ML17332A780

Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Relocation of Tables of Instrument Response Time Limits to UFSAR

ML17332A780
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/26/1995
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17332A781	List: ML17332A780 ML17334B546
References
NUDOCS 9506060454
Download: ML17332A780 (77)

Text

ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:1210 EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES MARKED TO REFLECT PROPOSED CHANGES 9506060454 950526 PDR ADOCK 050003'i5 P PDR

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3 4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

~34. 3. I RRACZOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMiTINQ CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE~"~="-9~

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:.

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILZANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at le~st once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1. W JPCP S JC S4 ~+

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I < ~' I I, 3 ) Iic I COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NO. )gg,ggg. 3144

TABLE 3.3 2 4a SMWI ~ S RESPONSE TIME /

l. Manual eactor Trip i.~.( NOT APPLICAB~

g

2. Power Range, Neutron Flux Less th or equal to (High and Low Secpoint) 0,5 seconds+

3. Power Range, ,eucron Flux, . NOT APPLICABLE Hi.gh,Positive Rate

4. Power'ange, Neutron Flux, ss than or equal co High Negative Rate 0,5 seconds+

5. Incermediate Range, eutron Flux NOT APPLICABLE

6. Source Range, Neutzon Flux NOT APPLICABLE

7. Qvertemperatuze delta T Less chan or equal to 6.0 seconds*

8. Ovezpovez delta T Less than or equal to 6.0 seconds+

9. Pressurizer Pressure--Lov Less than or equal co

l. 0 .seconds lO.Pressurizer Pressure--High Less than or equal to 1.0 seconds 11.Pressurizer Mater Level--High Less than or equal to 2.0 seconds

• euczon dececcors are exempt fzom response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal porcion of che channel shall be measured from dececcor oucput or inpuc of first elecczonic componenc in channel.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3P 3-10 eummrr No. 98, XZH, X~

158

TABLE 3.3-2 Continued P~GR 'Rep~gTKH-HF~%W~Y;RC /

g.

r S)e. RESPONSE TIME of low - Single Loop 12.Loss (Above P- ~ ( gJ Less than or equal to 1.0 seconds 13.Loss of Flow - Two Loops ess than or equal to (Above P-7 and . low.;P-8) 1,0 seconds 14.Steam Generator Wat r Level--Low-Low Less than or equal to 1.5 seconds 15.Steam/Feedwater Flow Mi match and Low St am NOT APPLICABLE Generator Water Level 16.Undervoltage-Reactor Coolan Pumps Less than or equal to 1.2 seconds 17.l:nderfrequency-Reactor Co'olant ps Less than or equal to 0' seconds 18.Turbine Trip P

A. Low Fluid Oil Pres re NOT APPLICABLE B. Turbine Stop Valv NOT APPLICABLE

19. Safety Inj ection nput from ESF NOT APPLICABLE 20.Reactor Coola e Pump Breaker Position Trip NOT APPLICABLE COOK NUCLEAR PIANT -'UNIT 1 3/4 3-11 NO.. XkS,. 158

'MENDMENT

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INSTRUMENTATION 3 4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown jn the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4;end-with-RZSPQNS~

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APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTEON:

ah With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint les's conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Tabl'e 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable. ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint ad]usted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

"SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test. The total interlock function shalL be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once,per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operatiod.

4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that bath logic trains are tested at 'least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" Column'f Table 3 '~3

'OOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 3-15 AMENDMENT NO. igg, iP.i, iN, ~53

TABLE 3.3 5 IN IATING SIGNAL AND

1. Nannal a.

FUNCTION Eaty Xn)ccthon e

(ECCS)

(,w) z ca. I ~ ~ f RESPONSE TIME Not IN hpplicabl ~

r SECONDS Fe ater Isolation Not hppli'cable Reac or Trip (SI) Not hpplicable Conta ent Isolation-Phase h".. Not Applicable Contai ent Purge and Exhaust Isolation Not hpplicable huxi lie Feedvater Pumps Not hpplicable Essential rvice Vater System Not Applicable f

b. Containment S ay Not hpplicable Containment Iso tion-Phase "B" Not hpplicable Containment Purge and Exhause. Isolation Not hpplicable Containmcnt hir Re rculation Fan Not Applicable

c. Containmcnt Isolation-Pase "hg Not hpplicable Containment Purge and aust~Isolation Not Applicable

d. Steam Line Isolation Not hpplicable

2. Containment PressureoHi

a. Safety Injection ( CCS) Less than or equal to

27. OQQ/27. 0++

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) Less than or equal to 3.0 Ca Feedvater Iso aeion Less chan or equal to 8.0

d. Containment solation-Phase "A" Less than or equal to 18.0g/28.00

'e. Contai nt Purge and Exhaust Isolation ot Applicable

'Auxili ry Feedvaeer Pumps No hpplicable g Esse ial Service Vater System Les than or equal to 13.0 48.00 a

