C-1302-187-5320-024, revision 2, "Drywell External UT Evaluation | ||
During two non-refueling | in the Sand Bed." In addition, the inspectors reviewed the Technical Evaluations (TEs) | ||
plant outages during the last operating cycle, both | associated with the UT data, as follows: | ||
* TE 330592.27.42, "2008 Sand Bed UT data - External" | |||
for the presence of water, and found dry.During the initial drywell entry on Oct. 25, the inspectors | * TE 330592.27.45i "2008 Drywell UT Data at Elevations 23 & 71 foot" | ||
observed that both floor trenches were dry. On subsequent | " TE 330592.27.88, "2008 Drywell Sand Bed UT Data - Internal Grids" | ||
drywell entries for routine inspection | The inspectors reviewed UT examination records for the following: | ||
activities, the inspectors | * Sand bed region elevation, inside the drywell | ||
also observed the trenches to be dry. During the final drywell closeout inspection | " All 10 sand bed bays, drywell external | ||
on Nov. 17, the inspectors | " Various drywell elevations between 50 and 87 foot elevations | ||
observed the following: | " Transition weld from bottom to middle spherical plates, inside the drywell | ||
e Bay 17 trench was dry and had newly installed | * Transition weld from 2.625 inch plate to 0.640 inch plate (knuckle area), inside | ||
sealant on the trench edge where concrete meets shell, and on the floor curb near the trench.* Bay 5 trench had a few ounces of water in it. The inspector | the drywell | ||
noted that within the last day there had been several system flushes | The inspectors reviewed Exelon UT examination procedures, interviewed NDE | ||
conducted | supervisors and technicians, and observed field collection and recording of UT data in | ||
in the immediate area. AmerGen stated the trench would be dried prior to final drywell closeout.* Bay 5 trench had the lower 6 inches of grout re-installed | accordance with the approved procedures. The inspectors also reviewed NDE | ||
and had newly installed | technician qualifications and certifications. | ||
sealant on the trench edge where concrete meets shell, and on the floor curb near the trench.3.8 Drywell Shell Thickness | b. Observations | ||
Measurements | TEs 330592.27.42, 330592.27.45, and 330592.27.88 determined the UT thickness | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | values satisfied the general uniform minimum wall thickness criteria (e.g., average | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | thickness of an area) and the locally thinned minimum wall thickness criteria (e.g., areas | ||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | 2 inches or less in diameter), as applicable. For UT data sets, such as 7x7 arrays (i.e., | ||
IWE Enhancements | 49 UT readings in a 6 inch by 6 inch grid), the TEs calculated statistical parameters and | ||
(1, 9, 14, and 21), stated: Perform full scope drywell inspections | determined the data sets had a normal distribution. The TEs also compared the data | ||
[in the sand bed region], including | set values to the corresponding 2006 values and concluded there were no significant | ||
differences and no observable on-going corrosion. | |||
measurements | 3.9 Moisture Barrier Seal Inspection (inside drywell) | ||
of the drywell shell, from inside and outside the drywell.During the 2008 refueling | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
outage and every other refueling | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement | ||
outage thereafter. | (17), stated: | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | |||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | Perform visual inspection of the moisture barrier seal between the drywell shell | ||
IWE Enhancements | and the concrete floor curb, installed inside the drywell during the October 2006 | ||
(7, 10, and 11) stated: Conduct UT thickness | refueling outage, in accordance with ASME Code. | ||
measurements | The inspector reviewed structural inspection reports 187-001 and 187-002, performed | ||
in the upper regions of the drywell shell. | by work order R2097321-01 on Nov 1 and Oct 29, respectively. The reports | ||
Prior to the period of extended operation | documented visual inspections of the perimeter seal between the concrete floor curb | ||
and two refueling | and the drywell steel shell, at the floor elevation 10 foot. In addition, the inspector | ||
outages later.The inspectors | reviewed selected photographs taken during the inspection | ||
observed non-destructive | b. Observations | ||
examination (NDE) activities | None. | ||
and reviewed UT examination | 3.10 One Time Inspection ProQram | ||
records. The inspectors compared | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
UT data results to licensee established | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 24, One Time Inspection Program, stated: | ||
acceptance | The One-Time Inspection program will provide reasonable assurance that an | ||
criteria in Specification | aging effect is not occurring, or that the aging effect is occurring slowly enough | ||
IS-318227-004, revision 14, "Functional | to not affect the component or structure intended function during the period of | ||
Requirements | extended operation, and therefore will not require additional aging management. | ||
for Drywell Containment | Perform prior to the period of extended operation. | ||
Vessel Thickness | The inspector reviewed the program's sampling basis and sample plan. Also, the | ||
Examinations," and to design analysis values for minimum wall thickness | inspector reviewed ultrasonic test results from selected piping sample locations in the | ||
in calculations C-1302-187-E310-041, revision 0, "Statistical | main steam, spent fuel pool cooling, domestic water, and demineralized water systems. | ||
Analysis of Drywell Vessel Sand Bed Thickness | b. Observations | ||
Data 1992, 1994, 1996, and 2006," and C-1302-187-5320-024, revision 2, "Drywell External UT Evaluation | None. | ||
in the Sand Bed." In addition, the inspectors | 3.11 "B" Isolation Condenser Shell Inspection | ||
reviewed the Technical Evaluations (TEs)associated | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
with the UT data, as follows:* TE 330592.27.42, "2008 Sand Bed UT data -External"* TE 330592.27.45i | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 24, One Time Inspection Program Item (2), stated: | ||
"2008 Drywell UT Data at Elevations | To confirm the effectiveness of the Water Chemistry program to manage the | ||
23 & 71 foot"" TE 330592.27.88, "2008 Drywell Sand Bed UT Data -Internal Grids" The inspectors | loss of material and crack initiation and growth aging effects. A one-time UT | ||
reviewed UT examination | inspection of the "B" Isolation Condenser shell below the waterline will be | ||
records for the following: | conducted looking for pitting corrosion. Perform prior to the period of extended | ||
* Sand bed region elevation, inside | operation. | ||
the drywell" All 10 sand bed bays, drywell external" Various drywell elevations between | The inspector observed NDE examinations of the "B" isolation condenser shell | ||
50 and 87 foot elevations" Transition | performed by work order C2017561-11. The NDE examinations included a visual | ||
weld from bottom to middle | inspection of the shell interior, UT thickness measurements in two locations that were | ||
spherical | |||
plates, inside the drywell* Transition | previously tested in 1996 and 2002, additional UT tests in areas of identified pitting and | ||
weld from 2.625 inch plate to 0.640 inch plate (knuckle area), inside the drywell The inspectors | corrosion, and spark testing of the final interior shell coating. The inspector reviewed | ||
reviewed Exelon UT examination | the UT data records, and compared the UT data results to the established minimum wall | ||
procedures, interviewed | thickness criteria for the isolation condenser shell, and compared the UT data results | ||
with previously UT data measurements from 1996 and 2002 | |||
and recording | b. Observations | ||
of UT data in accordance | None. | ||
with the approved procedures. | 3.12 Periodic Inspections | ||
The inspectors | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
also reviewed NDE technician | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 41, Periodic Inspection Program, stated: | ||
qualifications | Activities consist of a periodic inspection of selected systems and components to | ||
and certifications. | verify integrity and confirm the absence of identified aging effects. Perform prior | ||
b. Observations | to the period of extended operation. | ||
TEs 330592.27.42, 330592.27.45, and 330592.27.88 | The inspectors observed the following activities: | ||
determined | * Condensate system pipe expansion joint inspection | ||
the UT thickness values satisfied | * 4160 V Bus 1C switchgear fire barrier penetration inspection | ||
the general uniform minimum wall thickness | b. Observations | ||
criteria (e.g., average | None. | ||
thickness | 3.13 Circulatinq Water Intake Tunnel & Expansion Joint Inspection | ||