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...:,':;J;,,-agji

- UNIT 1 '

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT 3/4 3-27 AMENDMENT. i'll.-':;.'>,~,8i

~ 1 c'(1 A thgi@

l TAELE 3.3 5 Continue

~RIRH. ~~ASS~

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ZN ZATZNC SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TINE

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3. P&ssurizer Pressure-Law $ (LIAR

a. afety Injection (ECCS) Loss than or equal to 27.086/27.'0++

b. Rea tor Trip (fram SZ) Less than or equal to 3.0 Co Feed ater Zsolation Less than or equal ta'8.0 dO Contai ent Isolation-Phase "A" Less/than or equal to 18.0f B~ Containm nt Purge and Exhaust Isolation Not' ppl icabl e Auxiliary eedwater Pumps Not Applicable go Essential S rvice Water System ,Less mohan ar equal to 48 0 /13 Of

4. Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-H h

a. Safety Injection (E CS) Less than or equal to 27.088/37.08

b. Reactor Trip (from SZ) Less than or equal to 3.0 C ~ Feedwater Isolation Less than or equal to 8.0

d. Containment Isolation-Pha Less than ar equal to 18.0f/28.0ff e ~ Containment Purge and ExPaus Isolation Not Applicable Auxiliary Feedwater Pus)ps Not Applicable go Essential Service Wats'r System Less than ar equal to 13.0f/48.0ff

5. Steam Flaw in Two Steam Lines - Hi h Coin ident with Tav Low-Law

a. S afety j Zn ec ion (ECCS ) Less than or equal to 9.0I39/39.08

b. Reactor+rip (fram SZ) L s than ar equal to 5.0 C ~ FeedwaPer Isolation Les than or equal ta 10.0

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Less han or equal ta 20.0f/ 0.0ff

e. Cpntainment Purge ar 'xhaust Isolation Not App ica.'-.'~.

Cuxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable go Essential Service Water System Less than o equal ta 15-Of/50.0ff Steam I,ine Isolation Less than or e al to 13.0 COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 3 28 AHENDHENT NO.29, X/7, 158

TA3LI'.3 5 Continued

~04K~ ~~. RY~~M~

~fig O'I ~ I g.->p"~ .- Il INIT TINC SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TXYZ IN SECONDS

6. Ste Flay fn Tvo Steam Lines.Hf h Caine dent Vfth Steam Lfne Pressure-Lov Sa ty In)ection (ECCS) Lass than or equal to 27.~7.%

b. Reacto Tzip (fzom SI) Less or equal ta 3.0

c. Feedvat ( Isolation Les chan or equal to 8.0

d. Contafnme c Isolation-Phase h Leis than or equal ca 18.&e/28.0~

e. Containment urge and Exhaust Isolatfan Not hpplicable

f. Auxiliary Fee ater Pumps Not Applicable

~ ~

Essential Servi e Mater System Lass than or equal co 14.0e/48.0~

h. Sceam Line Isolation Less than or equal co 11.0

7. Cancairaenc Pres'sure--Hfzh-Hfah

a. Concafr~enc Spray Less chan or equal to 45.0

b. Contafraenc. Isolation'-Phas "B" Nac hpplfcable

c. Steam Line Isolation Less than ar equal to 10.0

d. Contafnmenc Afz Recirculation an Less than ar equal to 600 .0

8. Steam Ceneracor "acer Le el.--Hfsh-Hitch

a. Turbine Trip Less than or equal ta 2.5

b. Feedvater Isolation Less than or equal co 11.0

9. 5=earn Ceneratori ate. Level--Lav-Lav

a. ~otor Driven huxili,ary Feedvacer Pu"ps Less than or equal to 60.0

b. Turbjite Driven Auxflfa~"Feedvacer P"~s Les than or equal ca 50.0

10. 4160 volt Emergency Bus Lass of VoLtase

a. y4oter Driver Atxt.jerry peetvater rt"ps Less than or equal co 60.0 11, Lass af Ma'n Feedvacer Pumps

a. Motor Driven huxilfary Feedvacer Pumps than or equal to 60.0

12. Reactor Coolant Pump Bus Undervalta e

a. Turbine Driven huxflfary Feedvarer Pumps Less than or equal co 60 o COOK NUC~~ PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 3-29 AMEND~ NO. gV, S2~. Xl~

168

T~Up 3. 3-5 Continued 4 <

ThBLE OTATXOH

+ Diese generator starting and sequence loading delays not included.

Offsite over avaQable, Response time limit includes opening, of valves to establ sh SZ path and attainment of discharge pressuz'e for centzifuga chazging pumps.

Di~~~l genezat r starting and sequence loading delays included.

Response time 1 it includea opening of valves to establish SZ path and attainment of dis azge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps.'+

Diesel generator sta ing and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes op ing of valves to establish SZ path and attainment of'ischarge pzessuze fo centrifugal chazging, SZ. and RHR pumps Sequential transfer of ch rging pump 'suction from the VCT to the RVST

{Rggy valves open, then VCT valves tlos ~ ) gi NOT lntlndad.

hiatal generator starting and gnente~loading delays lnelndad. Response time limit includes opening of v lvey'to establish SZ path and attainment of discharge pressure foz centzifu al charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the V to the RUST (RVST valves'open, then VCT valves close) is included.

QQ Diesel generator starting an sequence 1 ading delays NOT included.

Offsite pover available. sponse time 1 it includes opening of valves to establish SZ path and ttainmcnt of disch rge pressure foz centzifugal charging pumps. Sequen al tzansfez of chazg g pump suction from the VCT to the RVST (RVST valves open, then VCT valves lose) is included.

COOK NUC~~ PLhNT - UHET 1 3/4 3-30 hMEHDMEFf NO. g7, 158

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~ st vygrvT+At>>a~i~'g>> >~2 '>>vk 'aad&pdg dt eaiA~v

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de a a e a d nde e ue v e ta Cao bus trips The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump provide reactor core pxotcction against DHB as a result af loss of voltage reactor coolant Xhc specified se-or underfrequcncy to more than one pump.

points assure' reactor txip signal i gen'crated bcforc the la@ floM trip set point is reached. h time delay is incorporated in etch of.

these trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical powez transients.

ub e A Tuxbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip shen apezaling above P-?.

Each of the turbine tzips provide turbine protection and reduce the severity of the ensuing transient. No czedit Mas taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips. Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is requix'ed to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactox Protection System.

Safet In ection In t fram ESF If a reactor trip has not already been generated by the reactor protective instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels vill initiate a reactor tzip upon any signal which initiates a safety injection. This tzip is pravided to protect the core in the event of a fAXA. Thc ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a safety injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.

Reactor Coalant ~ Breaker Position Tri The Reactor Coolant.Pump Breaker Position Trip is an anticipatory trip which provides reactor core protection against DNB resulting from the apening of t~o or more pump breakers above P-7. This trip is blocked below P-7 The open/close position trip assures a reactor trip signal is generated before the lov fla~ trip setpoint is reached. Na credit vas taken in the accident analyses for operation af this .txip. The functional capability at the open/close pasition settings is required to enhance the overall reliability af the Reactor Protection System.

D.'C. COOK - UNIT 1 B 2-7 AtlFHDREHT HO. QP,140

3 4.3 INS hTION BASES e

4.3.1 and 3 4,3.2 PROTECTIVE hND ENGINEERED ShFETY YEhTURES ESP INSTRUMENThTION The OPERhBILITY of the protective and ESP instrumentation systems and interlocks ensuze that I:) the associated ESP action and/or reactor trip vill be inieiated vhen the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its aetpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient zedundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service foz testing oz maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available foz protective and ESP purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERhBILITY of these systems is zequized to provide the overall reliabilitye redundancy a'nd diversity assumed available in the facility design ior the proecction and mitigation of acct.dent and transient conditions, The integrated operation of each of these systems is const.stene vith the assumptions used in ehe accident analyses.

The surveilLancc requirements specifi.ed for these systems ensure that ehe overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies aze sufficiene to demonstrate this capability.

The measuremcnt of res'ponae time at the spetcified frequencies provi.des assurance that thc protective and ESP action function associated vt.th each channel is completed.vithtn ehe time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, over-lapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor zesponse time verification may be demonstrated by ei.ther 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements oz 2) utilizing replacement sensors vith certified response times.