of an area) and the locally thinned minimum wall thickness | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
criteria (e.g., areas 2 inches or less in diameter), as applicable. | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 31, Structures Monitoring Program Enhancement (1), | ||
For UT data sets, such as 7x7 arrays (i.e., 49 UT readings in a 6 inch by 6 inch grid), the TEs calculated | stated: | ||
statistical | Buildings, structural components and commodities that are not in scope of | ||
parameters | maintenance rule but have been determined to be in the scope of license | ||
renewal. Perform prior to the period of extended operation. | |||
the data sets had a normal distribution. | On Oct. 29, the inspector directly observed the conduct of a structural engineering | ||
The TEs also compared | inspection of the circulating water intake tunnel, including reinforced concrete wall and | ||
the data set values to the corresponding | floor slabs, steel liners, embedded steel pipe sleeves, butterfly isolation valves, and | ||
2006 values and concluded | tunnel expansion joints. The inspection was conducted by a qualified structural | ||
there were no significant | engineer. After the inspection was completed, the inspector compared his direct | ||
differences | observations with the documented visual inspection results. | ||
and no observable | b. Observations | ||
on-going corrosion. | |||
3.9 Moisture Barrier Seal Inspection (inside | None. | ||
drywell)a. Scope of Inspection | 3.14 Buried Emerqency Service Water Pipe Replacement | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 63, Buried Piping, stated: | ||
IWE Enhancement | Replace the previously un-replaced, buried safety-related emergency service | ||
(17), stated: | water piping prior to the period of extended operation. Perform prior to the | ||
Perform visual | period of extended operation. | ||
inspection | The inspectors observed the following activities, performed by work order C2017279: | ||
of the moisture barrier | * Field work to remove old pipe and install new pipe | ||
seal between the drywell shell and the concrete | * Foreign material exclusion (FME) controls | ||
floor curb, installed | * External protective pipe coating, and controls to ensure the pipe installation | ||
inside the drywell during the October 2006 refueling | activities would not result in damage to the pipe coating | ||
outage, in accordance | b. Observations | ||
with ASME Code.The inspector | None. | ||
reviewed structural inspection | 3.15 Electrical Cable Inspection inside Drywell | ||
reports 187-001 and 187-002, performed by work order R2097321-01 | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
on Nov 1 and Oct 29, respectively. | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 34, Electrical Cables and Connections, stated: | ||
The reports documented | A representative sample of accessible cables and connections located in | ||
visual inspections | adverse localized environments will be visually inspected at least once every 10 | ||
of the perimeter | years for indications of accelerated insulation aging. Perform prior to the period | ||
seal between the concrete floor curb and the drywell steel shell, at the floor elevation | of extended operation. | ||
10 foot. In addition, the inspector | The inspector accompanied electrical technicians and an electrical design engineer | ||
reviewed selected photographs | during a visual inspection of selected electrical cables in the drywell. The inspector | ||
taken during the inspection | observed the pre-job brief which discussed inspection techniques and acceptance | ||
b. Observations | criteria. The inspector directly observed the visual inspection, which included cables in | ||
None.3.10 One Time Inspection | raceways, as well as cables and connections inside junction boxes. After the inspection | ||
was completed, the inspector compared his direct observations with the documented | |||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | visual inspection results. | ||
Item 24, One Time Inspection | b. Observations | ||
Program, stated: The One-Time Inspection | None. | ||
program will provide reasonable | 3.16 Drywell Shell Internal Coatinqs Inspection (inside drywell) | ||
assurance | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
is not occurring, or that the aging effect is occurring | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 33, Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance | ||
slowly enough to not affect the component or structure | Program, stated: | ||
intended function during the period of extended operation, and therefore | The program provides for aging management of Service Level I coatings inside | ||
will not require additional | the primary containment, in accordance with ASME Code. | ||
aging management. | The inspector reviewed a vendor memorandum which summarized inspection findings | ||
Perform prior to the period of extended operation. | for a coating inspection of the as-found condition of the ASME Service Level I coating of | ||
The inspector | the drywell shell inner surface. In addition, the inspector reviewed selected photographs | ||
reviewed the program's | taken during the coating inspection and the initial assessment and disposition of | ||
sampling basis and sample | identified coating deficiencies. The coating inspector was also interviewed. The coating | ||
plan. Also, the inspector | inspection was conducted on Oct. 30, by a qualified ANSI Level III coating inspector. | ||
reviewed ultrasonic | The final detailed report, with specific elevation notes and photographs, was not | ||
test results from selected piping sample locations | available at the time the inspector left the site. | ||
in the main steam, spent | b. Observations | ||
fuel pool cooling, domestic water, and demineralized | None. | ||
water systems.b. Observations | 3.17 Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cable Test | ||
None.3.11 "B" Isolation | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
Condenser | Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 36, Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables, stated: | ||
Shell Inspection | Cable circuits will be tested using a proven test for detecting deterioration of the | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | insulation system due to wetting, such as power factor or partial discharge. | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | Perform prior to the period of extended operation. | ||
Item 24, One Time Inspection | The inspector observed field testing activities for the 4 kV feeder cable from the auxiliary | ||
Program Item (2), stated: To confirm the effectiveness | transformer secondary to Bank 4 switchgear and independently reviewed the test | ||
of the Water Chemistry | results. A Doble and power factor test of the transformer, with the cable connected to | ||
program to manage the loss of material and crack initiation | the transformer secondary, was performed, in part, to detect deterioration of the cable | ||
and growth aging effects. A one-time UT inspection | insulation. The inspector also compared the current test results to previous test results | ||
of the "B" Isolation | from 2002. In addition, the inspector interviewed plant electrical engineering and | ||
Condenser shell below | maintenance personnel. | ||
the waterline | b. Observations | ||
will be conducted | None. | ||
looking for pitting corrosion. | 3.18 Fatigue Monitoring Program | ||
Perform prior to the period of extended operation. | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
The inspector | xxx what about SER Supplement 1 | ||
observed NDE examinations | |||
of the "B" isolation | On the basis of a projection of the number of design transients, the licensee concluded, during | ||
condenser | the license renewal application process, the existing fatigue analyses of the RCS components | ||
remain valid for the extended period of operation (See NRC Safety Evaluation Report NUREG | |||
by work order C2017561-11. The | 1728 Section 4.3). Constellation however indicated that, prior to the expiration of the current | ||
NDE examinations | operating license, a Fatigue Monitoring Program will be implemented as a confirmatory program | ||
included a visual inspection | as discussed in Section B.3.2 of their original license renewal application. | ||
of the shell interior, UT thickness | The licensee proposed using the Fatigue Monitoring Program to provide assurance that the | ||
measurements | number of design cycles will not be exceeded during the period of extended operation. It was | ||
in two locations | on this basis that the staff found licensee's Fatigue Monitoring Program provided an acceptable | ||
that were | basis for monitoring the fatigue usage of reactor coolant system components, in accordance | ||
previously | with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii). | ||
tested in 1996 and 2002, additional | Subsequent to the application, the NRC staff became aware of a simplified assumption used in | ||