45k ration oi ne RVST and VCT valves (Notes g and ) are based on values.~

assume ehe non-LOCh safety analyses. These analyses take credit for injection of cd vatez from the RWST. Injection of~oraced vater is assumed not.to'ccur 1 the VCT charging p~mo~uctWon vaLves are closed folloving opening of ehe RWS~ha ing um~uceion valves. %hen sequential operation of the RVST and VCT va oe included in the response times (Note'+), the values spa Pie are based'n h~LOCh analyses. The LOCh analyses take cre or injection flov regardless of-tbe source.

Vcrificat the response times 'specified in Table 3.3-3 vill assure that th unption used for VCT and REST valves are valid.

COOX NUCLEhR PLhNT - UNIT 1. B 3/4 3-1

l 343 S E 4 3 EACTOR TRIP SYSTEM I STRVMENT T 0 G CO I ON 0 0 0 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels h+Yt& ~

CABIL: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

hCXXQE:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

LANCE E EM S 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the GEMMA. CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

~ 4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated 'to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels"

'olumn of Table 3.3-1.$ P c'~

f The prov'isions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 AM')MENT NO. M, M, 434, 158

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TABLE 3.3-2 RRAUi~CL Qtl.J~B ZD J 4 FUNCTIONAL UNIT Reactor Trip (Q,A(j RESPONSE TIME NOT APPLICABLE

1. Man 1 G

2. Power nge, Neutron Flux Less than or equal to 0.5 (High an Low Setpoint) seconds*

3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, NOT APPLICABLE High Positive te

4. Power Range, Neu ron Flux Less tha or equal to 0.5 High Negative Rate seconds+

5. Intermediate Range, N tron Flux NO APPLICABLE

6. Source Range, Neutron Fl OT APPLICABLE

7. Overtemperature Delta T Less than or equal to 6.0 seconds*

8. Overpower Delta T Less than or equal to 6 0 seconds*

9'. Pressurizer Pressure--Low .Less than or equal to 2.0 seconds

10. Pressurizer Pressure-- gh Less than or equal to 2.0 seconds

11. Pressurizer Wate Level--High Les than or equal to 2.0 seconds

• Neutron'de'ctors are exempt from response time testing. esponse time of the neutr flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from de'ecto output or input of first electronic component in channel.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-9 AM1M)MENT NO.yg, gZg, /gal 142 h ~

l N

'k t

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i, ThBLE 3. 3-2 Continued

~c; CTZONhL UNZ

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'ESPONSE TnZ

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< j 12 ~ Los of Flov ~ S in'] ~ Loop Less than or equal to 1.0 (hbo P-8) seconds 13.Loss of ov - Tvo Loops Less than or e ual to 1.0 (hbove P- and belov P-8) seconds 14.Steam Cenerato Vater Level--Lov-Lov Less than or equal to 2.0 seconds 1S.Steam/Feedvater Flo mismatch and Lov Steaa Generator Mater Level 16.Undervoltage-Reactor Coo ant Pumps Less than or equal to 1.S seconds 17.Underfrequency-Reactor Coolant Less than or equal to 0.6 seconds 18.Turbine .Trfp

h. Lov Fluid Oil Pressure NOT hPPLIChBLE B. Turbine Stop Valve NOT hPPLIChBLE 19.Safety Infection In t from ESF hPPLIChBLE 20.Reacto&Coo1.ant Breaker Position Trip NOT PLIChBLE...

COOK NUCLEhR PlhNT. - UNIT 2 3/4 3-10 ~mar N0.134

I 1,g 0 S 0 GCO I 0 0 0 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Sa="ety Feature Actuatioa System (ESFAS) ias~eata-tion channeLs and intarloc3cs shown jn Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent vith the values showa in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4-am~~

RUJBSuat As showa in Table 3.3-3.

h<GZ With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoiat less conserva-tive than the value showa in the Allovable VaLues column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable aad apply the applicable ACTION recpxfremeat of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status vith the trip setpoiat adjusted consistent vith the Trip Setpoint value.