UT tests in areas of identified | the EPRI program for fatigue monitoring called FatiguePro. The inspector reviewed the current | ||
pitting and corrosion, and spark testing of the final interior shell coating. The inspector | status of the fatigue monitoring program for the licensee. The inspector also determined if the | ||
computational shortcut was present in the program and what response the licensee was | |||
minimum wall thickness | planning to the NRC's concern that the simplified assumption might result in a non-conservative | ||
criteria for the isolation | prognosis of fatigue. The inspector interviewed the responsible engineer staff and reviewed the | ||
condenser | results of the fatigue program in place at the facility. The inspector reviewed the procedures | ||
shell, and compared the UT data results with previously | and computational methodology to determine the status of current fatigue limits on reactor | ||
UT data measurements | coolant system components. | ||
from 1996 and 2002 b. Observations | b. Observations | ||
None.3.12 Periodic Inspections | None. | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | 4. Commitment Management Program | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | a. Scope of Inspection | ||
Item 41, Periodic Inspection | The inspectors evaluated Exelon procedures used to manage and revise regulatory | ||
Program, stated: Activities | commitments to determine whether they were consistent with the requirements of 10 | ||
consist of a periodic inspection | CFR 50.59, NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, "Managing Regulatory | ||
of selected systems and components | Commitments," and the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04, "Guidelines | ||
for Managing NRC Commitment Changes." In addition, the inspectors reviewed the | |||
and confirm the absence of identified | procedures to assess whether adequate administrative controls were in-place to ensure | ||
aging effects. Perform prior to the period of extended operation. | commitment revisions or the elimination of commitments altogether would be properly | ||
The inspectors | evaluated, approved, and annually reported to the NRC. The inspectors also reviewed | ||
observed the following | AmerGen's current licensing basis commitment tracking program to evaluate its | ||
activities: | effectiveness. In addition, the following commitment change evaluation packages were | ||
* Condensate | reviewed: | ||
system pipe expansion | " Commitment Change 08-003, OC Bolting Integrity Program | ||
joint inspection | * Commitment Change 08-004, RPV Axial Weld Examination Relief | ||
* 4160 V Bus 1C switchgear | b. Observations | ||
fire barrier penetration | |||
inspection | xxx describe factual detail of changes and explain basis to NOT notify NRC staff | ||
b. Observations | None. | ||
None.3.13 Circulatinq | 40A6 Meetin-gs, Includinq Exit Meeting | ||
Water Intake Tunnel & Expansion Joint Inspection | Exit Meeting Summary | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | xxx ADD ADAMS # for Exit Notes | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | The inspectors presented the results of this inspection to Mr. T. Rausch, Site Vice | ||
Item 31, Structures | President, Mr. M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal, and other members of | ||
Monitoring | AmerGen's staff on December 23, 2008. NRC Exit Notes from the exit meeting are | ||
Program Enhancement | located in ADAMS within package MLxxxx. | ||
(1), stated: Buildings, structural | No proprietary information is present in this inspection report. | ||
components | |||
and commodities | A-1 | ||
that are not in scope of maintenance | ATTACHMENT | ||
rule but have been determined | SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION | ||
to be in the scope of | KEY POINTS OF CONTACT | ||
prior to the period of extended operation. | Licensee Personnel | ||
On Oct. 29, the inspector | C. Albert, Site License Renewal | ||
directly observed the conduct | J. Cavallo, Corrosion Control Consultants & labs, Inc. | ||
of a structural | M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal | ||
engineering | C. Hawkins, NDE Level III Technician | ||
inspection | J. Hufnagel, Exelon License Renewal | ||
of the circulating | J. Kandasamy, Manager Regulatory Affairs | ||
water intake tunnel, including | S. Kim, Structural Engineer | ||
reinforced | R. McGee, Site License Renewal | ||
concrete wall and floor slabs, steel liners, embedded steel pipe sleeves, butterfly isolation | F. Polaski, Exelon License Renewal | ||
valves, and tunnel expansion | R. Pruthi, Electrical Design Engineer | ||
joints. The inspection | S. Schwartz, System Engineer | ||
was conducted | P. Tamburro, Site License Renewal Lead | ||
by a qualified | C. Taylor, Regulatory Affairs | ||
structural | NRC Personnel | ||
engineer. | S. Pindale, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek | ||
After the inspection was completed, the | J. Kulp, Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek | ||
inspector | L. Regner, License Renewal Project Manager, NRR | ||
compared his direct observations | D. Pelton, Chief - License Renewal Projects Branch 1 | ||
with the documented | M. Baty, Counsel for NRC Staff | ||
visual inspection | J. Davis, Senior Materials Engineer, NRR | ||
results.b. Observations | Observers | ||
None.3.14 Buried Emerqency | R. Pinney, State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection | ||
Service Water Pipe Replacement | R. Zak, State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection | ||
a. Scope of Inspection | M. Fallin, Constellation License Renewal Manager | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | R. Leski, Nine Mile Point License Renewal Manager | ||
Item 63, Buried Piping, stated: Replace the previously | |||
un-replaced, buried safety-related | A-2 | ||
emergency | LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED | ||
Opened/Closed | |||
Perform prior to the period of extended operation. | None. | ||
The inspectors | Opened | ||
observed the following | 05000219/2008007-01 URI xxx | ||
activities, performed | Closed | ||
by work order C2017279: | None. | ||
* Field work to remove old pipe and install new pipe* Foreign material exclusion (FME) controls* External protective | |||
pipe coating, and controls to ensure the pipe installation | E | ||
activities | A-3 | ||
would not result in | LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | ||
damage to the pipe coating b. Observations | License Renewal Program Documents | ||
None.3.15 Electrical | PP-09, Inspection Sample Basis for the One-Time Inspection AMP, Rev 0 | ||
Cable Inspection | Drawings | ||
inside Drywell a. Scope of Inspection | Plant Procedures | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | LS-AA-104-1002, 50.59 Applicability Review, Rev 3 | ||
Item 34, Electrical Cables and Connections, stated: A representative sample | LS-AA- 110, Commitment Change management, Rev 6 | ||
of accessible | 645.6.017, Fire Barrier Penetration Surveillance, Rev 13 | ||
cables and connections | Condition Reports (CRs) | ||
located in adverse localized | * = CRs written as a result of the NRC inspection | ||
environments | 00804754 | ||
will be visually inspected | Maintenance Requests & Work Orders | ||
at least once every 10 years for indications | C20117279 | ||
of accelerated | Nondestructive Examination Records | ||
insulation aging. Perform | NDE Data Report 2008-007-017 | ||
prior to the period of extended operation. | NDE Data Report 2008-007-030 | ||
The inspector | NDE Data Report 2008-007-031 | ||
accompanied | UT Data Sheet 21 R056 | ||
electrical | Miscellaneous Documents | ||
technicians | NRC Documents | ||
and an electrical | Industry Documents | ||
design engineer during a visual inspection | *= documents referenced within NUREG-1801 as providing acceptable guidance for specific | ||
of selected electrical | aging management programs | ||
cables in the drywell. The inspector observed the pre-job brief which discussed | |||
inspection | 4, | ||
techniques | A | ||
and acceptance | A-4 | ||
criteria. | |||
The inspector | A-5 | ||
directly observed the visual inspection, which included cables in raceways, as well as cables and connections inside junction | LIST OF ACRONYMS | ||
boxes. After the inspection | EPRI Electric Power Research Institute | ||
was completed, the inspector | NDE Non-destructive Examination | ||
compared his direct observations | NEI Nuclear Energy Institute | ||
with the documented | SSC Systems, Structures, and Components | ||
visual inspection | SDP Significance Determination Process | ||
results.b. Observations | TR Technical Report | ||
None.3.16 Drywell Shell Internal Coatinqs Inspection (inside drywell)a. Scope of Inspection | UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report | ||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | |||
Item 33, Protective | |||
Coating Monitoring | |||
and Maintenance | |||
Program, stated: The program provides for aging management | |||