Pith an ESFAS instrumeatatioa channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS iastrumeatatioa chaaael shall be demons~ted OPERABLE by the performance of the CHAHNEL CHECK, CHAHHEL CALIBRATION, CHAHHZZ FUNCTIONAL TEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES aad, at the frequencies showa in Table 4.3-2.j 4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuatioa logic test. The total interlock function shaLl be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months duriag QDLNHEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.j 4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAKZY FUTURES RESPONSE TIME of.each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be vithin the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both 1'ogic trains are tested at least once per 36 months aad one channel per function such that all channeLs are tested at least once per N times

-

18 months where N is the total number of redundant chaaaels in a specific ESFAS function as showa in the Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3-3-3 j j The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 AK2G)MENT HO. M, W, M4, 159

~,

I TABLE 3.3-5

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)g INI IATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIKE IN SECONDS

1. Man 1 S ety Injection (ECCS) Not Applicable Fee ater Isolation Not hpyXicable Reac r Trip (SI) 'h" Not Applicable Contai ent Isolation-Phase No Applicable Containm t Purge and Exhaust Isolation N~t Applicable Auxiliary eedwater Pumps . Rot Applicable Essential Se ice Vater System Not Applicable

b. Containment Spr Not Applicable Containment Isola ion-Phase B" Not Applicable Containment Purge d Exhaust Iso ation Not Applicable Containment Air Recir ulation F n Not Applicable P

c ~ Containment Isolation-Ph se A" Not Applicable Containment Purge and Exh t Isolation Not Applicable

d. Steam Line Isolation Not Applicable 0)

2. Containment Pressure-Hi

a. Safety In]ection (ECCS) Less than or equal to

27. OQQ/27. 0++

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) Less chan or equal to 3.0 Feedvate Isolation Less than or equal to 8.0 Contai ent Isolation-Phase "A" ot Applicable

e. Cont nment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Not Applicable

f. h Sary Feedvater Pumps Not Applicable

g. E sential Sexvice Vater System Not h'icable P

~ j

)'=

~

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-26 ~HENT NO. PN, ZV:-'42

TABLE 3.3-5 Continued

~CTN INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION . RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS 3, Pr ssurizer Pressure-Lov j /ma (p HJ

a. afety Injection (ECCS) Less than or equal to 27.088/27.0++

b. Rea tor Trip (from SI) Less than or equal to 3.0 c ~ Feed ater Isolation Less than or equal to 8.0

d. 0onta tnt Isolation - Phasa "0" Lass than or dtnsl to 18.0a

e. Contai ent Purge and Exhaust Zsolatio Not hppli.cable

f. Motor Driv n Auxiliary Feedvater Pumps Less t an or ~qual to 60.0

g. Essential Se ice Vater System Less han or equal to

48. ++/13.0¹

4. Differenti.al Pressure Betveen Steam Line -Hih

a. Saf ety In5 ection (EC S) Less than or equal to 27.0QQ/37.0Q

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) Less than or equal to 3.0

c. Feedvater Isolation Less than or equal to 8.0

d. Containment Isolation - Ph e "A" Less than or equal to 18.0¹/28.0¹¹ Containment Purge and E aust Isolation Not Applicable Motor Driven Auxi.lie Feedvate Pumps Less than or equal to 60.0 g ~ Essential Service ater System Less than or equal to 3.0¹/48.0¹¹

5. Steam Flov'n Tv Steam Lines - Hi h Coincident vith Tav <<-Lov v

a. Safety 5ection (ECCS) Not Applicable

b. React Trip (from SZ) .";."Not cable Cs d.

Fee Co ater I<<1~'. '.on tainment Isolation-Phase "h".

'ot hpplApplicable Not Applicable ntainment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Not Applicable Auxiliary Feedvater Pumps Not Applicable Essential Service Vater System Not Applicable Steam Line Isolation Less than or equal to 13 0 ~

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-27 AMENDMENT NO. gg, XPS. XS$

'142

'E ~

TABLE 3.3-5 Continued

.~NSI~W~Z~M-~5-FBc~hBS-P ~

SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

~ Q4 w RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

6. team Line Pressure--Low

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) Less than or equal to 27.0QQ/37.0Q

b. actor Trip (from SI) Less than or equal to 3.0

c. dwater Isolation Less than or equal~to 8.0 d.

Fe Con inment Isolation-Phase "A" Le'ss i

than or equal to 18.0¹/28.0¹¹

e. Contai gent Purge and Exhaust g.