of Service Level I coatings inside the primary containment, in accordance | |||
with ASME Code.The inspector | |||
reviewed a vendor memorandum | |||
which summarized | |||
inspection | |||
of the as-found condition | |||
of the ASME Service Level I coating of the drywell shell inner surface. In addition, the inspector | |||
reviewed selected photographs | |||
taken during the coating inspection | |||
and the initial assessment | |||
and disposition | |||
coating deficiencies. | |||
The coating inspector | |||
was also interviewed. | |||
The coating inspection | |||
was conducted | |||
on Oct. 30, by a qualified | |||
ANSI Level III coating inspector. | |||
The final detailed report, with specific elevation | |||
notes and photographs, was not available | |||
at the time the inspector | |||
left the site.b. Observations | |||
None.3.17 Inaccessible | |||
Medium Voltage Cable Test a. Scope of Inspection | |||
Proposed SER Appendix-A | |||
Item 36, Inaccessible | |||
Medium Voltage Cables, stated: Cable circuits will be tested using a proven test for detecting | |||
deterioration | |||
of the insulation | |||
system due to wetting, such as power factor or partial | |||
discharge. | |||
Perform prior to the period of extended operation.The inspector | |||
observed field testing activities | |||
for the 4 kV feeder cable from the auxiliary transformer | |||
secondary | |||
to Bank 4 switchgear | |||
and independently | |||
reviewed the test results. A Doble and power factor | |||
test of the transformer, with the cable connected | |||
secondary, was performed, in part, to detect deterioration | |||
of the cable insulation. | |||
The inspector | |||
also compared the current test results to previous test results from 2002. In addition, the inspector | |||
interviewed | |||
plant electrical engineering and | |||
maintenance | |||
personnel. | |||
b. Observations | |||
None.3.18 Fatigue Monitoring | |||
xxx what about SER Supplement | |||
On the basis of a projection | |||
of the number of design transients, the licensee concluded, during the license renewal application | |||
process, the existing fatigue analyses of the RCS components | |||
remain valid for the extended period of operation (See NRC Safety Evaluation | |||
Report NUREG 1728 Section 4.3). Constellation | |||
however indicated | |||
that, prior to the expiration | |||
of the current operating | |||
license, a Fatigue Monitoring | |||
Program will be implemented | |||
as a confirmatory | |||
in Section B.3.2 of their original license renewal application. | |||
The licensee proposed using the Fatigue Monitoring | |||
Program to provide assurance | |||
that the number of design cycles will not be exceeded during the period of extended operation. | |||
It was on this basis that the staff found licensee's | |||
Fatigue Monitoring | |||
Program provided an acceptable | |||
basis for monitoring | |||
the fatigue usage of reactor coolant system components, in accordance | |||
with the requirements | |||
of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii). | |||
Subsequent | |||
to the application, the NRC staff became aware of a simplified | |||
assumption | |||
used in the EPRI program for fatigue monitoring | |||
called FatiguePro. | |||
The inspector | |||
reviewed the current status of the fatigue monitoring | |||
program for the licensee. | |||
The inspector | |||
also determined | |||
if the computational | |||
shortcut was present in the program and what response the licensee was planning to the NRC's concern that the simplified | |||
assumption | |||
might result in a non-conservative | |||
prognosis | |||
of fatigue. The | |||
inspector | |||
interviewed | |||
the responsible | |||
engineer staff and reviewed the results of the fatigue program in place at the facility. | |||
The inspector | |||
reviewed the procedures | |||
and computational | |||
methodology | |||
to determine | |||
the status of current fatigue limits on reactor coolant system components. | |||
b. Observations | |||
None.4. Commitment | |||
Management | |||
The inspectors evaluated | |||
Exelon procedures | |||
used to manage and revise regulatory | |||
commitments | |||
to determine | |||
whether they were consistent | |||
with the requirements | |||
of 10 CFR 50.59, NRC Regulatory Issue Summary | |||
2000-17, "Managing | |||
Regulatory | |||
Commitments," and the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04, "Guidelines | |||
for Managing NRC Commitment | |||
Changes." In addition, the inspectors | |||
reviewed the procedures | |||
to assess whether adequate administrative | |||
controls were in-place to ensure commitment | |||
revisions | |||
or the elimination | |||
of commitments | |||
altogether | |||
would be properly evaluated, approved, and annually reported to the NRC. The inspectors also | |||
current licensing | |||
basis commitment | |||
tracking program to evaluate its effectiveness. | |||
In addition, the following | |||
commitment | |||
change evaluation | |||
packages were reviewed: " Commitment | |||
Change 08-003, OC Bolting Integrity | |||
Change 08-004, RPV Axial Weld Examination | |||
xxx describe factual detail of changes and explain basis to NOT notify | |||
NRC staff None.40A6 Meetin-gs, Includinq | |||
Exit Meeting Exit Meeting Summary xxx ADD ADAMS # for Exit Notes The inspectors | |||
presented | |||
the results of this inspection | |||
to Mr. T. Rausch, Site Vice President, Mr. M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal, and other members of AmerGen's | |||
staff on December 23, 2008. NRC Exit Notes from the exit meeting are located in ADAMS within | |||
package MLxxxx.No proprietary | |||
information | |||
is present in this inspection | |||
report. | |||
A-1 ATTACHMENT | |||
SUPPLEMENTAL | |||
INFORMATION | |||
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel C. Albert, Site License Renewal J. Cavallo, Corrosion | |||
Control Consultants | |||
& labs, Inc.M. Gallagher, Vice President | |||
License Renewal C. Hawkins, NDE Level | |||
III Technician | |||
J. Hufnagel, Exelon License Renewal J. Kandasamy, Manager Regulatory | |||
License Renewal F. Polaski, Exelon License Renewal R. Pruthi, Electrical | |||
Design Engineer S. Schwartz, System Engineer P. Tamburro, Site License Renewal Lead C. Taylor, Regulatory | |||
Inspector, Oyster Creek J. Kulp, Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek L. Regner, License Renewal Project Manager, NRR D. Pelton, Chief -License Renewal Projects Branch 1 M. Baty, Counsel for NRC Staff J. Davis, Senior Materials | |||
Engineer, NRR Observers R. Pinney, State of New Jersey Department | |||
of Environmental | |||
Protection | |||
R. Zak, State of New Jersey Department | |||
of Environmental | |||
Protection | |||
M. Fallin, Constellation License | |||
Renewal Manager R. Leski, Nine | |||
Mile Point License Renewal Manager | |||
A-2 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened/Closed | |||
None.Opened 05000219/2008007-01 | |||
URI xxx Closed None. | |||
E A-3 LIST OF DOCUMENTS | |||
Sample Basis for the One-Time Inspection | |||
AMP, Rev 0 Drawings Plant Procedures | |||
LS-AA-104-1002, 50.59 Applicability | |||
Review, Rev 3 LS-AA- 110, Commitment | |||
Change management, Rev 6 645.6.017, Fire Barrier Penetration | |||
Surveillance, Rev 13 Condition | |||
Reports (CRs)* = CRs written as a result of the NRC inspection | |||
00804754 Maintenance | |||
Requests & Work Orders C20117279 Nondestructive | |||
Examination | |||
NDE Data Report 2008-007-030 | |||
NDE Data Report 2008-007-031 | |||
UT Data Sheet 21 R056 Miscellaneous | |||
referenced | |||
within NUREG-1801 | |||
as providing | |||
acceptable | |||
guidance for specific aging management | |||
4, A A-4 | |||
A-5 LIST OF ACRONYMS EPRI Electric Power Research Institute NDE Non-destructive | |||
Examination | |||
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute SSC Systems, Structures, and Components | |||
SDP Significance | |||
Determination | |||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 05:07, 14 November 2019
ML091980359 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Oyster Creek |
Issue date: | 06/17/2009 |
From: | Conte R Engineering Region 1 Branch 1 |
To: | Pardee C Exelon Generation Co |
References | |
FOIA/PA-2009-0070 IR-08-007 | |
Download: ML091980359 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000219/2008007
Text
Mr. Charles G. Pardee
Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) and Senior Vice President
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
200 Exelon Way
Kennett Square, PA 19348
SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC LICENSE RENEWAL
FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2008007
Dear Mr. Pardee
On December 23, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed report documents the
inspection results, which were discussed on December 23, 2008, with Mr. T. Rausch, Site Vice
President, Mr. M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal, and other members of your staff
in a telephone conference observed by representatives from the State of New Jersey.
An appeal of a licensing board decision regarding the Oyster Creek application for a renewed
license is pending before the Commission. The NRC concluded Oyster Creek should not enter
the extended period of operation without directly observing continuing license renewal activities
at Oyster Creek. Therefore, the NRC performed an inspection using Inspection Procedure (IP)
71003 "Post-Approval Site Inspection'for License Renewal" and observed Oyster Creek license
renewal activities during the last refuel outage prior to entering the period of extended
operation.
IP 71003 verifies license conditions added as part of a renewed license, license renewal
commitments, selected aging management programs, and license renewal commitments
revised after the renewed license was granted, are implemented in accordance with Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Pert 54 "Reouirements for the Renewal of Ooeratino
Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants."E (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5) 'The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed
activities, and interviewed personnel. The enclosed report records the inspector's observations,
absent any conclusions of adequacy, pending the final decision of the Commissioners on the
appeal of the renewed license.
o WMthf Freedompo Inftomutl
_______. -______/t-
P
C. Pardee 3
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/readincq-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at (610) 337-5183 if you have any
questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,
Richard Conte, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 50-219
License No. DPR-16
Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000219/2008007
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
C. Pardee 4
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system
(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at (610) 337-5183 if you have any
questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,
Richard Conte, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 50-219
License No. DPR-16
Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000219/2008007
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
SUNSI Review Complete: _ (Reviewer's Initials)
ADAMS ACCESSION NO.
DOCUMENT NAME: C:\Doc\_.OC LRI 2008-07\_. Report\OC 2008-07 LRIrev-3.doc
After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure
"E"= Copy with attachment/enclosure
"N" = No copy
OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS
NAME JRichmond/ RConte/ RBellamy/ DRoberts/
DATE //09 /09 / /09 / /09
OFF FIAL RErORD7PY
C. Pardee 3
Distribution w/encl:
C. Pardee
Distribution w/encl: (VIA E-MAIL)
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket No.: 50-219
License No.: DPR-16
Report No.: 05000219/2008007
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: Oyster Creek Generating Station
Location: Forked River, New Jersey
Dates: October 27 to November 7, 2008 (on-site inspection activities)
November 13, 15, and 17, 2008 (on-site inspection activities)
November 10 to December 23, 2008 (in-office review)
Inspectors: J. Richmond, Lead
M. Modes, Senior Reactor Engineer
G. Meyer, Senior Reactor Engineer
T. O'Hara, Reactor Inspector
J. Heinly, Reactor Engineer
J. Kulp, Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
Approved by: Richard Conte, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
ii
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000219/2008007; 10/27/2008 - 12/23/2008; Exelon, LLC, Oyster Creek
Generating Station; License Renewal Follow-up
The report covers a multi-week inspection of license renewal follow-up items. It was conducted
by five region based engineering inspectors and the Oyster Creek resident inspector. The
inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71003 "Post-Approval Site
Insiection for License Renewal.'" (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5) "1The report documents the inspector observations, absent any conclusions OT
adequac7, pending the final decision of the Commissioners on the appeal of the renewed
license.
2
REPORT DETAILS
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 License Renewal Follow-up (IP 71003)
1. Inspection Sample Selection Process
This inspection was conducted in order to observe AmerGen's continuing license
renewal activities during the last refueling outage prior to Oyster Creek (OC) entering
the extended period of operation. The inspection team selected a number of inspection
samples for review, using the NRC accepted guidance based on their importance in the
license renewal aq.lication Drocess, as an opportunity to make observations on license
renewal activities.L. (b)(5)
(b)(5)
Accordingly, the inspectors recorded observations, without any assessment of
implementation adequacy or safety significance. Inspection observations were
considered, in light of pending 10 CFR 54 license renewal commitments and license
conditions, as documented in NUREG-1875, "Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Related
to the License Renewal of Oyster Creek Generating Station," as well as programmatic
performance under on-going implementation of 10 CFR 50 current licensing basis (CLB)
requirements.
The reviewed SER proposed commitments and license conditions were selected based
on several attributes including: the risk significance using insights gained from sources
such as the NRC's "Significance Determination Process Risk Informed Inspection
Notebooks," revision 2; the extent and results of previous license renewal audits and
inspections of aging management programs; the extent or complexity of a commitment;
and the extent that baseline inspection programs will inspect a system, structure, or
component (SSC), or commodity group.
For each commitment and on a sampling basis, the inspectors reviewed supporting
documents including completed surveillances, conducted interviews, performed visual
inspection of structures and components including those not accessible during power
operation, and observed selected activities described below. The inspectors also
reviewed selected corrective actions taken as a consequence of previous license
renewal inspections.
At the time of the inspection, AmerGen Energy Company, LLC was the licensee for
Oyster Creek Generating Station. As of January 8, 2009, the OC license was
transferred to Exelon Generating Company, LLC by license amendment No. 271
(ML082750072).
2. NRC Unresolved Item
e Observed actions to evaluate primary containment structural integrity
10 CFR 50 existing requirements (e.g., current licensing basis (CLB)
xxx USE words from PN
- The conclusions of PNO-1-08-012 remain unchanged
" An Unresolved Item (URI) will be opened to evaluate whether existing current licensing basis
commitments were adequately performed and, if necessary, assess the safety significance for
any related performance deficiency.
e The issues for follow-up include the strippable coating de-lamination, reactor cavity trough
drain monitoring, and sand bed drain monitoring.
- The commitment tracking, implementation, and work control processes will be reviewed,
based on corrective actions resulting from AmerGen's review of deficiencies and operating
experience, as a Part 50 activity.
3. Detailed Reviews
3.1 Reactor Refuel Cavity Liner Strippable Coating
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement
(2), stated:
A strippable coating will be applied to the reactor cavity liner to prevent water
intrusion into the gap between the drywell shield wall and the drywell shell during
periods when the reactor cavity is flooded. Refueling outages prior to and during
the period of extended operation.
The inspector reviewed work order R2098682-06, "Coating application to cavity walls
and floors."
b. Observations
From Oct. 29 to Nov. 6, the strippable coating limited leakage into the cavity trough
drain at less than 1 gallon per minute (gpm). On Nov. 6, the observed leakage rate in
the cavity trough drain took a step change to 4 to 6 gpm. Water puddles were
subsequently identified in 4 sand bed bays. AmerGen stated follow-up UTs would be
performed to evaluate the drywell shell during the next refuel outage. AmerGen
identified several likely or contributing causes, including:
9 A portable water filtration unit was improperly placed in the reactor cavity,
which resulted in flow discharged directly on the strippable coating.
" An oil spill into the cavity may have affected the coating integrity.
- No post installation inspection of the coating had been performed.
3.2 Reactor Refuel Cavity Seal Leakage Trbuqh Drain Monitoring
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement
(3), stated:
The reactor cavity seal leakage trough drains and the drywell sand bed region
drains will be monitored for leakage. Periodically.
Reactor refuel cavity seal leakage is collected in a concrete trough and gravity drains
through a 2 inch drain line into a plant drain system funnel. AmerGen monitored the
cavity seal leakage daily by monitoring the flow in the trough drain line.