Isolatioq f...Motor Dri Pumps Essential Se n Auxiliary Feedwater ice Mater System r

Not Applicable Less than or equal to 60 0 Less j:han or equal to

14. 4/48.0¹¹

h. Ste'am Line Isol tion Le s than or equal to 11.0

7. Containment Pressure--H h-Hi h

a. Containment Spray Less than or equal to 45.0

b. Containment Isolation- ase "B" Not Applicable C. Steam Line Isolation Less than or equal to 10.0

d. Containment Air Recirculat n Fan Less than or equal to 600.0

8. Steam Generator Mater Level- i h- i h

a. Turbine Trip Less than or equal to 2.5

b. Feedwater Isolatio Less than or equal to 11.0

9. Steam Generator Wate Level--Low-Low a ~ Motor Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Less than or equal to 60.0

b. Turbine riven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Less th n or equal to 60.0

10. 4160 vo Emer enc Bus Lc, c I Volta e

a. otor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Less than or e 1 to 60.0

11. oss of Main Feedwater Pum s

a. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Less than or equal to 0.0

12. Reactor Coolant Pum Bus Undervolta e

a. Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Less than or equal to 60.0 134 '.""-~

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 3/4 3-28 2 AMENDMENT NO. gg, F7, PAP.=.':

142

I 0

l TABLE NOTATION

¹ D TABLE 3.3-5 Continued esel genezator stazting and sequence loading delays not inc ded.

Of&ite povez available. Response time limit includes openi g of valve to establish SI path ahd attainment of discharge pr sure for ce rifugal charging pumps.

¹¹ Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays ncluded.

Response- tim limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainnent of disoharge pressers for eentrifngal oharging pumps.

++ Diesel generator starting and sequence loadin delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to espablish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure d'or centzifugal charging, SI, and RHR pumps.

Sequential transfer of charging pump sue+ion from the VCT to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is HOT included.

Q Diesel generator'tarting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of hives to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction fzom the V0. to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.

QQ Diesel generator startin and sequence loading delays NOT included.

Offsite po~er available.</ Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and,attainment of discharge.,pressure for centzifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-29 ANENDHEHT NO. 142

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LIHITINC ShFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS ShSES Undervolta e and Underfre uenc Reactor Coolant Susses ..

The Undervoltage and Undezfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump bus trips provide x'eactox'ore protection against DNB as a result of loss of voltage or r'. <::Z underfrequency to more than one reactor coolant pump. The specified set points assure a reactor trip signal is generated'before the lov floe trip set point is reached. Time delays are incoxpox'ated in the undex'fxequency and undervoltage tx'ips to pzevent spuxious reactor trips from momentary electrical pover transients. oL t e xeq e a, gn each the react g trip breakers loving the

'

imultaneous tr of evo or circuit ' -".g more eactor coolangpump bus reakers all nero.nosed 2 seconds F.or d rafa qauanoygth edalay fs sac so rhac .

the+time required f a signal to re%eh the reictor trip bxeakers tx'ip set point is reached shall not exceed 0.3 seconds'. The afteqthe'ndezErequency tot'al response times for>these functional'niti include an additional 0.3 ~

ncLs-for-trip-breaker-operation-and-CRDM-'releas .

h Turbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip vhen operating above P-7.

Each of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduce the sbverity of the ensuing- transient. No czedit vas taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips. Theix functional cipability at the specified is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor txip'~ttings Pzotection System.

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COOK NUCLEhR PLANT - UNIT 2 . 527 ~MENT NO gSF t34 '-'j""s.

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4 3 4. 3 XRSTRR62lTATION BASES 3 4. 3. 1 and 3 4. 3. 2 PROTECTIVE AND BfCIHEERED SA~c,s. FEATURES ESF INS TRUHEVI'ATIOH The OPERABILITY of che protective and ESF instrumentation systems and fntarl,ocks ensuza thac L) rhe associated ESF action and/or reactor trip vill.

be iniriared vhen che paramecer monicored by each channel or'ombinac'on thereof exceeds its secpoinr, 2) rhe specified coincidence logf.c is maintained, 3).,sufficient redundancy is maincained to permi.t a channaL to be ouc of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system funcrianaL capabilicy is available for protecrive and ESF proposes from diverse pazamecers.

The OP~VILITY of these system is required to pzovide che overall, reliability, redundance and diversicy assumed available in the facility design for rhe protect'on and mitigacion of accident and czansianc conditions. The incegraced operacion of each of chase syscem f.s cansistanc virh rhe assu pcians used f.n rhe accident analyses.

Protection has been provided f'r main feedvarar system malfunctions in NODES 3 and 4. Th's proteccion is required vhen main faedpumps are aligned co feed steam generators f.n NODES 3 and 4. The avaiLability of feedvatez isol.acian on high-high steam generator level terminates the addition of'old varer ca the steam generacors in any main feedvarer system malfunction. The coral. volume thar can be added ro the steam generators by the main feedvarer system in NODES 3 and 4 is limited by this safaguards actuacion ind the fac" rhac feedvacer isolation on l.ov T ave secpoinc coincident vith reactor trip can only be cleared above rhe Lov-l5v steam gene aror level trip setpoinc.