The inspectors independently checked the trough drain flow immediately after the
reactor cavity was filled, and several times throughout the outage. The inspectors also
reviewed the written monitoring logs.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed AmerGen's cavity trough drain flow monitoring plan
and pre-approved Action Plan. AmerGen had established an administrative limit of 12
gpm.on the cavity trough drain flow, based on a calculation which indicated that cavity
trough drain flow of less than 60 gpm would not result in trough overflow into the gap
between the drywell concrete shield wall and the drywell steel shell.
b. Observations
On Oct. 27, the cavity trough drain line, was isolated to install a tygon hose to allow drain
flow to be monitored. On Oct. 28, the reactor cavity was filled. Drain line flow was
monitored frequently during cavity flood-up, and daily thereafter. On Oct. 29, a
boroscope examination of the drain line identified that the isolation valve had been left
closed. When the drain line isolation valve was opened, about 3 gallons of water
drained out, then the drain flow subsided to about an 1/8 inch stream (less than 1 gpm).
On Nov. 6, the reactor cavity liner strippable coating started to de-laminate. The cavity
trough drain flow took a step change from less than, 1 gpm to approximately 4 to 6 gpm.
AmerGen increased monitoring of the trough drain to every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and sand bed poly
bottles to every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. On Nov. 8, NDE technicians inside sand bed bay 11 identified
dripping water. Subsequently, water puddles were identified in 4 sand bed bays. After
the cavity was drained, all sand bed bays were inspected; no deficiencies identified.
The sand bed bays were originally scheduled to have been closed by Nov. 2. In
addition, on Nov. 15, after cavity was drained, water was found in the sand bed bay 11
poly bottle.
The inspectors observed that AmerGen's pre-approved action plan was inconsistent with
the actual actions taken in response to increased cavity seal leakage. The plan did not
direct increased sand bed poly bottle monitoring, and would not have required a sand
bed entry or inspection until Nov 15, when water was first found in a poly bottle. The
pre-approved action plan directed:
- If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 5 gpm, then increase monitoring of the
cavity drain flow from daily to every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
- If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 12 gpm, then increase monitoring of the
sand bed poly bottles from daily to every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
- If the cavity trough drain flow exceeds 12 gpm and any water is found in a
sand bed poly bottle, then enter and inspect the sand bed bays.
3.3 Drywell Sand Bed Region Drains Monitoring
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement
(3), stated:
The sand bed region drains will be monitored daily during refueling outages.
There is one drain line for each two sand bed bays (five drains total). A poly bottle was
attached via tygon tubing to a funnel hung below each drain line. AmerGen performed
the drain line monitoring by checking the poly bottles.
The inspectors independently checked the poly bottles during the outage, and
accompanied AmerGen personnel during routine daily checks. The inspectors also
reviewed the written monitoring logs.
b. Observations
The sand bed drains were not directly observed and were not visible from the outer area
of the torus room, where the poly bottles were located. After the reactor cavity was
drained, 2 of the 5 tygon tubes were found disconnected, laying on the floor. In
addition, sand bed bay 11 drain poly bottle was empty during each daily check until Nov.
15 (cavity was drained on Nov 12), when it was found full (greater than 4 gallons). Bay
11 was entered within a few hours, visually inspected, and found dry.
3.4 Reactor Cavity Trouqh Drain Inspection for Blockage
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement
(13), stated:
The reactor cavity concrete trough drain will be verified to be clear from blockage
once per refueling cycle. Any identified issues will be addressed via the
corrective action process. Once per refueling cycle.
The inspector reviewed a video recording record of a boroscope inspection of the cavity
trough drain line.
b. Observations
See observations in section 2.4 below.
3.5 Moisture Barrier Seal Inspection (inside sand bed bays)
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements
(12 & 21), stated:
Inspect the [moisture barrier] seal at the junction between the sand bed region
concrete [sand bed floor] and the embedded drywell shell. During the 2008
refueling outage and every other refueling outage thereafter.
The inspectors directly observed as-found conditions of the moisture barrier seal in 5
sand bed bays, and as-left conditions in 3 sand bed bays. The inspectors reviewed VT
examination records for each sand bed bay, and compared their direct observations to
the recorded VT examination results. The inspectors reviewed Exelon VT examination
procedures, interviewed nondestructive examination (NDE) technicians, and reviewed
NDE technician qualifications and certifications.
The inspectors observed AmerGen's activities to evaluate and repair the moisture
barrier seal in sand bed bay 3.
b. Observations
The VT examinations identified moisture barrier seal deficiencies in 7 of the 10 sand bed
bays, including surface cracks and partial separation of the seal from the steel shell or
concrete floor. All deficiencies were entered into the corrective action program and
evaluated. AmerGen determined the as-found moisture barrier function was not
impaired, because no cracks or separation fully penetrated the seal. All deficiencies
were repaired.
The VT examination for sand bed bay 3 identified a seal crack and a surface rust stains
below the crack. When the seal was excavated, some drywell shell surface corrosion
was identified. A laboratory analysis of removed seal material determined the epoxy
seal material had not adequately cured, and concluded it was an original 1992
installation issue. The seal crack and surface rust were repaired.
The inspectors compared the 2008 VT results to the 2006 results and noted that in 2006
no deficiencies were identified.
3.6 Drywell Shell External CoatinQs Inspection (inside sand bed bays)
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements
(4 & 21), stated:
Perform visual inspections of the drywell external shell epoxy coating in all 10
sand bed bays. During the 2008 refueling outage and every other refueling
outage thereafter,
AmerGen performed a 100% visual inspection of the epoxy coating in the sand bed
region (total of 10 bays). The inspectors directly observed as-found conditions of the
epoxy coating in 7 sand bed bays, and the as-left condition in sand bed bay 11, after
coating repairs. The inspectors reviewed VT examination records for each sand bed
bay, and compared their direct observations to the recorded VT examination results.
The inspectors reviewed Exelon VT examination procedures, interviewed nondestructive
examination (NDE) technicians, and reviewed NDE technician qualifications and
certifications.
The inspectors directly observed AmerGen's activities to evaluate and repair the epoxy
coating in sand bed bay 11.
b. Observations
In bay 11, AmerGen identified one small broken blister, about 1/4 inch in diameter, with
a 6 inch surface rust stain, dry to the touch, trailing down from the blister. During the
initial investigation, an NRC inspector identified three additional smaller surface
irregularities (initially described as surface bumps) within a 1 to 2 square inch area, near
the broken blister, which were subsequently determined to be unbroken blisters. All four
blisters were evaluated and repaired.
To confirm the adequacy of the initial coating examination, AmerGen re-inspected 4
sand bed bays with a different NDE technician. No additional deficiencies were
identified. A laboratory analysis of the removed blisters determined approximately 0.003
inches of surface corrosion had occurred directly under the broken blister, and
concluded the corrosion had taken place over approximately a 16 year period. UT
dynamic scan thickness measurements from inside the drywell confirmed the drywell
shell had no significant degradation as a result of the corrosion under the four blisters.
During the final closeout of bay 9, AmerGen identified an area approximately 8 inches
by 8 inches where the color of the epoxy coating appeared different than the
surrounding area. Because each of the 3 layers of the epoxy coating is a different color,
AmerGen questioned whether the color difference could have been indicative of an
original installation deficiency. The identified area was re-coated with epoxy.
In follow-up, AmerGen reviewed a 2006 video of the sand beds, which had been made
as a general aid, not as part of an NDE examination. The 2006 video showed the same
6 inch rust stain in bay 11. The inspectors compared the 2008 VT results to the 2006
results and noted that in 2006 no deficiencies were identified.
3.7 Drywell Floor Trench Inspections
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements
(5, 16, & 20), stated:
Perform visual test (VT) and Ultrasonic test (UT) examinations of the drywell shell
inside the drywell floor inspection trenches in bay 5 and bay 17 during the 2008
refueling outage, at the same locations that were examined in 2006. In addition,
monitor the trenches for the presence of water during refueling outages.