The restrict'ons associacad vich bypassing ESF tzip functions belov e'cher P-ll or P-12 provide proreccion against an increase in scaam flov transient and are consistent vich assumptions made in che safety analysis.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensuza thar the overall system functional. capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periadic surveillance cases pezfozmed ac che minimum frequencies aza sufficient to demonstzate this capabil.ity.

inhered-as-no The measurement of response cime at the speci. fied fzequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associaced virh each channel is completed vithin cha time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

Response tfme may be demonscracad by any series of sequential, ov<<lapping or rocal channel tesc measuremencs provided chat such cesti demonstrate che tacaL channeL response rime as defined. Sensor zespanse rime verification may be demonsrraced by either 1) in place, onsf.te or test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors vith certified response times.

COOK NUCLEAR PL<VT . UNIT 2 B 3)4 3-1 Amendmenr Ho.82,1 l9

'S S

INSTRUMENTATION Continued BASES x'esponse times specific'd in Table 3.3-5 vhich include sequenj:ia peration o h RWST and VCT valves (Notes Q and QQ) are base on values ssumed in the non- safety analyses, These analyses e credit for njection of borated vate from the RWST. InjeceiozCof borated vater is ssumed not to occur until the VC charging-primp suction valves are closed.

xollowing opening of the RWST char~ ump suction valves. When sequeneial peration of the RWST and VCT alves is not Excluded in the x'esponse times Note ++), the value~s e fied are based on the Lb~nalyses. The LOCA nalyses take cmc&e for injection flow regardless of th~eource.

erificat ~of the response times specified in Table 3.3-5 vitlassure that he umption used for VCT and RWST valves are valid.

3 4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION I

3 4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Noble gas effluent monitox's provide informaeion, during and following it'p an accidene, which is considered helpful to the operator in assessing the plant condition. Ie is desired that these monitors be OPERABLE at all times during plant operation, but they are not required for safe shutdown of the Jf'9 plant.

In addition, a minimum of two in containment radiation-level monitors with a maximum range of 107 R/hr for photon only should be OPERABLE at all times except for cold shutdown and refueling outages. In case of failure of the monitor, appropriate actions should be taken to restore its operational capability as soon as possible.

Table 3.3-6 is based on the following Alarm/Trip Setpoints and Measurement Ranges for each instrument listed. For the unit vent noble gas monitors, it should be noted that there is an automatic switchover from the lov/mid-range channels to the high-range channel when the upper limies of the low- and mid-range channel measurement ranges are reached. In this case there is no flov to the low- and rP mid-range channels from the unit vent sample line. This is considered to represene proper operation of this monitox'. '~>>

Therefore, if automatic switchover to the high-range should occur, and and mid-range detectors are capable of functioning vhen flov is the'ov-

,>>>>a

~ i re-established, the lov- and mid-range channels should not be declared inoperable and the ACTION statement in the Technical Specification does not apply. This is also true while purging the lov- and mid-range chambers folloving a large activity excursion prior to resumpeion of lov-level monitoring and establishmene of a nev background.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-la AMENDMENT NO. HP.

S ATTACHMENT 3 TO AEP:NRC:1210 PROPOSED REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

r 3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

""As shown'n Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.

COOK NUCLEAR PLAi~-UNIT. 1 Page 3/4 3-1 AiWIENDMENT400) 434, 4-W

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3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-2 Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page 3/4 3-10 AMEiVDiHENTQO, ~, kA, 4M

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3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-2 Continued

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Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page 3/4 3-11 AMENDMENT44S, 488

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3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.34.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION,CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page 3/4 3-15 AAIENDMENT400, 434, 444, 48$

3/4 LIMrI'INGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page 3/4 3-27 AMENDME.iT 48k, 4N

3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK iNUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page 3/4 3-28 AMENDMENTA, ~, 488

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3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page 3/4 3-30 AillENDMENT%, 4$ S

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BASES 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMH'INGSAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS LIMITINGSAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES Undervolta e and Underfre uenc - Reactor Coolant Pum Busses The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump bus trips provide reactor core protection against DNB as a result of loss of voltage or underfrequency to more than one reactor coolant pump. The specified set points assure a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip set point is reached. A time delay is incorporated in each of these trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients.