The inspectors observed non-destructive examination (NDE) activities and reviewed UT
examination records. In addition, the inspectors directly observed conditions in the
trenches on multiple occasions during the outage. The inspectors compared UT data to
licensee established acceptance criteria in Specification IS-318227-004, revision 14,
"Functional Requirements for Drywell Containment Vessel Thickness Examinations,"
and to design analysis values for minimum wall thickness in calculations C-1302-187-
E310-041, revision 0, "Statistical Analysis of Drywell Sand Bed Thickness Data 1992,
1994, 1996, and 2006," and C-1302-187-5320-024, revision 2, "Drywell External UT
Evaluation in the Sand Bed." In addition, the inspectors reviewed Technical Evaluation
(TE) 330592.27.43, "2008 UT Data of the Sand Bed Trenches,"
The inspectors reviewed Exelon UT examination procedures, interviewed NDE
4
technicians, reviewed NDE technician qualifications and certifications. The inspectors
also reviewed records of trench inspections performed during two non-refueling plant
outages during the last operating cycle.
b. Observations
TE 330592.27.43 determined the UT thickness values satisfied the general uniform
minimum wall thickness criteria (e.g., average thickness of an area) and the locally
thinned minimum wall thickness criteria (e.g., areas 2 inches or less in diameter), as
applicable. For UT data sets, such as 7x7 arrays (i.e., 49 UT readings in a 6 inch by 6
inch grid), the TE calculated statistical parameters and determined the data sets had a
normal distribution. The TE also compared the data set values to the corresponding
2006 values and concluded there were no significant differences and no observable on-
going corrosion.
During two non-refueling plant outages during the last operating cycle, both trenches
were inspected for the presence of water, and found dry.
During the initial drywell entry on Oct. 25, the inspectors observed that both floor
trenches were dry. On subsequent drywell entries for routine inspection activities, the
inspectors also observed the trenches to be dry. During the final drywell closeout
inspection on Nov. 17, the inspectors observed the following:
e Bay 17 trench was dry and had newly installed sealant on the trench edge
where concrete meets shell, and on the floor curb near the trench.
- Bay 5 trench had a few ounces of water in it. The inspector noted that within
the last day there had been several system flushes conducted in the immediate
area. AmerGen stated the trench would be dried prior to final drywell closeout.
- Bay 5 trench had the lower 6 inches of grout re-installed and had newly
installed sealant on the trench edge where concrete meets shell, and on the floor
curb near the trench.
3.8 Drywell Shell Thickness Measurements
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements
(1, 9, 14, and 21), stated:
Perform full scope drywell inspections [in the sand bed region], including UT
thickness measurements of the drywell shell, from inside and outside the drywell.
During the 2008 refueling outage and every other refueling outage thereafter.
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancements
(7, 10, and 11) stated:
Conduct UT thickness measurements in the upper regions of the drywell shell.
Prior to the period of extended operation and two refueling outages later.
The inspectors observed non-destructive examination (NDE) activities and reviewed UT
examination records. The inspectors compared UT data results to licensee established
acceptance criteria in Specification IS-318227-004, revision 14, "Functional
Requirements for Drywell Containment Vessel Thickness Examinations," and to design
analysis values for minimum wall thickness in calculations C-1302-187-E310-041,
revision 0, "Statistical Analysis of Drywell Vessel Sand Bed Thickness Data 1992, 1994,
1996, and 2006," and C-1302-187-5320-024, revision 2, "Drywell External UT Evaluation
in the Sand Bed." In addition, the inspectors reviewed the Technical Evaluations (TEs)
associated with the UT data, as follows:
" TE 330592.27.88, "2008 Drywell Sand Bed UT Data - Internal Grids"
The inspectors reviewed UT examination records for the following:
- Sand bed region elevation, inside the drywell
" All 10 sand bed bays, drywell external
" Various drywell elevations between 50 and 87 foot elevations
" Transition weld from bottom to middle spherical plates, inside the drywell
- Transition weld from 2.625 inch plate to 0.640 inch plate (knuckle area), inside
the drywell
The inspectors reviewed Exelon UT examination procedures, interviewed NDE
supervisors and technicians, and observed field collection and recording of UT data in
accordance with the approved procedures. The inspectors also reviewed NDE
technician qualifications and certifications.
b. Observations
TEs 330592.27.42, 330592.27.45, and 330592.27.88 determined the UT thickness
values satisfied the general uniform minimum wall thickness criteria (e.g., average
thickness of an area) and the locally thinned minimum wall thickness criteria (e.g., areas
2 inches or less in diameter), as applicable. For UT data sets, such as 7x7 arrays (i.e.,
49 UT readings in a 6 inch by 6 inch grid), the TEs calculated statistical parameters and
determined the data sets had a normal distribution. The TEs also compared the data
set values to the corresponding 2006 values and concluded there were no significant
differences and no observable on-going corrosion.
3.9 Moisture Barrier Seal Inspection (inside drywell)
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 27, ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Enhancement
(17), stated:
Perform visual inspection of the moisture barrier seal between the drywell shell
and the concrete floor curb, installed inside the drywell during the October 2006
refueling outage, in accordance with ASME Code.
The inspector reviewed structural inspection reports 187-001 and 187-002, performed
by work order R2097321-01 on Nov 1 and Oct 29, respectively. The reports
documented visual inspections of the perimeter seal between the concrete floor curb
and the drywell steel shell, at the floor elevation 10 foot. In addition, the inspector
reviewed selected photographs taken during the inspection
b. Observations
None.
3.10 One Time Inspection ProQram
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 24, One Time Inspection Program, stated:
The One-Time Inspection program will provide reasonable assurance that an
aging effect is not occurring, or that the aging effect is occurring slowly enough
to not affect the component or structure intended function during the period of
extended operation, and therefore will not require additional aging management.
Perform prior to the period of extended operation.
The inspector reviewed the program's sampling basis and sample plan. Also, the
inspector reviewed ultrasonic test results from selected piping sample locations in the
main steam, spent fuel pool cooling, domestic water, and demineralized water systems.
b. Observations
None.
3.11 "B" Isolation Condenser Shell Inspection
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 24, One Time Inspection Program Item (2), stated:
To confirm the effectiveness of the Water Chemistry program to manage the
loss of material and crack initiation and growth aging effects. A one-time UT
inspection of the "B" Isolation Condenser shell below the waterline will be
conducted looking for pitting corrosion. Perform prior to the period of extended
operation.
The inspector observed NDE examinations of the "B" isolation condenser shell
performed by work order C2017561-11. The NDE examinations included a visual
inspection of the shell interior, UT thickness measurements in two locations that were
previously tested in 1996 and 2002, additional UT tests in areas of identified pitting and
corrosion, and spark testing of the final interior shell coating. The inspector reviewed
the UT data records, and compared the UT data results to the established minimum wall
thickness criteria for the isolation condenser shell, and compared the UT data results
with previously UT data measurements from 1996 and 2002
b. Observations
None.
3.12 Periodic Inspections
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 41, Periodic Inspection Program, stated:
Activities consist of a periodic inspection of selected systems and components to
verify integrity and confirm the absence of identified aging effects. Perform prior
to the period of extended operation.
The inspectors observed the following activities:
- Condensate system pipe expansion joint inspection
- 4160 V Bus 1C switchgear fire barrier penetration inspection
b. Observations
None.
3.13 Circulatinq Water Intake Tunnel & Expansion Joint Inspection
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 31, Structures Monitoring Program Enhancement (1),
stated:
Buildings, structural components and commodities that are not in scope of
maintenance rule but have been determined to be in the scope of license
renewal. Perform prior to the period of extended operation.