~Turbine Tri A Turbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip when operating above P-7. Each of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduce the severity of the ensuing transient. No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips. Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

Safe In'ection In ut from ESF If a reactor trip has not already been generated by the reactor protective instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal which initiates a safety injection. This trip is provided to protect the core, in the event of a LOCA. The ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a safety injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.

Reactor Coolant Pum Breaker Position Tri The Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip is an anticipatory trip which provides reactor core protection against DNB resulting from the opening of two or more pump breakers above P-7. This trip is blocked below P-7.

The open/close position trip assures a reactor trip signal is generated before the low flow trip setpoint is reached.

No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of this trip. The functional capability at the open/close position settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT I Page B 2-7

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3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES S INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and interlocks ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITYof these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either I) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT 1 Page B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT94, W4, 44S

3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor trip system instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once evety N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the Total

",

No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT&, %, ~, 488

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TABLE 3.3-2

~ "Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 3-9 Ai>IENDMENT$ Q, 4A, 434, 44k

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3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2.1 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.34.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.34, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION,CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST and TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the interlocks shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the automatic actuation logic test. The total interlock function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by interlock operation.

4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 3-14 AMEibDWIENT78, %, 434, ~, 4$ 4' S,

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3/4 I IMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 3-27 AMENDMENT4$ , 40S, 43$ , ~

3/4 LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 Continued Table Intentionally Deleted COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page 3/4 3-2S AMENDMENT34, 4Ã, 434, 43$ , ~

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BASES 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITINGSAFETY SYSTEM SEITINGS 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Continued)

Undervolta e and Underfre uenc - Reactor Coolant Pum Busses The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump bus trips provide reactor core protection against DNB as a result of loss of voltage or underfrequency to more than one reactor coolant pump. The specified set points assure a reactor trip signal is generated before the low fiow trip set point is reached. Time delays are incorporated in the underfrequency and undervoltage trips to prevent spurious reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients.

T~urbine Tri A Turbine Trip causes a direct reactor trip when operating above P-7. Each of the turbine trips provide turbine protection and reduce the severity of the ensuing transient. No credit was taken in the accident analyses for operation of these trips. Their functional capability at the specified trip settings is required to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Protection System.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page B 2-7 AMENDMENT8R, 434

3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ES INSTRUMENTATION

'he OPERABILITYof the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and interlocks ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITYof these system is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these system is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

Protection has been provided for main feedwater system malfunctions in MODES 3 and 4. This protection is required when main feedpumps are aligned to feed steam generators in MODES 3 and 4. The availability of feedwater isolation on high-high steam generator level terminates the addition of cold water to the steam generators in any main feedwater system malfunction. The total volume that can be added to the steam generators by the main feedwater system in MODES 3 and 4 is limited by this safeguards actuation and the fact that feedwater isolation on low Tavg setpoint coincident with reactor trip can only be cleared above the low-low steam generator level trip setpoint.

The restrictions associated with bypassing ESF trip functions below either P-11 or P-12 provide protection against an increase in steam flow transient and are consistent with assumptions made in the safety analysis.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action .

function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page B 3/4 3-1 AVKNDMENTSR, 44'

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3/4 BASES 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATIONMONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Noble gas effluent monitors provide information, during and following an accident, which is considered helpful to the operator in assessing the plant condition. It is desired that these monitors be OPERABLE at all times during plant operation, but they are not required for safe shutdown of the plant.

P In addition, a minimum of two in containment radiation-level monitors with a maximum range of 107 R/hr for" photon only should be OPERABLE at all times except for cold shutdown and refueling outages. In case of failure of the monitor, appropriate actions should be taken to restore its operational capability as soon as possible.

Table 3.3-6 is based on the following Alarm/Trip Setpoints and Measurement Ranges for each instrument listed.

For the unit vent noble gas monitors, it should be noted that there is an automatic switchover from the low/mid-range channels to the high-range channel when the upper limits of the low- and mid-range channel measurement ranges are reached. In this case there is no flow to the low- and mid-range channels from the unit vent sample line.

This is considered to represent proper operation of this monitor. Therefore, if automatic switchover to the high-range should occur, and the low- and mid-range detectors are capable of functioning when flow is re-established, the low- and mid-range channels should not be declared inoperable and the ACTION statement in the Technical Specification does not apply. This is also true while purging the low- and mid-range chambers following a large activity excursion prior to resumption of low-level monitoring and establishment of a new background.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT-UNIT2 Page B 3/4 3-ln AMENDMENT80, 449, ~

l' 0