On Oct. 29, the inspector directly observed the conduct of a structural engineering
inspection of the circulating water intake tunnel, including reinforced concrete wall and
floor slabs, steel liners, embedded steel pipe sleeves, butterfly isolation valves, and
tunnel expansion joints. The inspection was conducted by a qualified structural
engineer. After the inspection was completed, the inspector compared his direct
observations with the documented visual inspection results.
b. Observations
None.
3.14 Buried Emerqency Service Water Pipe Replacement
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 63, Buried Piping, stated:
Replace the previously un-replaced, buried safety-related emergency service
water piping prior to the period of extended operation. Perform prior to the
period of extended operation.
The inspectors observed the following activities, performed by work order C2017279:
- Field work to remove old pipe and install new pipe
- Foreign material exclusion (FME) controls
- External protective pipe coating, and controls to ensure the pipe installation
activities would not result in damage to the pipe coating
b. Observations
None.
3.15 Electrical Cable Inspection inside Drywell
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 34, Electrical Cables and Connections, stated:
A representative sample of accessible cables and connections located in
adverse localized environments will be visually inspected at least once every 10
years for indications of accelerated insulation aging. Perform prior to the period
of extended operation.
The inspector accompanied electrical technicians and an electrical design engineer
during a visual inspection of selected electrical cables in the drywell. The inspector
observed the pre-job brief which discussed inspection techniques and acceptance
criteria. The inspector directly observed the visual inspection, which included cables in
raceways, as well as cables and connections inside junction boxes. After the inspection
was completed, the inspector compared his direct observations with the documented
visual inspection results.
b. Observations
None.
3.16 Drywell Shell Internal Coatinqs Inspection (inside drywell)
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 33, Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance
Program, stated:
The program provides for aging management of Service Level I coatings inside
the primary containment, in accordance with ASME Code.
The inspector reviewed a vendor memorandum which summarized inspection findings
for a coating inspection of the as-found condition of the ASME Service Level I coating of
the drywell shell inner surface. In addition, the inspector reviewed selected photographs
taken during the coating inspection and the initial assessment and disposition of
identified coating deficiencies. The coating inspector was also interviewed. The coating
inspection was conducted on Oct. 30, by a qualified ANSI Level III coating inspector.
The final detailed report, with specific elevation notes and photographs, was not
available at the time the inspector left the site.
b. Observations
None.
3.17 Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cable Test
a. Scope of Inspection
Proposed SER Appendix-A Item 36, Inaccessible Medium Voltage Cables, stated:
Cable circuits will be tested using a proven test for detecting deterioration of the
insulation system due to wetting, such as power factor or partial discharge.
Perform prior to the period of extended operation.
The inspector observed field testing activities for the 4 kV feeder cable from the auxiliary
transformer secondary to Bank 4 switchgear and independently reviewed the test
results. A Doble and power factor test of the transformer, with the cable connected to
the transformer secondary, was performed, in part, to detect deterioration of the cable
insulation. The inspector also compared the current test results to previous test results
from 2002. In addition, the inspector interviewed plant electrical engineering and
maintenance personnel.
b. Observations
None.
3.18 Fatigue Monitoring Program
a. Scope of Inspection
xxx what about SER Supplement 1
On the basis of a projection of the number of design transients, the licensee concluded, during
the license renewal application process, the existing fatigue analyses of the RCS components
remain valid for the extended period of operation (See NRC Safety Evaluation Report NUREG 1728 Section 4.3). Constellation however indicated that, prior to the expiration of the current
operating license, a Fatigue Monitoring Program will be implemented as a confirmatory program
as discussed in Section B.3.2 of their original license renewal application.
The licensee proposed using the Fatigue Monitoring Program to provide assurance that the
number of design cycles will not be exceeded during the period of extended operation. It was
on this basis that the staff found licensee's Fatigue Monitoring Program provided an acceptable
basis for monitoring the fatigue usage of reactor coolant system components, in accordance
with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii).
Subsequent to the application, the NRC staff became aware of a simplified assumption used in
the EPRI program for fatigue monitoring called FatiguePro. The inspector reviewed the current
status of the fatigue monitoring program for the licensee. The inspector also determined if the
computational shortcut was present in the program and what response the licensee was
planning to the NRC's concern that the simplified assumption might result in a non-conservative
prognosis of fatigue. The inspector interviewed the responsible engineer staff and reviewed the
results of the fatigue program in place at the facility. The inspector reviewed the procedures
and computational methodology to determine the status of current fatigue limits on reactor
coolant system components.
b. Observations
None.
4. Commitment Management Program
a. Scope of Inspection
The inspectors evaluated Exelon procedures used to manage and revise regulatory
commitments to determine whether they were consistent with the requirements of 10
CFR 50.59, NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, "Managing Regulatory
Commitments," and the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-04, "Guidelines
for Managing NRC Commitment Changes." In addition, the inspectors reviewed the
procedures to assess whether adequate administrative controls were in-place to ensure
commitment revisions or the elimination of commitments altogether would be properly
evaluated, approved, and annually reported to the NRC. The inspectors also reviewed
AmerGen's current licensing basis commitment tracking program to evaluate its
effectiveness. In addition, the following commitment change evaluation packages were
reviewed:
" Commitment Change 08-003, OC Bolting Integrity Program
- Commitment Change 08-004, RPV Axial Weld Examination Relief
b. Observations
xxx describe factual detail of changes and explain basis to NOT notify NRC staff
None.
40A6 Meetin-gs, Includinq Exit Meeting
Exit Meeting Summary
xxx ADD ADAMS # for Exit Notes
The inspectors presented the results of this inspection to Mr. T. Rausch, Site Vice
President, Mr. M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal, and other members of
AmerGen's staff on December 23, 2008. NRC Exit Notes from the exit meeting are
located in ADAMS within package MLxxxx.
No proprietary information is present in this inspection report.
A-1
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
C. Albert, Site License Renewal
J. Cavallo, Corrosion Control Consultants & labs, Inc.
M. Gallagher, Vice President License Renewal
C. Hawkins, NDE Level III Technician
J. Hufnagel, Exelon License Renewal
J. Kandasamy, Manager Regulatory Affairs
S. Kim, Structural Engineer
R. McGee, Site License Renewal
F. Polaski, Exelon License Renewal
R. Pruthi, Electrical Design Engineer
S. Schwartz, System Engineer
P. Tamburro, Site License Renewal Lead
C. Taylor, Regulatory Affairs
NRC Personnel
S. Pindale, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
J. Kulp, Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
L. Regner, License Renewal Project Manager, NRR
D. Pelton, Chief - License Renewal Projects Branch 1
M. Baty, Counsel for NRC Staff
J. Davis, Senior Materials Engineer, NRR
Observers
R. Pinney, State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
R. Zak, State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
M. Fallin, Constellation License Renewal Manager
R. Leski, Nine Mile Point License Renewal Manager
A-2
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened/Closed
None.
Opened
Closed
None.
E
A-3
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
License Renewal Program Documents
PP-09, Inspection Sample Basis for the One-Time Inspection AMP, Rev 0
Drawings
Plant Procedures
LS-AA-104-1002, 50.59 Applicability Review, Rev 3
LS-AA- 110, Commitment Change management, Rev 6
645.6.017, Fire Barrier Penetration Surveillance, Rev 13
Condition Reports (CRs)
- = CRs written as a result of the NRC inspection
00804754
Maintenance Requests & Work Orders
C20117279
Nondestructive Examination Records
NDE Data Report 2008-007-017
NDE Data Report 2008-007-030
NDE Data Report 2008-007-031
UT Data Sheet 21 R056
Miscellaneous Documents
NRC Documents
Industry Documents
- = documents referenced within NUREG-1801 as providing acceptable guidance for specific
aging management programs
4,
A
A-4
A-5
LIST OF ACRONYMS
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
NDE Non-destructive Examination
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
SSC Systems, Structures, and Components
SDP Significance Determination Process
TR Technical Report